The cause of this war is to be traced to Neapolis and Palæopolis, the
old Parthenope. Palæopolis we find mentioned only in Livy; it was an
old colony of Cumæ, the citizens of which had fled for refuge thither
across the sea. Neapolis has its name from its being a much later
settlement of different Greek peoples: it was probably first founded
Ol. 91, about the time of the Athenian expedition against Sicily, as a
bulwark of the Greeks against the Sabellian nations. The Athenians may
have had a share in its foundation. Both of the towns were, however, of
Chalcidian origin, and constituted a confederate state, which at that
time may perhaps have been in possession of Ischia. About the site of
Palæopolis, a great deal of worthless stuff has been written, most of
all by the Italian antiquaries; we have nothing whatever to build upon
besides the two statements in Livy, that Palæopolis was by the side of
Neapolis, and that the Roman camp was pitched between the two towns.
The old Neapolis undoubtedly lay in the centre of the present city,
above the church of Sta. Rosa, the sea having now considerably receded.
People, however, sought for Palæopolis likewise within the present
city, without considering whether an army could have had room enough
between the two towns. I should never have found out the site. A French
diplomatist, my friend De Serre, who had been an officer in his youth,
and thus had the quick eye of a soldier, discovered it when he was
taking a walk with me. The town was on the outer side of the Posilipo,
where the lazaretto now stands, a nice healthy place in the direction
of Nisida and Limon: perhaps there was in old times a harbour there;
both of the isles have very good harbours. This was also the natural
communication with Ischia: the Posilipo with its prolongations lay
between the two towns in an interval of less than half a German mile;
here the Roman army could have encamped on the mountains, and thus the
two towns have been cut off from each other. Monuments and coins of
Palæopolis are, however, no more to be found. According to the usual
supposition, the two towns would have been so near together, that the
missiles from the walls of either might have reached the other.
The cause of the hostilities was piracy, or at least attacks by sea
against the unprotected merchant-ships of the Romans; who at that time
had no fleet, and, strange to say, wanted to disregard the sea, as if
indeed it could be disregarded. Complaints about the division of the
Falernian territory might likewise have had something to do with it.
Many people, in such divisions, of course sold their lots, and so
this became a running sore to Rome. Yet if the people of Palæopolis
were on this ground at enmity with Rome, the reproach of piracy, which
Dionysius puts forth in such a declamatory style, is quite uncalled
for; as it is but natural that they should try to harass the trade of
a hostile people. The Neapolitans, relying on their alliances with
the Samnites and the people of Nola, refused the satisfaction which
the Romans demanded from them. Nola had an Oscan population with
Chalcidian immigrants: how much the inhabitants were hellenized, may
be seen from the Greek stamp of the coins, which bear the inscription
ΝΩΛΑΙΩΝ. On the whole, the friendliness between the Samnites and the
Greeks is striking: Strabo calls them φιλέλληνες. The Samnites, having
no literature of their own, were certainly open to the Greek one: they
even tried to talk like the Greeks themselves. Romans and Greeks were
always on bad terms with each other; Lucanians and Greeks also were
enemies, although the Lucanians partook of Greek civilization: it is
certainly no fable that the Pythagorean philosophy was homebred among
them. The statement that Pythagoras was a Tyrrhenian of the isles, has
no doubt this meaning, that the roots of the Pythagorean philosophy, so
far as it is theological, are for the most part to be sought among the
Pelasgians in the religion of Samothrace.
Samnite auxiliaries, amounting to four thousand men, together with two
thousand Nolans, threw themselves into the towns of Palæopolis and
Neapolis: the Tarentines also are mentioned as those who had stirred
up Palæopolis. The Tarentines and Samnites were very closely allied;
and the former spent their money in getting up a distant war against
Rome. The Romans looked upon the occupation of Palæopolis by the
Samnites as an act of hostility, and complained of it to the assembly
at Samnium. The evacuation was a moral impossibility; and the answer
was, that one must not quibble about single grievances, that war was
what they wanted, and war they should have. The national assemblies
confirmed this answer. In the meanwhile, the siege of Palæopolis had
lasted a long time, and the Romans had no prospect of success; their
own practice in sieges was still in its very infancy, and the Greeks
opposed to them considerable technical skill: their assaults were
therefore without effect, and the sea remained free. But what force
could not do, treachery brought about. Neapolis had ships of war with
which frequent attacks may have been made against the Roman coasts,
which the Romans were not able to protect: the Samnite garrison, at
least to all appearance, lay for the greater part in Palæopolis, the
Greeks in Neapolis. Two Greeks, Charilaus and Nymphæus, now betrayed
the Samnites to the Roman consul Publilius Philo. They proposed an
expedition against the Roman coast, and the Samnites marched out of
the town ready to embark. The towns were on the side of the harbour
enclosed with walls, so the conspirators now shut the gates behind
them, and let the Romans in by another gate; the ships had also in the
mean time cast off from the shore, and the Samnites were obliged to
save themselves as they best could. Palæopolis disappears, and without
doubt was destroyed on this occasion. Neapolis (Naples) obtained a
favourable alliance; so the conspirators must have been Neapolitans.
This acquisition was of great importance to the Romans; for they thus
got possession of the two harbours of Naples and Nisida, the only
places from which inroads against their territory could possibly be
made by sea. This conquest was achieved by Q. Publilius Philo _pro
Consule_: he is the first whose consular power was on the motion of a
tribune prolonged by a _Senatus consultum_ and a _Plebiscitum_ (429),
his own law on the _plebiscita_ being now applied to him. This is a
great change in the constitution: a magistracy was created, new in its
nature, though not in its form. Until then, no one had triumphed out of
his time of holding office; Publilius triumphed as proconsul.
Now begins the second Samnite war, by far the greatest, most
interesting, and most wonderful, that of Hannibal excepted. On the
whole, it is only with much trouble that we can arrive at somewhat
satisfactory results concerning it. Where the battles were fought, is
in most cases passed over in silence. Livy has described it, sometimes
with a great deal of spirit, at other times with weariness, which comes
from his manner of composing. He had set to work without preparation;
and therefore he wrote indeed with much freshness, but in a way which
was detrimental to anything like criticism or comprehensiveness of
view. If he had made a better use of his annals, we might have a
clearer insight. It is a pity that the books of Dionysius on this war
have been lost: the few fragments in Appian, who copied from him, and
in Constantinus Porphyrogenitus, throw a bright light on many points;
for with regard to these times, Dionysius must have been excellent,
as the annals were now already quite enough to make out real history
from, if one searched as diligently through them as Dionysius did.
Even in that age, there were some detached anonymous chronicles,
dry and obscure as to details. That isochronistic historiography
commences only a hundred years afterwards, does not prejudice this
case. Unfortunately, Livy has made no use whatever of the old materials
which formed the groundwork of the annals; whenever, therefore, their
statements are conflicting, he chooses from among them just what he
likes, and is in most instances quite wrong. Livy does not give us a
comprehensive view of this war, which lasted for twenty-two years;
I succeeded only very late in forming a clear outline of it: it is
divided into several periods.
