sprung, not like the general evils of war, from the execution of great
and calculated plans of a political or military kind, but must have had
their source in a temper naturally passionate and vindictive. The Duc
d'Enghien's murder was at the head of this list; a gratuitous act of
treachery and cruelty, which, being undeniable, led Napoleon to be
believed capable of other crimes of a secret and bloody character--of
the murder of Pichegru and of Wright--of the spiriting away of Mr.
Windham, who was never afterwards heard of--and of other actions of
similar atrocity. We pause before charging him with any of those which
have not been distinctly proved. For while it is certain that he had a
love of personal vengeance--proper, it is said, to his country--it is
equally evident, that, vehement by temperament, he was lenient and calm
by policy; and that, if he had indulged the former disposition, the
security with which he might have done so, together with the ready
agency of his fatal police, would have made his rage resemble that of
one of the Roman emperors. He was made sensible, too late, of the
general odium drawn upon him by the murder of the Duc d'Enghien, and
does not seem to have been disposed to incur farther risks of popular
hatred in prosecution of his individual resentment. The records of his
police, however, and the persecutions experienced by those whom Napoleon
considered as his personal enemies, show that, by starts at least,
nature resumed her bent, and that he, upon whom there was no restraint,
save his respect for public opinion, gave way occasionally to the
temptation of avenging his private injuries. He remarked it as a
weakness in the character of his favourite Cæsar, that he suffered his
enemies to remain in possession of the power to injure him; and
Antommarchi, the reporter of the observation, admitted, that when he
looked on the person before him, he could not but acknowledge that _he_
was unlikely to fall into such an error.[295]
When Napoleon laid aside reserve, and spoke what were probably his true
sentiments, he endeavoured to justify those acts of his government which
transgressed the rules of justice and morality, by political necessity,
and reasons of state; or, in other words, by the pressure of his own
interest. This, however, was a plea, the full benefit of which he
reserved to vindicate his own actions, never permitting it to be used by
any other sovereign. He considered _himself_ privileged in transgressing
the law of nations, when his interests required it; but pleaded as
warmly upon the validity of public law, when alleging it had been
infringed by other states, as if he himself had in all instances
respected its doctrines as inviolable.
But although Napoleon thus at times referred to state necessity as the
ultimate source of actions otherwise unjustifiable, he more frequently
endeavoured to disguise his errors by denial, or excuse them by
apologies which had no foundation. He avers in his Will,[296] that by
the confession of the Duc d'Enghien, the Comte d'Artois maintained sixty
assassins against his life;[297] and that for this reason the Duc
d'Enghien was tried, convicted, and put to death. The examination of the
duke bears no such confession, but, on the contrary, an express denial
of the whole of the alleged system; nor was there the slightest attempt
made to contradict him by other testimony. He bequeathed, in like
manner, a legacy to a villain[298] who had attempted the assassination
of the Duke of Wellington; the assassin, according to his strange
argument, having as good a right to kill his rival and victor, as the
English had to detain him prisoner at St. Helena. This clause in the
last will of a dying man, is not striking from its atrocity merely, but
from the inaccuracy of the moral reasoning which it exhibits. Napoleon
has drawn a parallel betwixt two cases, which must be therefore both
right or both wrong. If both were wrong, why reward the ruffian with a
legacy? but if both were right, why complain of the British Government
for detaining him at St. Helena?
But, indeed, the whole character of Napoleon's autobiography marks his
desire to divide mankind into two classes--his friends and his
enemies;--the former of whom are to be praised and vindicated; the
latter to be vilified, censured, and condemned, without any regard to
truth, justice, or consistency. To take a gross example, he stoutly
affirmed, that the treasures which were removed from Paris in April
1814, and carried to Orleans, were seized and divided by the ministers
of the allied powers--Talleyrand, Metternich, Hardenberg, and
Castlereagh; and that the money thus seized included the
marriage-portion of the Empress Maria Louisa.[299] Had this story been
true, it would have presented Napoleon with a very simple means of
avenging himself upon Lord Castlereagh, by putting the British public in
possession of the secret.
It is no less remarkable, that Napoleon, though himself a soldier, and a
distinguished one, could never allow a tribute of candid praise to the
troops and generals by whom he was successively opposed. In mentioning
his victories, he frequently bestows commendation upon the valour and
conduct of the vanquished. This was an additional and more delicate mode
of praising himself and his own troops by whom these enemies were
overthrown. But he never allows any merit to those by whom he was
defeated in turn. He professes never to have seen the Prussian troops
behave well save at Jena, or the Russians save at Austerlitz. Those
armies of the same nations, which he both saw and felt in the campaigns
of 1812 and 1813, and before whom he made such disastrous retreats as
those of Moscow and Leipsic, were, according to his expressions, mere
_canaille_.
In the same manner, when he details an action in which he triumphed, he
is sure to boast, like the old Grecian (very justly perhaps,) that in
this Fortune had no share; while his defeats are entirely and
exclusively attributed to the rage of the elements, the combination of
some most extraordinary and unexpected circumstances, the failure of
some of his lieutenants or maréchals, or, finally, the obstinacy of the
general opposed, who, by mere dint of stupidity, blundered into success
through circumstances which should have ensured his ruin.
In a word, from one end of Napoleon's works to the other, he has
scarcely allowed himself to be guilty of a single fault or a single
folly, excepting of that kind, which, arising from an over confidence
and generosity, men secretly claim as merits, while they affect to give
them up as matters of censure. If we credit his own word, we must
believe him to have been a faultless and impeccable being. If we do not,
we must set him down as one that, where his own reputation was
concerned, told his story with a total disregard to candour and truth.
Perhaps it was a consequence of the same indifference to truth, which
induced Napoleon to receive into his favour those French officers who
broke their parole by escape from England. This, he alleged, he did, by
way of retaliation, the British Government having, as he pretended,
followed a similar line of conduct. The defence is false, in point of
fact; but if it were true, it forms no apology for a sovereign and a
general countenancing a breach of honour in a gentleman and a soldier.
The French officers who liberated themselves by such means, were not the
less dishonoured men, and unfit to bear command in the army of France,
though they could have pointed with truth to similar examples of infamy
in England.
But the most extraordinary instance of Napoleon's deceptive system, and
of his determination, at all events, to place himself under the most
favourable light to the beholders, is his attempt to represent himself
as the friend and protector of liberal and free principles. He had
destroyed every vestige of liberty in France--he had persecuted as
ideologists all who cherished its memory--he had boasted himself the
restorer of monarchical government--the war between the
Constitutionalists and him, covered, after the return from Elba, by a
hollow truce, had been renewed, and the Liberalists had expelled him
from the capital--he had left in his Testament, the appellation of
_traitor_ with La Fayette, one of their earliest, most devoted, and most
sincere chiefs--yet, notwithstanding all this constant opposition to the
party which professes most to be guided by them, he has ventured to
represent himself as a friend of liberal ideas! He has done so, and he
has been believed.
There is but one explanation of this. The friends of revolution are upon
principle the enemies of ancient and established governments--Napoleon
became the opponent of the established powers from circumstances; not
because he disputed the character of their government, but because they
would not admit him into their circle; and though there was not, and
could not be, any real connexion betwixt his system and that of the
Liberalists, yet both had the same opponents, and each loved in the
other the enemy of their enemies. It was the business of Napoleon in his
latter days, to procure, if professions could gain it, the sympathy and
good opinion of any or every class of politicians; while, on the
contrary, it could not be indifferent to those to whom he made advances,
to number among their disciples, even in the twelfth hour, the name of
Napoleon. It resembled what sometimes happens in the Catholic Church,
when a wealthy and powerful sinner on his death-bed receives the
absolution of the Church on easy terms, and dies after a life spent in
licentious courses, wrapt up in the mantle, and girded with the cord, of
some order of unusual strictness. Napoleon, living a despot and a
conqueror, has had his memory consecrated and held up to admiration by
men, who term themselves emphatically the friends of freedom.
The faults of Buonaparte, we conclude as we commenced, were rather those
of the sovereign and politician, than of the individual. Wisely is it
written, that "if we say we have no sin we deceive ourselves, and the
truth is not in us." It was the inordinate force of ambition which made
him the scourge of Europe; it was his efforts to disguise that selfish
principle, that made him combine fraud with force, and establish a
regular system for deceiving those whom he could not subdue. Had his
natural disposition been coldly cruel, like that of Octavius, or had he
given way to the warmth of his temper, like other despots, his private
history, as well as that of his campaigns, must have been written in
letters of blood. If, instead of asserting that he never committed a
crime, he had limited his self-eulogy to asserting, that in attaining
and wielding supreme power, he had resisted the temptation to commit
many, he could not have been contradicted. And this is no small praise.
His system of government was false in the extreme. It comprehended the
slavery of France, and aimed at the subjugation of the world. But to the
former he did much to requite them for the jewel of which he robbed
them. He gave them a regular government, schools, institutions, courts
of justice, and a code of laws. In Italy, his rule was equally splendid
and beneficial. The good effects which arose to other countries from his
reign and character, begin also to be felt, though unquestionably they
are not of the kind which he intended to produce. His invasions, tending
to reconcile the discords which existed in many states between the
governors and governed, by teaching them to unite together against a
common enemy, have gone far to loosen the feudal yoke, to enlighten the
mind both of prince and people, and have led to many admirable results,
which will not be the less durably advantageous, that they have arisen,
are arising slowly, and without contest.
In closing the Life of NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE, we are called upon to
observe, that he was a man tried in the two extremities, of the most
exalted power and the most ineffable calamity, and if he occasionally
appeared presumptuous when supported by the armed force of half a world,
or unreasonably querulous when imprisoned within the narrow limits of
St. Helena, it is scarce within the capacity of those whose steps have
never led them beyond the middle path of life, to estimate either the
strength of the temptations to which he yielded, or the force of mind
which he opposed to those which he was able to resist.
FOOTNOTES:
[262] "See Dr. Baillie's inestimable book on Morbid Anatomy, pp. 141,
142."--S.
[263] See, for a detailed account of the establishment at Longwood,
APPENDIX, No. V.
[264] Las Cases, tom. iii., p. 359.
[265] Las Cases, tom. iv., p. 281.
[266] See Parl. Debates, vol. xxxv., p. 1137.
[267] Voice, &c., vol. ii., p. 256.
[268] The letter alluded to is quoted at full length in the Quarterly
Review, vol. xxviii., p. 224 to p. 226. It was received after Dr.
O'Meara's dismission; which therefore, must have been occasioned only by
the suspicion of what was afterwards proved.--S.
