North Carolina.—Difficulties of its Invasion.—Character of the People
and Country.—Sumter, his Character and Story.—Rocky Mount.—Hanging
Rock.—Slow Advance of De Kalb.—Gates takes Command.—Desolate
March.—Battle of Camden.—Flight of Gates.—Sumter surprised by
Tarleton at the Waxhaws.—Washington’s Opinion of Militia.—His Letter
to Gates.
Lord Cornwallis, when left in military command at the South by Sir Henry
Clinton, was charged, it will be recollected, with the invasion of North
Carolina. It was an enterprise in which much difficulty was to be
apprehended, both from the character of the people and the country. The
original settlers were from various parts, most of them men who had
experienced political or religious oppression, and had brought with them
a quick sensibility to wrong, a stern appreciation of their rights, and
an indomitable spirit of freedom and independence. In the heart of the
State was a hardy Presbyterian stock, the Scotch Irish, as they were
called, having emigrated from Scotland to Ireland, and thence to
America; and who were said to possess the impulsiveness of the Irishman,
with the dogged resolution of the Covenanter.
The early history of the colony abounds with instances of this spirit
among its people. “They always behaved insolently to their governors,”
complains Governor Barrington in 1731; “some they have driven out of the
country—at other times they set up a government of their own choice,
supported by men under arms.” It was in fact the spirit of popular
liberty and self-government which stirred within them, and gave birth to
the glorious axiom: “the rights of the many against the exactions of the
few.” So ripe was this spirit at an early day, that when the boundary
line was run, in 1727, between North Carolina and Virginia, the
borderers were eager to be included within the former province, “as
there they payed no tribute to God or Cæsar.”
It was this spirit which gave rise to the confederacy, called the
Regulation, formed to withstand the abuses of power; and the first blood
shed in our country, in resistance to arbitrary taxation, was at Almance
in this province, in a conflict between the regulators and Governor
Tryon. Above all, it should never be forgotten, that at Mecklenburg, in
the heart of North Carolina, was fulminated the first declaration of
independence of the British crown, upwards of a year before a like
declaration by Congress.
A population so characterized presented formidable difficulties to the
invader. The physical difficulties arising from the nature of the
country consisted in its mountain fastnesses in the northwestern part,
its vast forests, its sterile tracts, its long rivers, destitute of
bridges, and which, though fordable in fair weather, were liable to be
swollen by sudden storms and freshets, and rendered deep turbulent, and
impassable. These rivers, in fact, which rushed down from the mountain,
but wound sluggishly through the plains, were the military strength of
the country, as we shall have frequent occasion to show in the course of
our narrative.
Lord Cornwallis forbore to attempt the invasion of North Carolina until
the summer heats should be over and the harvests gathered in. In the
mean time he disposed of his troops in cantonments, to cover the
frontiers of South Carolina and Georgia, and maintain their internal
quiet. The command of the frontiers was given by him to Lord Rawdon, who
made Camden his principal post. This town, the capital of Kershaw
District, a fertile, fruitful country, was situated on the east bank of
the Wateree River, on the road leading to North Carolina. It was to be
the grand military depot for the projected campaign.
Having made these dispositions, Lord Cornwallis set up his head-quarters
at Charleston, where he occupied himself in regulating the civil and
commercial affairs of the province, in organizing the militia of the
lower districts, and in forwarding provisions and munitions of war to
Camden.
The proclamation of Sir Henry Clinton, putting an end to all neutrality,
and the rigorous penalties and persecutions with which all infractions
of its terms were punished, had for a time quelled the spirit of the
country. By degrees, however, the dread of British power gave way to
impatience of British exactions. Symptoms of revolt manifested
themselves in various parts. They were encouraged by intelligence that
De Kalb, sent by Washington, was advancing through North Carolina at the
head of two thousand men, and that the militia of that State and of
Virginia were joining his standard. This was soon followed by tidings
that Gates, the conqueror of Burgoyne, was on his way to take command of
the Southern forces.
