Integration in the Air Force and the Navy
The racial reforms instituted by the four services between 1949 and
1954 demonstrated that integration was to a great extent concerned
with effective utilization of military manpower. In the case of the
Army and the Marine Corps the reforms would be delayed and would
occur, finally, on the field of battle. The Navy and the Air Force,
however, accepted the connection between military efficiency and
integration even before the Fahy Committee began to preach the point.
Despite their very dissimilar postwar racial practices, the Air Force
and the Navy were facing the same problem. In a period of reduced
manpower allocations and increased demand for technically trained men,
these services came to realize that racial distinctions were imposing
unacceptable administrative burdens and reducing fighting efficiency.
Their response to the Fahy Committee was merely to expedite or revise
integration policies already decided upon.
_The Air Force, 1949-1951_
The Air Force's integration plan had gone to the Secretary of Defense
on 6 January 1949, committing that service to a major reorganization
of its manpower. In a period of severe budget and manpower
retrenchment, the Air Force was proposing to open all jobs in all
fields to Negroes, subject only to the individual qualifications of
the men and the needs of the service.[16-1] To ascertain these needs
and qualifications the Director of Personnel Planning was prepared to
screen the service's 20,146 Negroes (269 officers and 19,877 airmen),
approximately 5 percent of its strength, for the purpose of
reassigning those eligible to former all-white units and training
schools and dropping the unfit from the service.[16-2] As Secretary of
the Air Force Symington made clear, his integration plan would be
limited in scope. Some black service units would be retained; the rest
would be eliminated, "thereby relieving the Air Force of the critical
problems involved in manning these units with qualified
personnel."[16-3]
[Footnote 16-1: Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 25 Mar 49,
sub: Salient Factors of Air Force Policy Regarding
Negro Personnel, SecAF files.]
[Footnote 16-2: Negro strength figures as of 5 April
1949. Ltr, ASecAF to Robert Harper, Chief Clerk,
House Armed Services Cmte, 5 Apr 49, SecAF files.]
[Footnote 16-3: Memo, Symington for Forrestal, 6 Jan
49, SecAF files.]
In the end the integration process was not a drawn-out one; much of
Symington's effort in 1949 was devoted instead to winning approval
for the plan. Submitted to Forrestal on 6 January 1949, it was (p. 398)
slightly revised after lengthy discussions in both the Fahy Committee
and the Personnel Policy Board and in keeping with the Defense
Secretary's equal treatment and opportunity directive of 6 April 1949.
Some further delay resulted from the Personnel Policy Board's abortive
attempt to achieve an equal opportunity program common to all the
services. The Air Force plan was not finally approved by the Secretary
of Defense until 11 May. Some in the Air Force were worried about the
long delay in approval. As early as 12 January the Chief of Staff
warned Symington that budget programming for the new 48-wing force
required an early decision on the plan, especially in regard to the
inactivation of the all-black wing at Lockbourne. Further delay, he
predicted, would cause confusion in reassignment of some 4,000
troops.[16-4] In conversation with the Secretary of Defense, Symington
mentioned a deadline of 31 March, but Assistant Secretary Zuckert was
later able to assure Symington that the planners could tolerate a
delay in the decision over integration until May.[16-5]
[Footnote 16-4: Memo, Hoyt S. Vandenberg, CofS, USAF,
for SecAF, 12 Jan 49, SecAF files.]
[Footnote 16-5: Memo, SecAF for Forrestal, 17 Feb 49;
Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 24 Mar 49, sub:
Lockbourne AFB; both in SecAF files.]
By then the long official silence had produced serious consequences,
for despite the lack of any public announcement, parts of the plan had
leaked to the press and caused some debate in Congress and
considerable dissatisfaction among black servicemen. Congressional
interest in the internal affairs of the armed forces was always of
more than passing concern to the services. When a discussion of the
new integration plan appearing in the Washington _Post_ on 29 March
caused a flurry of comment on Capitol Hill, Zuckert's assistant,
Clarence H. Osthagen, met with the clerk of the House Armed Services
Committee to "explain and clarify" for the Air Force. The clerk,
Robert Harper, warned Osthagen that the impression in the House was
that a "complete intermingling of Negro and white personnel was to
take place" and that Congressman Winstead of Mississippi had been
tempted to make a speech on the subject. Still, Harper predicted that
there would be no adverse criticism of the plan in the House "at this
time," adding that since that body had already passed the Air Force
appropriation Chairman Carl Vinson was generally unconcerned about the
Air Force racial program. Reporting on Senate reaction, Harper noted
that while many members of the upper house would have liked to see the
plan deferred, they recognized that the President's order made change
mandatory. At any rate, Harper reassured Osthagen, the announcement of
an integration plan would not jeopardize pending Air Force
legislation.[16-6]
[Footnote 16-6: Memo for Files, Osthagen, Asst to
ASecAF, 13 Apr 49, SecAF files.]
Unfortunately, the Air Force's black personnel were not so easily
reassured, and the service had a morale problem on its hands during
the spring of 1949. As later reported by the Fahy Committee staff,
black troops generally supported the inactivation of the all-black
332d Fighter Wing at Lockbourne as a necessary step toward
integration, but news reports frequently linked the disbandment of
that unit to the belt tightening imposed on the Air Force by the 1950
budget. Some Negroes in the 332d concluded that the move was not (p. 399)
directed at integration but at saving money for the Air Force.[16-7]
They were concerned lest they find themselves relegated to unskilled
labor units despite their training and experience. This fear was not
so farfetched, considering Zuckert's private prediction that the
redistribution of Lockbourne men had to be executed exactly according
to the proposed program or "we would find experienced Air Force Negro
technical specialists pushing wheelbarrows or driving trucks in Negro
service units."[16-8]
[Footnote 16-7: Ltr, Joseph H. Evans, Assoc Exec Secy,
Fahy Cmte, to Fahy Cmte, 23 Jun 49, FC file. See
also "U.S. Armed Forces: 1950," _Our World 5_ (June
1950):11-35.]
[Footnote 16-8: Draft Memo, Zuckert for Symington, 15
Feb 49, sub: Air Force Policies on Negro Personnel
(not sent), SecAF files.]
The truth was that, while most Negroes in the Air Force favored
integration, some were disturbed by the prospect of competition with
whites of equivalent rank that would naturally follow. Many of the
black officers were overage in grade, their proficiency geared to the
F-51, a wartime piston plane, and they were the logical victims of any
reduction in force that might occur in this period of reduced military
budgets.[16-9] Some men doubted that the new program, as they
imperfectly understood it, would truly integrate the service. They
could, for example, see no way for the Air Force to break through what
the press called the "community patterns" around southern bases, and
they were generally suspicious of the motives of senior department
officials. The Pittsburgh _Courier_ summarized this attitude by
quoting one black officer who expressed doubt "that a fair program
will be enforced from the top echelon."[16-10]
[Footnote 16-9: Washington _Post_, April 4, 1949; USAF
Oral History Program, Interview with Lt Col Spann
Watson (USAF, Ret.), 3 Apr 73.]
[Footnote 16-10: Pittsburgh _Courier_, January 22,
1949.]
But such suspicions were unfounded, for the Air Force's senior
officials were determined to enforce the new program both fairly and
expeditiously. General Vandenberg, the Chief of Staff, reported to the
War Council on 11 January that the Air Force would "effect full and
complete implementation" of its integration plan not only by issuing
the required directives and orders, but also by assigning
responsibility for monitoring the worldwide implementation of the
program to his deputy for personnel. The Chief of Staff also planned
to call a meeting of his senior commanders to discuss and solve
problems rising from the plan and impress on them the personal
attention they must give to carrying it out in the field.[16-11]
[Footnote 16-11: Memo, Vandenberg, CofS, USAF, for
SecAF, 12 Jan 49, SecAF files.]
The Air Force Commanders' Conference, assembled on 12 April 1949,
heard Lt. Gen. Idwal Edwards, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel,
explain the genesis of the integration plan and outline its major
provisions. He mentioned two major steps to be taken in the first
phase of the program. First, the 332d Fighter Wing would be
inactivated on or before 30 June, and all blacks would be removed from
Lockbourne. The commander of the Continental Air Command would create
a board of Lockbourne officers to screen those assigned to the
all-black base, dividing them into three groups. The skilled and
qualified officers and airmen would be reassigned worldwide to white
units "just like any other officers or airmen of similar skills (p. 400)
and qualifications." General Edwards assumed that the number of men in
this category would not be large. Some 200 officers and 1,500 airmen,
he estimated, would be found sufficiently qualified and proficient for
such reassignment. He added parenthetically that Colonel Davis
understood the "implications" of the new policy and intended to
recommend only an individual "of such temperament, judgment, and
common sense that he can get along smoothly as an individual in a
white unit, and second, that his ability is such as to warrant respect
of the personnel of the unit to which he is transferred."
The technically unqualified but still "usable" men would be reassigned
to black service units. The staff recognized, General Edwards added,
that some Negroes were unsuited for assignment to white units for
"various reasons" and had specifically authorized the retention of
"this type of Negro" in black units. Finally, those who were found
neither qualified nor useful would be discharged under current
regulations.
The second major action would be taken at the same time as the first.
All commands would similarly screen their black troops with the object
of reassigning the skilled and qualified to white units and
eliminating the chronically unqualified. At the same time racial
quotas for recruitment and school attendance would be abolished.
Henceforth, blacks would enter the Air Force under the same standards
as whites and would be classified, assigned, promoted, or eliminated
in accordance with rules that would apply equally to all. "In other
words," Edwards commented, "no one is either helped or hindered
because of the color of his skin; how far or how fast each one goes
depends upon his own ability." To assure equal treatment and
opportunity, he would closely monitor the problem. Edwards admitted
that the subject of integrated living quarters had caused discussion
in the staff, but based on the Navy's years of good experience with
integrated quarters and bolstered by the probability that the number
of Negroes in any white unit would rarely exceed 1 percent, the staff
saw no need for separate sleeping accommodations.
General Edwards reminded the assembled commanders that, while
integration was new to the Air Force, the Navy had been following a
similar policy for years, encountering no trouble, even in the Deep
South where black troops as well as the nearby civilian communities
understood that when men left the base they must conform to the laws
and customs of the community. And as a parting shot he made the
commanders aware of where the command responsibility lay:
There will be frictions and incidents. However, they will be
minimized if commanders give the implementation of this policy
their personal attention and exercise positive command control.
