_Army of Wellington covers Brussels--that of Blucher on the Sambre
and Meuse--Napoleon reviews his Grand Army on 14th June--Advances
upon Charleroi--His plan to separate the Armies of the two opposing
Generals fails--Interview of Wellington and Blucher at Bric--British
Army concentrated at Quatre-bras--Napoleon's plan of attack--Battle
of Ligny, and defeat of Blucher on 16th June--Action at Quatre-bras
on the same day--The British retain possession of the field--Blucher
eludes the French pursuit--Napoleon joins Ney--Retreat of the
British upon Waterloo._
The triple line of strong fortresses possessed by the French on the
borders of Belgium served Napoleon as a curtain, behind which he could
prepare his levies and unite his forces at pleasure, without any
possibility of the allies or their generals being able to observe his
motions, or prepare for the attack which such motions indicated. On the
other hand, the frontier of Belgium was open to his observation, and he
knew perfectly the general disposal of the allied force.
If the French had been prepared to make their meditated attack upon
Flanders in the month of May, they would have found no formidable force
to oppose them, as at that time the armies of the Prussian general
Kleist, and the hereditary Prince of Orange, did not, in all, exceed
50,000 men. But the return of Napoleon, which again awakened the war,
was an event as totally unexpected in France as in Flanders, and,
therefore, that nation was as much unprepared to make an attack as the
allies to repel one. Thus it happened, that while Napoleon was exerting
himself to collect a sufficient army by the means we have mentioned,
the Duke of Wellington, who arrived at Brussels from Vienna in the
beginning of April, had leisure to garrison and supply the strong places
of Ostend, Antwerp, and Nieuport, which the French had not dismantled,
and to fortify Ypres, Tournay, Mons, and Ath. He had also leisure to
receive his reinforcements from England, and to collect the German,
Dutch, and Belgian contingents.
Thus collected and reinforced, the Duke of Wellington's army might
contain about 30,000 English troops. They were not, however, those
veteran soldiers who had served under him during the Peninsular war; the
flower of which had been despatched upon the American expedition. Most
were second battalions, or regiments which had been lately filled up
with new recruits. The foreigners were 15,000 Hanoverians, with the
celebrated German Legion, 8000 strong, which had so often distinguished
itself in Spain; 5000 Brunswickers, under their gallant duke; and about
17,000 Belgians, Dutch, and Nassau troops, commanded by the Prince of
Orange.
Great and just reliance was placed upon the Germans; but some
apprehensions were entertained for the steadiness of the Belgian troops.
Discontents had prevailed among them, which, at one period, had broken
out in open mutiny, and was not subdued without bloodshed. Most of them
had served in the French ranks, and it was feared some of them might
preserve predilections and correspondences dangerous to the general
cause. Buonaparte was under the same belief. He brought in his train
several Belgian officers, believing there would be a movement in his
favour so soon as he entered the Netherlands. But the Flemings are a
people of sound sense and feeling. Whatever jealousies might have been
instilled into them for their religion and privileges under the reign of
a Protestant and a Dutch sovereign, these were swallowed up in their
apprehensions for the returning tyranny of Napoleon. Some of these
troops behaved with distinguished valour; and most of them supported the
ancient military character of the Walloons. The Dutch corps were in
general enthusiastically attached to the Prince of Orange, and the cause
of independence.
[Sidenote: BLUCHER'S ARMY.]
The Prussian army had been recruited to its highest war-establishment,
within an incredibly short space of time after Buonaparte's return had
been made public, and was reinforced in a manner surprising to those who
do not reflect, how much the resources of a state depend on the zeal of
the inhabitants. Their enthusiastic hatred to France, founded partly on
the recollection of former injuries, partly on that of recent success,
was animated at once by feelings of triumph and of revenge, and they
marched to this new war, as to a national crusade against an inveterate
enemy, whom, when at their feet, they had treated with injudicious
clemency. Blucher was, however, deprived of a valuable part of his army
by the discontent of the Saxon troops. A mutiny had broken out among
them, when the Congress announced their intention of transferring part
of the Saxon dominions to Prussia; much bloodshed had ensued, and it was
judged most prudent that the troops of Saxony should remain in garrison
in the German fortresses.
