THE REBELLION OF THE PERCIES, -- ITS ORIGIN. -- LETTERS OF HOTSPUR,
AND THE EARL OF NORTHUMBERLAND. -- TRIPARTITE INDENTURE BETWEEN THE
PERCIES, OWYN, AND MORTIMER. -- DOUBTS AS TO ITS AUTHENTICITY. --
HOTSPUR HASTENS FROM THE NORTH. -- THE KING'S DECISIVE CONDUCT. -- HE
FORMS A JUNCTION WITH THE PRINCE. -- "SORRY BATTLE OF SHREWSBURY." --
GREAT INACCURACY OF DAVID HUME. -- HARDYNG'S DUPLICITY. -- MANIFESTO
OF THE PERCIES PROBABLY A FORGERY. -- GLYNDOWR'S ABSENCE FROM THE
BATTLE INVOLVES NEITHER BREACH OF FAITH NOR NEGLECT OF DUTY. --
CIRCUMSTANCES PRECEDING THE BATTLE. -- OF THE BATTLE ITSELF. -- ITS
IMMEDIATE CONSEQUENCES.
1403.
In analysing the motives which drove the Percies, father and son, into
rebellion, we are recommended by some writers to search only into
those antecedent probabilities, those general causes of mutual
dissatisfaction, which must have operated on parties situated as they
were with regard to Henry IV. The same authors would dissuade us from
seeking for any immediate and proximate causes, because "chroniclers
have not discovered or detailed the beginning incidents." But we shall
scarcely be able to do justice to our subject if we strictly follow
this prescribed rule of inquiry. The general causes enumerated (p. 142)
by Hume, and expatiated upon in modern times, we may take for granted.
Undoubtedly ingratitude on the one side, and discontent on the other,
were not only to be expected, but, as we know, actually prevailed.
"The sovereign naturally became jealous of that power which had advanced
him to the throne, and the subject was not easily satisfied in the
returns which he thought so great a favour had merited." But we are by
no means left to conjecture abstractedly on the "beginning incidents,"
as the proximate causes of the open revolt of the family of Percy have
been called: Hotspur's own letters, as well as those of his father
Northumberland, the existence of which seems not to have been known to
our historians, prepare us for much of what actually took place. We
have already observed the indications of wounded pride, and indignation,
and utter discontent, which Hotspur's despatches from Wales evince.
Another communication, dated Swyneshed, in Lincolnshire, July 3, is more
characteristic of his temper of mind than the preceding, and makes his
subsequent conduct still more easily understood.[147] Sir Harris (p. 143)
Nicolas has so clearly analysed this letter, that we may well content
ourselves with the substance of it as we find it in his valuable
preface.
[Footnote 147: The date of this letter is not
ascertained; it probably was in the July of 1402.
It could scarcely have been in 1401, in which year
he was certainly in Wales in June, and was
appointed a commissioner for negociating a peace
with Scotland on the 1st of September. In the
beginning of July 1403 he was in Wales, or on its
borders, negociating perhaps with Owyn Glyndowr's
representatives, and in Cheshire exciting the
people to rebellion.]
"Hotspur commenced by reminding the council of his repeated applications
for payment of the money due to him as Warden of the East March; and
then alluded to the other sums owing to his father and himself, and to
the promise made by the treasurer, when he was last in London, that,
if it were agreeable to the council, 2,000 marks should be paid him
before the February then last past. He said he had heard that at the
last parliament, when the necessities of the realm were explained by
the lords of the great council to the barons and commons, the war
allowance was demanded for all the marches, Calais, Guienne and Scotland,
the sea, and Ireland; that the proposition for the Scotch marches was
limited to 37,000_l._; and that, as the payment for the marches in
time of truce, due to his father and to him, did not exceed 5,000_l._
per annum, it excited his astonishment that it could not be paid in
good faith; that it appeared to him either that the council attached
too little consideration to the said marches, where the most formidable
enemies which they had would be found, or that they were not satisfied
with his and his father's services therein; but, if they made proper
inquiry, he hoped that the greatest neglect they would discover in the
marches was the neglect of payment, without which they would find no
one who could render such service. On this subject he had, he (p. 144)
said, written to the King, entreating him that, if any injury occurred
to town, castle, or march, in his charge, from default of payment, he
might not be blamed; but that the censure should rest on those who would
not pay him, agreeably to his Majesty's honourable command and desire.
He begged the council not to be displeased that he wrote ignorantly in
his rude and feeble manner on this subject, because he was compelled
to do so by the necessities not merely of himself, but of his soldiers,
who were in such distress, that, without providing a remedy, he neither
could nor dared to go to the marches; and he concluded by requesting the
council to take such measures as they might think proper."
Two letters from the Earl of Northumberland, the one to the council in
May, the other to the King, dated 26th June 1403, breathe the same
spirit with those of his son Hotspur, and would have led us to
anticipate the same subsequent conduct; at least they ought to have
prepared the King and council for the resentments of two such men,
overflowing with bitter indignation at the neglect and injustice with
which they considered themselves to have been treated.
"The last of these letters (we quote throughout the words of the same
Editor) is extremely curious. Northumberland commenced by acknowledging
the receipt of a letter from the King, wherein Henry has expressed (p. 145)
his expectation that the Earl would be at Ormeston Castle on the day
appointed, and in sufficient force, without creating any additional
expense to his Majesty; but that, on consideration, the King, reflecting
that this could not be the case without expenses being incurred by the
Earl and his son Hotspur, had ordered some money to be speedily sent
to them. Of that money the Earl said he knew not the amount, nor the
day of payment; that his honour, as well as the state of the kingdom,
was in question; and that the day on which he was to be at Ormeston
was so near, that, if payment was not soon ordered, it was very
probable that the fair renown of the chivalry of the realm would not
be maintained at that place, to the utter dishonour and grief of him
and of his son, who were the King's loyal subjects; which they
believed could not be his wish, nor had they deserved it. 'If,' the
Earl sarcastically observed, 'we had both been paid the 60,000_l._
since your coronation, as I have heard you were informed by those who
do not wish to tell you the truth, then we could better support such a
charge; but to this day there is clearly due to us, as can be fully
proved, 20,000_l._ and more'. He then entreated the King to order his
council and treasurer to pay him and his son a large sum conformably
to the grant made in the last parliament, and to their indentures, so
that no injury might arise to the realm by the non-payment of what was
due to them.' To this letter he signed himself 'Your Matathias, (p. 146)
who supplicates you to take his state and labour to heart in this
affair.'"