[269] "As member of the College of the Propaganda, he could not go
alone. Missions in which the line is to be crossed, must be composed of
at least two missionaries; and the Abbé Vignali, who had some notions of
medicine, was attached to Bonavita. Princess Pauline gave her cook;
Madame Mère one of her valets; and thus a little colony was
formed."--_Antommarchi_, vol. i., p. 9.
[270] Mémoire sur le Consulat, 1799 et 1804.--S.
[271] Antommarchi, vol. ii., p. 71.
[272] Such at least was the report. The attempt was to have been made by
Johnstone and his desperate associates in a boat, which they were to row
across the Scheldt towards Flushing, just when Napoleon was proceeding
thither. They were to board the imperial barge, throw every one save
Napoleon into the sea, and, removing him to their own light row-boat,
were to pull out and deliver him up to the British squadron, then
cruizing off the island. It is added, that Napoleon took the alarm from
seeing a boat rowing very swiftly towards him, and, ordering his crew to
pull harder, or give way, as it is called, the smuggler, instead of
running athwart the barge, fell astern, and the opportunity was lost. We
do not know that there is any good authority for this story.--S.
[273] Parl. Debates, vol. xl., p. 1559.
[274] Despatches to Sir Hudson Lowe, 30th September 1820.--S
[275] Antommarchi, vol. i., p. 339.
[276] Antommarchi, vol. i., p. 363.
[277]
"'Twas ever thus--from childhood's hour
I've seen my fondest hopes decay;
I never loved a tree or flower,
But was the first to fade away."
[278] Antommarchi, vol. i., p. 371.
[279] "He repeated the attempt three or four times, and with as little
success. 'I now see,' said he, with a tone of affliction, 'that my
strength forsakes me. Nature no longer answers, as formerly, to the
appeals of my will; violent shocks are no longer suited to my
debilitated frame: but I shall attain the end I propose by moderate
exercise.' On the following day, the Emperor was labouring under
profound depression of spirits;--he still felt persuaded that exercise
would save him. 'Sire,' said Montholon, 'perhaps the see-saw would do
your Majesty good?'--'True, I will try: have one arranged.' This was
immediately done; but this motion produced no favourable effect, and he
gave it up."--ANTOMMARCHI, vol. i., p. 393.
[280] Dr. Shortt, physician to the forces; who, at this time, replaced
Dr. Baxter as principal medical officer at St. Helena, and to whom we
have been obliged for much valuable information.--S.
[281] Antommarchi, vol. ii., p. 59.
[282] "I seized a moment, when the Emperor was more tranquil, to hazard
a few words about the necessity of a consultation.--'A consultation!
what would be the use of it? You all work in the dark. No! I will have
none of them.' The Emperor was warm, and I therefore did not insist for
the moment, but waited until he was more calm, when I again pressed the
subject. 'You persist,' said he, with a tone of kindness, 'consult with
the physician of the island that you consider the most skilful. I
accordingly applied to Dr. Arnott."--ANTOMMARCHI, vol. ii., p. 59.
[283] Antommarchi, vol. ii., p. 65.
[284] Madame Bertrand mentioned to Dr. Shortt that Napoleon conceived
himself dying of cancer in the stomach, which she considered as a mere
whim.--S.
[285] Antommarchi, vol. ii., p. 120.
[286] When at St. Helena, he was much troubled with toothache and scurvy
in the gums.--S.
[287] Las Cases, tom. i., part ii., p. 5.
[288] See APPENDIX, No. VI.
[289] See _ante_, p. 57.
[290] Histoire de la Guerre de la Péninsule, par Le Général Foy.--S.
[291] "And all the courses of my life do show, I am not in the roll of
common men."--_Henry IV._, act iii., sc. 2.
[292] "For _deity_, read _great man_, and Gourgaud's account is
perfectly correct."--JOSEPH BUONAPARTE, _Erreurs de Bourrienne_, tom.
i., p. 233.
[293] Memorable Events at Paris, p. 93.
[294] Thibaudaud, Mémoires sur le Consulat, p. 148.--S.
[295] Antommarchi, vol. i., p. 249.
[296] See APPENDIX, No. VII.
[297] The precise words of the Will seem to bear, that it was the _Comte
d'Artois'_ confession which established this charge. But no such
confession was ever made; neither, if made, could it have been known to
Napoleon at the time of the trial; nor, if known, could it have
constituted evidence against the party accused, who was no accessary to
the fact alleged. The assertion is utterly false in either case, but
under the latter interpretation, it is also irrelevant. The Duc
d'Enghien might be affected by his own confession, certainly not by that
of his kinsman.--S.
[298] Cantillon. See Fourth Codicil to Will, Appendix, No. VII.
[299] See Dr. O'Meara's Voice from St. Helena, who seems himself to have
been startled at the enormity of the fiction. What makes it yet more
extravagant is, that Napoleon's Will disposes of a part of that very
treasure, as if it were still in the hands of Maria Louisa.--S.
APPENDIX.
No. I.
REMARKS ON THE CAMPAIGN OF 1815,
BY CAPTAIN JOHN W. PRINGLE, OF THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.
[See pp. 185, 186.]
The following observations were hastily made, at a time when much public
interest was excited by the various accounts of the campaign of 1815,
edited by several individuals, all claiming the peculiar distinction of
having been dictated by Napoleon, or written under his immediate
direction. With some slight exceptions, and occasional anecdotes, they
nearly correspond, as far as relates to the military details.[300] The
9th volume of the Memoirs of Napoleon, published by O'Meara, is perhaps
the original from which the greatest part of the other productions are
derived. It is now generally acknowledged to have been, to a certain
extent, composed by Buonaparte.
These works have had one particular object--the defence of an
unfortunate and great man. The individual, however, is always held up to
view; the actions are softened or strengthened to suit this purpose, and
in the extension of this design, the reputation of his own officers, and
a strict adherence to facts, are occasionally sacrificed. The military
features of the campaign have remained unanswered; whilst the wounded
honour and fame of his generals have called for some counter-statements,
which throw curious light on the whole campaign, and on the machinery of
a system which so long alarmed the world. These last are little known in
Britain.
Whoever has perused the mass of military works by French officers, most
of them ably written, and many artfully composed, must feel how much
they tend to encourage a peculiar feeling of national superiority in
young minds, in a country where only their own military works are read.
In these works they never find a French army beaten in the field,
without some plausible reason; or, as Las Cases terms it [vol. ii., p.
15,] "a concurrence of unheard-of fatalities," to account for it. Upon
the minds of young soldiers, this has an effect of the most powerful
description.
Great care appears to have been taken in these various works, to meet
the accusations of military men respecting the disposition and
employment of the French army. Where a fault is admitted, the error is
at least transferred from Buonaparte to the incapacity or remissness of
his generals. The talents and honour of the British commanders are
rated at a low state; their success attributed more to chance than to
military skill, and the important result of the battle, less to the
courage of the British troops, than to the opportune arrival of the
Prussians, whom they allege to have saved the British army from
destruction. What are now termed liberal ideas, seem to have made it a
fashion to assert, and give credence to these accounts; and it is no
uncommon occurrence to meet with Englishmen who doubt the glory and
success of their countrymen on that eventful day. A wounded spirit of
faction has contributed to this feeling, and in the indulgence of its
own gratification, and under the mask of patriotism, endeavoured to
throw a doubt over the military achievements of our countrymen, eagerly
laid hold of any faults or failures, palliating, at the same time, those
of their enemies, and often giving that implicit belief to the garbled
accounts of the French, which they deny to the simple and manly dispatch
of a British general.
There does appear in this a decay of that national feeling, and jealousy
of our country's honour, the mainspring of all great actions, which
other nations, our rivals, cling to with renewed ardour. No man could
persuade a Frenchman that it was British valour which has conquered in
almost every battle from Cressy, down to Waterloo; and it is impossible
to forget that national pride, so honourable to the French name, which
could make their unfortunate emigrants even forget for a while their own
distresses, in the glory which crowned the arms of the Republicans at
that Revolution which drove them from their homes.
The British works on the campaign, with one exception [Batty,] are
incomplete productions, written by persons unacquainted with military
affairs, and hastily composed of rude materials, collected from
imperfect sources.[301]
Whoever has endeavoured to analyse the accounts of modern actions, and
to separate in them what can be proved to be facts, from what is
affirmed to be so, or to compare the private accounts (too often
indiscreetly published) with the official documents, and the information
procured from proper sources, will not be surprised to find in these
home-made accounts of this campaign, fulsome praises lavished on
individuals and regiments;[302] tales of charges, which one would
imagine must have annihilated whole corps, and yet find not more than
fifty or sixty men killed and wounded in a whole regiment.[303]
Our officers, whatever their corps may be, should be above the idea of
vain boasting or exaggeration. It is much that we can claim, during a
long period of eight years, the praise of having successfully contended
with troops of the first military power in Europe; while our soldiers
have disputed the palm of valour; and our officers, with less trumpeted
claims than their boasted marshals, have shown as great military skill;
and our armies, in the moment of victory, a spirit of humanity and
moderation, not frequently evinced by their antagonists.
In the following observations, it is not pretended that any new matter
can be given on a subject already so much discussed; still some facts
and considerations are treated of, which have not been perhaps fully or
fairly appreciated. Many charges of blame have been brought forward
against the generals of the allied forces; and superior talent in
profiting by their mistakes, has been attributed to their opponents,
which might well be accounted for, as arising from the situations in
which they were relatively placed. In order to judge, for instance, of
the credit given to Napoleon, of having surprised their armies in their
cantonments, it is necessary to be aware of the state of both countries
(France and Belgium,) and the objects, besides the mere watching of the
frontiers, to which the attention of the allied commanders was
necessarily directed previous to the commencement of the war, and
whilst it may be supposed as still in some measure doubtful.
France, as is well known, is, on the Belgian frontier, studded with
fortresses; Belgium, on the contrary, is now defenceless. The numerous
fortresses in the Low Countries, so celebrated in our former wars, had
been dismantled in the reign of the Emperor Joseph; and their
destruction completed by the French when they got possession of the
country at the battle of Fleurus, 1794, with the exception of Antwerp,
Ostend, and Nieuport, which they had kept up on account of their marine
importance. These circumstances placed the two parties in very different
situations, both for security and for facility of preparing and carrying
into execution the measures either for attack or defence.
