South Carolina threatened.—Its Condition and Population.—Stormy
Voyage of Sir Henry Clinton.—Loss of Horses.—Character of
Lieutenant-colonel Tarleton.—Fleet arrives at Tybee.—Sir Henry
Clinton advances upon Charleston.—Lincoln prepares for
Defense.—Commodore Whipple.—Governor Rutledge.—Forebodings of
Washington.—Embarkation of British Troops at New York.—Washington
sends De Kalb with Reinforcements.—His Hopeful Letter to Steuben.
The return of spring brought little alleviation to the sufferings of the
army at Morristown. All means of supplying its wants or recruiting its
ranks were paralyzed by the continued depreciation of the currency.
While Washington saw his forces gradually diminishing, his solicitude
was intensely excited for the safety of the Southern States. The reader
will recall the departure from New York, in the latter part of December,
of the fleet of Admiral Arbuthnot with the army of Sir Henry Clinton,
destined for the subjugation of South Carolina. “The richness of the
country,” says Colonel Tarleton, in his history of the campaign, “its
vicinity to Georgia, and its distance from General Washington, pointed
out the advantage and facility of its conquest. While it would be an
unspeakable loss to the Americans, the possession of it would tend to
secure to the crown the southern part of the continent which stretches
beyond it.” It was presumed that the subjugation of it would be an easy
task. The population was scanty for the extent of the country, and was
made up of emigrants, or the descendants of emigrants, from various
lands and of various nations: Huguenots, who had emigrated from France
after the revocation of the edict of Nantz; Germans, from the
Palatinate; Irish Protestants, who had received grants of land from the
crown; Scotch Highlanders, transported hither after the disastrous
battle of Culloden; Dutch colonists, who had left New York, after its
submission to England, and been settled here on bounty lands.
Some of these foreign elements might be hostile to British domination,
but others would be favorable. There was a large class, too, that had
been born or had passed much of their lives in England, who retained for
it a filial affection, spoke of it as _home_, and sent their children to
be educated there.
The number of slaves within the province and of savages on its western
frontier, together with its wide extent of unprotected sea-coast, were
encouragements to an invasion by sea and land. Little combination of
militia and yeomanry need be apprehended from a population sparsely
scattered, and where the settlements were widely separated by swamps and
forests. Washington was in no condition to render prompt and effectual
relief, his army being at a vast distance, and considered, as “in a
great measure broken up.” The British, on the contrary, had the
advantage of their naval force, “there being nothing then in the
American seas which could even venture to look at it.”[3]
Such were some of the considerations which prompted the enemy to this
expedition; and which gave Washington great anxiety concerning it.
General Lincoln was in command at Charleston, but uncertain as yet of
the designs of the enemy, and at a loss what course to pursue. Diffident
of himself, and accustomed to defer to the wisdom of Washington, he
turns to him in his present perplexity. “It is among my misfortunes,”
writes he, modestly (January 23d), “that I am not near enough to your
Excellency to have the advantage of your advice and direction. I feel my
own insufficiency and want of experience. I can promise you nothing but
a disposition to serve my country. If this town should be attacked, as
now threatened, I know my duty will call me to defend it, as long as
opposition can be of any avail. I hope my inclination will coincide with
my duty.”
The voyage of Sir Henry Clinton proved long and tempestuous. The ships
were dispersed. Several fell into the hands of the Americans. One
ordnance vessel foundered. Most of the artillery horses, and all those
of the cavalry perished. The scattered ships rejoined each other about
the end of January, at Tybee Bay on Savannah River, where those that had
sustained damage were repaired as speedily as possible. The loss of the
cavalry horses was especially felt by Sir Henry. There was a corps of
two hundred and fifty dragoons, on which he depended greatly in the kind
of guerrilla warfare he was likely to pursue, in a country of forests
and morasses. Lieutenant-colonel Banastre Tarleton who commanded them,
was one of those dogs of war, which Sir Henry was prepared to let slip
on emergencies, to scour and maraud the country. This “bold dragoon,” so
noted in Southern warfare, was about twenty-six years of age, of a
swarthy complexion, with small, black, piercing eyes. He is described as
being rather below the middle size, square-built and strong, “with large
muscular legs.” It will be found that he was a first-rate partisan
officer, prompt, ardent, active, but somewhat unscrupulous.
Landing from the fleet, perfectly dismounted, he repaired with his
dragoons, in some of the quartermaster’s boats, to Port Royal Island, on
the seaboard of South Carolina, “to collect at that place, from friends
or enemies, by money or by force, all the horses belonging to the
islands in the neighborhood.” He succeeded in procuring horses, though
of an inferior quality to those he had lost, but consoled himself with
the persuasion that he would secure better ones in the course of the
campaign, by “exertion and enterprise,”—a vague phrase, but very
significant in the partisan vocabulary.
In the mean time the transports, having on board a great part of the
army, sailed under convoy on the 10th of February, from Savannah to
North Edisto Sound, where the troops disembarked on the 11th, on St.
John’s Island, about thirty miles below Charleston. Thence, Sir Henry
Clinton set out for the banks of Ashley River, opposite to the city,
while a part of the fleet proceeded round by sea, for the purpose of
blockading the harbor. The advance of Sir Henry was slow and cautious.
Much time was consumed by him in fortifying intermediate ports, to keep
up a secure communication with the fleet. He ordered from Savannah all
the troops that could be spared, and wrote to Knyphausen at New York,
for reinforcements from that place. Every precaution was taken by him to
insure against a second repulse from before Charleston, which might
prove fatal to his military reputation.
