CHAPTER II

Nicholson's Nek

Until the 29th of October we retained our positions at Rietfontein. On

that date General Joubert joined us with a portion of the Transvaal

commandos. On his arrival it was settled that the Transvaalers should

proceed to the north of Ladysmith and occupy positions on the east of

Nicholson's Nek, whilst the Free-Staters were to go to the west and

north-west of that town.

A party of burghers, under Commandant Nel, of Kroonstad, were ordered to

station themselves on a kop with a flat top, called Swartbooiskop,[10]

an hour and a half to the south of Nicholson's Nek. After the battle

which was fought on the 30th of November this kop was christened by us

Little Majuba.

Just after sunrise on the 30th of November the roaring of cannon came to

our ears. The sound came from the extreme end of our position, where the

Transvaalers were stationed. No sooner did we hear it than the order to

off-saddle was given. I myself asked Commandant Steenekamp, who had

arrived the previous day from Bezuidenhoutspas, to go to General Croup's

laager, about two miles distant, and to request him to advance to where

the firing was taking place. To this request General Croup acceded, and

Commandant Steenekamp went there with three hundred men, of whom I was

one. Our way led past the kop to the south of Nicholson's Nek. What a

sight met our gaze on our arrival there!

The kop was occupied by the English.

This must be ascribed to the negligence of Commandant Nel, who had

orders to guard the kop. He excused himself by assuring us that he had

been under the impression that one of his Veldtcornets and a number of

burghers were occupying the hill.

What could we do now?

Commandant Steenekamp and I decided that we must storm the hill with the

three hundred men whom we had at our disposal. And this we did, and were

sufficiently fortunate to capture the northern point of the kop.

On reaching the summit we discovered that the British troops occupied

positions extending from the southern point to the middle of the

mountain.

The enemy, the moment we appeared on the ridge, opened a heavy rifle

fire upon us. We answered with as severe a fusillade as theirs. Whilst

we were shooting, twenty of Commandant Nel's men joined us and helped us

to hold our ground. When we had been engaged in this way for some time

we saw that the only possible course was to fight our way from position

to position towards the English lines.

I now observed that the mountain top was of an oblong shape, extending

from north to south for about a thousand paces. At the northern end,

where we were, the surface was smooth, but somewhat further south it

became rough and stony, affording very good cover. In our present

situation we were thus almost completely exposed to the enemy's fire.

The English, on the other hand, had excellent positions. There were a

number of ruined Kaffir kraals scattered about from the middle of the

mountain to its southern end, and these the enemy had occupied, thus

securing a great advantage.

Our bullets hailed on the English, and very shortly they retreated to

the southernmost point of the mountain. This gave us the chance for

which we had been waiting, for now we could take the splendid positions

they had left.

Whilst this was going on an amusing incident occurred. A Jew came up to

a burgher who was lying behind a stone, on a piece of ground where

boulders were scarce.

"Sell me that stone for half-a-crown," whined the Jew.

"Loop!"[11] the Boer cried; "I want it myself."

"I will give you fifteen shillings," insisted the Jew.

Although the Boer had never before possessed anything that had risen in

value with such surprising rapidity, at that moment he was anything but

ready to drive a bargain with the Jew, and without any hesitation he

positively declined to do business.

In the positions from which the English had retired we found several

dead and wounded men, and succeeded in capturing some prisoners.

The enemy were now very strongly posted at the south end of the

mountain, for there were in their neighbourhood many Kaffir kraals and

huge boulders to protect them from our marksmen. Their fire on us became

still more severe and unceasing, and their bullets whistled and sang

above our heads, or flattened themselves against the stones. We gave at

least as good as we got, and this was so little to their liking that

very soon a few white flags appeared in the kraals on their left wing,

and from that quarter the firing stopped suddenly.

I immediately gave the order to cease fire and to advance towards the

enemy. All at once the English blazed away at us again. On our part, we

replied with vigour. But that did not continue long. In a very short

time white flags fluttered above every kraal--the victory was ours.

I have no wish to say that a misuse of the white flag had taken place. I

was told when the battle was over that the firing had continued, because

the men on our eastern wing had not observed what their comrades on

their left had done. And this explanation I willingly accept.

Our force in this engagement consisted only of three hundred men from

Heilbron, twenty from Kroonstad, and forty or fifty from the

Johannesburg Police, these latter under Captain Van Dam. The Police had

arrived on the battlefield during the fighting, and had behaved in a

most praiseworthy manner.