The first period is from 429 to 433. At its beginning, the behaviour of
the Samnites seems to us quite strange. They had wished for war; and
yet we find them unprepared, and conscious of not being able to carry
it through. The instigators must have lost their popularity. It was
the same with the Athenians in the Peloponnesian war; after the first
and second campaigns, they wished for peace: so did the Venetians after
the battle of Ghiera d’Adda. In England, during the year 1793, the
war against France was quite popular (I was there myself part of the
time); people had not forgotten the meddling conduct of France in the
American war; much was still hoped from the colonies, and the national
hatred on the whole was very great. But when the war was badly managed,
and the power of France increased, it became thoroughly unpopular,
and there was a general outcry for peace: the ministers very wisely
yielded, and entered into negotiations. Then the nation saw that peace
was not possible; new efforts were made, and in 1798 and 1799 the war
again was highly popular; after that it was once more unpopular. Thus
it happened also with the Samnites. The Romans carried the war in quite
a different manner from what these had expected; they saw that their
hopes had not been fulfilled, and wished now for peace. Afterwards,
however, things completely changed. As the war went on, it became a
passion like gambling, especially, of course, when it was not waged
successfully. People will not then draw back; they will sooner perish
than give themselves up to the mercy of the conqueror, and the war
becomes a guerilla struggle. Towards the middle of it therefore, under
much greater disasters, the feeling of the Samnites becomes evident,
that peace was impossible.
The Samnites, as was mentioned before, consisted of four states,
each of which had the _imperium_ in its turn. This was an immense
disadvantage. Whenever a general was chosen, the hatred and the
jealousy there then was among the different leaders may be imagined:
if a great man, like Pontius, held the _imperium_, and if it luckily
happened that the other prætors were honest men, great results might
be arrived at; but all was changed again the year after. Confederate
states always have a heartfelt hatred against each other: thus it is
in America; thus it was in the army of the empire, where one general
was exceedingly glad, if another, who was his confederate, was beaten.
Had the Samnites been unanimous, they would have been more than a
match for the Romans; but the latter got the better of them, owing
to the perfection of the institutions: for the most varied, and even
conflicting elements, were all concentrated by the mere power of the
Roman mind. In the practice of warfare, the Samnites were certainly
equal to the Romans: according to Sallust, the Romans had adopted from
them their arms, and perhaps the whole of their military science; at
least, we find in the battles both armies formed quite in the same
way, and they fought against each other as equals, which is proved by
the accounts of the battles. And here I must give a flat contradiction
to general Vaudoncourt, who asserts that the Italian, Spanish, and
African nations fought in phalanx: their strength was in the sword.
The Italians had cohorts, and in all likelihood used the _pila_, like
the Romans. The Samnites, as it seems, had belonging to them subject
commonalties, or dependencies: the country from Frentum to Luceria
was either thus dependent, or formed into a canton of its own; but
the connexion was so slight, that the inhabitants of Frentum entirely
separated themselves in the course of the war. North of the Samnites,
was the confederacy of the Marsians, Marrucinians, Vestinians, and
Pelignians: of these, the Vestinians were friends to the Samnites;
the others were quite neutral, or had even placed themselves under
the protection of the Romans. Thus the Samnites were in a very bad
plight; but if, as undoubtedly it was their plan, they had carried on
the war along the Liris as far as Capua, they could certainly have
kept the Romans at bay. The Romans, however, had a far bolder plan.
Just as formerly in the Latin war, they described a semicircle round
Samnium; but with much greater risk than at that time. The Samnites
were intensely hated by the Apulians; the latter, the ruling tribes
of whom were Oscan, may have partly overpowered, partly incorporated
with themselves, and partly driven out the old Pelasgian inhabitants.
The country of Apulia is a basin in the midst of mountains; it is
like a theatre. The hills are ranged in the form of a horseshoe, and
they likewise belong to Apulia; but the country directly below these
mountains is a tableland, exceedingly hot, with a chalky soil, almost
like Leon in Spain. They had two chief towns, Arpi and Canusium, both
of which ruled over a large territory, and were very jealous of each
other. At that time, the Samnites had conquered the eastern mountains
of Luceria, and may also have harassed the plain. Tarentum was on
their side; the Apulians therefore turned themselves to the Romans,
and by their mediation may have gained much. It was a grand resolve,
to transport the Roman army into Apulia. There were two roads; one,
through the country of the Æquians (who were friendly with the Romans),
from Tivoli upwards, by the lake of Celano, and by Sulmona, across
the narrow district of Samnium; the other, through the country of the
Sabines, in the direction of Reate, Civita Ducale, and through the
terrible defiles of Antrodoco (the Interocrea of the ancients), the
nature of which is such that a brave people may hold out there for
an extraordinary length of time, although they were so disgracefully
abandoned by the Neapolitans in 1821; then as far as Pescara on the
eastern coast, and thus by an immense way round to Apulia. They may
have taken both roads at different times; at first, the former one.
Now, as long as the Romans were not sure of the Vestinians, and on
the other hand were on friendly terms with the other nations, they
might indeed have chosen the road first spoken of; as on the second,
the Vestinians were the only one of the four northern Sabellian
peoples whose country they were to cross, in order to get to Apulia,
whilst they had besides to fight their way through the land of the
Frentanians. But if they had chosen the first road, the Marsians and
Pelignians would as certainly have withstood them, as the Vestinians
on the other; for it was their interest, not to let the Romans advance
into Apulia. As the Vestinians are now mentioned as being friendly,
it is evident that the army marched by Antrodoco. If the Samnites had
been united, they would indeed have made every exertion to support
the Vestinians. This was not done, and therefore the Romans overthrew
the Vestinians, and reduced them to subjection. They now got a firm
footing in Apulia, and thus compelled the northern confederacy to keep
on a good understanding with them. It was a great advantage, to be in
possession of Apulia. The country of the four Sabellian peoples, and
also the territories of the northern Samnites, Pentrians, Bovians, and
even the Frentanians, are mountain districts and pasture lands on the
Abruzzi; during winter, these tracts are covered with snow, and it
is then impossible to keep the sheep there; they are therefore sent
during that season into Apulia, which is then clothed with fine and
excellent grass; in the spring, the shepherd again takes them to the
mountains. These broad features, which belong to Nature herself, are
necessarily lasting, and were the same in times of old as they are now.
That in those days already there was much sheep-breeding, is proved by
the wool-dying manufactories of Tarentum. When the Romans were now in
possession of Apulia, they protected the pastures of their allies, and
consequently obliged the Marsians, Pelignians, and others, to come to
friendly terms with them: they also harassed the northern Samnites.
This was therefore no blind undertaking, but one which was completely
justified by the nature of the countries: the Romans for all that would
not run the hazard, until they saw that it could not be avoided.