The prospect of such aid from the North reanimated the Southern
patriots. One of the most eminent of these was Thomas Sumter, whom the
Carolinians had surnamed the Game Cock. He was between forty and fifty
years of age, brave, hardy, vigorous, resolute. He had served against
the Indians in his boyhood, during the old French war, and had been
present at the defeat of Braddock. In the present war he had held the
rank of lieutenant-colonel of riflemen in the continental line. After
the fall of Charleston, when patriots took refuge in contiguous States,
or in the natural fastnesses of the country, he had retired with his
family into one of the latter.
The lower part of South Carolina for upwards of a hundred miles back
from the sea is a level country, abounding with swamps, locked up in the
windings of the rivers which flow down from the Appalachian Mountains.
Some of these swamps are mere canebrakes, of little use until subdued by
cultivation, when they yield abundant crops of rice. Others are covered
with forests of cypress, cedar, and laurel, green all the year and
odoriferous, but tangled with vines and almost impenetrable. In their
bosoms, however, are fine savannahs; natural lawns, open to cultivation,
and yielding abundant pasturage. It requires local knowledge, however,
to penetrate these wildernesses, and hence they form strongholds to the
people of the country. In one of these natural fastnesses, on the
borders of the Santee, Sumter had taken up his residence, and hence he
would sally forth in various directions. During a temporary absence his
retreat had been invaded, his house burnt to the ground, his wife and
children driven forth without shelter. Private injury had thus been
added to the incentives of patriotism. Emerging from his hiding-place,
he had thrown himself among a handful of his fellow sufferers who had
taken refuge in North Carolina. They chose him at once as a leader, and
resolved on a desperate struggle for the deliverance of their native
State. Destitute of regular weapons, they forged rude substitutes out of
the implements of husbandry. Old mill-saws were converted into
broad-swords; knives at the ends of poles served for lances; while the
country housewives gladly gave up their pewter dishes and other
utensils, to be melted down and cast into bullets for such as had
firearms.
When Sumter led this gallant band of exiles over the border, they did
not amount in number to two hundred; yet, with these, he attacked and
routed a well-armed body of British troops and tories, the terror of the
frontier. His followers supplied themselves with weapons from the slain.
In a little while his band was augmented by recruits. Parties of
militia, also, recently embodied under the compelling measures of
Cornwallis, deserted to the patriot standard. Thus reinforced to the
amount of six hundred men, he made, on the 30th of July, a spirited
attack on the British post at Rocky Mount, near the Catawba, but was
repulsed. A more successful attack was made by him, eight days
afterwards, on another post at Hanging Rock. The Prince of Wales
regiment which defended it was nearly annihilated, and a large body of
North Carolina loyalists, under Colonel Brian, was routed and dispersed.
The gallant exploits of Sumter were emulated in other parts of the
country, and the partisan war thus commenced was carried on with an
audacity that soon obliged the enemy to call in their outposts, and
collect their troops in large masses.
The advance of De Kalb with reinforcements from the North, had been
retarded by various difficulties, the most important of which was want
of provisions. This had been especially the case, he said, since his
arrival in North Carolina. The legislative or executive power, he
complained, gave him no assistance, nor could he obtain supplies from
the people but by military force There was no flour in the camp, nor
were dispositions made to furnish any. His troops were reduced for a
time to short allowance, and at length, on the 6th of July, brought to a
positive halt at Deep River.[24] The North Carolina militia, under
General Caswell, were already in the field, on the road to Camden,
beyond the Pedee River. He was anxious to form a junction with them, and
with some Virginia troops, under Colonel Porterfield, reliques of the
defenders of Charleston: but a wide and sterile region lay between him
and them, difficult to be traversed, unless magazines were established
in advance, or he were supplied with provisions to take with him. Thus
circumstanced, he wrote to Congress and to the State Legislature,
representing his situation, and entreating relief. For three weeks he
remained in this encampment, foraging an exhausted country for a meagre
subsistence, and was thinking of deviating to the right, and seeking the
fertile counties of Mecklenburg and Rowan, when, on the 25th of July,
General Gates arrived at the camp.