There is so much sound reasoning also and good sense in the review of
these proceedings, presented to us by the same pen, that we cannot do
better than adopt it. The Author's subsequent researches have all
tended to confirm that Editor's view:
"This letter preceded the rebellion of the Percies by less than four
weeks; and that event may, it is presumed, be mainly attributed to the
inattention shown to their requests of payment of the large sums which
they had expended in the King's service. They were not only harassed
by debts, and destitute of means to pay their followers, but their
honour, as the Earl expressly told the King, was involved in the
fulfilment of their engagements; a breach of which not only exposed
them to the greatest difficulties, but, in the opinion of their
chivalrous contemporaries, perhaps affected their reputation. That
under these circumstances, and goaded by a sense of injury and injustice,
the fiery Hotspur should throw off his allegiance, and revolt, is not
surprising; but it is matter of astonishment that Henry should have
hazarded such a result. To the house of Percy he was chiefly indebted
for the crown; and it is scarcely credible that at the moment of their
defection it could have been his policy to offend them. The country
was at war with France and Scotland, Wales was then in open rebellion,
and Henry was far from satisfied of the general loyalty of his (p. 147)
subjects. Can it be believed that he desired to increase his enemies
by adding the most powerful family in the kingdom to the number? Nor
can Henry's constant efforts to prevent the people from becoming
disaffected, be reconciled with the wish to excite discontent in two
of the most influential and distinguished personages in the realm. It
is shown in another part of this volume, (Minutes of Privy Council,)
that the King had not the slightest suspicion of Hotspur's revolt
until it took place; and it appears that, when he heard of it, he was
actually on his route to join that chieftain, and, to use his own
words to his council, 'to give aid and support to his very dear and
loyal cousins, the Earl of Northumberland and his son Henry, in the
expedition which they had honourably commenced for him and his realm
against his enemies the Scotch.' Instead of refusing to pay to the
Percies the money which they claimed, from the desire to lessen their
power, or to inflict upon them any species of mortification, all which
is known of the state of this country justifies the inference that
Henry had the strongest motives for conciliating that family. The
neglect of their repeated demands seems, therefore, to have arisen
solely from his being unable[148] to comply with them; and the (p. 148)
King's pecuniary embarrassments are shown by the documents in this
work to have been of so pressing and so permanent a nature, that there
is no difficulty in believing such to have been the case. It is deserving
of observation, however, that the discontent which is visible in the
letters of Hotspur and his father, is as much at the conduct of the
council as at that of the King; and jealousy of their superior influence
with Henry, and possibly a suspicion that they endeavoured to injure
them in his estimation, as well as to impede their exertions in his
service, by withholding the necessary resources, may have combined
with other causes in producing their disaffection."[149]
[Footnote 148: The fact is, that in the years
immediately preceding their defection, the Issue
Rolls of the Exchequer abound with items of
payment, some to a very large amount, to the Earl
of Northumberland and his son. The names of both
the father and the son, sometimes separately, often
jointly, recur so constantly that they can scarcely
escape the observation even of a cursory glance
over the Rolls. Generally the payment is for the
protection of the East March and Berwick; in some
instances, for defending the castle of Beaumaris,
and the island of Anglesea. On the 17th July 1403,
payment is recorded of precisely the same sum to
the two Percies for their services in the North
March, and to the Prince for the protection of
Wales; in each case, no doubt, falling far short of
the requisite amount, but in each case probably as
much as the Exchequer could afford to supply.]
[Footnote 149: Preface to Sir H. Nicolas's Privy
Council of England, p. 4.]
* * * * *
Not Shakspeare only, in his highly-wrought scene at the Archdeacon of
Bangor's house, but our historians also and their commentators,
instruct us to refer to a point of time very little subsequent to the
date of the last letter from the Earl of Northumberland the celebrated
TRIPARTITE INDENTURE OF DIVISION. Shakspeare has traced, with (p. 149)
such exquisite designs and shades of colouring, the different characters
of the contracting parties in their acts and sentiments, and has
thrown such vividness and life and beauty into the whole procedure,
that the imagination is led captive, superinducing an unwillingness to
doubt the reality; and the mind reluctantly engages in an examination
of the truth. But, consistently with the principles adopted in these
Memoirs, the Author is compelled to sift the evidence on which the
genuineness of the treaty depends. The document, if it could have been
established as trustworthy, could not have failed to be interesting to
every one as a fact in general history, whilst the English and Welsh
antiquary must in an especial manner have been gratified by being made
acquainted with its particular provisions. At all events, whatever
opinion may be ultimately formed of its character as the vehicle of
historical verity, it is in itself too important, and has been too
widely recognised, to be passed over in these pages without notice.
Sir Henry Ellis, to whom we are indebted for having first called
attention to the specific stipulations of this alleged treaty, with
his accustomed perspicuity and succinctness thus introduces the
subject to his reader:
"Sir Edmund Mortimer's letter is dated December 13 (1402), and the
Tripartite Indenture of Partition was not fully agreed upon till
toward the middle of the next year. The negociation for the (p. 150)
partition of the kingdom seems to have originated with Mortimer and
Glyndowr only. The battle of Shrewsbury was fought on July 21st, 1403.
The manuscript chronicle, already named, compiled by one of the
chaplains[150] to King Henry V, gives the particulars of the final
treaty, signed at the house of the Archdeacon of Bangor, more amply
than they can be found elsewhere. The expectation declared in this
treaty that the contracting parties would turn out to be those spoken
of by Merlin, who were to divide amongst them the Greater Britain, as
it is called, corroborates the story told by Hall. The whole passage
is here submitted to the reader's perusal: the words are evidently
those of the treaty." The reader is then furnished with a copy of the
Latin original: but, since no point of the general question as to its
genuineness appears to be affected by the words employed, the
following translation is substituted in its place.
[Footnote 150: That this chronicle was not compiled
by one of Henry V.'s chaplains, is shown in the
Appendix.]