The French had maintained their own celebrated triple line of
fortresses; extending, on that part of the frontier, from Dunkirk to
Philipville, and which had been put into a state of defence during the
war in the preceding year [Liv. ix., p. 36;]--these gave every facility
for the concentration and formation of troops--for affording a supply of
artillery, and every requisite for taking the field, and for concealing
their movements--particularly from the French organisation of their
national guards, which enabled the latter immediately to take the
garrison duties, or relieve and occupy the outposts along the
frontiers;--such was the relative situation of the frontiers at the
period of Napoleon's return from Elba.
The necessity of re-establishing the principal fortresses on the Belgian
frontier, which commanded the sluices and inundation of the country, had
indeed already been evident; and decided upon whilst Napoleon was yet in
Elba. A committee of British engineers had been employed in examining
the country for that purpose, but only the general plans and reports had
been prepared, when Buonaparte's sudden return and rapid advance upon
Paris, and the probability of a speedy renewal of the war, called for
expeditious and immediate means of defence. The declaration of the
Congress of Vienna, of the 13th March, reached Paris on the same day he
arrived there, which must have convinced him he would not be allowed
quietly to repossess his throne.
It may be well supposed, that the general impression in Belgium was,
that he would lose no time to endeavour to regain a country which he
considered as almost part of France; important to him from the resources
it would have afforded, and perhaps still more so, as it would deprive
his enemies of so convenient a base of operations, for the preparation
of the means for attacking France. The discontent in Belgium, and the
Prussian provinces on the Rhine, also amongst the Saxon troops who had
served in his army, was known.--[Liv. ix., pp. 58-61.]--The mutinous
spirit of these troops appeared to be in concert with the movements of
the French forces on the frontiers; so much so, that they were disarmed
and sent to the rear.--[Muffling, p. 5.]--In the former, the discontent
was particularly favoured by the number of French officers and soldiers,
who had been discharged as aliens from the French army, in which they
had served nearly since the Revolution, and now gave themselves little
care to conceal their real sentiments and attachments. The flight of
Louis from Lisle, through Flanders, added to this feeling in
Belgium--such appeared to be the prevailing spirit. The force the
British had to keep it in check, and resist an invasion, amounted only
to 6000 or 7000 men, under the orders of Sir Thomas Graham, consisting
chiefly of second battalions, hastily collected, a great portion of our
best troops not having yet returned from America. There were also in
Belgium the German Legion, together with 8000 to 10,000 men of the new
Hanoverian levies. The organisation of the Belgian troops had been just
commenced, so that the force of the Prince of Orange might amount to
about 20,000 men.
The Prussian General Kleist, who commanded on the Rhine and Meuse, had
30,000 men, afterwards augmented to 50,000, which, however, included the
Saxons.--[Muffling, pp. 1-5.]
These generals had immediately agreed to act in concert; but from what
we have mentioned, had Napoleon concentrated 36,000 men at Lisle on the
1st April, which he says was possible for him to have done--[Montholon,
vol. ii., p. 281; Liv. ix., p. 58]--and advanced into Belgium, it is
certainly probable he might have obtained the most important results;
for the Prince of Orange, who had united his troops at Ath, Mons, and
Tournay, was not strong enough to have covered Brussels, and must have
either fallen back on Antwerp, or formed a junction with the Prussian
General Kleist. The intelligence of Napoleon having landed at Cannes on
the 1st March, reached Brussels on the 9th. Preparations were
immediately made for the defence of the country. The British troops
under General Clinton concentrated, with their allies, near Ath, Mons,
and Tournay; and these places, with Ypres, Ghent, and Oudenarde were
ordered to be put in a state of defence consistently with the exigence
of the moment. To effect this, every use was made of what remained of
the old fortifications. New works were added, and advantage was taken of
the great system of defence in that country, which is generally under
the level of some canal, or the sea, and consequently capable of being
inundated. The sluices which commanded the inundations were covered by
strong redoubts.
The inundation of the country near the sea, admits of being made in two
ways. The canals or rivers are drains for the fresh water of the country
to the sea. The sluice gates are opened for its egress at low water, and
shut to prevent the ingress of the salt water at the return of the tide.
It is evident, therefore, that we could have laid the country under
water, and so covered their fortresses on two or three sides, which
would prevent the necessity of their having large garrisons to defend
them.[304] But salt-water inundation ruins the soil for several years,
and it was determined only to employ it as a last resource; and in the
meantime the sluice-gates were merely kept shut to prevent the egress of
the fresh water, which in that wet season soon accumulated; and the
fresh water inundation only destroyed the crops of one season.
About 20,000 labourers, called in by requisitions on the country, were
daily employed on the works, in addition to the working parties
furnished by the troops. The necessary artillery and stores were
supplied from England and Holland. Troops arrived daily, and were
immediately moved to the frontiers, where, from the movements that were
constantly taking place, it is probable that exaggerated accounts were
transmitted to the enemy. By these vigorous and prompt measures,
confidence became restored--the panic amongst the people of Belgium was
removed--they saw that their country was not to be given up without a
severe struggle--it fixed the wavering, and silenced the disaffected. In
less than a month, most of the frontier places were safe from a
coup-de-main.
The Duke of Wellington had arrived at Brussels from Vienna early in
April, and immediately inspected the frontier and the fortresses; after
which, he agreed on a plan of operations with the Prussians, by which
they concentrated their troops along the Sambre and Meuse, occupying
Charleroi, Namur, and Liege, so as to be in communication with his left.
The Prussians had repaired the works round Cologne, which assured their
communications with Prussia, and gave them a tête-du-pont on the Rhine.
The small fortress of Juliers afforded them the command of the Roer on
the same line, and they held Maestricht on the Lower Meuse. It was
important to occupy Liege and Namur, though their fortifications had
been destroyed. They afforded a facility to act rapidly on either side
of the Meuse, and a choice of the strong positions along the banks of
that river. The disaffection in the provinces on the Rhine, which had
been recently added to Prussia, was considered even greater than in
Belgium. The fortress of Luxembourg was the great key which Prussia
possessed for their preservation; and her interest would have led her to
make that her depôt and base of operations for the invasion of France;
but besides being so far distant from Brussels, that armies occupying
such distant points could not act in concert, the roads in that part of
the country, between the Meuse and the Moselle, were in a state almost
impracticable for artillery, and for the general communication of an
army. On the other hand, the roads and communications to cross the Rhine
at Cologne are good, the town itself could be put in a state of defence,
and have become the best and safest line of communication. Reference to
the map will elucidate these observations, and show that the cantonments
of the Prussians, along the Sambre and Meuse, enabled them to act in
concert with our army; to cover their line of communication with
Prussia; and to move rapidly into the provinces of the Moselle, in the
event of the enemy advancing from Metz.[305]
The Russians were to have come into the line at Mayence, but they did
not reach the Rhine until June, and then only the first corps; so that,
for the present, a gap existed from the Prussian left at Dinant, to the
Austro-Bavarian right at Manheim.
It was an important object to cover Brussels; and it is to be
considered, that this city forms, as it were, a centre to a large
portion of the French frontier, extending about seventy miles from the
Lys to the Meuse, viz. from Menin to Philipville or Givet; that it is
about fifty miles distant from these extreme points; and that it was
necessary to guard the entry from France by Tournay, Mons, and
Charleroi; and also to prevent Ghent, a very important place, from being
attacked from Lisle. The protection of all these distant points, with
the difficulty of subsisting troops, particularly cavalry and artillery,
are sufficient causes to explain why the armies were not more united in
their cantonments.[306] Buonaparte appears to have attached much
importance to the occupation of Brussels, as appears by the bulletins
found ready printed in his baggage, which was captured. It was,
therefore, of much importance, in every point of view, to prevent even a
temporary occupation of this city, and this could only be done by
risking an action in front of it. The Duke of Wellington and Marshal
Blucher had also separate views in preserving their lines of
operation--the one by Cologne with Prussia; the other with England, by
Brussels, which neither was disposed willingly to abandon. This probably
may have been the cause why Quatre-Bras and Ligny were chosen as
positions covering both.
It is evident, that an army placed in cantonments, so as to meet all
these objects, could only be concentrated in a position covering the
city, by the troops in advance being able to keep the enemy in check, so
as to afford time for that concentration, which was certainly
accomplished. The positions on the different roads of approach from the
French frontier had been attentively reconnoitred; that of Mont St.
Jean, or Waterloo, very particularly; and no precaution appears to have
been omitted, by which an offensive movement of the enemy was to be
encountered.
Some movements were observed on the French frontier between Lisle and
Berguer, as if preparing for offensive operations, about the end of
March, at which period the troops, cantoned near Menin, had orders,
after making due resistance, and destroying the bridge on the Lys, to
fall back on Courtrai, their point of assembling; and then, after such a
resistance as would not compromise their safety in retreat, to endeavour
to ascertain the object of the enemy's movements, and give time for the
troops to assemble. They were to retire on Oudenarde and Ghent, opening
the sluices, and extending the inundation. About the beginning of May
similar movements were also observed, but less was then to be
apprehended, since, by the advanced state of the works at Tournay, the
tête-du-pont at Oudenarde and Ghent, we then commanded the Scheldt, and
could have assumed the offensive.
Great credit is undoubtedly due to Napoleon, for the mode in which he
concealed his movements, and the rapidity with which he concentrated his
army. The forced marches he was obliged to make, appear, however, to
have paralysed his subsequent movements, from the fatigue his troops
underwent. The numerous French fortresses favoured his plans in a very
great degree, by affording him the means of employing the garrison and
national guards to occupy the advanced posts along the frontier, and
opportunity afterwards to make demonstrations across the frontiers near
Lisle, whilst he assembled his army on the Sambre.--[Liv. ix., pp.
