THE FIRST WAR WITH THE SAMNITES. PROGRESS OF LEGISLATION.

_Majora hinc bella narranda sunt_, says Livy. We now arrive at a period

in which great masses come into collision; when Rome struggles with

a great people, which displayed heroic stedfastness, which possessed

great generals and an excellent system of arms (which the Romans even

adopted from them), and which had all the political virtues that give

greatness to a nation in the eyes of posterity. The war for life and

death lasted seventy years, interrupted only by treaties of peace,

or rather, armistices. In the Samnites we have a proof how much is

gained for future generations by heroic perseverance, even though one

be overpowered in the strife; for, their lot was always much more

tolerable than that of many other nations conquered by Rome. Had their

descendants brought down their wishes to the standard of things as

they were; had they not aimed, though in a high and noble spirit, at

impossibilities; had they not intoxicated themselves with feelings, the

season for which was long since gone by; they would not have perished

in the days of Sylla. And indeed, theirs was then a terrible fate,

because they had no longer regard to the circumstances in which they

were placed.

The great event by which Rome emerged from childhood, is the reception

of Capua under her protection. It is involved, however, in obscurity,

and is falsified besides by the Romans.

When we read in the ancients of a colony which turns in hostility

against its mother state, we always think of disloyalty and

ingratitude: the ancients themselves, that is to say, our authors,

look upon such a defection as a domestic feud of the daughter against

the mother. In some detached cases, this may be true; but in most

instances, especially in Italian history, the relation is quite a

different one. We must bear in mind the origin of the colonies; how a

portion of the territory was set apart, and allotted to the _coloni_,

while the rest remained to the old inhabitants; and how the colony then

became, either the representative of the sovereign state, or, should

it get emancipated, itself a sovereign power. The Romans always bound

their colonies closely to themselves; the same appears to have been

done by the Latins. There is scarcely anything similar to this in the

Greek colonies. The Greeks almost always sent their colonies into waste

countries, and built themselves new towns in which they afterwards

would receive burghers of the pale and foreign residents; but they

remained utter strangers to the nations among which they settled. Thus

it was in Libya, on the Black Sea, Asia Minor, Thrace, Gaul, Spain.

The only peoples akin to them were the Pelasgian nations in Italy and

Sicily, and thence arose the rapid increase of the Greek colonies

in those parts. Their colonies generally went out from political

reasons, from discontent, perhaps also from over-population; and as

they immediately emancipated themselves, they owed to the mother state

no other feeling than that of reverence. The Roman colonies, on the

contrary, stood always _in patria potestate_, and were bound to the

discharge of certain duties.

A different system we meet with among the Samnites, perhaps everywhere

among the Sabine states. Just as they had quite a different religion,

different fundamental types of division, a different military

equipment, so had they likewise a different system of rights in the

colonies.--From Strabo we know the tradition of the Samnites concerning

their descent; that sprung from the Sabines, they had found the Oscans

in the country which they occupied. The Oscans inhabited the whole

of that neighbourhood, whilst on the coast there were Pelasgians,

who once upon a time, we do not know when, had also spread over the

midland country. Probably the Pelasgians dwelt at first from the Tiber

to the Garganus: the Oscans from the mountains of Abruzzo, pushed on

by the Sabines, overran these districts; and after these the Sabines,

the stock from which the Samnites sprang, took possession of them,

and advanced into the most southern part of Italy, the most ancient

population perishing before them. Their colonisation therefore, unlike

that of the Romans, was not undertaken with the view of extending

their dominion; but it was merely the overflow of too crowded a state,

whence it happens that there is nowhere a trace of connexion between

the Sabine colonies and the original race. Thus it was likewise with

the Picentines; with the four nations, the Marsians, Marrucinians,

Pelignians, and Vestinians; thus also among the Samnites. These

consisted of four peoples, which formed a confederation, the Pentrians,

Caudinians, Hirpinians, and in all probability, the Frentanians. The

Frentanians were afterwards separated from them; and in their place

another canton, between Surrentum and the Silarus, was introduced,

the inhabitants of which were perhaps called Alfaterians. From the

Samnites other tribes came forth; the Lucanians, and by a cross of

Lucanians, Oscan-Sabellian adventurers, and freedmen, the Bruttians.

When the Sabines had now settled in the middle valley of the Vulturnus,

they also spread into Campania, the most favoured land in Italy: here

there had existed since 280 an Etruscan colony. The oldest inhabitants

of the country were most likely Tyrrhenians, which is the reason why

Capua, like Rome, was derived from Troy. The Tyrrhenians were subdued

by the Oscans, and these in their turn by the Etruscans: among the

latter, Capua is said to have been called Vulturnum. The Oscans must

have been a very great mass; for they quite changed the whole of the

population. But the greatness of the Etruscans lasted only for a

little while: as early as in 320, they began to decline at the Tiber;

how much more therefore in Campania? Now it is natural that Capua,

which was a mere settlement of an oligarchic nation, should not have

been able to hold out against a conquering people: the subjugated

Oscans were not very zealous in the defence of their masters. On this

account, the Tuscans at Capua agreed to a compromise by which they

received ἔποικοι of their enemy, in fact a Samnite colony,--a foolish

arrangement which is so often to be met with in ancient history. Thus

the Amphipolitans received the Chalcidians, and these drove out the old

Athenian colony: Aristotle brings forward many similar examples. Such

towns, in which the ruling community was formed of two distinct races,

had seldom the good fortune, like Rome, of having them well united.

The Samnites conspired against the Tuscans; and with that faithlessness

and cruelty for which all the Sabellians and Oscans are so remarkable,

they murdered them after some time, and kept the city for themselves.

Three years afterwards, the Samnites spread as far as Cumæ, and

conquered that town, which had long been one of the most splendid in

Italy. And thus at Capua, the ruling class were first Etruscans; then

Samnites, and with them a numerous Oscan commonalty. For according to

this system of colonisation, the sovereignty in the colony was given

to an offshoot of the conquering people: part of the old inhabitants

in the towns became clients; another part remained free; while those

in the country, on the other hand, were bondmen or serfs, as in the

conquests of the Franks and Lombards. Similar also is the condition of

the Spanish colonies in Mexico, in which the original population has

likewise continued. This was the state of things in Capua. We now find

it mentioned in Roman history, that the Campanians asked for the help

of the Romans and Latins against the Samnites. But how could the colony

have fallen out with the people from which it came? This is only to be

thus explained. The commonalty of the Oscans, which had been kept in

dependance by the Samnites, gained strength, increased in number, and

recovered itself; and whereas the Roman _Plebes_ gradually united with

the patricians, these broke out into a revolution, and overthrew the

Samnite patricians, Owing to this, Capua and Samnium became enemies;

yet the Samnites seem not to have been destroyed at Capua, but only to

have lost the rule: it is the _equites Campani_, mentioned by Livy, to

whom the whole body of the citizens pays yearly contributions, either

as an indemnity for the _Ager Falernus_, or because they remained

faithful to the Romans. Rome liked oligarchy for dependent peoples.

The Samnites reached at that time from the Adriatic to the Lower Sea.

No ancient author gives a distinct account of their constitution;

and it is only by analogies, and by conclusions from detached

circumstances, that the following facts may be surmised as probable.

They consisted of four cantons, which formed a confederation, perhaps

with subjects and affiliated towns, and were probably quite equal

among themselves. Each of these cantons was sovereign, but united

to the others by a perpetual league. In what rotation the federal

administration went round among them, is more than we know. The

weakness of the Samnites with regard to the Romans, was their not

forming a compact state, as did these from the time that the Latins

were subjected to their sway. They only assembled together in case of

war; yet they must have had a permanent congress: what was the nature

of it, is quite uncertain. Livy never speaks of a Samnite senate;

Dionysius in his fragments makes mention of πρόβουλοι. These were very

likely the delegates of each people, similar to the ἀποκλητοῖς of the

Ætolians; but whether they were fully empowered to decide on peace and

war, or whether, as among the Greek nations, a popular assembly was

convoked for such a decision, is uncertain. If this were the case,

each people had a vote; as the ancients never voted according to the

accidental poll number of those present.[130]

Latium took those who did not belong to it into its league. In the

same manner, Rome had formed from the allied Volscians two tribes,

which dwelt near the Pontine marshes. Rome and Latium therefore agreed

to receive each a portion of the Volscians, and to keep the Hernicans

apart. If now Rome, Latium, and the Hernicans had been allied without

supremacy, and they had had common assemblies, the relation of the

Samnites would have been a similar one. Each of their peoples formed

a sovereign state combining with the others against the foreigner

only. Nations which are threatened with destruction from without, can

scarcely attain to the sound conviction, that they must sacrifice their

individual will to preserve their nationality: the only example to the

contrary is that of the nations of Greece joining the Achæan league.

In the beginning, the Romans and Samnites fought on equal terms; but

the Samnites were never aware of the fundamental defect of their

constitution. Had they remodelled it, and instituted but one senate

with a popular assembly, I have not the least doubt that the whole war

would have taken a different turn. But as it was, now one canton, now

another had the ascendency; sometimes Bovianum and the Pentrians, then

perhaps the Caudinians, carried the decisions; now one people, now

another was attacked, and the chief command changed hands; for in all

likelihood the people which was most threatened at the moment always

had it for the protection of its own frontiers. The highest magistrate

of the confederation was called _Embratur_ (_Imperator_): he is often

mentioned on monuments. It is also not unlikely that each people had

its _Imperator_, and that the general of the one which happened to

hold the chief command, became _Imperator_, or perhaps _Prætor_ of

the whole of the army. As far as we can judge, their constitutions

were thoroughly democratical, as might be expected from mountaineers

like these. Moreover, they must have received the whole of the old

population among themselves; for even after the most dreadful defeats,

numerous as they were, they seem to have been quite unanimous.

The cause which in 412 first engaged the Romans and Samnites in a war

with each other, was the spreading of the Samnites towards the Liris.

As to the Volscians, they were not much thought of any more: their

power was broken, and they were most of them united with the Latins,

or connected with them. The Samnites held the whole of the country to

Casinum, and had subjugated the Volscians as far as Sora and Fregellæ:

sometimes, however, they had to evacuate these districts. Lucania was

not in their league; it was an emancipated colony. But the Samnites had

likewise reached Apulia, and had conquered a great part of it, as for

instance, Luceria. Thus we see that the Samnites were greater than the

Romans and Latins together: their country was equal in extent to half

of Switzerland. Their league with the Romans in the beginning of the

fifth century, we know already; but unhappily, such treaties are only

kept so long as the cravings of ambition, or the lust of conquest, are

not strongly roused. I have no doubt, but that an agreement had been

entered into with Samnium, that neither people should spread beyond

the Liris; yet the Romans might repent of having put to themselves

such narrow limits. Had the Samnites conquered Teanum, they would have

been masters of all the country between the rivers, and have subjected

to themselves the whole district to the Liris. That the Romans were

not warranted in receiving the Campanians into their alliance, is

acknowledged by Livy himself.

