The Role of the Secretary of Defense
1949-1951
Having ordered the integration of the services and supported the Fahy
Committee in the development of acceptable racial programs, President
Truman quickly turned the matter over to his subordinates in the
Department of Defense, severing White House ties with the problem.
Against the recommendations of some of his White House advisers,
Truman adjourned the committee, leaving his executive order in effect.
"The necessary programs having been adopted," he told Fahy, it was
time for the services "to work out in detail the procedures which will
complete the steps so carefully initiated by the committee."[15-1] In
effect, the President was guaranteeing the services the freedom to put
their own houses in order.
[Footnote 15-1: Ltr, Truman to Fahy, 6 Jul 50, FC
file.]
The issue of civil rights, however, was still of vital interest to one
of the President's major constituencies. Black voters, recognized as a
decisive factor in the November 1948 election, pressed their demands
on the victorious President; in particular some of their spokesmen
called on the administration to implement fully the program put forth
by the Fahy Committee. These demands were being echoed in Congress by
a civil rights bloc--for bloc it had now become in the wake of the
election that sent Harry Truman back to the White House. No longer the
concern of a congressman or two, the cause of the black serviceman was
now supported by a group of politicians who, joining with civil rights
leaders, pressed the Department of Defense for rapid changes in its
racial practices.
The traditionalists in the armed forces also had congressional allies.
In all probability these legislators would accept an integrated Navy
because it involved relatively few Negroes; they might even tolerate
an integrated Air Force because they lacked a proprietary attitude
toward this new service; but they would fight to keep the Army
segregated because they considered the Army their own.[15-2]
Congressional segregationists openly opposed changes in the Army's
racial policy only when they thought the time was right. They carefully
avoided the subject in the months following publication of the (p. 380)
executive order, waiting to bargain until their support became crucial
to the success of such vital military legislation as the renewal of
the Selective Service Act and the establishment of universal military
training.
[Footnote 15-2: Interv, Nichols with Gen Wade H.
Haislip, 1953, in Nichols Collection; Telephone
Interv, author with Haislip, 18 Mar 71; Interv,
author with Martin Blumenson, 8 Jan 68. All in CMH
files.]
At most, Congress played only a minor role in the dramatic changes
beginning in the armed forces. Champions of civil rights had little
effect on service practices, although these congressmen channeled the
complaints of black voters and kept the military traditionalists on
the defensive. As for the congressional traditionalists, their support
may have helped sustain those on the staff who resisted racial change
within the Army, thus slowing down that service's integration. But the
demands of congressional progressives and obstructionists tended to
cancel each other out, and in the wake of the Fahy Committee's
disbandment the services themselves reemerged as the preeminent factor
in the armed forces racial program.
The services regained control by default. Logically, direction of
racial reforms in the services should have fallen to the Secretary of
Defense. In the first place, the secretary, other administration
officials, and the public alike had begun to use the secretary's
office as a clearinghouse for reconciling conflicting demands of the
services, as an appellate court reviewing decisions of the service
secretaries, and as the natural channel of communication between the
services and the White House, Congress, and the public. Many racial
problems had become interservice in nature, and only the Office of the
Secretary of Defense possessed the administrative machinery to deal
with such matters. The Personnel Policy Board or, later, the new
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower and
Personnel might well have become the watchdog recommended by the Fahy
Committee to oversee the services' progress toward integration, but
neither did.
Certainly the Secretary of Defense had other matters pressing for his
attention. Secretary Johnson had become the central character in the
budgetary conflicts of Truman's second term, and both he and General
George C. Marshall, who succeeded him as secretary on 20 September
1950, were suddenly thrust into leadership of the Korean War. In
administrative matters, at least, Marshall had to concentrate on
boosting the morale of a department torn by internecine budgetary
arguments. Integration did not appear to have the same importance to
national security as these weighty matters. More to the point, Johnson
and Marshall were not social reformers. Whatever their personal
attitudes, they were content to let the services set the pace of
racial reform. With one notable exception neither man initiated any of
the historic racial changes that took place in the armed forces during
the early 1950's.
For the most part those racial issues that did involve the Secretary
of Defense centered on the status of the Negro in the armed forces in
general and were extraneous to the issue of integration. One of the
most persistent status problems was classification by race. First
posed during the great World War II draft calls, the question of how
to determine a serviceman's race, and indeed the related one of who
had the right to make such a determination, remained unanswered five
years later. In August 1944 the Selective Service System decided (p. 381)
that the definition of a man's race should be left to the man himself.
While this solution no doubt pleased racial progressives and certainly
simplified the induction process, not to speak of protecting the War
Department from a ticklish court review, it still left the services
the difficult and important task of designating racial categories into
which men could be assigned. As late as April 1949 the Army and the
Air Force listed a number of specific racial categories, one of which
had to be chosen by the applicant or recruiter--the regulation left
the point unclear--to identify the applicant's race. The regulation
listed "white, Negro, Indian (referring to American Indian only),
Puerto Rican, Cuban, Mexican, Hawaiian, Filipino, Chinese, East
Indian, etc.," and specifically included mulattoes and "others of
negroid race or extraction" in the Negro category, leaving other men
of mixed race to be entered under their predominant race.[15-3]
[Footnote 15-3: SR 615-105-1 (AFR 39-9), 15 Apr 49.]
The regulation was obviously subject to controversy, and in the wake
of the President's equality order it is not surprising that some
group--a group of Spanish-speaking Americans from southern California,
as it turned out--would raise the issue. Specifically, they objected
to a practice of Army and Air Force recruiters, who often scratched
out "white" and inserted "Mexican" in the applications of
Spanish-speaking volunteers. These young men wanted to be integrated
into every phase of community life, Congressman Chet Holifield told
the Secretary of Defense, and he passed on a warning from his
California constituents that "any attempt to forestall this ambition
by treating them as a group apart is extremely repellent to them and
gives rise to demoralization and hostility."[15-4] If the Department
of Defense considered racial information essential, Holifield
continued, why not make the determination in a less objectionable
manner? He suggested a series of questions concerning the birthplace
of the applicant's parents and the language spoken in his home as
innocuous possibilities.
[Footnote 15-4: Ltr, Holifield to SecDef, 10 Aug 49,
SD 291.2 Negroes.]