Unless our young commanders are guided and counselled by the
senior commanders in unbiased implementation, we may encounter
serious troubles which the Navy has very ably avoided. It must
have your _personal attention and personal control_.[16-12]
[Footnote 16-12: Lt Gen I. H. Edwards, "Remarks on
Major Personnel Problems Presented to USAF
Commanders' Conference Headquarters, USAF," 12 Apr
49, SecAF files. Italics in the original.]
Compelling reasons for reform notwithstanding, the effectiveness of
an integration program would in the end depend on the attitude and
initiative of the local commander. In the Air Force's case the (p. 401)
ultimate effectiveness owed much to the fact that the determination of
its senior officials was fully explained and widely circulated
throughout the service. As Lt. Gen. Daniel (Chappie) James, Jr., later
recalled, those who thought to frustrate the process were well aware
that they risked serious trouble if their opposition was discovered by
the senior commanders. None of the obvious excuses for preserving the
racial _status quo_ remained acceptable after Vandenberg and Edwards
made their positions clear.[16-13]
[Footnote 16-13: USAF Oral History Program, Interview
with Lt Gen Daniel James, Jr., 2 Oct 73. James was
to become the first four-star black officer in the
armed forces.]
The fact that the control of the new plan was specifically made a
personal responsibility of the senior commanders spoke well for its
speedy and efficient execution. This was the kind of talk commanders
understood, and as the order filtered down to the lower echelons its
terms became even more explicit.[16-14] "Direct attention to this
changed condition is required throughout the Command," Maj. Gen.
Laurence S. Kuter notified his subordinate commanders at the Military
Air Transport Service. "Judgment, leadership, and ingenuity are
demanded. Commanders who cannot cope with the integration of Negroes
into formerly white units or activities will have no place in the Air
Force structure."[16-15]
[Footnote 16-14: Ltr, Marr to author, 19 Jun 70.]
[Footnote 16-15: MATS Hq Ltr No. 9, 1 May 49, SecAF
files.]
The order itself, as approved by the Secretary of Defense on 11 May
1949 and published on the same day as Air Force Letter 35-3, was
unmistakable in intent and clearly spelled out a new bill of rights
for Negroes in the Air Force.[16-16] The published directive differed
in some respects from the version drafted by the Chief of Staff in
January. Despite General Edwards's comments at the commanders'
conference in April, the provision for allowing commanders to
segregate barracks "if considered necessary" was removed even before
the plan was first forwarded to the Secretary of Defense. This
deletion was made in the Office of the Secretary of the Air Force,
probably by Zuckert.[16-17] Later Zuckert commented, "I wouldn't want
to give the commanders that kind of sweeping power. I would be afraid
of how it might be exercised."[16-18] From the beginning, black airmen
were billeted routinely in the living quarters of the units to which
they were assigned.
[Footnote 16-16: AF Ltr 35-3, 11 May 49. Effective
until 11 May 1950, the order was superseded by a
new but similar letter, AF Ltr 35-78, on 14
September 1950.]
[Footnote 16-17: Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 12 Jan
49, AF Negro Affairs 49, SecAF files.]
[Footnote 16-18: USAF Oral Hist Interv with Zuckert.]
The final version of the directive also deleted reference to a 10
percent limitation on black strength in formerly white units. Zuckert
had assured the Fahy Committee this limitation was designed to
facilitate, not frustrate, the absorption of Negroes into white units,
and Edwards even agreed that given the determination of Air Force
officials to make a success of their program, the measure was probably
unnecessary.[16-19] In the end Zuckert decided to drop any reference
to such limitations "because of the confusion that seemed to arise
from this statement."[16-20]
[Footnote 16-19: Testimony of Zuckert and Edwards,
USAF, Before the Fahy Committee, 28 Mar 49,
afternoon session, pp. 7-8.]
[Footnote 16-20: Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 29 Apr
49, sub: Department of the Air Force Implementation
of the Department of Defense Policy on Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Services,
SecAF files.]
[Illustration: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ZUCKERT.]
Zuckert also deleted several clauses in the supplementary letter (p. 402)
to Air Force commanders that was to accompany and explain the order.
These clauses had listed possible exemptions from the new order: one
made it possible to retain a man in a black unit if he was one of the
"key personnel" considered necessary for the successful functioning of
a black unit, and the other allowed the local commander to keep those
Negroes he deemed "best suited" for continued assignment to black
units. The free reassignment of all eligible Negroes, particularly the
well-qualified, was essential to the eventual dissolution of the
all-black units. The Fahy Committee had objected to these provisions
and considered it important for the Air Force to delete them,[16-21]
but the matter was not raised during the committee hearings. There is
evidence that the deletions were actually requested by the Secretary
of Defense's Personnel Policy Board, whose influence in the
integration of the Air Force is often overlooked.[16-22]
[Footnote 16-21: _Freedom to Serve_, pp. 37-38.]
[Footnote 16-22: Memo, SecAF for Chmn, PPB, 30 Apr 49,
copy in FC file. McCoy and Ruetten, _Quest and
Response_, p. 223, call the deletion a victory for
the committee.]
The screening of officers and men at Lockbourne got under way on 17
May. A board of officers under the presidency of Col. Davis, the
commander of Lockbourne, and composed of representatives of Air Force
headquarters, the Continental Air Command, and the Air Training
Command, and important officers of Lockbourne, interviewed every
officer in the wing. After considering each man's technical training,
his performance, and his career field preference, the board
recommended him for reassignment in a specific duty field. Although
Edwards had promised that the screening boards would also judge each
man's "adaptability" to integrated service, this requirement was
quickly dropped by Davis and his fellow board members.[16-23] In fact,
the whole idea of having screening boards was resented by some black
officers. Zuckert later admitted that the screening may have been a
mistake, but at the time it had been considered the best mechanism for
ascertaining the proper assignment for the men.[16-24]
[Footnote 16-23: USAF Oral Hist Interv with Davis.]
[Footnote 16-24: USAF Oral Hist Interv with Zuckert.]
At the same time, a screening team in the Air Training Command gave a
written examination to Lockbourne's more than 1,100 airmen and WAF's
to determine if they were in appropriate military occupational
specialties. A team of personnel counselors interviewed all (p. 403)
airmen, weighed test scores, past performances, qualifications outside
of assigned specialty, and choices of a career field, and then placed
them in one of three categories. First, they could be earmarked for
general reassignment in a specific military occupational specialty
different from the one they were now in; second, they could be
scheduled for additional or more advanced technical training; or
third, they could be trained in their current specialties. The
screeners referred marginal or extraordinary cases to Colonel Davis's
board for decision.[16-25]
[Footnote 16-25: NME Fact Sheet No. 105-49, 27 Jul
49.]
Concurrently with the Lockbourne processing, individual commanders
established similar screening procedures wherever black airmen were
then assigned. All these teams uncovered a substantial number of men
and women considered eligible for further training or reassignment.
(_Table 4_)
Table 4--Disposition of Black Personnel at Eight Air Force Bases, 1949
Percentages
Total Asgmt to Asgmt to Asgmt to Recom for
Base Tested Instr Tech Present Board
Duty School MOS Action
Lockbourne
Male 970 .32 12.08 64.64 22.98
Female 58 0.00 25.86 55.17 18.97
Lackland 247 1.62 20.65 67.61 10.12
Barksdale 158 0.00 20.25 65.82 13.93
Randolph 252 2.38 26.19 57.14 14.29
Waco 146 2.06 30.14 57.53 10.27
Mather 126 .79 27.78 40.48 30.95
Williams 144 8.33 21.53 39.58 30.56
Goodfellow 122 .82 36.89 40.89 21.31
Total 2,223 1.35 19.61 59.20 19.84
_Source_: President's Cmte on Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in
the Armed Forces, "A First Report on the Racial Integration Program of
the Air Force," 6 Feb 50, FC file.
The process of screening Lockbourne's troops was quickly completed,
but the process of reassigning them was considerably more drawn-out.
The reassignments were somewhat delayed in the first place by
indecision, caused by budgetary uncertainties, on the future of
Lockbourne itself. By 25 July, a full two months after the screening
began, the Lockbourne board had recommended only 181 officers and 700
airmen to Air Force headquarters for new assignment. A short time
later, however, Lockbourne was placed on inactive status and its
remaining men and women, with the exception of a small caretaker
detachment, were quickly reassigned throughout the Air Force.
The staff had predicted that the speed with which the integration
order was carried out would follow a geographical pattern, with
southern bases the last to integrate, but in fact no special pattern
prevailed. For the many Negroes assigned to all-black base squadrons
for administrative purposes but serving on a day-to-day basis in
integrated units, the change was relatively simple. These men had
already demonstrated their ability to perform their duties competently
under integration, and in conformity with the new order most (p. 404)
commanders immediately assigned them to the units in which they were
already working. Except for their own squadron overhead, some base
service squadrons literally disappeared when these reassignments were
effected. After the screening process, most commanders also quickly
reassigned troops serving in the other all-black units, such as
Squadron F's, air ammunition, motor transport, vehicle repair, signal
heavy construction, and aviation engineer squadrons.[16-26]
[Footnote 16-26: "Report on the First Year of
Implementation of Current Policies Regarding Negro
Personnel," Incl to Memo, Maj Gen Richard E. Nugent
for ASecAF, 14 Jul 50, sub: Distribution of Negro
Personnel, PPB 291.2 (9 Jul 50) (hereafter referred
to as Marr Report). See also USAF Oral Hist Interv
with Marr.]
There were of course a few exceptions. Some commanders, noticeably
more cautious than the majority, began the integration process with
considerably less ease and speed.[16-27] As late as January 1950, for
example, the Fahy Committee's executive secretary found that, with the
exception of a small number of Negroes assigned to white units, the
black airmen at Maxwell Air Force Base were still assigned to the
all-black 3817th Base Service Squadron, the only such unit he found,
incidentally, in a tour of seven installations.[16-28] But as the
months went by even the most cautious commander, learning of the
success of the new policy in other commands, began to reassign his
black airmen according to the recommendations of the screening board.
