_A light machine gun crew of Company H, 2d Battalion, 27th Marines,
hugs the ground and takes advantage of whatever cover it can from an
enemy gunner._]
Lieutenant Colonel English recalled that by the 12th day the 2d
Battalion, 21st Marines, had “lost every company commander.... I had
one company exec left.” Lieutenant Colonel Donn Robertson, commanding
the 3d Battalion, 27th Marines, lost all three of his rifle company
commanders, “two killed by the same damned shell.” In many infantry
units, platoons ceased to exist; depleted companies were merged to form
one half-strength outfit.
[Sidebar (page 29): The Japanese 320mm Spigot Mortar
One of the unique Japanese weapons that Marines encountered on Iwo Jima
was the 320mm spigot mortar. These enormous defensive weapons were
emplaced and operated by the Japanese Army’s _20th Independent Mortar
Battalion_.
The mortar tube, which had a small cavity at the muzzle, rested on a
steel baseplate which, in turn, was supported by a wooden platform.
Unlike a conventional mortar, the five-foot long projectile was placed
over the tube instead of being dropped down the barrel. The mortar
shell had a diameter of nearly 13 inches, while the mortar tube was
little more than 10 inches wide. The weapon could hurl a 675-pound
shell a maximum of 1,440 yards. The range was adjusted by varying the
powder charge, while changes in deflection were accomplished by brute
force: shoving and pushing the base platform.
Although the tubes only held out for five or six rounds, enough shells
were lobbed onto Marine positions to make a lasting impression on those
who suffered through that campaign. According to a platoon leader who
served with the 28th Marines, the spigot mortar (referred to as “the
screaming Jesus” in his unit) was always afforded a healthy respect
and, along with the eight-inch Japanese naval rocket, remains one of
his most vivid memories of Iwo Jima. General Robert E. Cushman, Jr.,
who commanded the 2d Battalion, 9th Marines, at Iwo Jima and went on
to become the 25th Commandant of the Marine Corps, recalled that the
tumbling projectile’s inaccuracy made it that much more terrifying.
“You could see it coming,” he said, “but you never knew where the hell
it was going to come down.”
_Kenneth L. Smith-Christmas_
[Illustration]
]
[Sidebar (page 32): Marine Corps Air Support During Iwo Jima
For a few special moments just prior to the landing on D-day at Iwo
Jima the Marines’ long-cherished vision of an integrated air-ground
team seemed to have been realized. As assault troops neared the beach
in their tracked amphibian vehicles, dozens of Marine Vought F4U
Corsairs swept low over the objective, paving the way with rockets
and machine-gun fire. “It was magnificent!” exclaimed one observer.
Unfortunately, the eight Marine fighter squadrons present at Iwo
that morning came from the fast carriers of Task Force 58, not the
amphibious task force; three days later TF 58 left for good in pursuit
of more strategic targets. Thereafter, Navy and Army Air Force pilots
provided yeoman service in support of the troops fighting ashore.
Sustained close air support of amphibious forces by Marine air was once
again postponed to some future combat proving ground.
Other Marine aviation units contributed significantly to the successful
seizure of Iwo Jima. One of the first to see action was Marine Bombing
Squadron (VMB) 612, based on Saipan, whose flight crews flew North
American PBJ Mitchell medium bombers in nightly, long-range rocket
attacks against Japanese ships trying to resupply Iwo Jima from other
bases in the Volcano and Bonin Islands. These nightly raids, combined
with U.S. Navy submarine interdictions, significantly reduced the
amount of ammunition and fortification material (notably barbed wire)
delivered to Iwo Jima’s defenders before the invasion.
[Illustration: _Marine LtCol Donald K. Yost in his F4U Corsair takes
off from the flight deck of the_ Cape Gloucester _(CVE 109) to provide
close air support to the fighting troops ashore. This was one of a
number of Marine aircraft flown at Iwo Jima._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 262047
]
The contributions of the pilots and aerial spotters from three Marine
observation squadrons (VMOs-1, -4 and -5) are described at length in
the text. Flying in to Iwo initially from escort carriers, or launched
precariously by the infamous “Brodie Slingshot” from _LST 776_, or
eventually taking off from the captured airstrips, these intrepid crews
were quite successful in spotting enemy artillery and mortar positions,
and reporting them to the Supporting Arms Control Center. When Japanese
antiaircraft gunners managed to down one of the “Grasshoppers,” Marines
from all points of the island mourned.
