CHAPTER XIII.

THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.

During the Congressional recess of the autumn of 1861 gross

mismanagement led to the annihilation at Ball's Bluff of a brigade of

Union troops, led by Senator Edward D. Baker of Oregon. They had been

sent across the Potomac in flat-boats and skiffs, were left without

adequate support, and, being surrounded by a vastly superior force of

rebels, were driven to the edge of the river, and there either killed,

wounded, captured, or driven into hiding places along the banks. Their

commanding officer, who displayed throughout a high order of personal

courage, was shot at the head of his line before the final rout.

General Baker was a man of eloquence and many gallant qualities, and

his death created a profound impression; that he was sacrificed by

military incapacity cannot be doubted.

Congress met on Dec. 2, 1861, and on the first business day of the

session Mr. Chandler offered a motion for the expulsion of John C.

Breckenridge, who had at last joined the rebels, and it was unanimously

adopted. On December 5 he introduced this resolution:

_Resolved_, That a committee of three be appointed to inquire into

the disasters at Bull Run and Edward's Ferry (subsequently changed

to Ball's Bluff), with power to send for persons and papers.

Mr. Chandler said, in explanation of his motion, that these reverses

had been attributed to politicians, to civilians, to everything but

the right cause, and that it was due to the Senate and to the country

that they should be investigated and that the blame should rest where

it belonged. After some discussion the Senate adopted the resolution

with only three dissenting votes, first amending it by providing for

a joint committee of both branches, and by enlarging the scope of

its inquiries so as to include "the conduct of the war." The House

concurred in the action, and the famous "Committee on the Conduct of

the War" was thus created. On December 17, Mr. Chandler moved that the

Vice-President should appoint the Senate members, adding: "I do not

know what the parliamentary usage may be in a case of this kind. If

that usage would give me the position of chairman, I wish to say that,

under the circumstances, I do not wish to accept it." Mr. Chandler

had also privately requested Mr. Hamlin to appoint Senator Wade to

the chairmanship, saying it was important that a lawyer should be

given that place, and his desires were followed in both respects.

The first committee, as announced at that time, consisted of the

following Congressmen: On the part of the Senate, Benjamin F. Wade,

Zachariah Chandler and Andrew Johnson; on the part of the House,

Daniel W. Gooch of Massachusetts, John Covode of Pennsylvania, George

W. Julian of Indiana, and Moses F. Odell of New York. Of the original

committee, George W. Julian is the only one who survived Mr. Chandler.

When Andrew Johnson was appointed Military Governor of Tennessee, he

resigned his position upon the committee, and Senator Joseph A. Wright

of Indiana took his place. Mr. Wright served but a year, and after

the expiration of his term the Senate branch of the committee in the

Thirty-seventh Congress consisted of only Mr. Chandler and Mr. Wade.

William Blair Lord, now one of the official reporters of the House of

Representatives, was appointed its clerk and stenographer.

[Illustration: ZACHARIAH CHANDLER IN 1862.]

The tone of the Congressional discussion upon Mr. Chandler's

proposition shows that this was regarded as an exceedingly important

step, for the resolution clothed the committee with powers of very

unusual magnitude, which, if abused, must have seriously embarrassed

the Administration. Mr. Lincoln and Secretary Cameron, as well as

General Scott and General McClellan, opposed its appointment at the

outset, but Mr. Chandler took prompt and successful measures to assure

the President that, if the plans of its projectors were carried

out, the committee would be used only to strengthen the hands of

the Executive, and promised that it should be made a help and not a

hindrance to the vigorous prosecution of the war. On this point the

Hon. James M. Edmunds, who was thoroughly informed as to the secret

history of that period, has said:

The writer knows that the Administration was not without fear

that this was an unfriendly measure. A member of the Cabinet

expressed such fears to him, and said that the President had not

only expressed doubts as to the wisdom of the movement, but also

fears that the committee might, by unfriendly action, greatly

embarrass the Executive. On being told by the writer that the

measure was not so intended, but, on the contrary, that it was the

intention of the mover to bring the committee to the aid of the

Administration, he expressed much gratification, and said it was

of the utmost importance to bring such purpose to the knowledge

of the President in some authoritative way, and at the earliest

moment possible. This conversation was at once reported to Senator

Chandler, whereupon both he and Senator Wade went immediately to

the President and the Secretary of War, and assured them that it

was their purpose to bring the whole power of the committee to the

aid of the Executive. From this moment the most cordial relations

existed between the committee and the Administration.[22]

President Lincoln and Secretaries Cameron and Stanton ultimately

placed great reliance upon the committee, and constantly, throughout

the war, it gave them the most valuable assistance. Mr. Wade and Mr.

Chandler were deeper in the confidence of Secretary Stanton, from

their connection with it, than were any other members of Congress, and

differences of aim and opinion between them were exceedingly rare.

Upon organizing for work the committee found itself confronted with

an enormous task, inquiries into every phase of the organization and

management of the Union armies being referred to it for consideration.

"Upon the conduct of the war," to quote from its own report, "depended

the issue of the experiment inaugurated by our fathers, after the

expenditure of so much blood and treasure--the establishment of a

nation founded upon the capacity of man for self-government. The nation

was engaged in a struggle for its existence; a rebellion, unparalleled

in history, threatened the overthrow of our free institutions, and the

most prompt and vigorous measures were demanded by every consideration

of honor, patriotism, and a due regard for the prosperity and happiness

of the people." And its sphere of duty was the constant watching of the

details of movements, upon whose result depended such vast interests,

as well as the safety of thousands of lives. The committee, in laying

out its work, followed the suggestion of Mr. Chandler, which was,

first, to obtain such information in respect to the conduct of the war

as would best enable them to point out the mistakes which had been made

in the past, and the course that promised to ensure the avoidance of

their repetition; second, to collect such information as the many and

laborious duties of the President and Secretary of War prevented them

from obtaining, and to lay it before them with those recommendations

and suggestions which the circumstances seemed to demand. Working in

such a field, the committee soon became a second Cabinet council,

and its proceedings were constantly at the President's hand. Its

sessions were nearly perpetual, and almost daily its members were in

consultation with the President or the Secretary of War. Many of its

transactions were never committed to paper, and, as the members were

sworn to the strictest secrecy, will never be revealed. Secretary

Stanton was frequently present while the committee was in session, and

its door was always open to him. There was never any lack of harmony

between him and its chief members, but, on the contrary, the utmost

confidence was exchanged, and this committee was the right arm of the

War Department in the darkest days of the rebellion. Repeatedly, after

the examination of some important witness, did Mr. Chandler or Mr.

Wade go at once to the White House with the official stenographer,

when Mr. Stanton would be sent for and the stenographic notes of the

evidence would be read to the President and Secretary of War for their

information and guidance. From such conferences there sprang many

important decisions, and the files and records of the committee were

constantly referred to and relied upon as sources of exceedingly useful

knowledge and hints both at the White House and at the War Department.

Many subjects presented themselves for investigation, any one of which

would, in ordinary times, have required the exclusive attention of a

separate committee, and to follow out every line of inquiry suggested

was manifestly a practical impossibility. Therefore the committee

decided not to undertake any investigations into what might be

considered side issues, but to keep their attention directed entirely

to the essential features of the war, so that they could ascertain and

comprehend the necessities of the armies and the causes of disaster

or complaint, and the methods of supplying the one and remedying the

other. Attempts were made repeatedly to use its power to punish enemies

or to avenge private grievances, but its members adhered resolutely to

the straightforward course originally marked out as the path of its

duty.

The first subject which the committee carefully inquired into was the

defeat at Bull Run. Many witnesses were examined, chiefly officers

who were engaged in the battle--Generals Scott, McDowell, Meigs,

Heintzelman, Butterfield, Fitz-John Porter, and others. The testimony

was very voluminous, but the committee reached an early and unanimous

opinion as to the causes of the disaster. Their report, written by Mr.

