WAR WITH THE SABINES. COMMOTIONS AT HOME. LEX MÆNIA. LEX HORTENSIA.

M’. Curius was called upon to chastise the Sabines. These consisted

of several peoples which were very loosely connected with each other:

Amiternum had already leagued itself before with the Samnites, and

had been taken in the third Samnite war. Hitherto, the fear which

the Romans had of the Gauls, had protected the Sabines; but now the

former no doubt required that they should accept the Cærite citizenship

(sympolity): the Sabines refused, and war broke out. As nearly all

their towns were open, the struggle was short and bloodless, and the

conquest easy; the booty also was immense, owing to the length of time

in which they had lived in peace.

This Sabine war led to a great division of land, as the Roman people by

their many and mighty wars had been brought into great distress, like

that which is described by Massillon in his funeral oration on Louis

XIV. All these great victories appear to us brilliant in a political

point of view; the whole period is grand, and we cannot but own in

our hearts, that if we were Romans, we should have liked to live in

those days, and with men like these: but all this splendour was but

a fair outside which covered very grievous misery, and however much

Augustine and his friend Orosius may exaggerate, they were not so far

wrong at bottom. Before the battle of Sentinum, a miracle had taken

place: the statue of the goddess of victory was found lowered from its

pedestal and turned towards the north; from her altar, milk, blood,

and honey were pouring forth. This was a hard task for the soothsayers:

they interpreted it in this way, that the Romans were to go and meet

the enemy; that the blood meant war; that the honey betokened the

plague, inasmuch as it was wont to be given to those who were thus

stricken; that milk was the sign of a bad harvest, as one had then to

do without corn, and to make shift with whatever grew of itself. This

interpretation is so far-fetched, that evidently it cannot be very old;

yet it is a poetical embodying of what really happened. A pestilence

spread far and wide, which may not even have begun in Rome, but in

Umbria or Samnium: it may have been a sickness which had arisen from

the wars; but perhaps it was connected with a deeper source. The age

was on the whole a time of great physical changes; there are still

traces which show that in Italy all nature was then in a state of

convulsion. Earthquakes are felt, and become quite frightful, until

towards the end of the century; the winters are most bitterly cold; an

eruption of the volcano in the island of Ischia takes place. In the

whole of Europe, epidemics must have reigned: according to Pausanias,

a terrible plague was wasting Greece at the time of Antigonus Gonatas,

which completed the work of depopulation there. At Rome, according

to Livy, it raged for the third year already in 460. There certainly

was also a famine in Latium, owing to the devastation of Campania,

the granary of Rome. On this occasion, the Romans were directed

by the Sibylline books to send an embassy to Epidaurus, and bring

Æsculapius to Rome. It consisted of Q. Ogulnius and another. When the

state trireme arrived, and they laid the request before the people of

Epidaurus, the senate of that town referred them to the god himself: at

the incubation, the god promised them that he would follow; a gigantic

serpent came forth from the sanctuary, and remained on the deck. At

the mouth of the Tiber, it crawled out, plunged into the water, and

swam up the Tiber to the island near the city, where the temple of the

god was then built. The embassy is not by any means to be doubted: in

the temple of Æsculapius at Epidaurus, harmless snakes were kept, one

of which had likewise formerly been carried in a waggon to Sicyon. The

ground work of this legend is true, all the rest is added to it; we are

here on quite different ground from what we were on before. The tale is

also remarkable, as it shows how little the Greek ideas were at that

time foreign to the Romans.

In this great distress, there now arose in Rome, on the one hand, a

great burthen of debt, and on the other, the necessity for a better

state of things. The booty from the Sabines, which was gained just

then, was so considerable, that the historian Fabius, in Strabo, says

that the Romans had first known by this victory what riches were.

Besides money, a great part of it must have been land and cattle.

Curius declared, that there was so much land, that it must have lain

waste, if he had not taken so many prisoners.

This is the obscurest period of Roman history, as here the eleventh

book of Livy is wanting. Certain it is, that Curius had a most fierce

quarrel with the senate, no doubt about the division of the public

land. Curius insisted upon a larger assignation being made to the

people,--for so we must call it, and not commonalty any longer,--and

likewise to the _libertini_, inasmuch as they were in the tribes. The

quarrel was now also with the plebeian nobility; and so great was the

exasperation, that a band of eight hundred youths united to defend

the life of Curius, as the knights did that of Cicero. In this state

of things, the triumvirs wanted to give Curius seven times seven

_jugera_, a whole century at that period; but Curius rejected it,

saying that he was a bad citizen, who was not content with his share.

Of Agrippa Menenius, we may believe that he was poor; but hardly of

Valerius Poplicola, as he was able to build himself a splendid house.

As to M’. Curius, his poverty, and the cheerfulness with which he bore

it, are well attested; and it is likewise well known how the Samnite

ambassadors found him in his farm by his hearth, and how he spurned

their gifts; and also that the senate provided for the maintenance of

his family while he was consul.

Two years afterwards, he executed during his censorship one of the most

magnificent works to be found in the world, the draining of the lake

Velinus, by which the cascade of Terni, which is a hundred and forty

feet high, was called into existence,--the finest fall of water known,

and yet the work of man. Livy calls the Appian Way _monumentum gentis

Appiæ_, this is _monumentum Curii_. The lake Velinus filled a great

valley in the mountains, and had no outlet, a ridge of rocks of no very

great height cutting it off from the Nar (the Nera). Here Curius cut

through the rock; gave the lake _Pié de Luna_ and _Velino_ an outlet;

and thus created several square leagues of the richest soils, the

fields of la campagna Rieti, the _Rosea_ which Cicero calls another

Tempe. It is owing to quite an accidental remark of Cicero’s, that we

know this to have been done by Curius. The water is calcareous, as it

is everywhere in the Apennines; and therefore stalactites are growing

all about it, on which account it has more than once become necessary

since the sixteenth century, the work having been neglected during the

middle ages, to change the course of the stream. The lake has shifted

its bed, so that a bridge built in those ages is now entirely covered

with limestone, and has only been found again a few years ago. A noble

Roman bridge across the canal is still to be seen; yet it is not

visited by strangers, being rather difficult of access: undoubtedly

it is likewise a work of Curius. It was shown to me by an intelligent

peasant, and it is built of large blocks of stone fitted together into

an arch without cement, in the old Etruscan manner. Although earth as

high as a house, on which trees are growing, is lying upon it, yet

there is not a stone moved from its place, even to the breadth of the

back of a knife.

The interval between the third Samnite war and Pyrrhus’ being called

into Italy, which is not quite ten years, is one of the most important

in the whole of ancient history, and the want of a more accurate

knowledge of it we feel most painfully. Were we able to conjure up some

of the lost writings of antiquity, the eleventh book of Livy would be

the most instructive; yet sooner or later, this history will certainly

be one day discovered. I have collected much of it, but not enough

to give a complete historical outline of the time. In the year 462

(according to Cato), the _Lex Mænia_ was passed. Only a few days ago, I

have discovered a passage concerning it, which I had indeed read more

than once before, but in a place where until now it has been overlooked

by every one: otherwise, the law is merely known by a cursory remark

of Cicero’s. It can have no other meaning, but that the _auctoritas_

of the _patres_ for the curule elections was now done away with, even

as forty-six years before it had been by the _Lex Publilia_ for the

laws made by the centuries. This _Lex Mænia_ was absolutely necessary,

as the patricians had already voted once. From henceforth, the senate

gave its _auctoritas_ beforehand; yet the curies were not abolished, as

were at Augsburg the chambers (Stuben), the meetings of the houses. The

_imperium_ was conferred by the mere _simulacrum_ of the curies, that

is, by the lictors, who represented the curies, as the five witnesses

did the classes of the centuries. The carrying of this law is one of

the stormy events which happened during the consulship of M’. Curius.

Quite different from it was the _Lex Hortensia_, about which we should

be so glad to learn something. From Zonaras we knew until now, that

there was much debt, and that from thence arose disturbances; on this

the tribunes moved, that the debts should be cancelled, and when all

was of no avail, the _Plebes_ entrenched itself on the Janiculum, and

was after a long sedition at last brought back by the dictator Q.

Hortensius. From this dictatorship sprang the _Lex Hortensia_, which

is known from Gaius and the _Institutiones_, and of which the purport

is, _ut plebiscita omnes Quirites tenerent_. During the last year

(1828), something more has been found in the _Excerpta de Sententiis_,

edited by Mai, from Dio Cassius, but dreadfully mutilated. I have

tried to restore its connection in the _Rheinische Museum_;[154]

of the correctness of its general meaning, I do not entertain the

slightest doubt. According to that passage, the tribunes moved the

cancelling of the debts (_tabulæ novæ_) in consequence of the general

suffering.[155] Distress and debt are most severely felt in the first

years of peace. The tribunes made the motion on the strength of the

_Lex Publilia_,[156] according to which, the resolution of the _Plebes_

was a bill which was to be confirmed by the curies, before whom nothing

could be brought but what had passed through the senate, by whom it

was to be introduced: the latter might throw out a bill; if it did

not, it went on to the curies. The _Plebes_ was now highly delighted

at the motion and adopted it; but it had to be brought before the

senate, which threw it out. For in those days, we already find the

state of things which is so strongly marked under the Gracchi, namely,

the feud between the people and the nobles: the plebeian nobility

shielded themselves behind the curies, and were very glad when these

rejected the motion. The tribunes then brought in another proposition,

that, if it thought too much to grant a complete cancelling of the

debts, the creditors should fall back to the Licinian law; so that

the interests already paid should be deducted from the capital, and

the remainder be liquidated in three instalments. It was at that time

forbidden to take interest, and money lenders were therefore obliged to

screen themselves behind foreigners. When a loan on which interest was

charged, was to be negotiated, they went to Præneste and Tibur; and the

Tiburtine ostensibly furnished the money, and in his forum also were

the litigations decided which might arise from the transaction. Thus

the prohibition of usury may be reconciled with the fact that interests

were paid after all.