Marine transport aircraft from Marine Transport Squadrons (VMR) 952,
253, and 353 based in the Marianas delivered critical combat cargo to
the island during the height of the battle. The Marines frequently
relied on aerial delivery before the landing force could establish a
fully functional beachhead. On D+10, for example, VMR-952 air-dropped
critically needed mortar shells, machine gun parts, and blood within
Marine lines. On 3 March, Lieutenant Colonel Malcolm S. Mackay, CO of
VMR-952, brought in the first Marine transport to land on the island,
a Curtiss Commando R5C loaded with ammunition. All three squadrons
followed suit, bringing supplies in, taking wounded men out.
On 8 March, Marine Torpedo Bomber Squadron (VMTB) 242 flew in to
Iwo Jima from Tinian to assume responsibility for day and night
anti-submarine patrols from the departing escort carrier force.
Colonel Vernon E. Megee, USMC, had the distinction of commanding the
first Landing Force Air Support Control Unit, a milestone in the
evolution of amphibious command and control of supporting arms. Megee
came ashore on D+5 with General Schmidt, but the offloading process was
still in such disarray that he could not assemble his communications
jeeps for another five days. This did little to deter Megee. Using
“borrowed” gear, he quickly moved inland, coordinating the efforts of
the Air Liaison Parties, encouraging the Navy pilots to use bigger
bombs and listening to the complaints of the assault commanders.
Megee’s subsequent work in training and employing Army P-51 Mustang
pilots in direct support was masterful.
Before the battle’s end, General Kuribayashi transmitted to Tokyo 19
“lessons learned” about the problems of defending against an American
amphibious assault. One of these axioms said: “The enemy’s air control
is very strong; at least thirty aircraft are flying ceaselessly from
early morning to night above this very small island.”
]
_The Bitter End_
The American drive north continued after the 5 March standdown, but the
going never got any easier. The nature of enemy fire changed--fewer big
guns and rockets, less observed fire from the highlands--but now the
terrain grew uglier, deteriorating into narrow, twisted gorges wreathed
in sulfur mists, lethal killing zones. Marine casualties continued to
mount, but gunshot wounds began to outnumber high-explosive shrapnel
hits. The persistent myth among some Marine units that Japanese troops
were all near-sighted and hence poor marksmen ended for good at Iwo
Jima. In the close-quarters fighting among the badlands of northern
Iwo Jima, Japanese riflemen dropped hundreds of advancing Marines with
well-aimed shots to the head or chest. “Poor marksmen?” snorted Captain
Caldwell of Company F, 1st Battalion, 26th Marines, “The Japs we faced
all fired ‘Expert.’”
[Illustration: _Mopping up the caves with grenades and Browning
automatic rifles, Marines flush out remaining Japanese hidden in Iwo
Jima’s numerous and interconnecting caves._
Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 142472
]
Supporting arms coordination grew more effective during the battle.
Colonel “Buzz” Letcher established what some have identified as the
first corps-level Supporting Arms Coordination Center (SACC), in which
senior representatives of artillery, naval gunfire, and air support
pooled their talents and resources. While Letcher lacked the manpower
and communications equipment to serve as corps artillery officer and
simultaneously run a full-time SACC, his efforts represented a major
advancement in this difficult art. So did Colonel Vernon Megee’s
Landing Force Air Support Control Unit, which worked in relative
harmony with the fledgling SACC. Instances of friendly fire still
occurred, perhaps inevitably on that crowded island, but positive
control at the highest level did much to reduce the frequency of such
accidents. In terms of response time, multiple-source coordination
probably worked better at the division level and below. Most infantry
battalions, for example, had nothing but praise for the Air Liaison
Parties, Shore Fire Control Parties, and artillery forward observer
teams which deployed with each maneuver unit.
[Illustration: