THE CRIMEAN WAR;--PALMERSTON PRIME MINISTER, 1855.
The war began in earnest with the naval conflict at Sinope. It was a
terrible deed, and done, we must say, altogether in revenge. The English
and French fleets had gone up the Dardanelles, and by doing so had
offended the proud nature of Nicholas past all immediate forgiveness.
The Russian ships came out from Sebastopol, and, after hovering about
the Black Sea for a fortnight, to see, probably, whether the combined
fleet would interfere, and finding that the small Turkish squadron lying
at Sinope was at their mercy, went in and destroyed it altogether. “It
was believed by men in authority,” says Mr. Kinglake, “that 4,000 Turks
were killed, and that less than 400 survived, and that all these were
wounded.”[L]
England was full of wrath, and nothing would appease her anger but a
conviction that now, let the Prime Minister say what he would, we should
fight Russia. Looking back on the circumstance over many years, we must
acknowledge that the Emperor of Russia had on his side any legal rights
which a state of war can give. He, out of his own mad sense of power,
had crossed the Pruth, and we,--the French, that is, and
ourselves,--had on the part of our allies taken our fleets up to
Constantinople. The Russians had returned back across the Pruth; but
Nicholas refused to say that he would give up his idea of a
protectorate. The allies had therefore gone with their fleets into the
Black Sea, and there could be no doubt that a state of war existed. But
the Russian Admiral had six or seven ships of the line on the spot,
whereas the Turks had but seven frigates. There was no hope for them,
but still they fought bravely while they had a gun to fight, and
perished at last almost to a man. Our fleet, the meanwhile, was lying at
the Bosphorus, and all England was angry. Nothing but war could now
serve to quiet the minds of Englishmen.
On the 10th of December, 1853, Lord Palmerston wrote to the Prime
Minister, recommending that we in England should at once prepare to
fight;--“What I would strongly recommend, therefore, is that which I
proposed some months ago to the Cabinet, namely, that the Russian
Government and the Russian Admiral at Sebastopol should be informed that
so long as Russian troops occupy the Principalities, or hold a position
in any other part of the Turkish territory, no Russian ships of war can
be allowed to show themselves out of port in the Black Sea.” Lord
Aberdeen declined the advice thus given, and on the 15th Lord Palmerston
resigned. But the Government could not go on without him. “In truth,”
says Mr. Kinglake, “he was gifted with the instinct which enables a man
to read the heart of a nation.”[M] He was no sooner gone than the
Cabinet in his absence did decide upon sending the fleet into the Black
Sea; and then the resignation was withdrawn. Lord Aberdeen wrote to him
as follows;--“I am glad to find that you approve of a recent decision
of the Cabinet with respect to the British and French fleets, adopted in
your absence. I feel sure you will have learnt with pleasure that,
whether you are absent or present, the Government are duly careful to
preserve from all injury the interests and dignity of the country.” On
the 7th of February the Russian Ambassador was recalled, and troops were
immediately sent to the East. Then there was a dinner given to Sir
Charles Napier at the Reform Club, for which Lord Palmerston was held to
be specially responsible. It was not, perhaps, done in the best taste or
with the most correct judgment. A triumphant banquet to a conquering
hero should follow, and not precede, the victories to be celebrated.
Lord Palmerston presided, and was very triumphant and very jocund. He
told stories of all that the Admiral had done in the Mediterranean and
elsewhere, and suggested all that he would do in the Baltic. Mr. Bright
fell very foul of him, and perhaps deservedly. Lord Palmerston retorted
on Mr. Bright with severity, and a considerable amount of ill-feeling
was engendered. Mr. Bright belonged then, as now, to the Peace party,
and found an ample scope for attack in the loud joy of a Minister who
was exciting his fellow-countrymen to war; and, undoubtedly, he had the
best of it in the end, as Sir Charles did not return triumphant.
The British troops now flocked into Turkey, and the transit across from
Varna to the Crimean Peninsula was quickly achieved. On the 14th of
September the first detachments of the English and French armies landed,
and a few days later the battle of the Alma was fought and won. We can
still remember the feeling of triumph with which the news was heard, and
the spirit of conquest which was enhanced by the false tidings,
believed at the time, that Sebastopol also had fallen. England did think
for a few hours that she had already done that which was to cost her
twelve months of heart-rending anxieties, many millions of taxes, and
woe beyond measure. Hitherto, as we have read the records of the
preparations for the campaign, it has appeared that Lord Palmerston, as
Home Secretary, has had more to do with the war than any other Minister.