Wade, said: "That which now appears to have been the great error was

the failure to occupy Centreville and Manassas at the time Alexandria

was occupied, in May. The position at Manassas controlled the railroad

connections in all that section of the country.... The next cause of

disaster was the delay in proceeding against the enemy until the time

of the three months' men was nearly expired. The enemy were allowed

time to collect their forces and strengthen their position by defensive

works.... There had been but little time devoted to disciplining

the troops and instructing them, even in regiments; hardly any

instruction had been given them in brigade movements, and none at all

as divisions." General McDowell prepared a plan of campaign, which

was approved by the Cabinet, and the 9th of July was fixed upon as the

day for the advance; but the movement did not commence until a week

later than the appointed time. Transportation was deficient, and there

was much delay resulting from lack of discipline among the troops, and

when the battle came the Union forces were fatigued and not in good

fighting condition. "But," said the report, "the principal cause of

the defeat was the failure of General Patterson to hold the troops of

General Johnston in the valley of the Shenandoah." Patterson had 23,000

men, while Johnston had but 12,000. Still, Patterson disobeyed the

orders of General Scott, which were to make offensive demonstrations

against General Johnston so as to detain his army at Winchester, and

if he retreated to follow him and keep up the fight. Those orders

were repeated every day for more than a week in the telegraphic

correspondence between Scott and Patterson. Finally, General Scott

heard of a large force moving from Patterson's front, and telegraphed,

"Has not the enemy stolen a march on you?" To this Patterson replied,

"The enemy has stolen no march upon me," while at that very time his

large army was watching an empty camp and Johnston was far on his way

to reinforce the rebels at Manassas. Patterson did not discover that

Johnston had gone until he was miles distant, and the consequence

was that McDowell had both Beauregard and Johnston to fight, while

Patterson, with 23,000 men, was lying idle in his camp. This is the

substance of the report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War

on the battle of Bull Run, and was the official announcement to the

country of the inefficiency of the organization and generalship of the

Army of the Potomac.

But before the committee was organized the men who were responsible

for this failure had been displaced, and General McClellan had been

made the commander-in-chief. He had taken the reins of authority amid

national acclamations, and was then at the height of a remarkable

popularity, which it is now known was adroitly stimulated for political

purposes by the conservative press. But on the investigation into the

second subject taken up by the committee (the disaster at Edward's

Ferry or Ball's Bluff) facts came to the knowledge of its members

which created the suspicion in their minds that General Stone, who was

charged with the blame of that defeat, and who, as the scape-goat, was

arrested and imprisoned in Fort Lafayette, was not alone responsible

for the calamity, but that the real fault would be found higher up.

This suspicion they were never able to substantiate by absolute proof,

and it was not expressed in any of their reports.

The third topic taken up by the committee was the military management

of the Western Department, under General Fremont. This was an inquiry

of special importance, for the reason that that officer, upon taking

command at St. Louis, issued a proclamation declaring free all slaves

whose masters were engaged in rebellion against the United States.

This order caused a great excitement throughout the country, and the

Republican party was widely divided in opinion as to its legality

and propriety. President Lincoln was conservative on the question,

and revoked the Fremont order, much to the disappointment of Mr.

Chandler and the other more "advanced" Republicans. Hence the committee

approached the subject with unusual interest, and, after a thorough

investigation, made an elaborate report. That part of this document

which relates to General Fremont's order in regard to slaves was signed

by Messrs. Wade, Chandler, Julian, and Covode, and showed the ground on

which these gentlemen then stood with regard to emancipation; it was as

follows:

But that feature of General Fremont's administration which

attracted the most attention, and which will ever be most prominent

among the many points of interest connected with the history of

that department, is his proclamation of emancipation. Whatever

opinion may be entertained with reference to the time when the

policy of emancipation should be inaugurated, there can be no doubt

that General Fremont at that early day rightly judged in regard

to the most effective means of subduing this rebellion. In proof

of that, it is only necessary to state that his successor, when

transferred to another department, issued a proclamation embodying

the same principle, and the President of the United States has

since applied the same principle to all the rebellious States; and

few will deny that it must be adhered to until the last vestige of

treason and rebellion is destroyed.

The committee heartily endorsed General Fremont's administration,

declaring it to have been "eminently characterized by earnestness,

ability, and the most unquestionable loyalty." They also examined into

various minor military matters and movements, including, particularly,

rebel barbarities and the return of slaves to their masters by the army.

It was as a member of the Committee on the Conduct of the War in the

Thirty-seventh Congress, and from the evidence taken in its inquiries,

that Mr. Chandler obtained the mass of information which enabled him

to make the most important of his war speeches, that of July 16,

1862, in which he exposed so conclusively General McClellan's utter

incompetence. Ample as was the foundation of facts upon which rested

this effective arraignment of conspicuous incapacity, the attack was

one requiring genuine boldness, for it defiantly invited a storm of

denunciation and, if it had failed of justification by the event, would

have certainly ended its maker's political career. Notwithstanding

his tardiness, his timidity, his inefficiency as a commander in the

field, and his political sympathy with the more unpatriotic classes

of the Northern people, General McClellan was still strong with the

people and entrusted with great powers. The Democracy warmly commended

his sentiments and methods, and labored incessantly to prevent any

diminution of his hold upon the public confidence. The Army of the

Potomac yet regarded him as "the young Napoleon," and its corps

commanders were, with but few exceptions, his personal adherents. The

long-suffering President was submitting with patience to his unjust

complaints, after having labored incessantly to stimulate into activity

his chronic sluggishness, fearful, with characteristic over-caution,

lest his summary removal should divide the North and breed a dangerous

disaffection in the face of the enemy among his troops. Many who did

not believe in the sincerity or ability of the man also smothered

their distrust, for fear that criticism would only weaken the common

cause and with the hope that even in his nerveless hands the mighty

weapon of the national resources would at last fall--even if by its

own weight only--on the enemy with decisive force. At this juncture,

and under these circumstances, Mr. Chandler, with characteristic vigor

of statement and plainness of speech, placed before the Senate and the

country the demonstration of McClellan's imbecility.

Originally Mr. Chandler believed that McClellan's selection as the

practical successor of General Scott was a wise one, and hoped to see

his organizing capacity in camp supplemented by enterprise and courage

in the field. Distrust first sprang up with the persistent inaction

of the Army of the Potomac throughout the last months of 1861, and it

was strengthened by contact with the man himself and the study of his

character and his plans. An illustration of how this change of opinion

was brought about is given in an incident which occurred in the room

of the Committee on the Conduct of the War. That committee sent for

General McClellan as soon as they took up matters relating to his

command, in order to consult with him informally as to the situation.

This was in January, 1861, while he was in Washington "organizing" his

army, and while there was no little impatience felt because he did

not move. He was not formally summoned before the committee then, but

simply called in for general consultation. After the regular business

was finished, Mr. Chandler asked him bluntly why he did not attack

the rebels. General McClellan replied that it was because there were

not sufficient means of communication with Washington; he then called

attention to the fact that there were only two bridges and no other

means of transportation across the Potomac.

Mr. Chandler asked what the number of bridges had to do with an advance

movement, and McClellan explained with much detail that it was one

of the most important features of skillful strategy that a commander

should have plenty of room to retreat before making an attack. To this

Mr. Chandler's response was:

"General McClellan, if I understand you correctly, before you strike at

the rebels you want to be sure of plenty of room so that you can run in

case they strike back!"

"Or in case you get scared," added Senator Wade.

The commander of the Army of the Potomac manifested indignation at this

blunt way of putting the case, and then proceeded at length to explain

the art of war and the science of generalship, laying special stress

upon the necessity of having lines of retreat, as well as lines of

communication and supply, always open. He labored hard to make clear

all the methods and counter-methods upon which campaigns are managed

and battles fought, and, as he was an accomplished master of the theory

of war, succeeded in rendering himself at least interesting. After he

had concluded, Mr. Wade said:

"General, you have all the troops you have called for, and if you

haven't enough, you shall have more. They are well organized and

equipped, and the loyal people of this country expect that you will

make a short and decisive campaign. Is it really necessary for you to

have more bridges over the Potomac before you move?"