The baron greeted him with a continental salute from his little park of
artillery, and received him with the ceremony and deference due to a
superior officer who was to take the command. There was a contest of
politeness between the two generals. Gates approved of De Kalb’s
standing orders, but at the first review of the troops, to the great
astonishment of the baron, gave orders for them to hold themselves in
readiness to march at a _moment’s warning_. It was evident he meant to
signalize himself by celerity of movement in contrast with protracted
delays.
It was in vain the destitute situation of the troops was represented to
him, and that they had not a day’s provision in advance. His reply was,
that wagons laden with supplies were coming on, and would overtake them
in two days.
On the 27th, he actually put the army in motion over the Buffalo Ford,
on the direct road to Camden. Colonel Williams, the adjutant-general of
De Kalb, warned him of the sterile nature of that route, and recommended
a more circuitous one further north, which the baron had intended to
take, and which passed through the abundant county of Mecklenburg. Gates
persisted in taking the direct route, observing that he should the
sooner form a junction with Caswell and the North Carolina militia; and
as to the sterility of the country, his supplies would soon overtake
him.
The route proved all that had been represented. It led through a region
of pine barrens, sand hills, and swamps, with few human habitations, and
those mostly deserted. The supplies of which he had spoken never
overtook him. His army had to subsist itself on lean cattle, roaming
almost wild in the woods; and to supply the want of bread with green
Indian corn, unripe apples, and peaches. The consequence was, a
distressing prevalence of dysentery.
Having crossed the Pedee River on the 3d of August, the army was joined
by a handful of brave Virginia regulars, under Lieutenant-colonel
Porterfield, who had been wandering about the country since the disaster
of Charleston; and, on the 7th, the much desired junction took place
with the North Carolina militia. On the 13th they encamped at Rugeley’s
Mills, otherwise called Clermont, about twelve miles from Camden, and,
on the following day were reinforced by a brigade of seven hundred
Virginia militia, under General Stevens.
On the approach of Gates, Lord Rawdon had concentrated his forces at
Camden. The post was flanked by the Wateree River and Pine-tree Creek,
and strengthened with redoubts. Lord Cornwallis had hastened hither from
Charleston on learning that affairs in this quarter were drawing to a
crisis, and had arrived here on the 13th. The British effective force
thus collected was something more than two thousand, including officers.
About five hundred were militia and tory refugees from North Carolina.
The forces under Gates, according to the return of his adjutant-general,
were three thousand and fifty-two fit for duty; more than two thirds of
them, however, were militia.
On the 14th, he received an express from General Sumter, who, with his
partisan corps, after harassing the enemy at various points, was now
endeavoring to cut off their supplies from Charleston. The object of the
express was to ask a reinforcement of regulars to aid him in capturing a
large convoy of clothing, ammunition, and stores, on its way to the
garrison, and which would pass Wateree Ferry, about a mile from Camden.
Gates accordingly detached Colonel Woolford of the Maryland line, with
one hundred regulars, a party of artillery, and two brass field-pieces.
On the same evening he moved with his main force to take post at a deep
stream about seven miles from Camden, intending to attack Lord Rawdon or
his redoubts should he march out in force to repel Sumter.
It seems hardly credible that Gates should have been so remiss in
collecting information concerning the movements of his enemy as to be
utterly unaware that Lord Cornwallis had arrived at Camden. Such,
however, we are assured by his adjutant-general, was the fact.[25]
By a singular coincidence, Lord Cornwallis on the very same evening
sallied forth from Camden to attack the American camp at Clermont.
About two o’clock at night, the two forces blundered, as it were, on
each other about half way. A skirmish took place between their advance
guards, in which Porterfield of the Virginia regulars was mortally
wounded. Some prisoners were taken on either side. From these the
respective commanders learnt the nature of the forces each had stumbled
upon. Both halted, formed their troops for action, but deferred further
hostilities until daylight.