TRIPARTITE INDENTURE OF DIVISION.
"This year, the Earl of Northumberland made a league and covenant
and friendship with Owyn Glyndwr and Edmund Mortimer, son of the
late Edmund Earl of March, in certain articles of the form and
tenor following:--In the first place, that these Lords, Owyn, the
Earl, and Edmund, shall henceforth be mutually joined, confederate,
united, and bound by the bond of a true league and true (p. 151)
friendship, and sure and good union. Again, that every of these
Lords shall will and pursue, and also procure, the honour and
welfare one of another; and shall, in good faith, hinder any losses
and distresses which shall come to his knowledge, by any one
whatsoever intended to be inflicted on either of them. Every one,
also, of them shall act and do with another all and every those
things which ought to be done by good, true, and faithful friends
to good, true, and faithful friends, laying aside all deceit and
fraud. Also, if ever any of the said Lords shall know and learn of
any loss or damage intended against another by any persons whatsoever,
he shall signify it to the others as speedily as possible, and assist
them in that particular, that each may take such measures as may
seem good against such malicious purposes; and they shall be anxious
to prevent such injuries in good faith; also, they shall assist
each other to the utmost of their power in the time of necessity.
Also, if by God's appointment it should appear to the said Lords
in process of time that they are the same persons of whom the
Prophet speaks, between whom the government of the Greater Britain
ought to be divided and parted, then they and every of them shall
labour to their utmost to bring this effectually to be accomplished.
Each of them, also, shall be content with that portion of the
kingdom aforesaid limited as below, without further exaction or
superiority; yea, each of them in such portion assigned to him
shall enjoy equal liberty. Also, between the same Lords it is
unanimously covenanted and agreed that the said Owyn and his heirs
shall have the whole of Cambria or Wales, by the borders, limits,
and boundaries underwritten divided from Leogoed which is commonly
called England; namely, from the Severn sea, as the river Severn
leads from the sea, going down to the north gate of the city of
Worcester; and from that gate straight to the ash-trees, commonly
called in the Cambrian or Welsh language Ouuene Margion, which
grow on the high way from Bridgenorth to Kynvar; thence by (p. 152)
the high way direct, which is usually called the old or ancient way
to the head or source of the river Trent; thence to the head or
source of the river Meuse; thence as that river leads to the sea,
going down within the borders, limits, and boundaries above written.
And the aforesaid Earl of Northumberland shall have for himself
and his heirs the counties below written, namely, Northumberland,
Westmoreland, Lancashire, York, Lincoln, Nottingham, Derby,
Stafford, Leicester, Northampton, Warwick, and Norfolk. And the
Lord Edmund shall have all the rest of the whole of England
entirely to him and his heirs. Also, should any battle, riot, or
discord fall out between two of the said Lords, (may it never be!)
then the third of the said Lords, calling to himself good and
faithful counsel, shall duly rectify such discord, riot, and battle;
whose approval or sentence the discordant parties shall be held
bound to obey. They shall also be faithful to defend the kingdom
against all men; saving the oak on the part of the said Owyn given
to the most illustrious Prince Charles, by the grace of God King
of the French, in the league and covenant between them made. And
that the same be, all and singular, well and faithfully observed,
the said Lords, Owyn, the Earl, and Edmund, by the holy body of
the Lord which they now stedfastly look upon, and by the holy
Gospels of God by them now bodily touched, have sworn to observe
the premises all and singular to their utmost, inviolably; and
have caused their seals to be mutually affixed thereto."
The above learned Editor of this instrument (to whose labours in rescuing
from oblivion so many original documents relative to these times we
are repeatedly induced to acknowledge our obligations,) seems to have
fallen into some serious mistakes here. Either influenced by the
fascinating reminiscences of Shakspeare's representations, or (p. 153)
following Hall with too implicit a confidence, he has altogether
overlooked the date assigned in the manuscript itself to the execution
of this partition deed, and the persons between whom the agreement is
there said to have been made. So far from countenancing the assumption
that "the indenture was finally agreed upon towards the middle of the
year next after the date of Edmund Mortimer's letter announcing his
junction with Owyn (December 14th, 1402)," the manuscript expressly
states that the covenant was made on the 28th of February,[151] in the
fourth year of Henry IV; and that the contracting parties were Henry
Earl of Northumberland, Sir Edmund Mortimer, and Owyn Glyndowr. Hall,
on whom there exists strong reason for believing that Shakspeare
rested as his authority, asserts that the contracting parties were
Glyndowr, the LORD PERCY (by which title he throughout designates
Hotspur), and the EARL OF MARCH. Hall's expressions would lead us to
infer that the circumstance was not generally recognised or known (p. 154)
by the chroniclers before his time, but was recorded by one only of
those with whose writings he was acquainted. "A certain writer," he
says, "writeth that this Earl of March, the Lord Percy, and Owyn
Glyndowr were unwisely made believe by a Welsh prophesier that King
Henry was the Moldwarp cursed of God's own mouth, and that they were
the Dragon, the Lion, and the Wolf which should divide the realm
between them, by the deviation, not divination, of that mawmet Merlin."
Hall then proceeds to tell us that the tripartite indenture was sealed
by the deputies of the three parties in the Archdeacon's house; and
that, by the treaty, Wales was given to Owyn, all England from Severn
and Trent southward and eastward, was assigned to the Earl of March,
and the remnant to Lord Percy.
[Footnote 151: This date cannot have been earlier
than February 1404, nor later than 1405. If we
interpret the words of the MS. to mean the regnal
year of Henry IV, the date will be the first of
those two years; if it was the February subsequent
to the election of Pope Innocent, October 1404,
immediately after noticing which the MS. records
this treaty, it will be the latter. The copy of
this manuscript agrees in all points with the
Sloane, except that it refers it to the 18th
instead of the 28th of February.]