The curies refused to pass the law, even with this modification, and

therefore such a bill had every time to be brought in anew _in trinum

nundinum_; the people would indeed have been quite satisfied with the

proposition as it now stood, but the curies kept on saying no. The

people now became maddened; they marched out of the city, and encamped

on the Janiculum: it can scarcely be supposed that any magistrate

headed the _Plebes_, as in the former secessions. The leaders of the

democratical party thought to make use of these circumstances for their

own ends, and allowed the people to go farther and farther; thus on

the Janiculum it hardly could be said to have behaved as harmlessly

as in the former secessions. And now, when the crowd there, instead

of dispersing, went on strengthening, the rulers of the republic were

frightened, and eagerly wished for a compromise. The insurgents,

however, would have nothing of the sort; they were ever demanding more

and more:--what they wanted, it is impossible for us to say, probably

a new division of the land, and a much more considerable diminution

of the debts. The popular leaders at last put forth the demand, that,

as the opposition of the senate and the curies had shaken the peace,

these should give up their _veto_; and they carried their point. For

the last time, the curies met in the Æsculetum, and decreed their own

dissolution. An analogous case is the _ordinanza della giustizia_ at

Florence, by which a great part of the houses was wholly excluded from

all civil offices; and that through their own fault, as they would

commit any crime, and not appear before the courts of justice.

The Hortensian law comprehended other objects besides. There was but

one dictator Hortensius, down to the time of Cicero, and likewise only

one Hortensian law.

This resolution was an extraordinary event, the first step towards the

fall and the breaking up of the Roman state. Yet the condition of Rome

was so sound, that a hundred and fifty years passed away before the

mischief displayed itself. It is one of the disadvantages of a free

constitution, that what has once been neglected, cannot be so easily

made up. The _Veto_ could not have continued as it was; but what ought

to have been done, and was not done, because it was not done at the

right time, was this: the curies should have been filled up from the

plebeian nobles, and by a number of clans from the allies. The senate

could not have the same weight as a strong aristocratical body; the

_sincera plebes_, the good old country folk, gradually dwindled away,

and the _factio forensis_ got the upperhand; the elements which had

rendered the Roman commonalty so excellent, died off by degrees, and

ought to have been replaced. This must have struck many a person at

that time; for instance, that wise man Fabius, if he was still alive.

Sp. Carvilius, a son or grandson of him who conquered the Samnites,

brought forward a motion in the war of Hannibal, to receive two

members from each senate of the allies into the Roman one; just like

Scipio Maffei, who made a similar proposition in Venice. The former

was all but torn to pieces in the senate; as for the latter, it is

quite a wonder that he got off unpunished. Sallust says, that between

the second and the third Punic war, there had been the strongest

feeling of respect for the laws of Rome; yet this was merely the

peaceful state just before the outbreak of a revolution. Single cases

of evil consequences had not been wanting already; one was, that

from henceforth the admission of the Italians to the full right of

citizenship became more and more difficult, as this would lessen the

influence of the ancient citizens. This afterwards gave rise to a

coalition between the allies and the nobles; but unhappily the nobility

did not form a corporation. The patrician body crumbled to pieces, and

there was nothing to take its place.

Even as the French revolution was very much hastened by the absurd

regulation of old Marshal Ségur, that only nobles were to hold

commissions, which exasperated all the soldiers; thus in Rome also, a

like provocation was given by L. Postumius, an odd character, who--what

at that time was not common--had thrice been consul, and was also

employed in the decisive embassy to Tarentum: he must therefore have

been a man of consequence; but he behaved on this occasion like a

madman. During his consulship, he insulted old Q. Fabius, who was with

the army as proconsul, by driving him away. There is party hatred in

this: Fabius was an aristocrat, but free from all oligarchical spirit.

After the war, Postumius had possessed himself of immense tracts of

land, and had set two thousand soldiers to work at clearing a forest.

For this accumulated insolence, he was impeached by the tribunes, and

condemned to pay a fine of five hundred thousand _asses_. Circumstances

of this kind gave greater offence than anything else, and the more

bitter it became as the oligarchical party fell off in numbers.

In this period is to be placed the appointment of the _triumviri

capitales_. The form _triumviri_ is indeed a solecism, a proof that

even so early as this the _casus obliqui_ were prevalent, as in the

modern Romanesque languages. From _triumvirorum_, which was often

heard, a nominative, _triumviri_, was made; and this form was already

generally current in the times of Cicero.--The _triumviri capitales_

correspond to the Athenian ἕνδεκα; they had the superintendence of the

gaols; beyond this, we are altogether in the dark as to what their

office was. They entered upon the functions which had passed from the

old _Quæstores parricidii_ to the _ædiles curules_. There were many

cases in which there was no further investigation to be made, namely,

those of _delicta manifesta_: but to inquire in every instance whether

a person was _reus manifestus_, the prætor had not time, and there must

have been an authority which informed him that there was a _delictum

manifestum_: this must formerly have been the quæstors, and now the

_tresviri capitales_. Besides this, they were judges in cases of which

the prætor did not take cognisance, in those of foreigners, slaves, and

so forth; and they likewise watched over their punishment, as these

persons were not under the protection of the tribunes: when, however,

there was a doubt, a _judex_ was to be granted. Thus this office had

the mingled powers of a police and of a criminal jurisdiction.

DESTRUCTION OF THE SENONIAN GAULS. C. FABRICIUS LUSCINUS. WAR WITH

TARENTUM. PYRRHUS OF EPIRUS. EVENTS IN SICILY DOWN TO THE FIRST PUNIC

WAR.

According to Zonaras, it was the Tarentines who stirred up the peoples

far and near against the Romans; first the Lucanians, then the

Etruscans, and even the deeply humbled Samnites: the Greek towns were

no longer the closest friends of the people of Tarentum; the latter

looked to their own political advantage, and were ready to leave them

to the mercy of the Lucanians and Bruttians. Either after the third,

or even after the second Samnite war, a peace was concluded between

the Romans and the Tarentines: in 451, or 452, they already seem to

be friends; the Greek writers also speak of it as a treaty of long

standing. They seem on both sides to have checked each other by sea;

for the Romans bound themselves not to appear with any ship of war

north of the Lacinian headland in the gulf of Tarentum, whilst the

Tarentines may have made a similar promise.

An unprejudiced observer must have seen from the issue of the third

Samnite war, that the fate of Italy was decided; and the Italian people

ought to have hastened to unite themselves with Rome on the most

favourable terms which they could get. But men’s passions have no such

wisdom, and they are always looking for some _Deus ex machina_, who

is to change everything. One people after another joined the ranks of

the enemies of Rome. The Lucanians, who were allied with them during

the third Samnite war, availed themselves of their independence to

act according to their own liking, and to reduce the Greek towns to

subjection. The Bruttians likewise became leagued with the enemies of

the Romans; the Greek towns, on the other hand, having been abandoned

by the Tarentines, sought their aid. The Etruscans, disunited among

themselves, still continued to be ever alternating between peace and

war: the Vulsinians alone seem to have carried on uninterrupted war.

The strength of the Samnites was quite broken; yet they tried to rally,

so as again to take up arms, as soon as it could be done with any hope

of success: for the present, they kept aloof, and gave the Romans no

occasion for hostilities. The Tarentines tried to stir up even the

Gauls, doing every thing all the while by means of subsidies only:

they themselves did nothing openly, and to all appearance the good

understanding was kept up. The great distress at home must have obliged

the Romans to dissemble; we merely know that, true to their system of

supporting the weak against the strong, they gave to the Thurinians

their help against the Lucanians. On this occasion, we meet with the

first instance of a Greek town having raised a statue to a Roman.[157]

Rome’s support saved the Thurinians.

In Etruria, the war now took a different turn. The Etruscans seem

to have been so divided among themselves, that the war party called

in the Gauls to join with them in fighting against their opponents.

Arretium in the north-eastern corner of Tuscany, thus exposed to the

Gauls, being governed by the Cilnii, and on friendly terms with Rome,

was besieged by the barbarians. In 469 (according to Cato, in whose

system the birth of Christ is to be placed in 752, not in 754), the

Romans sent to the relief of Arretium the prætor L. Cæcilius Metellus

and two legions with auxiliaries, in all, about 20,000 men. But the

Senonian Gauls, though they dwelt on the other side of the Alps, over

which there was no way, broke through, and defeated Metellus, who

himself was left dead on the field of battle, and eleven thousand

Romans with him: the whole of his force seems to have been utterly

destroyed. Curius was now sent with an army into Etruria, and envoys

were also despatched to the Senonians, to ransom the prisoners. The

Senonians, however, still harboured vengeance on account of the battle

of Sentinum, and Britomaris, a young chieftain whose father had been

killed there, instigated them to murder the ambassadors. On this, the

Romans determined at all hazards to take revenge; and the consul, P.

Cornelius Dolabella, instead of attacking the army of the Gauls, who

were perhaps already dreaming of a new conquest of Rome, adopted the

plan of falling upon the deserted country of the Senonians, where he

partly destroyed the population, and partly carried it away captive.