Secretary Johnson sent the congressman's complaint to the Personnel
Policy Board, which, ignoring the larger considerations posed by
Holifield, concentrated on simplifying the department's racial
categories to five--Caucasian, Negroid, Mongolian, Indian (American),
and Malayan--and making their use uniform throughout the services. The
board also adopted the use of inoffensive questions to help determine
the applicant's proper race category. Obviously, the board could not
abandon racial designations because the Army's quota system, still in
effect, depended on this information. Less clear, however, was why the
board failed to consider the problem of who should make the racial
determination. At any rate, its new list of racial categories,
approved by the secretary and published on 11 October, immediately
drew complaints from members of the department.[15-5]
[Footnote 15-5: Memo, Dep Dir, Personnel Policy Bd
Staff, for Chmn, PPB, 13 Sep 49, sub: Project
Summary--Change of Nomenclature on Enlistment Forms
as Pertains to "Race" Entries (M-63); Memo, Chmn,
PPB, for SA et al., 11 Oct 49, sub: Policy
Regarding Race Entries on Enlistment Contracts and
Shipping Articles; both in PPB 291.2.]
[Illustration: NAVY CORPSMAN IN KOREA _attends wounded from the 1st
Marine Division, 1950_.]
The secretary's racial adviser, James C. Evans, saw no need for (p. 382)
racial designations on departmental forms, but knowing their removal
was unlikely in the near future, he concentrated on trying to change
the newly revised categories. He explained to the board, obviously
unschooled in the nuance of racial slurs, that the word "Negroid" was
offensive to many Negroes. Besides, the board's categories made no
sense since Indian (American) and Malayan were not comparable to the
other three entries listed. Why not, he suggested, settle for the old
black, white, yellow, red, and brown designations?[15-6]
[Footnote 15-6: Memo, Evans for Chmn, PPB, 25 Nov 49,
sub: Racial Designation and Terminology, SD 291.2;
Interv, author with Evans, 22 Jul 71, CMH files.]
The Navy, too, objected to the board's categories. After consulting a
Smithsonian ethnologist, the Under Secretary of the Navy suggested
that the board create a sixth category, Polynesian, for use in
shipping articles and in forms for reporting casualties. The Army,
also troubled by the categories, requested they be defined. The
categories were meant to provide a uniform basis for classifying
military personnel, The Adjutant General pointed out, but given the
variety and complexity of Army forms--he had discovered that the Army
was using seven separate forms with racial entries, each with a
different procedure for deciding race--uniformity was practically (p. 383)
impossible without a careful delineation of each category.[15-7]
[Footnote 15-7: Memo, Head, Strength and Statistics
Br, BuPers, for Head, Policy Control Br, BuPers, 27
Oct 49, sub: Policy Regarding Race Entries, Pers
25-EL, BuPersRecs; Memo, Under SecNav for Chmn,
PPB, 25 Nov 49, sub: Policy Regarding "Race"
Entries on Enlistment Contracts and Shipping
Articles, GenRecsNav; DF, D/P&A to TAG, 18 Oct 49,
same sub, with CMT 2, TAG to D/P&A, 2 Nov 49, copy
in AG 291.2 (11 Oct 49).]
Its ruling under attack from the services, the board made a hasty
appeal to authority. Its chief of staff, Vice Adm. John L.
McCrea,[15-8] recommended that the Army and Navy consult Funk and
Wagnalls _Standard Dictionary_ for specific definitions of the five
racial categories. That source, the admiral explained to the Under
Secretary of the Navy, listed Polynesian in the Malayan category, and
if the Navy decided to add race to its shipping articles, the five
categories should be sufficient. The board, he added, had not meant to
encourage additional use of racial information. The Navy had always
used the old color categories on its shipping articles forms, the
ones, incidentally, favored by Evans, and McCrea thought they
generally corresponded to the categories developed by the board.[15-9]
The admiral also suggested that the Army use the color system to help
clarify the board's categories. He offered some generalizations on
specific Army questions: "a) Puerto Ricans are officially Caucasian,
unless of Indian or Negro birth; b) Filipinos are Malayan; c)
Hawaiians are Malayan; d) Latin Americans are Caucasian or Indian; and
e) Indian-Negro and White-Negro mixtures should be classified in
accordance with the laws of the states of their birth."[15-10] The
lessons on definition of race so painfully learned during World War II
were ignored. Henceforth race was to be determined by a dictionary, a
color scheme, and the legal vagaries found in the race laws of the
several states.
[Footnote 15-8: Admiral McCrea succeeded General
Lanham as director of the board's staff in 1949.]
[Footnote 15-9: Memo, Dir, PPB Staff, for Under
SecNav, 7 Dec 49, sub: Policy Regarding "Race"
Entries on Enlistment Contracts and Shipping
Articles, PPB 291.2.]
[Footnote 15-10: Idem for Administrative Asst to SA, 8
Dec 49, sub: Policy Regarding "Race" Entries on
Enlistment Contracts and Shipping Articles, OSA
291.2.]
The board's rulings, unscientific and open to all sorts of legal
complications, could only be stopgap measures, and when on 4 January
1950 the Army again requested clarification of the racial categories,
the board quickly responded. Although it continued to defend the use
of racial categories, it tried to soften the ruling by stating that an
applicant's declaration of race should be accepted, subject to
"sufficient justification" from the applicant when his declaration
created "reason to doubt." It was 5 April before the board's new
chairman, J. Thomas Schneider,[15-11] issued a revised directive to
this effect.[15-12]
[Footnote 15-11: Schneider succeeded Thomas Reid as
chairman on 2 February 1950.]
[Footnote 15-12: Memo, Chmn, PPB, for SA et al., 5 Apr
50, sub: Policy Regarding "Race" on Enlistment
Contracts and Shipping Articles, PPB 291.2.]
The board's decision to accept an applicant's declaration was simply a
return to the reasonable and practical method the Selective Service
had been using for some time. But adopting the vague qualification
"sufficient justification" invited further complaints. When the
services finally translated the board's directive into a new
regulation, the role of the applicant in deciding his racial identity
was practically abolished. In the Army and the Air Force, for (p. 384)
example, recruiters had to submit all unresolved identity cases to the
highest local commander, whose decision, supposedly based on available
documentary evidence and answers to the questions first suggested by
Congressman Holifield, was final. Further, the Army and the Air Force
decided that "no enlistment would be accomplished" until racial
identity was decided to the satisfaction of both the applicant and the
service.[15-13] The Navy adopted a similar procedure when it placed
the board's directive in effect.[15-14] The new regulation promised
little comfort for young Americans of racially mixed parentage and
even less for the services. Contrary to the intent of the Personnel
Policy Board, its directive once again placed the burden of deciding
an applicant's race, with the concomitant complaints and potential
civil suits, back on the services.