68-85; Montholon, vol. ii., p. 153.] They were also somewhat favoured by
the circumstance, that hostilities were not actually commenced, which
prevented our advanced posts (even if they suspected a change in the
troops opposed to them) from obliging the enemy to show himself, or, by
bringing on a skirmish, to obtain from prisoners intelligence of their
movements. He had another advantage of powerful consequence. The army he
commanded were mostly old soldiers of the same nation, under a single
chief. The allied armies were composed of different nations, a great
portion young levies, and under two generals, each of such reputation,
as not likely to yield great deference to the other.[307]
On the night of the 14th June, the French army bivouacked in three
divisions, as near the frontier as possible, without being observed by
the Prussians; the left at Ham-sur-heure, the centre at Beaumont, where
the headquarters were established, and the right at Philipville.[308]
At three o'clock, A.M., on the 15th June, the French army crossed the
frontier in three columns, directed on Marchiennes, Charleroi, and
Chatelet. The Prussian out-posts were quickly driven in; they, however,
maintained their ground obstinately at three points, until eleven
o'clock, when General Ziethen took up a position at Gilly and Gosselies,
in order to check the advance of the enemy, and then retired slowly on
Fleurus, agreeably to the orders of Maréchal Blucher, to allow time for
the concentration of his army.[309] The bridge at Charleroi not having
been completely destroyed, was quickly repaired by the enemy. Upon
Ziethen's abandoning the chaussée, which leads to Brussels through
Quatre-Bras, Marshal Ney, who commanded the left of the French army, was
ordered to advance by this road upon Gosselies, and found at Frasnes
part of the Duke of Wellington's army, composed of Nassau troops, under
the command of Prince Bernard of Saxe Weimar, who, after some
skirmishing, maintained his position.[310] The French army was formed,
on the night of the 15th, in three columns, the left at Gosselies, the
centre near Gilly, and the right at Chatelet. Two corps of the Prussian
army occupied the position at Sombref on the same night, where they were
joined by the first corps, and occupied St. Amand, Bry, and Ligny; so
that, notwithstanding all the exertions of the French, at a moment where
time was of such importance, they had only been able to advance about
fifteen English miles during the day, with nearly fifteen hours of
daylight.[311] The corps of Ziethen had suffered considerably, but he
had effected his orders: so that Maréchal Blucher was enabled to
assemble three corps of his army, 80,000 men, in position early on the
15th, and his fourth corps was on its march to join him that evening.
The Duke of Wellington seems to have expected an attack by the Mons
chaussée,[312] and on his first receiving information of the enemy's
movements, merely ordered his troops to hold themselves in readiness;
this was on the evening of the 15th of June, at six o'clock. Having
obtained farther intelligence about eleven o'clock, which confirmed the
real attack of the enemy to be along the Sambre, orders were immediately
given for the troops to march upon Quatre-Bras; a false movement of the
English general to his right, at that period, could not have been easily
remedied in time to have fought in front of Brussels, and to have
effected his junction with the Prussians; and in such a case, as
Maréchal Blucher only fought at Ligny on the expectation of being
supported by the Duke of Wellington, it is probable that that action
would not have taken place. He had, however, a safe retreat on Bulow's
corps and Maestricht, as had the Duke of Wellington on Ghent and
Antwerp, or else the plan afterwards adopted of concentrating at
Waterloo and Wavres, could not have been easily executed. It is,
indeed, a matter of surprise, that Buonaparte did not make a more
important demonstration on the side of Lisle and Mons. The Duke, in
deciding on these movements, was under the necessity of acting on the
intelligence given by spies or deserters, which can only be so far
depended on, as it is confirmed by reports from the outposts, who may be
themselves deceived.[313] What was true at their departure, may be
entirely changed at their arrival with the information; and whatever may
have been the case formerly, few or no instances occur at present of a
person in the confidence of the cabinet, particularly of a military
officer, betraying the confidence placed in him.
The Duke of Wellington arrived at Quatre-Bras on the 16th, at an early
hour, and immediately proceeded to Bry, to concert measures with Marshal
Blucher, for arranging the most efficient plan of support. It appeared
at that time, that the whole French attack would be directed against the
Prussians, as considerable masses of the enemy were in movement in their
front. Blucher was at this time at the wind-mill of Bry, about five
English miles from Quatre-Bras. [Muffling, p. 10.] The Duke proposed to
advance upon Frasnes and Gosselies, which would have been a decided
movement, as acting on the French communications, and immediately in
rear of their left flank; but as the troops could not be ready to
advance from Quatre-Bras before four o'clock, the attack must have been
too late, and in the meantime the Prussians would have to sustain the
attack of nearly the whole French army. Maréchal Blucher, therefore,
judged it more desirable, that the Duke should form a junction with the
Prussian right, by marching direct by the chaussée from Quatre-Bras to
Bry.[314]
The object of the enemy on the 16th, as may be seen by the general
orders of Napoleon, communicated by Soult to Ney and Grouchy, was to
turn the Prussian right, by driving the British from Quatre-Bras, and
then to march down the chaussée upon the Bry, and thus separate the
armies. [Batty, p. 150.] For this purpose, Ney was detached with 43,000
men. [Liv. ix., p. 103.] On reference to the above orders, it appears
that not much resistance was expected in getting possession both of
Sombref and Quatre-Bras.[315] Ney has been accused of delaying to
attack, but reference to those orders will show that Ney had not been
commanded to attack[316] until two o'clock P.M., in consequence of the
allies having assembled in force at Quatre-Bras. The plan was excellent,
and if Ney had been successful, would have led to important results.
After obtaining possession of Quatre-Bras, he was to have detached part
of his forces to attack the Prussian right flank in rear of St. Amand,
whilst Buonaparte was making the chief attack on that village, the
strongest in the position, and at the same time keeping the whole
Prussian line engaged. Half of Ney's force was left in reserve near
Frasnes, to be in readiness either to support the attacks on Quatre-Bras
or St. Amand, and in the event of both succeeding, to turn the Prussian
right, by marching direct on Wagnele or Bry.[317]
The village of St. Amand was well defended; it formed the strength of
the Prussian right, and from the intersection of several gardens and
hedges, was very capable of defence; although so much in advance of the
rest of the Prussian position. The face of the country in front of this
position possesses no remarkable features; the slopes towards the
stream are gentle, and of easy access. After a continued attack for two
hours, the enemy had only obtained possession of half the village of St.
Amand, and a severe attack was made upon Ligny, which was taken and
retaken several times.[318] At this time Buonaparte sent for the corps
of reserve left by Ney at Frasnes; before, however, it reached St.
Amand, in consequence of the check they had sustained at Quatre-Bras, it
was countermarched, and from this circumstance became of little use
either to Buonaparte or Ney. Buonaparte having observed the masses of
troops which Blucher had brought up behind St. Amand (and probably in
consequence of the corps above mentioned being necessary at
Quatre-Bras,)[319] appears to have changed the disposition of his
reserves, who were marching upon St. Amand, and moved them towards the
right, to attack the Prussian centre at Ligny, which they succeeded in
forcing, and so obtained possession of that village.[320] A large body
of French cavalry, and another of infantry, then pushed forward to the
height between Bry and Sombref, immediately in the rear of Ligny, and
quite in the heart of the Prussian position, where they were attacked by
Blucher at the head of his cavalry; this attempt to re-establish the
action failed, and the Prussian cavalry were driven back upon the
infantry.[321] It was now nine o'clock, about dark, which prevented the
French from advancing farther, and they contented themselves with the
occupation of Ligny. The Prussians did not evacuate Bry before three
o'clock A.M. on the 17th.[322] In the course of the night, the Prussians
fell back on Tilly and Gembloux. The loss of the Prussians, according to
their own account, amounted to 14,000 men, and fifteen pieces of
artillery. The French official account in the _Moniteur_ to 15,000.[323]
The French acknowledge to have lost 7000. It is evident that Buonaparte,
in changing the point of attack from the Prussian right at St. Amand, to
the centre at Ligny, in a manner forced the Prussians, if defeated, to
retreat upon the British army, and give up their own line of operations;
but still, at that hour in the evening, when the situation of the armies
is considered, the change of attack appears to be the only hope he had
of obtaining even a partial success; under such circumstances, it was
perhaps the best course he could pursue.[324]
It is not easy to conceive that a defeat, in any case, would have been
such as to prevent their junction, since each army had such considerable
reinforcements moving up, and close upon them; but even in an extreme
case, they could each have retired on their fortresses, and formed
intrenched camps of perfect security, with every means of repairing the
losses they sustained.[325]
The force of the enemy, at the time the Duke of Wellington left
Quatre-Bras to communicate with Blucher, appeared to be so weak, that no
serious attack was at that time to be apprehended; but on his return to
that position, about three o'clock, he found they had assembled a large
force at Frasnes, and were preparing for an attack, which was made about
half-past three o'clock by two columns of infantry, and nearly all their
cavalry, supported by a heavy fire of artillery. The force at that time
under his orders, was 17,000 infantry and 2000 cavalry, of which about
4500 were British infantry, the rest Hanoverians, and Belgians, and
Nassau troops.[326] They at first obtained some success, driving back
the Belgian and Brunswick cavalry; their cavalry penetrated amongst our
infantry before they had quite time to form squares, and forced a part
to retire into the adjoining wood; they were, however, repulsed. At this
period of the action, the third British division, under General Alten,
arrived about four o'clock, soon after the action had commenced. They
consisted of about 6300 men, and were composed of British, King's German
legion, and Hanoverians. They had some difficulty in maintaining their
ground, and one regiment lost a colour.[327] They succeeded, however, in
repelling the enemy from the advanced points he had gained at the farm
of Gemincourt and village of Pierremont.
Ney still, however, occupied part of the wood of Bossu, which extends
from Quatre-Bras, on the right of the road towards Frasnes, to the
distance of about a mile. This favoured an attack on the right of our
position, which he accordingly made, after having been repulsed on the
left. At this moment the division of General Cooke [Guards,] 4000
strong, arrived from Enghien, and materially assisted to repel this
attack, which, after considerable exertions, was done, and the enemy
driven back upon Frasnes, in much confusion. This affair was severely
contested, and though the enemy were repulsed, the loss on each side was
nearly equal, owing to the superiority of the French in artillery. The
loss, however, inflicted on the French by the fire of musketry, which
their attacking columns were exposed to, was very considerable, and
counterbalanced the advantage they derived from their artillery. It
required great exertions to maintain the important post of Quatre-Bras,
in the present relative situations of the two armies. It is certain
that, if Ney had advanced as rapidly as Buonaparte says he might have
done, he would have obtained his object. Ney, however, in his letter,
contradicts the possibility of his having done so, which seems to be
confirmed by Soult's letter to him, dated at 2 o'clock P.M., where he
tells him, that Grouchy is to attack Bry with the 3d and 4th corps, at
half-past 2 P.M. [Batty, App.]; that he is to attack the corps in his
front, and afterwards to assist Grouchy; but that if he (Ney) defeats
the troops in his front first, Grouchy would be ordered to assist his
operations. It is most probable that the corps left at Frasnes, which
Ney complains was taken away without his knowledge, was destined to
assist either attack as might be found necessary.
Even had Ney got possession of Quatre-Bras at an early hour, he would
scarcely have been able to detach any sufficient force against the
Prussians, seeing, as he must have done, or at least ought to have
calculated, that the British forces were arriving rapidly on the point
which we suppose him to have occupied. The British could have still
retreated on Waterloo, and been concentrated on the 17th at that
position; and there was nothing to prevent the Prussians retreating on
Wavre, as they afterwards did. Though Buonaparte says [Liv. ix., p.