Another alliance, besides the Apulian, the Romans had with the
Lucanians. These are called a Samnite colony, which is to be
understood in a different meaning, from that in which a town-colony is
so called: the Lucanians are most likely an offshoot of the Samnites,
which had severed itself from the mainstock. They were dwelling amidst
Œnotrians (the old Pelasgians), and Greeks; and even as the Samnites
were Sabellians become Oscan, so were the Lucanians Œnotrians become
Samnite. They had spread, from about Ol. 80, since the downfall of
Sybaris, which opened these districts to the Italic peoples: in what
relation the Lucanians and Samnites had formerly stood to each other,
is uncertain. The territory of Lucania is larger than that of Samnium,
yet there is never a corresponding proportion between the power of
the two peoples; never, as we see from the rolls of the census, were
the Lucanians strong, not even in later times, when the Samnites had
been already considerably weakened; the number of their _capita_ did
not amount to any thing like half that of the Samnites, not to so
many as thirty thousand. This shows, that the greater part of the
Lucanian population had no share in the sovereignty: in single places
only, as, for instance, in Petelia, it was more concentrated; it was
a country rent by factions. A portion of them resolved upon uniting
with the Romans; this must, however, have been a small majority,
as a revolution soon followed, in consequence of which this league
was broken up, and the Samnites were called in to garrison their
strongholds. This alliance of the Lucanians and Romans is known to
us from Livy: we are, however, considerably to modify what he states
besides, that the Tarentines, frightened at the power of the Romans,
had persuaded the chief men among the Lucanians to tell the people,
that their ambassadors had been cruelly treated by the Romans; and that
the Lucanians, exasperated by it, had thrown themselves into the arms
of the Samnites. This is the same tale as that which is told of Zopyrus
and of Sextus Tarquin. Traitorous party spirit is in Greece also but
too prevalent in the later ages. The Samnites are therefore masters of
Lucania, and turn its resources in men and money to their own account.
These wars, as far as we are able to get a view of them, are from the
very beginning exceedingly interesting, owing to the resolution, skill,
and steadiness with which the combats were fought. On both sides, it
was a struggle for life and death; they aimed at each other’s hearts,
like two good swordsmen in a duel: if Hannibal, after the battle
of Cannæ, had shown the same determination; if he had not been too
cautious, but had pushed his thrusts against the heart of Rome, even as
the Samnites did, he would have won. Both parties reckoned much on the
discontent of each other’s dependents. The Samnites had their frontier
above Sora in the Abruzzi, Casinum being their chief town: from that
mountain-range they seem always to have chosen the direction of their
operations; from thence they also acted on the offensive, and in fact
with the express purpose of stirring up a rising of the Latin peoples,
who had been still independent so late as fourteen years before, and
were therefore ripe for revolt. The traces of this partial insurrection
are slurred over in Livy, notwithstanding which they may still be
found,--especially those of a rising at Tusculum in conjunction with
Privernum and Velitræ: but the Romans always put down these outbreaks,
and in consequence, many of these Latin towns were ruined. All this is
only to be guessed from detached intimations; for instance, from the
motion of a tribune utterly to destroy the Tusculans, which, however,
was not carried. To this we must also refer the story which sounds so
strange in Livy, of people suddenly flocking together at night, as if
the enemy were in the city; for as the armies were far removed, it was
quite natural, that a rising of the Latins should spread terror to the
very walls of Rome.
The Samnites tried to advance immediately to Rome by the Apennines,
at the sources of the Liris; at the same time, the Romans passed the
Vulturnus, and endeavoured to make an inroad into Campania by Saticula,
and from thence into Samnium. Both parties little heeded where the
blows of the enemy might fall, if they could only successfully deal
their own. They both of them found their advantage in this mode of
warfare; the Romans, that while the Samnites only laid waste the
territory of the allies, they for their part struck at the Samnites
themselves; on the other hand, this could not have had any thing like
the mischievous effect which the devastations of the Samnites had upon
the feelings of the allies. We merely know by the greatest chance, that
the seat of that war was in the neighbourhood of the present abbey of
Subiaco, on the frontier of the Æquians and Hernicans, in the high
mountain-ridges which divide the valleys of the Liris and the Anio.
Livy says that they faced each other near Imbrinium in Samnium; but
even the Italian commentators, as Sigonius and Hermolaus Barbarus,
rightly take this to be Imbrivium, and recognise it as the place,
in the country of the Æquians, near Subiaco, from which the emperor
Claudius led his aqueducts. Livy shows such little proof of care
and exactness, that we cannot but decide for this emendation, which
is recommended not only by probability, but even by necessity. The
Samnites took up a strong position here; and thus cut off the Romans
from the road which leads by Sora to Apulia, so that they were obliged
to keep up their communication by Antrodoco: the spot is marked out
with all the accuracy of a military history. The state of things was so
serious, that in the third year of the war the Romans made L. Papirius
Cursor dictator. The consul L. Furius Camillus was ill. Papirius Cursor
is still remembered as one of the greatest generals of his nation; by
his side was M. Valerius Corvus, who was of the same age with him,
and Q. Fabius Maximus, who was younger, but yet was in all likelihood
outlived by Valerius Corvus.
M. Valerius Corvus was the most popular man of his day: in politics
he stands quite aloof from all party strife. He loved the people,
and was beloved by it; the soldiers had unbounded confidence in him,
and when he was among them in his leisure hours, it was just as if
he were in his own family; he shared with them their toils and their
amusements: his popularity was the heir-loom of the Valerii. It was
this character which enabled him to allay the insurrection in the year
413. L. Papirius Cursor was a rough man, a downright savage, who had
something in him of the nature of Suwarow, except that the latter was
certainly far more educated: he had huge bodily strength, and kept it
in condition by eating and drinking by rule, like the athletes, as
did the emperor Maximin. He teased and worried the soldiers by his
terrible strictness, making their duty as irksome as he could, in
the belief that by this means they were rendered more efficient. He
was just as harsh towards the officers and commanders of the allies:
it was his pleasure, to strike terror into all about him; he never
pardoned the least neglect, and he was capable of inflicting corporal
and even capital punishment for it. He was hated; yet at the same time
he was regarded as quite an unearthly being, as an immense treasure
for the republic, as a last refuge in time of need, Q. Fabius was of
a different stamp from Valerius Corvus; he seems not to have had such
a cheerful, loving, joyous soul: yet for all that, he was _comis_,
being a kind master, a mild and wise man. His wisdom and good luck
were much reckoned on; Papirius had not so much success. He was also
most popular; yet not in the same way as M. Valerius, but rather, it
would seem, from a feeling of respect than of love. He was looked upon
as the first man of his age, and therefore the surname of Maximus was
given him; he was no less a statesman than a general, being as it were
a point of union for all parties. He was an aristocrat by birth and
position; yet a most judicious one: he was able in many cases, when an
umpire, to bend the stubbornness of the oligarchy. We see from his
life, how earnest he was in every thing; how he could control his own
feelings, and sacrifice them for the common good.
In the neighbourhood of Subiaco, the dictator faced the Samnites;
nevertheless there was also an army stationed near Capua, to guard
against the inroads into Campania. The dictator had remarked that the
auspices had not been observed correctly; nor could he take new ones
where he was, as the auspices were different in different places,
some being good in Rome, others in the country of the enemy; he had
therefore to go back to Rome, that he might take fresh ones in the
Capitol. From this, or some other reason, he went to Rome, leaving the
_Magister Equitum_, Q. Fabius, in command, with express orders not to
act on the offensive. This prohibition may have been well grounded;
but perhaps also he did not trust the younger man, or he may indeed
have grudged him everything. The Samnites very soon discovered that the
Romans were not allowed to fight, and they teased and harassed them
the more; besides which, the inactivity of the Romans was dangerous,
as the Latin peoples in their rear were ever ready to rise, if the
Samnites would only lend a helping hand. On this, Fabius, with all
the confidence of youth, resolved upon giving battle to the Samnites,
and he won the victory; according to some, he even conquered twice.