Gates was astounded at being told that the enemy at hand was Cornwallis
with three thousand men. Calling a council of war, he demanded what was
best to be done. For a moment or two there was blank silence. It was
broken by General Stevens of the Virginia militia, with the question,
“Gentlemen, is it not too late now to do anything but fight?” No other
advice was asked or offered, and all were required to repair to their
respective commands,[26] though General de Kalb, we are told, was of
opinion that they should regain their position at Clermont, and there
await an attack.
In forming the line, the first Maryland division, including the
Delawares, was on the right, commanded by De Kalb. The Virginia militia
under Stevens, were on the left. Caswell with the North Carolinians
formed the centre. The artillery was in battery on the road. Each flank
was covered by a marsh. The second Maryland brigade formed a reserve, a
few hundred yards in rear of the first.
At daybreak (August 16th), the enemy were dimly descried advancing in
column; they appeared to be displaying to the right. The deputy
adjutant-general ordered the artillery to open a fire upon them, and
then rode to General Gates, who was in the rear of the line, to inform
him of the cause of the firing. Gates ordered that Stevens should
advance briskly with his brigade of Virginia militia and attack them
while in the act of displaying. No sooner did Stevens receive the order
than he put his brigade in motion, but discovered that the right wing of
the enemy was already in line. A few sharp-shooters were detached to run
forward, post themselves behind trees within forty or fifty yards of the
enemy to extort their fire while at a distance, and render it less
terrible to the militia. The expedient failed. The British rushed on
shouting and firing. Stevens called to his men to stand firm, and put
them in mind of their bayonets. His words were unheeded. The
inexperienced militia, dismayed and confounded by this impetuous
assault, threw down their loaded muskets and fled. The panic spread to
the North Carolina militia. Part of them made a temporary stand, but
soon joined with the rest in flight, rendered headlong and disastrous by
the charge and pursuit of Tarleton and his cavalry.
Gates, seconded by his officers, made several attempts to rally the
militia, but was borne along with them. The day was hazy; there was no
wind to carry off the smoke, which hung over the field of battle like a
thick cloud. Nothing could be seen distinctly. Supposing that the
regular troops were dispersed like the militia, Gates gave all up for
lost, and retreated from the field.
The regulars, however, had not given way. The Maryland brigades and the
Delaware regiment, unconscious that they were deserted by the militia,
stood their ground, and bore the brunt of the battle. Though repeatedly
broken, they as often rallied, and braved even the deadly push of the
bayonet. At length a charge of Tarleton’s cavalry on their flank threw
them into confusion, and drove them into the woods and swamps. None
showed more gallantry on this disastrous day than the Baron de Kalb; he
fought on foot with the second Maryland brigade, and fell exhausted
after receiving eleven wounds. His aide-de-camp, De Buysson, supported
him in his arms and was repeatedly wounded in protecting him. He
announced the rank and nation of his general, and both were taken
prisoners. De Kalb died in the course of a few days, dictating in his
last moments a letter expressing his affection for the officers and men
of his division who had so nobly stood by him in this deadly strife.
If the militia fled too soon in this battle, said the adjutant-general,
the regulars remained too long; fighting when there was no hope of
victory.[27]
General Gates in retreating, had hoped to rally a sufficient force at
Clermont to cover the retreat of the regulars, but the further they
fled, the more the militia were dispersed, until the generals were
abandoned by all but their aides. To add to the mortification of Gates,
he learned in the course of his retreat that Sumter had been completely
successful, and having reduced the enemy’s redoubt on the Wateree, and
captured one hundred prisoners and forty loaded wagons, was marching off
with his booty on the opposite side of the river; apprehending danger
from the quarter in which he had heard firing in the morning. Gates had
no longer any means of coöperating with him; he sent orders to him,
therefore, to retire in the best manner he could; while he himself
proceeded with General Caswell towards the village of Charlotte, about
sixty miles distant.