209,] that on the 15th every thing had succeeded as he wished, and that
the Duke of Wellington had manœuvred as he would have wished him to do;
yet one corps of the Prussian army had so far kept him in check, that he
was not able to reach Fleurus; and on the 16th, could not commence the
attack until three hours after mid-day. He did not gain possession of
Quatre-Bras until the forenoon of the 17th. He had sustained a severe
check with one part of his army, and gained an indecisive action with
the other; the loss of the allies not exceeding his own, whilst they had
the advantage of retiring leisurely on their resources and
reinforcements, and by the retreat, gave up no place or position now of
consequence to the pursuing enemy. The result of the operations of the
16th produced no important consequences to the French. The celebrated
engineer, General Rogniat, does not hesitate to term it an indecisive
action. The success of the British in repelling the attack of
Quatre-Bras, tended to make them meet the renewed attack at Waterloo
with more confidence, and probably had a contrary effect on the enemy;
whilst the manner in which the Prussian corps of Thielman received the
attack of Grouchy on the 18th, who had superior forces, showed how
little the confidence of the Prussians had been shaken by the action at
Ligny. It may be observed, that the forces engaged at Ligny were nearly
equal, even deducting D'Erlon's corps, which was left at Frasnes, as not
engaged. The French passed the frontiers with about 125,000 men--Blucher
had 80,000--and at _the close_ of the day, Lord Wellington had
30,000.[328] The commanders of the allied armies appear not to have
overrated what was to be expected from their troops, which was not
exactly the case with their opponents.
The outline of the operations, and the strategie on the part of Napoleon
to separate the two armies, was no doubt finely conceived, and, as we
have seen, was nearly successful; yet it is presumed, that, had it been
so, even to the extent Buonaparte could hope or expect, the allies had
still a safe retreat, and sufficient resources. On all sides, it was a
calculation of hours. It is hardly possible to know the point an
enterprising enemy means to attack, especially on so extended a line;
and here the assailant has the advantage. Fault has been found with the
Duke of Wellington for having no artillery and very few cavalry upon the
16th. No portion of either were with the reserve at Brussels, which is
remarkable, particularly as regards the artillery.[329]
The spirited manner in which the allied maréchals adhered to their plans
of defence previously agreed on, and extricated themselves from the
difficulties which they found themselves placed in, by the sudden and
vigorous attack they had to sustain, and which their distinct commands
tended rather to increase, must command admiration; and since war is
only a great game, where the movements are influenced by many events
which occur during their execution and progress--events which human
calculation cannot foresee--it becomes easy to criticise when the
operations are passed, when all the data on which they rested, or might
have rested, are known; but to form a good plan of attack, or a
campaign--to act with decision and firmness, and with a "coup d'œil,"
so as immediately to profit by the changes which incessantly take place,
can be said of very few men of the many who have ever arrived at the
command of an army.
On the morning of the 17th, the British troops remained in possession of
Quatre-Bras, where the rest of the army had joined the Duke of
Wellington, who was prepared to maintain that position against the
French army, had the Prussians remained in the position of Ligny, so as
to give him support.
Maréchal Blucher had sent an aide-de-camp to inform the duke of his
retreat, who was unfortunately killed; and it was not until seven
o'clock on the 17th, that Lord Wellington learned the direction which
the Prussians had taken. A patrol sent at daylight to communicate with
the Prussians, advanced beyond Bry and Sombref, which confirmed how
little of the Prussian position had been occupied by the French. The
Prussians had fallen back very leisurely on Wavre, their rear-guard
occupying Bry, which they did not evacuate before three o'clock on the
morning of the 17th. Buonaparte, in deceiving the French people, by the
accounts he gave of the defeat of the Prussians at Ligny, seems almost
to have deceived himself. He must have known that the action was not a
decisive one--that the enemy had retired in excellent order--that he had
not been able to pursue them--and that his own loss must have
considerably weakened his army, whilst the Prussians were falling back
upon their reinforcements--and, above all, that Maréchal Blucher
commanded them. The Prussian army was concentrated at Wavre at an early
hour, and communication took place between the Duke of Wellington and
Blucher, by which a junction of the army was arranged for the succeeding
day at Waterloo.[330] The retrograde movement of the Prussians rendered
a corresponding one necessary on the part of the British, which was
performed in the most leisurely manner, the duke allowing the men time
to finish their cooking. About ten o'clock, the whole army retired, in
three columns, by Genappe and Nivelles, towards a position at
Waterloo--a rear-guard was left to occupy the ground, so as to conceal
the movement from the enemy, who, about mid-day, deployed their troops
in columns of attack, as if expecting to find the English army in
position there. They immediately followed up the retreat with cavalry
and light-artillery. An affair of cavalry occurred at Genappe, where the
7th hussars attacked a French regiment of lancers without success; upon
which the heavy cavalry were brought up by the Marquis of Anglesea, who
checked the enemy's advance by a vigorous and decisive charge.
As the troops arrived in position in front of Mont Saint Jean, they took
up the ground they were to maintain, which was effected early in the
evening. The weather began to be very severe at this period. The whole
French army, under Buonaparte, with the exception of two corps under
Grouchy (32,000 men, and 108 guns,) took up a position immediately in
front; and after some cannonading, both armies remained opposite to each
other during the night, the rain falling in torrents. The duke had
already communicated with Maréchal Blucher, who promised to come to his
support with the whole of his army, on the morning of the 18th. It was
consequently decided upon to cover Brussels (the preservation of which
was of such importance, in every point of view, to the King of the
Netherlands,) by maintaining the position of Mont St. Jean. The
intention of the allied chiefs, if they were not attacked on the 18th,
was to have attacked the enemy on the 19th.
Since we are now arrived at the position of Mont St. Jean, it may be
necessary to offer a few remarks as regards the position itself, which
has been considered as a bad one by some writers,[331] and some loose
allusions to its defects thrown out; but more particularly fixing upon
its not affording a secure retreat, in the event of the enemy's attack
having proved successful. Previous, however, to entering into any
disquisition as to the merits of the position of Mont St. Jean, it may
be well to consider a few of the conditions that are judged essential in
a greater or less degree, for every position taken up by an army. The
first requisite is, that the ground in front, within cannon-shot, should
be well seen; and every point of approach with musket-shot, well
discovered.--2d, That the ground which is occupied should admit of a
free communication for troops and guns, from right to left, and from
front to rear, in order to move supports wherever they may be wanted;
also that, by the sinuosities of the ground, or other cover, such
movements may be made unseen by the enemy.--3d, That your flanks rest on
some support, secure from being turned--And, lastly, that your retreat
be ensured in the event of your position being forced or turned.
The site of the position of Mont St. Jean, and the features of the
ground round it, have been so often and well described, that we may
conclude it to be familiar to most people; and hence the possession of
these necessary conditions will be already evident. The easy slope from
our front into the valley, from whence it rises in an ascent equally
gentle and regular, to the opposite heights, on which the enemy were
posted at the distance of about a mile, or a mile and a half, gave it,
in an eminent degree, the condition stated in the first remark. The two
chaussées, running nearly perpendicular to our line--the valley
immediately in rear of our first line, and parallel to it, with two
country roads passing in the same direction; also the openness of the
country--gave the position the requisites mentioned in the second. The
same valley afforded cover for the support of the first line; also for
its artillery, and spare ammunition-waggons; whilst the second line and
reserves, placed on and behind the next ridge, and about 500 or 600
yards in rear of the first, were unseen from the enemy's position,
although certainly so far exposed, that many of his shot and shells,
which passed over the first line, ricocheted into the second, and
amongst the reserves. The fourth requisite, as far as regards the
security of the flanks, was completely obtained, by the occupation of
the village of Braine la Leude on its right, which would have been
intrenched, but for an accidental misunderstanding of orders; and La
Haye and Ohain on the left; also by both flanks being thrown back on the
forest of Soignies.
That our retreat in case of a reverse, was sufficiently provided for, we
trust, notwithstanding the criticism above noticed, to establish in a
satisfactory manner. Our position was sufficiently in advance of the
entrance of the chaussée into the forest, to give a free approach from
every part of the field to that point; which the unenclosed state of the
country afforded the troops every means of profiting by. Had our first
position been forced, the village of Mont St. Jean, at the junction of
the two chaussées, afforded an excellent centre of support for a second,
which the enemy would have had equal difficulty in carrying;--besides
which there is another farm house and wood immediately behind Mont St.
Jean, and in front of the entrance of the forest; which would have
enabled us to keep open that entrance. By occupying these points, we
might have at any time effected a retreat; and with sufficient leisure
to have allowed all the guns, that were in a state to be moved, to file
off into the forest. Undoubtedly, had our centre been broken by the last
attack of the enemy [about half-past seven,] a considerable part of our
artillery must have been left behind, a number of guns disabled, and
many men and horses killed and wounded; these must have fallen into the
enemy's hands; also the brigades at the points attacked, which were
placed rather in front of the infantry, and remained until the last,
firing grape-shot into the enemy's columns. The men and horses would
have saved themselves with the infantry, and soon found a fresh
equipment in the fortresses. The troops at Hougomont would have been cut
off had that attack succeeded, but their retreat was open, either upon
the corps of 16,000 men left at Halle to cover Brussels, or upon Braine
la Leude, which was occupied by a brigade of infantry, who had
strengthened their post; between which and our right flank a brigade of
cavalry kept a communication open. From Braine la Leude there is a very
good road through the forest by Alemberg to Brussels, by which the
troops and artillery of our right flank could have effected their
retreat. If we now suppose, that the enemy, instead of our right centre,
had broken our left centre by the great attack made on it at three
o'clock, Ohain afforded nearly the same advantage to the left of our
army that Braine la Leude would have done on the right. A road leads
from it through the forest to Brussels; or that wing might have retired
on the Prussians at Wavre; so that, had either of these two grand
attacks succeeded, the retreat into the defiles of the forest need not
have been precipitated. It is no fault of our troops to take alarm and
lose confidence, because they find themselves turned or partially
beaten. Of this many instances might be given. The best proof, however,
is, that the enemy can scarcely claim having made a few hundred
prisoners during the whole of the last war. No success on the part of
the enemy, which they had a right to calculate on, could have then
precipitated us into the forest in total disorder. The attacks we
sustained to the last on the 18th, were as determined and severe as can
be conceived. Still, to the last, a part of the reserve and the cavalry
had not suffered much; whereas the French cavalry (heavy) had all been
engaged before five o'clock, and were not in a state, from the severe
losses they had sustained, to take advantage of a victory.[332]
But suppose we had been driven into the wood in a state of deroute,
similar to what the French were, the forest did not keep us hermetically
sealed up, as an impenetrable marsh did the defeated troops at
Austerlitz. The remains of our shattered battalions would have gained
the forest, and found themselves in security. It consists of tall trees
without underwood, passable almost any where for men and horses. The
troops could, therefore, have gained the chaussée through it, and when
we at last came to confine ourselves to the defence of the entrance to
the forest, every person, the least experienced in war, knows the
extreme difficulty in forcing infantry from a wood which cannot be
turned. A few regiments, with or without artillery, would have kept the
whole French army in check, even if they had been as fresh as the day
they crossed the frontiers.[333] Indeed, the forest in our rear gave us
so evident an advantage, that it is difficult to believe that an
observation to the contrary was made by Napoleon. Could he quite forget
his own retreat? It little availed him to have two fine chaussées, and
an open country in his rear; his materiel was all abandoned, and not
even a single battalion kept together.