"Not that," was the answer, "not that exactly, but we must bear in mind

the necessity of having everything ready in case of a defeat, and keep

our lines of retreat open."

With this remark General McClellan left the room, whereupon Mr. Wade

asked:

"Chandler, what do you think of the science of generalship?"

"I don't know much about war," was the reply, "but it seems to me that

this is infernal, unmitigated cowardice."

The committee, after this interview, made a careful inquiry into the

strength of the rebel forces confronting the elaborate intrenchments

about Washington, and became convinced that the army at and about

Manassas was a handful compared with the magnificent body of troops

under McClellan's command. They submitted these facts to the President

and his Cabinet at a special session held for that purpose, and urged

the importance of an instant advance. With one single exception (a

Cabinet officer) the heads of the departments and the committee agreed

that an offensive movement from the line of the Potomac into Virginia

was important and must be made. General McClellan promised that his

army should start, but it did not. Toward the close of the winter

the President ordered a general advance, but the Army of the Potomac

still remained immobile. Finally, on March 10, under the peremptory

orders of the President, it did advance to Centreville and found there

deserted camps, wooden guns, weak intrenchments, and traces of the

retreat of not more than a single full corps of rebel troops. It was

during this most aggravating delay that members of the committee had

another characteristic interview with General McClellan. On the 19th of

February a sub-committee waited upon the Secretary of War[23] to ask

why the army was idle, and why the city of Washington and the North

side of the Potomac river were crowded with troops when the enemy was

all in Virginia. Mr. Wade said that it was a disgrace to the nation

that Washington was thus allowed to remain to all intents and purposes

in a state of siege. To this Secretary Stanton replied that the

committee could not feel more keenly upon this subject than did he,

that he did not go to bed at night without his cheek burning with

shame at this disgrace, and that the subject had received his earnest

attention, but he had not been able to change the situation as he

wished. General McClellan was then sent for, and Secretary Stanton

stated to him the object of the visit, and repeated the inquiries as to

why an advance movement was not made into Virginia, the rebels driven

away from Washington, and the soldiers who were idle in their camps in

and around the city sent to active duty.

General McClellan answered that he was considering the matter, but

that instant action was impossible, although he hoped that he would

soon be able to decide what ought to be done. The committee asked what

time he would require to reach a decision. He replied that it depended

upon circumstances; that he would not give his consent to have the

troops about Washington sent over to the Virginia side of the Potomac

without having their rear protected more fully, and better lines of

retreat open; that he designed throwing a temporary bridge across the

river as soon as possible, and making a permanent structure of it at

his leisure. That would make three bridges, and then the requisite

precautions would be completed.

Mr. Wade replied, with great impatience, that with 150,000 of the best

troops the world ever saw, there was no need of more bridges; that the

rebels were inferior in numbers and condition, and that retreat would

be treason. "These 150,000 men," Mr. Wade said, "could whip the whole

Confederacy if they were given a chance; if I was their commander I

would lead them across the Potomac, and they should not come back until

they had won a victory and the war was ended, or they came in their

coffins." Mr. Wade spoke strongly and plainly throughout the interview,

and the Secretary of War endorsed every word he uttered. The committee

had another conference with Secretary Stanton on the following day at

his residence, at which it was decided that they should co-operate

with him in an effort to persuade President Lincoln either to displace

McClellan or to compel him to commence an active campaign at once.

On the 25th of February this conference with the President was held,

and it was followed by others, Senators Chandler and Wade finally

threatening to make the laggardness of the commander of the Army of the

Potomac a subject of debate in the Senate, and to offer a resolution

directing the President to order an advance forthwith. The first result

was what the committee were so anxious to accomplish. In March, the

armies commenced to move, and McClellan, at last taking the field in

person, pushed out to Centreville, and then followed up this delayed

advance by his flank movement to the Peninsula, driving the rebels out

of Yorktown by a month's work with the shovel, and following General

Johnston up to Williamsburg, where a bloody victory was won, but its

fruits were left ungathered. This campaign was short, bloody, and

blundering, ending with the battle of Malvern Hill, which was also

deprived of its proper importance by McClellan's failure to follow up

his advantage with a prompt advance upon Richmond, and which thus in

the end amounted to but little more than another Union reverse. Mr.

Chandler always firmly believed that had McClellan moved toward the

rebel capital and not toward his gunboats after Malvern Hill, the war

would have been shortened by two years.

When it first became evident that General McClellan was, by sullenness

and incapacity, throwing away advantages gained by the heroism of his

troops on the Peninsula, Mr. Chandler determined to denounce him on

the floor of the Senate, but was restrained by Mr. Stanton, who urged

that, while the campaign was still in active progress, there was yet

some hope of a change for the better, and that to destroy confidence in

a commanding officer under such circumstances might injure the army

in the field. After Malvern Hill these reasons ceased to have force,

and Mr. Chandler commenced the careful preparation of his speech. This

time the Secretary of War endorsed the timeliness as well as the truth

of the _expose_, and the Committee on the Conduct of the War by formal

vote authorized the use of the testimony taken before it and not yet

made public. After he had gathered and grouped the facts which formed

the basis of his arraignment, Mr. Chandler submitted them to a friend

upon whose good judgment and sincerity he greatly relied, and asked:

"Knowing all these facts, as I do, what is my duty?"

The answer was: "Beyond all question, these facts ought to be laid

before the country, for the knowledge of them is essential to its

safety. But they will create a storm that will sweep either you or

McClellan from public life, and it is more than probable that you will

be the victim."

Mr. Chandler said: "I did not ask your opinion of the consequences, but

of my duty."

To this it was replied: "The speech ought to be made, and no one else

will make it."

Mr. Chandler simply said: "It will be made to-day; come and hear it."

And he did make it, in the midst of a running discussion on a bill "to

provide for the discharge of state prisoners and others," which was the

special order in the Senate for that day (July 16, 1862).

Mr. Chandler commenced by briefly reciting the history of the

appointment of the committee, and then gave from the evidence taken at

its sessions a compact summary of the causes of the Bull Run disaster,

fortifying each point with citations from the testimony. After closing

this part of his speech he proceeded to review the Ball's Bluff

catastrophe, saying:

Were the people discouraged, depressed? Not at all. Untold

thousands rushed into the shattered ranks, eager to wipe out

the stain and stigma of that defeat (Bull Run). From the East,

the West, the North, and the Middle States, thousands and tens

of thousands and hundreds of thousands came pouring in, until

the government said, "Hold, enough." The Army of the Potomac,

denuded in August of three-months' men and scarcely numbering

50,000 efficient men, swelled in September to over 100,000, in

October to 150,000, in November to 175,000 and upward, until,

on the 10th day of December, the morning rolls showed 195,400

men, and thirteen regiments not reported, chiefly intended for

the Burnside expedition, but all under the command of General

McClellan. During the months of October, November, and December,

the weather was delightful and the roads fine. The question began

to be asked in October, when will the advance take place? All had

the most unbounded confidence in the army and its young general,

and were anxiously waiting for a Napoleonic stroke. It came, but

such a stroke! That a general movement was being prepared the

whole country had known for weeks; but when the terrific blow was

to be struck no one knew save the commander of the Army of the

Potomac. The nation believed in its young commander; the President

relied upon him, and all, myself included, had the most unbounded

confidence in the result of the intended movement. It came! On the

21st of October, McCall's division, 12,000 strong, was ordered

to Drainesville upon a reconnoissance. Smith's division, 12,000

strong, was ordered to support him. McCall's reconnoissance

extended four miles beyond Drainesville, and to within nine miles

of Leesburg. Stone, on Sunday, was informed of McCall's and Smith's

advance, and directed to make a slight demonstration upon Leesburg.

How? He could do it in but one way, and that was by crossing the

river and moving upon it. [Mr. Chandler here introduced a mass of

testimony and official orders to show that Col. E. D. Baker, whom

General Stone sent across the Potomac at Ball's Bluff, had ample

reasons to believe that he would be sustained in that advance,

and reinforced if necessary. He proceeded:] Thus it is shown that

Colonel Baker had reason to expect reinforcements, for the enemy

were to be pushed upon their flank by General Gorman.