It is said that the Campanians had got into a war with the Samnites,

in consequence of their having attacked the Sidicines of Teanum.[131]

The Sidicines probably sprang from the same stock as the Volscians;

they inhabited Teanum, but they may not have been limited to that town.

The Sidicines had betaken themselves at first to the Campanians, as

these were no longer allies of the Samnites, and the Campanian _Plebs_

must have deemed it an advantage to gain this people as a bulwark

against the Samnites on the north. Capua ruled over a number of places

which are said, but without any probability, to have been all of them

Etruscan. This region is called Campania,[132] and is different from

that which is so called on the map; it extends but a little beyond

the Vulturnus, as far as Casilinum to the south, and Calatia and

Saticula to the north.[133] Nola, Neapolis, Pompeii, and Herculanum

did not belong to it: it is therefore quite a little district, and

is nothing more than the townland of the citizens of Capua. The

Campanians, owing to the fruitfulness of their soil, were wealthy

and unwarlike. They wished to ward off the attack; but they could do

nothing against mountaineers, and were defeated. The Samnites took a

position on the hill of Tifata above Capua, and wasted all the country

around. In Capua, it was the old Oscan population which carried on

the war in spite of the Samnite colony; and great troubles now arose,

as the Samnites probably wanted to restore the oligarchic colonial

constitution. The Campanians therefore applied to Rome, or, more

likely, to the federal assembly of the Romans, Latins, and Hernicans.

This is clearly shown by what is stated from L. Cincius; in Livy we see

evident traces of an intentional obliteration of the Roman tradition

respecting it. Alone, the Romans must have been exceedingly embarrassed

by this application: they had pleaded in objection their alliance with

the Samnites, and therefore the Campanians placed themselves under

the protection of the whole league. This _deditio_ must not be taken

for that of a conquered people; it is here to be understood merely of

seeking and receiving protection. In such affairs, the Romans always

hypocritically stuck to the letter of the law, even when they acted in

direct opposition to the spirit of the ordinances of Numa and Ancus.

There was at least that good in it, that they always wished to have

the appearance of right on their side. Yet for all that, we must not

deem the old Roman _fides_ to have been downright hypocrisy: their

respect for the laws certainly kept them from doing many dishonourable

things against the weaker party. They may be excused on the plea that

the Samnites to all appearance became too great for them, and that it

was to be foreseen that the league would sooner or later be broken

up; so that the favourable opportunity ought not to be thrown away.

The Romans were too strongly tempted by the hope of gaining over

the Campanians and all the peoples of that country, by a defensive

alliance. There is no question, but that they were not impelled by the

wish to befriend those who were in need of help; they yielded to the

spirit of evil, and the Samnites were perfectly justified in their

hatred against them. The Romans sent an embassy to the Samnites, and

called upon them to make peace with the Sidicines, and not to devastate

the Campanian territory, as the Campanians had placed themselves upon

their protection. The Samnites proudly spurned these proffers; and now

began their giant struggle against the Romans, Latins, and Hernicans.

This Samnite war is the first great campaign which deserves to be

related, since Rome had a history. However much may be deducted from

the numbers which are given in Livy,--and this may be done the more

safely as it is one of the Valerii of whom these achievements are

told, and Valerias Antias was a client of that family,--the difference

between these battles and the earlier ones is quite evident. In the

year 412, three were fought, the first great battles, besides that of

A. Postumius Tubertus on the Algidus, which are recorded in history.

In this year, the Licinian law was violated for the last time, there

being two patrician consuls, A. Cornelius Cossus, of whom we know but

little, and M. Valerius Corvus, a man in whose favour an exception

might be made at any time. He was one of the greatest and most

successful of men; and it is a just remark of Pliny’s, that even Solon

would have called him such. He is one of the historical heroes of Rome,

although the account of the origin of his surname still belongs to

poetry: Livy himself does not treat it as history. Yet it is a proof

that even in those times heroes were still the subjects of lays. No

one will believe, that in 406, a Gaul had challenged the bravest of

the Romans to a single combat, and that Valerius when no more than

twenty-three years old, had conquered him; for a raven, flying against

the enemy, had pecked and lacerated him, so that the youth had gained

an easy victory. His first consulship falls in his twenty-third year.

(after he had slain the Gaul,) and probably he was consul for the sixth

time, forty-six years later: he nearly reached the age of a hundred,

and lived to see the complete conquest of Italy. As in those days it

often happened that one who had been consul held also the other curule

offices, to these he was repeatedly elected until the latest years of

his life, and he filled them yet in the full vigour of his mind. He

is the man who may give his name to his age; he was the idol of the

soldiers, and not only one of the first generals, but he also ruled

over the hearts of his men by his amiability and brotherly-kindness, in

which notwithstanding he never compromised his authority; the soldiers

saw in him the most able of their equals. If we place ourselves at his

deathbed, and review with him his life so rich in achievements, we have

before us a colossal age, of which we are far from able to give any

adequate image.

Rome sent two consular armies, half of them Romans, and the other half

Latins, to Campania, which was quite open on the side of Samnium, Nola

being even a Samnite colony and Neapolis allied with that people. The

two armies appear in very different positions. That of M. Valerius

in Campania beyond the Vulturnus, was evidently on the defensive;

whilst, on the contrary, the army of Cornelius Cossus was intended

for a diversion in Samnium, Capua very likely being the base of it,

in which enterprise he at that time advanced by the usual road on the

north side of the Vulturnus, from Calatia to Beneventum in Samnium.

Unfortunately we cannot get a distinct view of the events of the war,

and we can only surmise their general course from single facts. We find

Valerius on Mount Gaurus, probably near Nuceria; so that the Romans

enter Samnium from that point, in order to protect Campania. There was

another mount Gaurus, not far from Cumæ and the promontory of Misenum.

If this one be meant, the Romans were pushed back by the Samnites into

this corner, with the sea and the Vulturnus behind them, and their

victory was the result of despair.[134] This would clearly prove, that

at first the Romans suffered some losses, which Livy or his annalists

passed over in silence; but the battle at all events set matters right

again. It was evidently the greatest that had hitherto been known: all

the previous ones had indeed been bloody, but not of any duration; for

if the Gauls had for some hours striven in vain, they would give up

fighting, and the Æquians, Volscians, and Hernicans were insignificant

in number. The Samnites, on the contrary, stood against the Romans

with equal numbers, and most resolutely; and thus they held on during

the whole of the day, without anything being decided, until nightfall,

when the Roman knights, as the _principes juventutis_ (the Samnites had

no cavalry, and the Roman one was very weak as a mounted force), got

off their horses, placed themselves before the ranks, and fought with

noble spirit. The true nobility of the nation put all the rest to the

blush; they followed them, and were irresistible. The slaughter was

tremendous on both sides; the Samnites retreated, but merely retreated

without flight, as was done near Grossgörschen and Bautzen; the victors

followed, but with the greatest caution. Near Suessula, a few miles

off, the Samnites took again a position: the camp and the wounded fell,

of course, into the hands of the Romans. To these, victory gave more

hope than gain; yet the chief point was this, that the battle was an

auspicious omen for the whole of the war, which in all likelihood they

had entered upon, having before them the chance of a termination which

would have utterly ruined them.

The expedition of A. Cornelius Cossus to Samnium certainly took place

in the beginning of the campaign. There he seems to have been opposed

by a general levy of the militia of the Samnites; as on the whole it

was customary with them, to act on the offensive with the regular

army, and to leave the defence of the country to the people. Thus

the invading Roman hosts had mostly to encounter the levies of the

peasantry. Samnium was at that time in its full freshness and vigour.

The Roman general rashly entered the hostile country, though it was

unknown to him and of most difficult access. No army withstood him:

he marched over the ridge of mountains which runs from the North to

the South, crossing it from the west to its eastern side, where there

are nothing but narrow defiles. The first column had already reached

the valley, whilst the last still found itself on the crest of the

hill; for this is what, from the nature of the ground, we must gather

from Livy’s confused account. He most likely wished to get to the road

from Beneventum and the fertile valley of the Calore, so as to keep

the northern and the southern Samnites asunder. In this position, the

Romans remarked that the opposite hill was occupied. They halted.

To retreat in the defile was difficult, and now the Samnites were

advancing in order to occupy a height which commanded the road. The

Romans were nearly surrounded; as the Samnites were already taking

possession of the road in their rear. At this crisis, the tribune

P. Decius Mus, a descendant of one of the most energetic plebeian

families, proposed to the consul, rapidly to ascend the mountain-steep

with a cohort, and to occupy that eminence which the Samnites had

incautiously abandoned; so that he could attack them in the rear, and

there withstand the assaults of the enemy, until the army, keeping the

defile, should have reascended the mountain. This was executed. Decius

reached the height which commanded the pass before the Samnites, who

had now to try to dislodge him. Here he and his men fought, like the

Spartans at Thermopylæ, convinced that they must die, and with such

stedfastness, that the Samnites for that evening desisted from the

attack; but, whilst the Romans retired to the road which had been

abandoned, these took up a position with the resolution of storming

the hill the next morning. The band of Decius was entirely surrounded;

but during the night he ventured upon a sally down the hill, and cut

his way through the enemy, so that with the remainder of his men he

returned to the consul. The Romans, now, are said to have again on the

following morning won a great victory; yet we cannot believe it. The

army of Cossus is no longer spoken of: probably he had got aware of

the dangerous character of his expedition; or a loss had been in the

meanwhile sustained in Campania, and he been called to give help. At

the mount Gaurus, Valerius was alone; but near Suessula the two consuls

are together, and likewise the Samnites had been joined by those who

had followed in the track of Cossus. The two armies were encamped over

against each other; but the Samnites, who were superior in numbers,

felt too sure of success: their general must have been of indifferent

ability. They spread about, plundering the country; especially as

Valerius, entrenched in his camp, gave himself the appearance of being

afraid. When now the Samnites were thus scattered, Valerius suddenly

attacked their camp and took it; then he quickly turned against the

detached bands, and routed them one after the other; so that he and his

colleague had a brilliant victory, and both were allowed to triumph.

The Romans now learned by experience, that in the midst of splendour

and prosperity the pressure of the times may be very grievous. Since

the passing of the Licinian law, there had been continual misery in

Rome; new commissions were appointed to make arrangements concerning

the debts: this was also done after the victory over the Samnites. The

wars rendered a heavy taxation necessary; the plebeians, while they

were serving with the army, had also to provide for the maintenance

of their families; not one half of all those who were able to bear

arms may at that time have remained at home, and so bloody a campaign

must surely have caused the deepest affliction to many families. In

the second year of the war, when either the Latins held the chief

command, or perhaps a truce existed between the Romans and Samnites, a

fermentation took place, which very nearly broke out into an explosion.