The two farms in front of the position of Mont St. Jean, gave its
principal strength. That of Hougomont, with its gardens and enclosures,
could contain a force sufficient to make it a most important post. La
Haye Sainte was too small for that purpose; otherwise its situation in
the Genappe chaussée, in the centre of the position, rendered it better
adapted for that purpose. These farms lay on the slope of the valley,
about 1500 yards apart, in front of our line; so that no column of the
enemy could pass between them, without being exposed to a flank fire.
Indeed, without these posts, the ground gave us little advantage over
our enemy, except the loss he must be necessarily exposed to in
advancing in column upon a line already fixed.
From these observations it will appear that our retreat was well
secured, and that the advantages of the position for a field of battle
were very considerable; so that there was little risk but that it would
have been successfully defended, even if the Prussians had by "some
fatality" been prevented from forming a junction. The difficulties of
the roads, from the severe rains, detained them from joining us at least
double the time that was calculated upon. We had therefore to sustain
the attack of a superior army so much longer; yet they were not able to
make any impression. Every attack had been most successfully repulsed;
and we may safely infer that, even if the Prussians had not joined in
time, we would still have been able to maintain our position, and
repulse the enemy, but might have been perhaps unable, as was the case
at Talavera, to profit by this advantage, or to follow up our
success.[334]
The morning of the 18th, and part of the forenoon, were passed by the
enemy in a state of supineness, for which it was difficult to account.
The rain had certainly retarded his movements, more particularly that of
bringing his artillery into position; yet it was observed that this had
been accomplished at an early hour. In Grouchy's publication, we find a
reason which may have caused this delay; namely, that Napoleon's
ammunition had been so much exhausted in the preceding actions, that
there was only a sufficiency with the army for an action of eight hours.
Buonaparte states [Liv. ix.] that it was necessary to wait until the
ground was sufficiently dried, to enable the cavalry and artillery to
manœuvre [Montholon, tom. ii., p. 136;] however, in such a soil, a few
hours could make very little difference, particularly as a drizzling
rain continued all the morning, and indeed after the action had
commenced. The heavy fall of rain on the night of the 17th to 18th, was
no doubt more disadvantageous to the enemy than to the troops under Lord
Wellington; the latter were in position, and had few movements to make;
whilst the enemy's columns, and particularly his cavalry, were much
fatigued and impeded by the state of the ground, which, with the
trampled corn, caused them to advance more slowly, and kept them longer
under fire. On the other hand, the same causes delayed the Prussians in
their junction, which they had promised to effect at eleven o'clock, and
obliged Lord Wellington to maintain the position alone, nearly eight
hours longer than had been calculated upon.
About twelve o'clock, the enemy commenced the action by an attack upon
Hougomont, with several columns, preceded by numerous light troops, who,
after severe skirmishing, drove the Nassau troops from the wood in its
front, and established themselves in it. This attack was supported by
the constant fire of a numerous artillery. A battalion of the Guards
occupied the house and gardens, with the other enclosures, which
afforded great facilities for defence; and after a severe contest, and
immense loss, the enemy were repulsed, and a great part of the wood
regained.[335]
During the early part of the day, the action was almost entirely
confined to this part of the line, except a galling fire of artillery
along the centre, which was vigorously returned by our guns. This fire
gradually extended towards the left, and some demonstrations of an
attack of cavalry were made by the enemy. As the troops were drawn up on
the slope of the hill, they suffered most severely from the enemy's
artillery. In order to remedy this, Lord Wellington moved them back
about 150 or 200 yards, to the reverse slope of the hill, to shelter
them from the direct fire of the guns; our artillery in consequence
remained in advance, that they might see into the valley. This movement
was made between one and two o'clock by the duke in person; it was
general along the front or centre of the position, on the height to the
right of La Haye Sainte.
It is by no means improbable, that the enemy considered this movement as
the commencement of a retreat, since a considerable portion of our
troops were withdrawn from his sight, and determined in consequence to
attack our left centre, in order to get possession of the buildings,
called Ferme de M. St. Jean, or of the village itself, which commanded
the point of junction of the two chaussées. The attacking columns
advanced on the Genappe chaussée, and by the side of it; they consisted
of four columns of infantry (D'Erlon's corps, which was not engaged on
the 16th,) thirty pieces of artillery, and a large body of cuirassiers
(Milhaud's.) On the left of this attack, the French cavalry took the
lead of the infantry, and had advanced considerably, when the Duke of
Wellington ordered the heavy cavalry (Life Guards) to charge them as
they ascended the position near La Haye Sainte. They were driven back on
their own position, where the chaussée, being cut into the rising
ground, leaves steep banks on either side. In this confined space they
fought at swords' length for some minutes, until the enemy brought down
some light artillery from the heights, when the British cavalry retired
to their own position. The loss of the cuirassiers did not appear great.
They seemed immediately to reform their ranks, and soon after advanced
to attack our infantry, who were formed into squares to receive them,
being then unsupported by cavalry. The columns of infantry in the mean
time, pushed forward on _our_ left of the Genappe chaussée, beyond La
Haye Sainte, which they did not attempt in this attack to take. A
Belgian brigade of infantry, formed in front, gave way, and these
columns crowned the position. When Sir Thomas Picton moved up the
brigade of General Pack from the second line (the 92d regiment in
front,) which opened a fire on the column just as it gained the height,
and advanced upon it. When within thirty yards, the column began to
hesitate; at this moment a brigade of heavy cavalry (the 1st and 2d
dragoons) wheeled round the 92d regiment, and took the column in flank;
a total rout ensued; the French, throwing down their arms, ran into our
position to save themselves from being cut down by the cavalry; many
were killed, and two eagles, with 2000 prisoners, taken. But the cavalry
pursued their success too far, and being fired upon by one of the other
columns, and at the same time, when in confusion, being attacked by some
French cavalry who had been sent to support the attack, the British were
obliged to retire with considerable loss. In this attack the enemy had
brought forward several pieces of artillery, which were captured by our
cavalry; the horses in the guns were killed, and we were obliged to
abandon the guns. General Ponsonby, who commanded the cavalry, was
killed. The gallant Sir Thomas Picton also fell, leading on his division
to repel this attack.[336] The number of occurrences which crowded on
the attention, rendered it impossible for any individual to see the
whole action, and in the midst of noise, bustle, and personal danger, it
is difficult to note the exact time in which the event happens.[337]
It is only afterwards, in discussing the chances and merits of each,
that such questions become of interest, which may in some measure
account for the discrepancy of the statements of officers present, as to
the time and circumstances of some of the principal events. From this
period, half-past two, until the end of the action, the British cavalry
were scarcely engaged, but remained in readiness in the second
line.[338] After the French cuirassiers had re-formed, and were strongly
reinforced,[339] they again advanced upon our position, and made several
desperate attacks upon our infantry, who immediately formed into
squares, and maintained themselves with the most determined courage and
coolness. Some time previous to this, about three o'clock, an attack was
made upon La Haye Sainte, which is merely a small farm-house; it was
occupied by two companies of the German Legion. The enemy had advanced
beyond it, so that the communication was cut off for some time, and it
could not be reinforced. The troops having expended their ammunition,
the post was carried. A continued fire was kept up at this point, and
the enemy was soon afterwards obliged to abandon it, without being able
to avail himself of it as a point of support for his attacking columns.
The house was too small for a sufficient number of troops to maintain
themselves so close to our position, under such a heavy fire.
The French cavalry, in the attack on the centre of our line above
mentioned, were not supported by infantry. They came on, however, with
the greatest courage, close to the squares of our infantry; the
artillery, which was somewhat in advance, kept up a well-directed fire
upon them as they advanced, but on their nearer approach, the gunners
were obliged to retire into the squares, so that the guns were actually
in possession of the enemy's cavalry, who could not, however, keep
possession of them, or even spike them, if they had the means, in
consequence of the heavy fire of musketry to which they were exposed.
The French accounts say, that several squares were broken, and standards
taken, which is decidedly false; on the contrary, the small squares
constantly repulsed the cavalry, whom they generally allowed to advance
close to their bayonets before they fired. They were driven back with
loss on all points, and the artillerymen immediately resumed their guns
in the most prompt manner, and opened a severe and destructive fire of
grape-shot on them as they retired.[340]
After the failure of the first attack, the French had little or no
chance of success by renewing it; but the officers, perhaps ashamed of
the failure of such boasted troops, endeavoured repeatedly to bring them
back to charge the squares; but they could only be brought to pass
between them, and round them. They even penetrated to our second line,
where they cut down some stragglers and artillery-drivers, who were with
the limbers and ammunition-waggons. They charged the Belgian squares in
the second line, with no better success, and upon some heavy Dutch
cavalry showing themselves, they soon retired.
If the enemy supposed us in retreat, then such an attack of cavalry
might have led to the most important results; but by remaining so
uselessly in our position, and passing and repassing our squares of
infantry, they suffered severely by their fire; so much so, that before
the end of the action, when they might have been of great use, either in
the attack, or in covering the retreat, they were nearly destroyed.[341]
The only advantage which appeared to result from their remaining in our
position, was preventing the fire of our guns on the columns which
afterwards formed near La Belle Alliance, in order to debouche for a new
attack. The galling fire of the infantry, however, forcing the French
cavalry at length to retire into the hollow ground, to cover themselves,
the artillerymen were again at their guns, and, being in advance of the
squares, saw completely into the valley, and by their well-directed
fire, seemed to make gaps in them as they re-formed to repeat this
useless expenditure of lives. Had Buonaparte been nearer the front, he
surely would have prevented this useless sacrifice of his best troops.