At two o'clock on Monday morning Colonel Devens crossed the river

upon a reconnoissance with 400 men at Ball's Bluff, opposite

Harrison's Island, as directed by General Stone. At daylight

Colonel Baker was ordered to cross to the support of Colonel

Devens. I have read his orders. One scow and two small boats were

their only means of transportation. At eight o'clock on Monday

morning the fight commenced by Colonel Devens, and Colonel Baker

was placed in command, as is alleged, with discretionary orders.

Colonel Baker knew that Smith and McCall were at Drainesville,

or within striking distance, that our troops were crossing at

Edward's Ferry, or, in other words, that 40,000 effective men

were within twelve miles of him, and that at least 30,000 were

upon the Virginia side of the Potomac, and that, in the nature of

things, he must be reinforced. He did not know that at half-past

ten A.M., of Monday, or two and one-half hours after Colonel Devens

commenced the fight, the divisions of Smith and McCall commenced

their retreat by the express orders of General McClellan. He knew

that Colonel Devens was contending with greatly superior forces,

and, like a gallant soldier as he was, he hastened to his relief

with all the force he could cross with his inadequate means of

transportation.

Colonel Baker has been charged with imprudence and rashness; but

neither the facts nor the testimony support the charge. Instead

of rashly or imprudently advancing into the enemy's lines, as

was alleged, he did not move ten rods from the Bluff, and the

only sustaining witness to this charge was one officer, who swore

that he thought Colonel Baker imprudently exposed himself to the

enemy's bullets. This kind of rashness is usually pardoned after

the death of the perpetrator. At two o'clock P. M. Colonel Baker

found himself in command of about 1,800 men upon Ball's Bluff,

including Devens's men and three guns, and the fighting commenced.

The alternatives were fight and conquer, surrender, or be captured.

That noble band of heroes and their gallant commander understood

these terrible alternatives as well upon that bloody field as we

do now, and nobly did they vindicate their manhood. During all

those long hours, from two o'clock P. M. until the early dusk of

evening, the gallant Baker continued the unequal contest, when he

fell pierced by three bullets and instantly expired. A council

of war was called (after the frightful death-struggle over his

lifeless remains and for them), and it was decided that the only

chance of an escape was by cutting through the enemy and reaching

Edward's Ferry, which was at once decided upon; but, while

forming for the desperate encounter, the enemy rushed upon our

little band of heroes in overpowering numbers, and the rout was

perfect.... How many were killed in battle, how many drowned in

the relentless river, will never be correctly known; suffice it

to say, our little force was destroyed. Why was this little band

permitted to be destroyed by a force little more than double its

numbers in presence of 40,000 splendid troops? Why were McCall and

Smith ordered back at the very moment that Baker was ordered to

cross? If we wanted Leesburg, McCall could have taken it without

the loss of a man, as his movement in mass had already caused its

evacuation, and the enemy did not return in force until after

McCall had retreated. If we did not wish to capture Leesburg, why

did we cross at all? Of what use is "a slight demonstration" even,

without results? These are questions which the people will ask,

and no man can satisfactorily answer. Why were not reinforcements

sent from Edward's Ferry to Colonel Baker? The distance was only

three-and-a-half miles. We had 1,500 men across at two o'clock on

Monday, and the universal concurrent testimony of officers and men

is that a reinforcement of even 1,000 men--some say 500, and one

gallant captain swears that with 100 men he could have struck them

upon the flank,--would have changed the result of the day. Why were

not reinforcements sent? Stone swears, as I have already shown,

that there were batteries between Edward's Ferry and Ball's Bluff

which would have utterly destroyed any force he could have sent to

Baker's relief, and that Baker knew it. But Stone was not sustained

by a single witness; on the contrary, all swear that there were

not, to their knowledge, and that they did not believe there were

any, and a civilian living upon the spot, and in the habit of

passing over the ground frequently, swears there were none; and

again, Stone, when questioned as to the erection of forts under the

range of his guns upon his second examination, swears positively

that there is not a gun now between Edward's Ferry and Ball's

Bluff, and never has been. Why, then, were not reinforcements sent

from Edward's Ferry? Let the men who executed and planned this

horrible slaughter answer to God and an outraged country. General

Banks swears that his orders were such from General McClellan,

that, upon his arrival at Edward's Ferry, although his judgment was

against crossing, he did not feel himself at liberty to decline

crossing, and he remained upon the Virginia side until Thursday....

So much for the wholesale murder at Ball's Bluff.

Mr. Chandler next attacked General McClellan's disastrous

procrastination. Describing the lapse of an army of 150,000 men into

a state of chronic inaction in its intrenchments about Washington

after the Ball's Bluff disaster, he laid before the Senate and the

country documents which proved these facts: In October, 1861, the Navy

Department requested that 4,000 men might be detailed to hold Matthias

Point on the lower Potomac, after the gunboats should have shelled

out the rebels, who were then in possession, and thus in control of

the navigation of that important river. General McClellan agreed to

furnish the infantry; twice the Navy Department prepared its vessels

for the expedition, but the troops did not report for duty, so that,

finally, the gunboats were necessarily detailed for other service, and

the unnecessary, expensive and humiliating blockade of the Potomac

continued for months. Mr. Chandler then proceeded:

Why was this disgrace so long submitted to? No man knows or

attempts to explain. Month after month one of the most splendid

armies the world had ever seen, of 200,000 men, permitted itself

and the national capital to be besieged by a force _never_

exceeding one-half its own number.

During the month of December, the nation became impatient. The

time had arrived and passed when we were promised a forward

movement. The roads were good, the weather splendid, the army

in high condition, and eager for the fray. How long the roads

and weather would permit the movement, no man could predict;

still there was no movement. The generals, with great unanimity,

declared that the army had reached its maximum of proficiency

as volunteers, but still there was no movement. Under these

circumstances, the Committee on the Conduct of the War asked an

interview with the President and Cabinet, and urged that the winter

should not be permitted to pass without action, as it would lead

to an incalculable loss of life and treasure by forcing our brave

troops into a summer campaign, in a hot and to them inhospitable

climate. The President and Cabinet were united in the desire that

an immediate advance should be made, but it was not made, although

we were assured by General McClellan that it would be very soon,

that he had no intention of going into winter quarters, and he did

not! While the enemy erected comfortable huts at Centreville and

Manassas for their winter quarters, our brave and eager troops

spent the most uncomfortable winter ever known in this climate

under canvas, as thousands and tens of thousands of invalid

soldiers throughout the length and breadth of the land will attest.

Why did not the army move in all December, or why did it not go

into winter quarters? No man knows, nor is any reason assigned.

On the 1st day of January, 1862, and for months previous to that

date, the armies of the republic were occupying a purely defensive

position upon the whole line from Missouri to the Atlantic, until

on or about the 27th of January the President and Secretary of War

issued the order forward. Then the brave Foote took the initiative,

soliciting 2,000 men from Halleck to hold Fort Henry after he had

captured it with his gunboats. They were promptly furnished, and

Henry fell; then Donelson, with its 15,000 prisoners; then Newbern,

and the country was electrified. Credit was given where credit was

due. Do-nothing strategy gave way to an "immediate advance upon

the enemy's works," and the days of spades and pickaxes seemed

to be ended. On the 22d of February a forward movement upon our

whole line was ordered, but did not take place. The Army of the

Potomac was not ready; but on the 10th of March it moved, against

the protest of the commanding general and eight out of twelve of

the commanders of divisions; but the President was inexorable, and

the movement must be made. It proceeded to Centreville, and there

found deserted huts, wooden artillery, and intrenchments which

could and can be successfully charged by cavalry. It proceeded

to Manassas, and found no fortifications worthy of the name,

a deserted, abandoned camp, and dead horses for trophies. The

enemy, less than 40,000 men, had leisurely escaped, carrying away

all their artillery, baggage, arms, and stores. Our Army of the

Potomac, on that 10th day of March, showed by its muster-roll a

force of 230,000 men. Comment is needless! The Grand Army of the

Potomac proceeded toward Gordonsville, found no enemy, repaired the

railroad, and then marched back again.