As the prohibition was looked upon in the army to have been an act of
mere envy and jealousy, the _Magister Equitum_ sent in his report, not
to Papirius Cursor, but to the senate direct. The booty he burned, to
deprive the dictator of the _spolia_ for his triumph. In the city,
people were certainly not less alarmed at the consequences, than they
were glad of the victory. Papirius immediately returned to the camp,
his quick journey being also a proof that the army could not have been
far from Rome. Surrounded by his twenty-four lictors, he summoned the
_Magister Equitum_ before his tribunal, and only asked him whether he
had fought against his orders, or no? Everything was in readiness for
the execution of Fabius; but the whole army put on such a threatening
attitude, and men’s minds were so roused against Papirius, that he
himself began to waver, and at the earnest prayer of the soldiers
granted a respite until the following day. During the night, Fabius
fled to Rome, and there he betook himself to the senate. But when
the senators were met together, and Fabius was in the midst of them,
Papirius himself made his appearance and wanted his victim. The senate
showed more than once in after days, that it was not fond of Fabius;
but at that time, the sympathy for the youthful hero was still general,
and it was resolved to protect him. Papirius did not dare to use force.
The matter indeed was not now so desperate, as Livy describes it; for
the patricians had the free right to appeal from the dictator to the
curies, a fact which we know from Verrius Flaccus. What Livy tells
us about calling upon the tribunes, is either a mistake arising from
the expression _provocatio ad populum_, or it meant the confirmation
of the decree of the curies by the _Plebes_; so that, of course, the
whole people had granted an amnesty to Fabius. Even then, Papirius was
unwilling to give way; but the resolution of the two orders snatched
his victim from him. That he was reconciled to Fabius, as Livy makes
out, is impossible: Fabius laid down his office, and Papirius took
another _Magister Equitum_. He returned, loaded with hatred, to the
army; and to this circumstance the unlucky issue of a battle is
attributed. This happened in the year 430.
Fabius is said to have gained the victory very much owing to his having
ordered the _frena_ to be taken off the horses, and the cavalry to rush
in this manner against the enemy. If we take _frena_ to mean bridles,
this would indeed be absurd: the thing may, however, be explained from
the bits found at Pompeii and Herculanum. The curbs and bits which
the Romans use for their horses were exceedingly cruel; so that if,
instead of these, they had now put on the more humane ones of the
Greeks, which Xenophon describes, the horses, being thus eased, would
naturally have pressed forward full of spirit and energy.
The war took such a turn, that the Samnites were in great distress, and
repented of having taken up arms. They obtained a truce on engaging
to furnish a sum for the pay and clothing of the Roman troops; and
then began to treat, believing that they might have a peace, if they
agreed to the first demands of the Romans, which were the occupation
of Naples, and the recognition of the colony of Fregellæ. But there
is no doubt that the Romans now put forth very different claims: they
also required the evacuation of Lucania and Apulia, stipulating, as
they always did in such a peace, that the other party should place
themselves in the same disadvantage, as if they had been quite beaten.
This was one of the maxims which made the Romans a great nation. The
peace was not brought about: the war was renewed; and the Romans now
carried it on with great vigour. Fabius became consul, led his army
into Apulia, and conquered Luceria and many other towns of the Apulians
and Samnites; his repeated victories forced the Samnites to retreat
from Fregellæ, and to make a stand against him. The other Roman army
also had good luck; so that the whole of the following campaign was
crowned with success, and the Samnites at length came to the resolution
of seeking for peace at any price. They now turned their wrath
against the man who was looked upon as the life and soul of the whole
campaign, Papius Brutulus, of the very clan from which, two hundred
years afterwards, C. Papius Mutilus sprang. The Romans again granted
a truce, for which the Samnites had to make great sacrifices. We are
indebted to the _excerpta_ from Dionysius for our knowledge of these
transactions. The Samnites offered to do all they could; they would
punish those who had been the authors of the hostilities. The Romans,
however, had indeed demanded the giving up of Papius Brutulus. The
resolution which the latter conceived, shows him to have been a great
man: he had lived for his people, so long as they wanted to be great;
life had no more value for him when their hearts had failed them,
and he made away with it, that his fellow-citizens might be able to
say, that the author of the war had atoned for it. This is one of the
greatest deeds which were done of old, greater than that of Cato. The
Samnites, to their shame, sent his corpse to Rome.--As the Romans had
the first time already gone further than in their demands before the
war; so they now again went beyond the conditions which had then been
made, and asked the Samnites to acknowledge their hegemony, as Appian
expresses it, that is, _majestatem populi Romani comiter colere_. The
ambassadors of the Samnites had appealed to their clemency; they had
declared that they would agree to everything, if the Romans really
would not abate any of their pretensions; but as for the acknowledging
of Rome’s supremacy, that alone they could not decree; it was only
their community which could. The consequence of such an acknowledgment
of supremacy was a sort of pupilage with regard to other states: the
Samnites would therefore have had to give up their alliance with the
Tarentines and the Lucanians; Roman commissioners would have had the
power of visiting them, and enquiring whether the treaty was duly kept.
This was more than the Samnite people would put up with. They had now
lost their leader, had suffered shame, had suppliantly prayed for an
honourable peace, and all in vain: it was resolved with one consent, to
die rather, than to make such a peace. Thus the Romans had this time
carried their maxim too far. The consequence of this was, that the
Samnites exerted their might to the utmost, and actually began the war
in Apulia on account of the importance of that country in a physical
point of view. Luceria, with the Roman garrison, was besieged by the
Samnites: it had originally been a town of their own, but had been
taken from them by the Apulians. The Romans also now changed their
mode of warfare: as the chief force of the Samnites was stationed at
Apulia, they too resolved to concentrate the whole of their might.