But he escaped the personal annoyance to which those were subjected who
had the management of the details in their hands, and who were supposed
to be responsible for what was amiss. But the time was soon to come in
which he would cease to be an underling;--and then, such was his luck,
all things went well.
After the battle of the Alma things did not go prosperously. England,
when she was brought back from the feeling of triumph which had almost
overpowered her on the false report of the fall of Sebastopol, expected
that though the stronghold had not yet fallen into her hands, it should
be made to do so very quickly. She was unreasonable in the severity with
which she treated her servants, both civil and military, at home and in
the Crimea. England, not being accustomed to war on a great scale for
the last forty years, could not at first carry it on as though she were
used to it, and accused all her servants of “routine,” “red tape,”
blundering, and ignorance. We can look back now and see that such were
the charges made by the austere mistress, and remember the names of Lord
Raglan and the Duke of Newcastle with affection and respect, though we
broke the heart of the one and the spirit of the other by our usage. But
if the servants are noble-minded, as is generally the case with English
servants in high places, even when broken-hearted, they leave examples
behind them which instigate others to renewed efforts.
When the tidings of failures came Lord John Russell was himself the
first to declare that his own colleague at the War Department was unfit
for his position. That colleague was the unfortunate Duke of Newcastle,
and Lord John recommended that “before Parliament meets Lord Palmerston
should be entrusted with the seals of the War Department.” Lord
Aberdeen, however, declined to dismiss the Duke of Newcastle, and then
Mr. Roebuck moved for the appointment of a Select Committee to inquire
into the condition of our army. Lord John immediately resigned, by no
means with the good-will of his colleagues. Lord John had been leader of
the House, and on his desertion the defence of Lord Aberdeen and of the
Duke of Newcastle was left to Lord Palmerston. He said, which was true
enough, that our misfortunes had come from the inexperience caused by a
long peace. The House divided on Mr. Roebuck’s motion, and the Ministry
were defeated by a great majority. It was found that 305 members
followed Mr. Roebuck into the lobby against only 148, who supported the
Government. It was clear, at any rate, that Lord Aberdeen must resign.
But though Lord Palmerston must resign also with his chief, and appeared
for the time as the second in command of a beaten army, it was to him a
moment of great triumph. There was no longer a question whether he
should again serve under Lord John or with Lord John, or whether he
should be compelled on behalf of his country to serve under one whose
general politics were so distasteful to him as those of Lord Aberdeen.
Lord Derby was at once invited to form a Government,--but in vain. He
applied to Lord Palmerston to help him; but it was not thus, we can
fancy, that Lord Palmerston saw his way through the future troubles.
Lord Derby could well understand that if he were to be a successful
Prime Minister in a War Cabinet, he must have Lord Palmerston as his
right-hand man. But it was not so long since this same Lord Derby, then
Lord Stanley, had brought against him in the House of Lords the
bitterness of the Don Pacifico arraignment. It was not that this would
have stood in Palmerston’s way, had it been possible for him to have
thrown his heart into the work in conjunction with Lord Derby. But such
a conjunction cannot be always attained by mere volition. Political
coalitions are never firm, because they are formed of individual men,
and each man has a heart in his bosom in which he carries his memories
of the past as well as his hopes for the future. “I have come to the
conclusion,” he said, “that if I were to join your Government, as
proposed by you, I should not give to that Government that strength
which you are good enough to think would accrue to you from my
acceptance of office.” Lord John was then sent for, and made the
attempt. Lord Clarendon and others of the party would not serve with
him, though Lord Palmerston had consented to do so. Lord John, in
telling Lord Palmerston of his failure, offered to serve with him,
should the Queen require his services. There was no other alternative.
Indeed there was no other man than Lord Palmerston in England who could
have carried on the war. The Queen sent for him, and Lord John did join
him.
“ ... Quod optanti Divûm promittere nemo
Auderet, volvenda dies en attulit ultro.”
It was thus he signified his final triumph to his brother,--or intended
so to signify it, but quoted the passage wrongly.