Livy is obscure here; much clearer is an extract of Constantinus from

Appian, in which we may distinctly trace Dionysius. The insurrection

of the year 413 was occasioned by the debtors. Livy passes this

over in silence: he says that the Roman army lay in cantonments

in Campania,--probably in consequence of the truce, and that the

temptation had come upon them to seize Capua. The Roman consul, who,

on taking the command, found the army in a state of open mutiny, tried

to get rid of the ringleaders, by sending them off singly on different

errands, and at the same time giving orders to secure every one of

them. This sending off seems to them suspicious; and a cohort which

was sent to Rome, halts near Lautulæ, between Terracina and Fundi;

four or five Italian miles from the former place, on a lonely road

between the hills and the sea, which had ever been a haunt of robbers

and bandits. The mountains there approach the sea almost as close as

at Thermopylæ; but they are not as steep. It is quite a narrow defile,

connecting Latium and Campania, and there appear to have been warm

springs in it; so that in its name also the place resembles Thermopylæ.

The country is now a wilderness. I could not find the springs, and at

Terracina I forgot to inquire for them. In the second Samnite war,

there was fought near Lautulæ one of the greatest battles recorded in

history. Here the cohort mutinied, and was joined by great numbers;

the communication between Rome and the head quarters was cut off, the

messengers of the consuls were intercepted, and the whole of the army

must have refused their obedience. A crowd of bondmen for debt flocked

in to side with them, and now happened that dreadful state of things

which had never before been known: the common people marched against

Rome, without, however, offering any personal violence to the consul.

It was no more the _Plebs_ on the _Mons Sacer_; but proletarians

against the rich, very much like the workmen in manufactories against

their masters. But most fortunately for Rome, poor indeed as they had

become, they still looked upon themselves as plebeians, and the leading

plebeians as their chiefs; so that these last were able to make use

of them to reform the constitution. It is remarkable that they drew

forth an old lame patrician, T. Quinctius, of the Alban district, from

his country seat, and chose him for their captain, as the peasants, in

the Peasants’ War, did Götz Von Berlichingen; on which they advanced

against the city. The distress was very great. The government knew no

longer on whom to rely: all who were in the town, armed as well as they

could; but the city legions would hardly have been able to make head

against the army. Valerius Corvus felt his heart bleed at the thought

of a civil war. Fortunately the _Plebes_ also was not yet become quite

savage; so he held out his hand for reconciliation. The soldiers were

likewise moved, when they saw their kinsmen in the army of the town:

they alleged great grievances, and were ready to listen to terms of

accommodation. On either side, all were unwilling to shed the blood

of their brethren. The consequence of this moderation in both parties

was a reconciliation: peace was concluded, and the debts, according to

Appian (that is to say, Dionysius), were remitted.

The cause of all this, as it is stated in this account, is a most

unlikely one. The sending away of individuals could surely have lasted

only a very short time; but that a whole cohort should have been thus

despatched, is not to be thought of. The other story makes no mention

whatever of a military insurrection, or of the intention to take Capua;

but it speaks of a commotion at home, a secession like the former ones

of the _Plebes_, owing to their indebted state, and the unfair position

in which they stood to the patricians, the Licinian law not having

been kept. The plebeians emigrated into the Alban district, and had

drawn over to them cohorts of the army. It is indeed mentioned that the

senate had gathered troops; but there is nothing said about the two

armies having faced each other, or about the dictatorship of Valerius

(which is found in Livy). Just as they were on the point of drawing the

sword, it was agreed on both sides to put an end to the struggle at any

price.

A great and essentially plebeian legislation by which that of Licinius

was completed, manifests itself as the result of this event. Whatever

may have been the true history of that commotion, it was certainly of

much greater importance than Livy describes it to have been. Whereas

until then the Licinian law, according to which there was always to be

one plebeian consul, had been violated seven times in thirteen years;

from henceforth there are no more infringements of it, notwithstanding

some absurd attempts in later times. In the present fermentation, a

rule must have been made which precluded the possibility of any such

design being successful. Clauses must have been added, perhaps as

stringent as those in the _lex Valeria Horatia_, by which the severest

punishments were denounced against any one who hindered the election of

the tribunes of the people. Moreover, it is said to have been enacted,

that both consuls might also be chosen from the plebeians; but this

seems to be a mistake: that this was not carried out, may easily be

proved. In the war of Hannibal, there was once a special resolution

passed, that both consuls might be taken from the _Plebes_ while the

war lasted; yet it was not acted upon. It was not before 580, that the

natural proportion first won the day, the patrician nobility having

dwindled down to such insignificance, that it became impossible to keep

up the law as had been done hitherto. Another ordinance which Livy

mentions, is of great importance: it shows that there was no longer

a mere question of the opposition of the orders against each other;

but that among the plebeian nobility the same oligarchical intrigues

had manifested themselves, which until then had been confined to the

patricians alone,--a proof, that neither of the two was better than

the other. This law comprised two points: in the first place, that

no one should hold two curule dignities at the same time; secondly,

that whoever had filled a curule office, could only be re-elected to

it after ten years. The first point, as far as the prætorship was

concerned, could effect the patricians only, it having probably often

happened that a patrician consul had caused himself to be elected

prætor as well, so that he might get the upperhand over his colleague;

but with regard to the ædileship, it would also affect the plebeians in

alternate years. Livy says that the law was especially directed against

the _ambitio novorum hominum_. The second point had probably been

mooted by the plebeians themselves, as a check upon the overwhelming

influence of men who belonged to their own order; as until then we

always find the same plebeian names as Popillius Lænas, C. Marcius, C.

Poetelius, in the list of consuls. What was wanted, was to keep the

honours of the state from becoming the property of a few exclusive

families.

With regard to military matters, Livy knows of two laws which date

from the time of these disturbances. The first, that whosoever had

once been a military tribune, should no more become a centurion, is

represented as having been brought forward owing to a certain Salonius,

who is said to have been thus reduced to a lower rank out of spite.

The consuls had full right to appoint whom they chose as centurions;

yet there was a feeling among the soldiers, that when a man had been

a tribune, he could no more be a centurion which was no higher than

a non-commissioned officer. Among the military tribunes, six places

every year were filled by the tribes, the rest by the consuls: one

could not, however, be elected two years running by the same party.

During the year in which a person could not be tribune, he must have

been unemployed. Now Salonius, who had been a tribune, and as such had

no doubt opposed the consuls, was therefore made by these a centurion:

thus the voice of the public promoted, and the consuls degraded him.

It was against this that the law was directed. The organisation of

the class of officers is one of the best things in the Roman system.

Slow advancement, the right to gradual promotion, and the making

provision for officers in old age, were unknown to the Romans: by law,

no one held a permanent commission; every officer was required to be

efficient. They had no notion either of gradually rising by length of

service, or of a standing corps of officers: every military tribune was

appointed for one year only; if he did not show himself equal to his

duty, he was not chosen again; but whoever was efficient was elected

year by year by the people and by the consuls in turn, and this was

his calling, and his desire. Moreover, it was not necessary to pass

through a whole succession of subordinate steps: the young Roman of

rank served as a horseman; the consul had the distinguished ones in his

cohort as staff-officers; there they learned a great deal, and in a

couple of years the young man, in the full prime of life, might become

a military tribune. Regard was had besides to that respectable class

of people who, without any calling for a higher command, were well

qualified to train the soldiers. These were made centurions, what with

us would be sergeants. They were all of them people of humble station;

they had good pay and enjoyed consideration, and they also might in

some cases become tribunes, if they showed remarkable ability. What is

done by the great mass of our subalterns, might be performed as well

by an able non-commissioned officer. In all this, the Roman military

system is as admirable as in its perfect training of the individual

soldier.

The second law may show us how Livy jumbles everything together. The

pay of the _equites_ is said by him to have been lowered, because they

had not taken a share in the insurrection. If the rebels could carry

this through, the state was lost. I believe that this was the period

when the _equites_ ceased to be assigned as a burthen of two thousand

_asses_ upon the widows and orphans, and it was decreed, that they

should have a fixed pay. This was a reasonable change, but a loss for

the _eques publicus_; reasonable, because the state could afford the

expense.

_In luco Petelino_, the curies now voted a complete amnesty for all

that had happened: no one was either in jest or in earnest to be

reproached with it. Livy takes it for a resolution of the centuries

_auctoribus patribus_; but it is evident from the trial of Manlius,

that in the _lucus Petelinus_ the curies alone assembled.

THE WAR AGAINST THE LATINS. THE LAWS OF THE DICTATOR Q. PUBLIUS PHILO.

FURTHER EVENTS.

The Romans now decided upon peace with the Samnites. They had already,

on account of the past year, received from them an indemnity for pay

and keep; or they then received it. The peace was made by the Romans

in a selfish and base manner; as the war had been undertaken in

conjunction with the Latins. They yielded Capua to the Samnites, and

left them at liberty to conquer Teanum. The Sidicines, on the other

hand, threw themselves into the arms of the Latins, and concluded with

the Volscians, Auruncians, and Campanians, a separate league against

the Samnites. The same thing has happened also in modern times; as for

instance, the alliance between Prussia and Russia under Frederic the

Great and Peter III., in the seven years’ war. The Latins now went

on with the war _suo Marte_, which Livy in his way of viewing things

deems an offence in them, as if they had violated the _majestas populi

Romani_. They made war with the Pelignians; from which it may be seen

that the Æquians belonged to them, as otherwise they could not have

touched the Pelignians. The latter allied themselves with the Samnites,

who in their turn applied to the Romans for help or mediation, as the

peace had evidently been immediately followed by an alliance. The

federal compact of Rome with the Latins and Hernicans had now come to

a crisis: the Hernicans were either neutral, or, what is more likely,

in a league with the Romans; as Livy and the Capitoline Fasti do not

mention them among those over whom Mænius triumphed. Such confederacies

may subsist between peoples, none of which is as ambitious and powerful

as the Romans then were; but there were now only three ways open.

Either they might part from each other and remain friends; or they

might enter into a union, like that between Great Britain and Ireland;

or lastly, the fortune of arms had to decide, which was to be master

of the other: to stand side by side, as hitherto, was impossible.

During the last year already, the war had no longer been carried on

in common; the Latins had taken the field under their own standards.

It was therefore now resolved to negociate. Latium had a more solid

constitution than the Samnites; it was governed like Rome. It had two

prætors, as Rome had two consuls; and it must have had a senate, as

_decem primi_ are mentioned, evidently the deputies of as many towns.