[Footnote 15-13: SR 615-105-1 (AFR 39-9), 6 Sep 50.]
[Footnote 15-14: BuPers Cir Ltr 84-50, 1 Jun 50.]
At the time the Army did not see this responsibility as a burden and
in its quest for uniformity was willing to assume an even greater
share of the decision-making in a potentially explosive issue. On 7
August the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, asked the Personnel
Policy Board to include Army induction centers in the directive meant
originally for recruiting centers only.[15-15] In effect the Army was
offering to assume from Selective Service the task of deciding the
race of all draftees. The board obtained the necessary agreement from
Maj. Gen. Lewis B. Hershey, and Selective Service was thus relieved of
an onerous task reluctantly acquired in 1944. On 29 August 1950 The
Adjutant General ordered induction stations to begin entering the
draftee's race in the records.[15-16]
[Footnote 15-15: Memo, Dep Asst CS/G-1 for Dep Dir of
Staff, Mil Pers, PPB, 7 Aug 50, sub: "Race" Entries
on Induction Records, PPB 291.2. The Director,
Personnel and Administration, was redesignated the
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, in the 1950
reorganization of the Army staff; see Hewes, _From
Root to McNamara_.]
[Footnote 15-16: Memo, Dir, PPB Staff, for Dep ACS,
G-1, 29 Aug 50, sub: "Race" Entries on Induction
Records, PPB 291.2 (27 Aug 50); Memo, Chief, Class
and Standards Br, G-1, for TAG, 6 Sep 50, same sub,
G-1 291.2 (11 Oct 49); Ltr, Dir, Selective Service,
to Actg Dir of Production Management, Munitions Bd,
27 Nov 50, copy in G-1 291.2; G-1 Memo for Rcd,
attached to G-1 DF to TAG, 28 Dec 50, same sub, G-1
291.2 (11 Oct 50).]
The considerable staff activity devoted to definitions of race between
1949 and 1951 added very little to racial harmony or the cause of
integration. The simplified racial categories and the regulations
determining their application continued to irritate members of
America's several minority groups. The ink was hardly dry on the new
regulation, for example, before the director of the NAACP's Washington
bureau was complaining to Secretary of the Air Force Thomas K.
Finletter that the department's five categories were comparatively
meaningless and caused unnecessary humiliation for inductees. He
wanted racial entries eliminated.[15-17] Finletter explained that
racial designations were not used for assignment or administrative
purposes but solely for evaluating the integration program and
answering questions from the public. His explanation prompted much
discussion within the services and correspondence between them and
Clarence Mitchell and Walter White of the NAACP. It culminated in a
meeting of the service secretaries with the Secretary of Defense (p. 385)
on 16 January 1951 at which Finletter reaffirmed his position.[15-18]
[Footnote 15-17: Ltr, Clarence Mitchell to SecAF
Thomas K. Finletter, 13 Dec 50, SecAF files.
Finletter had become secretary on 24 April 1950.]
[Footnote 15-18: Ltr, SecAF to Mitchell, Dir,
Washington Bureau, NAACP, 3 Jan 51, and Ltr,
Mitchell to Asst SecAF, 8 Jan 51, both in SecAF
files; Memo, Edward T. Dickinson, Asst to Joint
Secys, OSD, for SA et al., 17 Jan 51, OSD files.]
There was some justification for the Defense Department's position.
Many of those who found racial designations distasteful also demanded
hard statistical proof that members of minority groups were given
equal treatment and opportunity,[15-19] and such assurances, of
course, demanded racial determinations on the records. Still, not all
the reasons for retaining the racial identification entry were so
defensible. The Army, for example, had to maintain accurate statistics
on the number of Negroes inducted because of its concern with a
possible unacceptable rise in their number and the President's promise
to reimpose the quota to prevent such an increase. Whatever the
reasons, it was obvious that racial statistics had to be kept. It was
also obvious that as long as they were kept and continued to matter,
the Secretary of Defense would be saddled with the task of deciding in
the end which racial tag to attach to each man in the armed forces. It
was an unenviable duty, and it could be performed with neither
precision nor justice.
[Footnote 15-19: Memo, Dep Asst SecAF (Program
Management) for SecAF, 18 Jan 51, SecAF files;
Memo, Col Robin B. Pape, Asst to Dir, PPB Staff,
for Chmn, PPB, 4 May 51, sub: Racial Entries on
Enlistment Records, PPB 291.2.]
_Overseas Restrictions_
Another problem involving the Secretary of Defense concerned
restrictions placed on the use of black servicemen in certain foreign
areas. The problem was not new. Making a distinction in cases where
American troops were stationed in a country at the request of the
United States government, the services excluded black troops from
assignment in some Allied countries during and immediately after World
War II.[15-20] The Army, for example, barred the assignment of black
units to China (the Chinese government did not object to assignment of
individual black soldiers up to 15 percent of any unit's strength),
and the Navy removed black messmen from stations in Iceland.[15-21]
Although these restrictions did not improve the racial image of the
services, they were only a minor inconvenience to military officials
since Negroes were for the most part segregated and their placement
could be controlled easily. The armed forces continued to exclude
black servicemen from certain countries into 1949 under what the
Personnel Policy Board called "operating agreements (probably not in
writing)" with the State Department.[15-22] But the situation changed
radically when some of the services started to integrate. Efficient
administration then demanded that black servicemen be interchanged (p. 386)
freely among the various duty stations. Even in the case of the still
segregated Army the exclusion of Negroes from certain commands further
complicated the chronic maldistribution of black soldiers throughout
the service.
[Footnote 15-20: Memo, Secy, Cmte on Negro Policies,
for ASW, 26 Sep 42, sub: Digest of War Department
Policy Pertaining to Negro Military Personnel, ASW
291.2 Negro Troops.]
[Footnote 15-21: Msg, CG, China Theater, to War
Department, 16 Mar 46, G-1 291.2 (1 Jan-31 Mar 46);
Memo Vice CNO for Chief of NavPers, 1 Jul 42, sub:
Colored Personnel on Duty in Iceland--Replacement
of, P-14, GenRecsNav.]