They had already before that betaken themselves to Apulia, and indeed
had gained allies there, but without acquiring a firm footing. They
were therefore obliged to force their way through the Vestinians; yet
this they deemed hazardous, as they ran the risk of getting likewise
into a war with the Marsians, Marrucinians and Pelignians. But here
the unhappy jealousy which these had of the people of their own race
would have come to their aid; and even other nations also to whom
the Romans were obnoxious, such as the Æquians, and the Campanians
themselves, wished well to the Samnites, but did not want them to gain
a decisive victory. These petty nations imagined that the Romans and
the Samnites would wear themselves out against each other, and that
this would be an advantage to them. At the tidings that Luceria was
besieged, the two consular armies forthwith prepared to march into
Apulia, and resolved upon taking the nearest road; that is to say, they
intended to cut their way through Samnium, the Samnites having become
contemptible to them. The way they went was perhaps the same as that
by which A. Cornelius Cossus had marched, being the road from Capua
to Luceria by Beneventum. The general of the Samnites, C. Pontius,
one of the greatest men of ancient times, had foreseen this. He left
before Luceria just what was necessary for the blockade, and encamped
on the road by which the Romans were advancing near Caudium, the
capital of the Caudine Samnites: this town afterwards vanished from
the face of the earth, in order that the shame of the Romans might be
buried. The Romans descended by a defile into the valley; on the other
side, another defile rose high and steep: having nowhere encountered
any enemy, as yet, they marched on quite carelessly. The army had
come down the first defile in a long column; but when the head of it
had begun to ascend the opposite pass, they found it blocked up with
stones and felled trees. It is probable that the Samnites had prepared
themselves in the same way as the Tyrolese in 1809, who fastened large
trunks of trees with ropes, and laid masses of rock behind them, so
that when the enemy were in the valley, they cut the ropes, and the
rocks crushed the army. With this the mention of the stones in Livy
seems to tally. According to his account, the Romans then behaved in
the most cowardly manner: he says that they endeavoured to retrace
their steps, but that when they found that the defile on the other
side was now likewise stopped up, they sat down and encamped in the
valley. This is absurd. Those who are thus hemmed in, try and cut their
way through like madmen. Surely a great battle was fought and lost by
the Romans, as Cicero tells us in plain words (_cum male apud Caudium
pugnatum esset_); Appian, of whom we have here only fragments, says
that those superior officers, who besides the consuls had remained
alive, signed the peace. He mentions twelve tribunes; but, as in a
complete army there were twenty-four, it would follow that twelve had
been killed, or at least, badly wounded. Zonaras also speaks of a lost
battle, and of the taking of the camp. Livy, with incomprehensible
vanity, positively insists upon it as a fact that no battle was fought
near Caudium: he describes the Romans as cowards, in order to disguise
the disgrace of a defeat. What further happened, is shrouded in great
darkness; the results of my inquiries are as follows. According to
Livy’s story, the consuls merely _promised_ that the Roman people would
make peace, and nothing had been done besides; it is evidently his
wish not to represent the Romans as faithless; he states, that half
of the Roman knights (six hundred) were given as hostages. But the
true state of the case is quite different. Appian, who borrows from
Dionysius, tells us that the hostages had been given, ἕως ἅπας ὁ δῆμος
τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπιψηφίσῃ, that is to say, until the curies and the tribes
had decreed the peace. The conditions were reasonable. C. Pontius, in
the heyday of his success, not knowing how to make use of it, invited
his father, Herennius Pontius, a friend of the people of Tarentum, and
of Archytas[141] in particular, to the camp, that he might ask him
how he should treat the Romans. The old man answered that he ought to
butcher them all; and when the son replied, that this would indeed be
too barbarous, he is said to have been told by his father, that he
ought to let them go, without touching a hair of their head, so as to
lay the Romans under obligations by this kindness. But the Romans would
at that time have laughed at such εὐήθεια. This account can only have
had this meaning. Herennius wanted to say, “The only thing to be done
is extermination. How can you ask? If you ask, why then, dismiss them
at once!” But Pontius was a highminded man, he had a strong Italian
feeling, and it was impossible for him to annihilate the army of a
people which protected Italy against invading foreigners, particularly
the Gauls and Carthaginians: he doubted not but that a lasting peace
might be made with the Romans, if one could only lay hold of them.
By great good luck, we know the conditions of it from the fragments.
The consuls and all the commanders pledged their word of honour that
the people would ratify the peace; until then, the knights, who were
sons of the first families, remained as hostages. The _status quo ante
bellum_ was to be restored; all the places which had belonged to the
Samnites were to be given back to them; the colonists were also of
course to be withdrawn from Fregellæ; and the old alliance of equality
between the Romans and Samnites was to be renewed. There is no trace
of any indemnification in money, or of disgraceful conditions: the
Romans might themselves march off; but they were to leave their arms,
all their stores, their military chest, their baggage, their waggons,
horses, &c., behind. This is the common Italian international law. That
the Romans passed under the yoke, is related as a _superbia_ of the
Samnites; but this is quite accounted for by the circumstances of the
case. The Samnites had fairly surrounded them with pallisades, some of
which were now pulled down, and a gateway made of them, through which
the Romans passed singly and unarmed. This had often been done, and was
a thing of course. Pontius, however, was so far from being cruel, that,
according to Appian, he gave the Romans, when they marched off, beasts
of burthen for their wounded, and provisions enough to last for their
journey home. Never was a great victory used more fairly. Now comes
the question, whether the peace was ratified by the Roman people; and
thereupon is based such a serious charge, that Livy throws it into the
shade. The proof of the ratification is the fact that the tribunes of
the people were given up to the Samnites; they either had confirmed the
resolution of the curies concerning the peace, or they had brought a
motion in due form before the _Plebes_. A tribune of the people could
not pass one night outside the precincts of the city; so that they
could not have been among those, who, being with the army, had settled
the peace. The only other possible way of accounting for it would be,
that the tribune had by an express resolution been sent to the army;
yet even this could only be supposed to have taken place with a view
to the ratification. The peace was necessary, in order to get back the
hostages. For this reason, the perfidy was committed of ratifying
the peace, which was afterwards to be broken under the pretext, that
the consuls and the tribunes who had moved it before the senate and
the _Plebes_, were traitors, and should be given up to the Samnites.
This is the most infamous transaction in the Roman history, and the
Romans had indeed good reasons to disguise it. To slur it over, Livy
has falsified the account of the whole of the following year, stating,
that the Romans had then recovered the hostages at the conquest of
Luceria; for in such a violation of the peace they would certainly have
been killed long before. The peace is also plainly to be seen from its
consequences: the next year, we find the Samnites in possession of
Luceria and Fregellæ. We are indeed told that the latter was conquered;
yet this may be false, or the colonists were not willing to relinquish
their abodes, and the Romans left the Samnites at liberty to make the
conquest. At all events, they got possession of the place, which was of
great importance in case of the war breaking out anew. Fregellæ covers
the Latin road which leads from Tusculum through the country of the
Hernicans to the upper Liris and Campania: in this manner, the Romans
had now only the road by Terracina, Lautulæ, and the lower Liris, near
Minturnæ; moreover, if a Roman army was posted in Campania, and another
marched by Subiaco to Apulia, the communication between the two hosts
was thus cut off. Still more important was the occupation afterwards
of Sora by the Samnites; as well for the reasons just mentioned, as
because they thereby acquired a base for their operations. The disaster
at Caudium dates from the year 433 according to Cato. Here ends the
first period of this war.[142]
The Romans now cancelled the peace, giving up to the Samnites the
consuls and the other commanders who had sworn to it. By doing this,
they strove to free themselves from the penalty of perjury; and it
was with this view perhaps, that they had even the hypocrisy to cause
the resolution concerning the peace to be passed by the tribes, and
not by the centuries, so as to exclude the auguries, and to withdraw
the case from the cognisance of the sacred law. Livy, on the giving
up of the tribunes, takes the opportunity of making a most silly
declamation. They, not less than the consuls, were to meet their fate;
and when so deep was the disgrace of their nation, they could hardly
look upon this as such a great calamity. Moreover, we are told that the
consul Postumius had kicked the _fetialis_ who is said to have given
him up to the Caudinians, with the remark, that the Romans might now
carry on the war with justice, as he was a Samnite citizen, and had
violated the international laws. This sounds quite absurd; yet the
thing is possible. We know from Velleius Paterculus, that isopolity
had been concluded with part of the Samnites before the war; perhaps,
they were these very Caudinians, and as now, on being exiled, every
Roman might assume the right of citizenship in such a state, Postumius,
according to the forms of international law, might have claimed the
right of citizenship among them for himself. By means of such a
detestable farce, he thinks to call down the vengeance of heaven upon
the Samnites. However this may be, the peace was faithlessly broken; in
opposition to which the generosity of C. Pontius stands out in noble
contrast, who let all the prisoners go free, saying, that in that
case the Romans ought to send all the legions back to Caudium, that
the affair might be restored _in integrum_; individuals were not his
enemies. This shows C. Pontius to have been an extraordinary man, and
the Samnites a people of high moral feeling.