Despite the announcement that some black units would be retained,
practically all units were integrated by the end of the first year of
the new program. Even using the Air staff's very restricted definition
of a "Negro unit," that is, one whose strength was over 50 percent
black, statistics show how radical was the change in just one year.
(_Table 5_)
[Footnote 16-27: USAF Oral Hist Interv with Davis.]
[Footnote 16-28: President's Committee on Equality of
Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed Forces, "A
First Report on the Racial Integration Program of
the Air Force," 6 Feb 50, FC file (hereafter cited
as Kenworthy Report).]
Table 5--Racial Composition of Air Force Units
Negroes Assigned Negroes Assigned
Month Black Integrated to Black to Integrated
Units Units Units Units[1]
1949
June 106 167 Not available Not available
July 89 350 14,609 7,369
August 86 711 11,921 11,977
September 91 863 11,521 13,290
October 88 1,031 9,522 15,980
November 75 1,158 8,038 17,643
December 67 1,253 7,402 18,489
1950
January 59 1,301 6,773 18,929
February 36 1,399 5,511 20,654
March 26 1,476 5,023 20,938
April 24 1,515 4,728 20,793
May 24 1,506 4,675 21,033
[Tablenote 1: Figures extracted from the Marr
Report; see also monthly reports on AF integration,
for example Memo, Dir, Pers Plng, for Osthagen
(SecAF office), 10 Mar 50, sub: Distribution of
Negro Personnel, SecAF files.]
Despite the predictions of some analysts, the effect of (p. 405)
integration on black recruitment proved to be negligible. In a service
whose total strength remained about 415,000 men during the first year
of integration, Negroes numbered as follows (_Table 6_):
Table 6--Black Strength in the Air Force
Percentage
Officer Enlisted of Air Force
Date Strength[1] Strength[1] Strength
December 1948 Not available Not available 6.5
June 1949 319 (47) 21,782 (2,196) 6.0
August 1949 330 (32) 23,568 (2,275) 6.5
December 1949 368 (18) 25,523 (3,072) 7.2
May 1950 341 (8) 25,367 (2,611) 7.1
[Tablenote 1: Includes in parentheses the Special
Category Army Personnel with Air Force (SCARWAF),
those soldiers assigned for duty in the Air Force
but still administratively under the segregated
Army, leftovers from the Department of Defense
reorganization of 1947. Figures extracted from Marr
Report.]
The Air staff explained that the slight surge in black recruits in the
early months of integration was related less to the new policy than to
the abnormal recruiting conditions of the period. In addition to the
backlog of Negroes who for some time had been trying to enlist only to
find the Air Force quota filled, there were many black volunteers who
had turned to the quota-free Air Force when the Army, its quota of
Negroes filled for some time, stopped recruiting Negroes.
With Negroes serving in over 1,500 separate units there was no need to
invoke the 10 percent racial quota in individual units as Vandenberg
had ordered. One notable exception during the first months of the
program was the Air Training Command, where the rapid and unexpected
reassignment of many black airmen caused some bases, James Connally in
Texas, for example, to acquire a great many Negroes while others
received few or none. To prevent a recurrence of the Connally
experience and "to effect a smooth operation and proper adjustment of
social importance," the commander of the Air Training Command imposed
an 8 to 10 percent black quota on his units and established a
procedure for staggering the assignment of black airmen in small
groups over a period of thirty to sixty days instead of assigning them
to any particular base in one large increment. These quotas were not
applied to the basic training flights, which were completely
integrated. It was not uncommon to find black enlistees in charge of
racially mixed training flights.[16-29] Of all Air Force
organizations, the Training Command received the greatest number of
black airmen as a result of the screening and reassignment. (_Table 7_)
[Footnote 16-29: ATC, "History of ATC, July-December
1949," I:29-31; New York _Times_, September 18,
1949.]
Table 7--Racial Composition of the Training Command, December 1949 (p. 406)
A. Flight Training
_Percent_
_White_ _Black_ _Black_
Officers 1,345 11 .8
Enlisted 2,063 22 1.0
Total 3,408 33 .9
B. Technical Training
Officers 1,897 37 1.9
Enlisted 25,838 1,819 6.5
Total 27,735 1,856 6.0
C. Indoctrination (Basic) Training
White 7,649
Black 1,007
Total 8,656
Percent black 11.6[a]
D. Officers Candidate Training
(candidates graduating from
28 November through 26
December 1949)
White 225
Black 7
Total 232
Percent black 3.0
E. Course Representation
_Base_ _No. of Courses_[b] _No. of Courses
with Blacks_
Chanute 31 21
Warren 11 10
Keesler 16 7
Lowry 23 13
Scott 6 4
Sheppard 4 1
[Tablenote a: In January 1950, probably as a result
of a decline in backlog and the raising of
enlistment standard to GCT 100, this percentage
dropped to 8.8.]
[Tablenote b: Negroes in 61 percent of the courses
offered as of 26 Dec 1949.]
_Source_: Kenworthy Report.
At the end of the first year under the new program, the Acting Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, General Nugent, informed Zuckert that
integration had progressed "rapidly, smoothly and virtually without
incident."[16-30] In view of this fact and at Nugent's recommendation,
the Air Force canceled the monthly headquarters check on the program.
[Footnote 16-30: Memo, Actg DCSPER for Zuckert, 14 Jul
50, USAF file No. 3370, SecAF files.]
To some extent the Air Force's integration program ran away with
itself. Whatever their personal convictions regarding discrimination,
senior Air Force officials had agreed that integration would be
limited. They were most concerned with managerial problems associated
with continued segregation of the black flying unit and the black
specialists scattered worldwide. Other black units were not considered
an immediate problem. Assistant Secretary Zuckert admitted as much in
March 1949 when he reported that black service units would be retained
since they performed a "necessary Air Force function."[16-31] As
originally conceived, the Air Force plan was frankly imitative of the
Navy's postwar program, stressing merit and ability as the limiting
factors of change. The Air Force promised to discharge all its
substandard men, but those black airmen either ineligible for
discharge or for reassignment to specialist duty would remain in
segregated units.
[Footnote 16-31: Memo, ASecAF for Symington, 25 Mar
49, sub: Salient Factors of Air Force Policy
Regarding Negro Personnel, SecAF files.]
Yet once begun, the integration process quickly became universal. By
the end of 1950, for example, the Air Force had reduced the number of
black units to nine with 95 percent of its black airmen serving in
integrated units. The number of black officers rose to 411, an (p. 407)
increase of 10 percent over the previous year, and black airmen to
25,523, an increase of 15 percent, although the proportion of blacks
to whites continued to remain between 6 and 7 percent.[16-32] Some
eighteen months later only one segregated unit was left, a 98-man
outfit, itself more than 26 percent white. Negroes were then serving
in 3,466 integrated units.[16-33]
[Footnote 16-32: _Air Force Times_, 10 February 1951.
These figures do not take into account the SCARWAF
(Army personnel) who continued to serve in
segregated units within the Air Force.]
[Footnote 16-33: Memo, DepSecAF for Manpower and
Organizations for ASD/M, 5 Sep 52, SecAF files.]
There were several reasons for the universal application of what was
conceived as a limited program. First, the Air Force was in a sense
the captive of its own publicity. While Secretary Symington had
carefully delineated the limits of his departmental plan for the
Personnel Policy Board in January 1949, he was carried considerably
beyond these limits when he addressed President Truman in the open
forum of the Fahy Committee's first formal meeting:
As long as you mentioned the Air Force, sir, I just want to
report to you that our plan is to completely eliminate
segregation in the Air Force. For example, we have a fine group
of colored boys. Our plan is to take those boys, break up that
fine group, and put them with the other units themselves and go
right down the line all through these subdivisions one hundred
percent.[16-34]
[Footnote 16-34: Transcript of the Meeting of the
President and the Four Service Secretaries With the
President's Committee on Equality of Treatment and
Opportunity in the Armed Services, 12 Jan 49, FC
file, which reports the President's response as
being "That's all right."]
Later, Symington told the Fahy Committee that while the new program
would probably temporarily reduce Air Force efficiency "we are ready,
willing, and anxious to embark on this idea. We want to eliminate the
fundamental aspect of class in this picture."[16-35] Clearly, the
retention of large black units was incompatible with the elimination
of class distinctions.
[Footnote 16-35: Testimony of the Secretary of the Air
Force Before the Fahy Committee, 28 Mar 49,
afternoon session, p. 33.]
The more favorable the publicity garnered by the plan in succeeding
months, the weaker the distinction became between the limited
integration of black specialists and total integration. Reinforcing
the favorable publicity were the monthly field reports that registered
a steady drop in the number of black units and a corresponding rise in
the number of integrated black airmen. This well-publicized progress
provided another, almost irresistible reason for completing the task.
More to the point, the success of the program provided its own impetus
to total integration. The prediction that a significant number of
black officers and men would be ineligible for reassignment or further
training proved ill-founded. The Air Force, it turned out, had few
untrainable men, and after the screening process and transfer of those
eligible was completed, many black units were so severely reduced in
strength that their inactivation became inevitable. The fear of white
opposition that had inhibited the staff planners and local commanders
also proved groundless. According to a Fahy Committee staff report
in March 1950, integration had been readily accepted at all levels
and the process had been devoid of friction. "The men," E. W. (p. 408)
Kenworthy reported, "apparently were more ready for equality of
treatment and opportunity than the officer corps had realized."[16-36]
At the same time, Kenworthy noted the effect of successful integration
on the local commanders. Freed from the charges of discrimination that
had plagued them at every turn, most of the commanders he interviewed
remarked on the increased military efficiency of their units and the
improved utilization of their manpower that had come with integration.
They liked the idea of a strictly competitive climate of equal
standards rigidly applied, and some expected that the Air Force
example would have an effect, eventually, on civilian attitudes.[16-37]
[Footnote 16-36: Kenworthy Report, as quoted and
commented on in Memo, Worthington Thompson
(Personnel Policy Board staff) for Leva, 9 Mar 50,
sub: Some Highlights of Fahy Committee Report on
Air Force Racial Integration Program, SD 291.2.]
[Footnote 16-37: Ltr, Kenworthy to Zuckert, 5 Jan 50,
SecAF files.]
