III

If those who have entered the American Door of Hope in quest of

happiness have reported that it is to be found neither in the Land of

the Blue Flower nor in the Land of Sensuous Desire, let us inquire what

those have reported who have sought the happiness of self-perfection,

of an exalted personal life, of “A Paradise within thee, happier

far.” This quest involves a definitely focused aspiration toward,

and a disciplined imitation of what is most richly and deeply human,

of what is most balanced and poised and complete, of what has in the

past been reported to yield lasting contentment and peace. This sort

of quest is very old. To Plato and Aristotle, justice, the crown of

life, consisted of the ideal balance of all the desires. Behind the

Horatian doctrine of the golden mean--_auream mediocritatem_--and

Cicero’s praise of _mediocritatem illam quae est inter nimium et parum_

is the ideal of mediation and centrality. The Christian tradition,

according to Mr. G. K. Chesterton, is peculiar in its reconciling of

opposites, in its synthetic balance. At any rate, the worldly classical

and the other-worldly Christian traditions have united in upholding

the doctrines of imitation, restraint, of a dualistic conflict in

man between appetite and aspiration, and of a definitely focused

aspiration which culminates in inner peace. In the Middle Ages the

“law for measure” was allied to the theory of the four humours, the

balance of which caused health, the excess of any one of which caused

“one-sidedness” and disease. In the Renaissance the author of _Everyman

in His Humour_ used satire to render eccentricity ridiculous, and the

Hamlet who allowed all to be “sicklied o’er with the pale cast of

thought” recognised that “by the o’ergrowth of some complexion,” by

“one defect,” men “take corruption.” He honoured Horatio, his “soul’s

choice,” because in him “blood and judgment are so well commingl’d.”

The Elizabethans recognised that a great man, like a tall tower,

must be balanced at all points, or be drawn down to ruin by his own

strength. If space permitted, one might trace through the impetus given

scientific specialisation and material progress by Bacon and the Royal

Society, through such figures as Congreve and Pope and Edward Young

and Rousseau, the gradual evolution of the theory of humours into

the theory of the master-passion and the “original genius” of being

idiosyncratic. But let us remember that Milton, uniting the Renaissance

passion for sensuous delight and the Puritan passion for saintliness,

kept his sublime balance, his vision of centrality, his ideal of

self-mastery. His exhortation to Adam as he leaves the physical

paradise of Eden is his exhortation to us:

“Only add

Deeds to thy knowledge answerable; add faith;

Add virtue, patience, temperance; add love

By name to come called Charity, the soul

Of all the rest: then wilt thou not be loth

To leave this Paradise, but shalt possess

A Paradise within thee, happier far.”

Mindful of the dark impulses of the natural man, the great liberal

distinguished sharply between anarchy and the true liberty resulting

from the substitution of inner for outer control: “License they mean

when they cry Liberty,” he remarks of the Cavaliers, “For who loves

that must first be wise and good.” “He who reigns within himself ... is

more than a king.... Real and substantial liberty is rather from within

than from without.”