There is in this a boyish feeling of the happiness of success. And yet
he was seventy years old. We cannot fancy such an expression coming from
Lord John or Lord Aberdeen. Though either had felt it, he could not have
so written to his brother. Here I am at last,--Prime Minister of
England, in spite of all accidents. My old friend, Lord John, turned me
out of the Foreign Office the other day. And I was obliged to go at his
bidding. And I had a bad quarter of an hour in the House of Commons
when, for reasons which are always paramount with an Englishman, I was
unable to take my own part. They said I was crushed. “There was a
Palmerston.” But when these times of war had come, I was wanted, And now
my Lord John is my lieutenant. All that was not loudly expressed in the
“volvenda dies en attulit ultro;” but it was understood both by the
writer and by his brother. And he goes on: “Here am I, writing to you
from Downing Street as First Lord of the Treasury. The fact was, that
Aberdeen and Newcastle had become discredited in public estimation as
Statesmen equal to the emergency; Derby felt conscious of the incapacity
of the greater portion of his party, and their unfitness to govern the
country; and John Russell, by the way in which he suddenly abandoned the
Government, had so lost caste for the moment that I was the only one of
his political friends who was willing to serve under him.” “I think our
Government will do very well. I am backed by the general opinion of the
whole country, and I have no reason to complain of the least want of
cordiality or confidence on the part of the Court.” Lord Aberdeen had
himself done his best to make the matter easy for Lord Palmerston. I
quote the following words from the “Life of the Prince Consort” (vol.
iii. p. 209);--“Lord Palmerston had good reason to appreciate the
generosity with which his old chief had interposed to remove this
formidable impediment to his success.” Nor was Her Majesty less
grateful; and in her letter, 6th of February, announcing to Lord
Aberdeen that Lord Palmerston had just kissed hands upon his appointment
as Premier, she told him that she was now relieved from great anxiety
and difficulty, and felt that she owed much to Lord Aberdeen’s kind and
disinterested assistance. Then he states the terms which he intends to
propose to the enemy, and in doing so prophesies the future almost
exactly. “We must also _ask_ for the destruction of the works at
Sebastopol, although we should not make that a _sine quâ non_ unless we
had taken the place and had destroyed the works ourselves.”
A majority of the House of Commons, led by Mr. Roebuck, and with the
people of the country to back them, insisted on inquiry, on punishment,
on improvement, and increased activity. We still remember how “red tape”
and “routine” were in all our mouths. Mail after mail brought home news
of increased suffering. Palmerston had become Prime Minister in
February, 1855, and it was during the winter then drawing to its close
that the sufferings and struggles of the Army had been most intense.
Balaclava had been fought in October; the battle of Mount Inkerman in
November; the great storm was on the 14th of that month; and, as the
winter wore on, tidings of the difficulties of transit from Balaclava to
the heights reached us,--and at last the road was made. It was in the
middle of all these difficulties that Palmerston had become Prime
Minister, and that Mr. Roebuck urged on his committee. Sir James Graham,
Mr. Gladstone, and Mr. Sydney Herbert then retired; but others came in
their places, and Lord Palmerston still went on; and during all the
misery of the time,--for England was miserable with the sense of
failure, or, at least, of performance not perfected,--he never quailed,
or expressed any diffidence as to the work to which he had been called.
It was the nature of the man not to be diffident, and therefore he
succeeded. His courage was coarse and strong and indomitable, like that
of a dog. We should say that he never trembled, even when he laid his
head upon his pillow, because of the task imposed upon him. He would go
on, having England at his back, and did not doubt but that the country
would be found standing on its legs when the struggle should come to an
end. I do not know that there was any one concerned in the matter whose
heart was exactly of the same calibre. It was the very type of health,
unadorned,--as also unalloyed,--by romance or high feeling, or poetry,
or even sentiment.
In the midst of these things, in the early spring, the Emperor Nicholas
died,--died broken-hearted, a victim to his own pride; but the contest
went on the same as ever.
A second conference, to which Lord John went on the part of England, was
held at Vienna, to arrange, if possible, the terms of peace, and to fix
the four principal headings,--the condition of the Principalities, the
navigation of the Danube, the power which Russia was to assume, or not
to assume, in the Black Sea, and the independence of the Porte. In his
operations there Lord John was held by the country to have failed.
Indeed, he had never really succeeded in any political effort since the
day on which he had ventured to dismiss Lord Palmerston. And yet Lord
Palmerston had been true to him. Lord Palmerston had never opposed him
since the great blow by which he had turned him out on the Militia Bill.
In truth, the people had not been with him, and had ceased to trust him.