[Illustration: MUSIC MAKERS _of the U.S. Far East Air Force prepare to
celebrate Christmas, Korea, 1950_.]
For the Air Force, it seemed, the problem of segregation was all over
but for the celebrating. And there was plenty of that, thanks to the
Fahy Committee and the press. In a well-publicized tour of a cross
section of Air Force installations in early 1950, Kenworthy surveyed
the integration program for the committee. His favorable report won
the Air Force laudatory headlines in the national press and formed the
core of the Air Force section of the Fahy Committee's final report,
_Freedom to Serve_.[16-38] For its part, the black press covered the
program in great detail and gave its almost unanimous approval. As
early as July 1949, for example, Dowdal H. Davis, president of the
Negro Newspaper Publishers Association, reported on the highly
encouraging reaction to the breakup of the 332d, and the headlines
reflected this attitude: "The Air Force Leads the Way," the Chicago
_Defender_ headlined; "Salute to the Air Force," the Minneapolis
_Spokesman_ editorialized; and "the swiftest and most amazing upset of
racial policy in the history of the U.S. Military," _Ebony_ concluded.
Pointing to the Air Force program as the best, the Pittsburgh
_Courier_ called the progress toward total integration "better than
most dared hope."[16-39]
[Footnote 16-38: See, for example, the Washington
_Post_, March 27, 1950.]
[Footnote 16-39: Press reaction summarized in Memo,
James C. Evans for PPB, 19 Jan 50, PPB 291.2. See
also, Ltr, Dowdal Davis, Gen Manager of the Kansas
City _Call_, to Evans, 9 Jul 49, SD 291.2; Memo,
Evans for SecAF, 5 Jul 49; and Memo, Zuckert for
SecAF, 2 Aug 49, both in SecAF files; Chicago
_Defender_, June 18, 1949; Minneapolis _Spokesman_,
January 13, 1950; _Ebony_ Magazine, 4 (September
1949):15; Pittsburgh _Courier_, July 25, 1952;
Detroit _Free Press_, May 14, 1953.]
General Vandenberg and his staff were well aware of the rapid and (p. 409)
profound change in the Air Force wrought by the integration order.
From the start his personnel chief carefully monitored the program and
reviewed the reports from the commands, ready to investigate any
racial incidents or differences attributable to the new policy. The
staff had expected a certain amount of testing of the new policy by
both white and black troops, and with few exceptions the incidents
reported turned out to be little more than that. Some arose from
attempts by Negroes to win social acceptance at certain Air Force
installations, but the majority of cases involved attempts by white
airmen to introduce their black comrades into segregated off-base
restaurants and theaters. Two examples might stand for all. The first
involved a transient black corporal who stopped off at the Bolling Air
Force Base, Washington, D.C., to get a haircut in a post exchange
barbershop. He was refused service and in the absence of the post
exchange officer he returned to the shop to trade words and eventually
blows with the barber. The corporal was subsequently court-martialed,
but the sentence was set aside by a superior court.[16-40] Another
case involved a small group of white airmen who ordered refreshments
at a segregated lunch counter in San Antonio, Texas, for themselves
"and a friend who would join them later." The friend, of course, was a
black airman. The Inspector General reported this incident to be just
one of a number of attempts by groups of white and black airmen to
integrate lunch counters and restaurants. In each case the commanders
concerned cautioned their men against such action, and there were few
reoccurrences.[16-41]
[Footnote 16-40: Memo, IG, USAF, for ASecAF, 25 Jul
49, SecAF files.]
[Footnote 16-41: Idem for DCSPER, 7 Sep 49, copy in
SecAF files; see also ACofS, G-2, Fourth Army, Ft.
Sam Houston, Summary of Information, 7 Sep 49, copy
in SA 291.2.]
The commanders' warnings were understandable because, as any official
from Secretary Symington on down would quickly explain, the Air Force
did not regard itself as being in the business of forcing changes in
American society; it was simply trying to make the best use of its
manpower to build military efficiency in keeping with its national
defense mission.[16-42] But in the end the integration order proved
effective on both counts. Racial feelings, racial incidents, charges
of discrimination, and the problems of procurement, training, and
assignment always associated with racially designated units had been
reduced by an appreciable degree or eliminated entirely. The problems
anticipated from the mingling of blacks and whites in social
situations had proved to be largely imaginary. The Air Force adopted a
standard formula for dealing with these problems during the next
decade. Incidents involving black airmen were treated as individual
incidents and dealt with on a personal basis like any ordinary
disciplinary case. Only when there was no alternative was an incident
labeled "racial" and then the commander was expected to deal speedily
and firmly with the troublemakers.[16-43] This sensible procedure
freed the Air Force for a decade from the charges of on-base
discrimination that had plagued it in the past.
[Footnote 16-42: See, for example, Memo, SecAF for
SecDef, 17 Feb 49; Ltr, SecAF to Sen. Burnet R.
Maybank, 21 Jul 49; both in SecAF files.]
[Footnote 16-43: Memo, Evans, OSD, for Worthington
Thompson, 18 May 53, sub: Summary of Topics
Reviewed in Thompson's office 15 May 53, SD 291.2.]
[Illustration: MAINTENANCE CREW, _462d Strategic Fighter Squadron,
disassembles aft section of an F-84 Thunderstreak_.]
Without a doubt the new policy improved the Air Force's manpower (p. 410)
efficiency, as the experience of the 3202d Installation Group
illustrates. A segregated unit serving at Eglin Air Force Base,
Florida, the 3202d was composed of an all-black heavy maintenance and
construction squadron, a black maintenance repair and utilities
squadron, and an all-white headquarters and headquarters squadron.
This rigid segregation had caused considerable trouble for the unit's
personnel section, which was forced to assign men on the basis of
color rather than military occupational specialty. For example, a
white airman with MOS 345, a truck driver, although assigned to the
unit, could not be assigned to the heavy maintenance and construction
squadron where his specialty was authorized but had to be assigned to
the white headquarters squadron where his specialty was not
authorized. Clearly operating in an inefficient manner, the unit was
charged with misassignment of personnel by the Air Inspector; in July
1950 it was swiftly and peaceably, if somewhat belatedly, integrated,
and its three squadrons were converted to racially mixed units,
allowing an airman to be assigned according to his training and not
his color.[16-44]
[Footnote 16-44: History Officer, 3202d Installations
Groups, "History of the 3202d Installations Group,
1 July-31 October 1950," Eglin AFB, Fla., pp. 8-9.]
The preoccupation of high officials with the effects of integration on
a soldier's social life seemed at times out of keeping with the issues
of national defense and military efficiency. At one of the Fahy
Committee hearings, for instance, an exasperated Charles Fahy asked
Omar Bradley, "General, are you running an Army or a dance?"[16-45]
Yet social life on military bases at swimming pools, dances, bridge
parties, and service clubs formed so great a part of the fabric of
military life that the Air Force staff could hardly ignore the
possibility of racial troubles in the countless social exchanges that
characterized the day-to-day life in any large American institution.
The social situation had been seriously considered before the new
racial policy was approved. At that time the staff had predicted that
problems developing out of integration would not prove insurmountable,
and indeed on the basis of a year's experience a member of the Air
staff declared that (p. 411)
at the point where the Negro and the white person are actually in
contact the problem has virtually disappeared. Since all races of
Air Force personnel work together under identical environmental
conditions on the base, it is not unnatural that they participate
together, to the extent that they desire, in certain social
activities which are considered a normal part of service life.
This type of integration has been entirely voluntary, without
incident, and considerably more complete and more rapid than was
anticipated.[16-46]
[Footnote 16-45: This off-the-record comment occurred
during the committee hearings in the Pentagon and
was related to the author by E. W. Kenworthy in
interview on 17 October 1971. See also Memo,
Kenworthy to Brig Gen James L. Collins, Jr., 13 Oct
76, copy in CMH.]
[Footnote 16-46: Marr Report.]
[Illustration: JET MECHANICS _work on an F-100 Supersabre, Foster Air
Force Base, Texas_.]
The Air staff had imposed only two rules on interracial social
activities: with due regard for sex and rank all Air Force facilities
were available for the unrestricted use of all its members;
troublemakers would get into trouble. Under these inflexible rules,
the Fahy Committee later reported, there was a steady movement in the
direction of shared facilities. "Here again, mutual respect engendered
on the job or in the school seemed to translate itself into friendly
association."[16-47] Whether it liked it or not, the Air Force was in
the business of social change.
[Footnote 16-47: _Freedom to Serve_, p. 41.]
Typical of most unit reports was one from the commander of the 1701st
Air Transport Wing, Great Falls Air Force Base, Montana, who wrote
Secretary Symington that the unit's eighty-three Negroes, serving in
ten different organizations, lived and worked with white airmen "on an
apparently equal and friendly basis."[16-48] The commander had been
unable to persuade local community leaders, however, to promote
equality of treatment outside the base, and beyond its movie theaters
Great Falls had very few places that allowed black airmen. The
commander was touching upon a problem that would eventually trouble
all the services: airmen, he reported to Secretary Symington, although
they have good food and entertainment on the base, sooner or later
want to go to town, sit at a table, and order what they want. The Air
Force was now coming into conflict with local custom which it could
see no way to control. As the _Air Force Times_ put it, "The Air
Force, like the other services, feels circumspect policy in this
regard is the only advisable one on the grounds that off-base
segregation is a matter for civilian rather than military
decision."[16-49]
[Footnote 16-48: Ltr, Col Paul H. Prentiss, Cmdr,
1701st AT Wing, to SecAF, 27 Dec 49, SecAF files.]
[Footnote 16-49: _Air Force Times_, 10 February 1951.]
But this problem could not detract from what had been accomplished on
the bases. Judged by the standards it set for itself before the Fahy
Committee, the Air Force had achieved its goals. Further, they (p. 412)
were achieved in the period between 1949 and 1956 when the percentage
of blacks in the service doubled, an increase resulting from the
Defense Department's qualitative distribution of manpower rather than
the removal of the racial quota.[16-50] During these years the number
of black airmen rose from 5.1 to 10.4 percent of the enlisted strength
and the black officers from 0.6 to 1.1 percent. Reviewing the
situation in 1960, _Ebony_ noted that the program begun in 1949 was
working well and that white men were accepting without question
progressive racial practices forbidden in their home communities.