Cornwallis was apprehensive that Sumter’s corps might form a rallying
point to the routed army. On the morning of the 17th of August,
therefore, he detached Tarleton in pursuit with a body of cavalry and
light infantry, about three hundred and fifty strong. Sumter was
retreating up the western side of the Wateree, much encumbered by his
spoils and prisoners. Tarleton pushed up by forced and concealed marches
on the eastern side. Horses and men suffered from the intense heat of
the weather. At dusk Tarleton descried the fires of the American camp
about a mile from the opposite shore. He gave orders to secure all boats
on the river, and to light no fire in the camp. In the morning his
sentries gave word that the Americans were quitting their encampment. It
was evident they knew nothing of a British force being in pursuit of
them. Tarleton now crossed the Wateree; the infantry with a
three-pounder passed in boats; the cavalry swam their horses where the
river was not fordable. The delay in crossing, and the diligence of
Sumter’s march, increased the distance between the pursuers and the
pursued. About noon a part of Tarleton’s force gave out through heat and
fatigue. Leaving them to repose on the bank of Fishing Creek, he pushed
on with about one hundred dragoons, the freshest and most able; still
marching with great circumspection. As he entered a valley, a discharge
of small-arms from a thicket tumbled a dragoon from his saddle. His
comrades galloped up to the place, and found two American videttes whom
they sabred before Tarleton could interpose. A sergeant and five
dragoons rode up to the summit of a neighboring hill to reconnoiter.
Crouching on their horses they made signs to Tarleton. He cautiously
approached the crest of the hill, and looking over beheld the American
camp on a neighboring height, and apparently in a most negligent
condition.
Sumter, in fact, having pressed his retreat to the neighborhood of the
Catawba Ford, and taken a strong position at the mouth of Fishing Creek,
and his patrols having scoured the road without discovering any signs of
an enemy, considered himself secure from surprise. The two shots fired
by his videttes had been heard, but were supposed to have been made by
militia shooting cattle. The troops having for the last four days been
almost without food or sleep, were now indulged in complete relaxation.
Their arms were stacked, and they were scattered about, some strolling,
some lying on the grass under the trees, some bathing in the river.
Sumter himself had thrown off part of his clothes on account of the heat
of the weather.
Having well reconnoitered this negligent camp, indulging in summer
supineness and sultry repose, Tarleton prepared for instant attack. His
cavalry and infantry formed into one line, dashed forward with a general
shout, and, before the Americans could recover from their surprise, got
between them and the parade ground on which the muskets were stacked.
All was confusion and consternation in the American camp. Some
opposition was made from behind baggage wagons, and there was
skirmishing in various quarters, but in a little while there was a
universal flight to the river and the woods. Between three and four
hundred were killed and wounded; all their arms and baggage, with two
brass field-pieces, fell into the hands of the enemy, who also
recaptured the prisoners and booty taken at Camden. Sumter with about
three hundred and fifty of his men effected a retreat; he galloped off,
it is said, without saddle, hat, or coat.
Gates, on reaching the village of Charlotte, had been joined by some
fugitives from his army. He continued on to Hillsborough, one hundred
and eighty miles from Camden, where he made a stand and endeavored to
rally his scattered forces. His regular troops, however, were little
more than one thousand. As to the militia of North and South Carolina,
they had dispersed to their respective homes, depending upon the
patriotism and charity of the farmers along the road for food and
shelter.
It was not until the beginning of September that Washington received
word of the disastrous reverse at Camden. The shock was the greater, as
previous reports from that quarter had represented the operations a few
days preceding the action as much in our favor. It was evident to
Washington that the course of war must ultimately tend to the Southern
States, yet the situation of affairs in the North did not permit him to
detach any sufficient force for their relief. All that he could do for
the present was to endeavor to hold the enemy in check in that quarter.
For this purpose, he gave orders that some regular troops enlisted in
Maryland for the war, and intended for the main army, should be sent to
the southward. He wrote to Governor Rutledge of South Carolina (12th
September), to raise a permanent, compact, well-organized body of
troops, instead of depending upon a numerous army of militia, always
“inconceivably expensive, and too fluctuating and undisciplined” to
oppose a regular force. He was still more urgent and explicit on this
head in his letters to the President of Congress (September 15th).