Prince Blucher arrived at Liege, with the Prussian army, which was
concentrated on the Sambre and Meuse rivers, occupying Charleroi, Namur,
Givet, and Liege. The Duke of Wellington covered Brussels, where he had
fixed his headquarters, communicating by his left with the right of the
Prussians. There was a general idea that Napoleon's threatened advance
would take place on Namur, as he was likely to find least opposition at
that dismantled city.
The Duke of Wellington's first corps, under the Prince of Orange, with
two divisions of British, two of Hanoverians, and two of Belgians,
occupied Enghien, Brain le Comte, and Nivelles, and served as a reserve
to the Prussian division under Ziethen, which was at Charleroi. The
second division, commanded by Lord Hill, included two British, two
Hanoverian, and one Belgian divisions. It was cantoned at Halle,
Oudenarde, and Grammont. The reserve, under Picton, who, at Lord
Wellington's special request, had accepted of the situation of second in
command, consisted of the remaining two British divisions, with three of
the Hanoverians, and was stationed at Brussels and Ghent. The cavalry
occupied Grammont and Nieve.
The Anglo-Belgic army was so disposed, therefore, as might enable the
divisions to combine with each other, and with the Prussians, upon the
earliest authentic intelligence of the enemy's being put in motion. At
the same time, the various corps were necessarily, to a certain degree,
detached, both for the purpose of being more easily maintained
(especially the cavalry,) and also because, from the impossibility of
foreseeing in what direction the French Emperor might make his attack,
it was necessary to maintain such an extensive line of defence as to be
prepared for his arrival upon any given point. This is the necessary
inconvenience attached to a defensive position, where, if the resisting
general should concentrate his whole forces upon any one point of the
line to be defended, the enemy would, of course, choose to make their
assault on some of the other points, which such concentration must
necessarily leave comparatively open.
In the meantime, Napoleon in person advanced to Vervins on 12th June,
with his Guard, who had marched from Paris. The other divisions of his
selected grand army had been assembled on the frontier, and the whole,
consisting of five divisions of infantry, and four of cavalry, were
combined at Beaumont on the 14th of the same month, with a degree of
secrecy and expedition which showed the usual genius of their commander.
Napoleon reviewed the troops in person, reminded them that the day was
the anniversary of the great victories of Marengo and Friedland, and
called on them to remember that the enemies whom they had then defeated,
were the same which were now arrayed against them. "Are they and we," he
asked, "no longer the same men?"[134] The address produced the strongest
effect on the minds of the French soldiery, always sensitively alive to
military and national glory.
Upon the 15th June, the French army was in motion in every direction.
Their advanced-guard of light troops swept the western bank of the
Sambre clear of all the allied corps of observation. They then advanced
upon Charleroi, which was well defended by the Prussians under General
Ziethen, who was at length compelled to retire on the large village of
Gosselies. Here his retreat was cut off by the second division of the
French army, and Ziethen was compelled to take the route of Fleurus, by
which he united himself with the Prussian force, which lay about the
villages of Ligny and St. Amand. The Prussian general had, however,
obeyed his orders, by making such protracted resistance as gave time for
the alarm being taken. In the attack and retreat, he lost four or five
guns, and a considerable number in killed and wounded.
By this movement the plan of Napoleon was made manifest. It was at once
most scientific and adventurous. His numbers were unequal to sustain a
conflict with the armies of Blucher and Wellington united, but by
forcing his way so as to separate the one enemy from the other, he would
gain the advantage of acting against either individually with the gross
of his forces, while he could spare enough of detached troops to keep
the other in check. To accomplish this masterly manœuvre, it was
necessary to push onwards upon a part of the British advance, which
occupied the position of Quatre-bras, and the yet more advanced post of
Frasnes, where some of the Nassau troops were stationed. But the extreme
rapidity of Napoleon's forced marches had in some measure prevented the
execution of his plan, by dispersing his forces so much, that at a time
when every hour was of consequence, he was compelled to remain at
Charleroi until his wearied and over-marched army had collected.
[Sidenote: FRASNES AND QUATRE-BRAS.]
In the meantime, Ney was detached against Frasnes and Quatre-bras, but
the troops of Namur kept their post on the evening of the 15th. It is
possible the French maréchal might have succeeded had he attacked at
Frasnes with his whole force; but hearing a cannonade in the direction
of Fleurus (which was that of Ziethen's action,) he detached a division
to support the French in that quarter. For this exercise of his own
judgment, instead of yielding precise obedience to his orders, Ney was
reprimanded; a circumstance curiously contrasted with the case of
Grouchy, upon whom Napoleon laid the whole blame of the defeat at
Waterloo, because he _did_ follow his orders precisely, and press the
Prussians at Wavre, instead of being diverted from that object by the
cannonade on his left.