[Footnote 15-22: Memo, Thomas R. Reid for Najeeb
Halaby, Dir, Office of Foreign Military Affairs,
OSD, 7 Jul 49, sub: Foreign Assignments of Negro
Personnel, PPB 291.2 (7 Jul 49).]
The interservice and departmental aspects of the problem involved
Secretary of Defense Johnson. Following promulgation of his directive
on racial equality and at the instigation of his Personnel Policy
Board and his assistant, Najeeb Halaby, Johnson asked the Secretary of
State for a formal expression of views on the use of black troops in a
lengthy list of countries.[15-23] Such an expression was clearly
necessary, as Air Force spokesmen pointed out. Informed of the
consultations, Assistant Secretary Zuckert asked that an interim
policy be formulated, so urgent had the problem become in the Air
Force where new racial policies and assignments were under way.[15-24]
[Footnote 15-23: Ltr, SecDef to Secy of State, 14 Sep
49, CD 30-1-4, SecDef files.]
[Footnote 15-24: Memo, Asst SecAF for Chmn, PPB, 16
Sep 49, sub: Assignment of Negroes to Overseas
Areas; Memo, Dir of Staff, PPB, for Asst SecAF, 28
Sep 49, same sub; Memo, Asst SecAF for Chmn, PPB,
12 Oct 49, same sub. All in SecAF files.]
For his part the Secretary of State had no objection to stationing
Negroes in any of the listed countries. In fact, Under Secretary James
E. Webb assured Johnson, the State Department welcomed the new Defense
Department policy of equal treatment and opportunity as a step toward
the achievement of the nation's foreign policy objectives. At the same
time Webb admitted that there were certain countries--he listed
specifically Iceland, Greenland, Canada, Newfoundland, Bermuda, and
British possessions in the Caribbean--where local attitudes might
affect the morale of black troops and their relations with the
inhabitants. The State Department, therefore, preferred advance
warning when the services planned to assign Negroes to these countries
so that it might consult the host governments and reduce "possible
complications" to a minimum.[15-25]
[Footnote 15-25: Ltr, James E. Webb to Louis Johnson,
17 Oct 49; Memo, SecDef for SA et al., 27 Oct 49;
both in CD 30-1-4, SecDef files.]
This policy definition did not end the matter. In the first place the
State Department decided not to restrict its list of excepted areas to
the six mentioned. While it had no objection to the assignment of
individual Negroes or nonsegregated units to Panama, the department
informally advised the Army in December 1949, it did interpose grave
objections to the assignment of black units.[15-26] Accordingly, only
individual Negroes were assigned to temporary units in the Panama
Command.[15-27]
[Footnote 15-26: DF, D/PA to D/OT, 1 Mar 50, sub:
Utilization of Negro Manpower; Ltr, D/PA for Maj
Gen Ray E. Porter, CG, USACARIB, 9 Feb 50; both in
CSGPA 291.2.]
[Footnote 15-27: G-1 Summary Sheet, 12 Apr 50, sub:
Utilization of Negro Manpower, CSGPA 291.2.]
Yet for several reasons, the services were uneasy about the situation.
The Director of Marine Corps Personnel, for example, feared that since
in the bulk reassignment of marines enlisted men were transferred by
rank and military occupational specialties only, a black marine might
be assigned to an excepted area by oversight. Yet the corps was
reluctant to change the system.[15-28] An Air Force objection was (p. 387)
more pointed. General Edwards worried that the restrictions were
becoming public knowledge and would probably cause adverse criticism
of the Air Force. He wanted the State Department to negotiate with the
countries concerned to lift the restrictions or at least to establish
a clear-cut, defensible policy. Secretary Symington discussed the
matter with Secretary of Defense Johnson, and Halaby, knowing Deputy
Under Secretary of State Dean Rusk's particular interest in having men
assigned without regard to race, agreed to take the matter up with
Rusk.[15-29] Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews reminded
Johnson that black servicemen already numbered among the thousands of
Navy men assigned to four of the six areas mentioned, and if the
system continued these men would periodically and routinely be
replaced with other black sailors. Should the Navy, he wanted to know,
withdraw these Negroes? Given the "possible unfavorable reaction" to
their withdrawal, the Navy wanted to keep Negroes in these areas in
approximately their present numbers.[15-30] Both the Fahy Committee
and the Personnel Policy Board made it clear that they too wanted
black servicemen retained wherever they were currently assigned.[15-31]
[Footnote 15-28: Memo, Dir of Personnel, USMC, for
Dir, Div of Plans and Policies, 22 Dec 49, Hist
Div, HQMC.]
[Footnote 15-29: Memo, Dep CS/Pers for SecAF, 28 Dec
49; Memo, Clarence H. Osthagen, Asst to SecAF, for
Asst SecAF, 6 Jan 50; Rcd of Telecon, Halaby with
Zuckert, 10 Jan 50. All in SecAF files.]
[Footnote 15-30: Memo, SecNav for SecDef, 3 Jan 50,
sub: Foreign Assignment of Negro Personnel, CD
30-1-4, SecDef files.]
[Footnote 15-31: Memo, NEH (Halaby) for Maj Gen J. H.
Burns, 10 Feb 50, attached to Ltr, Burns to Rusk,
13 Feb 50, CD 30-1-4, SecDef files.]
Maj. Gen. James H. Burns, Secretary Johnson's assistant for foreign
military affairs, put the matter to the State Department, and James
Evans followed up by discussing it with Rusk. Reassured by these
consultations, Secretary Johnson issued a more definitive policy
statement for the services on 5 April explaining that "the Department
of State endorses the policy of freely assigning Negro personnel or
Negro or non-segregated units to any part of the world to which US
forces are sent; it is prepared to support the desires of the
Department of Defense in this respect."[15-32] Nevertheless, since
certain governments had from time to time indicated an unwillingness
to accept black servicemen, Johnson directed the services to inform
him in advance when black troops were to be dispatched to countries
where no blacks were then stationed so that host countries might be
consulted. This new statement produced immediate reaction in the
services. Citing a change in policy, the Air Force issued directives
opening all overseas assignments except Iceland to Negroes. After an
extended discussion on the assignment of black troops to the Trieste
(TRUST) area, the Army followed suit.[15-33]
[Footnote 15-32: Memo, SecDef for SA et al., 5 Apr 50,
sub: Foreign Assignment of Negro Personnel; Ltr,
Dean Rusk to Maj Gen Burns, 1 Mar 50; Memo, Burns
for SecDef, 3 Apr 50. All in CD 30-1-4, SecDef
files.]