Why this Grand Army of the Potomac did not march upon Richmond has

never been satisfactorily explained, and probably never will be.

One reason assigned was lack of transportation; but there were two

railroads, one by way of Acquia Creek and Fredericksburg, the

other via Manassas and Gordonsville, which could have been repaired

at the rate of ten miles per day, and our army was ample to guard

it. Had this overwhelming force proceeded directly to Richmond by

these lines, it would have spent the 1st day of May in Richmond,

and ere this the rebellion would have been ended. This grand army,

_ably_ commanded, was superior to any army the world has seen for

five hundred years. Napoleon I. never fought 130,000 men upon

one battle-field. Yet this noble army was divided and virtually

sacrificed by some one. Who is the culprit?

Before the advance upon Manassas, General McClellan changed his

plans, and demanded to be permitted to leave the enemy intrenched

at Centreville and Manassas; to leave the Potomac blockaded, and

to take his army to Annapolis by land, and there embark them for

the rear of the enemy to surprise him. In the council of war

called upon this proposition, the commanding general and eight out

of twelve of the commanders of divisions (and here permit me to

say that I am informed that seven out of the eight generals were

appointed upon the recommendation of General McClellan) voted that

it was not safe to advance upon the wooden guns of Centreville, and

to adopt the new plan of campaign. The President and the Secretary

of War overruled this pusillanimous decision, and compelled

McClellan to "move immediately upon the enemy's works." He marched,

and the trophies of that memorable campaign are known to the Senate

and the country.

At Fairfax, General McClellan changed his plan and decided not to

advance upon the rebels with his whole force, but to return to

Alexandria, divide his army, and embark for Fortress Monroe and

Yorktown. It was decided that 45,000 men should be left for the

defense of the capital, and he was permitted to embark. After much

delay (unavoidable in the movement of so vast a force, with its

enormous material) the general-in-chief himself embarked. Soon

after he sailed it came to the knowledge of the Committee on the

Conduct of the War that the capital, with its vast accumulation

of material of war, had been left by General McClellan virtually

without defense, and the enemy's whole force, large or small, was

untouched in front. [Mr. Chandler here introduced the official

testimony to prove that General McClellan had so denuded Washington

as to compel the President to interpose and detain General

McDowell's corps for its adequate defense. He then said:] The

country has been deceived. It has been led to believe that the

Secretary of War or somebody else has interfered with General

McClellan's plans, when he had an army that could have crushed any

other army on the face of the earth. One hundred and fifty-eight

thousand of the best troops that ever stood on God's footstool were

sent down to the Peninsula and placed under command of General

McClellan; and yet the whole treasonable press of the country has

been howling after the Secretary of War because of his alleged

refusal to send reinforcements to General McClellan. As I said the

other day, he has sent every man, every sabre, every bayonet, every

horse, that could be spared from any source whatever to increase

that grand army under General McClellan in front of Richmond. Why

did he not enter Richmond? We shall see.... It is not for me, sir,

to state the strength of McClellan's army at this time; but I know

it is 158,000 men, less the number lost by sickness and casualties.

Does any man doubt that this army, ably handled, was sufficiently

strong to have captured Richmond and crushed the rebel army? I

think not, if promptly led against the enemy; but instead of that,

it sat down in malarious swamps and awaited the drafting, arming,

drilling, and making soldiers of an army to fight it, and in the

meantime our own army was rapidly wasting away. Unwholesome water,

inadequate food, overwork, and sleeping in marshes, were rapidly

filling the hospitals, and overloading the return boats with the

sick. Sir, we have lost more men by the spade than the bullet,

five to one, since the army started from Yorktown under McClellan.

Had the soldiers been relieved from digging and menial labor by

the substitution of negro laborers, the Army of the Potomac would

to-day, in my estimation, contain 30,000 more brave and efficient

soldiers than it does. Had it been relieved from guarding the

property of rebels in arms, many valuable lives would have been

saved. Yorktown was evacuated after a sacrifice of more men by

sickness than the enemy had in their works when our army landed at

Fortress Monroe. The battle of Williamsburg was fought by a small

fraction of our army, and the enemy routed. During the battle,

General McClellan wrote a dispatch, miles from the field of battle,

saying he should try to "hold them in check" there.... He would try

to "hold them in check!" He could not hold them. He could not stop

his eager troops from chasing them. After a small fraction of his

army had whipped their entire force and had been chasing them for

hours, he penned that dispatch and sent it to the Secretary of War,

and, if I remember aright, it was read in one of the two houses of

Congress. As you may suppose from that dispatch, there was no great

eagerness in following up that victory. Three Michigan regiments

were not only decimated, they were divided in twain, in that

bloody battle at Williamsburg. They fought there all day without

reinforcements. One Michigan regiment went into the trenches and

left sixty-three dead rebels, killed by the bayonet, weltering in

their blood. But who has ever heard, by any official communication

from the head of the army, that a Michigan regiment was in the

fight at Williamsburg? I do not blame him for not giving credit

where credit is due, for I do not believe he knew anything more of

that fight than you or I.

When that battle was fought and won, all the enemy's works were

cleared away, and we had an open road to Richmond. There was not a

single fortification between Richmond and Williamsburg. All we had

to do was to get through those infernal swamps, march up, and take

possession of Richmond. What did we do? We found the worst swamp

there was between Richmond and Williamsburg, and sat right down

in the center of it and went to digging. We sacrificed thousands

and tens of thousands of the bravest troops that ever stood on

the face of God's earth, digging in front of no intrenchments, and

before a whipped army of the enemy. We waited for them to recruit;

we waited for them to get another army. They had a levy _en masse_.

They were taking all the men and boys between the ages of fifteen

and fifty-five, and magnanimously we waited weeks and weeks and

weeks for them to bring these forced levies into some sort of

consistency as an army. The battle of Fair Oaks was fought. There

the enemy found again a little fraction of our army, very much

less than half, and they brought out their entire force. I have it

from the best authority that they had not a solitary regiment in

or about Richmond that was fit to put in front of an enemy that

they did not bring to Fair Oaks and hurl upon our decimated army.

Again the indomitable bravery of our troops (of the men, of private

soldiers, the indomitable energy of Michigan men and New Jersey

men--but I will not particularize, for all the troops fought like

lions), and the fighting capacity of our army not only saved it

from being utterly destroyed by an overwhelming force, but gave us

a triumphant victory. The enemy went back to Richmond pell-mell.

I have been informed by a man who was there at the time, that two

brigades of fresh troops could have chased the whole Confederate

army through the city of Richmond and into the James river, so

utter was their rout and confusion.

And what did we do then? We found another big swamp, and we sat

down in the center of it and went to digging. We began to throw up

intrenchments when there were no intrenchments in our front, no

enemy that was not utterly broken. We never took advantage of the

battle of Fair Oaks. Again Michigan soldiers were cut to pieces

by hundreds. Go into the Judiciary square hospital in this city,

and you will find more than half the occupants are Michigan men

who were shot at Fair Oaks and Williamsburg, men who stood until

a regiment of 1,000 men was reduced to 105, and even then did not

run. Sir, these men have been sacrificed, uselessly sacrificed.

They have been put to hard digging, and hard fare, and hard

sleeping, and if there was any hard fighting to do they have been

put to that; and, besides all this, at night they have had to guard

the property of rebels in arms. They have been so sacrificed that

two or three of the Michigan regiments to-day cannot bring into the

field 250 men each out of 1,000 with whom they started.