These ten leaders betook themselves to Rome, and there they made the

most just proposal that the two states should unite; that the senate

from three hundred members should be doubled to six hundred; that the

popular assembly should be increased,--in which case the seven and

twenty Roman tribes would no doubt have been raised to thirty, and

the Latin towns have voted as so many tribes; that Rome should be the

seat of government, and a Roman and a Latin consul be elected every

year. Had the Romans accepted these terms, Rome and Latium would in

reality have been equal; but every Roman would have had his privileges

lessened. The idea of a Latin consul was odious to the Romans; for, in

all the republics, however democratically they may be disposed, there

is a spirit of exclusiveness. Of this we find a striking instance in

the history of the institutions of Geneva. In that republic there are

_bourgeois_; _natifs_, that is to say, children of the μέτοικοι or

_habitans_; and lastly, _habitans_; all of which have one after the

other acquired the right of citizenship. Nothing is more oligarchical

than the canton of Uri. Patricians as well as plebeians were

discontented. If there was to be only one consul, who should it be, a

patrician or a plebeian? They would rather have agreed to have four

consuls. The embassy of the Latins, as Livy tells us, was received with

general indignation; not that they had disguised from themselves that

the impending struggle would be a war for life and death; but because

vanity and selfishness outweighed this consideration. We are told, that

the consul T. Manlius had declared that he would stab with his own hand

the first Latin in the Roman senate. The story has besides the poetical

addition, that while they were debating in the Capitol, a thunderstorm

and a pelting shower came on; and that the Latin prætor, as he was

retiring, fell down the _centum gradus_ of the Tarpeian rock, and was

taken up lifeless. In later narratives, “lifeless” was prosaically made

out to mean “in a swoon.”

The Sabines, renowned as they were of old for uprightness, had been

quite asleep, and they had no longer any importance whatever: the

northern confederation, the Marsians, Pelignians, Marrucinians, and

Vestinians, in spite of their bravery, only wished to be left quiet

in their mountains. The Romans passed through their territory, and

were in alliance with the Samnites: the latter expected for themselves

the conquest of Capua and Teanum as the result of the war. Had the

Romans now been afraid of letting their open country be wasted by the

Latins, they would have been obliged to keep themselves merely on the

defensive, or else to carry on a tedious war of sieges against the

Latin towns. But here the Roman generals showed themselves great,

and the way in which they dealt with the whole matter, was masterly.

Fixing upon the very boldest plan, they armed the reserve at Rome,

and abandoned the fields, even to the very gates of the city, to the

Latins; then they marched all the way round through the Sabine and

the Marsian country, to join the Samnites; and when this was done,

they advanced with a combined force against Capua. If the Latins had

now left the Campanians to their fate, and had gone beforehand to

meet the Romans, while they were still on their march through the

country of the Æquians, they might have perhaps defeated them in these

impassable regions. This daring enterprise of the Romans is a proof

of high strategical talent; and great men were Manlius and Decius,

who, like all great men, knew very well how to estimate their foes: it

was on the strength of this knowledge that they ventured thus to lead

their armies round in a semicircle. The Latins, by a quick movement,

might have devastated the whole of the Roman territory; and then,

eight days before the Romans could have returned, they might have made

their appearance at the gates of Rome, with an easy retreat to their

fortresses: but the Roman generals must have well known the want of

spirit and the mediocrity of their enemy, and therefore have left

the road to Rome open. The Latins listened to the complaints of the

Campanians, and may perhaps have thought thus to destroy the whole of

the Roman army with one blow, as it could not return. Their force also

might have encouraged them in such a hope: a trifle would have turned

the scale; they might have conquered, as well as have been conquered.

The Romans, no doubt, had sent all that they could muster into the

field, and were not even then equal to the Latins. That the Samnites

joined them, is certain; but the Roman annalists try to deny it, as if

the Samnites had arrived only after the battle. The Latins and their

allies, the Volscians, Æquians, Sidicines, Campanians, and Auruncians,

had pitched their camp on the eastern side of Vesuvius; whether

Veseris, where the battle was fought, is the name of a town or a river,

is not certain. Here the two armies stood for a long time over-against

each other, anxiously awaiting the decisive day. If the Latins had had

an able general, they would, after a defeat, have been far better off

than the Romans: they could retreat to Capua, throw themselves behind

the Liris, and there collect reinforcements from their own country.

Nor were the Romans superior to the Latins in a military point of

view. There had always been a Roman and a Latin century combined as a

maniple in the legion, so that the organisation of the two armies was

the same. Under these circumstances, the consul forbade all single

combats on pain of death; and this he did on account of the moral

effect,--as slight accidents may easily give birth to a prejudice

concerning the issue of the battle,--not on account of the acquaintance

with the enemy, as is stated by Livy. Thus it was forbidden in the

Russian army to accept the challenge of the Turkish Spahis. The

stricter the prohibition was, the louder was the defiance of the Latin

knights; and it moreover happened that the Roman cavalry had always

been the worst part of the army, worse, for instance, than that of the

Ætolians. This gave rise to the duel between the Tusculan Geminius

Metius and the son of consul Manlius. Livy has told this incident in

a masterly style, with the heart of a Roman, and the soul of a poet:

the father, in order to enforce obedience, had his son executed. There

is another circumstance connected with it, which Livy mentions only

cursorily.[135] In the old legend, it was certainly not the son of

Manlius alone, but a centurion besides, who conquers for the _pedites_

as the former did for the _equites_.

The long time which elapsed before the battle began, is a decisive

proof that the Samnites did not stay away altogether. The Romans went

into battle with gloomy forebodings; besides which, both of the consuls

had had a dream, which announced a dismal issue, that one army and

the general of the other were doomed to the infernal gods. On this,

the two consuls agreed that the general of whichever wing[136] was

hard pressed, should devote himself to the infernal gods. Both of them

offered sacrifice; and that of Decius was of evil omen, that of Manlius

propitious. It occurs here, as it often does in such cases, that the

liver had no _caput_, which is, what in Italian is still called _capo_,

the place where the liver is grown to the midriff; the seam was

wanting. The liver exhibits the most varied features: quite healthy

animals may have great differences of formation in their livers. In

the heart and the lungs, no handle for divinations is to be found; the

liver has nearly always some abnormities. Decius now went into battle

with the resolution of sacrificing himself, a resolution which must

have been formed already in Rome, as the pontifex accompanied the army

in order to devote him.

The Roman legion then consisted of five bodies, _hastati_, _principes_,

_triarii_, _rorarii_, _accensi_. Of these, there were three battalions

of the line mixed up with light troops, and a battalion of light

troops, the _rorarii_ with a third of the _hastati_. Of the latter,

nearly two-thirds were from early times armed with spears: the

_principes_ had at that time already _pila_; but the _triarii_ had

still lances. These were the troops of the line; but the _ferentarii_

were light troops with slings, and one-third of the _hastati_,

light soldiers with javelins. In the beginning of the battle, these

skirmishers were thrown out like the ψιλοί of the Greeks, and

afterwards retired through the lines to the rear; yet they always came

forth again, as soon as the enemy retreated. These three battalions

stood in detached maniples with intervals, as at Zama; but certainly

not _en échelons_, such a large interval, as that stated by Livy, being

practically impossible in a line, as the cavalry would have broken

through it at once: probably they were drawn up in a _quincunx_, in

which such intervals might exist. As the whole of the Roman array of

battle was calculated to keep up the exertion of the individual, not,

like the Greek, to form compact masses; the rule was this, that the

two first battalions, covered by the skirmishers, approached the enemy

as close as possible. Every Roman soldier was perfectly trained for

fighting. In the later order of battle, the soldier began the onset

with the _pilum_. The Roman soldiers stood in ten ranks with plenty

of room for moving; if these were closed, the first battalion ran

forward, halted, and then hurled those terrible _pila_ which pierced

through armour, and of which each man had several with him. When they

thus halted, all was not yet over after the first throw; but the front

ranks, after having discharged their _pila_, fell back two steps,

and the rank close behind them came forward too, and took its place

at the side of each, on the same line; the first rank then retired,

and formed the tenth rank. Thus the whole ten advanced in their turn

to use their _pila_. This mode of attack, the only possible and true

one, was terrible to the enemy. From this quiet rotation it may also

be conceived, how it was that the fights lasted a long while, and

that the soldiers did not at once come to close quarters: an hour

surely was taken up in merely throwing the _pila_. Then did the fight

with swords begin, in which the ranks again relieved each other. The

rear ranks were not idle in the meantime. If some of the front ranks

fell, or were worn out, they took their places; and thus the Roman

battle might last a good while. For this, armies must indeed have been

trained and practised, as the Romans were. The dust and the shout of

battle were not as confusing as the smoke and thunder of artillery.

If the _hastati_ had done fighting, they withdrew to the rear of the

_principes_ who now commenced; if the troops were overpowered, they

fell back on the _triarii_, who, at that time, formed a reserve which,

however, was always obliged to enter into the fight. Besides those four

battalions, the three of the line and one of light troops, there was a

fifth, the _accensi_, without armour, and merely intended to fill up

the places of the slain, whose arms they were to take. The _accensi_

and _velati_ were the two centuries which were attached to the fifth

class, though below its census.

It is evident that Manlius, in this instance, did a thing which had

never been done before: he armed the _accensi_, used them to strengthen

his line, instead of the _triarii_ whom he reserved for the last

decision. By this means he saved himself. Not that, as Livy says, the

Latins mistook the _accensi_ for _triarii_; this is not possible,

though it may be that the _accensi_ also were armed with spears, and

advanced as phalangites. The Latins went on in the old routine; and

even then, they had nothing but its common-place elements. In the

meantime, at the wing of Decius the fight was disastrous; the Latins

were conquering. On this, Decius caused himself to be devoted to death

by the pontifex M. Valerius. This devotion had an inspiring effect upon

the army, and one which to their ideas was magical; as the consul had

atoned for the whole nation, which was now deemed invincible. And thus,

according to the legend, the fortune of the battle turned at once; the

legions rallied, and won the completest of victories.

If Rome had been overpowered in this struggle, the whole of her army

would have been annihilated. The Latins, however, would not have been

able to derive the same advantages from it which Rome did; for as

Latium itself was wanting in that unity which is based upon a grand

central point, the supremacy would have been left in abeyance between

it and Samnium. There is every likelihood that Italy would then have

fallen under a foreign yoke; it might perhaps have become the hopeless

prey of Pyrrhus, or at least of the Carthaginians, and the Gauls would

have incessantly wasted it. Had the Italian nations been wise, the same

result would have been brought about without the destruction which now

indeed accompanied it.