[Footnote 15-33: DF, ACS, G-1, for CSA, 3 Dec 52, sub:
Restricted Distribution of Negro Personnel; ibid.,
30 Mar 53, sub: Assignment of Negro Personnel to
TRUST; both in CS 291.2 Negroes. See also Memo,
ACS, G-1, for TAG, 24 Apr 53, sub: Assignment of
Negro Personnel, AG 291.2 (13 Apr 53); Memo, ASecAF
for SecDef, 28 Apr 50, sub: Foreign Assignment of
Negro Personnel, CD 30-1-4, SecDef files.]
Yet the problem refused to go away, largely because the services
continued to limit foreign assignment of black personnel, particularly
in attache offices, military assistance advisory groups, and military
missions. The Army's G-3, for example, concluded in 1949 that, (p. 388)
while the race of an individual was not a factor in determining
eligibility for a mission assignment, the attitude of certain
countries (he was referring to certain Latin American countries) made
it advisable to inform the host country of the race of the prospective
applicant. For a host country to reject a Negro was undesirable, he
concluded, but for a Negro to be assigned to a country that did not
welcome him would be embarrassing to both countries.[15-34] When the
chief of the military mission in Turkey asked the Army staff in 1951
to reconsider assigning black soldiers to Turkey because of the
attitude of the Turks, the Army canceled the assignment.[15-35]
[Footnote 15-34: G-3 Summary Sheet, 15 Nov 49, sub:
Assignment of Negro Personnel, G-3 291.2.]
[Footnote 15-35: Msg, Chief, JAMMAT, Ankara, Turkey,
to DA, personal for the G-1, 14 Apr 51; Ltr, Brig
Gen W. E. Dunkelberg to Maj Gen William H. Arnold,
Chief, JAMMAT, 24 Apr 51; idem to Brig Gen John B.
Murphy, G-1 Sec, EUCOM, 24 April 51. All in G-1
291.2.]
[Illustration: 25TH DIVISION TROOPS UNLOAD TRUCKS AND EQUIPMENT _at
Sasebo Railway Station, Japan, for transport to Korea, 1950_.]
Undoubtedly certain countries objected to the assignment of American
servicemen on grounds of race or religion, but there were also
indications that racial restrictions were not always made at the
behest of the host country.[15-36] In 1957 Congressman Adam Clayton
Powell protested that Negroes were not being assigned to the (p. 389)
offices of attaches, military assistance advisory groups, and military
missions.[15-37] In particular he was concerned with Ethiopia, whose
emperor had personally assured him that his government had no race
restrictions. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army admitted that
Negroes were barred from Ethiopia, and although documentary evidence
could not be produced, the ban was thought to have been imposed at the
request of the United Nations. The State Department claimed it was
unaware of any such ban, nor could it find documentation to support
the Army's contention. It objected neither to the assignment of
individual Negroes to attache and advisory offices in Ethiopia nor to
"most" other countries.[15-38] Having received these assurances, the
Department of Defense informed the services that "it was considered
appropriate" to assign black servicemen to the posts discussed by
Congressman Powell.[15-39] For some time, however, the notion
persisted in the Department of Defense that black troops should not be
assigned to Ethiopia.[15-40] In fact, restrictions and reports of
restrictions against the assignment of Americans to a number of
overseas posts on grounds of race or religion persisted into the
1970's.[15-41]
[Footnote 15-36: Jack Greenberg, _Race Relations and
American Law_ (New York: Columbia University Press,
1959), pp. 359-60.]
[Footnote 15-37: Memo, Dep ASA for ASD/ISA, 6 Feb 57,
sub: Racial Assignment Restrictions, OSA 291.2
Ethiopia.]
[Footnote 15-38: Ltr, Dep Asst Secy of State for
Personnel to Dep ASD (MP&R), 24 May 57, OASD (MP&R)
291.2.]
[Footnote 15-39: Memo, Dep ASD for ASA (MP&R) et al.,
24 Jun 57, ASD (MP&R) 291.2.]
[Footnote 15-40: Memo, James C. Evans for Paul Hopper,
ISA, 29 Oct 58; Memo for Rcd, Exec to Civilian
Asst, OSD, 21 Jan 60, sub: MAAG's and Missions,
copies of both in CMH.]
[Footnote 15-41: See AFM 35-11L, Appendix M, 14 Dec
60, sub: Assignment Restrictions; Memo, USMC IG for
Dir of Pers, MC, 31 Aug 62, sub: Problem Area at
Marine Barracks, Argentia, Hist Div, HQMC. See also
New York _Times_, December 5, 1959 and November 16,
17, and 18, 1971.]
_Congressional Concerns_
Congress was slow to see that changes were gradually transforming the
armed services. In its special preelection session, the Eightieth
Congress ignored the recently issued Truman order on racial equality
just as it ignored the President's admonition to enact a general civil
rights program. But when the new Eighty-first Congress met in January
1949 the subjects of armed forces integration, the Truman order, and
the Fahy Committee all began to receive attention. Debate on race in
the services occurred frequently in both houses. Each side appealed to
constitutional and legal principles to support its case, but the
discussions might well have remained a philosophical debate if the
draft law had not come up for renewal in 1950. The debate focused
mostly on an amendment proposed by Senator Richard B. Russell of
Georgia that would allow inductees and enlistees, upon their written
declaration of intent, to serve in a unit manned exclusively by
members of their own race. Russell had made this proposal once before,
but because it seemed of little consequence to the still largely
segregated services of 1948 it was ignored. Now in the wake of the
executive order and the Fahy Committee Report, the amendment came to
sudden prominence. And when Russell succeeded in discharging the draft
bill with his amendment from the Senate Armed Forces Committee with
the members' unanimous approval, civil rights supporters quickly (p. 390)
jumped to the attack. Even before the bill was formally introduced on
the floor, Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon told his colleagues that the
Russell amendment conflicted with the stated policy of the
administration as well as with sound Republican principles. He cited
the waste of manpower the amendment would bring about and reminded his
colleagues of the international criticism the armed forces had endured
in the past because of undemocratic social practices.[15-42]
[Footnote 15-42: _Congressional Record_, 81st Cong.,
2d sess., vol. 96, p. 8412.]