The army of the Senonians, maddened at the tidings of this disaster,

returned home, and was entirely routed: it is hardly an exaggeration

to say, that the whole of the nation was exterminated. The Boians now

crossed the mountains, joined the Etruscans, and met with a defeat near

the lake Vadimo; yet the Romans did not set foot on their territory,

which reached from the river Trebia to the Romagna. In the following

year, all the fighting men of this tribe came forth again, but with no

greater success; the nation, however, was not annihilated: the women

and children had stayed behind, and so it regenerated itself. It was

not until fifty years later, that the extermination took place. The

Gallic migrations from henceforth were no more turned against Italy,

but against Thrace and Macedon. How matters went on in Etruria, and

what Etruscan towns made their submission, the wretched history of that

period leaves quite untold.

All the time that these dreadful wars were waging on the northern

frontier, at home in the city, everything was quiet in consequence

of the peace of the Janiculum and Æsquiletum; but in Lucania, the

Romans carried on their wars without interruption. In this war, C.

Fabricius Luscinus is mentioned for the first time. The old heroes

were still living: Valerius Corvus, who was now an old man, full of

days, no longer plays any active part; Ap. Claudius was blind, but

had very great influence still; Fabius in all likelihood was dead.

Younger than Appius, but older than Fabricius, was the great warrior

M’. Curius Dentatus, who in his politics was a staunch democrat, but

yet no demagogue. Curius and Fabricius are remarkable men, and in some

respects they are like each other. Of both of them it is certain that

they were really poor; both were proud characters; both of them _novi

homines_, risen by their greatness in war, and by their personal worth.

Fabricius has in all ages been quoted as a pattern of public virtue.

Besides these two men, there were on the other side also some eminent

personages: L. Postumius, who indeed was also a man of energy, but not

so noble as he; P. Cornelius Rufinus, as covetous as Fabricius was

disinterested, whom moreover Fabricius and his colleague Q. Æmilius

Papus removed from the senate for his luxuriousness. And without them,

Rome seems to have abounded in remarkable people: it may likewise have

already stood high in an intellectual proficiency of its own, far above

that of the most celebrated times of the middle ages, and perhaps also

in literature.

Another great man, great as a wise statesman, though he left behind

him no distinct memorial in the state, was Ti. Coruncanius, the first

plebeian _Pontifex maximus_, who enjoyed the reputation of profound

wisdom and knowledge of law. He was always looked upon as the pattern

of a pontiff.

The Romans now became more and more aware of how matters stood between

them and the people of Tarentum. The peace only lasted because

other countries separated them. The wealth of the Tarentines, their

naval power, and the ease with which they were able to enlist Greek

armies, made the Romans very unwilling to go to war with them. When,

however, the troops engaged in Lucania were surrounded on all sides

by guerillas, Rome was obliged to send them their supplies by sea,

notwithstanding the treaty concluded about twenty years before, which

had imposed mutual limits upon that element. The Romans must under

actual circumstances have found it unnatural: they might plead that

at that time Venusia was not yet theirs; and that by founding this

colony, they had tacitly acquired the right of sailing beyond the

Lacinian headland. It seems, however, that they also wished to try

how long the Tarentines would wait before they made war. This is what

is more likely; for according to a notice from a lost book of Livy,

which Zonaras confirms, the Tarentines endeavoured to call into life

a great coalition against the Romans, with which even the expedition

of the Gauls against Arretium is said to have already been connected.

Certain it is, that they wished for one; but each single people came

but slowly into it. The Romans sent a squadron of ten triremes under

the _duumvir navalis_,[158] L. Valerius, to the roadstead of Tarentum.

All the Greek theatres had, if possible, a view of the sea, or at least

they faced it; thus it is at Tusculum, and even at Fæsulæ: in these

the people assembled, as at Rome in the forum. Among the Greeks, it

was less customary to meet together in the ἀγορά, which was a mere

place of business: they felt more comfortable in the theatres where

they could sit down. These were open every day, and if any one had

something to say to the people, he got up upon the stage and spoke from

thence. Unhappily for Tarentum, the people was just assembled in the

theatre, when the Roman ships steered towards the harbour: had it not

been there, the history of the world would have taken another turn; the

στρατηγοί would most likely have requested the Romans to go back, and

nothing would have followed from the expedition. The people excited

one another, and without even coming to any resolution, they all of

them ran down to the harbour, pulled the galleys into the water, manned

them, and fell upon the Romans without the least warning: two or three

ships only saved themselves; most of them were sunk, Valerius himself

was killed. Almost all the Tarentines, who had never before seen a

Roman army, were now exulting in their victory.

In Rome, this event gave rise to great dismay. They knew there that

the whole of Italy was fermenting, and they saw for certain that

the Tarentines relied upon a general outbreak; we find distinct

traces which show, that not even the Latin people was trusted; the

Prænestines, especially, were again ripe for a rising. For this reason,

it was a very critical affair for the Romans. Instead of declaring

war, they sent an embassy to the Tarentines, to protest in the face

of the whole world; so that every one might see that vengeance was

only delayed, and not given up. Delegates were also sent to some of

the allies north of Tarentum, partly to keep them in their faith,

and partly to demand hostages. Among these was C. Fabricius, who, in

violation of the law of nations, was arrested, as it seems, by the

Samnites. At Rome the greatest exertions were now made: they wished

to overawe the enemy, without having at once to begin the war. At

the head of an embassy to Tarentum was L. Postumius. A reckless,

excitable, giddy people, as the Tarentines were, must have felt their

courage rising, when the hated Romans showed themselves frightened;

L. Postumius did not gain any thing by his demand that the Tarentines

should give up the guilty parties, and indeed the Romans could hardly

have expected it. Unfortunately, it was the time of the Dionysia, the

feast of the vintage. The ambassadors in democratical Tarentum were not

brought before the senate, but before the people, in the orchestra;

here they had to speak from below to those above them, instead of

haranguing, as they were wont, from a raised platform: this was of

itself quite enough to make them feel embarrassed and fidgetty. The

whole town was intoxicated; drunken sots and impudent fellows laughed

at every blunder which the ambassadors made in speaking Greek: one of

them even went so far as to befoul the _toga prætexta_ of Postumius. He

did not lose his self-command, but showed the Tarentines the abominable

insult which had been done to him, and loudly complained of it. At

this sight, the drunken populace broke out into a much more violent

laughter. Then Postumius, shaking his garment, said, I prophesy, ye

people of Tarentum, that ye shall wash out this stain with your heart’s

best blood.

The ambassadors returned without the satisfaction which they had

demanded, without even an answer; and they insisted in the Roman senate

upon immediate vengeance. But many senators advised caution, and were

for waiting until more favourable circumstances presented themselves;

the people also, which was labouring under great distress, was at that

time against the war, and thus, when it was first proposed, the measure

was thrown out. Fresh negotiations, backed by an army, were to be set

on foot. Afterwards, however, it was resolved notwithstanding, to send

the army to the frontiers of Tarentum, the consul L. Æmilius Barbula

having instructions, when on his march through Lucania, also to attack

Tarentum. In that city likewise, there were two parties, one of them

mad for war, and the other prudent; the former were aware that the only

way of carrying on the war was by calling over into their country a

foreign prince, and this could be no other than Pyrrhus of Epirus, who

kept a standing army. But then it was to be foreseen, that Pyrrhus,

if victorious, would make himself king of Italy, as he was much more

powerful than Alexander of Epirus. The aristocracy at Tarentum wished

for a union with Rome, that they might bridle the unruly populace; but

those who were in power had so lost all common sense, that instead of

protecting, as heretofore, the Italiote towns, they made common cause

with the Lucanians, and, giving warning to Thurii, an open colony of

the whole of Greece, that their protection was withdrawn, they left

it to the mercy of its foes. This venerable town, distinguished for

its great men, was now taken and sacked by the Lucanians: the Romans

conquered it at a later period, but it never recovered. When Barbula

appeared before Tarentum, peace would perhaps have been concluded, had

not the Tarentines already entered into negotiations with Pyrrhus.

These had not yet led to any definitive result, when the Romans,

laying every thing waste before them, arrived before Tarentum. On this

a _proxenus_ of the Romans, Agis, offered himself for the office of

στρατηγός, that he might mediate; but just as he was about to undertake

the task, the news came that Pyrrhus had accepted the terms proposed

to him. Agis was dismissed, and the war began.

Pyrrhus was at that time in his thirty-seventh year, the very prime of

life; none of his contemporaries in an age in which neither night nor

property was sure, had seen so many vicissitudes as he. For an able

man, the finest thing on earth is a career of activity and strife. That

which he himself has won, a man may well call his own; to enter quietly

into a settled possession, is what any one can do. But action may also

be overstrained, so that a person may lose all power of calmly enjoying

what he has. Such characters are Charles XII. and Pyrrhus, men who,

when they happen to be on the throne, are disastrous to their subjects,

and dangerous to their neighbours.

In the Peloponnesian war, the kingdom of the Molossians had been first

raised from its insignificance by Tharyps, who had been brought up at

Athens. The princely race of the Molossians branched from Philip into

two lines, that of Arymbas, and that of Neoptolemus, the father of

Olympias. This younger branch, by the influence of Macedon, came into

the possession of the throne. By Philip the country had been enlarged

in favour of the relations of his wife; Thesprotia and Chaonia seem

already to have belonged to it. Afterwards Æacidas, the father of

Pyrrhus, of the elder branch, obtained the crown. The lawful power

of these Epirote kings, like that of the sovereigns in the middle

ages, was very much bounded. Aristotle compares them to the kings of

Lacedæmon; but the following of soldiers which they had, was by no

means always inconsiderable: tempted by this power, Æacidas, contrary

to the general wish of his subjects, meddled in a great many matters.

