It was General Shepherd’s plan to have the Twenty Second and Fourth
continue the drive up the mainland of Okinawa until Hedo Misaki was
seized. To destroy the enemy known to be on Motobu, the General
committed the Twenty Ninth Marines, which had been in Corps reserve
during the first four days of the operation. For the time being, the
Fourth Marines was held as a reserve near the base of the peninsula.
Patrolling continued.
Many captured enemy soldiers and civilians had stated that the main
Japanese defensive force was in southern Okinawa but that a force of
about 3000 men, commanded by a Colonel Udo, was somewhere up north,
probably on Motobu. Aerial observation and photo terrain studies
confirmed indications that there was a sizeable enemy force on the
peninsula. On 8 April the Twenty Ninth Marines moved out in three
columns, one along the south coast, one along the north coast and one up
the center toward the town of Itomi. At first progress was rapid and
there were few contacts made; it was noted, however, that all inland
trails were mined or blocked. The coast roads had numerous roadblocks
and tank traps. By 10 April the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, was at
Toguchi and had been hit by enemy artillery fire near Awa. Near Toguchi,
on the Manna road, it had contacted Udo’s force. West of Itomi the First
Battalion was also in contact with what was apparently the same force.
Meanwhile the Second Battalion had captured the enemy midget submarine
base at Unten Ko but had encountered no appreciable resistance.
During the next three days the battalions were in almost constant
contact with Udo’s forces. Ambushes were frequent but the enemy could
not be engaged in any decisive action. It was clear that he was engaged
in guerrilla-type warfare and wanted to harass our troops but was trying
to avoid a meeting engagement. By 13 April the enemy position was
definitely fixed as being in the Mt. Yaetake area; it was known that he
had considerable artillery, mortars, and a few naval guns emplaced in
hidden positions in the wild and rugged mountain mass.
Mt. Yaetake provided Colonel Udo with ideal ground for defensive
positions. Here he had unlimited observation in every direction; it was
impossible to attack him without warning. The rugged character of the
terrain prohibited the use of mechanized support in the reduction of his
positions.
While the Twenty Ninth Marines were fixing the enemy position and
determining its character and strength, General Shepherd saw that he
would need additional troops to destroy Udo’s force. His tactical
decision was to move the Fourth Marines, less the Third Battalion, to
Sakimotobu on the western side of the peninsula and attach to it the
Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth Marines which was near by. Then he ordered
a coordinated attack for 14 April with the Fourth Marines driving into
Yaetake in an easterly direction while the Twenty Ninth Marines, with
two battalions, near Itomi, attacked to the west and southwest. Udo
would be hit from front and rear.
[Illustration: Map 3. 4th Marines Battle for Mt. Yaetake.]
On 14 April the Fourth Marines, commanded by Colonel Alan Shapley with
the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, attached, moved rapidly inland to
seize the first high ground from which to launch the attack on Mt.
Yaetake. The Twenty Ninth Marines found enemy dispositions to its front
in such strength and on such unfavorable ground, that it was virtually
impossible to attack in a southwesterly direction.
Resuming the attack on 15 April the Fourth Marines drove up the
approaches to Mt. Yaetake; fighting was bitter with one battalion
commander killed and several company commanders casualties. The First
Battalion, Fourth Marines, seized a key hill mass southwest of the
Yaetake peak against heavy resistance. Over rugged terrain the Twenty
Ninth Marines continued to advance into the rear of Udo’s position
against intermittent resistance.
[Illustration: Map 4. Battle for Mt. Yaetake.]
Next day, 16 April, the Sixth Marine Division prepared to attack the
enemy from three sides. The First Battalion, Twenty Second Marines,
which had been in immediate reserve near Awa, was ordered to advance to
the north to close the gap between the two attacking regiments. After a
day of extremely hard fighting the Fourth Marines seized Mt. Yaetake and
held it despite an all-out Banzai charge. Meanwhile, the Twenty Ninth
Marines, now under Colonel William J. Whaling, USMC, had swung its front
to the west and north, destroying fixed emplacements and enemy groups as
it moved.
With Udo’s force caught in the jaws of a giant nutcracker, and driven
from the commanding ground in its position, the Fourth Marines changed
its tactics. Colonel Shapley ordered his two left battalions, facing
east, to initiate a holding attack on 17 April, while the two right
battalions drove down from Mt. Yaetake to the north with the mission of
seizing the Manna Road. The situation on this day then, was for the two
battalions to sweep down a corridor formed by the First and Second
Battalions, Twenty Ninth, on the east and the Second Battalion, Fourth
Marines, and Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth, on the west. Down from
Yaetake and through the corridor swept the First and Third Battalions,
Fourth Marines, mopping up enemy remnants as they went. Nightfall saw
both regiments on the first hills south of the Toguchi-Itomi road, the
road that ran through Manna.
On 19 April the Sixth Marine Division began a coordinated drive to
secure the high ground remaining between the Toguchi-Itomi road and the
north coast of the peninsula. On the left was the Fourth Marines; next
to it, the First and Second Battalions, Twenty Ninth Marines. From
Toguchi, the Third Battalion, Twenty Ninth moved by truck to Itomi and
struck out through the hills toward the highest hill mass in the
northern part of Motobu, which was seized next morning. On 20 April, the
drive continued and both regiments reached the north coast without
difficulty. Little opposition had been found in this last sweep, but it
was known that several hundred enemy troops had escaped from Motobu and
were somewhere in northern Okinawa.
The battle for Motobu had challenged the Sixth Division with mountain
warfare of the most rugged sort. It was costly: the Sixth Marine
Division lost 207 men killed, 757 wounded and 6 missing in action. In
contrast, the enemy lost 2,014 men killed. Captured enemy material
included 11 field pieces of 75 and 150-mm. calibre, two six-inch naval
cannon and large numbers of mortars, machine guns and 20-mm. dual
purpose guns.
While the other two regiments were fighting on Motobu, the Twenty Second
Marines, commanded by Colonel Merlin F. Schneider, USMC, continued its
march up the northern part of the mainland. On 13 April the Second
Battalion moved by forced march to seize Hedo Misaki, the northern tip
of the island. Scattered resistance was encountered during the march.
Upon occupying Hedo Misaki, the regiment sent patrols down the east
coast and on 19 April, patrols from the north and south met on the east
coast at Aha. By 20 April all of Okinawa north of the original landing
beaches had been secured by the Sixth Marine Division; it was known,
however, that several small enemy groups still remained at large.
The first of these isolated enemy groups to be located was one
consisting of about 200 men. It was contacted by the First Battalion,
Twenty Second Marines, near Taniyo-take, a hill mass southeast of Motobu
Peninsula. After two days of heavy fighting most of the enemy band was
destroyed although a few escaped to join another remnant of the Motobu
action. By 27 April this group had been located and from Hentona two
battalions of the Twenty Second Marines advanced toward the suspected
area in a forced night march. Meanwhile from Kawada the Third Battalion,
Fourth Marines hurried inland and made contact by noon. After
considerable maneuvering, the battalion outflanked the enemy and forced
him to fight on unfavorable ground. Most of the group was destroyed; a
handful escaped.