But I overestimate our numbers, for it was not the _whole_ of the

Heilbron contingent that reached the firing line. We had to leave some

of them behind with the horses at the foot of the kop, and there were

others who remained at the first safe position they reached--a frequent

occurrence at that period.

I took careful note of our numbers when the battle was over, and I can

state with certainty that there were not more than two hundred burghers

actually engaged.

Our losses amounted to four killed and five wounded. As to the losses of

the English, I myself counted two hundred and three dead and wounded,

and there may have been many whom I did not see. In regard to our

prisoners, as they marched past me four deep I counted eight hundred and

seventeen.

In addition to the prisoners we also captured two Maxim and two mountain

guns. They, however, were out of order, and had not been used by the

English. The prisoners told us that parts of their big guns had been

lost in the night, owing to a stampede of the mules which carried them,

and consequently that the guns were incomplete when they reached the

mountain. Shortly afterwards we found the mules with the missing parts

of the guns.

It was very lucky for us that the English were deprived of the use of

their guns, for it placed them on the same footing as ourselves, as it

compelled them to rely entirely on their rifles. Still they had the

advantage of position, not to mention the fact that they out-numbered us

by four to one.

The guns did not comprise the whole of our capture: we also seized a

thousand Lee-Metford rifles, twenty cases of cartridges, and some

baggage mules and horses.

The fighting had continued without intermission from nine o'clock in the

morning until two in the afternoon. The day was exceedingly hot, and as

there was no water to be obtained nearer than a mile from the berg,[12]

we suffered greatly from thirst. The condition of the wounded touched my

heart deeply. It was pitiable to hear them cry, "Water! water!"

I ordered my burghers to carry these unfortunate creatures to some

thorn-bushes, which afforded shelter from the scorching rays of the sun,

and where their doctors could attend to them. Other burghers I told off

to fetch water from our prisoners' canteens, to supply our own wounded.

As soon as the wounded were safe under the shelter of the trees I

despatched a message to Sir George White asking him to send his

ambulance to fetch them, and also to make arrangements for the burial of

his dead. For some unexplained reason, the English ambulance did not

arrive till the following morning.

We stayed on the mountain until sunset, and then went down to the

laager. I ordered my brother, Piet de Wet, with fifty men of the

Bethlehem commando, to remain behind and guard the kop.

We reached camp at eight o'clock, and as the men had been without food

during the whole day it can be imagined with what delight each watched

his _bout span_ frizzling on the spit. This, with a couple of

_stormjagers_ and a tin of coffee, made up the meal, and speedily

restored them. They were exempted from sentry duty that night, and

greatly enjoyed their well-earned rest.

To complete my narrative of the day's work, I have only to add that the

Transvaal burghers were engaged at various points some eight miles from

Nicholson's Nek, and succeeded in taking four hundred prisoners.

We placed our sentries that evening with the greatest care. They were

stationed not only at a distance from the camp, as _Brandwachten_,[13]

but also close round the laager itself. We were especially careful, as

it was rumoured that the English had armed the Zulus of Natal. Had this

been true, it would have been necessary to exercise the utmost vigilance

to guard against these barbarians.

Since the very beginning of our existence as a nation--in 1836--our

people had been acquainted with black races, and bitter had been their

experience. All that our _voortrekkers_[14] had suffered was indelibly

stamped on our memory. We well knew what the Zulus could do under cover

of darkness--their sanguinary night attacks were not easily forgotten.

Their name of "night-wolves" had been well earned. Also we Free-Staters

had endured much from the Basutos, in the wars of 1865 and 1867.

History had thus taught us to place _Brandwachten_ round our laagers at

night, and to reconnoitre during the hours of darkness as well as in the

day-time.

Perhaps I shall be able to give later on a fuller account in these

pages--or, it may be, in another book--of the way we were accustomed to

reconnoitre, and of the reasons why the scouting of the British so

frequently ended in disaster. But I cannot resist saying here that the

English only learnt the art of scouting during the latter part of the

war, when they made use of the Boer deserters--the "Hands-uppers."

These deserters were our undoing. I shall have a good deal more to say

about them before I finally lay down my pen, and I shall not hesitate to

call them by their true name--the name with which they will be for ever

branded before all the nations of the world.

[Footnote 10: About nine miles: distance reckoned by average pace of

ridden horse--six miles an hour.]

[Footnote 11: Clear off.]

[Footnote 12: Hill.]

[Footnote 13: Literally, watch-fire men. They were the furthest

outposts, whose duty it was to signal by means of their fires.]

[Footnote 14: Pioneers.]

Three Years' War · 第 2 / 39 章