Fair Oaks was lost; that is to say, we won a brilliant victory,

but it did us no good; we did not take advantage of it. Of course

it would have been very unfair to take advantage of a routed army

[laughter]; it would not have been according to our "strategy." We

magnanimously stopped, and commenced digging. There was no army in

our front, there were no intrenchments in our front; but we did not

know what else to do, and so we began to dig and ditch, and we kept

digging and ditching until the rebels had impressed and drilled and

armed and made soldiers of their entire population. But that was

not enough; they sent Jackson up on his raid to Winchester, and

we waited for him to come back with his twenty or thirty thousand

men. We heard that Corinth was being evacuated, and of course

it would have been very unfair to commence an attack until they

brought their troops from Corinth, and so we waited for the army at

Corinth to get to Richmond. After the rebels had got all the troops

they ever hoped to raise from any source, we did not attack them,

but they attacked us, as we had reason to suppose they would. They

attacked our right wing, and, as I am informed upon what I must

deem reliable authority, they hurled the majority of their entire

force upon our right wing of 30,000 men, and during the whole of

that Thursday our right wing of 30,000 men held their ground, and

repulsed that vast horde of the enemy over and over again, and held

their ground at night. Of course you will say a reinforcement of

twenty or thirty thousand men was sent to these brave troops that

they might not only hold their ground the next day, but send this

dastardly army into Richmond a second time, as at Fair Oaks. No,

sir, nothing of the sort was done.

At night, instead of sending them reinforcements, they were ordered

to retreat. That was "strategy!" The moment they commenced their

retreat, as is said in the dispatches, the enemy fought like

demons. Of course they would. Who ever heard of a retreating army

that was not pursued by the victors like demons, except in the

case of rebel retreats? No other nation but ours was ever guilty

of stopping immediately after a victory. Other armies fight like

demons after a victory, and annihilate the enemy, but we do not.

Our left wing and center remained intact. A feint was made upon

the left and center, and I have here, not the sworn testimony, but

the statement of one of the bravest men in the whole Army of the

Potomac--I will not give his name, but a more highly honorable man

lives not--that when his regiment was ordered under arms, he had

no doubt that he was going to march into Richmond. He believed the

whole force of the enemy had attacked our right wing; he believed

there was nothing but a screen of pickets in front; and he thought

that now our great triumph was to come off. His men sprang into

line with avidity, prepared to rush into Richmond and take it at

the point of the bayonet. He never discovered his error until he

saw a million and a half dollars' worth of property burned in

front of his regiment, and then he began to think that an advance

upon Richmond was not intended. And it was not! We had been at

work there and had lost 10,000 men in digging intrenchments; we

had spent months in bringing up siege guns, and we abandoned

those intrenchments without firing one gun. Our army was ordered

to advance on the gunboats instead of on Richmond. This colonel

told me that his regiment fought three days and whipped the enemy

each day, and retreated each night. The left wing and center were

untouched until they were ordered to retreat. No portion of our

vast force had been fought except the right wing under Porter, and

they whipped the enemy the first day.

This is called strategy! Again, sir, I ask, Why was this great

Army of the Potomac of 230,000 men divided? Human ingenuity could

not have devised any other way to defeat that army; Divine wisdom

could scarcely have devised any other way to defeat it than that

which was adopted. There is no army in Europe to-day that could

meet the Army of the Potomac when it was 230,000 strong, the best

fighting material ever put into an army on the face of the earth.

Why was that grand army divided? I simply charge that grave and

serious errors have been committed, and, as I have said, no other

way could have been devised to defeat that army. If the 158,000

men that were sent to General McClellan had been marched upon the

enemy, they could have whipped all the armies the Confederates

have, and all they are likely to have for six months. One hundred

and fifty-eight thousand men are about as many as can be fought on

any one battle-field. One hundred and fifty-eight thousand men are

a vast army, a great deal larger army than that with which Napoleon

destroyed 600,000 of the Austrians in a single year. One hundred

and fifty-eight thousand men ably handled can defeat any force

the Confederates can raise; and that is the force that went down

to the Peninsula. But, sir, it lay in ditches, digging, drinking

rotten water, and eating bad food, and sleeping in the mud, until

it became greatly reduced in numbers, and of those that were left

very many were injured in health. Still they fought; still they

conquered in every fight, and still they retreated, because they

were ordered to retreat.

Sir, I have deemed it my duty to present this statement of facts to

the Senate and the country. I know that I am to be denounced for so

doing, and I tell you who will denounce me. There are two classes

of men who are sure to denounce me, and no one else, and they are

traitors and fools. The traitors have been denouncing every man who

did not sing pæans to "strategy," when it led to defeat every time.

The traitors North are worse than the traitors South, and sometimes

I think we have as many of them in the aggregate. They are meaner

men; they are men who will come behind you and cut your throat in

the dark. I have great respect for Southern traitors who shoulder

their muskets and come out and take the chances of the bullets

and the halter; but I have the most superlative contempt for the

Northern traitors, who, under the pretended guise of patriotism,

are stabbing their country in the dark.

The effect of this speech was profound. It enraged McClellan's friends

to the highest pitch; it was not supported at the time by any like

utterance in Congress, and at first many who believed it to be true

condemned, or at least deprecated, the fierceness of the attack;

but those who knew that "the young Napoleon" at heart preferred a

pro-slavery compromise to the conquest of a durable and honorable

peace, and who had marked with righteous indignation the attempt of

his _claquers_ to make the Secretary of War the scape-goat for his

own blunders, greeted with enthusiasm the signal courage of the man

who, in the face of abuse, prejudice, and popular blindness, dared to

tell with words of rugged force this story of disastrous imbecility.

Mr. Chandler disregarded the remonstrances of weak friends, and met

without quailing the storm of vituperation he had invited. Events

made themselves his justifiers and within four months[24] President

Lincoln, with the full approval of the patriotic masses of the North,

relieved General McClellan from all command and abruptly terminated

his military career. Nothing contributed more to this salutary change

than Mr. Chandler's arraignment, of which it has been well said, that

"with words resembling battles he told the American people that they

were leaning upon a broken reed, that 'the idol of the soldiers' was

as incapable of helping them as the idols of the heathen, and that

McClellan was only digging graves for the brave men who followed him

and a last ditch for the cause he defended; he shocked by his language

the mass of the people into a right comprehension of the death's dance

this military Jack-o'-lantern was leading them through the swamps of

Virginia."

Mr. Chandler, who took this step after full deliberation and not

from any passing impulse, rated the McClellan speech as his most

important public service, alike in its necessity, its timeliness,

and its results. He also felt that it involved more real hazard,

and made larger demands upon his courage, than any other act of his

Senatorial career, for such relentless invective could scarcely fail

to mortally wound either its object or its maker. Had time shown that

he had uttered calumnies and not the sober truth, he would have been

inevitably driven from public life; and even when he spoke, the men who

thoroughly doubted McClellan were still a small minority. History has

shown that his indictment was as true in substance as it was unsparing

in terms and bold in spirit.

Two other matters naturally group themselves with this speech: Mr.

Chandler distrusted McClellanism in the Army of the Potomac as

thoroughly as he did McClellan. The investigations of this committee

convinced him that General Pope's campaign was so unfortunate because

of the insubordination of General McClellan's friends among the corps

commanders, and led him to believe that the same cause crippled the

movements of both Burnside and Hooker, who, if faithfully supported,

would have won decisive victories. So strong were his convictions on

these points, that when General Grant became commander-in-chief he

called upon the Secretary of War and requested him to make out a list

of the incompetent, suspected and insubordinate generals of the Army of

the Potomac, to be furnished to that officer so that he would be able

to place them where they could do the least harm in the service. This

Secretary Stanton promised to do. A few days afterward Mr. Chandler

called again at the War Department, and, learning that this had not

yet been done, said, "I will make out the list myself and send it to

Grant;" and he did so, Major-Gen. C. C. Washburn being its bearer.