The strange confusion made either by Hall, or "the certain writer"
from whom he draws his story, of Owyn's prisoner and son-in-law, Edmund
Mortimer, with the Earl of March his nephew, then a minor in the King's
safe custody, throws doubtless great suspicion on his narrative;
nevertheless, such as it is, (allowing for that mistake,) his account
seems far more probable than the statement given in the Sloane
manuscript,--the only authority, it is presumed, now known to have
reported the alleged words of the treaty. It is much more likely, that
the project of dividing South Britain among the houses of Glyndowr,
Mortimer, and Percy, should have been entertained before the (p. 155)
battle of Shrewsbury, when the Earl of Worcester's malicious love of
mischief might have suggested it, and Hotspur's headstrong impetuosity
might have caught at the scheme, and their troops, not yet dispirited
by defeat, might have been sanguine of success, than after that struggle,
when the old Earl of Northumberland[152] was the only representative of
the house of Percy who could have signed it. The cause of Owyn, Mortimer,
and Northumberland had so sunk into its wane after Hotspur's death,
that they could then scarcely have contemplated as a thing feasible
the division of the fair realm of England and Wales among themselves.
Of the authority of the manuscript from which the indenture is
extracted, the Author (for reasons stated in the Appendix) is (p. 156)
compelled to form a very low estimate. And if such a deed ever was
signed, it is far less improbable that the manuscript (full, as it
confessedly is elsewhere, of errors) should have inserted it incorrectly
in point of chronological order, than that the contracting parties
should have postponed their contemplated arrangement to a period when
success must have appeared almost beyond hope. Independently, however,
of the suspicion cast on the document by the date assigned to it in
the manuscript, it seems to carry with it internal evidence against
itself. The contract was made by Edmund Mortimer, the Earl of
Northumberland, and Owyn, and among them the land was to be divided;
but, so far from the report of such an intended distribution being
corroborated by any other authority, there is much evidence to render
it incredible. Edmund Mortimer's own genuine letter, for example,
announcing his adhesion to Owyn, which preceded this agreement, makes
no allusion to the Percies, or even to himself, as portionists. "The
cause," he says, "which he espoused would guarantee to Owyn his rights
in Wales, and, in case Richard were dead, would place the Earl of
March on the throne." It is, indeed, scarcely conceivable that the
nobles, the gentry, and the people at large would have suffered their
land to be cut up into portions, destroying the integrity of the
kingdom, and exposing it with increased facilities to foreign (p. 157)
invasion, and interminable intestine warfare; whilst neither of the
three who were to share the spoil had any pretensions of title to the
crown. It is scarcely less inconceivable that three men, such as
Mortimer, Glyndowr, and Northumberland, could have seriously devised
so desperate a scheme.
[Footnote 152: Nevertheless, it should be
remembered that many ancient accounts mention the
Earl of Northumberland's visit to Glyndowr
subsequently to his return from the flight into
Scotland, and that the French auxiliaries invaded
England under Glyndowr's standard long after the
battle of Shrewsbury. It was on the last day of
February 1408, that Rokeby, Sheriff of Yorkshire,
compelled Northumberland and Lord Bardolf to engage
with him in the field of Bramham Moor, when the
Earl fell in battle, and Lord Bardolf died of his
wounds. The Earl's head, covered with the snows of
age, was exposed on London Bridge. The people
lamented his fate when they recalled to mind his
former magnificence and glory. Many (says
Walsingham) applied to him the lines of Lucan:
Sed nos nec sanguis, nec tantum vulnera nostri
Afficere senis, quantum gestata per urbem
Ora ducis, quæ transfixo deformia pilo
Vidimus.]
On the whole, the Author is disposed to express his suspicion that the
entire story of the tripartite league is the creature only of
invention, originating in some inexplicable mistake, or fabricated for
the purpose of exciting feelings of contempt or hostility against the
rebels.
* * * * *
In examining the various accounts of the battle of Shrewsbury with a
view of putting together ascertained facts in right order, and
distinguishing between certainty,--strong probability,--mere
surmise,--improbabilities,--and utter mistakes, we shall find it far
more easy to point out the errors of others, than to adopt one general
view which shall not in its turn be open to objections. Still, in any
important course of events, it seems to be a dereliction of duty in an
author to shrink from offering the most probable outline of facts
which the careful comparison of different statements, and a patient
weighing of opposite authorities, suggest. Before, however, we enter
upon that task, it will be necessary to clear the way by examining
some other questions of doubt and difficulty.
To Mr. Hume's inaccuracies, arising from the want of patient (p. 158)
labour in searching for truth at the fountain-head, we have been led
to refer above. His readiness to rest satisfied with whatever first
offered itself, provided it suited his present purpose, without either
scrutinizing its internal evidence, or verifying it by reference to
earlier and better authority, is forced upon our notice in his account
of the battle of Shrewsbury. Just one half of the entire space which
he spares to record the whole affair, he devotes to a minute detail of
the manifesto which Hotspur is said to have sent to the King on the
night before the battle, in the name of his father, his uncle, and
himself. This document, at least in the terms quoted by Mr. Hume, is
proved as well by its own internal self-contradictions, as by historical
facts, to be a forgery of a much later date.
The first charge which the manifesto is made to bring against Henry
is, that, after his landing at Ravenspurg, he swore on the Gospel that
he only sought his own rightful inheritance, that he would never
disturb Richard in his possession of the throne, and that never would
he aim at being King. And yet another item charges him with having
sworn on the same day, and at the same place, and on the same Gospel,
an oath (the very terms of which imply that he was to be King) that he
never would exact tenths or fifteenths without consent of the three
estates, except in cases of extreme emergence. Again, "It complained
of his cruel policy (says Mr. Hume, without adding a single remark,)
in allowing the young Earl of March, whom he ought to regard as (p. 159)
his sovereign, to remain a captive in the hands of his enemies, and
in even refusing to all his friends permission to treat of his ransom;"
whilst it is beyond all question that the person whom this pretended
manifesto confounds with the Earl of March, "taken in pitched battle,"
was Sir Edmund Mortimer. The Earl of March was himself then a boy, and
was in close custody in Henry's castle of Windsor. The manifesto, as
Hume quotes it, is evidently full of historical blunders; its author
had followed those historians who had confounded Edmund Mortimer with
the Earl of March; and yet Mr. Hume adopts it on the authority of
Hall, and gives it so prominent a place in his work.
But even as the manifesto is found in its original form in Hardyng,
(though the blunders copied by Hume from Hall[153] do not appear there
in all their extravagance and absurdity,) something attaches to it
exceedingly suspicious as to its character and circumstances.
