Washington applies to the State Legislatures for Aid.—Subscriptions of
the Ladies of Philadelphia.—Gates appointed to command the Southern
Department.—French Fleet arrives at Newport.—Preparation for a
Combined Movement against New York.—Arnold obtains Command at West
Point.—Greene resigns the Office of Quartermaster-general.
Apprehensive that the next move of the enemy would be up the Hudson,
Washington resumed his measures for the security of West Point; moving
towards the Highlands in the latter part of June. Circumstances soon
convinced him that the enemy had no present intention of attacking that
fortress, but merely menaced him at various points, to retard his
operations, and oblige him to call out the militia; thereby interrupting
agriculture, distressing the country, and rendering his cause unpopular.
Having, therefore, caused the military stores in the Jerseys to be
removed to more remote and secure places, he countermanded by letter the
militia, which were marching to camp from Connecticut and Massachusetts.
He now exerted himself to the utmost to procure from the different State
Legislatures their quotas and supplies for the regular army. “The
sparing system,” said he, “has been tried until it has brought us to a
crisis little less than desperate.” This was the time by one great
exertion to put an end to the war. The basis of everything was the
completion of the continental battalions to their full establishment;
otherwise, nothing decisive could be attempted, and this campaign, like
all the former, must be chiefly defensive. He warned against those
“indolent and narrow politicians, who, except at the moment of some
signal misfortune, are continually crying, _all is well_, and who to
save a little present expense, and avoid some temporary inconvenience,
with no ill designs in the main, would protract the war, and risk the
perdition of our liberties.”[21]
The desired relief, however, had to be effected through the
ramifications of general and State governments, and their committees.
The operations were tardy and unproductive. Liberal contributions were
made by individuals, a bank was established by the inhabitants of
Philadelphia to facilitate the supplies of the army, and an association
of ladies of that city raised by subscription between seven and eight
thousand dollars, which were put at the disposition of Washington, to be
laid out in such a manner as he might think “most honorable and
gratifying to the brave old soldiers who had borne so great a share of
the burden of the war.”
The capture of General Lincoln at Charleston had left the Southern
department without a commander-in-chief. As there were likely to be
important military operations in that quarter, Washington had intended
to recommend General Greene for the appointment. He was an officer on
whose abilities, discretion, and disinterested patriotism he had the
fullest reliance, and whom he had always found thoroughly disposed to
act in unison with him in his general plan of carrying on the war.
Congress, however, with unbecoming precipitancy, gave that important
command to General Gates (June 13th), without waiting to consult
Washington’s views or wishes.
Gates, at the time, was on his estate in Virginia, and accepted the
appointment with avidity, anticipating new triumphs. His old associate,
General Lee, gave him an ominous caution at parting. “Beware that your
Northern laurels do not change to Southern willows!”
On the 10th of July a French fleet, under the Chevalier de Ternay,
arrived at Newport, in Rhode Island. It was composed of seven ships of
the line, two frigates and two bombs, and convoyed transports on board
of which there were upwards of five thousand troops. This was the first
division of the forces promised by France, of which Lafayette had
spoken. The second division had been detained at Brest for want of
transports, but might soon be expected.
The Count de Rochambeau, lieutenant-general of the royal armies, was
commander-in-chief of this auxiliary force. He was a veteran, fifty-five
years of age, who had early distinguished himself, when colonel of the
regiment of Auvergne, and had gained laurels in various battles,
especially that of Kloster Camp, of which he decided the success. Since
then, he had risen from one post of honor to another, until intrusted
with his present important command.[22]
Another officer of rank and distinction in this force, was Major-general
the Marquis de Chastellux, a friend and relative of Lafayette, but much
his senior, being now forty-six years of age. He was not only a soldier,
but a man of letters, and one familiar with courts as well as camps.