He had attached himself to Olympias, although he had formerly been

driven out of his kingdom by the usurpation of his cousin Alexander of

Epirus, and he had with singular generosity identified himself with

the fate of that fury: by this he incurred the enmity of Cassander, who

co-operated in expelling him from Epirus. At that time, Pyrrhus was

two years old. Cassander wanted to exterminate the whole family, and

it was with the utmost difficulty that the child was saved by faithful

servants. He was brought up by Glaucias, the prince of the Taulantians,

although the latter had been on terms of enmity with Æacidas. Glaucias

grew so fond of the boy, that he did every thing in his power to

protect him against Cassander. Pyrrhus was hardly grown up, when he

went to the court of Demetrius Poliorcetes, and of old Antigonus, the

One-eyed: in this school his extraordinary talent as a general was

developed. Demetrius was indeed a great genius spoiled. Here Pyrrhus

preserved his moral dignity amidst a most infamous crew. He was, by

Demetrius, nominally restored as king of the Molossians; but according

to the fashion of the age, he was the vassal of the greater king, and

had to serve in his army, like the other petty princes of Epirus. He

was with Demetrius and Antigonus in the battle near Ipsus Ol. 119, 4,

in which the empire of Antigonus was overthrown, and himself killed:

Pyrrhus was at that time sixteen years old. After this battle had been

won by the allies, these began to quarrel; and the crafty Demetrius

soon found an opportunity of making up with Ptolemy Soter, who, in

dividing the spoil, had fallen out with his old friend Seleucus,

with Cassander, whom he had ever hated, and likewise with Lysimachus

to boot. Pyrrhus was sent to Alexandria to treat with Ptolemy, and

was given as a hostage for the fulfilment of the conditions. He had

something peculiarly fascinating about him: his wonderful talents were

of the most varied kind, and Heaven had endowed him with the most

enchanting amiability and beauty. These qualities he now used for his

patron’s best advantage, as well as for his own. The Epirote towns were

lost in the meanwhile, and his dominions had to all appearance fallen

into the hands of Neoptolemus, a son of Alexander the Molossian. But

Pyrrhus gained the favour of Ptolemy and Berenice, and was married

to Antigone a daughter of Berenice by her first marriage. With the

help of Ægyptian money, he was again put in possession of his throne;

the attachment of the people soon rid him of his rival Neoptolemus,

though for this he employed, it is true, a certain unjustifiable

means, the like of which was so much in vogue during the sixteenth

century. He now tried to settle himself, for which Fortune soon gave

him an opportunity. Cassander died, and left sons behind him, who were

enemies to each other: one of these yielded to Pyrrhus, in return

for his protection, Ambracia, Amphilochia, and the Epirote provinces

which had until now been united with Macedon. This was of the greatest

importance to Pyrrhus: now, for the first time, Epirus deserved to

be called a state. Pyrrhus indeed did help his ally; but the latter

fell by his own fault, and Pyrrhus remained master of the provinces.

Demetrius Poliorcetes now also got again upon the throne of Macedon;

and with him, Pyrrhus, at first, stood on the same friendly terms as

of old. But Demetrius was an encroaching, grasping prince, and thus it

was not long before war broke out between them. The oriental pride and

haughtiness of Demetrius gave offence to the Macedonians: they fell

off from him, and Pyrrhus leagued himself with Lysimachus. The people

declared for them, and they divided the country between them. But this

division again roused the spirit of the Macedonians: Lysimachus was a

native, Pyrrhus a foreigner, for which reason he was cast off by the

inhabitants of the district which had fallen to his share. The period

of the loss of Macedon is generally dated several years too soon.

Pyrrhus was not stubborn against fortune: he carried on war as an art;

if his stars were unkind, he would give way. War was his happiness and

his life; he raised the science of generalship to its utmost height;

in his method of battle array, he was a mighty master. A fragment of

Livy in Servius, according to a safe emendation, says, _Pyrrhus, unicus

bellandi artifex, magisque in prœlio quam in bello bonus_: the result

of the campaign was what interested him least. Some generals have a

talent for making the disposition of a battle; but they either do not

know at all how to plan a campaign, or, when they have won a battle,

they get tired of the thing; others show a remarkable turn for the

arrangement of the whole campaign, but are less successful in battles.

To the former class belongs the Archduke Charles of Austria, as he

himself acknowledges in his strategical writings: Pyrrhus also cared so

much for the pleasure of winning in the game of war, that he scarcely

ever followed up a battle which he had gained. It may even have been

painful to him, afterwards to annihilate a beaten foe, when there was

no longer any skill in destroying him. This betokens a fine soul, but

the object of the war is in this way lost sight of.

Pyrrhus now took up his residence in Ambracia, and embellished it as

a real city of kings. When the Tarentine ambassadors now made their

appearance, and concluded with him a treaty of subsidies, in which

very likely much remained unsettled; Pyrrhus quickly sent over Cineas

with three thousand men, that he might get a firm footing, and prevent

any revulsion in the anger which had been aroused by the devastations

of the Romans. Cineas, like his princely friend, was an extraordinary

man; he stood by the side of Pyrrhus as one who was quite free, and

had attached himself to him from inclination, and with all his heart.

He was from a people which has produced no other distinguished man,

being of Larissa in Thessaly, probably an Aleuad; and he is called a

pupil of Demosthenes: this is only barely possible, as Demosthenes

had now been dead forty years already. Perhaps this statement merely

rests on a mistake; as he may indeed have been spoken of as a

_sectator Demosthenis_. Few at that time might have still been able

to appreciate Demosthenes; a man like Cineas understood him, and drew

inspiration from his writings. How Cineas became the friend of Pyrrhus,

we cannot tell.

The Tarentines delivered up their citadel to Cineas, who, with great

adroitness, did every thing to keep them in good humour, so as to blind

them with regard to the views of Pyrrhus; he allowed them to go on

living merrily; they did not arm themselves, and he quite won their

confidence. Pyrrhus had not much might of his own; but from several

neighbouring princes he managed to get elephants, engines, ships, and

other necessaries of war;--from Ptolemy Ceraunus, he had five thousand

Macedonian soldiers:--he was a thorn in the side of every one of them,

and they were all glad that he went so far away. He is said to have

gone over with twenty thousand foot, four or five thousand horse, and

a number of elephants: how many there were of these, we are not told.

Early in the year, he was ready; but he had a very bad passage, owing

partly to the imperfect navigation of the time, and still more to the

circumstance that the Epirotes were even less skilled in steering a

ship’s course than the Greeks. Moreover, the sea about the Ceraunian

rocks had then, as it has to this very day, a bad name for sudden

squalls; the swell from the Adriatic to the Syrtes, which is almost

like the great Mexican gulf-stream, made the voyage across a hazardous

one. Several ships of his fleet were lost, others were driven out

of their course; he himself, with a great deal of trouble, reached

the Sallentine coast, at which all who had escaped came together. He

made all haste to get to Tarentum, which opened its gates to him;

but he had hardly collected his scattered fleet, when he took very

serious measures with the people there. He saw that his army alone

was not strong enough for his designs, and yet an enlistment was too

expensive; he therefore had the gates shut, and he raised a levy from

among the Tarentines, whom he forced to serve in his phalanx. They

were highly displeased at this, many tried to escape; but he redoubled

the strictness of his measures, put a stop to the gymnasia and other

public meetings, and soon showed himself to be a tyrannical master.

The Tarentines had indeed been mistaken in their expectations. They

would have treated Pyrrhus, as they did princes who had formerly been

called over; they wanted to stay at home, while he carried on the

war. But Pyrrhus could do no such thing; his territory was but small,

and the war promised to be a bloody one: he therefore demanded the

co-operation of the Tarentines. These began to grumble; but they were

quite powerless against him, as he was in possession of the citadel.

He was thus driven to have recourse to harsh police regulations. Only

a consular army under P. Valerius Lævinus withstood him.--The history

of the time, with the exception of Pyrrhus’ campaigns, is very little

known to us: probably Rome employed a large force against Etruria, in

order to bring it to a definite peace. The whole of Italy was thrown

into a state of fermentation: the Romans took hostages from those

allies who could not be relied on, trying however, nowhere to betray

any fear; and they raised great armaments. But it is inconceivable

how they could have ventured to send only a consular army against

Pyrrhus, who moreover every where gained people over by his manners

and address. He is, among all the barbarian kings, the only character

fraught with all the brilliance of the old Hellenism; and, although not

without faults, he was a being of a higher order, and able to achieve

great things with small means. The Samnites and Lucanians had sent

ambassadors to him already in Epirus; the Apulians, and several Italian

peoples joined him immediately after his arrival; but this did not, for

the moment, lead to any increase of his power. The proconsul L. Æmilius

Barbula was stationed in Samnium, which he frightfully wasted, to

prevent the Samnites from thinking of forming a junction with Pyrrhus

against the army of Lævinus. A correspondence sprang up between Pyrrhus

and Valerius Lævinus, in which the former offered to act as mediator

between Rome and Tarentum. He may indeed have had a high opinion of

the Romans, but he did not understand them after all; for the tone of

his letters, as far as we know them, is entirely mistaken, so that no

agreement took place. The Romans demanded satisfaction from him, for

having, though a stranger, set his foot upon Italian ground. This seems

to have been a national view of theirs. Valerius now went to Lucania.

He wished for a battle, before a confederate army of Samnites and

Lucanians could join the king; as most likely they were kept in check

by the other consul. Pyrrhus had likewise marched against him, seeking

to fight before the two armies formed a junction. He crossed the Siris

in the neighbourhood of Heraclea, which is the finest country in this

part of Italy, and may rank with Campania in fertility and wealth.