Minor racial flare-ups still occurred, but integration was no longer a
major problem in the Air Force; it was a fact of life.[16-51]
[Footnote 16-50: Memo for Rcd, ADS(M), 12 Sep 56, sub:
Integration Percentages, ADS(M) 291.2. For further
discussion of the qualitative distribution program,
see Navy section, below.]
[Footnote 16-51: "Integration in the Air Force
Abroad," _Ebony_ 15 (March 1960):27.]
_The Navy and Executive Order 9981_
The changing government attitude toward integration in the late 1940's
had less dramatic effect on the Navy than upon the other services
because the Navy was already the conspicuous possessor of a racial
policy guaranteeing equal treatment and opportunity for all its
members. But as the Fahy Committee and many other critics insisted,
the Navy's 1946 equality guarantee was largely theoretical; its major
racial problem was not one of policy but of practice as statistics
demonstrated. It was true, for example, that the Navy had abolished
racial quotas in recruitment, yet the small number of black
sailors--17,000 during 1949, averaging 4.5 percent of the total
strength--made the absence of a quota academic.[16-52] It was true
that Negroes served side by side with white sailors in almost every
occupation and training program in the Navy, but it was also a fact
that 62 percent of all Negroes in the Navy in 1949 were still assigned
to the nonwhite Steward's Branch. This figure shows that as late as
December 1949 fewer than 7,000 black sailors were serving in racially
integrated assignments.[16-53] Again, with only 19 black officers,
including 2 nurses, in a 1949 average officer strength of 45,464, it
meant little to say that the Navy had an integrated officer corps. A
shadow had fallen, then, between the promise of the Navy's policy and
its fulfillment, partly because of indifferent execution.
[Footnote 16-52: Unless otherwise noted all statistics
are from information supplied by the Bureau of
Naval Personnel. The exact percentage on 1 July
1949 was 4.7; see Memo for Rcd, ASD(M), 12 Sep 56,
sub: Integration Percentages, ASD(M) 291.2.]
[Footnote 16-53: Memo, Chief, NavPers, for Under
SecNav, 5 Dec 49, sub: Proposed Report to Chairman
Personnel Policy Board Regarding the Implementation
of Executive Order 9981, Pers 21, GenRecsNav.]
Submitted to and approved by the Secretary of Defense, the new Navy
plan announced on 7 June 1949 called for a specific series of measures
to bring departmental practices into line with policy.[16-54] Once he
had gained Johnson's approval, Secretary of the Navy Matthews did not
tarry. On 23 June he issued an explicit statement to all ships and
stations, abjuring racial distinctions in the Navy and Marine (p. 413)
Corps and ordering that all personnel be enlisted or appointed,
trained, advanced or promoted, assigned and administered without
regard to race, color, religion, or national origin.[16-55] Admirable
and comprehensive, Matthew's statement scarcely differed in intent
from his predecessor's general declaration of equal treatment and
opportunity of 12 December 1945 and the more explicit directive of the
Chief of Naval Operations on the same subject on 27 February 1946. Yet
despite the close similarity, a reiteration was clearly necessary. As
even the most ardent apologist for the navy's postwar racial policy
would admit, these groundbreaking statements had not done the job,
and, to satisfy the demands of the Fahy Committee and the Secretary of
Defense, Secretary Matthews had to convince his subordinates that the
demand for equal treatment and opportunity was serious and had to be
dealt with immediately. His specific mention of the Marine Corps and
the problems of enlistment, assignment, and promotion, subjects
ignored in the earlier directives, represented a start toward the
reform of his department's racial practices currently out of step with
its expressed policy.
[Footnote 16-54: Memo, SecNav for SecDef, 23 May 49,
sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the
Armed Forces, copy in FC file.]
[Footnote 16-55: ALNAV 447-49, which remained in force
until 23 March 1953 when SecNav Instruction 1000.2
superseded it without substantial change.]
Yet a restatement of policy, no matter how specific, was not enough.
As Under Secretary Dan A. Kimball admitted, the Navy had the
formidable task of convincing its own people of the sincerity of its
policy and of erasing the distrust that had developed in the black
community "resulting from past discriminating practices."[16-56] Those
who were well aware of the Navy's earlier failure to achieve
integration by fiat were bound to greet Secretary Matthews's directive
with skepticism unless it was accompanied by specific reforms.
Matthews, aware of the necessity, immediately inaugurated a campaign
to recruit more black sailors, commission more black officers, and
remove the stigma attached to service in the Steward's Branch.
[Footnote 16-56: Memo, Under SecNav for Chmn, PPB, 22
Dec 49, sub: Implementation of Executive Order
9981, PPB 291.2.]
It was logical enough to start a reform of the Navy's integration
program by attacking the perennial problem of too few Negroes in the
general service. In his annual report to the Secretary of Defense,
Matthews outlined some of the practical steps the Navy was taking to
attract more qualified young blacks. The Bureau of Naval Personnel, he
explained, planned to assign black sailors and officers to its
recruiting service. As a first step it assigned eight Negroes to
Recruitment Procurement School and subsequently to recruit duty in
eight major cities with further such assignments planned when current
manpower ceilings were lifted.[16-57]
[Footnote 16-57: SecNav, Annual Report to SecDef, FY
1949, p. 230; Memo, Under SecNav Chmn, PPB, 22 Dec
49, sub: Implementation of Executive Order 9981,
PPB 291.2.]
The Bureau of Naval Personnel had also polled black reservists on the
possibility of returning to active duty on recruiting assignments, and
from this group had chosen five officers for active duty in the New
York, Philadelphia, Washington, Detroit, and Chicago recruiting
offices. At the same time black officers and petty officers were sent
to extol the advantages of a naval career before black student (p. 414)
bodies and citizen groups.[16-58] Their performances were exceedingly
well received. The executive secretary of the Dayton, Ohio, Urban
League, for example, thanked Secretary Matthews for the appearances of
Lieutenant Nelson before groups of students, reporters, and community
leaders in the city. The lieutenant, he added, not only "clearly and
effectively interpreted the opportunities open to Negro youth in the
United States Navy" but also "greatly accelerated" the community's
understanding of the Navy's integration program.[16-59] Nelson,
himself, had been a leading advocate of an accelerated public
relations program to advertise the opportunities for Negroes in the
Navy.[16-60] The personnel bureau had adopted his suggestion that all
recruitment literature, including photographs testifying to the fact
that Negroes were serving in the general service, be widely
distributed in predominantly black institutions. Manpower ceilings,
however, had forced the bureau to postpone action on Nelson's
suggestion that posters, films, pamphlets, and the like be
used.[16-61]
[Footnote 16-58: Memo, Dir, Recruiting Div, BuPers,
for Admin Aide to SecNav, 22 Dec 50, sub: Negro
Officer in Recruiting on the West Coast; Ltr,
SecNav to Actg Exec Dir, Urban League, Los Angeles,
22 Dec 50; both in Pers B6, GenRecsNav.]
[Footnote 16-59: Ltr, Charles W. Washington, Exec
Secy, Dayton, Ohio, Urban League, to SecNav, 19 Oct
50, copy in Pers 1376, GenRecsNav.]
[Footnote 16-60: Memo, Nelson for Charles Durham, Fahy
Committee, sub: Implementation of Proposed Navy
Racial Policy, 17 Jun 49, FC file.]
[Footnote 16-61: Memo, Under SecNav for Chmn, PPB, 22
Dec 49, sub: Implementation of Executive Order
9981, PPB 291.2.]
An obvious concomitant to the increase in the number of black sailors
was an increase in the number of black officers. The personnel bureau
was well aware of this connection; Comdr. Luther C. Heinz, officer in
charge of naval reserve officer training, called the shortage of
Negroes in his program a particularly important problem. He promised,
"in accord with the desires of the President," as he put it, to
increase black participation in the Naval Reserve Officers' Training
Corps, and his superior, the Chief of Naval Personnel, started a
program in the bureau for that purpose.[16-62] With the help of the
National Urban League, Heinz arranged a series of lectures by black
officers at forty-nine black schools and other institutions to
interest Negroes in the Navy's reserve officers program. In August
1949, for example, Ens. Wesley Brown, the first Negro to be graduated
from Annapolis, addressed gatherings in Chicago on the opportunities
for Negroes as naval officers.[16-63]
[Footnote 16-62: Memo, Off in Charge, NROTC Tng, for
Chief, Plans & Policy Div, BuPers, 14 Jul 49, sub:
NROTC Personnel Problems, Pers 424, BuPersRecs.]
[Footnote 16-63: Ltr, Granger to Chief, NavPers, 3 Aug
49, Pers 42, BuPersRecs.]
At the same time the Bureau of Naval Personnel wrote special press
releases, arranged interviews for naval officials with members of the
black press, and distributed publicity materials in predominantly
black schools to attract candidates and to assure interested young men
that race was no bar to their selection. In this connection Commander
Heinz bid for and received an invitation to address the Urban League's
annual conference in August 1949 to outline the Navy's program.
The Chief of Naval Personnel, Rear Adm. Thomas L. Sprague, also (p. 415)
arranged for the training of all those engaged in promoting the
program--professors of naval science, naval procurement officers, and
the like. In states where such assignments were considered acceptable,
Sprague planned to appoint Negroes to selection committees.[16-64] In
a related move he also ordered that when local law or custom required
the segregation of facilities used for the administration of
qualifying tests for reserve officer training, the Navy would use its
own facilities for testing. This ruling was used when the 1949
examinations were given in Atlanta and New Orleans; to the delight of
the black press the Navy transferred the test site to its nearby
facilities.[16-65] These efforts had some positive effect. In 1949
alone some 2,700 black youths indicated an interest in the Naval
Reserve Officers' Training Corps by submitting applications.[16-66]
[Footnote 16-64: Memo, Dir of Tng, BuPers, for Chief,
NavPers, 1 Jul 49; Ltr, Granger to Cmdr Luther
Heinz, 3 Aug 49; Ltr, Heinz to Granger, 18 Aug 49.
