_“The Target,” by Col Charles H. Waterhouse._]
While the Marines remained angry at the paucity of the overall
preliminary naval bombardment of Iwo Jima, all hands valued the
continuous and responsive support received from D-day onward. Many
of the gunfire ships stood in close--frequently less than a mile
offshore--to deliver along the flanks and front lines, and many took
hits from masked Japanese coast defense batteries. There were literally
no safe zones in or around the island. Two aspects of naval gunfire at
Iwo Jima rate special mention. One was the extent to which the ships
provided illumination rounds over the battlefield, especially during
the early days before landing force artillery could assume the bulk of
these missions. The second unique aspect was the degree of assistance
provided by the smallest gunships, frequently modified landing craft
armed with 4.2-inch mortars, rockets, or 20mm guns. These “small boys”
proved invaluable, especially along the northwest coast where they
frequently worked in lock-step with the 5th Marine Division as it
approached The Gorge.
While the Marines comprised the bulk of the landing force at Iwo Jima,
they received early and increasing support from elements of the U.S.
Army. Two of the four DUKW companies employed on D-day were Army units.
The 138th Antiaircraft Artillery Group provided 90mm AA batteries
around the newly captured airfields. Major General James E. Chaney,
USA, who would become Island Commander, Iwo Jima, at the battle’s end,
landed on D+8 with advance elements of the 145th Infantry.
As far as the Marines on the ground were concerned, the most welcome
Army units flew into Iwo Jima on 6 March (D+15). This was the 15th
Fighter Group, the vanguard of VII Fighter Command destined to
accompany the B-29s over Tokyo. The group included the 47th Fighter
Squadron, a seasoned outfit of North American P-51 Mustangs. Although
the Army pilots had no experience in direct air support of ground
troops, Colonel Megee liked their “eager-beaver attitude” and
willingness to learn. He also appreciated the fact that the Mustangs
could deliver 1,000-pound bombs. Megee quickly trained the Army pilots
in striking designated targets on nearby islands in response to a
surface-based controller. In three days they were ready for Iwo Jima.
Megee instructed the P-51 pilots to arm their bombs with 12-second
delay fuzes, attack parallel to the front lines, and approach from a
45-degree angle. Sometimes these tactics produced spectacular results,
especially along the west coast, where the big bombs with delayed fuzes
blew the sides of entire cliffs into the ocean, exposing enemy caves
and tunnels to direct fire from the sea. “The Air Force boys did a
lot of good,” said Megee. With that, the escort carriers departed the
area and left close air support to the 47th Fighter Squadron for the
duration of the battle.
While technically not a “supporting arm,” the field medical support
provided the assault Marines primarily by the Navy was a major
contributor to victory in the prolonged battle. The practice of
integrating surgeons, chaplains, and corpsmen within the Fleet Marine
Force units continued to pay valuable dividends. In many cases company
corpsmen were just as tough and combat-savvy as the Marines they
accompanied. In all cases, a wounded Marine immediately knew “his”
corpsman would move heaven and earth to reach him, bind his wounds, and
start the long process of evacuation. Most Marines at Iwo Jima would
echo the sentiments of Staff Sergeant Alfred I. Thomas, a half-track
platoon commander in the 25th Marines: “We had outstanding corpsmen;
they were just like family.”
Unfortunately, the luxury of having first-rate medical assistance so
close to the front lines took a terrible toll. Twenty-three doctors and
827 corpsmen were killed or wounded at Iwo Jima, a casualty rate twice
as high as bloody Saipan.
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