But to the other man the people had been true throughout. Lord
Palmerston had no capability for thought equal to that of which Lord
John was the master; but he possessed an instinctive sympathy with the
masses which supported him to the end of his days.
The Vienna Conference was broken up, but the war still was carried on,
certainly with the most exemplary care on the part of the septuagenarian
Prime Minister. He writes as follows to Lord Panmure, the Minister for
War;--“This is capital news from the Sea of Azoff, and the extensive
destruction of magazines and supplies in the towns attacked must greatly
cripple the Russian army in the Crimea. I am very sorry, however, to see
so sad an account of the health of the Sardinians, and I strongly
recommend you to urge Raglan, by telegraph to-day, to move the Sardinian
camp to some other and healthier situation. Such prevalence of disease
as the telegraphic message mentions must be the effect of some local
cause.” “As the cholera seems to be increasing among the troops, I
should advise you to send for the doctor I mentioned.” “We are 40,000
men short of the number voted by Parliament, and we shall be without the
shadow of an excuse if we do not resort to every possible means and
every possible quarter to complete our force to the number which
Parliament has authorized.” “Do not forget to suggest to our
commissariat people in the Black Sea that large supplies of oxen to be
eaten, and of horses to be ridden and to draw, may be derived from the
country on the eastern shore of the Sea of Azoff.” “It would be well
also to point their attention to the projecting neck of land or island
called Krassnoi, in the Bay of Perekop, which is said to abound in sheep
and hay.” From these quotations it will be seen how sleepless was his
watchfulness, and how minute his attentions to the affairs of the war.
He writes to his brother in August of the same year, and speaks of the
probable fall of Sebastopol. “Our danger will then begin--a danger of
peace, and not a danger of war.” “I must try to fight the battle of
negotiation as well as the battle of war, and, fortunately, the spirit
of the English nation will support us. I wish I could reckon with equal
confidence on the steady determination of the French.”
In September Sebastopol had fallen, and the difficulties did in truth
begin. He had now to contend not only with Russia, but with Austria and
also with France. It is said of course that his spirit of contention was
simply interference, and that in all things he wrote and spoke as a
bully. It is difficult indeed to defend his manner; but that which he
desired to get, he desired honestly. He desired it always on behalf of
his country, and he usually got it. He writes as follows in January,
1856, to our Ambassador at Vienna;--“My dear Seymour,--Buol’s statement
to you the night before last was what, in plain English, we should call
impertinent. We are happily not yet in such a condition that an Austrian
minister should bid us sign a treaty without hesitation or conditions.
The Cabinet of Vienna, forsooth, must insist upon our doing so! Why,
really our friend Buol must have had his head turned by his success at
St. Petersburg, and quite forgot whom he was addressing such language
to.” “We know the exhaustion, the internal pressure, difficulties, and
distress of Russia quite as well as Buol does; but we know better than
he does our own resources and strength. He may rest assured, however,
that we have no wish to continue the war for the prospect of what we may
accomplish another year, if we can now obtain peace upon the conditions
which we deem absolutely necessary and essential; but we are quite
prepared to go on if such conditions cannot be obtained. The British
nation is unanimous in this matter. I say unanimous, for I cannot reckon
Cobden, Bright, and Co. for anything.” And he was right. The British
nation did support him, and, in spite of Mr. Cobden and Mr. Bright,
would have supported no minister who had acted otherwise. The Emperor of
the French, now that the war was over,--now rather when it was possible
to bring it to an end,--was desirous of softening the terms for Russia.
But England was not specially desirous,--was not in a hurry. England was
better able to continue the fight than she had been to begin it, and was
by no means willing to give up any of those points for which she had
expended her blood and her money. It had cost her fifty millions and
25,000 men. Having paid so dearly for her whistle, she was determined to
have as much of it as might be possible. Therefore it must, I think, be
admitted, that Lord Palmerston, in his arrogance, showed no more than
the concentrated essence of an Englishman. It may be said that the
feeling of the country was bulldog, turbulent, arrogant, and headstrong;
but it was honest, and in all that it did it was guided by the feeling
that each man should have that which was properly his own.