Count Rochambeau’s first dispatch to Vergennes, the French Minister of
State (July 16th) gave a discouraging picture of affairs. “Upon my
arrival here,” writes he, “the country was in consternation, the paper
money had fallen to sixty for one, and even the government takes it up
at forty for one. Washington had for a long time only three thousand men
under his command. The arrival of the Marquis de Lafayette, and the
announcement of succors from France, afforded some encouragement; but
the tories, who were very numerous, gave out that it was only a
temporary assistance, like that of Count D’Estaing. In describing to you
our reception at this place, we shall show you the feeling of all the
inhabitants of the continent. This town is of considerable size, and
contains, like the rest, both whigs and tories. I landed with my staff,
without troops; nobody appeared in the streets; those at the windows
looked sad and depressed. I spoke to the principal persons of the place,
and told them, as I wrote to General Washington, that this was merely
the advanced guard of a greater force, and that the king was determined
to support them with his whole power. In twenty-four hours their spirits
rose, and last night all the streets, houses, and steeples were
illuminated, in the midst of fire-works, and the greatest rejoicings. I
am now here with a single company of grenadiers, until wood and straw
shall have been collected; my camp is marked out, and I hope to have the
troops landed to-morrow.”
Still, however, there appears to have been a lingering feeling of
disappointment in the public bosom. “The whigs are pleased,” writes De
Rochambeau, “but they say that the king ought to have sent twenty
thousand men, and twenty ships to drive the enemy from New York; that
the country was infallibly ruined; that it is impossible to find a
recruit to send to General Washington’s army, without giving him one
hundred hard dollars to engage for six months’ service, and they beseech
His Majesty to assist them with all his strength. The war will be an
expensive one; we pay even for our quarters, and for the land covered
with the camp.”[23]
The troops were landed to the east of the town; their encampment was on
a fine situation, and extended nearly across the island. Much was said
of their gallant and martial appearance. There was the noted regiment of
Auvergne, in command of which the Count de Rochambeau had first gained
his laurels, but which was now commanded by his son the viscount, thirty
years of age. A legion of six hundred men also was especially admired;
it was commanded by the Duke de Lauzun (Lauzun-Biron), who had gained
reputation in the preceding year by the capture of Senegal. A feeling of
adventure and romance, associated with the American struggle, had caused
many of the young nobility to seek this new field of achievement, who,
to use De Rochambeau’s words, “brought out with them the heroic and
chivalrous courage of the ancient French nobility.” To their credit be
it spoken also, they brought with them the ancient French politeness,
for it was remarkable how soon they accommodated themselves to
circumstances, made light of all the privations and inconveniences of a
new country, and conformed to the familiar simplicity of republican
manners. General Heath, who, by Washington’s orders, was there to offer
his services, was, by his own account, “charmed with the officers,” who,
on their part, he said, expressed the highest satisfaction with the
treatment they received.
The instructions of the French ministry to the Count de Rochambeau
placed him entirely under the command of General Washington. The French
troops were to be considered as auxiliaries, and as such were to take
the left of the American troops, and, in all cases of ceremony, to yield
them the preference. This considerate arrangement had been adopted at
the suggestion of the Marquis de Lafayette, and was intended to prevent
the recurrence of those questions of rank and etiquette which had
heretofore disturbed the combined service.
Washington, in general orders, congratulated the army on the arrival of
this timely and generous succor, which he hailed as a new tie between
France and America; anticipating that the only contention between the
two armies would be to excel each other in good offices, and in the
display of every military virtue. The American cockade had hitherto been
black, that of the French was white; he recommended to his officers a
cockade of black and white intermingled in compliment to their allies,
and as a symbol of friendship and union.
His joy at this important reinforcement was dashed by the mortifying
reflection, that he was still unprovided with the troops and military
means requisite for the combined operations meditated. Still he took
upon himself the responsibility of immediate action, and forthwith
dispatched Lafayette to have an interview with the French commanders,
explain the circumstances of the case, and concert plans for the
proposed attack upon New York.