The battle must have been a complete defeat to the Latins; so decisive

was it, that all were seized with panic. Capua evidently yielded

at once; and those who had been beaten, did not even try to defend

themselves behind the Vulturnus, but hurried away beyond the Liris. All

fled. At Vescia, however, a new army was formed. Vescia is an Ausonian

town near the Vescinian mountains, probably the present S. Agata di

Goti: there are indeed no ruins there, but many tombs. It is situated

on the natural road from the Liris to the Vulturnus; going to Naples,

one has the mountains on the right hand. The flight of the Latins

cannot then have been so disorderly as Livy describes it. Here those

who had escaped assembled, and were reinforced by fresh contingents

from the old Latin and Volscian towns; the Volscians on the sea coast,

and on the Liris, the Auruncians and Sidicines, consequently the whole

of the country between the Liris and the Vulturnus, were united. This

army offered to the Romans a final battle near Trifanum on the Liris,

between Sinuessa and Minturnæ. The Romans at once attacked, without

resting from their march, and gained a decisive victory, though with a

great loss of men; and this second overthrow of the Latins completed

the destruction of all their resources, especially as they had the

broad river Liris behind them. The contingents dispersed, each to

defend its own town. The Romans quickly followed up the advantage

which they had won, and went on towards Rome, passing through the very

territory of the Latins. Whether Latium was then entirely subdued

already, as Livy tells us, or yet later,--the Latins indeed are

still open enemies the year after,--can only be decided according to

probability. The Roman senate now pronounced judgment at once: perhaps

these had laid down arms in their first fright, and had afterwards

taken them up again; perhaps also the senate, with a grand confidence

in the certainty of eventual success, passed the resolution that the

_ager publicus_ of the Latin state, the Falernian district of the

Campanians, and part of the _ager Privernas_,--Privernum does not seem

to have entered into the league of the Latins,--should be confiscated,

and assigned to the _Plebes viritim_, that is to say, to every one who

had put on the _toga pura_: assignments beyond the Vulturnus would

not have been worth anything to the Romans. The assignation was,

however, of very trifling extent, as the chief men among the plebeians

intrigued with the patricians against the people. It was probably as

a compensation for the _ager Falernus_, that to each of the Campanian

knights a yearly revenue of four hundred and fifty _denarii_, to be

paid by the commonalty of Capua, was adjudged: these, as was already

remarked, were the Samnites of the old colony, who for the sake of

their own interest had taken no share in the struggle. In the following

year, after the Romans had received the submission of the Latins, that

terrible punishment must have driven the latter to despair, and we

see them again under arms. We know from more examples than one, with

what cruelty the Romans dealt with a people that had revolted, for

instance, Pleminius at Locri, during the war of Hannibal; so that we

may believe that the garrisons in each of the towns were allowed to

commit every crime, and such places had long to suffer all the horrors

of a city taken by storm. The Romans now made war against the Latins

from the nearest points of their territory. The insurrection was only

in old Latium proper; in Tibur, Præneste, Pedum, on one side, and in

Aricia, Lavinium, Antium, and Velitræ, on the other: this last town

was originally Latin, then Volscian, at length it received a Roman

colony; Tusculum and Ardea were Roman. These places formed two masses

which defended themselves. The two consuls, Ti. Æmilius Mamercinus

and Q. Publilius Philo, fought against them: Publilius had foiled an

attempt of the Latins in the field;[137] Æmilius besieged Pedum. Here

the united peoples of Tibur and Pedum had intrenched themselves, and

the year passed away without any result. It was resolved to appoint a

dictator; it is uncertain for what reason. Æmilius thence took occasion

to name Publilius for that dignity.

There was now a suspension of arms, and attention was turned to

domestic laws _minuendo juri Patrum_, the necessary results of the

existing state of things, and not to be blamed, as Livy imagines. The

first was, that one of the censors was now, of necessity, to be a

plebeian. This in truth had already before been the case; C. Marcius,

as we know, was the first plebeian censor; but it was only now that it

became lawful, and was always done. The second, that to the laws which

should be brought before the _comitia centuriata_, the patricians were

to give a previous consent, whatever might be the resolution which the

centuries should come to. Formerly the consuls had the initiative in

the laws; afterwards also the prætor, as he too might preside in the

senate, and make motions, his power having sprung from that of the

consuls: the ædiles therefore had not this right, although they had

the _sella curulis_. Yet the decree which the senate had passed on the

motion of the magistrate, was not law; but it went to the centuries,

and then to the curies. This circuitous method began when the _comitia

centuriata_ were added to the constitution. The senate was at first

a patrician committee, and in fact even now the majority was still

patrician; there was, however, already a very powerful plebeian element

in it. Since the decemvirate, a hundred and ten years had elapsed;

many patrician clans therefore must in that time have become extinct,

and others have gone over to the _Plebes_. From Von Stetten’s history

of the houses of Augsburg, we see that out of fifty-one houses in

that city, thirty-eight became extinct in one hundred years; and that

those which were left, then put forth the self-same claims which the

fifty-one, a hundred years before, had not been able to make good.

There was therefore no longer any reason whatever for allowing the

patricians at Rome to have the veto as formerly; if it were taken away,

it would only save a very great deal of unnecessary quarrelling. The

more the patricians dwindled away, the more the ground was felt to

be shaking beneath their feet, the more jealous they became, and the

more they displayed their ill-humour in the weightiest business of the

state. The change therefore made by Publilius, was a well-grounded

one. Nothing, however, was ever formally abolished in Rome; but if old

institutions were no more of use, they were allowed to continue as

forms, so that they could do no harm: and thus it was enacted, that

if the senate wanted anything to be decreed, the curies were to give

their sanction to it beforehand. It is probable that, as in after days,

only the lictors lent themselves to this farce. The third law is, _ut

plebiscita omnes Quirites tenerent_; and it concerns, as was explained

above, government decrees (ψηφίσματα), which were to be confirmed by

the tribes, instead of by the centuries. This too was a mere formality;

for if the tribunes, with whom the consul had previously conferred,

agreed to them, the _Plebs_ also always gave its consent.

The following year 417 is a decisive one: it is that in which the two

hostile masses, the people of Pedum with their neighbours, and the

inhabitants of the sea-coast, were utterly routed by L. Furius Camillus

and C. Mænius, and Pedum taken by storm. C. Mænius is looked upon by

the ancients as the one who decided the war. He conquered on the river

Astura, the position of which is not known; a place of that name was

situated between Circeii and Antium: certain it is, that he gained a

victory on the coast, and Camillus another inland. To Mænius as the

conqueror of the Latin people, an equestrian statue was erected. From

henceforth no Latin army makes a stand any more in the field: the

towns one by one capitulated. Livy’s account of it seems extremely

satisfactory; but, if we compare it with other important notices, it is

not so. He postdates events; some matters he omits, others he conceives

but vaguely; and he makes no distinction between the free and the

dependent _municipium_. Thus it happens, that we have only a general

knowledge of these relations. The whole of the Latin state was broken

up; the single towns, the senate resolved upon keeping, and making them

of use to Rome, which, with extraordinary wisdom was done in different

ways. Tusculum had had from of old the right of Roman citizenship,

but not completely; its inhabitants now became full citizens. To the

people of Lanuvium and of Nomentum, the freedom of Rome was granted, to

become full citizens like the Tusculans; and at the same time, their

population was enrolled in the census as plebeians, and admitted into

the tribes. The Tusculans were put into the _tribus Pupinia_;[138]

the Lanuvinians, and perhaps the Veliturnians, were formed into a

new tribe, probably the _Scaptia_: whether the Nomentans formed the

_Mæcia_, is uncertain. The Aricians also are mentioned by Livy among

those who had received the citizenship; but according to an authentic

account, they stood some years later in the position of a dependent

_municipium_. Thus therefore these peoples attained to great honours.

No place has given birth to so many renowned families as the little

town of Tusculum, the cradle of the Fulvii, Porcii, Coruncanii, Curii,

and others. This is a remark of Cicero’s, and as a general rule, a

particularly large number of great men thus often come from certain

places. Of Lanuvium hardly a family can be named.

Others also became citizens; but not _optimo jure_. From thence begins

the class of citizens _sine suffragio_, which afterwards increases, and

rises to a position of its own. The isopolites of old were _municipes_;

and, if they settled in Rome, they could exercise the full rights of

Roman citizens, a case like that of the freemen from the district of

Florence before the year 1530. Into this relation of isopolity did

those towns now enter, which had received the _civitas sine suffragio_.

There was this difference, that formerly those only were _municipes_,

who came to Rome, but whose native land enjoyed perfect independence

in its political relations with other countries. This was now done

away with. Single places became _municipia_; but were quite dependent

with regard to foreign affairs; in the definition therefore in Festus,

this is the second class of the _municipia_. Such _municipia_ had

_connubium_ with Rome, and their own magistrates, and their inhabitants

might acquire landed property there; but they were entirely dependent

upon Rome, like an _arrogated_ son on his father, or a wife _quæ in

manum convenerat_: with regard to others they had no _persona_. Their

right as regarded Rome, was to have equity at her hands. To that

of Roman citizenship, they might be admitted as individuals by the

censors; yet they did not serve in the legion, because they were not

in the tribes; still they had to furnish troops, not as _socii_, but

in fact as _Romani_, although in separate cohorts. The question may be

mooted, whether they were liable to the _tributum_; that is to say,

whether, if a _tributum_ was levied at Rome, they had to pay according

to the Roman census, and possessed the right of sharing burthens and

advantages with the Roman people; or whether they were assessed at

home. The latter was probably the case, as they raised and paid their

troops themselves, and the _tributum_ was also inherently connected

with the _tribus_. To pay they had at all events; that was a thing of

course. Without doubt, they had a share in the common land: if the

Romans got a general assignation, these places also had a district

assigned to them which they might dispose of in whatever way they

chose. It is thus only, that Capua could have made such considerable

acquisitions after the war of Pyrrhus.

Thus was this decision an important epoch for the Roman state.

There sprang up quite a new class of _municipia_, the consequence

of which was, that the Romans frequently bought estates in those

districts. Soon, however, an inconvenience showed itself; as Romans

had to appear before the tribunal of those who were by no means of

so high a standing as themselves. This was afterwards remedied by

the establishment of a _præfectura_; which the ancients, Livy in

particular, misinterpreted, as if those towns had become quite subject

when such an office was instituted. The province of the præfects

(townwardens, reeves), was that of administering the law to the full

citizens. Such places were then called _fora_ or _conciliabula_, which

was much the same thing as the townhouse in an American township:

here was the court of law, and the markets also. The Roman who,

for instance, bought at Capua a slave according to the law of that

district, could not claim him as his property at Rome; if, however, the

purchase had been made before the præfect according to Roman law, it

could not be impugned on any account.

The fate of the other Latin towns was very hard. From Velitræ, the

old senators, who were probably Volscians, together with a large part

of the inhabitants, were led away across the Tiber into exile; and a

new colony was sent into the place. To Antium, which was a sea-port,

a marine colony was sent; the inhabitants received the inferior right

of Roman citizenship, which the Roman settlers also entered into on

going thither. The Antiates were deprived of their armed vessels

(_interdictum mare_): the Romans detested piracy, and in this way got

most easily out of it: whether the commerce of the Antiates suffered

from it, was all the same to them. The other places were forbidden

_connubium_ and _commercium_ among each other, and also common

deliberations (_concilia_), as in Achaia, Phocis, Bœotia; from none of

them could any thing be bought or sold to the other; besides which,

each had its own burdens; so that, if once by any calamity the landed

property in one of them fell in value, the distress was very great.