All in Pers 42, BuPersRecs. See also Interv, author
with Nelson, 26 May 69, and Ltr, Nelson to author,
10 Feb 70, both in CMH files.]
[Footnote 16-65: Ltr, Chief, NavPers, to Cmdt, All
Continental Naval Dists, 17 Mar 50, Pers 42,
BuPersRecs; Memo, Under SecNav for Chmn, PPB, 22
Dec 49, PPB 291.2.]
[Footnote 16-66: Memo, Under SecNav for Chmn, PPB, 22
Dec 49, PPB 291.2.]
Despite these well-intentioned efforts, the Navy failed to increase
significantly the number of black officers or sailors in the next
decade (_Table 8_). The percentage of Negroes in the Navy increased so
slowly that not until 1955, in the wake of the great manpower buildup
during the Korean War, did it exceed the 1949 figure. Although the
percentage of black enlistments increased significantly at
times--approximately 12 percent of all enlistments in 1955 were black,
for example--the proportion of Negroes in the Navy's enlisted ranks
was only 0.4 percent higher in 1960 than in 1949. While the number of
black officers increased more than sevenfold in the same decade, it
was still considerably less than 1 percent of the total officer
strength, well below Army and Air Force percentages.
Table 8--Black Manpower, U.S. Navy
A. Enlisted Strength
_Percent
_Year_ _Total Strength_ _Black Strength_ Black_
1949 363,622 17,051 4.5
1950 329,114 14,858 3.7
1951 656,371 17,604 2.7
1952 728,511 23,010 3.2
1953 698,367 24,734 3.5
1954 635,103 24,236 3.8
1955 574,157 30,623 5.3
1956 586,782 37,308 6.3
1957 593,022 38,222 6.4
1958 558,955 30,978 5.7
1959 547,236 30,098 5.5
1960 544,323 26,760 4.9
B. Percentage of Blacks Enlisted in Steward's and Other Branches
_Year_ _Steward's Branch_ _Other Branches_
1949 65.12 34.88
1950 57.07 42.93
1951 55.27 44.73
1952 54.95 45.05
1953 51.73 48.27
1954 53.43 48.57
1955 51.19 48.81
1956 25.38 74.62
1957 21.66 78.34
1958 23.35 76.65
C. Officer Strength (Selected Years)
_Year_ _Black Officers on Active Duty_ _Total Officers_
1949 19 45,464
1951 23 66,323
1953 53 78,095
1955 81 71,591
1960 149
_Source_: BuPers, Personnel Statistics Branch. See especially BuPers,
"Memo on Discrimination of the Negro," 24 Jan 59, BAF2-014. BuPers
Technical Library. All figures represent yearly averages.
The Navy had an explanation for the small number of Negroes. The
reduced manpower ceilings imposed on the Navy, even during the Korean
War, had caused a drastic curtailment in recruiting. At the same time,
with the brief exception of the Korean War, the Navy had depended on
volunteers for enlistment and had required volunteers to score ninety
or higher on the general classification test. The percentage of those
who scored above ninety was lower for blacks than for whites--16
percent against 67 percent, a ratio, naval spokesmen suggested, that
explained the enlistment figures. Furthermore, the low enlistment
quotas produced a long waiting list of those desiring to volunteer.
All applicants for the relatively few openings were thoroughly
screened, and competition was so keen that any Negroes accepted for
the monthly quota had to be extraordinarily well qualified.[16-67]
[Footnote 16-67: For a public expression of these
sentiments see, for example, Ltr, Capt R. B. Ellis,
Policy Control Br, BuPers, to President of
Birmingham, Ala., Branch, NAACP, 30 Mar 50, Pers 66
MM, GenRecsNav.]
What the Navy's explanation failed to mention was that the rise and
decline in the Navy's black strength during the 1950's was intimately
related to the number of group IV enlistees being forced on the
services under the provisions of the Defense Department's program (p. 416)
for the qualitative distribution of manpower. Each service was
required to accept 24 percent of all recruits in group IV from fiscal
year 1953 to 1956, 18 percent in fiscal year 1957, and 12 percent
thereafter. Between 1953 and 1956 the Navy accepted well above the
required 24 percent of group IV men, but in fiscal year 1957 took only
15.1 percent, and in 1958 only 6.8 percent. In 1958, with the
knowledge of the Secretary of Defense, all the services took in fewer
of the group IV's than the distribution program required, but
justified the reduction on the grounds that declining strength made it
necessary to emphasize high quality in recruits. In a move endorsed by
the Navy, the Air Force finally requested in 1959 that the qualitative
distribution program be held in abeyance. On the basis of this request
the Navy temporarily ceased to accept all group IV and some group III
men, but resumed recruiting them when it seemed likely that the (p. 417)
Secretary of Defense would refuse the request.[16-68]
[Footnote 16-68: BuPers, "Memo on Discrimination of
the Negro," 24 January 1959, Pers A1224, BuPers
Tech Library.]
[Illustration: CHRISTMAS IN KOREA, 1950.]
The correlation between the rise and fall of the group IV enlistments
and the percentage of Negroes in the Navy shows that all the increases
in black strength between 1952 and 1959 came not through the Navy's
publicized and organized effort to attract the qualified black
volunteers it had promised the Fahy Committee, but from the men forced
upon it by the Defense Department's distribution program. The
correlation also lends credence to the charges of some of the civil
rights critics who saw another reason for the shortage of Negroes.
They claimed that there had been no drop in the number of applicants
but that fewer Negroes were being accepted by Navy recruiters. One
NAACP official claimed that Negroes were "getting the run around."
Those who had fulfilled all enlistment requirements were not being
informed, and others were being given false information by recruiters.
He concluded that the Navy was operating under an unwritten policy of
filling recruit quotas with whites, accepting Negroes only when whites
were unavailable.[16-69] If these accusations were true, the Navy was
denying itself the services of highly qualified black applicants at a
time when the Defense Department's qualitative distribution program
was forcing it to take large numbers of the less gifted. Certainly the
number of Negroes capable of moving up the career and promotion ladder
was reduced and the Navy left vulnerable to further charges of
discrimination.
[Footnote 16-69: Ltr, Exec Secy, Birmingham, Ala.,
Branch, NAACP, to Chief, NavPers, 14 Mar 50, Pers
A, GenRecsNav.]
As for the shortage of officers, Nelson cited the awareness among
candidates that promotions were slower for blacks in the Navy than in
the other services where there was "less caste and class to
buck."[16-70] Nelson was aware that out of the 2,700 blacks who had
indicated an interest in the reserve officer training program in 1949
only 250 actually took the aptitude tests. Of these, only two passed
the tests and one of these was later rejected for poor eyesight. An
Urban League spokesman believed that some failed to take the tests out
of fear of failure but that many harbored a suspicion that the program
was not entirely open to all regardless of race.[16-71] Reinforcing
this suspicion was the fact that, despite the intentions of the (p. 418)
Bureau of Naval Personnel and the Navy's increasing control over the
appointment process, as of 1965 not a single Negro had been appointed
to any of the 150-man state selection committees on reserve officer
training.[16-72] Also to be considered, as the American Civil
Liberties Union later pointed out, was the promotion record of black
officers. As late as 1957 no black officer had ever commanded a ship,
and while both black and white officers started up the same promotion
ladder, the blacks were usually transferred out of the line into staff
billets.[16-73]
[Footnote 16-70: Interv, Nichols with Nelson, 1953, in
Nichols Collection; Ltr, Nelson to author, 10 Feb
70; both in CMH files.]
[Footnote 16-71: Quoted in Memo, Dir of Tng, BuPers,
for Chief, NavPers, 1 Jul 49, Pers 42, GenRecsNav.]
[Footnote 16-72: Memo for Rcd, Evans, 23 Jun 65, sub:
NROTC Boards, ASD/M 291.2.]
[Footnote 16-73: Ltr, Exec Dir, ACLU, to SecNav, 26
Nov 57, GenRecsNav.]
[Illustration: REARMING AT SEA. _Ordnancemen at work on the deck of
the USS Philippine Sea, off Korea, October 1950._]
Given the pressure on the personnel bureau to develop some respectable
black manpower statistics, it is unlikely that the lack of educated,
black recruits can be blamed on widespread subterfuge at the
recruiting level. Far more likely is the explanation offered by Under
Secretary Kimball, that the black community distrusted the
Navy.[16-74] First apparent in the 1940's, this distrust lasted
throughout the next decade as young Negroes continued to show a
general apathy toward the Navy, which at times turned into open
hostility. In September 1961 the Chief of Naval Personnel reported
that recruiters were not infrequently being treated to "booing,
hissing and other disorderly conduct" when they tried to discuss the
opportunities for naval careers before black audiences.[16-75]
[Footnote 16-74: Memo, Under SecNav for Chmn, PPB, 22
Dec 49, sub: Implementation of Executive Order
9981, PPB 291.2.]
[Footnote 16-75: Memo, Chief, NavPers, for Pers B, 23
Sep 61, copy in Harris Wofford Collection, J. F.
Kennedy Library.]
The Navy's poor reputation in the black community centered on the
continued existence of the racially separate servants' branch, in the
eyes of many the symbol of the service's racial exclusiveness. The
Steward's Branch remained predominantly black. In 1949 it had 10,499
Negroes, 4,707 Filipinos, 741 other nonwhites, and 1 white man. Chief
stewards continued to be denied the grade of chief petty officer, on
the grounds that since stewards were not authorized to exercise
military command over others than stewards because of their lack of
military training, chief stewards were not chiefs in the military
sense of the word. This difference in authority also explained, as the
Chief of Naval Personnel put it, why as a general rule chief stewards
were not quartered with other petty officers.[16-76] These (p. 419)
distinctions were true also for stewards in the first, second, and
third classes, a fact in their case symbolized by differences in
uniform. Most of the thousands of black stewards continued to be
recruited, trained, and employed exclusively in that branch, and thus
for over half the Negroes--65 percent--in the 1949 Navy the chance for
advancement was severely limited and the chance to qualify for a
different job almost nonexistent.
[Footnote 16-76: Testimony of Vice Adm William M.
Fechteler Before the President's Committee on
Equality of Treatment and Opportunity in the Armed
Services (the Fahy Cmte), 28 Mar 49, p. 18.]