“Pressed on all sides by a choice of difficulties,” writes he to the
President, “I have adopted that line of conduct which suited the dignity
and faith of Congress, the reputation of these States, and the honor of
our arms. Neither the season nor a regard to decency would permit delay.
The die is cast, and it remains with the States to fulfill either their
engagements, preserve their credit and support their independence, or to
involve us in disgrace and defeat.... I shall proceed on the supposition
that they will ultimately consult their own interest and honor, and not
suffer us to fail for want of means, which it is evidently in their
power to afford. What has been done, and is doing, by some of the
States, confirms the opinion, I have entertained of the sufficient
resources of the country. As to the disposition of the people to submit
to any arrangements for bringing them forth, I see no reasonable grounds
to doubt. If we fail for want of proper exertions, in any of the
governments, I trust the responsibility will fall where it ought, and
that I shall stand justified to Congress, to my country, and to the
world.”
The arrival, however, of the British Admiral Graves, at New York, on the
13th of July, with six ships of the line, gave the enemy such a
superiority of naval force, that the design on New York was postponed
until the second French division should make its appearance, or a
squadron under the Count de Guichen, which was expected from the West
Indies.
In the mean time Sir Henry Clinton, who had information of all the plans
and movements of the allies, determined to forestall the meditated
attack upon New York, by beating up the French quarters on Rhode Island.
This he was to do in person at the head of six thousand men, aided by
Admiral Arbuthnot with his fleet. Sir Henry accordingly proceeded with
his troops to Throg’s Neck on the sound, there to embark on board of
transports which Arbuthnot was to provide. No sooner did Washington
learn that so large a force had left New York, than he crossed the
Hudson to Peekskill, and prepared to move towards King’s Bridge, with
the main body of his troops, which had recently been reinforced. His
intention was, either to oblige Sir Henry to abandon his project against
Rhode Island, or to strike a blow at New York during his absence. As
Washington was on horseback, observing the crossing of the last division
of his troops, General Arnold approached, having just arrived in the
camp. Arnold had been maneuvering of late to get the command of West
Point, and, among other means, had induced Mr. Robert R. Livingston,
then a New York member of Congress, to suggest it in a letter to
Washington as a measure of great expediency. Arnold now accosted the
latter to know whether any place had been assigned to him. He was told,
that he was to command the left wing, and Washington added, that they
would have further conversation on the subject when he returned to
head-quarters. The silence and evident chagrin with which the reply was
received surprised Washington, and he was still more surprised when he
subsequently learned that Arnold was more desirous of a garrison post
than of a command in the field, although a post of honor had been
assigned him, and active service was anticipated. Arnold’s excuse was
that his wounded leg still unfitted him for action either on foot or
horseback; but that at West Point he might render himself useful.
The expedition of Sir Henry was delayed by the tardy arrival of
transports. In the mean time he heard of the sudden move of Washington,
and learned, moreover, that the position of the French at Newport had
been strengthened by the militia from the neighboring country. These
tidings disconcerted his plans. He left Admiral Arbuthnot to proceed
with his squadron to Newport, blockade the French fleet, and endeavor to
intercept the second division, supposed to be on its way, while he with
his troops hastened back to New York.
In consequence of their return Washington again withdrew his forces to
the west side of the Hudson; first establishing a post and throwing up
small works at Dobbs’ Ferry, about ten miles above King’s Bridge, to
secure a communication across the river for the transportation of troops
and ordnance, should the design upon New York be prosecuted.
Arnold now received the important command which he had so earnestly
coveted. It included the fortress at West Point and the posts from
Fishkill to Kings Ferry, together with the corps of infantry and cavalry
advanced towards the enemy’s line on the east side of the river. He was
ordered to have the works at the Point completed as expeditiously as
possible, and to keep all his posts on their guard against surprise;
there being constant apprehensions that the enemy might make a sudden
effort to gain possession of the river.