He felt confident of victory, and he was bent on humbling the pride

of the Italian allies, by beating the Romans without their help. The

Romans seem to have gone on very slowly with their preparations; he

distressed them very cleverly by cutting off their supply of food, and

they were obliged to fight that they might not have to abandon that

district, and to fall back upon Venusia, which was dangerous on account

of the allies. The evening before the battle, Pyrrhus reconnoitred the

Roman position, and was amazed at the order there. He was accustomed

to fight against Macedonians and Greeks, or against Illyrians; now

he saw the activity and the high state of training of the individual

Roman soldier, and thus he became very serious at the thoughts of the

impending battle. Here the contrary tactics of two excellent armies

came into collision: on the side of the Macedonians, the system was

then carried to the highest perfection, of acting in masses;[159] on

the side of the Romans, that of a line which far outflanked the enemy.

If the Epirote phalanx awaited the shock of the Romans unmoved, the

latter could do nothing; but it was no easy work in cold blood to stand

the furious charge of the Romans, the shower of their _pila_, and the

fierce onset of their swords. Yet Pyrrhus had a great advantage in his

Thessalian cavalry, that of the Romans being badly mounted and badly

armed. The Roman army, to the astonishment of Pyrrhus, now forded

the Siris, and fell upon him: on both sides, they fought with great

fury. The Romans had never yet encountered any Macedonian phalanx.

Seven attacks were repulsed: like madmen, they threw themselves on

the _sarissæ_, in order to break through the phalanx, as did Arnold

Von Winkelried. The day was not yet won; but the Roman cavalry was

very successful in the beginning of the battle: the Epirotes were

already wavering; another moment, and they would have been broken. At

this crisis, Pyrrhus led forth his cavalry, which, contrary to all

expectation, had before that been worsted by the Romans,[160] and also

about twenty elephants with it: the Roman cavalry was terror stricken;

the horses took fright and ran away. The Thessalian cavalry now

dashed into the flanks of the legions, and cut them down with fearful

bloodshed: many Romans were taken prisoners, especially horsemen. The

overthrow was complete: the camp could not be held, and every one fled

singly: had Pyrrhus pursued, the whole of the Roman army would have

been annihilated, as were the French after the battle of Waterloo.

But the Romans, and above all Lævinus, here again behaved admirably:

they collected their forces, as Frederic the Great did after the battle

of Kunersdorf, and retreated to Venusia. This alone could have been

the place in Apulia of which Zonaras speaks; were it not for this

stronghold, they would have had to go across the mountains as far as

Luceria. It was now shown how excellent was the plan of making Venusia

a colony; but for this, not a Roman could have escaped, as the Samnites

and Lucanians would have destroyed them. The Italian allies reached

Pyrrhus after the battle only. Hereupon Pyrrhus at first expected Roman

ambassadors; but as he did not hear of any thing from the Romans, who,

on the contrary, made new armaments, he put himself in motion. The

direct road to Rome lay open before him; he therefore left the Roman

armies on one side, and marched upon the capital, as he held that

most sound principle of always trying to end the war soon. But as he

advanced, he found himself dreadfully mistaken about the condition of

the country: Rufinus had been joined by the remnants of Lævinus’ army;

and probably they had either cut their way through Samnium, or had gone

to Rome through the territory of the Marsians and Marrucinians. Pyrrhus

expected every where to find provisions for his army; but he was struck

with dismay, when he saw the state of Lucania, and especially of

Samnium. According to a newly discovered fragment, he told the Samnites

that they had deceived him, and that their country was a wilderness.

He could therefore advance but slowly. He approached Capua, which,

however, with praiseworthy fidelity shut its gates against him; near

Casilinum, he must have crossed the Vulturnus; and he now tried to

gain the Latin road, so as to reach the discontented towns, Præneste,

Tibur, and others. He reckoned likewise on the Etruscans, perhaps also

on the Gauls. Here we clearly see the hand of Providence. Had not the

Boians been destroyed the year before by the Romans, the Etruscans

would certainly have risen; but now they were confined to their own

resources, and divided among themselves. On this occasion, the Romans

must have shown great adroitness: they no doubt made with the Etruscans

at this very moment συνθήκαι εὐδοκούμεναι, by which these were only

bound to trifling services.

Pyrrhus, who was slowly advancing against Rome with seventy thousand

men, as it is said, availed himself of the interval to enter into

negotiations for peace, and sent Cineas to Rome. The conditions

seemed fair; but when looked at more closely, they were very hard.

He demanded that the Romans should conclude a peace with Tarentum,

Samnium, Lucania, Apulia, and Bruttium, as with equals, and give up

what they had taken from them, namely, Luceria, Fregellæ, Venusia; that

is to say, that they should go back to what they possessed forty years

before. This was exorbitant. We know these conditions from Appian,

who must have taken them from Dionysius: in our books of history, it

looks as if Pyrrhus had wished to beg the peace for the Tarentines. The

defeat, however, had made such a terrible impression, that Rome was

deeply shaken; the majority already began to reconcile themselves to

the thought of it. This is the celebrated negotiation of Cineas, and in

it we perceive his uncommon tact; for he by no means hurried matters,

but tried to win all hearts by personal attentions, in which he was

aided by his extraordinary memory: he called every Roman by his name,

and treated him according to his peculiar disposition. Appius Claudius,

however, turned the scales; and for whatever he may have been guilty of

in the course of his life, he now made amends, by inspiring the senate

with the courage to reject the proposals of Cineas, and to order him to

quit Rome within four and twenty hours. It was not until after these

negotiations, that Pyrrhus made his appearance before Rome.

The history of this war has been handed down to us in such a scanty

form, that we know merely from an incidental notice, that Pyrrhus took

the important town of Fregellæ by storm, and advanced on the Latin road

as far as Præneste, of which he got possession of the citadel. Here,

where he could overlook the _campagna_ of Rome, he found all his hopes

disappointed. The Etruscans had concluded a peace, and the army which

had been fighting against them, was at Rome, where a levy besides was

raised of every one who was able to bear arms; the troops of Lævinus

had been reinforced, and following close on the heels of Pyrrhus, had

advanced by Capua on the Appian road; the allies who remained faithful

had mustered all their forces; and thus he stood in the high Æquian

mountains, at a late season of the year, with an army before him

within the walls of Rome, another at his side, a reserve forming in

his rear, and all this in a country in which retreat was impossible in

winter. With a heavy heart, he therefore resolved upon turning back to

Campania; a Roman army followed him, and another under Lævinus marched

on his flank. Before these two armies could join each other, he wished

to give battle to the Romans; but the courage and alacrity of the

enemy, and the demoralized state of his own troops, who were already

living on bad terms with the allies, so depressed him, that he gave up

the idea, and was glad to return to Tarentum with a great deal of booty

and many prisoners.

Although this campaign ended without any lasting evil consequences for

the Romans, yet they were very much weakened; the number of prisoners

taken by Pyrrhus was far greater than at the battle of Heraclea. They

therefore sent an embassy to treat about the ransom of these, or

to exchange them for Tarentines and Italians. It was then that the

celebrated conversation between Fabricius and Pyrrhus took place,

which certainly the Romans have not been the first to record. Timæus

has written a special work on the war of Pyrrhus; Pyrrhus himself

left memoirs behind him, and from these, most likely, the accounts

we have are derived: they show what a high opinion the Greeks had of

the Romans. The embassy was unsuccessful; but Pyrrhus, owing to the

greatness of his mind, and also to make an impression upon a people

like the Romans, gave leave to the prisoners to go to Rome for the

_Saturnalia_, on their taking an oath that they would return after the

feast was ended. It is asserted that no man dared to break his oath,

and also that the senate and consuls issued a strict edict against

it. On both sides, this act affords a fine proof of the feelings of

that age, and on the whole, the war, from the mutual respect of the

combatants, is one of the finest in history; for although both parties

fought for life and death, they yet carried it on with kindliness for

each other. The embassy of Fabricius, Rufinus, and Dolabella, and

the account of how Pyrrhus tried to get Fabricius to stay with him,

and even to share his kingdom, has passed into an infinite number

of moralizing books. I certainly believe in the fact that the king

wanted to make Fabricius his friend and companion; the story tallies

so exactly with Pyrrhus’ character, that we cannot but take it for

true, though the details are flourishes of the rhetors, particularly

of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. It is one of the traits of genius in

Pyrrhus, that he had become an enthusiastic admirer of the Romans: he

courted their friendship. Although we must give up some of the actions

of his life as unjust, yet his whole soul is so great and noble, that

we do not know of any period of history on which one may dwell with

greater pleasure. He was desirous of peace, but of a reasonable one for

his Italian allies, whom he did not choose to abandon.

But the peace was not obtained. Pyrrhus now saw very clearly, that he

could not effect anything by such thrusts against the heart of Rome:

the strongholds in Apulia--Venusia and Luceria--had to be wrested from

the enemy. This was the object of the campaign which followed. In the

meanwhile, an event fell out which made the war still more difficult

for him, and did not allow him to draw any fresh reinforcements from

Macedon. This was the invasion of that kingdom by the Gauls, which

was fatal to Ptolemy Ceraunus by whom he had been hitherto supported.

With his Italian allies also, he must have had some differences; so

that he now carried on the war with nothing like the forces which he

had before. The Romans with both their armies were in Apulia; that

Pyrrhus was besieging a town there when one of the armies came up, is

mentioned, but not the name of the place: very likely it was Venusia.