Americans may well be proud that this noble hope partially lives on

in Emerson, our greatest man of letters, who found Milton “foremost

of all men ... to inspire,” to communicate “the vibration of hope, of

self-reverence, of piety, of delight in beauty.” Out of materialistic

America has come this “friend and aider of those who would live in

the spirit,” who strove above all to celebrate “the Ideal and Holy

Life, the life within life, ... the spiritual powers in their infinite

contrast to the mechanical powers and the mechanical philosophy of this

time.” It is true, of course, that Emerson did not altogether escape

the contagion of his romantic age; that in his apparent praise of the

unique and the individual, in his most un-Miltonic faith in natural

goodness, in his belittling of logic, of tradition, and of the aid

which culture can give as a guide to conduct, Emerson has a certain

kinship with Rousseau. Let us grant it--and guard against it! One must

recall, however, that part of his dubious influence has resulted from

a superficial and piece-meal reading of Emerson, encouraged by his

characteristic oracular device of presenting two conflicting statements

rather than a balanced and qualified generalisation. If one reads

all of Emerson, however, in an endeavour to relate and define his

thought, it is apparent, as Professor Harrison and Professor Foerster

have found, that his stronger affinities are not with Rousseau but

with Plato and the humanists. His central doctrine of self-reliance

turns out to be a reliance on a self which is not unique but common to

all men, “a reliance upon man’s share of divinity,” upon his higher,

universal self. “We become divine,” he says, not by eccentricity, by

revolt, but by “obedience,” by conformity to “the common heart,” to

what is normally, typically, and nobly human. In fact he strictly

warns us against the “rudeness” of failing to “distinguish between

the private and the universal consciousness.” He perceived the

unity of man, the need of spiritual concentration; his occasional

assumption of good intentions is balanced by his own Spartan virtue

and his confession that “because the temptations are so manifold and

so subtle,” he agrees with Socrates and the Hindoos in denominating

the Supreme Being the “Internal Check.” In common with the Christian

tradition, he sharply severs the “law for man” from the “law for

thing.” He is aware of “the eternal distinction between the soul and

the world,” aware that too great a preoccupation with the outward,

sensuous, mundane life about us (the “work” rather than the “workman”)

at the expense of “the integrity of your own mind” and deeper spiritual

needs, breeds a dread of transience and hence “uneasiness” and

despair. Behind the fleeting scenes of daily life he perceived “that

which changes not,” permanent human elements common to every one, the

cultivation of which gave him that sweet serenity, that “cheerfulness

and courage” which Arnold pronounced the outcome of his philosophy,

“his abiding word for us.” “Happiness in labour, righteousness,

and veracity; in all the life of the spirit; happiness and eternal

hope;--that was Emerson’s gospel.”

Here, then, in our own native tradition is a sort of hope which led to

happiness. Can such a hope, however, be reconciled with the artist’s

devotion to beauty? To Emerson, as to the æsthetes, art is simply “the

creation of beauty,” “beauty is its own excuse for being,” and “the

Beautiful is the highest.” But, unlike the æsthetes, he proclaims the

unity and parity of beauty, truth, and goodness--“different faces of

the same All.” Beauty has “its source in perfect goodness”; it is “the

mark God sets upon virtue.” In other words, the rarest beauty is a

by-product of that perfect harmony by which a man realises his complete

humanity, his complete happiness. This ideal of beauty was given the

support of a literary creed by James Russell Lowell, who never feared

to expose the weakness of a romanticism whose ultimate fruit was a

“melancholy liver-complaint.” He urged the study and creation of a

literature which should be an ideal representation of life, “stripped

of all unessential particulars” by an imagination which found “the

true ideal” not by escape but by a purposeful selection of the real.

For Lowell as for Emerson the “first duty” of the artist “is to be

delightful.” He distinguishes, however, between a merely recreational

“literature as holiday” and a literature which, ideally “representing

life, ... teaches, like life, by indirection.” Such a literature,

ministering to all the higher needs of the mind and spirit, yields the

greatest delight and the greatest beauty.

Aspiration and art of this quality, however, are rare in American

fiction. We looked for them in vain in the seekers for a paradise of

supernal beauty, and in the seekers for an American paradise of nature.

Great as is Hawthorne as an artist, in my judgment he falls short of an

aspiration of the Emersonian quality on account of his penchant for the

eccentric, the fanciful, and the morbid. One seeks it in vain in the

realists’ transcripts from life, which lack the selection and focusing

that distinguish art from experience. There is evidence, nevertheless,

that the novel is no longer hostile to the specifically human destiny

of normal humanity, no longer oblivious to that rare beauty which is

the by-product of the struggle by which a noble character imposes order

on the chaos of natural desire and approaches the imaginative ideal of

a life richly varied, finely poised, and of exalted happiness.