[Illustration: BROADENING SKILLS. _Stewards on the USS Valley Forge
volunteer for classes leading to advancement in other fields, Korea,
1950._]
The Navy instituted several changes in the branch in the wake of the
Fahy Committee's recommendations. On 25 July 1949 the Chief of Naval
Personnel ordered all chief stewards designated chief petty officers
with all the prerogatives of that status; in precedence they came
immediately after chief dental technicians,[16-77] who were at the
bottom of the list. That the change was limited to chief stewards did
not go unnoticed. Joseph Evans of the Fahy Committee staff charged
that the bureau "seemed to have ordered this to accede to the
committee's recommendations never intending to go beyond Chief
Stewards."[16-78] Nelson, by now a sort of unofficial ombudsman and
gadfly for black sailors, urged his superiors to broaden the reform,
and Kimball warned Admiral Sprague that limiting the change to
chief stewards might be "justified on the literal statement of (p. 420)
intention, but is vulnerable to criticism of continued discrimination."
Without compelling reasons to the contrary, he added, "I do not feel
that we can afford to risk any possible impression of reluctant
implementation of the spirit of the directive."[16-79]
[Footnote 16-77: BuPers Cir Ltr 115-49, 25 Jul 49.]
[Footnote 16-78: Memo, Evans for Fahy Cmte, 23 Aug 49,
sub: Progress in Navy, Fahy Papers, Truman
Library.]
[Footnote 16-79: Memo, Under SecNav for Chief,
NavPers, 10 Aug 49, MM (1) GenRecsNav.]
Admiral Sprague got the point, and on 30 August he announced that
effective with the new year, stewards--first, second, and third
class--would be designated petty officers with appropriate pay,
prerogatives, and precedence, and that their uniforms would be changed
to conform to those of other petty officers. He also amended the
bureau's manual to allow commanding officers to change the ratings of
stewards without headquarters approval, thus enlarging the opportunity
for stewards, in all other respects qualified, to transfer into other
ratings.[16-80] These reforms brought about a slow but steady change
in the assignment of black sailors. Between January 1950 and August
1953, the percentage of Negroes in the general service rose from 42 to
47 percent of the Navy's 23,000 man black strength, with a
corresponding drop in the percentage of those assigned to the
Steward's Branch.[16-81]
[Footnote 16-80: BuPers Cir Ltr 141-49, 30 Aug 49. See
also Memo, Under SecNav for Chmn, PPB, 22 Dec 49,
sub: Implementation of Executive Order 9981, PPB
291.2; Memo, Chief, NavPers, for SecNav, 4 May 50,
sub: Equality of Treatment and Opportunity, Pers
42, GenRecsNav.]
[Footnote 16-81: Memo, Dir, Plans and Policy, BuPers,
for Capt Brooke Schumm, USN, PPB, 17 Jul 50, sub:
Secretary of Defense Semi-Annual Report, Negro
Enlisted Personnel Data for, Pers 14B; Memo, Head,
Strength and Statistics Br, BuPers, for Head,
Technical Info Br, BuPers, 25 Aug 53, sub:
Information Requested by LCDR D. D. Nelson
Concerning Negro Strength, Pers A14; both in
BuPersRecs.]
Yet these reforms were modest in terms of the pressing need for a
substantive change in the racial composition of the Steward's Branch.
Despite the changes in assignment policy, the Steward's Branch was
still nearly 65 percent black in 1952, and the rest were mostly
Filipino citizens under contract. Secretary of the Navy Kimball's
observation that 133 stewards had transferred out of the branch in a
recent four-month period hardly promised any speedy change in the
current percentages.[16-82] In fact there was evidence even at that
late date that some staff members in the personnel bureau were working
at cross-purposes to the Navy's expressed policy. Worried about the
shortages of volunteers for the Steward's Branch, a group of officials
had met in August 1951 to discuss ways of improving branch morale.
Some suggested publicizing the branch to the black press and schools,
showing that Negroes were in all branches of the Navy including the
Steward's. They also studied a pamphlet called "The Advantages of
Stewards Duty in the Navy" that gave nine reasons why a man should
become a steward.[16-83]
[Footnote 16-82: Kimball was sworn in as Secretary of
the Navy on 31 July 1951. Ltr, SecNav to Granger,
19 Nov 52, SecNav files, GenRecsNav.]
[Footnote 16-83: BuPers, Plans and Policy Div, "Review
of Suggestions and Recommendations to Improve
Standards, Morale, and Attitudes Toward Stewards
Branch of U.S. Navy" (ca. 2 Aug 51), BuPersRecs.]
Obviously the Navy had to set a steady course if it intended any
lasting racial reform of the Steward's Branch, but its leaders seemed
ambivalent toward the problem. Despite his earlier efforts to raise
the status of stewards, Kimball, in a variation on an old postwar
argument, tried to show that the exclusiveness of the Steward's (p. 421)
Branch actually worked to the Negro's advantage. As he explained to
Lester Granger in November 1952, any action to effect radical or
wholesale changes in ratings "would not only tend to reduce the
efficiency of the Navy, but also in many instances be to the
disadvantage or detriment of the individuals concerned, particularly
those in the senior Steward ratings."[16-84] Supporting this line of
argument, the Chief of Naval Personnel announced the reenlistment
figures for the Steward's Branch--over 80 percent during the Korean
War period. These figures, Vice Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr., added,
proved the branch to be the most popular in the Navy and offered "a
rational measure of the state of the morale and job satisfaction."[16-85]
[Footnote 16-84: Ltr, SecNav for Granger, 19 Nov 52,
SecNav files, GenRecsNav.]
[Footnote 16-85: Ltrs, Chief, NavPers, to James C.
Evans, OSD, 19 Jun 53, and Granger, 28 Jul 53, both
in P 8 (4), BuPersRecs.]
These explanations still figured prominently in the Navy's 1961
defense of its racial statistics. Discussing the matter at a White
House meeting of civil rights leaders, the Chief of Naval Personnel
pointed out that all the black stewards could be replaced with
Filipinos, but the Navy had refrained from such a course for several
reasons. The branch still had the highest reenlistment rate. It
provided jobs for those group IV men the Navy was obliged to accept
but could never use in technical billets. Without the opportunity
provided by the branch, moreover, "many of the rated black stewards
would probably not achieve a petty officer rating at all."[16-86]
[Footnote 16-86: Memo, Chief, NavPers, for Pers B, 23
Sep 61, Harris Wofford Collection, J. F. Kennedy
Library. See also Memo, Chief, NavPers, for ASD/M,
29 Mar 61, sub: Stewards in U.S. Navy, Pers 8 (4),
BuPersRecs; Memo, Special Asst to SecDef, Adam
Yarmolinsky, for Frederic Dutton, Special Asst to
President, 31 Oct 61, sub: Yarmolinsky Memo of
October 26, Harris Wofford Collection, J. F.
Kennedy Library.]
However well founded these arguments were, they did not satisfy the
Navy's critics, who continued to press for the establishment of one
recruitment standard and the assignment of men on the basis of
interest and training rather than race. Lester Granger, for example,
warned Secretary Kimball of the skepticism that persisted among
sections of the black community: "As long as that branch [the
Steward's Branch] is composed entirely of nonwhite personnel, the Navy
is apt to be held by some to be violating its own stated
policy."[16-87] To Kimball's successor, Robert B. Anderson,[16-88]
Granger was even more blunt. The Steward's Branch, he declared, was "a
constant irritant to the Negro public." He saw some logical reason for
the continued concentration of Negroes in the branch but added "logic
does not necessarily imply wisdom and I sincerely believe that it is
unwise from the standpoint of efficiency and public relations to
continue the Stewards Branch on its present basis."[16-89]
[Footnote 16-87: Ltr, Granger to SecNav, 24 Oct 52,
SecNav files, GenRecsNav.]
[Footnote 16-88: Secretary Anderson, appointed by
President Eisenhower, became Secretary of the Navy
on 4 February 1953.]
[Footnote 16-89: Ltr, Granger to SecNav, 24 Apr 53,
SecNav files, GenRecsNav.]
Granger's suggestion for change was straightforward. He wanted the
Bureau of Naval Personnel to find a way to introduce a sufficiently
large number of whites into the branch to transform its racial
composition. The task promised to be difficult if the charges leveled
in the Detroit _Free Press_ were accurate. In May 1953 the paper (p. 422)
reported incidents of naval recruiting officers who, "by one ruse or
another," were shunting young volunteers, sometimes without their
knowledge, into the Steward's Branch.[16-90]
[Footnote 16-90: Detroit _Free Press_, May 16, 1953.]
Granger's suggestions were taken up by Secretary Anderson, who
announced his intention of integrating the Steward's Branch and
ordered the Chief of Naval Personnel to draw up plans to that
end.[16-91] To devise some practical measures for handling the
problem, the personnel bureau brought back to active duty three
officers who had been important to the development of the Navy's 1946
integration policy. Their study produced three recommendations:
abolish the segregation of the Steward's Branch from the general
service and separate recruitment for its members; consider
consolidating the branch with the predominantly white Commissary
Branch; and change the steward's insignia.[16-92]
[Footnote 16-91: UP News Release, September 21, 1953,
copy in CMH.]
[Footnote 16-92: Ltr, Cmdr Durwood W. Gilmore, USNR et
al., to Chief, NavPers, Vice Adm J. L. Holloway,
Jr., 31 Aug 53, P 8 (4), BuPersRecs.]
The group acknowledged that the Steward's Branch was a "sore spot with
the Negroes, and is our weakest position from the standpoint of Public
Relations," and two of their recommendations were obviously aimed at
immediate improvement of public relations. Combining the messmen and
commissary specialists would of course create an integrated branch,
which Granger estimated would be only 20 percent black, and would
probably provide additional opportunities for promotions, but in the
end it could not mask the fact that a high proportion of black sailors
were employed in food service and valet positions. Nor was it clear
how changing the familiar crescent insignia, symbolic of the steward's
duties, would change the image of a separate group that still
performed the most menial duties. Long-term reform, everyone agreed,
demanded the presence of a significant number of whites in the branch,
and there was strong evidence that the general service contained more
than a few group IV white sailors. The group's proposal to abolish
separate recruiting would probably increase the number of blacks in
the general service and eliminate the possibility that unsuspecting
black recruits would be dragooned into a messman's career; both were
substantial reforms but did not guarantee that whites would be
attracted or assigned to the branch.