Indeed, the attack of cavalry at this period, is only to be accounted
for by supposing the British army to be in retreat. He had had no time
to avail himself of his powerful artillery to make an impression on that
part of the line he meant to attack, as had always been his custom,
otherwise it was not availing himself of the superiority he possessed;
and it was treating his enemy with a contempt, which, from what he had
experienced at Quatre-Bras, could not be justified.[342] He allows, in
Liv. ix., p. 156, that this charge was made too soon,[343] but that it
was necessary to support it, and that the cuirassiers of Kellerman, 3000
in number, were consequently ordered forward to maintain the position.
And at p. 196 and 157, Liv. ix., he allows that the grenadiers-à-cheval,
and dragoons of the guard, which were in reserve, advanced without
orders; that he sent to recall them, but, as they were already engaged,
any retrograde movement would then have been dangerous. Thus, every
attack of the enemy had been repulsed, and a severe loss inflicted. The
influence this must have had on the "morale" of each army, was much in
favour of the British, and the probability of success on the part of the
enemy was consequently diminished from that period.
The enemy now seemed to concentrate their artillery, particularly on the
left of the Genappe chaussée, in front of La Belle Alliance, and
commenced a heavy fire (a large proportion of his guns were
twelve-pounders) on that part of our line extending from behind La Haye
Sainte towards Hougomont. Our infantry sheltered themselves by lying
down behind the ridge of the rising ground, and bore it with the most
heroic patience. Several of our guns had been disabled, and many
artillerymen killed and wounded, so that this fire was scarcely
returned; but when the new point of attack was no longer doubtful, two
brigades were brought from Lord Hill's corps on the right, and were of
most essential service.
It may here be proper to consider the situation of the Prussian army,
and the assistance they had rendered up to this time, about six o'clock.
The British army had sustained several severe attacks, which had been
all repulsed, and no advantage of any consequence had been gained by the
enemy. They had possessed part of the wood and garden of Hougomont, and
La Haye Sainte, which latter they were unable to occupy. Not a square
had been broken, shaken, or obliged to retire. Our infantry continued to
display the same obstinacy, the same cool, calculating confidence in
themselves, in their commander, and in their officers, which had covered
them with glory in the long and arduous war in the Peninsula. From the
limited extent of the field of battle, and the tremendous fire their
columns were exposed to, the loss of the enemy could not have been less
than 15,000 killed and wounded. Two eagles, and 2000 prisoners, had been
taken, and their cavalry nearly destroyed. We still occupied nearly the
same position as we did in the morning, but our loss had been severe,
perhaps not less than 10,000 killed and wounded. Our ranks were further
thinned by the numbers of men who carried off the wounded, part of whom
never returned to the field. The number of Belgian and Hanoverian
troops, many of whom were young levies, that crowded to the rear, was
very considerable, besides the number of our own dismounted dragoons,
together with a proportion of our infantry, some of whom, as will always
be found in the best armies, were glad to escape from the field. These
thronged the road leading to Brussels, in a manner that none but an
eyewitness could have believed, so that perhaps the actual force under
the Duke of Wellington at this time, half-past six, did not amount to
more than 34,000 men.[344] We had at an early hour been in communication
with some patroles of Prussian cavalry on our extreme left. A Prussian
corps, under Bulow, had marched from Wavre at an early hour to manœuvre
on the right and rear of the French army, but a large proportion of the
Prussian army were still on the heights above Wavre, after the action
had commenced at Waterloo.[345] The state of the roads, and the immense
train of artillery they carried, detained Bulow's corps for a remarkably
long time; they had not more than twelve or fourteen miles to march. At
one o'clock,[346] the advanced guard of this corps was discovered by the
French; about two o'clock the patroles of Bulow's corps were discovered
from part of our position. The French detached some light cavalry to
observe them, which was the only diversion that had taken place up to
this time. At half-past four, Blucher had joined in person Bulow's
corps, at which time two brigades of infantry and some cavalry were
detached to act on the right of the French. [Muffling, p. 30.] He was so
far from the right of the French, that his fire of artillery was too
distant to produce any effect, and was chiefly intended to give us
notice of his arrival. [Muffling, p. 31.] It was certainly past five
o'clock before the fire of the Prussian artillery (Bulow's corps) was
observed from our position, and it soon seemed to cease altogether. It
appears that they had advanced, and obtained some success, but were
afterwards driven back to a considerable distance by the French, who
sent a corps under General Lobau to keep them in check.[347] About
half-past six, the first Prussian corps came into communication with our
extreme left near Ohain.
The effective state of the several armies may be considered to be as
follows:
The army under the Duke of Wellington amounted, at the commencement of
the campaign, to 75,000 men, including every description of force,[348]
of which nearly 40,000 were English, or the King's German Legion. Our
loss at Quatre-Bras amounted to 4500 killed and wounded, which reduced
the army to 70,500 men; of these about 54,000 were actually engaged at
Waterloo; about 32,000 were composed of British troops, or the King's
German Legion, including cavalry, infantry, and artillery; the
remainder, under Prince Frederick, took no part in the action, but
covered the approach to Brussels from Nievelles, and were stationed in
the neighbourhood of Halle. The French force has been variously stated,
and it is not easy to form a very accurate statement of their strength.
Batty gives it at 127,000; that is the number which crossed the
frontiers. Liv. ix., p. 69, it is given at 122,000. Gourgaud reduces it
to 115,000; of these, 21,000 were cavalry, and they had 350 guns. Let
us, however, take the statement in Liv. ix., and say,
122,000
Deduct left at Charleroi, Liv. ix., 92,[349] 5,300
Loss at Quatre-Bras and Ligny, Liv. ix., 100 and 106, 10,350
Left at Ligny (Grouchy, p. 8,) Liv. ix., 193;
this is stated at 3000, 3,200
With Grouchy (Grouchy, p. 8,) 32,000
------ 50,850
------
Engaged at Waterloo, 71,150
This number, however, is certainly underrated; and there is little doubt
but Buonaparte had upwards of 75,000 men under his immediate command on
the 18th June.[350]
Buonaparte, liv. ix., 162, 117, states the Prussian force concentrated
at Wavre to be 75,000 men. Grouchy, p. 9, makes it 95,000. It is,
however, generally understood that they had not above 70,000 with the
army at Wavre.
It may be necessary here to refer to the operations of the corps under
Grouchy, who were detached in pursuit of the Prussians. It appears, that
at twelve o'clock on the 17th, Buonaparte was ignorant of the direction
the Prussian army had taken.--[Grouchy, p. 13.]--It was generally
supposed that it was towards Namur. At that hour, Buonaparte ordered
Grouchy, with 32,000 men, to follow them. As the troops were much
scattered, it was three o'clock before they were in movement, and they
did not arrive at Gembloux before the night of the 17th, when Grouchy
informed Buonaparte of the direction the Prussian army had taken. He
discovered the rear-guard of the Prussians near Wavre about twelve
o'clock on the 18th, and at two o'clock he attacked Wavre, which was
obstinately defended by General Thielman, and succeeded in obtaining
possession of a part of the village. By the gallant defence of this post
by General Thielman, Grouchy was induced to believe that the whole
Prussian army was before him. Blucher, however, had detached Bulow's
corps (4th) at an early hour upon Chapelle-Lambert, to act on the rear
of the French army. The movement of this corps was, however, much
delayed by a fire which happened at Wavre, and by the bad state of the
roads; so that they had great difficulty in bringing up the numerous
artillery they carried with this corps, which prevented them from
attacking the enemy before half-past four o'clock.[351]
The 2d Prussian corps marched upon Chapelle-Lambert and Lasne; and at a
later period of the day[352] the 1st corps moved in the direction of
Ohain. The 3d corps was also to have supported the 4th and 2d corps.
Blucher was not aware of the large force under Grouchy, who attacked the
3d corps as it was preparing to leave Wavre, and obliged it to take up a
position on the Dyle, between Limale and Wavre, where he afterwards
ordered it to maintain itself as well as it could.
The British army, at this eventful period of the day, amounted to about
34,000 men (allowing 10,000 killed and wounded, and 10,000 more who had
left the field,) 18,000 of whom are English.--[Muffling, p. 32.]--The
enemy may have had about 45,000 immediately opposed to us, allowing
20,000 killed, wounded, and taken prisoners; and 10,000 men detached to
act against the Prussians.
The assistance of the Prussians had been expected at an early hour,[353]
which had induced Lord Wellington to accept a battle; so that the
British army had to bear the whole brunt of the action for a much longer
period than was calculated. Lord Wellington, however, showed no anxiety
as to the result. The corps of Lord Hill, several Belgian battalions,
and a considerable portion of the cavalry, had been little engaged. He
knew the troops he had under his command, and seemed confident of being
able to maintain his position, even if the Prussians did not arrive
before night. The army was not aware of their approach, nor did he think
it necessary to animate their exertions by this intelligence.
Buonaparte, on the contrary, thought proper to revive the drooping
spirits of his troops, even of his guards, who had not yet been engaged,
by sending his aide-de-camp Labédoyère to inform them, as they were
about to advance,[354] that Grouchy had joined their right flank, and
even deceived Ney himself by this false intelligence.
The above detail has been entered into for the purpose of showing the
state of the armies towards the close of the day. Buonaparte was now
aware of the powerful diversion the Prussians were about to make, but at
the same time seems to have imagined that Grouchy would be able to
paralyse their movements. He therefore resolved to make a last desperate
effort to break the centre of the British army, and carry their position
before the attack of the Prussians could take effect.
The imperial guard had been kept in reserve, and had been for some time
formed on the heights extending from La Belle Alliance, towards
Hougomont, which supported their left flank. They had not yet been
engaged.
About seven o'clock they advanced in two columns,[355] leaving four
battalions in reserve. They were commanded by Ney, who led them on. At
the same time, they pushed on some light troops in the direction of La
Haye. The advance of these columns of the guards was supported by a
heavy fire of artillery. Our infantry, who had been posted on the
reverse of the hill, to be sheltered from the fire of the guns, were
instantly moved forward by Lord Wellington. General Maitland's brigade
of guards, and General Adam's brigade (52d and 71st regiments, and 95th
rifles,) met this formidable attack. They were flanked by two brigades
of artillery, who kept up a destructive fire on the advancing columns.