Independently of the internal evidence of the document itself, which
will repay a careful scrutiny, the very fact of Hardyng having
withheld even the most distant allusion to such a manifesto in the
copy of his work which he presented to Henry VI, the grandson of (p. 160)
the King whose character the manifesto was designed to blast, at a
time so much nearer the event, when the reality or the falsehood of
his statement might have been more easily ascertained, contrasts very
strikingly with the forced and unnatural manner in which, many years
after, he abruptly thrusts the manifesto in Latin prose into the midst
of his English poem. He then[154] desired to please Edward IV, to whom
any adverse reflection on Bolinbroke would be acceptable.
[Footnote 153: Hall says, "Because no chronicle
save one makes mention what was the cause and
occasion of this bloody battle, in the which on
both parts were more than forty thousand men
assembled, I word for word, according to my copy,
do here rehearse." He then gives the heads of the
manifesto, from which Hume has drawn his account.]
[Footnote 154: The fact is, that Hardyng's
character is assailable, especially on the point of
forging documents. "Several writers have considered
Hardyng a most dexterous and notable forger, who
manufactured the deed for which he sought
reward."[154-a] The first manuscript, the Lansdown,
containing no allusion to this said manifesto,
comes down to 1436. The Harleian copy, which
contains it, comes down to the flight of Henry VI.
for Scotland. In the Lansdown copy not one word is
said about the oath sworn on Bolinbroke's landing,
nor about the manifesto.]
[Footnote 154-a: See Sir H. Ellis's Introduction to
his edition of Hardyng.]
The document, however, itself savours strongly of forgery. In the
first place, it purports to be signed and sealed by Henry Percy, Earl
of Northumberland, (though the Earl at that time was in Northumberland,)
Henry Percy, his first-born son, and Thomas Earl of Worcester, styling
themselves Procurators and Protectors of the kingdom. Should this
apparent contradiction be thought to be reconciled with the truth by
what Hardyng mentions, that the document was made by good advice (p. 161)
of the Archbishop of York, and divers other holy men and lords; it
must be answered that it could not have been drawn up for the purpose
of being used whenever an opportunity might offer, for, in the name of
the three, it challenges the King, and declares that they will prove
the allegations "_on this day_," "_on this instant day_," twice repeated.
Evidently the writer of the document had his mind upon the fatal day of
Shrewsbury.
Again, one of their principal charges seems to have emanated from a
person totally ignorant of some facts which must have been known to
the Percies, and which are established by documents still in our
hands. The words of the clause to which we refer run thus: "We aver
and intend to prove, that whereas Edmund Mortimer, brother of the Earl
of March, was taken by Owyn Glyndowr in mortal battle, in the open
field, and has UP TO THIS TIME[155] _been cruelly kept in prison_ and
bands of iron, in your cause, you have publicly declared him to have
been guilefully taken, [ex dolo,--willingly, as Hall quotes it, to
yield himself prisoner to the said Owyn,] and you would not suffer him
to be ransomed, neither by his own means nor by us his relatives and
friends. We have, therefore, negociated with Owyn, as well for his
ransom from our own proper goods, as also for peace between you and
Owyn. Wherefore have you regarded us as traitors, and moreover (p. 162)
have craftily and secretly planned and imagined our death and utter
destruction."
[Footnote 155: Adhuc.]
This clause of the manifesto declares the King to have publicly
proclaimed that Edmund Mortimer, who was taken in pitched battle, had
fraudulently given himself up to Owyn. The King's own letter to the
council[156] is totally irreconcileable with his making such a
declaration. He announces to them the news which he had just received
of Mortimer's capture, as a calamity which had made him resolve to
proceed in person against the rebels. "Tidings have reached us from
Wales, that the rebels have taken our very dear and much beloved
Edmund Mortimer." Again, the clause avers that the King had suffered
the same person, Edmund Mortimer, to be kept cruelly in prison and
iron chains _up to that time_, and would not suffer him to be
ransomed. In contradiction to this charge, we are assured by the early
chroniclers[157] that Owyn treated Mortimer with all the humanity and
respect in his power; and that because he possessed not the means of
paying a ransom, he had, as early as St. Andrew's day, (30th of
November 1402, less than six months after his capture, and nearly
eight months before the alleged delivery of the manifesto,) been
married to the daughter of Owyn with great solemnity; and, "thus (p. 163)
turning wholly to the Welsh people, he pledged himself thereafter to
fight for them to the utmost of his power against the English."
[Footnote 156: Acts of Council, vol. i. p. 185.]
[Footnote 157: Monk of Evesham and Sloane,
1776.--In the passage relating to Mortimer's
marriage in Walsingham's history, the word "obiit"
is evidently an interpolation by mistake. It does
not occur in the corresponding passage in his
Ypodig. Neust.]
Another expression in this clause, incompatible with the truth, but
quite consistent with the mistakes which from very early times
prevailed as to the circumstances preceding the battle of Shrewsbury,
charges the King with having pronounced the three Percies to be
traitors, and with having secretly planned and imagined their ruin and
death; and this is said to have been signed and sealed by
Northumberland, then remaining in the north. Whereas the truth,
established beyond controversy, though little known, is, that, up to
the very day when the King announced to the council Hotspur's
rebellion,--barely four days before the battle,--he had entertained no
idea of their disloyalty. Even in his last preceding despatch he
informed the council that he was on his way "to afford aid and comfort
to his very dear and faithful cousins, the Earl of Northumberland and
his son Henry, and to join them in their expedition against the
Scots."[158]
[Footnote 158: Acts of Council, vol. i. p. 207.]
These considerations, among others, throw so many and such weighty
suspicions on the manifesto, that it can scarcely be regarded as
deserving of credit. Nor must the Author here disguise his conviction,
that the whole is a forgery, guiltily made for the purpose of
blackening the memory of Henry IV, and of casting odium on the (p. 164)
dynasty of the house of Lancaster.