Admiral Holloway was concerned about this latter point, which dominated
his discussions with the Secretary of the Navy on 1 September 1953. He
had, he told Anderson, discussed with his recruiting specialists the
possibility of recruiting white sailors for the branch, and while they
all agreed that whites must not be induced to join by "improper
procedures," such as preferential recruitment to escape the draft,
they felt that whites could be attracted to steward duty by skillful
recruiters, especially in areas of the country where industrial
integration had already been accomplished. His bureau was considering
the abolition of separate recruiting, but to make specific recommendations
on matters involving the stewards he had created an ad hoc committee,
under the Deputy Chief of Naval Personnel and composed of (p. 423)
representatives of the other bureaus. When he received this committee's
views, Holloway promised to take "definite administrative action."[16-93]
[Footnote 16-93: Memo, Chief, NavPers, for SecNav, 1
Sep 53, sub: Mr. Granger's Visit and Related
Matters, Pers, GenRecsNav.]
[Illustration: INTEGRATED STEWARDS CLASS GRADUATES, GREAT LAKES, 1953.]
The three recommendations of the reservist experts did not survive
intact the ad hoc committee's scrutiny. At the committee's suggestion,
Holloway rejected the proposed merger of the commissary and steward
functions on the grounds that such a move was unnecessary in an era of
high reenlistment. He also decided that stewards would retain their
branch insignia. He did approve, however, in a decision announced on
28 February 1954, putting an end to the separate recruitment of
stewards with the exception of the contract enlistment of Filipino
citizens. As Anderson assured Congressman Adam Clayton Powell of New
York, only after recruit training and "with full knowledge of the
opportunities in various categories of administrative specialties"
would an enlistee be allowed to volunteer for messman's duty.[16-94]
[Footnote 16-94: Ltr, SecNav to Congressman Adam C.
Powell, 19 Mar 54, SecNav files, GenRecsNav.]
Admiral Holloway promised a further search for ways to eliminate
"points of friction" regarding the stewards, and naval officials
discussed the problem with civil rights leaders and Defense Department
officials on several occasions in the next years.[16-95] The (p. 424)
Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Adam Yarmolinsky,
reported in 1961 that the Bureau of Naval Personnel "was not sanguine"
about recruiting substantial numbers of white seamen for the Steward's
Branch.[16-96] In answer, the Chief of Naval Personnel could only
point out that no matter what their qualifications or ambitions all
men assigned to the Steward's Branch were volunteers. As one
commentator observed, white sailors were very rarely attracted to the
messmen's field because of its reputation as a black specialty.[16-97]
[Footnote 16-95: See, for example, ASD/M, Thursday
Reports, 7 Jan 54 and 12 Apr 56, copies in Dep ASD
(Civil Rights) files; see also Memo, Chief,
NavPers, for Special Asst to SecDef, 29 Mar 61,
sub: Stewards in U.S. Navy, BuPersRecs.]
[Footnote 16-96: Memo, Adam Yarmolinsky for Fred
Dutton, 31 Oct 61, sub: Yarmolinsky Memo of October
26, Harris Wofford Collection, J. F. Kennedy
Library.]
[Footnote 16-97: Greenberg, _Race Relations and
American Law_, p. 359.]
Nevertheless, by 1961 a definite pattern of change had emerged in the
Steward's Branch. The end of separate recruitment drastically cut the
number of Negroes entering the rating, while the renewed emphasis on
transferring eligible chief stewards to other specialties somewhat
reduced the number of Negroes already in the branch. Between 1956 and
1961, some 600 men out of the 1,800 tested transferred to other rating
groups or fields. The substantial drop in black strength resulting
from these changes combined with a corresponding rise in the number of
contract messmen from the western Pacific region reduced for the first
time in some thirty years Negroes in the Steward's Branch to a
minority. Even for those remaining in the branch, life changed
considerably. Separate berthing for stewards, always justified on the
grounds of different duties and hours, was discontinued, and the
amount of time spent by stewards at sea, with the varied military work
that sea duty involved, was increased.[16-98]
[Footnote 16-98: Memo, Chief, NavPers, for Special
Asst to SecDef, 29 Mar 61, sub: Stewards in U.S.
Navy, Pers 8 (4), GenRecsNav.]
If these changes caused by the increased enlistment of stewards from
the western Pacific relieved the Steward's Branch of its reputation as
the black man's navy, they also perpetuated the notion that servants'
duties were for persons of dark complexion. The debate over a
segregated branch that had engaged the civil rights leaders and the
Navy since 1932 was over, but it had left a residue of ill will; some
were bitter at what they considered the listless pace of reform, a
pace which left the impression that the service had been forced to
change against its will. To some extent the Navy in the 1950's failed
to capitalize on its early achievements because it had for so long
missed the point of the integrationists' arguments about the stewards.
In the fifties the Navy expended considerable time and energy
advertising for black officer candidates and recruits whom they
guaranteed a genuinely equal chance to participate in all specialties,
but these efforts were to some extent dismissed by critics as not
germane. In 1950, for example, only 114 Negroes served in the
glamorous submarine assignments and even fewer in the naval air
service.[16-99] Yet this obvious underrepresentation caused no great
outcry from the black community. What did cause bitterness and (p. 425)
protest in an era of aroused racial pride was the fact that servants'
duties fell almost exclusively on nonwhite Americans. That these
duties were popular--the 80 percent reenlistment rate in the Steward's
Branch continued throughout the decade and the transfer rate into the
branch almost equaled the transfer out--was disregarded by many of the
more articulate spokesmen, who considered the branch an insult to the
black public. As Congressman Powell informed the Navy in 1953, "no one
is interested in today's world in fighting communism with a frying pan
or shoe polish."[16-100] Although statistics showed nearly half the
black sailors employed in other than menial tasks, Powell voiced the
mood of a large segment of the black community.
[Footnote 16-99: The Navy commissioned its first black
pilot, Ens. Jesse L. Brown, in 1950. He was killed
in action in Korea.]
[Footnote 16-100: Ltr, Powell to John Floberg, Asst
SecNav for Air, 29 Jun 53, SecNav files,
GenRecsNav.]
[Illustration: WAVE RECRUITS, _Naval Training Center, Bainbridge,
Maryland, 1953_.]
The Fahy Committee had acknowledged that manpower statistics alone
were not a reliable index of equal opportunity. Convinced that Negroes
were getting a full and equal chance to enlist in the general service
and compete for officer commissions, the committee had approved the
Navy's policy, trusting to time and equal opportunity to produce the
desired result. Unfortunately for the Navy, there would be many
critics both in and out of government in the 1960's who disagreed with
the committee's trust in time and good intentions, for equal opportunity
would remain very much a matter of numbers and percentages. In an (p. 426)
era when a premium would be placed on the size of minority membership,
the palm would go to the other services. "The blunt fact is," Granger
reminded the Secretary of the Navy in 1954, "that as a general rule
the most aspiring Negro youth are apt to have the least interest in a
Navy career, chiefly because the Army and Air Force have up to now
captured the spotlight."[16-101] A decade later the statement still
held.
[Footnote 16-101: Ltr, Granger to SecNav, 7 Jan 54,
SecNav files, GenRecsNav.]
[Illustration: ADMIRAL GRAVELY (_1973 portrait_).]
It was ironic that black youth remained aloof from the Navy in the
1950's when the way of life for Negroes on shipboard and at naval
bases had definitely taken a turn for the better. The general service
was completely integrated, although the black proportion, 4.9 percent
in 1960, was still far less than might reasonably be expected,
considering the black population.[16-102] Negroes were being trained
in every job classification and attended all the Navy's technical
schools. Although not yet represented in proportionate numbers in the
top grades within every rating, Negroes served in all ratings in every
branch, a fact favorably noticed in the metropolitan press.[16-103]
Black officers, still shockingly out of proportion to black strength,
were not much more so than in the other services and were serving more
often with regular commissions in the line as well as on the staff.
Their lack of representation in the upper ranks demonstrated that the
climb to command was slow and arduous even when the discriminatory
tactics of earlier times had been removed. In 1961 the Navy could
finally announce that a black officer, Lt. Comdr. Samuel L. Gravely,
Jr., had been ordered to command a destroyer escort, the USS
_Falgout_.[16-104]
[Footnote 16-102: Memo, ASD/M for SA et al., 21 Nov
51, sub: Manuscript on the Negro in the Armed
Forces, SecDef 291.2.]
[Footnote 16-103: See New York _Herald Tribune_,
December 2, 1957, and New York Post, March 14,
1957.]
[Footnote 16-104: Gravely would eventually become the
first black admiral in the U.S. Navy.]
But how were these changes being accepted among the rank and file?
Comments from official sources and civil rights groups alike showed
the leaven of racial tolerance at work throughout the service.[16-105]
Reporter Lee Nichols, interviewing members of all the services in (p. 427)
1953,[16-106] found that whites expected blacks to prove themselves in
their assignments while blacks were skeptical that equal opportunities
for assignment were really open to them. Yet the Nichols interviews
reveal a strain of pride and wonderment in the servicemen at the
profound changes they had witnessed.
[Footnote 16-105: See, for example, Ltr, Exec Secy,
President's Cmte on Equal Treatment and Opportunity
in the Armed Services, to CNO, 21 Jun 49, FC file;
Memo, Chief, NavPers, for SecNav, BuPersRecs; Memo,
ASD/M for SA et al., 21 Nov 51, sub: Manuscript on
the Negro in the Armed Forces, SecDef 291.2; Ltr,
Exec Secy, ACLU, to SecNav, 26 Nov 57, SecNav
files, GenRecsNav.]
[Footnote 16-106: Nichols's sampling, presented in the
form of approximately a hundred interviews with men
and women from all the services, was completely
unscientific and informal and was undertaken for
the preparation of his book, _Breakthrough on the
Color Front_. Considering their timing, the
interviews supply an interesting sidelight to the
integration period. They are included in the
Nichols Collection, CMH.]
In time integrated service became routine throughout the Navy, and
instances of Negroes in command of integrated units increased. Bigots
of both races inevitably remained, and the black community continued
to resent the separate Steward's Branch, but the sincerity of the
Navy's promise to integrate the service seemed no longer in doubt.