When debate began on the amendment, Senator Leverett Saltonstall of
Massachusetts was one of the first to rise in opposition. While
confessing sympathy for the states' rights philosophy that recognized
the different customs of various sections of the nation, he branded
the Russell amendment unnecessary, provocative, and unworkable, and
suggested Congress leave the services alone in this matter. To support
his views he read into the record portions of the Fahy Committee
Report, which represented, he emphasized, the judgment of impartial
civilians appointed by the President, another civilian.[15-43]
[Footnote 15-43: Ibid., pp. 8973, 9073.]
Discussion of the Russell amendment continued with opponents and
defenders raising the issues of military efficiency, legality, and
principles of equality and states' rights. In the end the amendment
was defeated 45 to 27 with 24 not voting, a close vote if one
considers that the abstentions could have changed the outcome.[15-44]
A similar amendment, this time introduced by Congressman Arthur
Winstead of Mississippi, was also defeated in 1951.
[Footnote 15-44: Ibid., p. 9074; see also Memo, Rear
Adm H. A. Houser, OSD Legis Liaison, for ASD
Rosenberg, 17 Mar 51, sub: Winstead
Anti-nonsegregation Amendment, SD 291.2.]
The Russell amendment was the high point of the congressional fight
against armed forces integration. During the next year the
integrationists took their turn, their barrage of questions and
demands aimed at obtaining from the Secretary of Defense additional
reforms in the services. On balance, these congressmen were no more
effective than the segregationists. Secretary Johnson had obviously
adopted a hands-off policy on integration.[15-45] Certainly he openly
discouraged further public and congressional investigations of the
department's racial practices. When the Committee Against Jim Crow
sought to investigate racial conditions in the Seventh Army in
December 1949, Johnson told A. Philip Randolph and Grant Reynolds that
he could not provide them with military transport, and he closed the
discussion by referring the civil rights leaders to the Army's new
special regulation on equal opportunity published in January
1950.[15-46]
[Footnote 15-45: See Ltrs, Rep. Kenneth B. Keating to
Johnson, 19 Dec 49; SecDef to Keating, 20 Jan 50;
idem to Hubert H. Humphrey, 24 Mar 50; Humphrey to
SecDef, 28 Feb 50; Rep. Jacob Javits to Johnson, 22
Dec 49; Draft Ltr, SecDef to Javits, 16 Jan 50 (not
sent); Memos, Leva for Johnson, 12 and 17 Jan 50.
All in SD 291.2 Negroes.]
[Footnote 15-46: Ltrs, Johnson to Reynolds, 23 Dec 49;
Reynolds to Johnson, 13 Jan 50; Reynolds and
Randolph to Johnson, 15 Jan 50; Johnson to Reynolds
and Randolph, 6 Feb 50. The Committee Against Jim
Crow was particularly upset with Johnson's
assistants, Leva and Evans; see Ltrs, Reynolds to
Johnson, 19 Dec 49; Leva to Niles, 7 Feb 50;
Reynolds to Evans, 13 Jan 50. All in SD 291.2.]
[Illustration: ASSISTANT SECRETARY ROSENBERG _talks with men of the
140th Medium Tank Battalion during a Far East tour_.]
Johnson employed much the same technique when Congressman Jacob (p. 391)
K. Javits of New York, who with several other legislators had become
interested in the joint congressional-citizen commission proposed by
the Committee Against Jim Crow, introduced a resolution in the House
calling for a complete investigation into the racial practices and
policies of the services by a select House committee.[15-47] Johnson
tried to convince Chairman Adolph J. Sabath of the House Committee on
Rules that the new service policies promised equal treatment and
opportunity, again using the new Army regulation to demonstrate how
these policies were being implemented.[15-48] Once more he succeeded
in diverting the integrationists. The Javits resolution came to
naught, and although that congressman still harbored some reservations
on racial progress in the Army, he nevertheless reprinted an article
from _Our World_ magazine in the _Congressional Record_ in April 1950
that outlined "the very good progress" being made by the Secretary (p. 392)
of Defense in the racial field.[15-49] Javits would have no
reason to suspect, but the "very good progress" he spoke of had not
issued from the secretary's office. For all practical purposes,
Johnson's involvement in civil rights in the armed forces ended with
his battle with the Fahy Committee. Certainly in the months after the
committee was disbanded he did nothing to push for integration and
allowed the subject of civil rights to languish.
[Footnote 15-47: Ltr, Javits to Johnson, 22 Dec 49;
Press Release, Jacob K. Javits, 12 Jan 50; Ltr,
Javits to Johnson, 24 Jan 50. Other legislators
expressed interest in the joint commission idea;
see Ltrs, Saltonstall to Johnson, 11 Jan 50; Sen.
William Langer to Johnson, 29 Oct 49; Henry C.
Lodge to Johnson, 30 Nov 49. All in SD 291.2. See
also Ltr, Javits to author, with attachments, 28
Oct 71, CMH files.]
[Footnote 15-48: Ltr, SecDef to Chmn, Cmte on Rules,
21 Mar 50, SD 291.2 (21 Mar 50).]
[Footnote 15-49: _Congressional Record_, 81st Cong.,
2d sess., pp. A3267-68; Memo, Leva for Johnson, 9
May 50; Ltr, Johnson to Javits, 18 May 50; both in
SecDef files. See also Ltr, Javits to author, 28
Oct 71.]
Departmental interest in racial affairs quickened noticeably when
General Marshall, Johnson's successor, appointed the brilliant labor
relations and manpower expert Anna M. Rosenberg as the first Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Manpower and Personnel.[15-50] Rosenberg had
served on both the Manpower Consulting Committee of the Army and Navy
Munitions Board and the War Manpower Commission and toward the end of
the war in the European theater as a consultant to General Eisenhower,
who recommended her to Marshall for the new position.[15-51] She was
encouraged by the secretary to take independent control of the
department's manpower affairs, including racial matters.[15-52] That
she was well acquainted with integration leaders and sympathetic to
their objectives is attested by her correspondence with them. "Dear
Anna," Senator Hubert H. Humphrey wrote in March 1951, voicing
confidence in her attitude toward segregation, "I know I speak for
many in the Senate when I say that your presence with the Department
of Defense is most reassuring."[15-53]
[Footnote 15-50: Carl W. Borklund, _Men of the
Pentagon_ (New York: Praeger, 1966), pp. 121-24;
Ltr, Anna Rosenberg Hoffman to author, 23 Sep 71;
Interv, author with James C. Evans, 13 Sep 71; both
in CMH files.]