Mr. Chandler carefully studied and vigilantly watched the Fitz-John

Porter case, and approved of the findings of the court-martial, except

the failure to inflict the death penalty, which he believed that the

character and consequences of Porter's action fully merited. The

attempt to secure the reversal of this verdict and the re-instatement

in the army of the dismissed officer aroused his sternest indignation,

and he fought it resolutely at every stage--and successfully, while

he remained in the Senate. He spoke at length on this subject in that

body on Feb. 21, 1870, declaring that he did so in fulfillment of a

voluntary pledge given some years before in the same chamber to General

Pope, "that justice should be done to him and to his campaign in the

valley of Virginia, even although I were called upon to vindicate him

from my seat in the Senate." After rehearsing the facts connected with

Pope's movement, which was planned to create a diversion of Lee's

army for the extrication of McClellan's forces from the Peninsula, in

conformity with the suggestion of Gen. James S. Wadsworth, and showing

that Pope had frequently requested to be relieved from the hazardous

work laid out for him and that he had only a force of 42,000 men

scattered between Harper's Ferry and Acquia Creek, Mr. Chandler said:

I asked him in the presence of the committee: "What is to prevent

you from being struck by a superior force of the enemy and

overwhelmed?" Said he: "Nothing on earth is more probable than

that I shall be struck by a superior force and shall be whipped;

but I will keep my troops near the mountains, and there are no

ten miles where there is not a gulch up which I can take my men

and small-arms, and, by abandoning my artillery and baggage,

save my men; I shall probably be whipped, but it must be done."

Any military man can see and appreciate the difficulties and

responsibilities of so desperate a campaign. "Yet," said he, "it

must be done."

Well, sir, General Pope started on that campaign. Had he announced

to the newspaper press of Washington, or of the North, the number

of his men or his object, the object itself would have been

defeated. General Pope did what I believe is allowable in war: he

perpetrated a _ruse de guerre_. He sent his scouts all through the

mountains of Virginia proclaiming that he had an army of 120,000

men. And, sir, he fooled the newspaper correspondents of the city

of Washington and of the whole North. General Pope, when he started

on that campaign, had no more idea of going to Richmond than he had

of following Elijah to Heaven in a chariot of fire without seeing

death. He started with one single object, and that was to save the

army of McClellan, or to do all that was in his power to save it.

He massed his troops, and that terrible battle of Cedar Mountain

was fought; and by that battle he not only fooled the people of

this country, but he fooled the rebels. The rebels believed that

he had 120,000 men, and that, unless they fought him and crushed

him before he could unite with the Army of the Potomac, their cause

was lost; and he drew upon his shoulders with that little force the

whole rebel army, so that, when McClellan started for Yorktown,

there was not even a popgun fired at his troops. The _ruse_ was

a perfect success, and, as I told General Pope then, "I consider

that your campaign has been one of the most brilliant that has been

fought up to this time"--which was February, 1863--"you saved two

armies; you first saved the Army of the Potomac, and then you saved

your own."

Sir, General Pope fought for eleven days, fought night and day,

fought the whole rebel army with his little force, his force never

having exceeded 70,000 men,--comprising not simply his own army,

but also General Burnside's forces, and the 20,000 men who had in

thirty days been brought up from the Army of the Potomac, and of

whom Porter's corps was part. The force which he had met with these

was that originally in his front, but overwhelmingly augmented by

that rebel force from which McClellan, with his 90,000 men, had to

be delivered by a demonstration in their rear. He fought for time.

He defended every brook, every barn, every piece of woods, every

ravine. He fought for time for the Army of the Potomac to reach him

and unite with him, so as to crush the advancing and overwhelming

force of the rebels.

Mr. Chandler then reviewed at length (and with copious citations from

the testimony of eye-witnesses and the official orders) the facts as

to Fitz-John Porter's course in Pope's campaign, adding extracts from

the reports of rebel officers which had come into the possession of the

government since the war, and closed as follows:

Mr. President, if I had more time I should like to go more fully

into this subject; but I cannot. The court, after forty-five days

spent in careful investigation, brought in unanimously the verdict

against Porter. Many of the members of that court were in favor of

sentencing him to suffer death. It is rumored, and many believe,

that the only reason the death-penalty was not inflicted was the

fear that Mr. Lincoln, whose kindness of heart was so well-known,

would not execute the sentence; and, hence, they unanimously

brought in the verdict they did. It was first carefully examined

_seriatim_ by the then Secretary of War and the President. No more

just tribunal ever investigated a case, I presume to assert, than

this tribunal, and there its finding stands.

It may be asked, How came it that a misunderstanding, almost as

universal as complete, was suffered to be put upon the country?

General Pope himself says: "The next day it (my report) was

delivered to General Halleck; but by that time influences of

questionable character, and transactions of most unquestionable

impropriety, which were well known at the time, had entirely

changed the purposes of the authorities. It is not necessary,

and, perhaps, would scarcely be in place, for me to recount these

things."

It is as well known to others present as to me that, during

that gloomy, eventful Sunday which succeeded the last battle on

Saturday, the 30th of August, the President and Mr. Stanton were

overrun and overcome with statements that, unless McClellan was

restored to command "the army would not fight." These statements

came from men who did not mean it should fight, who could not in

the exigency of the moment be displaced. The President was able

afterward to relieve McClellan and court-martial Porter. Had he

lived, he would have seen justice to General Pope awarded also. It

remains for me, while I live, to do my portion of that duty.

There is one other point to which I wish to allude. During this

very trial--during the very pendency of the trial--Fitz-John Porter

said, in the presence of my informant, who is a man whom most of

you know, and who is to-day in the employment of Congress, and

whose word I would take as soon as I would most men's--though

I told him I would not use his name, but I will give his sworn

testimony, taken down within two minutes after the utterance was

made--Fitz-John Porter said in his presence: "I was not true to

Pope, and there is no use in denying it." Mr. President, what was

"not true to Pope"? If he was not true to Pope, whom was he true

to? Being true to Pope was being true to the country; "not true

to Pope" was being a traitor to the country. Sir, "not true to

Pope" meant the terrible fight of the 30th of August, with all the

blood and all the horrors of that bitter day; "not true to Pope"

meant the battle of Antietam, with its thousands of slain and its

other thousands maimed; "not true to Pope" meant the first battle

of Fredericksburg, with its 20,000 slain and maimed; "not true

to Pope" covered the battles of the Wilderness and Cold Harbor,

and all the dreadful battles that followed. Had Fitz-John Porter

been true to his government, Jackson would have been destroyed

on the 29th of August, and on the 30th the rebels could scarcely

have offered any resistance to our victorious army. "Not true to

Pope" meant 300,000 slain and 2,000,000,000 of additional dollars

expended.

Sir, I wish to put this on the record for all time, that it may

remain. Let Fitz-John Porter thank God that he yet lives, and that

he was not living at that time under a military government. I told

General Pope, in the first interview I had with him, that I had but

one fault to find in the whole conduct of the campaign. He asked,

"What is that?" Said I, "That you ever allowed Fitz-John Porter to

leave the battle-field alive!"

In 1877 Porter at last succeeded, by the most persistent effort, in

obtaining the order for the re-examination of his case, and when Mr.

Chandler re-entered the Senate in 1879, he found himself confronting

an organized movement to secure that officer's restoration to his

old rank with full pay since the date of his dishonorable dismissal

from the army. To this contemplated action he proposed to offer the

most strenuous resistance, and the last volumes he drew from the

Congressional Library were authorities he wished to consult in the

preparation of his argument against the reversal of the Porter finding.

Mr. Chandler's positive opinions in the McClellan and Porter cases were

shared by his colleagues of the Committee on the Conduct of the War

of the Thirty-seventh Congress, and are justified by their elaborate

reports covering the history of the Army of the Potomac from the

battle of Ball's Bluff to the close of the Fredericksburg campaign.

The Thirty-eighth Senate adopted a resolution continuing the existence

of this committee, and, the House concurring, the old members, so

far as they were in Congress, were re-appointed. Senator Harding of

Oregon took the place of Mr. Wright, and afterward Mr. Buckalew of

Pennsylvania succeeded Mr. Harding. From the House, Mr. B. F. Loan of

Missouri was appointed as the successor of Mr. Covode. Wm. Blair Lord

was re-elected clerk and stenographer. This committee also devoted

much of its time to the troubles of the Army of the Potomac. General

Burnside had resigned the command because of a misunderstanding with

the President, brought about by the interference of Gens. John Cochrane

and John Newton, and General Hooker was appointed in his place, with

General Halleck as commander-in-chief. But Halleck disliked Hooker,

and forced his resignation by overruling his plans and countermanding

his orders, General Meade succeeding. The committee examined closely

into this matter, reaching the conclusion that Hooker had not been

fairly dealt with, and incidentally disposing of the false statement

then current that that officer was intoxicated at the battle of

Chancellorsville, and was defeated from that cause. The committee

condemned Hooker's removal, and Mr. Chandler firmly believed in his

courage, patriotism and ability, and regarded him as the victim of

circumstances. These facts make it an interesting coincidence that

these two men--both bold, frank and positive in their respective

spheres of public activity--should have died sudden and painless deaths

within the same week.