The Samnites maintained great advantages, although not any lasting
ones; the Romans, on the other hand, made immense exertions, and fell
back upon their former plan of operations in attacking Samnium on the
side of Apulia, and on the western frontier. Q. Publilius Philo and L.
Papirius Cursor became consuls. The latter went to Apulia; the former
is said to have successfully given battle again on the road which
had been so disastrous in 433, and to have fought his way through to
Papirius, who was stationed near Arpi. This is not very likely; yet
we cannot decide on it. The Romans took up a position at Arpi, which
was friendly to them, and from thence besieged Luceria. There, it is
stated, Pontius was shut up with seven thousand Samnites, and the six
hundred hostages; being obliged to capitulate, he had to pass under the
yoke. This account is evidently a mere figment of vanity.
Diodorus is very deserving of attention with regard to these times.
We do not know from what source he has borrowed; perhaps from Fabius,
perhaps from Timæus: the latter is very possible. Timæus may have
treated of this period as an introduction to his history of Pyrrhus,
or else in his Siceliote and Italiote histories. The notices of
Diodorus are very remarkable, though extremely scattered and unequal;
sometimes he drops the thread of his subject, being on the whole a very
wretched writer, sometimes he takes it up again; names of places are
met with in him, which we do not know at all, some of these evidently
misspelt, others, perhaps, written by mistake, or simply unknown to
us.--The account of Livy for the year 434 (but the consuls, at that
time, came into office in September, so that it belongs to the spring
of 435), Diodorus places in the year 439; and this is much more
likely, as Luceria can hardly have been twice conquered. The consuls
perhaps confined themselves to making preparations for the struggle,
and reducing to obedience the allies who had become mutinous. The
greatest efforts of the Romans were now in Apulia. They subdued most
of the peoples of that country, inasmuch as in 436, and 437, there was
a truce between them and the Samnites through the mediation of the
Tarentines, who were very much bent on having peace restored, being
afraid that the Romans might permanently settle in their neighbourhood.
The truce of that time was the curse of the Samnites; we may be sure
that C. Pontius, owing to the jealousy of the other cantons, had not
then the chief command. The Romans had now the upperhand already.
In the year 438, the war breaks out again with extraordinary fury;
it is full of the most remarkable turns and changes of fortune: the
ever memorable campaign of the year 1757 was indeed more brilliant;
yet the one which we have before us, may not unaptly be compared with
it. The Samnites got hold of Sora by treachery; we see therefore that
they again tried to spread their rule at the upper Liris, according
to the same plan which they had followed from the very first. The
Romans, on the other hand, with that lion-hearted intrepidity which
distinguished both nations in this war, besieged Saticula near
Capua, that they might gain ground against Samnium, and confound
the Samnites by a diversion. The details I pass over. A Roman army
was already in the heart of Samnium, the other in Apulia; both were
nearly surrounded, and the tidings of their danger came to Rome. The
Samnites having strengthened themselves on the Liris, the Romans saw
that the whole of this movement was to cut off Campania from Rome;
and they sent in the greatest haste a contingent under the dictator
Q. Fabius into the defile of Lautulæ, from whence it was to join the
army in Campania. Yet even Fabius was not invincible. The Samnites
crossed the mountains in the rear of Fundi, and posted themselves in
the narrow pass, the real Thermopylæ of the country; the Romans seem
to have fallen in with them quite unawares, and were signally beaten
and routed. This is told in plain words by Diodorus (438 or 439); the
_Magister Equitum_, Q. Aulius, allowed himself to be cut down by the
enemy. This victory made a wonderful change in the state of affairs.
The Samnites overran Latium; Satricum joined them; the peoples far and
near either broke out into actual rebellion, or showed themselves
to be disaffected. How it happened that fortune turned round, is a
point as to which Livy leaves us in the dark; for he has only slightly
alluded to the preceding defeats. The Samnites besieged a town which
Diodorus calls Kinna (we do not know what place this is); the Romans,
while relieving it, utterly discomfited the enemy, and again subjected
the towns which had fallen off. Among those who had thus revolted
were the Ausonians, or Auruncians, at the mouth of the Liris; they
may have tried to keep neutral: some of them, being also perhaps the
most compromised, now displayed a degree of baseness which one would
not have deemed possible. Twelve Auruncians come to the Romans, and
give up to them their cities, which are thereupon destroyed by Rome, a
measure which excites the horror of Livy, though as a matter of policy
it was quite right. The more embarrassing their circumstances were, the
more terrible they had to make themselves to their subjects, as they
could not reckon on their attachment. _Deleta Ausonum gens vix certo
defectionis crimine_, says Livy; that we cannot know so positively. The
disposition to revolt spread as far as Præneste: that the insurrection
of this town is to be placed in this year, may be gathered from Livy;
as in his account of the year 449, he says of the Prænestine Q.
Anicius, who was at that time plebeian ædile, _qui paucis annis ante
hostis fuerat_. Most of these people, however, only went far enough to
hurt themselves, without doing any good to the Samnites: they none of
them had the slightest wish that the supremacy of Rome should pass over
to these, and they rather chose to abide in their sorry independence,
apart between the two. Had they been wise, they would have sought for
a union with Rome; and Rome right gladly would have welcomed them. It
is a pity that Livy omits these painful accounts, and that he does
not explain how the two Roman armies extricated themselves from the
danger; this must needs have happened, and the Samnites have thus had
their advantage wrested from them. Livy himself says, _omnes circa
populi defecerant_; the notice of the army of relief under Fabius, we
owe to Diodorus alone. With careful examination, we may very nearly
ascertain the whole extent of the defection. According to Diodorus,
Capua had revolted; according to Livy, it was merely suspected, and
the leaders of the conspiracy committed suicide. The former story is
the more likely one; so that in consequence of that rebellion, a Roman
army under C. Mænius, who was appointed as _Prætor rei gerendi causa_,
marched to Campania, and reconquered the town.
With this year ends the second period of the war: the year 440 is
the turning point. When the battle near Lautulæ and its results had
raised the Samnites to the highest pinnacle of their power, the Romans
succeeded in gaining Fortune over to their side again; for on the
whole, they never showed themselves greater than after a disaster, even
as Horace says, _Merses profundo pulchrior evenit_: they never lost
their heads, but after the battle at the Alia. With such determination,
one is sure to conquer the world; whoever, with singleness of purpose
and sterling qualities, is conscious of his own strength, and
resolutely makes head against his antagonist, in every case has already
won the game. As early as in the next year, Rome paralysed her enemies
by her invincibility; at home indeed she suffered dreadfully from these
exertions, but abroad she was unconquerable.