[Footnote 15-51: Immediately before her appointment as
the manpower assistant, Rosenberg was a public
member of the Committee on Mobilization Policy of
the National Security Resources Board and a special
consultant on manpower problems to the chairman of
the board, Stuart Symington.]
[Footnote 15-52: Interv, author with Davenport, 17 Oct
71.]
[Footnote 15-53: Ltr, Humphrey to Rosenberg, 7 Mar 51,
SD 291.2.]
Still, to bring about effective integration of the services would take
more than a positive attitude, and Rosenberg faced a delicate
situation. She had to reassure integrationists that the new racial
policy would be enforced by urging the sometimes reluctant services to
take further steps toward eliminating discrimination. At the same time
she had to promote integration and avoid provoking the segregationists
in Congress to retaliate by blocking other defense legislation. The
bill for universal military training was especially important to the
department and to push for its passage was her primary assignment. It
is not surprising, therefore, that she accomplished little in the way
of specific racial reform during the first year of the Korean War.
Secretary Rosenberg took it upon herself to meet with legislators
interested in civil rights to outline the department's current
progress and future plans for guaranteeing equal treatment for black
servicemen. She also arranged for her assistants and Brig. Gen. B. M.
McFayden, the Army's Deputy G-1, to brief officials of the various
civil rights organizations on the same subject.[15-54] She had
congressional complaints and proposals speedily investigated, and (p. 393)
demanded from the services periodic progress reports which she issued
to legislators who backed civil rights.[15-55]
[Footnote 15-54: See Memo for Rcd, Maj M. O. Becker,
G-1, 13 Mar 51, G-1 291.2; Ltrs, Granger to Leva,
25 Jan 51, Leva to Granger, 13 Feb 51, Clarence
Mitchell, NAACP, to Rosenberg, 26 Mar 51, last
three in SD 291.2. Legislators attending these
briefings included Senators Lehman, William Benton
of Connecticut, Humphrey, John Pastore of Rhode
Island, and Kilgore.]
[Footnote 15-55: See Ltrs, Humphrey to Rosenberg, 10
Mar 51; Rosenberg to Humphrey, 26 Mar 51; Javits to
SecDef, 10 Mar 51; Marshall to Javits, 30 Mar 51;
Memo, Leva for Rosenberg, 23 Mar 51; Ltrs,
Rosenberg to Douglas, Humphrey, Benton, Kilgore,
Lehman, and Javits, 26 Jun 51; Memo, Rosenberg for
SA, 16 May 51, sub: Private Lionel E. Bolin. All in
SD 291.2. See also DF, ACS, G-1, to CSA, 6 Apr 51,
sub: Summary of Advances in Utilization of Negro
Manpower, CS 291.2 Negroes.]
Rosenberg and her departmental colleagues were less forthcoming in
some other areas of civil rights. Reflecting a desire to placate
segregationist forces in Congress, they did little, for example, to
promote federal protection of servicemen in cases of racial violence
outside the military reservation. The NAACP had been urging the
passage of such legislation for many years, and in March 1951 Clarence
Mitchell called Rosenberg's attention to the mistreatment of black
servicemen and their families suffered at the hands of policemen and
civilians in communities surrounding some military bases.[15-56] At
times, Walter White charged, these humiliations and abuses by
civilians were condoned by military police. He warned that such
treatment "can only succeed in adversely affecting the morale of Negro
troops ... and hamper efforts to secure fullhearted support of the
American Negro for the Government's military and foreign policy
program."[15-57]
[Footnote 15-56: Ltr, Mitchell to Rosenberg, 26 Mar
51, SD 291.2.]
[Footnote 15-57: Telgs, White to Marshall and SA, 9
Jan 51, copy in SD 291.2.]
The civil rights leaders had at least some congressional support for
their demand. Congressman Abraham J. Multer of New York called on the
Armed Services Committee to include in the 1950 extension of the
Selective Service Act an amendment making attacks on uniformed men and
women and discrimination against them by public officials and in
public places of recreation and interstate travel federal
offenses.[15-58] Focusing on a different aspect of the problem,
Senator Humphrey introduced an amendment to the Senate version of the
bill to protect servicemen detained by public authority against civil
violence or punishment by extra legal forces. Both amendments were
tabled before final vote on the bill.[15-59]
[Footnote 15-58: _Congressional Record_, 81st Cong.,
2d sess., vol. 96, p. A888.]
[Footnote 15-59: Ibid., p. 904. For the Army's
opposition to these proposals, see Memo ACofS, G-1,
for CofS, 12 Apr 50, sub: Department of the Army
Policies re Segregation and Utilization of Negro
Manpower, G-1 291.2 (5 Apr 50).]
The matter came up again in the next Congress when Senator Herbert H.
Lehman of New York offered a similar amendment to the universal
military training bill.[15-60] Commenting for his department,
Secretary Marshall admitted that defense officials had been supporting
such legislation since 1943 when Stimson asked for help in protecting
servicemen in the civilian community. But Marshall was against linking
the measure to the training bill, which, he explained to Congressman
Franck R. Havenner of California, was of such fundamental importance
that its passage should not be endangered by consideration of
extraneous issues. He wanted the problem of federal protection
considered as a separate piece of legislation.[15-61]
[Footnote 15-60: Memo for Rcd, Maj M. O. Becker, G-1,
13 Mar 51, G-1 291.2.]
[Footnote 15-61: Ltr, SecDef to Havenner, 27 Mar 51,
SecDef files.]
But evidently not just yet, for when the NAACP's Mitchell, (p. 394)
referring to Marshall's letter to Congressman Havenner, asked
Rosenberg to press for separate legislation, he was told that since
final congressional action was still pending on the universal military
training and reserve programs it was not an auspicious moment for
action on a federal protection bill.[15-62] The department's
reluctance to act in the matter obviously involved more than concern
with the fate of universal military training. Summing up department
policy on 1 June, the day after the training bill passed the House,
Rosenberg explained that the Department of Defense would not itself
propose any legislation to extend to servicemen the protection
afforded "civilian employees" of the federal government but would
support such a proposal if it came from "any other source."[15-63]
This limitation was further defined by Rosenberg's colleagues in the
Defense Department. On 19 June the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Legal and Legislative Affairs, Daniel K. Edwards, rejected Mitchell's
request for help in preparing the language of a bill to protect black
servicemen. Mitchell had explained that discussions with congressional
leaders convinced the NAACP that chances for such legislation were
favorable, but the Defense Department's Assistant General Counsel
declared the department did not ordinarily act "as a drafting service
for outside agencies."[15-64] In fact, effective legislation to
protect servicemen off military bases was more than a decade away.