Here follows the battle near Asculum, the only incident which we know

of this year’s campaign, the different accounts of which in Plutarch

are most perplexing: that of Hieronymus of Cardia, whose sources were

Pyrrhus’ own memoirs, must be our guide. On the first day, there was

a skirmish between the two armies, in which the Romans were afraid to

go down into the plain, lest they should be exposed to the elephants

and cavalry. As the phalanx with the _sarissæ_ would have had to fight

at great disadvantage on broken ground, Pyrrhus, with great skill,

forced his enemy to take a position which was favourable to him; and

here the Romans were beaten, and are said to have lost seven thousand

men. Yet they were so near their camp, and had so well fortified it,

that they retired to it in perfect order: it was not an overthrow, but

merely a lost battle. It seems also that the Apulians in Pyrrhus’ army

stopped the course of the victory; for when the Romans were beginning

to fall back, they plundered the camp of their own allies, so that it

was necessary to send troops to check them. That Pyrrhus did not gain

anything beyond the victory, was already the same to him as a defeat.

In the meanwhile, the winter was now setting in: among the Romans, the

confident hope of victory was on the increase, whereas Pyrrhus had no

more prospects. He could not recruit his own troops, as the Gauls were

advancing into Macedon, and threatening the frontiers of Epirus; his

kingdom was very limited, and his subjects displayed the most decided

unwillingness to go and serve beyond the sea to gratify his ambition,

when the barbarians were already showing themselves at their borders.

Nor had he any trust in the Italians: to control them, he alternately

placed an Italian moveable cohort which fought with the _pilum_, and a

solid battalion of the phalanx,--a plan which may have been better in

theory than it turned out to be in practice. That he had this system,

is evident from Polybius; he employed it near Beneventum, perhaps also

at Asculum.

The Romans, in all likelihood, had for some time reduced the places

on the Liris which had fallen away: public opinion declared for them

in the whole of Italy. On both sides, negotiations were attempted.

The Romans wished to drive Pyrrhus out of Italy, because its conquest

was now sure; Pyrrhus, whose love of roving had been stirred, and who

therefore longed to give up the enterprise, made the Romans repeated

offers, to which, however, they would not listen so long as any foreign

troops had a footing on Italian ground. Now we have new Roman consuls,

one of whom was Fabricius. To this time belongs the story of a noble

Epirote, or the physician, or cupbearer of Pyrrhus (the name also

varies greatly, Timochares, Nicias, &c., being written), having offered

the Roman consuls to poison the king. The thing is not incredible in

itself; but it is so differently told in all the versions, that it

cannot possibly have been publicly known. It seems to me to have been

nothing else but a preconcerted farce, which Pyrrhus had got up, that

he might have a pretext for retreating from Italy. One could hardly

suppose this, had not something like it happened in modern times: the

negotiation between Napoleon and Fox in the year 1806, is a case in

point. They wanted to conclude a truce: Pyrrhus, when the Romans gave

him up that physician, set all the Roman prisoners free without any

ransom; and they, on their side, probably sent him an equal number of

Tarentines and Italians. Pyrrhus now declared to his allies, that in

the rich country of Sicily, which received him with open arms, he would

find the means of aiding them effectually. Thus he now obtained from

the Romans an advantageous truce. The latter did not, however, give

up the right of continuing the war against the Italians: unfortunate

Samnium was left to its fate. Pyrrhus had been in Italy two years and

two months; in Sicily he remained until the fourth year.

The Greek population of Sicily had, owing to the death of Agathocles,

been rent into factions. Tyrants dismembered the island; the

Carthaginians also were spreading over it; and the Mamertines, who

were Oscan mercenaries, had treacherously seized upon Messana.

Pyrrhus was looked upon as a deliverer, especially as he had married

Lanassa, a daughter of Agathocles: his son, whom he brought with him,

received homage at Syracuse as king. He drove out the Carthaginians

from every place but the impregnable stronghold of Lilybæum, and kept

the Mamertines closely shut up within their walls. His friend Cineas

must then have been already dead, as we find him surrounded by other

men, who were his evil geniuses, and led him on to perdition. His

own sound sense inclined him to make peace with the Carthaginians on

splendid terms,--they wanted to keep Lilybæum only; but the cowardly

Siceliotes would not do this, as they believed that they would not be

at all better off, if the Carthaginians still remained in any part

of the island. Their condition would, however, have been very much

improved. Pyrrhus had conquered the Mamertines, and united the whole

of Sicily under the settled rule of an Æacidas. But he now yielded to

these unhappy counsels, which was so much the worse for him, as he

was wanting in perseverance. The siege of Lilybæum was an immense

undertaking; the fortifications of that town were one of the wonders

of the ancient world, and the fleet of the Carthaginians was ever

bringing fresh troops and provisions. The end of all this was, that

Pyrrhus had to raise the siege. He thus lost his credit with the fickle

Siceliotes, and was beguiled into tyrannical measures; so that it was

good news to him when the Italian allies entreated him to return at any

rate, as otherwise they would be forced by the Romans to make a most

disadvantageous peace. He could not cross the strait, as the Mamertines

were masters of Messana, and a mutinous Campanian legion had Rhegium;

but he landed near Locri. While on his passage, he was attacked by the

Carthaginian fleet, which destroyed very many of his ships; and having

now scarcely saved any thing of the treasures which he had brought with

him from Sicily, he arrived very much reduced in men and in money.

During his absence of more than three years, the Romans had carried on

the war with the utmost cruelty. The inhabitants, as was the case in

the last years of the Spanish war, could only form guerillas, which

did much harm to the enemy’s army, but were unable to stand against

it in a pitched battle: they were therefore always beaten. I shall

not now speak of the single places which were destroyed at that time:

old Croton, which was twelve (Italian) miles in circumference, now

received its deathblow, and was entirely bereft of its population;

the enemy took one town after another, and the country became a

wilderness. Pyrrhus returned in the year 477, and restored his army

in the most wonderful way. He had many old soldiers from the army of

Agathocles, deserters also from the Carthaginians, and others; he now

called upon the Tarentines and all the Italians: his army--but most

likely this is an exaggeration--is said to have amounted to eighty

thousand men. He encamped near Taurasia, not far from Beneventum,

being opposed by Curius, who, it seems, had only one army. Pyrrhus was

now already disheartened; he had lost all faith in his invincibility;

dark forebodings and dreams haunted him;--not that he had entirely

lost courage, but his spirit was no more what it had once been. His

dispositions for attacking Curius were beautiful; too much, however,

was left in them to chance, and his luck had forsaken him. His plan

was, that a large body should go round the Roman camp, which was on

the side of a hill, and storm it from above at day break, whilst he,

at the same time, attacked it from below. But as in night marches

people always arrive later than is calculated, the troops which had

been sent, lost their way; the king was waiting for the preconcerted

signal for him to advance while it was still night, and before it

appeared, it became broad day. The Romans then learned that there were

enemies behind them on the mountains; on which they quickly formed, and

the camp was easily defended, whilst the main body faced the army of

Pyrrhus. As they were now already trained to fight against elephants,

they took burning arrows wrapped round with tow, which, when shot with

sufficient force, penetrated into the hide of the beast with such

friction, that the oakum and the pitch caught fire, and maddened it:

they had tried this already at Ascalum, and they now practised it on a

far larger scale. One dam, in particular, whose young one was wounded,

became furious, and in her rage turned against her own masters. The

Epirotes were overpowered, the phalanx utterly broken, and the rout

complete; even the camp could not be maintained: Pyrrhus retired to

Tarentum. The Romans, besides their other booty, had taken eight

elephants. The affair was now decided. Pyrrhus’ only thought was to

abandon the whole undertaking; yet he did not wish entirely to give up

what he possessed in Italy. He therefore left Milo behind in Tarentum

with a considerable force, which was strong enough to keep the enemy

from a siege, but was a dreadful nuisance for the place itself. The

Romans now turned against the several peoples which they had to subdue,

while Pyrrhus made use of a stratagem to get off. For he caused the

report to be spread among the Tarentines, that he intended, first to

settle matters in Macedon, and then to come back again with the whole

power of that country: and really he may have had some thoughts of

the kind. He now returned with a feeble force to Epirus, after having

been away for six years. There he found ample room for enterprises.

Antigonus Gonatas, when scarcely raised to the Macedonian throne, was

abandoned by his troops, and the whole of the land proclaimed Pyrrhus

king; the Macedonians soon became exasperated by the excesses of his

Gallic mercenaries, and again sided with Antigonus. Pyrrhus then

transferred the war into the Peloponnesus, and undertook an expedition

against Sparta, in which he well nigh succeeded; but the victory was

snatched from him when the Epirotes had already entered the town.

Fortune always showed him success very near, in order to wrest it from

him again. From thence he marched to Argos, having been called in by

the republican party against the aristocrats and the tyrant Aristippus,

who had summoned Antigonus to their aid. In a fight with the latter,

within the town itself, Pyrrhus was killed by a woman with a tile. The

history of those times is so scanty, that we do not even know the year

in which this great prince died.

Two years after Pyrrhus had left Italy, L. Papirius the younger and Sp.

Carvilius completed the reduction of Samnium (480). It was indeed in

the confident hope that they would effect this, that they were chosen:

both of them, about five and twenty years before, in the third Samnite

war, had fought the most decisive campaign. The Samnites saw that they

could not struggle against fate, and they saved themselves by a peace,

which, however painful it might be, could not, after all, be called

disgraceful: it was in reality rather a subjection than a peace. We

have no accurate knowledge of its conditions. Thus much is clear, that

the confederacy, of which there were only three cantons left, was

broken up, and that the Samnite peoples, as such, continued to exist

singly. They were to bind themselves _ad majestatem populi Romani

comiter colendam_.