“Regular troops alone,” said he, “are equal to the exigencies of modern
war, as well for defense as offense; and whenever a substitute is
attempted, it must prove illusory and ruinous. No militia will ever
acquire the habits necessary to resist a regular force. The firmness
requisite for the real business of fighting is only to be attained by a
constant course of discipline and service. I have never yet been witness
to a single instance, that can justify a different opinion; and it is
most earnestly to be wished, that the liberties of America may no longer
be trusted, in any material degree, to so precarious a dependence.... In
my ideas of the true system of war at the southward, the object ought to
be to have a good army, rather than a large one. Every exertion should
be made by North Carolina, Virginia, Maryland, and Delaware, to raise a
permanent force of six thousand men, exclusive of horse and artillery.
These, with the occasional aid of the militia in the vicinity of the
scene of action, will not only suffice to prevent the further progress
of the enemy, but, if properly supplied, to oblige them to compact their
force and relinquish a part of what they now hold. To expel them from
the country entirely is what we cannot aim at, till we derive more
effectual support from abroad; and by attempting too much, instead of
going forward, we shall go backward. Could such a force be once set on
foot, it would immediately make an inconceivable change in the face of
affairs not only in the opposition to the enemy, but in expense,
consumption of provisions, and waste of arms and stores. No magazines
can be equal to the demands of an army of militia, and none need economy
more than ours.”
He had scarce written the foregoing, when he received a letter from the
now unfortunate Gates, dated at Hillsborough, August 30th and September
3d, giving particulars of his discomfiture. No longer vaunting and
vainglorious, he pleads nothing but his patriotism, and deprecates the
fall which he apprehends awaits him. The appeal which he makes to
Washington’s magnanimity to support him in this day of his reverse, is
the highest testimonial he could give to the exalted character of the
man whom he once affected to underrate and aspired to supplant.
“Anxious for the public good,” said he, “I shall continue my unwearied
endeavors to stop the progress of the enemy, reinstate our affairs,
recommence an offensive war, and recover all our losses in the Southern
States. But if being unfortunate is solely a reason sufficient for
removing me from command, I shall most cheerfully submit to the orders
of Congress, and resign an office which few generals would be anxious to
possess, and where the utmost skill and fortitude are subject to be
baffled by difficulties, which must for a time surround the chief in
command here. That your Excellency may meet with no such difficulties,
that your road to fame and fortune may be smooth and easy, is the
sincere wish of your most humble servant.”
Again: “If I can yet render good service to the United States, it will
be necessary it should be seen that I have the support of Congress, and
of your Excellency; otherwise, some men may think they please my
superiors by blaming me, and thus recommend themselves to favor. But
you, sir, will be too generous to lend an ear to such men, if such there
be, and will show your greatness of soul rather by protecting than
slighting the unfortunate.”
Washington in his reply, while he acknowledged the shock and surprise
caused by the first account of the unexpected event, did credit to the
behavior of the continental troops. “The accounts,” added he, “which the
enemy give of the action, show that their victory was dearly bought.
Under present circumstances, the system which you are pursuing seems to
be extremely proper. It would add no good purpose to take a position
near the enemy while you are so far inferior in force. If they can be
kept in check by the light irregular troops under colonel Sumter and
other active officers, they will gain nothing by the time which must be
necessarily spent by you in collecting and arranging the new army,
forming magazines, and replacing the stores which were lost in the
action.”
Washington still cherished the idea of a combined attack upon New York
as soon as a French naval force should arrive. The destruction of the
enemy here would relieve this part of the Union from an internal war,
and enable its troops and resources to be united with those of France in
vigorous efforts against the common enemy elsewhere. Hearing, therefore,
that the Count de Guichen, with his West India squadron, was approaching
the coast, Washington prepared to proceed to Hartford in Connecticut,
there to hold a conference with the Count de Rochambeau and the
Chevalier de Ternay, and concert a plan for future operations, of which
the attack on New York was to form the principal feature.
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