[Footnote 15-62: Ltr, Mitchell to Rosenberg, 16 Apr
51; Ltr, Rosenberg to Mitchell, 9 May 51; both in
SD 291.2.]
[Footnote 15-63: Memo, ASD (MP&R) for ASD (Legal and
Legis Affairs), 14 Jun 51, SD 291.1; PL 51, 82d
Congress.]
[Footnote 15-64: Ltr, Mitchell, Dir, Washington Br,
NAACP, to Dir of Industrial Relations, DOD, 25 May
51; Ltr, ASD (Legal and Legis Affairs) to Mitchell,
19 Jun 51; Memo, Asst Gen Counsel, OSD, for ASD
(Legal and Legis Affairs), 19 Jun 51. All in SD
291.2.]
Despite her concern over possible congressional opposition, Rosenberg
achieved one important reform during her first year in office. For
years the Army's demand for a parity of enlistment standards had been
opposed by the Navy and the Air Force and had once been rejected by
Secretary Forrestal. Now Rosenberg was able to convince Marshall and
the armed services committees that in times of manpower shortages the
services suffered a serious imbalance when each failed to get its fair
share of recruits from the various so-called mental categories.[15-65]
Her assistant, Ralph P. Sollat, prepared a program for her
incorporating Roy K. Davenport's specific suggestions. The program
would allow volunteer enlistments to continue but would require all
the services to give a uniform entrance test to both volunteers and
draftees. (Actually, rather than develop a completely new entrance
test, the other services eventually adopted the Army's, which was
renamed the Armed Forces Qualification Test.) Sollat also devised an
arrangement whereby each service had to recruit men in each of the
four mental categories in accordance with an established quota.
Manpower experts agreed that this program offered the best chance to
distribute manpower equally among the services. Approved by Secretary
Marshall on 10 April 1951 under the title Qualitative Distribution of
Military Manpower Program, it quickly changed the intellectual
composition of the services by obliging the Navy and Air Force to
share responsibility with the Army for the training and employment (p. 395)
of less gifted inductees. For the remainder of the Korean War, for
example, each of the services, not just the Army, had to take 24
percent of its new recruits from category IV, the low-scoring group.
This figure was later reduced to 18 percent and finally in 1958 to 12
percent.[15-66]
[Footnote 15-65: Ltr, Anna Rosenberg Hoffman to
author, 23 Sep 71.]
[Footnote 15-66: BuPers Study, Pers A 1224 (probably
Jan 59), GenRecsNav.]
The Navy and the Air Force had always insisted their high minimum
entrance requirements were designed to maintain the good quality of
their recruits and had nothing to do with race. Roy Davenport believed
otherwise and read into their standards an intent to exclude all but a
few Negroes. Rosenberg saw in the new qualitative distribution program
not only the chance to upgrade the Army but also a way of "making sure
that the other Services had their proper share of Negroes."[15-67]
Because so many Negroes scored below average in achievement tests and
therefore made up a large percentage of the men in category IV, the
new program served Rosenberg's double purpose. Even after discounting
the influence of other factors, statistics suggest that the imposition
of the qualitative distribution program operated just as Rosenberg and
the Fahy Committee before her had predicted. (_Table 3_)
[Footnote 15-67: Interv, author with Davenport, 17 Oct
71; and Ltr, Anna Rosenberg Hoffman to author, 23
Sep 71.]
Table 3--Percentage of Black Enlisted Men and Women
Service 1 July 1949 1 July 1954 1 July 1956
Army 12.4 13.7 12.8
Navy 4.7 3.6 6.3
Air Force 5.1 8.6 10.4
Marine Corps 2.1 6.5 6.5
_Source_: Memo for Rcd, ASD/M, 12 Sep 56, sub: Integration
Percentages, ASD(M) 291.2.
The program had yet another consequence: it destroyed the Army's best
argument for the reimposition of the racial quota. Upset over the
steadily rising number of black enlistments in the early months of the
Korean War, the Army's G-1 had pressed Secretary Pace in October 1950,
and again five months later with G-3 concurrence, to reinstate a
ceiling on black enlistments. Assistant Secretary Earl D. Johnson
returned the request "without action," noting that the new qualitative
distribution program would produce a "more equitable" solution.[15-68]
The President's agreement with Secretary Gray about reimposing a quota
notwithstanding, it was highly unlikely that the Army could have done
so without returning to the White House for permission, and when in
May 1951 the Army staff renewed its demand, Pace considered asking the
White House for a quota on Negroes in category IV. After consulting
with Rosenberg on the long-term effects of qualitative distribution of
manpower, however, Pace agreed to drop the matter.[15-69]
[Footnote 15-68: G-1 Summary Sheet with incl, 13 Mar
51, sub: Negro Strength in the Army; Memo, ASA for
CofS, 13 Apr 51, same sub; both in CS 291.2 Negroes
(13 Mar 51).]
[Footnote 15-69: Memo, Actg CofS for SA, 31 May 51,
sub: Present Overstrength in Segregated Units; G-1
Summary Sheet for CofS, 26 May 51, same sub; Draft
Memo, Frank Pace, Jr., for President; Memo, ASA for
SA, 1 Jul 51. All in G-1 291.2 (26 May 51).]
Executive Order 9981 passed its third anniversary in July 1951 (p. 396)
with little having happened in the Office of the Secretary of Defense
to lift the hearts of the champions of integration. The race issues
with which the Secretary of Defense concerned himself in these
years--the definition of race, the status of black servicemen
overseas, even the parity of enlistment standards--while no doubt
important in the long run to the status of the Negro in the armed
forces, had little to do with the immediate problem of segregation.
Secretary Johnson had done nothing to enforce the executive order in
the Army and his successor achieved little more. Willing to let the
services set the pace of reform, neither secretary substantially
changed the armed forces' racial practices. The integration process
that began in those years was initiated, appropriately enough perhaps,
by the services themselves.