Having made these arrangements, Washington recrossed to the west side of
the Hudson, and took post at Orangetown or Tappan, on the borders of the
Jerseys, and opposite to Dobbs’ Ferry, to be at hand for any attempt
upon New York.
The execution of this cherished design, however was again postponed by
intelligence that the second division of the French reinforcements was
blockaded in the harbor of Brest by the British: Washington still had
hopes that it might be carried into effect by the aid of the squadron of
the Count de Guichen from the West Indies; or of a fleet from Cadiz.
At this critical juncture, an embarrassing derangement took place in the
quartermaster-general’s department, of which General Greene was the
head. The reorganization of this department had long been in agitation.
A system had been digested by Washington, Schuyler, and Greene, adapted,
as they thought, to the actual situation of the country. Greene had
offered, should it be adopted, to continue in the discharge of the
duties of the department, without any extra emolument other than would
cover the expenses of his family. Congress devised a different scheme.
He considered it incapable of execution, and likely to be attended with
calamitous and disgraceful results; he therefore tendered his
resignation. Washington endeavored to prevent its being accepted.
“Unless effectual measures are taken,” said he, “to induce General
Greene and the other principal officers of that department to continue
their services, there must of necessity be a total stagnation of
military business. We not only must cease from the preparations for the
campaign, but in all probability, shall be obliged to disperse, if not
disband the army, for want of subsistence.”
The tone and manner, however, assumed by General Greene in offering his
resignation, and the time chosen, when the campaign was opened, the
enemy in the field, and the French commanders waiting for coöperation,
were deeply offensive to Congress. His resignation was promptly
accepted: there was a talk even of suspending him from his command in
the line.
Washington interposed his sagacious and considerate counsels to allay
this irritation, and prevent the infliction of such an indignity upon an
officer for whom he entertained the highest esteem and friendship. “A
procedure of this kind, without a proper trial,” said he, “must touch
the feelings of every officer. It will show in a conspicuous point of
view the uncertain tenure by which they hold their commissions. In a
word, it will exhibit such a specimen of power, that I question much if
there is an officer in the whole line that will hold a commission beyond
the end of the campaign, if he does till then. Such an act in the most
despotic government would be attended at least with loud complaints.”
The counsels of Washington prevailed; the indignity was not inflicted,
and Congress was saved from the error, if not disgrace, of discarding
from her service one of the ablest and most meritorious of her generals.
Colonel Pickering was appointed to succeed Greene as
quartermaster-general, but the latter continued for some time, at the
request of Washington, to aid in conducting the business of the
department. Colonel Pickering acquitted himself in his new office with
zeal, talents, and integrity but there were radical defects in the
system which defied all ability and exertion.
The commissariat was equally in a state of derangement. “At this very
juncture,” writes Washington (August, 20th), “I am reduced to the
painful alternative, either of dismissing a part of the militia now
assembling, or of letting them come forward to starve; which it will be
extremely difficult for the troops already in the field to avoid....
Every day’s experience proves more and more that the present mode of
supplies is the most uncertain, expensive, and injurious that could be
devised. It is impossible for us to form any calculations of what we are
to expect, and, consequently, to concert any plans for future execution.
No adequate provision of forage having been made, we are now obliged to
subsist the horses of the army by force, which, among other evils, often
gives rise to civil disputes, and prosecutions, as vexatious as they are
burdensome to the public.” In his emergencies he was forced to empty the
magazines at West Point; yet these afforded but temporary relief;
scarcity continued to prevail to a distressing degree, and on the 6th of
September, he complains that the army has for two or three days been
entirely destitute of meat. “Such injury to the discipline of the army,”
adds he, “and such distress to the inhabitants, result from these
frequent events, that my feelings are hurt beyond description at the
cries of the one and at seeing the other.”
The anxiety of Washington at this moment of embarrassment was heightened
by the receipt of disastrous intelligence from the south; the purport of
which we shall succinctly relate in another chapter.
[Illustration]