They were limited to selling among themselves, or to Roman citizens,

as they had _commercium_ with Romans only. This was the cause of the

decline of these towns; for in proportion as Romans settled there,

their burthens became greater and greater, so that part of them

vanished from the face of the earth. Præneste and Tibur only kept

their footing. They were _agro multati_; but in Polybius’ times they

again make their appearance in possession of the old _jus municipii_.

According to Livy, it might seem as if none but the Laurentines had

retained the old _fœdus_; but it is very possible that this was also

the case with these two, and that, although they at that time lost

their demesne, they still preserved the franchise of the _municipium_.

Both of them had large and fruitful country districts, and they must

have had peculiar vitality in them: Præneste indeed tried more than

once to shake off the Roman yoke. In this isolation all those places

were comprehended, which at the end of the fourth century were leagued

with Latium. The prohibition of the _concilia_ remained in force; for

the _feriæ Latinæ_, the old diet, became a mere shadow, a _conventus_

(πανήγυρις) solely for the celebration of the games. This isolation was

also particularly extended to the Æquians, who doubtless had been in

the Latin league.

This was an expedient which the Romans now invariably employed,

wherever they wanted to break a conquered people, as they did

afterwards in Achaia. By this means, the chief places were entirely

severed; the feeling of unity died away; they looked on each other as

strangers,--and such a separation generally brings on hostility after

it, as in Northern and Southern Dittmarschen. As the Romans placed no

garrisons in the towns, they were obliged to adopt this Machiavellian

policy. In the same manner, the Grand Duke Peter Leopold of Tuscany,

who likewise kept no troops, divided his subjects, and thereby made

them bad.

The Latin colonies, as it seems, were severed from the rest of Latium;

whereas formerly they had been attached in the first instance to

Latium, and did not immediately depend upon Rome. They now became a

peculiar class of subjects, the like of which had not existed before;

as Rome from this time founds Latin colonies by her own absolute

authority. These deserve the admiration with which Machiavel speaks

of them; they are the device of a grand, statesmanlike spirit. They

were increased to thirty, even as there had formerly been thirty

Latin towns. These colonies have their origin in the treaty between

the two peoples. A district conquered in common, was formerly shared

between them both; but those which could not, or which were not to

have been thus divided, were assigned as colonies. Rome also founded

for herself several colonies, which received the Cærite franchise; but

those were called Latin colonies. Here Roman citizens might settle,

and thereby left the tribes; yet they could again become citizens,

if they chose. Afterwards these colonies joined the Latin towns: in

the list of the thirty Latin places, previous to the battle at the

Regillus, in Dionysius, which are certainly those in the treaty of

peace between Rome and Latium, there are some which were stated to have

been founded as Latin colonies by Tarquin the Proud, and are mentioned

as such in the war of Hannibal. With regard to these, there is no

doubt but that those Romans who joined the Latins in them, acquired

equal civil rights. In the Latin colonies, the number of citizens

was much larger than in the Roman ones. Afterwards the Italians were

admitted to take part in the colonies; they also sometimes got a

share of the demesne; and thus the colonies became the great means

for the spread of the Roman dominion, and by the Latin language,

which became that of Roman policy, those of the old inhabitants were

overpowered. They always were from the first dependent upon Rome, and

quite unconnected with each other. Until then, the number of the Latin

colonies was inconsiderable; from henceforth it increases. All these

places were bound to military service, and Rome prescribed to them

their contingent: they mainly contributed to the success of the Romans

in the Samnite wars. The Romans surrounded themselves with colonies,

as their border strongholds. A district was given over to several

thousand men with the obligation to keep it; there were added to them

from Rome as many as liked to join them, and others from Latium and

other nations. The laws were established; the old inhabitants remained

as a commonalty,--the mass of the tradesmen certainly consisted of

them; they amalgamated before long with the _coloni_, and this germ

grew up to be a stately tree. Rome first planted these colonies on the

Liris, and in Campania; then drew this chain as high up as Umbria,

and pushed it on further and further. This double plan of founding

colonies, and of imparting the right of citizenship, without, and in

some cases with the _suffragium_, became the means by which Rome, from

a city-corporation, grew into a state which comprised the whole of

Italy. The _coloni_ were not charged with any personal taxes, which

fell upon foreigners only; they had but to pay tithes from the _Ager_,

_ex formula_.

The revolution which resulted from the conquest of the Latins, is

immense in its consequences. Only two years before, Rome’s destruction

by the Latins was quite a possible event; now all the resources of

Latium had accrued to her, which had not been destroyed during the

struggle. There follows, however, from the reasons mentioned above, an

epoch of decline for the Latin towns.

Among the Campanians the Romans likewise created divisions: they made

a distinction between the _Populus_ and the _Plebes_, the former being

the indemnified knights. The relation with the Hernicans was not

changed; or if it were, they had now in the victories of the Romans

got an equivalent in money. Capua, Cumæ, Suessula, Atella, Fundi,

and Formiæ, receive the free _municipium_ and isopolity; the Romans

therefore nominally acknowledge their full equality.

We are hardly able to form a distinct idea of the then state of the

Roman commonwealth at home, owing to the insufficiency of the accounts

which we have. The war had cost Rome such heavy sacrifices, that

although her sway reached from Sutrium and Nepete as far as Campania,

she suffered from faintness and loss of blood for a long time after;

and thus the calm which ensued is perfectly intelligible. The year

after the decision of the war (418), the prætorship was imparted to

the plebeian order, under certain conditions; so that from that time,

the prætorship, in accordance with the rule laid down, alternated

between patricians and plebeians. This may be historically proved:

the exceptions are worth remarking, and they help to explain the law.

The first plebeian prætor was Q. Publilius Philo; and therefore,

perhaps, some connection between this law and three others which go by

his name, may be surmised. When the second prætorship, the so-called

_prætura peregrina_ was added, one was always a patrician and the

other a plebeian; just as afterwards, when there are four in number,

two are patricians, and two plebeians. But when afterwards there were

six of them, such an equal division could no longer take place, as

the patricians had fast dwindled. The completion of the Licinian law

was a great step in advance; the equality of the two orders had now

become a reality; for the circumstance that the patricians still chose

_interreges_ exclusively from among themselves, is of no importance.

The recurrence of the _interregna_ at that period, indeed shows that

the patricians were still dreaming of evading the law; the gain became

the more tempting, as the number lessened of those who laid claim to

it. Yet these attempts, as far as we can see, did not call forth any

violent reaction: the force of circumstances and the reality of facts

turned the scales.

Abroad there was no war of any consequence. The Romans had to carry

on a petty warfare which was rather welcome to them, and which had

for its object, to make their state a connected whole as far as the

Liris and Campania. On both banks of the Liris dwelt the Auruncians

(called Ausonians by the Greeks, and also in Livy, when he borrows

from Greek sources, namely Fabius, or Dionysius), an Oscan people.

These had taken part against the Romans in the Latin war; but had

afterwards submitted to them as subjects, and were now under their

protection. The Sidicines had been left by the Romans to be conquered

by the Samnites, and must have come to terms with them: so that the

Samnites allowed them to keep their ground, not wishing the barrier

between themselves and the Romans to be pulled down. For this reason,

there was now jealousy between the Romans and Samnites. Nor could it

have been otherwise. It was especially owing to the Samnite conquests

in those parts, that the Volscians had attached themselves to the

Latins, and afterwards to the Romans; as the Samnites, at that time,

were more dangerous to them than the Romans. The great states would

let the small ones make war with each other; for by this means events

might be brought about, in which they would find an opportunity for

coming forth with all their might: these states, were as it were _pour

les coups d’épingles qui précèdent les coups de canon_. The Sidicines,

leagued with the Auruncians of Cales, attacked the other Auruncians;

and therefore the Romans marched against them. The Romans carried on

the war with much policy: they behaved lukewarmly, as it was far from

their interest that the Sidicines should be hard pressed, lest they

should throw themselves into the arms of the Samnites. They took Cales,

between Teanum and Cassilinum, and occupied it by a strong colony. The

system was now, by means of such settlements, to gain a firm footing in

the country between the Liris and the Vulturnus, as far as the Samnites

did not possess it: this course they pursued with great perseverance

and great success. By the colony of Cales, Rome connected Campania,

which was ever suspected, with her own empire. A second colony, founded

soon afterwards, was Fregellæ, which in the seventh century became

so remarkable for its pride and its misfortune: it was situated on

the spot where the Liris is crossed by the Latin road, which leads

through Tusculum to the Hernican towns, and thence by Teanum to Capua.

The planting of this colony was a real usurpation: the Samnites were

masters of the country as far as Monte Casino; they had subjected the

Volscians there, and destroyed Fregellæ; by the treaty moreover, they

were allowed to spread in those parts, and even if they had abandoned

them, the Romans were not to take possession of them. The Samnites had

also taken Sora, and established themselves there, with views certainly

as ambitious as those of Rome. The Romans concluded isopolity with

the Caudinians; nevertheless the two nations were convinced that war

between them was inevitable. Under these circumstances, the Romans

indeed were engaged in as troublous a policy as the interesting one of

the sixteenth century was.

It is certainly not the mere result of chance, when we remark in

history, that at certain periods, in countries far apart, the very

same kind of changes take place, which, owing to the distance of space

and time, cannot have been brought about one by the other, and from

which a new order of things springs up. In this we trace the hand of

Providence, which guides the fortunes of men, and the progress of all

nations, as one whole. Such an epoch is the breaking up of the Latin

league, and the spread of the power of Rome, quite similar to the state

of things towards the end of the fifteenth century. An interesting

parallel may be drawn between the two periods. It is as if the events

which single nations and countries may work out by their own resources,

had been achieved; and as if all the relations of life should now

be changed according to new landmarks. Nations which had ever been

strangers to each other, are now brought into contact; the states,

which had hitherto been the most flourishing, begin to decay, and there

only remains the yellow leaf of autumn; the intellectual brilliance

of the most gifted races is waning fast, never to blaze forth again;

inclinations and tastes take a new turn, as well as the whole of every

day life with its animal wants and enjoyments: even the physical nature

of man is changed, as new diseases make their appearance. Thus it was

at the end of the fifteenth century. The bloom of the Italian towns had

withered, even as, at the period of which we are treating, Greece was

falling into decay. The cause of the prosperity of Greece, the balance

of its many small states, was also that of its decline; for no single

one of these was powerful enough to keep up the whole.--The very same

were the relations of Italy at that time. Florence and Venice stood

side by side with equal power; if Venice had been strong enough to have

had the mastery, a new and better order of things would have arisen.