Another important mistake into which tradition seems to have betrayed
some very pains-taking persons is that which charges Owyn Glyndowr
with a breach of faith, and a selfish conduct, on the occasion of the
battle of Shrewsbury, utterly unworthy of any man of the slightest
pretensions to integrity and honour. He is said by Leland to have
promised Percy to be present at that struggle: he is reported by
Pennant to have remained, as if spell-bound, with twelve thousand men
at Oswestry. The History of Shrewsbury tells us of the still existing
remains of an oak at Shelton, into the top-most branches of which he
climbed to see the turn of the battle, resolving to proceed or retire
as that should be; having come with his forces to that spot time
enough to join the conflict. The question involving Owyn Glyndowr's
good faith and valour, or zeal and activity, is one of much interest,
and deserves to be patiently investigated; whilst an attentive
examination of authentic documents, and a careful comparison of dates,
are essential to the establishment of the truth. The result of the
inquiry may be new, and yet not on that account the less to be relied
upon.
That Owyn gladly promised to co-operate with the Percies, there is
every reason to regard as time; that he undertook to be with them at
Shrewsbury on that day of battle cannot, it should seem, be true.
Probably he never heard of any expectation of such an engagement, (p. 165)
and the first news which reached him relating to it may have been
tidings of Percy's death, and the discomfiture of his troops. The
Welsh historians unsparingly charge him with having deceived his
northern friends on that day: and some assert that he remained at
Oswestry, only seventeen miles off; others that he came to the very
banks of the Severn, and tarried there in safety, consulting only his
own interest, whilst a vigorous effort on his part might have turned
the victory that day against the King. This is, perhaps, within the
verge of possibility; but is in the highest degree improbable. That
the reports have originated in an entire ignorance of Owyn's probable
position at the time, and of the sudden, unforeseen, and unexpected
character of the struggle to which Bolinbroke's instantaneous decision
forced the Percies, will evidently appear, if, instead of relying on
vague tradition, we follow in search of the reality where facts only,
or fair inferences from ascertained facts, may conduct us.
It appears, then, to be satisfactorily demonstrable by original
documents, interpreted independently of preconceived theory, that,
four days only before King Henry's proclamation against the Percies
was issued at Burton upon Trent, Owyn Glyndowr was in the extreme
divisions of Caermarthenshire, most actively and anxiously engaged in
reducing the English castles which still held out against him, and by
no means free from formidable antagonists in the field, being (p. 166)
fully occupied at that juncture, and likely to be detained there
for some time. It must be also remembered that the King published his
proclamation as soon as ever he had himself heard of Hotspur's movements
from the north, and that even his knowledge of the hostile intentions
of the Percies preceded the very battle itself only by the brief space
of five days. This circumstance has never (it is presumed) been noticed
by any of our historians; and the examination of the whole question
involves so new and important a view of the affairs of the Principality
at that period, and bears so immediately on the charge made against
the great rebel chieftain for dastardly cowardice or gross breach of
faith, that it seems to claim in these volumes a fuller and more
minute investigation than might otherwise have been desirable or
generally interesting. The documents furnishing the facts on which we
ground our opinion, are chiefly original letters preserved in the
British Museum, and made accessible to the general reader by having
been published by Sir Henry Ellis.[159] That excellent Editor,
however, has unquestionably referred them to an earlier date than can
be truly assigned to them.[160] Independently of the material fact
which they are intended to establish, they carry with them much
intrinsic interest of their own; and although the detail of the (p. 167)
evidence in the body of the work might seem to impede unnecessarily
the progress of the narrative, the dissertation in its detached form
is recommended to the reader's careful perusal. Should he close his
examination of those documents under the same impression which the
Author confesses they have made on himself, he will acquiesce in the
conclusion above stated, and consider this position as admitting no
reasonable doubt,--That, a few days only before the fatal battle of
Shrewsbury, Owyn Glyndowr was in the very extremity of South Wales,
engaged in attempts to reduce the enemy's garrisons, and crush his
power in those quarters; with a prospect also before him of much
similar employment in a service of great danger to himself. And when
we recollect that probably Henry Percy as little expected the King to
meet him at Shrewsbury, as the King a week before had thought to find
him or his father in any other part of the kingdom than in
Northumberland, whither he was himself on his march to join them; when
we recollect the nature and extent of the country which lies between
Pembrokeshire and Salop; and reflect also on the undisciplined state
of Owyn's "eight thousand and eight score spears, such as they were;"
instead of being surprised at his absence from Shrewsbury on the 21st
of July, and charging him with having deserted his friends and sworn
allies on that sad field, we are driven to believe that his presence
there would have savoured more of the marvellous than many of his (p. 168)
most celebrated achievements. The simple truth breaks the spell of the
poet's picture, and forces us to unveil its fallacy, though it has
been pronounced by the historian of Shrewsbury to "form one of the
brightest ornaments of the pages of Marmion." To whatever cause we
ascribe the decline of Owyn's power, we cannot trace its origin to a
judicial visitation as the consequence of his failure in that hour of
need. The poet's imagination, creative of poetical justice, wrought
upon the tale as it was told; but that tale was not built on truth.
The lines, however, deserve to have been the vehicle of a less
ill-founded tradition.
[Footnote 159: Original Letters, Second Series.]
[Footnote 160: Those documents, with the Author's
remarks and reasonings upon them, will be found in
the Appendix.]
"E'en from the day when chained by fate,
By wizard's dream or potent spell,
Lingering from sad Salopia's field,
Reft of his aid, the Percy fell;--
E'en from that day misfortune still,
As if for violated faith,
Pursued him with unwearied step,
Vindictive still for Hotspur's death."[161]
[Footnote 161: Quoted by Scott in his Notes on
Marmion from a poem by the Rev. G. Warrington,
called "The Spirit's Blasted Tree."]
Those who feel an interest in tracing the localities of this battle
with a greater minuteness of detail in its circumstances than is
requisite for the purpose of these Memoirs, will do well to consult
the "Historian of Shrewsbury." The following is offered as the
probable outline of the circumstances of the engagement, together (p. 169)
with those which preceded and followed it.