The same Papirius, as consul, or proconsul, took Tarentum. In that

town, Milo had remained behind with a few thousand Epirote troops. Milo

behaved altogether like a rough general, in fact as a distinguished

captain of brigands, like the Spanish generals in the Netherlands: the

military thought themselves allowed to do anything; the term _latro_

is most aptly applied to them. We must imagine Milo to have been a

man like Ali Pacha of Janina and his followers: he was capable of the

deepest dissimulation, no promise, no oath was sacred to him. We have

no idea of what a φρουρά then was, even of friendly troops:--one must

for this be acquainted with the thirty years’ war and that of the

Netherlands;--it was just like a quartering of robbers, about the same

as the soldiers of the “Catholic League” in the thirty years’ war: the

Roman discipline was infinitely better. Milo was a thorough scoundrel.

He gave the Tarentines to understand that he would negotiate the peace

for them, and then leave the town; instead of which, he sold the

town and surrendered the citadel to the Romans, the Tarentines fully

believing all the time, that the peace was about to be proclaimed. One

morning, they were most dismally awakened when Milo had opened to the

Romans the gates of the Acropolis, and had himself embarked. The Romans

must then already have carried off very many precious things. The walls

were partly pulled down; all those who were still alive from the time

of the outrage against Postumius were butchered. The Romans boast of

having restored to the town its liberty, which means, that they left to

it its existence, and allowed the inhabitants the possession of their

landed property, and their own magistrates; but a Roman legion was long

quartered at Tarentum, and the Tarentines had to pay a contribution, as

did all the Greek towns, beginning with Naples, (unless, like Heraclea,

they were treated with particular favour,) in contradistinction to

the Italian ones, from which the Romans, on the other hand, exacted

military service. Only ships were likewise furnished by the Greek towns.

The Lucanians, Bruttians, Sallentines, Picentines, Sarsinates,

Umbrians, now gradually acknowledged Rome’s supremacy; but in most

cases, not before they had kicked against the pricks, and thereby

made their fate worse. The conditions were various. Bruttium had to

yield to the Romans half of the forest of Sila, which is of great

value for shipbuilding; and thus the Romans acquired revenues, as

well as supremacy, in all these countries. They now built a new chain

of fortresses, as the first one of the Samnite war was no longer

sufficient; on the Adriatic, Brundusium; and also on the lower sea,

the sea-port towns of Pyrgi and others. Ten years after the departure

of Pyrrhus, Rome was already mistress of the borders of the Romagna,

Ferrara, Ravenna, the marshes of Pisa, and the river Macra, as far as

the Japygian promontory; and thus she became the most powerful and

compact state in all the world then known. She had also a great number

of free allies, and she so conducted herself, that we clearly see that

there must have been at that time a general law which settled the

position of the Italian _socii_: the object of this is plain, it being

gradually to form out of them one Roman people. The allies had indeed

to blame themselves for having so long struggled against the will of

fate. The different nations managed their own affairs themselves;

they had their own laws, languages, and dialects; only Rome was their

centre, and they were in due time to rub off whatever was incongruous

with it. Italy was divided with reference to taxation, and placed

under a certain number of quæstors, who collected the revenue. Hence

their number was increased from four to eight, as the farmed revenues

of the republic had to be gathered in. Isopolity seems to have been

introduced for nearly all the peoples of Oscan and Sabellian stock:

the Etruscans had a law of their own. In this system, the share was

fixed which each of the nations had to take in every war. There must

have been a sort of rotation for the military service, although

discretionary power was given to the consuls, to state on entering

into office to the commissaries of the allies, who had then to find

themselves at Rome, how many auxiliaries each had to furnish. The

rules in which it is laid down, how much of the _ager publicus_ of

the Romans should be allotted to them, in what proportion they should

be allowed to share in the colonies which were founded, date likewise

from this period. It was settled with regard to all the allies of Rome,

how they should be capable of acquiring the rights of Roman citizens;

and, that too many might not be withdrawn from their homes, the rule

was made, that whoever migrated to Rome was to leave one member of his

family behind in the land of his birth. Every thing that belonged to

the burthen of military service, was regulated by general laws. If we

compare the relation of the allies in other countries of antiquity to

the state which held the hegemony, the result is most favourable to

the Romans. Their allies were placed on a very honourable footing: for

instance, they had to furnish for their soldiers nothing but the pay;

their food was provided by Rome. No new legislation took place: the

old constitution was merely consolidated, and some particular points

defined.

The most important event of that time, is the chastisement which the

Romans inflicted on the legion of Rhegium. The Campanians had furnished

a legion for the Roman service, and, properly speaking, in rank they

stood quite equal to the Romans, as they still had the old right of

the _municipium_: Rome had the superiority _de facto_ only. When the

Romans had got up eight legions against Pyrrhus, there was among them a

Campanian one. This was placed as a garrison in Rhegium, to keep that

Greek town in submission, which indeed at a former period had placed

itself under the protection of the Romans, but now wanted to unite with

Pyrrhus. Several of the Greek cities had already freed themselves by

treachery from such garrisons: a like charge was also brought against

the people of Rhegium. The Campanian general, Decius Jubellius, formed

the resolution of making himself master of the town, and to overcome

all the scruples of his troops, he caused forged letters of the people

of Rhegium to Pyrrhus to be read, as if they intended to betray the

garrison to the king; whereupon the soldiers engaged in a dreadful

massacre, butchering the male inhabitants, and seizing upon the women

and children, just as eight years before, the Mamertines had done

at Messana. The Romans had nothing to do with this foul crime; and

at the end of the war, when these men had already held the town ten

years, they marched to Rhegium. The soldiers had put themselves out

of the pale of all the rights of man, and did not consider any pardon

to be possible; they therefore, reckoning perhaps on the help of the

Carthaginians, tried to stand their ground. The Carthaginian general in

Sicily ought to have acted here with determination; yet this was too

hazardous, owing to the state of feeling in Carthage: had fortune been

unpropitious, he would have been sacrificed. The siege lasted a long

while, and the Carthaginians did not interfere with it at all; at last

the town was taken by storm. Out of the four thousand, there were three

hundred still alive: these were carried to Rome, and beheaded there.

The treaty between the Romans and the Carthaginians had more than

once been renewed and modified according to circumstances, especially

with regard to the rule of Carthage in Sicily and Sardinia; at last,

before the peace of Pyrrhus, they had concluded a formal alliance, and

had bound themselves not to make any separate peace. When, however,

Pyrrhus was in Sicily, both nations became exceedingly jealous of each

other; and when in the second year of the war with Pyrrhus, a fleet

of a hundred and twenty Carthaginian ships arrived before Ostia, and

placed itself under the disposition of the Romans, the latter sent

it back, though with the utmost courtesy. Afterwards, a Carthaginian

fleet appeared in the roadstead of Tarentum to negociate with Milo for

the surrender of the town. This evidently made the Romans hasten their

speed; and they concluded their bargain in a hurry, and paid more than

they would otherwise have done. This is the first misunderstanding

between Rome and Carthage; yet strange to say, not even a hint of it is

given by Polybius, although other writers mention it: and this is the

more wonderful, as nothing could have induced Polybius to conceal it;

for he is a most honest historian.

During the siege of Rhegium, the Romans entered into an alliance with

Hiero of Syracuse, the first ever made with a Greek out of Italy. Hiero

supported them vigorously; for it was his object to recover Messana.

This would be much easier for him to do, if the people of Rhegium were

destroyed, and he hoped to get from the Romans the furtherance of his

ends. But the siege being protracted, the services of Hiero were half

forgotten, and the Romans rather chose to do what formerly they would

have been ashamed of.

The first occasion of the wretchedness which spread over Sicily, was

the unfortunate expedition of the Athenian fleet to Sicily,--the νῆες

ἀρχέκακοι, to speak in the words of the poet, the first link of the

whole fatal chain. This expedition was a blunder; for even if it had

been successful, it was extremely difficult to take advantage of it;

yet it is pardonable in a people full of imagination, and which felt a

strong call for action, to have allowed itself to be beguiled into such

an enterprise. The Athenians were first called in by the Chalcidian

towns, owing to the miserable hatred between the Doric and Ionic race,

which is likewise found in the colonies; but the great expedition under

Alcibiades was caused by the Segestæans, a Pelasgian or Doric people,

at the foot of Mount Eryx in Western Sicily, which was hard pressed

by the Selinuntians, who were Ionians: this expedition, as is well

known, altogether miscarried. When the Syracusans had now become the

sole masters of the island, the Segestæans, dreading their vengeance

for having sought the help of the Athenians, betook themselves to the

Carthaginians as their refuge; and these, with a large army, conquered

Gela, Camarina, and other towns, and encamped before Syracuse, where at

that time Dionysius became tyrant. After a war of many vicissitudes, in

which Dionysius, during the second campaign, by the conquest of Motye

(the surviving inhabitants of which became the founders of Lilybæum),

seemed to get the upperhand, so that there was every appearance that

the Carthaginians would be entirely swept from the island; the peace

was concluded by which these were left in possession of the territories

of Selinus and Himera, consequently of a third of Sicily. The country

was now infamously governed by Dionysius the Younger, rent by domestic

struggles under Dion, and again restored to peace by Timoleon. The

latter defeated the Carthaginians, to whom the conquered province

remained indeed, but on condition that the Greeks might recover their

towns in it. Now follows a time of peace and happiness in Grecian

Sicily; then the dreadful usurpation of Agathocles, and his stormy

reign which was so full of change. This period has often been thought

to have been one of mildness and justice; but it was rather an age

which made the reign of Dionysius to be wished for again, an era of

humanity and prosperity. Agathocles was no common man; but he was a

monster: he wasted the marrow and heart’s blood of the country, that

he might surround himself with splendour. The way in which Sicily was

wasted under this tyrant, and afterwards, was so frightful, that one

cannot understand, how tillage and population could have continued in

such a country; and especially how Syracuse could have been one of

the greatest cities in the world. His wars, on the whole, were marked

by awful calamities; their renown for having been brilliant cannot

be gainsayed: the peace which he made at last with the Carthaginians

was fair enough. The hand of an avenging God was evidently upon him.