Our troops waited for their approach with their characteristic coolness,
until they were within a short distance of our line, when they opened a
well-directed fire upon them. The line was formed four deep. The men
fired independently, retiring a few paces to load, and then advanced and
fired, so that their fire never ceased for a moment. The French, headed
by their gallant leader, still advanced, notwithstanding the severe loss
they sustained by this fire, which apparently seemed to check their
movement. They were now within about fifty yards of our line, when they
attempted to deploy, in order to return the fire. Our line appeared to
be closing round them. They could not, however, deploy under such a
fire; and from the moment they ceased to advance, their chance of
success was over. They now formed a confused mass, and at last gave way,
retiring in the utmost confusion. They were immediately pursued by the
light troops of General Adam's brigade. This decided the battle. The
enemy had now exhausted his means of attack. He had still, however, the
four battalions of the old guard in reserve. Lord Wellington immediately
ordered the whole line to advance to attack their position. The enemy
were already attempting a retreat. These battalions formed a square to
cover the retreat of the flying columns, flanked by a few guns, and
supported by some light cavalry (red lancers.)
The first Prussian corps had now joined our extreme left. They had
obtained possession of the village of La Haye, driving out the French
light troops who occupied it. Bulow, with the fourth corps, had some
time previous to this made an unsuccessful attack upon the village of
Planchenot, in the rear of the enemy's right wing, and being joined by
the second corps, (Pirch's) was again advancing to attack it.[356] In
the meantime, the square of the Old Guard maintained itself, the guns on
its flank firing upon our light cavalry, who now advanced, and
threatened to turn their flank. Our light troops were close on their
front, and our whole line advancing, when this body, the "élite," and
now the only hope of the enemy to cover their retreat, and save their
army, gave way, and mixed in the general confusion and rout, abandoning
their cannon and all their materiel. It was now nearly dark. Bulow, upon
being joined by Pirch's corps, again attacked Planchenot, which he
turned; and then the enemy abandoned it. He immediately advanced towards
the Genappe chausée, and closed round the right of the French--[Liv.
ix., p. 169]--driving the enemy before him, and augmenting their
confusion. His troops came into the high-road, or chausée, near Maison
du Roi, and Blucher and Wellington having met about the same time near
La Belle Alliance, it was resolved to pursue the enemy, and give him no
time to rally. The loss of the Prussians on the 18th did not exceed 800
men. The brunt of the action was chiefly sustained by the troops of the
British and King's German Legion, as their loss will show. In stating
this, it must be allowed, that much support was afforded by the other
contingents; but they were chiefly raw levies, newly raised, who could
not be depended upon in a situation of importance. Some behaved ill, as
is publicly known. None were in the first line, except the Nassau troops
at Hougomont, and some on our extreme left. They were placed in the
second line, and in the valley behind the first line, and on the right,
at Braine la Leude. They had generally been formed with the British
brigades of the different divisions (in the manner Lord Wellington found
so advantageous with the Portuguese troops,) but these arrangements had
just been made. The different brigades in a division had not any
knowledge of, or confidence in, each other. Many battalions,
particularly some Belgian troops, in the rear of the first line, stood
with firmness against the French cavalry, and drove them back. They
suffered more severely, perhaps, than the first line, from the fire of
the enemy's artillery, and at the close of the action, advanced in
support of the first line with great steadiness and regularity.
The Prussians, who had made only a short march during the day, pursued
the enemy with such vigour, that they were unable to rally a single
battalion. The British army halted on the field of battle. They once
attempted to make a show of resistance at Genappe, where, perhaps, if
they had had a chief to direct them, they might have maintained
themselves until daylight, the situation of the village being strong;
this might have given them the means of saving at least the semblance of
an army. The second Prussian corps was afterwards detached to intercept
Grouchy, who was not aware of the result of the battle until twelve
o'clock next day. He had succeeded in obtaining some advantage over
General Thielman, and got possession of Wavre. He immediately retreated
towards Namur, where his rear-guard maintained themselves against all
the efforts of the Prussians, who suffered severely in their attempt to
take the place. This served to cover his retreat, which he executed with
great ability, keeping in a parallel line to Blucher, and having rallied
many of the fugitives, he brought his army without loss to Paris. He had
been considered as lost, and his army made prisoners; this belief was a
great cause of the resignation of Buonaparte; otherwise, with this army
he could have mustered 70,000 or 80,000 men; with the fortifications and
resources of Paris, which was sufficiently secure against a
coup-de-main, it is not likely he would have so easily submitted without
another struggle, after the brilliant defensive campaign he had made the
preceding year. The great central depôts of Paris and Lyons gave him
great advantages, as is well shown in the introductory chapter, Liv.
ix., p. 181. There are always some turns of fortune in the events of
war; he might at least have made terms. The southern and eastern parts
of France were certainly in his favour; he and his army had been well
received there only a few weeks before. That army, and a great part of
the population, would still have been glad to make sacrifices to
endeavour to re-establish the sullied lustre of his arms. At least the
honour of falling sword in hand was in his power.
The time of the arrival and co-operation of the Prussians has been
variously stated.[357] The above account is perhaps as near the truth as
can be. The French writers make it at an early hour, to account more
satisfactorily for their defeat. The Prussians also make it somewhat
earlier than was actually the case, in order to participate more largely
in the honours of the day. Their powerful assistance has been
acknowledged to its full extent. They completed the destruction of the
French army, after they had failed in all their attacks against the
British, which continued upwards of seven hours, after their cavalry had
been destroyed, their Imperial Guards driven back, and eagles and
prisoners taken, and when their means of further attack may be
considered as exhausted. The British army had suffered severely, and was
not in a state to have taken great advantage of the retreat of the
French. But its safety was never for a moment compromised, and no
calculation could justify the idea, that we would have been so easily
defeated and driven from our position, but that the enemy would have
been so much crippled, that he could not have taken much advantage of
our reverses. Even in such a case, the arrival of the Prussians must
have obliged him to have retired. Muffling has observed, that the bold
movement of Blucher on the 18th has not been sufficiently
appreciated.[358] It was bold and masterly. Even when he was told that
Grouchy was in his rear with a large force, his plans were not shaken,
though this might have somewhat retarded his movements. The skilful
veteran knew that it was on the field of Waterloo where the fate of the
day was to be decided, and if even Grouchy had attacked Bulow's corps,
there was nothing to prevent the first and second corps from joining the
British army by Ohain. Grouchy could only, at farthest, have checked the
third and fourth corps. There cannot be a moment's doubt of the anxiety
and exertions of the Prussians to assist on the 18th. The cordiality and
friendship of the Prussians have been felt and acknowledged by every
officer who has had occasion to visit Prussia subsequently;--this has
been particularly the case with the military.
This short campaign of "Hours" was a joint operation. The honours must
be shared. On the 16th, the Prussians fought at Ligny under the promise
of our co-operation, which could not, however, be given to the extent it
was wished or hoped. On the 18th, Lord Wellington fought at Waterloo, on
the promise of the early assistance of the Prussians, which, though
unavoidably delayed, was at last given with an effect, which perhaps had
never before been witnessed. The finest army France ever saw, commanded
by the greatest and ablest of her chiefs, ceased to exist, and in a
moment the destiny of Europe was changed.
No. II.
BUONAPARTE'S PROTEST.
[See p. 241.]
"I hereby solemnly protest, in the face of Heaven and of men, against
the violence done me, and against the violation of my most sacred
rights, in forcibly disposing of my person and my liberty.
"I came voluntarily on board of the Bellerophon; I am not a prisoner--I
am the guest of England. I came on board even at the instigation of the
captain, who told me he had orders from the Government to receive me and
my suite, and conduct me to England, if agreeable to me. I presented
myself with good faith, to put myself under the protection of the
English laws. As soon as I was on board the Bellerophon, I was under
shelter of the British people. If the Government, in giving orders to
the captain of the Bellerophon to receive me as well as my suite, only
intended to lay a snare for me, it has forfeited its honour, and
disgraced its flag. If this act be consummated, the English will in vain
boast to Europe, their integrity, their laws, and their liberty. British
good faith will be lost in the hospitality of the Bellerophon. I appeal
to history; it will say that an enemy, who for twenty years waged war
against the English people, came voluntarily, in his misfortunes, to
seek an asylum under their laws. What more brilliant proof could he give
of his esteem and his confidence? But what return did England make for
so much magnanimity?--They feigned to stretch forth a friendly hand to
that enemy; and when he delivered himself up in good faith, they
sacrificed him.
(Signed) "NAPOLEON.
"_On board the Bellerophon, 4th August, 1815._"
We have already, in the text, completely refuted the pretence, that
Buonaparte was ensnared on board the Bellerophon. Every expression of
Captain Maitland went to disown any authority to treat with Napoleon, or
grant him conditions of any kind; nor could he say more when his private
opinion was demanded, than that he had no reason to suppose that
Napoleon would be ill received in England. This was in presence of
Captain Sartorius and Captain Gambier, both of whom Captain Maitland
appealed to in support of his statement. We do not, however, feel it too
much, on the present occasion, to copy the letters which passed betwixt
Lord Keith, on the one hand, and Captain Maitland, Captain Sartorius,
and Captain Gambier, on the other.
"_Tonnant, at anchor under Berryhead,
7th August, 1815._
"SIR,--Count Las Cases having this morning stated to me, that he
understood from you, when he was on board the Bellerophon in Basque
roads, on a mission from General Buonaparte, that you were authorised to
receive the General and his suite on board the ship you command, for
conveyance to England; and that you assured him, at the same time, that
both the General and his suite would be well received there; you are to
report, for my information, such observations as you may consider it
necessary to make upon these assertions. I am, Sir, &c.
"KEITH, Admiral.
"Captain Maitland, Bellerophon."
"_H. M. S. Bellerophon,
Plymouth Sound, 8th August, 1815._
"MY LORD,--I have to acknowledge the receipt of your lordship's letter
of yesterday's date, informing me that Count Las Cases had stated to
you, that he had understood from me, when he was on board the
Bellerophon in Basque roads, on a mission from General Buonaparte, that
I was authorised to receive the General and his suite on board the ship
I command, for a conveyance to England; and that I assured him, at the
same time, that both the General and his suite would be well received
there; and directing me to report, for your lordship's information, such
observations as I may consider it necessary to make upon these
assertions. I shall, in consequence, state, to the best of my
recollection, the whole of the transaction that took place between Count
Las Cases and me, on the 14th of July, respecting the embarkation of
Napoleon Buonaparte, for the veracity of which I beg to refer your
lordship to Captain Sartorius as to what was said in the morning, and to
that officer and Captain Gambier (the Myrmidon having joined me in the
afternoon) as to what passed in the evening.
"Your lordship being informed already of the flag of truce that came out
to me on the 10th of July, as well as of every thing that occurred on
that occasion, I shall confine myself to the transactions of the 14th of
the same month.