* * * * *
The Earl of Northumberland and his son Hotspur were engaged in collecting
and organizing troops in the north, for the professed purpose of
invading Scotland as soon as the King should join them with his
forces. Taking from these troops "eight score horse," Hotspur[162]
marched southward from Berwick at their head, and came through (p. 170)
Lancashire and Cheshire, spreading his rebellious principles on every
side, and adding to his army, especially from among the gentry. He
proclaimed everywhere that their favourite Richard, though deposed by
the tyranny of Bolinbroke, was still alive; and many gathered round
his standard, resolved to avenge the wrongs of their liege lord. The
King, with a considerable force, the amount of which is not precisely
known, was on his march towards the north, with the intention of
joining the forces raised by the Percies, and of advancing with them
into Scotland, and, "that expedition well ended," of returning to
quell the rebels in Wales. He was at Burton on Trent when news was
brought to him of Hotspur's proceedings, which decided him[163]
instantly to grapple with this unlooked-for rebellion. Hotspur was
believed to be on his road to join Glyndowr, and the King resolved to
intercept him.
[Footnote 162: Hardyng represents the variance
between Henry IV. and the Percies to have
originated in three causes:--in their own refusal
to give up certain prisoners of rank who had been
taken at the battle of Homildon; in the King's
refusal to let Sir Edmund Mortimer pay a ransom;
and in the displeasure which the King had felt in
consequence of an interview between Hotspur and
Glyndowr, which had excited his suspicions. A
commission was issued on the 14th March 1403, at
the instance of the Earl of Westmoreland, to
inquire about the prisoners taken at Homildon or
"Humbledon."--Rym. Foe The Pell Rolls acquaint
us with the great importance attached by Henry and
the nation to this victory, by recording the
pension assigned to the first bringer of the
welcome news: "To Nicholas Merbury 40_l._ yearly
for other good services, as also because the same
Nicholas was the first person who reported for a
certainty to the said lord the King the good,
agreeable, and acceptable news of the success of
the late expedition at Homeldon, near Wollor, in
Northumberland, by Henry, late Earl of
Northumberland. Four earls, many barons and
bannerets, with a great multitude of knights and
esquires, as well Scotch as French, were taken; and
also a great multitude slain, and drowned in the
river Tweed." This act of gratitude was somewhat
late, if the entry in the Roll records the first
payment. It is dated Nov. 3, 1405. At the date of
this payment Percy is called the _late_ Earl,
because he had forfeited his title.]
[Footnote 163: Walsingham records that the Earl of
Dunbar, urging Henry to strike an immediate blow,
quoted Lucan. He probably uttered the
sentiment,--the quotation being supplied by the
chronicler:
"Tolle moras; nocuit semper differre paratis,
Dum trepidant nullo firmatæ robore partes."]
So far from inferring, as some authors have done, from the smallness
of the numbers on either side, that the country considered it more a
personal quarrel between two great families than as a national concern,
we might rather feel surprise at the magnitude of the body of men (p. 171)
which met in the field of Shrewsbury.[164] It must be remembered that
the King did not "go down" from the seat of government with 14,000
men; but that the army with which he hastened to crush the rising
rebellion consisted only of the troops at the head of whom he was
marching towards the north, of the body then under the Prince of Wales
on the borders, and of those who could be gathered together on the
exigence of the moment by the royal proclamation. It must be borne
also in mind that (according to all probability) barely four days
elapsed between the first intimation which reached the King's ears of
the rebellion of the Percies, and the desperate conflict which crushed
them. As we have already seen, the King, only on the 10th of July,
(scarcely eleven days before that decisive struggle,) believed himself
to be on his road northward to join "his beloved and loyal"
Northumberland and Hotspur against the Scots.
[Footnote 164: Mr. Pennant, in his interesting
account of Owyn Glyndowr's life, (though he appears
to have been very diligent in collecting
traditionary materials for the work,) represents
King Henry to have "made an expeditious march to
Burton on Trent, on his way _against the northern
rebels_," _the Percies_; when, on hearing of
Hotspur having come southward, he turned to meet
him.]
The Prince of Wales, who, as we infer, first apprised the King of this
rising peril, was on the Welsh borders, near Shrewsbury; and he formed
a junction with his father,--but where, and on what day, is not known.
Very probably the first intimation that Henry of Monmouth himself (p. 172)
had of the hostile designs of the Percies, was the sudden departure of
the Earl of Worcester, his guardian, who unexpectedly left the Prince's
retinue, and, taking his own dependents with him, joined Hotspur.
At all events, delay would have added every hour to the imminent peril
of the royal cause, and probably Hotspur's impetuosity seconded the
King's manifest policy of hastening an immediate engagement; and thus
the "sorry battle of Shrewsbury" was fought by the united forces of
the King and the Prince on the one side, and the forces of Hotspur and
his uncle the Earl of Worcester on the other, unassisted by Glyndowr.
That the opposed parties engaged in "Heyteley Field,"[165] near that
town, is placed beyond question. With regard to their relative position
immediately before the battle, there is no inconsiderable doubt. Some
say that the King's army reached the town and took possession of the
castle on the Friday, only three hours before Hotspur arrived: others,
following Walsingham, represent Hotspur as having arrived first, (p. 173)
and being in the very act of assaulting the town, when the sudden,
unexpected appearance of the royal banner advancing made him desist
from that attempt, and face the King's forces. Be this as it may, on
Saturday the 21st of July, the two hostile armies were drawn up in
array against each other in Hateley Field, ready to rush to the struggle
on which the fate of England was destined much to depend. Whether any
manifesto were sent from Hotspur, or not, it is certain that the King
made an effort to prevent the desperate conflict, and the unnecessary
shedding of so much Christian blood. He despatched the Abbot of
Shrewsbury and the Clerk of the Privy Seal to Hotspur's lines, with
offers of pardon even then, would they return to their allegiance.