I have space for but one example in modern fiction--Dorothy Canfield’s

_The Brimming Cup_. This deals with the “eternal triangle” in a

little Vermont town. Marise Chittenden, whose children have gradually

taken her interest from Neale, her husband, becomes lonely when her

children all go to school and she senses that “the days of her physical

flowering are numbered.” She is loved by Marsh, a wealthy man visiting

her elderly neighbour Mr. Wells; Marsh tries to convince her that

she is sacrificing “a world of impassioned living” for “an outworn

ideal” of “the traditional thing to do.” The characters, not always

vividly humanised, symbolise man’s universe. Marise, the “brimming

cup,” “filled with some emotion ... gushing up in a great flooding

rush,” typifies the surge of impulse. Marsh, a “swirly brook,” to

whom life is but a moment’s “blind sensual groping and grabbing”

before the “big final smash-up,” typifies unbridled lust and greed.

The “steady, visible light” of Neale’s life, Neale who had found

true freedom by conquering his “great, fierce, unguessed appetite,

the longing for wandering, lawless freedom,” typifies centrality.

Mr. Wells, who surrenders “the happiness that comes of living as

suits his nature” to help make the world more courteous to negroes,

typifies humanitarian sympathy. The much-travelled Eugenia typifies

“sophisticated cosmopolitanism,” æsthetic escape: to her “everything’s

so common-place”; she cultivates her fading beauty by “breathing in and

out through one nostril, and thinking of the Infinite!” Cousin Hetty

symbolises tradition; the Indian Touclé, mysticism. Marise sees her

conflict as one not between “routine, traditional, narrow domestic life

and the mightiness and richness of mature passion,” but as a conflict

between the lure of sensuousness and “what is deepest and most living

in you.” It is a psychological novel, a novel of introspection: it

is based on the quest, not for what is conventionally moral, but for

what in the end gives the richest human satisfaction. It presents a

struggle based on self-reliance and self-conquest. Neale “wanted her

to be herself, to be all that Marise could ever grow to be, he wanted

her to attain her full stature.” “Nothing is your own, if you haven’t

made it so.” Marise wonders if her mother-love is what Marsh calls

“inverted sensuality”; Neale says, “Look into your own heart and see

for yourself.” He “longed for her sake to have her strike out into the

deep,” he knew that peace could only come from “Marise’s acting with

her own strength on her own decision.” He urges not outer but inner

control--“as few umpires as possible.” In her conflict Marise sought

“what was deepest and most living in her ...; that was what the voices

were trying to cry her down from finding.” She longed to be “one with

the great current”--Emerson’s “stream of power.” She discovers that she

is being lured by “the conventional pose of revolt,” that separation

from her children would not be true “growth and freedom, and generous

expansion of the soul.” Like Milton and Emerson, she finally becomes

free by discovering and obeying what is deepest within:

“She was a free woman, free from something in her heart that was

afraid. For the moment she could think of nothing else beyond the

richness of that freedom. Why, here was the total fulfilment she

had longed for. Here was the life more abundant, within, within her

own heart, waiting for her!”

Joyous in her centrality, poise and freedom, she sees Marsh as an

“undeveloped and tyrannical soul, the cramped mind without experience

or conception of breadth and freedom.” “How narrow and cramped,”

and “blinded to the bigness and variety of life” seemed people who

thought that “a woman of beauty and intelligence” was wasting her

life “unless she was engaged in ... stimulating ... sexual desire.”

Marise had the serene joy of her home, her beloved children and her

understanding husband; she had the marvel of her music; and she had

the surpassing wisdom to seek her happiness not in the miraculous but

in the common--in the symbolic neighbourly gathering on the night of

the blooming of the Cereus, that rite of beauty; in the calm strength

of simple folk whom experience has made wise. And this woman, living

out her “heritage, alive and rooted deep,” with her “vivid charm like

an aureole of golden mist,” “felt slowly coming into her, like a tide

of a great ocean,” the ineffable peace which comes from self-mastery,

from the quest of what is most universally and nobly human. Calm and

free, she was lifted “high, high above the smallness of life, up to a

rich realm of security in joy.”

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