The committee did not believe that the selection of General Meade

for the command of the Army of the Potomac was a fortunate one,

and doubted his ability to properly control his subordinates. While

there is no reference to the matter in their report on this subject,

it is a fact that they recommended the removal of General Meade from

command, and the re-instatement of Hooker. On the 4th of March, 1864,

Mr. Chandler and Mr. Wade called upon the President, and told him that

they believed it to be their duty, impressed as they were with the

testimony the committee had taken, to lay a copy of it before him, and

in behalf of the army and the country demand the removal of General

Meade, and the appointment of some one more competent to command. The

President asked what general they could recommend; they said that for

themselves they would be content with General Hooker, believing him to

be competent, but not being advocates of any particular officer, they

would say that if there was any one whom the President considered more

competent, then let him be appointed. They added that "Congress had

appointed the committee to watch the conduct of the war; and unless

this state of things should be soon changed it would become their duty

to make the testimony public which they had taken, with such comments

as the circumstances of the case seemed to require." General Meade was

not removed, but General Grant was, within a week, given command as

general-in-chief, and assumed personal direction of the movements of

the Army of the Potomac.

During 1864 and 1865 the committee (besides considering many minor

matters) also investigated, with care:

1. The disastrous assault upon Petersburg on July 30, 1864; their

report exonerated General Burnside from the responsibility for

the repulse, and held that the disaster was attributable to the

interference with his plans of General Meade, whose course in the

matter was severely censured.

2. The unsuccessful expedition of 1864 up the Red river in Louisiana,

which the committee (Mr. Gooch dissenting) emphatically condemned.

3. The first Fort Fisher expedition, the committee, in its report,

approving of General Butler's course in withdrawing from the projected

assault.

During the inquiry into the Petersburg fiasco, the sub-committee were

in session at General Grant's headquarters, and Mr. Chandler was his

guest, renewing there an early acquaintance and laying the foundations

of their future close friendship. Some incidents of their intercourse

were characteristic.

General Sherman had just reached Savannah, and the mystery of the

objective point of his great "march to the sea" had thus been solved

for the public. This memorable exploit was discussed at length between

General Grant and Mr. Chandler. The former said that the suggestion

was Sherman's, and so was the entire plan of the campaign. Sherman had

urged it for a long time before he (Grant) would consent, but finally

the conditions were ripe, and the order was given. General Grant added

that Sherman was the only man in the army whom he would have entrusted

this campaign to, as he was especially adapted for such a command, and

said: "Congress ought to do something for Sherman. He deserves a great

deal more credit and honor than he has ever received." "What can we do

for him?" asked Mr. Chandler. "Increase his rank," was the reply. "We

have made you lieutenant general," responded Mr. Chandler, laughingly,

"and I suppose we could make him a general, and thus put him over you."

"Do it," said Grant, promptly. "If he carries this campaign through

successfully, do it. I would rather serve under Sherman than any man I

know." General Grant also said that when he received a dispatch that

Thomas had attacked Hood, he felt that a great victory was already won.

He added: "I did not have any anxiety about the result; when Thomas

attacks, a victory is sure. He is a slow man, but he is the surest man

I know. Once in motion, he is the hardest man to fight in this army.

He never precipitates a battle unless he is all ready, and knows his

points, and you may rest easy when he attacks, for the next news will

be the enemy's rout. When Thomas once gets in motion the rebels have

not force enough to stop him."

Upon the final adjournment of the Thirty-eighth Congress (on March 4,

1865) it continued the existence of the Committee on the Conduct of the

War for ninety days, in order to afford it time to finish its work.

During this period it closed up some pending inquiries and prepared

its final reports. Its last action was an examination into General

Sherman's unauthorized and unfortunate negotiations with General

Johnston, which the committee disapproved and that officer's superiors

promptly repudiated. The final report of the committee bears the date

of the 22d of May, 1865, and its closing passages are as follows:

Your committee, at the close of the labors in which the most

of them have been engaged for nearly four years past, take

occasion to submit a few general observations in regard to their

investigations. They commenced them at a time when the government

was still engaged in organizing its first great armies, and before

any important victory had given token of its ability to crush

out the rebellion by the strong hand of physical power. They

have continued them until the rebellion has been overthrown, the

so-called Confederate government been made a thing of the past,

and the chief of that treasonable organization is a proclaimed

felon in the hands of our authorities. And soon the military and

naval forces, whose deeds have been the subjects of our inquiry,

will return to the ways of peace and the pursuits of civil life,

from which they have been called for a time by the danger which

threatened their country. Yet while we welcome those brave veterans

on their return from fields made historical by their gallant

achievements, our joy is saddened as we view their thinned ranks

and reflect that tens of thousands, as brave as they, have fallen

victims to that savage and infernal spirit which actuated those who

spared not the prisoners at their mercy, who sought by midnight

arson to destroy hundreds of defenseless women and children,

and who hesitated not to resort to means and to commit acts so

horrible that the nations of the earth stand aghast as they are

told what has been done. It is a matter for congratulation that,

notwithstanding the greatest provocations to pursue a different

course, our authorities have ever treated their prisoners humanely

and generously, and have in all respects conducted this contest

according to the rules of the most civilized warfare....

Your committee would refer to the record of their labors to show

the spirit and purpose by which they have been governed in their

investigations. They have not sought to accomplish any purpose

other than to elicit the truth; to that end have all their labors

been directed. If they have failed at any time to accomplish that

purpose, it has been from causes beyond their control. Their work

is before the people, and by it they are willing to be judged.

The volumes which contain the official record of the proceedings of the

Committee on the Conduct of the War are and always must be regarded as

the most valuable single magazine of historical material relating to

the Great Rebellion. They have been liberally used in the preparation

of every important account of our civil strife yet published, and the

men, who shall in the light of another century estimate the greatness

and significance of that "throe of progress," will inevitably look

in their pages to the graphic narratives of those who were parts

of memorable movements and actors in famous battles as a means of

information, and to the conclusions of those who prosecuted inquiries

so zealously when the events were yet fresh in the memory as a source

of guidance. Infallibility is not a human attribute, and the work of

this committee was not free from misapprehension and mistake. Time,

which has shown some of its errors and will correct others, has also

sustained the essential justice of its most important conclusions,

which will stand unreversed on the pages of impartial history.

But the chief value of the labors of this committee is not to be

found in its collection of rich materials for the future chronicler.

To its unrecorded but potent influence upon the conduct of the war,

adequate justice has not yet been done. Its unwearied investigations

constantly exposed corruption, incompetence, and insubordination, and

placed in the hands of the authorities the means of discovering and

punishing the knavish, the weak, and the disloyal. Its activity was

a perpetual prompter to energy, and a vigilant detective by the side

of inefficiency and disaffection. As the result of its labors, the

unsuccessful, the half-hearted, and the traitorous gave way to the

able and the patriotic; because of the knowledge of its relentless

questioning, indolent men were vigilant, and laxity was transformed

into vigor. Its unremitting labors stayed up the hands of the War

Secretary in the heaviest hours of his great task, and usefully

informed the counsels and shaped the decisions of the White House. If

its every session had been permanently secret, and not a line of its

proceedings existed as a public record, there would still remain an

ineffaceable transcript of the results of its action in the correcting

of mistakes of organization and that crushing of sham generalship which

alone made final victory possible.

FOOTNOTES:

[22] In "The Republic" magazine of April, 1875.

[23] Edwin M. Stanton had succeeded Simon Cameron on Jan. 13. 1862.

[24] On Nov. 7, 1862.