The battle of Chæronea and the downfall of the Latins took place in

the same year, and this coincidence shows us the hand of Providence

working in secret. The Romans and Samnites, to all appearance, faced

each other as equals; and it seemed as if the struggle must have ended

in the destruction of both, of which foreigners and barbarians would

then have reaped the advantage. For in the North, the Gauls already

held a great part of Italy; and on the other side, the Carthaginians

were threatening. It is true that a short time before, Timoleon had

checked the spread of the latter in Sicily; yet sooner or later, they

could not fail to take that island as well as Corsica, even as they had

already got Sardinia, all but one mountain range. Thus it seemed, that

after the Romans and Samnites had mutually ruined each other, these two

peoples were to divide Italy between themselves.

As for the relations of Rome to the Greeks, there had been hitherto no

political connexion between them. There seems indeed to have been some

intercourse with the inhabitants of Magna Græcia and the Siceliotes;

and I believe that even the learning and science of Magna Græcia

exercised a much greater influence than is generally supposed, and

that the knowledge also of the Greek language may not at that time

have been anything unusual at Rome. Even though Pythagoras should not

have become a Roman citizen, as perhaps he is not even an historical

personage, the Pythagorean philosophy was from an early period known

and admired by the Romans. In the case of some neighbouring places,

communications with Greece are more than once spoken of. Cumæ gave

occasion for this; the Sibylline books were also indeed reputed to have

been kept at Rome. The first missions to Delphi are fabulous, though

in fact the Romans did consult the oracle. What we know besides, is

limited to the transactions with Massilia at the time that the city

was taken by the Gauls, and with the Lipariotes, the guardians of

the Tyrrhenian sea against the pirates. All the rest is grounded on

legends. But the first political relation, by which Rome as a state

comes at length to be connected with the Greeks, dates from that time;

for the treaty with Massilia was in all likelihood nothing more than

a treaty of commerce, which I am strongly led to believe from the

circumstance of Massilia and Carthage being at enmity, on account of

the fisheries, as Justin informs us. By these we are to understand

either the coral fisheries on the African, or the tunny fisheries on

the Italian coast: the inhabitants of Provence were during the whole of

the middle ages in possession of the coral fisheries of Africa. That

first connexion was the treaty between Rome and Alexander, king of

Epirus;--for, one may indeed call the Epirotes Greeks, although they

were of Pelasgian origin, as they were hellenized. Alexander was called

over to Italy by the people of Tarentum, in the year of Rome 420, Ol.

112.

About this time, the glory of Magna Græcia had already vanished; most

of the places, Posidonia, Pyxus, Caulonia, Hipponium, Terina, and

others, had been conquered by the Lucanians and the Bruttians, who

had only been able to keep part of them, and had abandoned the rest:

a few only still held out, but had to struggle for their existence.

Rhegium, Locri, and Croton once so flourishing, had been laid waste by

the Dionysii of Syracuse: these indeed had left them alone again; but

they lay half in ruins, having only been wretchedly patched up, just

as Delhi and Ispahan are now. Thurii and Metapontum had much trouble

to defend themselves against the Lucanians; their territory was almost

entirely lost, and they were like the Italian towns in the sixth and

seventh centuries, when they made head against the Lombards. The only

Greek city which, amid the general calamity, was in the full pride of

its bloom, was Tarentum. It is true that soon after the expedition of

Xerxes, this place had suffered a great defeat from the neighbouring

Messapians; yet it had recovered from it, and when the tyrants of

Syracuse and the Lucanians threatened the other towns, Tarentum began

to flourish. It was undoubtedly increased by the immigration of many

Greeks from the other cities, some of which were ruined, and the rest

in danger. A parallel to this may be found in the growing prosperity of

the Netherlands, and of Switzerland, at the time of the thirty years’

war: the flourishing condition of these countries was chiefly owing to

the misery in Germany, as industry and commerce had sought a refuge

there. In the same way did Tarentum wax great; and it had the advantage

besides, which is always enjoyed by a neutral state between countries

at war, to which we are to add the wisdom of its government.

The Tarentines were much enriched by industry and commerce, by wool

manufactures, by their skill in dyeing, and also by their salt

pastures; and with the exception of Syracuse, none of the Greek cities

in those days, not even Rhodes itself, were perhaps so wealthy as

Tarentum. This town from its position was perfectly peaceful: its

population consisted of excellent seamen. Navigation and fishing in

all likelihood was their element then, as it is now: this life of busy

laziness is the delight of the Greek and the southern Italian; the

Neapolitan is perfectly happy when rocking himself about in his fishing

boat. Nature has given everything in plenty to the country of Tarentum.

Probably the sea is nowhere in Europe so rich in shell and other fish,

as in the bay of Tarentum: the poor Tarentine in his idleness is indeed

as happy as a prince; he lives only on bread, salt, and olives, which

he can always easily procure. Tarentum had no large tracts of land

belonging to it, in which there was room for tillage. The Latin race,

the Etruscans, Umbrians, Sabellians, and the rest, are born husbandmen.

The Italian peasant is an excellent being as long as he is hereditary

owner of the soil: he is honest and respectable, whilst the townspeople

are good for nothing. The Italian, unless he be of Greek extraction,

is quite unfit for a sea life: the Roman coast is supplied with fish

by the southern towns, which were still Greek in the middle ages. The

Greek is a bad husbandman, even as in ancient times, and not to be

compared to the Italian. Although there is a great deal of agricultural

knowledge to be found in Theophrastus’ book, the Greek did not feel

happy in this pursuit: he likes to cultivate the olive-tree, the vine,

but not corn. The Greek soil is also in many places almost wholly unfit

for growing corn, and is far more suited for olives. The Greek is a

cheerful, happy fisherman, and a capital sailor.

The Tarentines were a thoroughly democratic people, like the Athenians

of the Piræeus, as Aristotle already remarks; owing to the revenue

from customs and a variety of other sources, it was a very rich state.

With these vast means they were enabled to keep standing armies, like

the Dutch in the seventeenth century, as it was also then customary

throughout the whole of Greece. General opinion is unfavourable to the

Tarentines. At the time when they were engaged in war with the Romans,

they were indeed a luxurious, unwarlike people; but the blame which is

generally heaped upon them, is in the true spirit of human nature,

which when some one, formerly mighty, has fallen, chooses rather to

trace to the man himself the causes of his own ruin, than to pity him.

I am convinced that in Tarentum, next to Athens, the wisest and most

eminently intellectual men have been bred, and that the commonwealth

made an excellent use of them. A state, which reared Archytas, the

Leibnitz of his age, and which did not look upon him with jealousy, as

the Ephesians did upon Hermodorus, but called him seven times to the

office of general, cannot be lightly thought of; the Grecian mind in

the whole of its fullness must have dwelt there. The wretched anecdotes

which Athenæus, for instance, tells of the Tarentines, are refuted

by that single fact. They do not deserve censure any more than those

great characters reviled in Schiller’s Mary Stuart; a thing which I can

never forgive in that fine poem. It is indeed possible, that Archytas

and the other statesmen of Tarentum looked too much to the interest of

their own town, and were not sufficiently imbued with the spirit of

general Greek patriotism. To such a feeling the Athenians alone have

raised themselves. Archytas may have kept up a good understanding with

the tyrants of Syracuse, having regard rather to the advantage than to

the honour of his city; yet this is a course from which, in unhappy

times, the most worthy men of all countries, when they were at the

helm of the state, have not kept altogether clear. The Tarentines are

reproached with having employed foreign soldiers, and that in whole

armies; first of all, Archidamus of Sparta; then Alexander of Epirus;

then Cleonymus, Agathocles, and at last Pyrrhus. For this, Strabo

taxes them with cowardice, charging them besides with having shown

themselves unthankful to their protectors. Yet it was a general evil

of the times after the Peloponnesian war, that militia soldiers were

no longer brought into the field, but that standing armies came into

use: this was owing to the circumstance, that wars were on a larger

scale, and had become more bloody, so that the old stock of citizens

was destroyed. The devastations which had attended them, had now made

numbers of men homeless, who, especially in Greece, as in modern

times in Switzerland, roved about by thousands, being the greatest

of nuisances. There had indeed for a long time existed in Greece the

fine custom, that the inhabitants of a town which had been conquered

and destroyed, remained free, and were not sold for slaves; but all

that they had was taken from them, and thus they were obliged to live

by robbery. In the thirty years’ war, it also became more easy every

year to find troops, πόλεμος πόλεμον τρέφει. These soldiers, who were

always under arms, were far superior to the militia; and when once it

was begun to employ them, the militia were soon no more able to stand

against them at all. A town like Tarentum could raise no legions. This

can only be done where there is a respectable and numerous peasantry;

whence it happens that there are countries where no other choice is

left but to enlist soldiers, as at Florence when the militia had got

out of practice, whilst the same thing is ruinous for others. The

people of Tarentum would thus have to employ mercenaries, and to keep a

standing army would have been injurious to their freedom; if therefore

they could do without troops, they were quite right in contenting

themselves with their town militia. But if ever it became necessary

to enlist troops, there was in Greece at Tænarus the gathering place

of the men without a home (_latrones_, μισθοφόροι). These, however,

were untrustworthy and faithless, as they followed him who paid the

most, like the _condotti_ in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries;

and a condottiere was very apt to be guilty of treachery, or he became

a tyrant. It was therefore much better to take princes with their

well-trained armies into their service, the honour of the prince

being a pledge to them. Besides which, why should the Tarentines put

themselves out of their way in their trade and business, if they could

do otherwise? It might become dangerous; but they wisely took care of

themselves, as long as they could. In their dealings with Alexander,

they were gainers; with Pyrrhus, however, this was not the case. The

English system of enlistment also has been blamed without any insight

into the merits of it.

The Tarentines got into a quarrel with the Lucanians, by whom Heraclea

and Metapontum, which were in a manner under their protection, had

been attacked. The Lucanians had at that time already lost again that

part of Calabria which was afterwards called Bruttium: the population

there, which was made up of the Pelasgian serfs of the Greek towns, had

collected into a people, and had renounced their allegiance; on which

the former had wisely recognised them, and made them their friends.

In order to indemnify themselves, the Lucanians turned their arms

against Tarentum, and tried to conquer Heraclea. In this strait, the

Tarentines had sent for Archidamus of Sparta, who, with the unfortunate

Phocian refugees, had engaged himself in the service of Crete; but

he was killed on the very day that the battle of Chæronea was lost.