Feuds broke out in his own family: he was poisoned, as we can hardly

doubt, by his son or his grandson; but he did not die, he was only

dangerously ill, and he was burned while yet half alive. The curse

which lay on the house of Lysimachus, was also manifest in him. After

his death, democracy was brought in again at Syracuse; yet it was not

able to keep its ground, and the island fell into utter decay. The

Carthaginians had laid Agrigentum waste in the days of Dionysius; it

had somewhat recovered since, and after the death of Agathocles, it

became independent under Phintias, a prince of its own. The condition

of Sicily, even as early as the period described in the letters known

under Plato’s name, was such, that the Hellenic races were threatened

with being crushed by the Pœni and Oscans. This was after the death of

Agathocles, and for this reason I believe that the so-called letters of

Plato--the earlier ones at least, the seventh and the eighth--date from

that time; for, old they are, and they still belong to the classical

era, though they are not genuine, that is to say, not as old as Plato.

Bentley says that there are two ways of proving the spurious character

of a writing, from its contents, and from the language. Against the

former, very little can be objected here; with regard, however, to the

seventh and eighth letters, some discussion might be raised not only

about the language, but also the contents, which evidently bear the

stamp of an age later than that of Plato. We have, for example, the

prophecy that the Greek race would perish, and in the whole island

Oscan or Phœnician be spoken. Agathocles had carried on his wars by

means of mercenaries who were most of them barbarians; many were

Samnites, Lucanians and Oscans, under which last name, at that time,

all the Sabellian peoples also were comprehended. We never find that

Romans served in foreign armies; on the other hand, there were Etruscan

troops in Sicily, especially Mamertines, which is the common name for

the Oscan mercenaries, and indeed we meet with them there at a time

when Rome was at war with their mother country. This shows quite a

different relation of the individual to the state among the Romans,

than among the other nations; and this also accounts for the power of

the Romans. The feeble hands which, after the death of Agathocles, took

the reins of government, were not able to manage these troops, and so

they gave them money to return to Italy. While on their way, these came

to Messana to embark. The people there, unmindful of the curse which,

once upon a time, had been uttered against them by the Zanclæans, whom

they had faithlessly driven out, received them into their houses; but

they massacred the inhabitants, and set themselves up as a nation under

the name of Mamertines, and many other Oscans flocked in to them. The

outrages which these hireling soldiers committed, may be likened to

those which took place in the year 1576, in the Netherlands, when the

mercenary troops sacked whole towns to pay themselves for their wages:

this was among others the fate of Maestricht. The Oscan colony was in a

league with the people of Rhegium, and supported them; and the Romans

only mastered them with the help of Hiero.

Hiero was of an old and noble race in Syracuse. Some there were,

who, perhaps to flatter him, derived his pedigree from Hiero

the son of Dinomenes; so that at a time when the state could be

prosperously governed by a monarchy alone,--which could only be by a

usurpation,--his circumstances peculiarly favoured him for it. He was

first nominated general; and then, by the soldiers, king. They could

not have wished for a better master. During his reign, which lasted

nearly sixty years, was the first Punic war of twenty-four years; and,

of course, the resources of his kingdom were most severely taxed.

Nevertheless, he displayed so much good sense and economy, and he was

withal such a mild ruler, that the Syracusans felt free, and, during

the last twenty years of his government, happy. In his youth he was

also warlike; but this habit he quite lost. One incident of his life,

which is told by the scholiast on the Ibis of Ovid, is seldom noticed.

He is said to have had Theocritus put to death on account of a satire,

which is very likely to have been done by a Greek ruler of those days.

It was the object of Hiero’s endeavours to reduce the Mamertines.

Syracuse had only a few dependent towns; Catana and Taurominium were

allies. The Carthaginians had gotten Agrigentum, and had extended

their frontiers as far as Gela and Camarina, as after the first peace

with Dionysius; if Hiero could but have Messana, he hoped to have in

the Romans a support against the Carthaginians. With these he was

obliged to conclude a peace, in which he yielded to them the conquered

places: he was, however, on very good terms with them, as far as

outward appearances went. When by straining a point in his morality,

he had got rid of his old mutinous mercenaries, whom he betrayed in

the war, and allowed to be slaughtered by the Mamertines; he formed a

new army, and taking the field against the latter, who had spread on

the north-eastern third of the island, he won a decisive battle. To

this refers the beautiful idyll Χάριτες of Theocritus, a poet, from

whom we may form an idea of the freshness of spirit which there was

then in Sicily. Hiero had peace with the Carthaginians, in order not to

have them for enemies; and they forced upon him their support; they

both of them together besieged Messana. Under these circumstances,

the Mamertines saw no help. Hiero wished to exterminate them, as the

destroyers of the Greek population; the Carthaginians had the same

object in view, but not from the same reason. They also wanted to root

them out; because as Oscans and Italians, these were of the same stock

with the Romans, and might easily one day open to them the way into

the island. Without doubt, they likewise thought of use Hiero merely

as their tool, and to get the town for themselves; for, the _fides

Punica_ cannot after all so entirely be denied. In this dilemma, the

Mamertines applied to the Romans. But it was absurd (ἄτοπον is the

expression of Polybius) for the Romans, after having hunted down the

allies of the Italians in Rhegium, to go and take the part of others

who had done the self-same thing. The evil spirit of lust of power had,

however, already got hold of the Romans: they were afraid, lest the

Carthaginians should put themselves in possession of Messana, where,

if these once gained a firm footing, they would find themselves sadly

taken in by their false delicacy. And this is also true, that Carthage

would have become for Rome, just as invulnerable as England was for

Napoleon. The Carthaginians had betrayed their views on Italy when they

sent the fleet to Tarentum. From Messana and its excellent harbour,

they would have had an opportunity of easily sailing over to Calabria;

whereas at present their nearest harbour was Panormus, from which they

could not easily have undertaken such a daring enterprise. The Italians

in Rhegium, it was contended, had disgraced the Roman name; but the

sins of the Mamertines in foreign lands, Rome had nothing to do with.

The most enlightened and moral policy would now have been, to exert

themselves to make Hiero master of Messana, and to gain him over for an

ally. This only seemed hazardous, because in that case, the Mamertines

might have opened their gates to the Carthaginians.

The Roman senate had come to no resolution; nay it seems that from the

fear of doing an unworthy act, or from motives of morality, it declined

the offer. If the constitution had been the same as of yore, that μηδὲν

ἀπροβούλευτον, nothing could be brought to the centuries, but what was

laid before it by the senate, the affair would have been decided; but

now the tribunes, without even calling upon the senate, could go at

once to the people, and the latter resolved upon giving help to the

Mamertines. Polybius accounts for this step by the circumstance that

the people, being burthened with debts, had looked forward to a war,

that they might enrich themselves; if this view be correct, it shows,

that by this time already, the poorer classes had the upperhand in the

assembly. Yet it is likely that Polybius puts forth that motive, only

because he so thought it, and there may have been some others. At any

rate, the resolution was foolhardy. The Carthaginians were masters of

the sea, and the Romans had not one ship of war; they had even in the

conquered sea-ports destroyed all the galleys of Etruria and of other

countries, perhaps in order to prevent piracy, and to escape from the

responsibility which might thus have fallen upon them. To transport

their troops from Rhegium to Messana, they had no other vessels but a

few triremes and penteconters belonging to Greek towns, as Polybius

tells us. Pliny, on the other hand, says that the Romans had for this

purpose in forty days built three hundred triremes; and indeed a

small quantity would not have been enough. From Rhegium, the Romans

treated with the Mamertines. These had already received into their

town a Carthaginian general, but either without any troops at all, or

with only very few: by what stratagem they got him away, is more than

we know. Appius Claudius at first went over with a small body; soon

afterwards, the whole of the army followed. The Carthaginians, whose

fleet was lying near Pelorus, tried to hinder their passage; but the

Romans took advantage of the wind and tide, and got speedily over by

this mad daring. The Carthaginians, who had protected Messana against

Rome, now united, as has been mentioned before, with Hiero, and both

blockaded the town from different sides; probably the Carthaginians

from the North, Hiero from the South. The communication between

the two might be difficult; Messana being situated near a mountain

of considerable extent, it was easy for the Romans to make a sally

and to defeat Hiero separately. He made a stout resistance; but the

Syracusan phalanx was not able to withstand the Roman legions. After

this victory, the latter turned against the Carthaginians, and, as it

seems, without any declaration of war. The Carthaginians retreated,

and the Romans advanced without any hindrance. In the following year,

489, they reached the walls of Syracuse under Valerius Messalla, who is

thus surnamed from Messana. Taurominium, Catana, and other towns opened

their gates to them, and they made preparations likewise to besiege

Syracuse; but Hiero still succeeded in making a peace. A very small

state only was left to him, but he retained the sovereignty of it: he

paid a small war contribution, and concluded an offensive and defensive

alliance with the Romans.

Here should be the beginning of the first Punic war; but for the sake

of connexion, it is usually dated from the passage over the strait.