Hotspur was much moved by this act of grace, and sent his uncle, the
Earl of Worcester, to negociate. This man has been called the origin
of all the mischief; and he is said so to have addressed the King, and
so to have misinterpreted his mild and considerate conversation, "who
condescended, in his desire of reconciliation, even below the royal
dignity," that both parties were incensed the more, and resolved
instantly to try their strength. The onset was made by the archers of
Hotspur, whose tremendous volleys caused dreadful carnage among the
King's troops. "They fell," says Walsingham, "as the leaves fall on
the ground after a frosty night at the approach of winter. There (p. 174)
was no room for the arrows to reach the ground, every one struck a
mortal man." The King's bowmen also did their duty. A rumour, spreading
through the host, that the King had fallen, shook the steadiness and
confidence of his partisans, and many took to flight; the royal presence,
however, in every part of the engagement soon rallied his men. Hotspur
and Douglas seemed anxious to fight neither with small nor great, but
with the King only;[166] though they mowed down his ranks, making
alleys, as in a field of corn, in their eagerness to reach him. He
was, we are told, unhorsed again and again; but returned to the charge
with increased impetuosity. His standard-bearer was killed at his
side, and the standard thrown down. At length the Earl of Dunbar
forced him away from the post which he had taken. Henry of Monmouth,
though he was then no novice in martial deeds, yet had never before
been engaged on any pitched-battle field; and here he did his duty
valiantly. He was wounded in the face by an arrow; but, so far from
allowing himself to be removed on that account to a place of safety,
he urged his friends to lead him into the very hottest of the conflict.
Elmham records his address: whether they are the very words he (p. 175)
uttered, or such only as he was likely to have used, they certainly
suit his character: "My lords, far be from me such disgrace, as that,
like a poltroon, I should stain my noviciate in arms by flight. If the
Prince flies, who will wait to end the battle? Believe it, to be carried
back before victory would be to me a perpetual death! Lead me, I
implore you, to the very face of the foe. I may not say to my friends,
'Go ye on first to the fight.' Be it mine to say, 'Follow me, my
friends.'" The next time we hear of Henry of Monmouth is as an agent
of mercy. The personal conflict between him and Hotspur, into the
description of which Shakspeare has infused so full a share of his
powers of song, has no more substantial origin than the poet's own
imagination. Percy fell by an unknown hand, and his death decided the
contest. The cry, "Henry Percy is dead!" which the royalists raised,
was the signal for utter confusion and flight.[167] The number of the
slain on either side is differently reported. When the two armies met,
the King's was superior in numbers, but Hotspur's far more abounded in
gentle blood. The greater part of the gentlemen of Cheshire fell on
that day. On the King's part,[168] except the Earl of Stafford and (p. 176)
Sir Walter Blount, few names of note are reckoned among the slain.
[Footnote 165: That the battle was fought in
Hateley Field is proved by a document containing a
grant by patent (10 Hen. IV.) of two acres of land
for ever to Richard Huse (Hussey), Esquire, for two
chaplains to chant mass for the prosperity of the
King during his life, and for his soul afterwards,
and for all his progenitors, and for the souls of
them who died in that battle and were there
interred, and for the souls of all Christians, in a
new chapel to be built on the ground. See Sir
Harris Nicolas' preface to vol. i. p. 53.]
[Footnote 166: The story that Henry adopted the
unchivalrous expedient of fighting in disguise,
arraying several persons, especially the Earl of
Stafford and Sir Walter Blount, in royal armour,
seems altogether fabulous.]
[Footnote 167: The Scots fled, the Welshmen ran,
the traitors were overcome; then neither woods
letted, nor hills stopped, the fearful hearts of
them that were vanquished.--Hall.]
[Footnote 168: Hume says, most unadvisedly, "the
persons of greatest distinction who fell on that
day were on the King's side."]
The Earl of Worcester, Lord Douglas, and Sir Richard Vernon, fell into
the hands of the King; they were kept prisoners till the next Monday,
when Worcester and Vernon were beheaded. The Earl's head was sent up
to London on the 25th (the following Wednesday), by the bearer of the
royal mandate, commanding it to be placed upon London bridge.
Thus ended the "sad and sorry field of Shrewsbury."[169] The battle
appeared to be the archetype of that cruel conflict which in the (p. 177)
middle of the century almost annihilated the ancient nobility of England.
Fabyan says, "it was more to be noted vengeable, for there the father was
slain of the son, and the son of the father."
[Footnote 169: The Pell Rolls, so called from the
pells, or skins, on rolls of which accounts of the
royal receipts and expenditure used to be kept, are
preserved both in the Chapter House of Westminster,
and also in duplicate at the Exchequer Office in
Whitehall. The Author had every facility afforded
him of examining them at his leisure; and doubtless
these documents contain much valuable information,
throwing light as well on the national affairs of
the times to which they belong, as on the more
private history of monarchs and people. This is
evident to every one on inspecting the records of
any one year. But at the same time they read a
lesson, clear and sound, on the indispensable
necessity of constant care, and circumspection, and
sifting scrutiny, before reliance be placed on them
as evidence conclusive, and beyond appeal. The
Author of these Memoirs entered upon an examination
of the original documents, fully aware that the
date of payment with reference to any fact could
never be adduced in evidence that the event took
place at the time the entry was made, but only that
it had taken place before that time. Thus, a debt
due to the Prince, or one in command under him, at
the siege of a castle in Wales, or to tradesmen and
merchants for supplying the forces with provisions,
or to messengers sent with all speed bearing
despatches to the castle during the siege, might
remain unpaid for several years. He was, however,
at the same time under an impression that the sum
was recorded on the day of payment; at all events,
that payments with reference to any insulated fact
could not have been recorded as having been made
before that fact had transpired. In both these
points, however, he was mistaken. Payments were
registered not only long after the day on which
they were made, but absolutely _before the event
had taken place_ to which they refer, and which
could not have been anticipated by any human
foresight. Thus, not only is payment recorded as
having been made to Hotspur nearly five months
after his death, and to the Earl of Worcester,
twelve weeks after he was beheaded, for expenses
incurred by him in bringing the King's consort from
Brittany to England in the January preceding, but
absolutely the payment of messengers sent
throughout the kingdom to announce Henry Percy's
death and the defeat of the rebels near Shrewsbury,
and to order all ferries and passages to be watched
to prevent the escape of the rebels, is recorded as
having been made on the 17th of July 1403, FOUR
DAYS BEFORE THE BATTLE TOOK PLACE, and the very day
on which the King wrote to his council, informing
them of the rebellion, before he could himself
possibly have anticipated the place or time of any
engagement, much less the successful issue of such
a struggle with the rebels. The fact is, these
accounts were not kept with the regularity of a
modern banking-house; and the entries of what may
have been omitted were made at the audits, from
rough minutes and account-books. Thus mistakes as
to the date of actual payment probably were not
rare. The Pell Rolls are useful assistants; they
must not be followed implicitly as guides.]