It would be vain in such a memoir as this to go back to the question of
the right or wrong of the Crimean War. Lord Clarendon wittily declared
that we had “drifted” into it. The word has been considered happy, and,
since our passion on the subject has been over, has been used
extensively to indicate our own folly in the matter. But if we had not
gone to war, together with our French allies, would not Nicholas have
been allowed to drift into Constantinople? It has been one of the chief
efforts of Europe in the present century to restrain the ambition of the
Czar of Russia. Whether this has or has not been a wise desire need not
be discussed here. But it will, I think, be admitted, that when the
Emperor’s troops had crossed the Pruth and occupied a position on
Turkish territory, they would not have receded without doing something
on their master’s behalf--unless they had been made to do so. Lord
Aberdeen had thought that they could be made to go back by the force of
argument. And the Czar had thought that he need not go back without
gaining some portion of his road to Constantinople, because Lord
Aberdeen’s thoughts had been of so peaceful a nature. Therefore Lord
Palmerston was put into Lord Aberdeen’s place, and the Czar had to go
back--with terrible consequences to himself. How it might have ended had
the English people been less turbulent and headstrong, it would require
a wise man to say. But had not Palmerston been there to their hand, some
other Prime Minister would have been found to do the work, and to do it
probably with less skill in the management.
The feelings of England with regard to Turkey, and also in regard to
Russia, have changed since the Crimean War. And there has been reason
for the change. At that time it had been the intention of the Emperor
Nicholas gradually to swallow the Sultan’s dominions,--to swallow them,
or to have them swallowed by some other confederate and hungry animal.
We all remember, as though it were yesterday, the proposal for the
partition of the sick man’s goods. The suggestion did not suit us. But
as we would have none of these goods for ourselves, neither would we
permit another to take them. We felt that for us Russia would be a more
dangerous occupant of the Eastern Mediterranean than Turkey. And though
we thought but little of the Mahommedan, we thought almost less of the
Russian Christian. It was, at any rate, indispensable for our purposes
that the Turk should be maintained. The half of the population of Turkey
in Europe were Christians, whom we thought to be as near to civilization
as the Muscovite from further North; and we flattered ourselves that it
might be possible for us to teach them and their Mahommedan compatriots
some touch of better manners. With the Russian we conceived that we
could do nothing. There was much of mistaken vanity in this, because we
had told ourselves that this people, thoroughly averse to us in customs,
might be tamed and reduced and made like ourselves by the execution of a
few treaties and the loan of a good deal of money. They took our money,
and increased their harems, and laughed at our treaties. But still we
had gained our object in this, that the Turk and not the Russian owned,
and was likely to own, Constantinople. We had beaten back the Russian,
to whom, though we did not begrudge him the power to increase his
borders in Asia,--except in our own special direction,--we did refuse
any advance in Europe. With these ideas, and on this theory, we went to
war, and as we were by treaty the joint protectors of Turkey, the war
was surely justifiable. Whether we got a good investment for our fifty
millions, and, also, for our 25,000 English lives, is a question which
we cannot now settle. The way in which it is settled by each individual
depends on his own occupation in life. Does he breed cattle, or does he
make carpets?
But in the quarter of a century which has passed since the Crimean War
the Turk has done very much to make the blood of an Englishman boil. We
lent him money on the promise of certain performances. He has spent our
money, but has performed none of his promises. We have called upon him
again and again to reform, and he has replied by expressing his desire
for more money. He has done nothing to change his habits, and has only
proved to us that a Mahommedan Turk cannot become a good Christian.
And this is the man for whom we expended 25,000 lives in war and fifty
millions in war expenses, for which we have no claim on any one,--and
many other millions in loans, as to which it would be better for our
peace of mind if also we had no claim! The Mahommedan must certainly be
made to go out of Europe, but it must be by slow degrees, and not at the
instance of a despotic Emperor, who, under the name of a religious
protectorate, would take possession of the country. Let any one who is
still unhappy on the score of Turkey take the modern map of Europe, and
compare the lines as they are drawn now and as they were drawn sixty
years ago. He will see that the banishment of the Turk has not been so
very slow.
Not, therefore, from dislike to Turkish rule should the English reader
decide that the war into which he will have been told we had drifted,
was inexpedient or more expensive than has been justified by the objects
attained. That war was essentially one of Lord Palmerston’s making. He
advised it, commenced it, carried it on, and completed it. His
hand--instant, urgent, and pressing--is to be seen in it throughout. We
cannot yet say that it was all wise. It may well be that the world shall
never be able to say with any certainty whether it was wise or foolish;
but as far as the world has gone yet, no verdict has been given against
it.