The year 440 was the twelfth of the war. The Samnites had as yet lost
nothing but the insignificant towns of Saticula and Luceria, and they
still possessed Fregellæ. But now, though they were indeed successful
in some detached undertakings, the scale soon turned in favour of
the Romans. This is the third period of the war. In 441, the Romans
conquered Fregellæ, Atina, Nola (a very important acquisition, not so
much in a military, as in a political and financial point of view,
as they now gained the rich and blissful country east and north of
Vesuvius), and Sora; Nuceria also, between Vesuvius and Salernum,
yielded itself up, but afterwards fell off again. They now waged the
war against Samnium like a siege, in which the trenches are brought
nearer and nearer, until the body of the place is reached. According to
Livy, Luceria had previously fallen off, and was now recovered; but it
is my belief that it had not indeed been taken before, and that this
account is a fiction got up to throw back the disgrace of Caudium on
the Samnites: here the story of the actual siege is twice told. The
Romans now formed the resolution of leaving a garrison in Luceria,
and they sent thither two thousand five hundred colonists. These, on
the district which was assigned to them, had to defend their persons
and their property: they were a permanent garrison, the vacancies of
which were filled up by their children, and they constituted a much
surer defence than cohorts would have done. This plan of founding a
colony at such a distance was looked upon with misgiving even by the
boldest; but boldness was the right thing: the colony kept its ground,
and the passes of Apulia were now Roman. On the Liris also the Romans
gain a footing, carrying out the system of a regular siege by parallels
which they push on further and further: they restore Sora; build quite
a new town, Interamnum; fortify Fregellæ, Casinum, Saticula, and
Suessa Aurunca, to overawe the enemy; Cales they had already occupied
before. Thus every inlet by the Latin road was shut: it was a girdle
of fortresses, like that of Vauban’s on the French frontier. Some
dim traces there are, which show that the Romans now feared that the
Tarentines might in good earnest take part in the war. Tarentum was
a naval power, although not like Athens of old. The Tarentines had
hitherto only given subsidies; they now sent a fleet to Agrigentum
under the command of a Spartan prince, which, as the Greek accounts
will have it, was to put the affairs of Syracuse in order (Ol. 116,
3.): but it was either actually destined against Rome, or the Romans
expected that it would be. They therefore build a fleet, and appoint
_duumviri navales classis ornandæ reficiendæque causa_, who were
independent of the consuls; and moreover, they found a colony in the
Pontian isles, where there was a good harbour. These islands were very
conveniently situated for annoying the coast, and so they were afraid
that the Tarentines might settle on them. Thus circumspect were the
Romans in all things! Having now a firm base in the fortresses, they
transferred the war into the north of Samnium, into the country of the
Pentrians.
In this campaign, the army of the consul C. Junius Bubulcus fell into
great danger. Guerillas sprang up; so that the communication was cut
off, and the troops had much trouble to provide for their subsistence
in a country which was quite hostile and desolate. They now heard that
the Samnites had driven their cattle into the mountains; and when they
tried to get this booty, they were surprised by the enemy, and it
was only with considerable loss that they cut their way through. In
this battle, the consul had vowed to _Salus_ a temple, the one[143]
for which C. Fabius Pictor made an excellent painting. Here we have
the opinion of a judge and lover of art; I have discovered it in a
fragment, where perhaps no one would look for it.[144] This was on the
whole the age of the fine arts in Rome: to this period belongs that
most beautiful figure of the she-wolf (457). We know besides that other
pictures also were at that time offered as votive gifts in the temples;
there were statues erected to C. Mænius and to C. Marcius; and Sp.
Carvilius caused a colossus to be set up on the Capitoline hill, so
that it could be seen from the Alban Mount. From this we may make out
with certainty the hill on which the temple of the Capitoline Jupiter
stood. In after days, Rome fell into imitating Greece: her inventive
powers had died away. This gives important hints for the history of the
fine arts.
The Romans had conquered a great part of the country of the Samnites;
and if the war had been continued in this way, they would in a few
years have attained their object of concluding peace on the terms
which these had rejected previous to the battle of Caudium. But now we
have before us the striking spectacle of the way in which the nations
of ancient Italy were isolated from each other. By this time, it was
already the fourteenth year of the war, and with the exception of the
Tarentines, no people had as yet taken part with the Samnites: the
northern confederacy had until then been at enmity with them, or at
least neutral; and the Etruscans had resolved not to stir, from fear
perhaps of the Gauls. According to an account in Polybius, the Romans
had about this time made a treaty with the Gauls; in all likelihood,
that they might use them in case of need against the Etruscans. Owing
to these circumstances, Samnium had been brought to the lowest ebb;
and it was now only that the Etruscans, headed by the Vulsinians,
declared against Rome; so that she was under the necessity of carrying
on a double war. We may safely suppose that this taking up of arms did
not, as Livy represents it, coincide by mere chance with the end of
the Samnite war, but that it was brought about by the Samnites. The
Samnites were somewhat relieved by it; yet the Romans did not for all
that leave them alone, but they still went on with their offensive war.
To describe these operations in detail, would lead too far, although
the incidents are remarkable enough; as to the Etruscan war, I put off
its history until I have done with that of the Samnites, so as not to
break the thread of the narrative. Interrupted by armistices, it was of
different length for different towns; with Vulsinii, it lasted thirty
years.
How low the Samnites had sunk, may be seen from the fact that a
consular army was too strong for them. It took Bovianum, next to
Maluentum, their most thriving town; which, like all the Samnite places
(unlike those of the Etruscans), was fortified by nature only, to which
it likewise owed an _arx_. The fate of Bovianum gives one a notion
how the Samnite places fared. Three times the Romans took this town;
and thus we may understand how it was, that it had become so small in
Strabo’s time. This was also the case in the thirty years’ war with
Magdeburg, which, after its conquest and destruction by Tilly, was
reduced from 30,000 inhabitants to 3,000; only the cathedral and some
few houses were still standing, and huts were built over the ruins.
Whilst the Romans were fighting in Etruria, the Samnites had evidently
formed the intention of carrying out the great plan which renders the
third Samnite war so remarkable, of transferring their forces to those
countries, and of encountering the Romans on a foreign soil: the people
there were in need of a brave and practised army, and the Samnites
were willing to let them have one. But in the third year already, the
largest of the Etruscan towns concluded a truce with the Romans, and
the hopes, which were founded on that diversion, fell to the ground.
The expeditions of the Romans against Samnium now became real wars
to the knife; as they had not the least prospect of gaining a firm
footing there, so long as a Samnite was yet alive. Their armies could
only hold the ground on which they stood, and they had to suffer from
the want of all the means of subsistence: wherever they came, every
soul had fled to the woods. It was in an expedition of this kind, that
the consul C. Junius Bubullus got into such great danger. When Q.
Fabius afterwards was in Etruria, another Roman army was surrounded in
Samnium, and the consul wounded: at Rome a contingent was levied, and a
dictator appointed. He was to be elected by the senate; the curies had
to confirm him, and to invest him with the _imperium_; and a consul
was then to proclaim him. The choice fell upon Papirius Cursor. One of
the consuls being blockaded in Samnium, the duty of proclaiming him
devolved on Fabius; and to the latter the senate sent a deputation,
entreating him to perform the proclamation, as it was expected that
he would object to it. But Fabius, like a man, got the better of his
feelings, and did it. Papirius answered the hopes of the nation: he
rescued the beleaguered army and defeated the Samnites.