After some years, they called in Alexander the Molossian, of Epirus,

brother to Olympias, the queen of Philip, who also had given him his

daughter Cleopatra in marriage. He had been an appanaged prince, and

his dominions were very small. At first, he had been presented by

Philip with three little towns in Cassopia on the Thesprotian coast;

afterwards the latter, who spread his rule in Epirus, and everywhere

took the strong places, raised him to the throne of the Molossians; yet

Alexander, as king of that people, found that he was hardly able to do

any thing. Philip followed the same line of policy with his relations,

which Napoleon did with his brothers; they were to be kings, but

without power; for which reason, Philip kept a stronghold like Ambracia

for himself. In the times of Alexander of Macedon, our Alexander had to

obey the commands of that old, insolent Antipater; he was not on good

terms with Alexander, and according to the account of the ancients, it

was jealousy of the glory of his nephew which moved him to go to Italy:

he is said to have bitterly complained, that it had been his fate to

fight against men, whilst the other had only women to withstand him. He

went to Italy with views quite different from those of the Tarentines

when they called him in. These had engaged him as a petty prince with a

well trained army, for their protection; but Alexander went over with

the intention of conquering for himself a kingdom, and thus there could

not of course be any good understanding long kept up between them.

He was successful: he overcame the Sallentines; made a diversion to

Posidonia; freed the Greek towns, and united them in a confederacy of

which he naturally became the στρατηγός and ἡγεμών. He was of course

never at a loss for subsidies from the Tarentines, any more than the

belligerent nations of the last century, who had them from England

under Walpole; but the memory of his achievements has almost entirely

past away: we find but a few stray notices in Tzetzes. His success was

brilliant as long as he was on good terms with the Tarentines; but he

betrayed his ambitious views and wanted to assume the title of a king

of Italy (no doubt in the strict sense of the word). This stirred up

the Tarentines, and caused a breach between the two parties. Whether

they concluded a separate peace with the Lucanians, is uncertain; but

as the assembly of the Greek towns was now held at Heraclea, although

Tarentum was the most powerful and distinguished among them, it would

seem that this change was made by Alexander, which clearly shows a

quarrel with the Tarentines. As, however, the power of Alexander was

now too inconsiderable, he seems to have carried on the war as an

adventurer, like Charles XII.: he made roving expeditions. Pandosia,

in the heart of Lucania, where he was surrounded by Lucanians and

Bruttians, became his Pultawa: his army was divided, both divisions

of it annihilated, and he himself slain. He had before that concluded

a treaty with the Romans, which Livy mentions cursorily, but certainly

from Roman annals. This is a proof how the Romans calculated

circumstances; they had nothing to fear from him, and wanted to unite

with him for no other reason than to overawe the Samnites, who had made

a treaty with Tarentum. Real alliance between Rome and Alexander, there

was none; for the treaty with the Samnites was still in force. As far

as we can get an insight into these matters, we must blame the Romans

for having taken the part of foreigners against a native and kindred

people. The Samnites are not mentioned among those who at last made

war against Alexander; but he had come into collision with them by his

excursions: at Posidonia they fought against each other.

What would have been the consequence, had Alexander founded a kingdom

of Italy, is a very interesting speculation. Probably it would only

have made the victories of the Romans more easy; and therefore, also,

their treaty with him was an act of farsighted policy.

In the state of things which now existed between Rome and Samnium,

it was not difficult for the ancient historians, to bring the

circumstances most vividly before their minds; which we particularly

find to be the case with Dionysius, in the _excerpta de Legationibus_.

Both parties saw in each other’s doings arch-knavery and malignity,

and on the whole they may not have been mistaken. The Romans had

kept the peoples who dwelt on the side towards Campania, partly in a

position of isopolity, as the Fundanians and Formians; partly in one

of dependence, as the Privernates. These last tried to shake off their

yoke, as the _civitas sine suffragio_ was only a burthen to them, the

advantages which they enjoyed from it being trifling in proportion;

that they could possess land in the Roman territory, was no great gain

when their own town itself had a fruitful soil. The Romans beheld in

this rebellion an instigation which came from Samnium; and without

doubt, any one who was discontented with the Roman rule, met with

fellow-feeling among the Samnites. The Privernates were joined by

the Fundanians: Vitruvius Vaccus, a Fundanian of high rank, had led

his countrymen into this undertaking; yet they did not follow it up,

but drew out of it. On the Privernates the Romans passed a severe

judgment, of which Livy and Valerius Maximus tell a very pretty story.

The ambassadors were to answer on their conscience, what punishment

they had deserved; and they said that they deserved that punishment

which he ought to have, who has struggled for freedom. The consuls

took this answer in good part, and then asked whether they would keep

the peace? “If you give us a good peace,” they replied, “we will keep

it; if you give us a bad one, we will break it.” The Romans then gave

them the right of citizenship. Dionysius has the same story in the

_excerpta de Legationibus_; but he dates it many years earlier, and

it has perhaps no foundation whatever. Valerius Maximus is really no

authority at all: he is nothing but the echo of Livy. The tale has

perhaps originated with the Gens Æmilia, or the Plautia, who were the

patrons of Privernum, and had the surname of Privernas; the annalists

then foisted it in where it seemed best to tally.[139] A few years

afterwards, the Privernates, according to an unimpeachable statement in

a _plebiscitum_,[140] again revolted. This is, however, struck out, in

order to maintain the old tradition with all its interest. At a later

period, we find Privernum in possession of the right of citizenship,

and that a much more ample one, than the bare Cærite franchise, as

its people constituted the _Tribus Ufentina_. Fundi and Formiæ were

likewise severely punished. This is the natural course of those events

which Livy relates so pathetically; the magnanimity which is there

ascribed to the senate, is quite incredible, and mere declamation.

There is no doubt that the Samnites secretly fomented the disturbances

among the subjects of Rome: they openly demanded the evacuation of

Fregellæ. Justice was undeniably on their side. The Romans had no right

to found a colony on the territory which the Samnites had conquered,

although these were not in possession of Fregellæ at the time that they

took it: such indeed was the state of the case, as otherwise it is not

likely that this would have happened. Yet in matters like these justice

cannot always be done;--want of right and injustice are often very

different things. I would not throw a stone at the leading men among

the Romans for not having given up a place which they had occupied on

a waste soil, although they had positively no business to do so. The

Samnites were spreading rapidly in that neighbourhood; Fregellæ was

a _tête-de-pont_ and a point of defence on the upper Liris against

them, and the advantage which the Romans would have derived from its

possession, was much less than the disadvantage of its being in the

hands of the Samnites. The Latin road would have been laid open as

soon as they gave it up; and their allies, the Hernicans, Latins, and

without doubt, the Æquians also, would have been left at the mercy of

the enemy. It was very like the case which occurred in the year 1803,

after the peace of Amiens, when every one called for the evacuation

of Malta by the English: they could not give it up, notwithstanding

their promise to do so, which indeed they ought never to have made.

The sluggishness of the Samnite senate might have perhaps afforded a

guarantee against any ill use being made of Fregellæ.

The Romans were so prepared for the breaking out of the war, that as

early as two years before, they had an army in cantonments on the

frontier; because they dreaded an attack against Fregellæ. At that

time, the Romans had not only secured a friend by the treaty with

Alexander of Epirus, but they also tried to guard against the enemy by

means of a peace with the Gauls. These had now had their abode in Italy

for more than sixty years. The national migration had stopped; and as

they had nowhere been quite a savage people, they had not failed to

adopt a certain degree of civilization. They betook themselves to the

tilling of land, and became a meek race of peasants; like the Goths

under Vitigis, who were likewise a set of unwarlike husbandmen, so that

the great Totila had to train them anew into soldiers. The Gauls had

two roads to Southern Italy,--the marshes on the Arno; and the Apennine

country, which was grown quite wild, being the bulwark of Etruria,--the

one down the Tiber, through Umbria, to Latium and Campania; the other

through Picenum, along the Adriatic, to Apulia. By the latter of these

they must have advanced more than once; but there they were withstood

by the northern Sabellian peoples in the Abruzzi; and it is also

more difficult than the former. Now, in order not to be troubled by

an attack of the Gauls, which the Samnites might easily have brought

about, the Romans concluded a formal peace with them, which is passed

over in silence by Livy, but is positively mentioned by Polybius, and

which there is no doubt that they bought with a sum of money.

This carefulness of the Romans also makes it highly probable, in my

opinion, that the old account of their having, in common with other

Italian peoples, sent an embassy to Alexander at Babylon, is not

a mere fiction. Alexander had put a limit to his conquests in the

East; to go southwards against the Ethiopian nations would have been

folly; that he would settle down to rest, no one could believe: it

was therefore to be expected that he would turn to the West. People

generally fancy the places in the west to have been much more isolated

than they were; and they will suppose for instance, that the Romans had

known nothing whatever of Alexander. But surely they must have had

at Rome some knowledge of Alexander’s campaigns, just as Clapperton

and Denham, in the interior of Soudan, heard of the insurrection in

Greece, and of the part which individual Europeans took in it. When

my father was at Sana, in the time of the seven years’ war, there

they had quite positive news of what was going on, especially of the

struggle between the English and French; an Arab showed him a map of

Europe: and yet these modern Arabs are people quite lost to the world.

The communication was also much easier in those days, than it was in

the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, though even then there was some

intercourse with the interior of Asia. In Rome there must have been

at that period, maps of the world, as in Greece; individuals among

the Romans may also have been imbued with Greek learning, as the

cognomen of P. Sempronius Sophus seems to prove. That the Samnites

and Lucanians sent ambassadors to Alexander, is disputed by no one;

that this was done by the Romans, the later writers have doubted. The

Lucanians did it, to turn aside from themselves his anger at the death

of his uncle; the Samnites, that they might be good friends with him

should he come to Italy; the Romans, in like manner, so as at least

not to offend him, even though they might not have hoped to gain him

for their friend. Even the Iberians sent to him, when they heard of

his warlike preparations against Carthage. Livy takes it in his head,

that the Romans had perhaps never heard of him. Either they may have

suppressed the above-mentioned notice from pride, or the Greeks have

invented it from vanity; which, however, must have been done at a

time when the Romans were already so powerful, that the homage of

Rome heightened the glory of Alexander. But Clitarchus, by whom that

statement has been handed down to us, was an elegant author who wrote

immediately after the death of Alexander, when the Romans were still

engaged in the doubtful struggle with the Samnites. Aristobulus and

Ptolemy Lagus, who in historical truth stand far above him, speak of

Tyrrhenians and Samnites: in this case, the Romans are comprehended

under the former name, even as all the Sabellian peoples are meant by

the term Samnites. If Alexander had lived, he would first have turned

his arms against Sicily, and from thence have gone against Carthage,

which would certainly have fallen; then to Italy, where the Greeks

would have received him with the same enthusiasm as in Asia Minor;

for he was δεινὸς παρέλκειν. He would have gained them over, have

made leagues with them, and have so weakened those who opposed him,

that the whole of the peninsula would have been his. Livy has on this

subject a discussion which is very finely written, but quite a failure.

Altogether blinded by national vanity, he is grievously mistaken in

his estimate of the contending forces, and likewise, when he thinks

that the whole of Italy would have united in withstanding Alexander.

Had Alexander lived, Rome would have fallen: his death was a necessary

dispensation of Providence in order that Rome might become great.