General Lincoln took advantage of this slowness on the part of his
assailant, to extend and strengthen the works. Charleston stands at the
end of an isthmus formed by the Ashley and Cooper rivers. Beyond the
main works on the land side he cut a canal, from one to the other of the
swamps which border these rivers. In advance of the canal were two rows
of abatis and a double picketed ditch. Within the canal, and between it
and the main works, were strong redoubts and batteries, to open a
flanking fire on any approaching column, while an inclosed horn-work of
masonry formed a kind of citadel.
A squadron commanded by Commodore Whipple, and composed of nine vessels
of war, of various sizes, the largest mounting forty-four guns, was to
coöperate with forts Moultrie and Johnston, and the various batteries,
in the defense of the harbor. They were to lie before the bar so as to
command the entrance of it. Great reliance also was placed on the bar
itself, which it was thought no ship of the line could pass.
Governor Rutledge, a man eminent for talents, patriotism, firmness, and
decision, was clothed with dictatorial powers during the present crisis;
he had called out the militia of the State, and it was supposed they
would duly obey the call. Large reinforcements of troops also were
expected from the North. Under all these circumstances, General Lincoln
yielded to the entreaties of the inhabitants, and instead of remaining
with his army in the open country, as he had intended, shut himself up
with them in the place for its defense, leaving merely his cavalry and
two hundred light troops outside, who were to hover about the enemy and
prevent small parties from marauding.
It was not until the 12th of March that Sir Henry Clinton effected his
tardy approach, and took up a position on Charleston Neck, a few miles
above the town. Admiral Arbuthnot soon showed an intention of
introducing his ships into the harbor; barricading their waists,
anchoring them in a situation where they might take advantage of the
first favorable spring-tide, and fixing buoys on the bar for their
guidance. Commodore Whipple had by this time ascertained by sounding
that a wrong idea had prevailed of the depth of water in the harbor, and
that his ships could not anchor nearer than within three miles of the
bar, so that it would be impossible for him to defend the passage of it.
He quitted his station within it, therefore, after having destroyed a
part of the enemy’s buoys, and took a position where his ships might be
abreast, and form a cross-fire with the batteries of Fort Moultrie,
where Colonel Pinckney commanded.
Washington was informed of these facts by letters from his former
aide-de-camp, Colonel Laurens, who was in Charleston at the time. The
information caused anxious forebodings. “The impracticability of
defending the bar, I fear, amounts to the loss of the town and
garrison,” writes he in reply. “It really appears to me, that the
propriety of attempting to defend the town, depended on the probability
of defending the bar, and that when this ceased, the attempt ought to
have been relinquished.” The same opinion was expressed by him in a
letter to Baron Steuben; “but at this distance,” adds he considerately,
“we can form a very imperfect judgment of its propriety or necessity. I
have the greatest reliance in General Lincoln’s prudence, but I cannot
forbear dreading the event.”
His solicitude for the safety of the South was increased, by hearing of
the embarkation at New York of two thousand five hundred British and
Hessian troops, under Lord Rawdon, reinforcements for Sir Henry Clinton.
It seemed evident the enemy intended to push their operations with vigor
at the South; perhaps, to make it the principal theatre of the war. “We
are now beginning,” said Washington, “to experience the fatal
consequences of the policy which delayed calling upon the States for
their quotas of men in time to arrange and prepare them for the duties
of the field. What to do for the Southern States, without involving
consequences equally alarming in this quarter, I know not.”
Gladly would he have hastened to the South in person, but at this moment
his utmost vigilance was required to keep watch upon New York and
maintain the security of the Hudson, the vital part of the confederacy.
The weak state of the American means of warfare in both quarters,
presented a choice of difficulties. The South needed support. Could the
North give it without exposing itself to ruin, since the enemy, by means
of their ships, could suddenly unite their forces, and fall upon any
point that they might consider weak? Such were the perplexities to which
he was continually subjected, in having, with scanty means, to provide
for the security of a vast extent of country, and with land forces
merely, to contend with an amphibious enemy.
“Congress will better conceive in how delicate a situation we stand,”
writes he, “when I inform them, that the whole operating force present
on this and the other side of the North River, amounts only to ten
thousand four hundred rank and file, of which about two thousand eight
hundred will have completed their term of service by the last of May;
while the enemy’s regular force at New York and its dependencies, must
amount, upon a moderate calculation, to about eleven thousand rank and
file. Our situation is more critical from the impossibility of
concentrating our force, as well for the want of the means of taking the
field, as on account of the early period of the season.”[4]
Looking, however, as usual, to the good of the whole Union, he
determined to leave something at hazard in the Middle States, where the
country was internally so strong, and yield further succor to the
Southern States, which had not equal military advantages. With the
consent of Congress, therefore, he put the Maryland line under marching
orders, together with the Delaware regiment, which acted with it and the
first regiment of artillery.
The Baron De Kalb, now at the head of the Maryland division, was
instructed to conduct this detachment with all haste to the aid of
General Lincoln. He might not arrive in time to prevent the fall of
Charleston, but he might assist to arrest the progress of the enemy and
save the Carolinas.
Washington had been put upon his guard of late against intrigues,
forming by members of the old Conway Cabal, who intended to take
advantage of every military disaster to destroy confidence in him. His
steady mind, however, was not to be shaken by suspicion. “Against
intrigues of this kind incident to every man of a public station,” said
he, “his best support will be a faithful discharge of his duty, and he
must rely on the justice of his country for the event.”
His feelings at the present juncture are admirably expressed in a letter
to the Baron de Steuben. “The prospect, my dear Baron, is gloomy, and
the storm threatens, but I hope we shall extricate ourselves, and bring
everything to a prosperous issue. I have been so inured to difficulties,
in the course of this contest, that I have learned to look upon them
with more tranquillity than formerly. Those which now present
themselves, no doubt require vigorous exertions to overcome them, _and I
am far from despairing of doing it_.”[5]
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