When at the end of three years, the Romans had made peace with the
Etruscans,--at least with part of them,--they again threw themselves
with all their might upon the Samnites; and now the smaller nations
began to see what would be the consequences of Rome’s unchecked
victories. The northern confederacy, with the exception perhaps of
the Vestinians, was drawn into the interest of the Samnites. But now
the time was past: twelve years earlier, this would have led to the
downfall of Rome. Something like this may be found in the history of
the French revolution. These people thought that their kinsmen were now
sufficiently weakened, so that they might lend them their aid without
any risk. The Hernicans also now take the part of the Samnites; and,
as it seems, the Æquians likewise, at least so far as to favour them.
In 446, Fabius turned against Samnium, and gained a great victory
near Allifæ. The exertions of the Samnites had been extraordinary:
they had made use of the years during which the Etruscan war lasted,
to reconquer Sora and Arpinum, consequently to occupy again the Latin
road, and from thence to act upon the neighbouring peoples. Their
efforts were not only directed to the raising of large levies. There
is mention at this period, of a peculiar ornament of their troops,
gold and silver targets; by which we are to understand brazen shields
with gold and silver emblems, like those which have been found at
Pompeii among the armour of Campanian gladiators, evidently of Greek
workmanship. This very circumstance leads one to believe that they had
subsidies from Tarentum; for the country of the Samnites was by this
time thoroughly wasted. The Tarentines may have furnished the clothing
and pay of the soldiers, from which we may also infer that the Samnites
had μισθοφόροι. The Tarentines might do this so much the more readily,
as the Samnites kept the Lucanians in check.
After the battle at Allifæ, there were found among the prisoners some
Hernicans likewise. This was looked upon by the Romans as high treason,
and they demanded that those who were guilty of it should be given
up. The Romans generally treated their prisoners with great severity.
Hannibal used his enemies cruelly, that he might exterminate them;
and his allies kindly, in order to gain them over: the Romans did
just the reverse. They followed the system of compelling the enemy to
acknowledge their supremacy; and when that was done, it was not their
plan to destroy them root and branch: on the contrary, they at that
time rather wished to bring all the Italians into virtual subjection,
and then by degrees to convert them into Romans. But whilst they did
not wish to annihilate their rivals, they held, on the other hand,
the principle of so thoroughly intimidating the smaller nations that
were averse to their sway, that they would not dare to fall away any
more. They therefore let the Samnite prisoners be ransomed, it being
an Italian international right, that a man could buy his freedom for
a certain sum; those who were not Samnites, they sold for slaves; and
the Hernicans, as traitors, were even distributed among the municipal
towns for trial. Three of the towns must have taken no share in the
war; but Anagnia, Frusino, and the rest, as Livy says, demur to the
conditions offered them, which were, to make their submission, and
to ransom the prisoners. The expression _cæteri_ in Livy shows, that
at that period the Hernicans must have been a greater nation than in
the days of old, when they consisted of no more than five peoples.
The Hernicans now took up arms. Rome was glad of it: for by the
fortresses in the south they were cut off from getting Samnite aid;
and they were now enemies of so little importance, that after a battle
they bought a truce for thirty days. This happened quite seasonably
for the Romans, their other army under Postumius being surrounded in
Samnium, and very hard pressed; Marcius therefore advanced by forced
marches, and made his appearance before matters had come to extremity.
The Samnites fought bravely; but the consul who was hemmed in, broke
through them, took their camp, and thereby gained the victory. After
this and another battle, a truce was concluded for three months, during
which the Romans had time to crush the Hernicans. Proud Anagnia, which
then ranked as an independent state, like Thebes in Bœotia, lost its
political existence, and became a municipal town of the second class,
without any intercourse with the foreigner, but with sympolity, that is
to say, _connubium_ and _commercium_ (with Rome); this place moreover
and Frusino were deprived of their principal magistrates, and received
every year from the prætor at Rome a provost to administer justice.
The other Hernicans, who submitted to the laws of Rome, retained their
political existence; but as subjects. This reduction of the Hernicans
was of the greatest importance for Rome, as the alliance with them had
become very burthensome. Nor is it unlikely that the Romans had already
tried before to bring in some alterations, and that this had in fact
excited the Hernicans to revolt.
The peace with the Samnites was broken again, and now the Romans
overran for five months the whole of Samnium; according to Diodorus,
they roamed about like hell-hounds, and wasted the country most
ruthlessly, destroying everything alive that they met with, as Ibrahim
Pacha did in the ill-fated Morea: on the side of the Samnites, the
war had now become a mere guerilla struggle. After this carnage, the
Romans themselves had to fly from such a waste: yet the Samnites were
still untamed. In the following year, both the Roman armies were again
in the heart of Samnium, opposed by two valiant native hosts. The Roman
consul Postumius had fought an unsuccessful battle near Tifernum, and
his colleague was likewise engaged with the enemy near Bovianum. This
campaign bears a great resemblance to that of 1815. Postumius, instead
of falling back upon his base of operations, broke up on hearing the
news of the other battle; and in the evening, after the two armies
had been fighting the whole of the day, he came up just in time to
gain a complete victory which decided the war. The Samnite general
Statius Gellius was taken prisoner. The Samnites could no longer make
a stand in the field: the Romans reconquered Nuceria and the towns in
the country of the Volscians, Sora, Arpinum, and others. The next year
passed away in an armistice, during which the Samnites had to feed a
Roman army in their country. At the end of this period, when the war,
according to Diodorus, had lasted twenty-two years and a half, dating
from the beginning of the hostilities with Palæopolis, peace was
concluded at last.
Its conditions have come down to us in a fragment of Dionysius. The
Samnites acknowledged the _majestas populi Romani_; so that they
were not allowed to conclude any treaties, and had to withdraw their
garrisons from the countries which had been formerly subjected by them.
How far their frontiers were altered, is difficult to make out. The
Volscian land, of course, remained to the Romans; but it is a question
whether Salernum and Buxentum became Roman. This cannot be decided with
certainty: it is most likely, as the Romans from henceforth seem to
be in immediate connexion with the Lucanians; and it is also probable
that the Frentanians remained quite isolated. If so, the territory of
Samnium was considerably reduced on both coasts, and then it was also
severed from Tarentum. The claims to the posts on the Liris, Fregellæ,
and other places, were of course abandoned. Lucania is now again
independent, after having become subject to Samnium during the war:
the Roman party once more got the upperhand, and thus by degrees the
country fell under the power of Rome.
The peace, however, did not last so much as five years, the nature of
its conditions rendering this impossible. The Samnite war was followed
by the reduction of the Æquians, who were still attached to their
independence. The Romans, by a short but fierce war, forced them into
a union with their own state. As the Æquians dwelt in villages built
on hills, they were not so easy to be got at; and in consequence they
received the right of Roman citizenship under favourable conditions.
Hereupon the Romans established a colony at Carseoli in the country
of the Æquians, and another at Alba on the lake Fucinus; the former
was meant against Samnium, the latter revealed to the Marsians and
to the other northern cantons the secret, that they also were to
become subjects of the Romans. All the passes which lead through the
Apennines, were now shut up. The Marsians rose; but peace was very soon
concluded: the Romans wisely granted them very favourable conditions,
by which that warlike nation was entirely gained over, and became one
of the most faithful of allies. This happened in the year 451.