The manœuvre meditated by Napoleon thus failed, though it had nearly
been successful. He continued, however, to entertain the same purpose of
dividing, if possible, the British army from the Prussians.
The British general received intelligence of the advance of the French,
at Brussels, at six o'clock on the evening of the 15th,[135] but it was
not of sufficient certainty to enable him to put his army in motion, on
an occasion when a false movement might have been irretrievable ruin.
About eleven of the same night, the certain accounts reached Brussels
that the advance of the French was upon the line of the Sambre.
Reinforcements were hastily moved on Quatre-bras, and the Duke of
Wellington arrived there in person at an early hour on the 16th, and
instantly rode from that position to Bric, where he had a meeting with
Blucher. It appeared at this time that the whole French force was about
to be directed against the Prussians.
Blucher was prepared to receive them. Three of his divisions, to the
number of 80,000 men, had been got into position on a chain of gentle
heights, running from Bric to Sombref; in front of their line lay the
villages of the Greater and Lesser St. Amand, as also that of Ligny, all
of which were strongly occupied. From the extremity of his right,
Blucher could communicate with the British at Quatre-bras, upon which
the Duke of Wellington was, as fast as distance would permit,
concentrating his army. The fourth Prussian division, being that of
Bulow, stationed between Liege and Hainault, was at too great a distance
to be brought up, though every effort was made for the purpose. Blucher
undertook, however, notwithstanding the absence of Bulow, to receive a
battle in this position, trusting to the support of the English army,
who, by a flank movement to the left, were to march to his assistance.
Napoleon had, in the meantime, settled his own plan of battle. He
determined to leave Ney with a division of 45,000 men, with instructions
to drive the English from Quatre-bras, ere their army was concentrated
and reinforced, and thus prevent their co-operating with Blucher, while
he himself, with the main body of his army, attacked the Prussian
position at Ligny. Ney being thus on the French left wing at Frasnes and
Quatre-bras, and Buonaparte on the right at Ligny, a division under
D'Erlon, amounting to 10,000 men, served as a centre of the army, and
was placed near Marchiennes, from which it might march laterally either
to support Ney or Napoleon, whichever might require assistance. As two
battles thus took place on the 16th June, it is necessary to take
distinct notice of both.
[Sidenote: LIGNY.]
That of Ligny was the principal action. The French Emperor was unable to
concentrate his forces, so as to commence the attack upon the Prussians,
until three o'clock in the afternoon, at which hour it began with
uncommon fury all along the Prussian line. After a continued attack of
two hours, the French had only obtained possession of a part of the
village of St. Amand. The position of the Prussians, however, was thus
far defective, that the main part of their army being drawn up on the
heights, and the remainder occupying villages which lay at their foot,
the reinforcements despatched to the latter were necessarily exposed
during their descent to the fire from the French artillery, placed on
the meadows below. Notwithstanding this disadvantage, by which the
Prussians suffered much, Napoleon thought the issue of the contest so
doubtful, that he sent for D'Erlon's division, which, as we have
mentioned, was stationed near Marchiennes, half-way betwixt Quatre-bras
and Ligny. In the meanwhile, observing that Blucher drew his reserves
together on St. Amand, he changed his point of attack, and directed all
his force against Ligny, of which, after a desperate resistance, he at
length obtained possession. The French Guards, supported by their heavy
cavalry, ascended the heights, and attacked the Prussian position in the
rear of Ligny. The reserves of the Prussian infantry having been
despatched to St. Amand, Blucher had no means of repelling this attack,
save by his cavalry. He placed himself at their head, and charged in the
most determined manner, but without success. The cavalry of Blucher were
forced back in disorder.
The prince maréchal, as he directed the retreat, was involved in one of
the charges of cavalry, his horse struck down by a cannon-shot, and he
himself prostrated on the ground. His aide-de-camp threw himself beside
the veteran, determined to share his fate, and had the precaution to
fling a cloak over him, to prevent his being recognised by the French.
The enemy's cuirassiers passed over him, and it was not until they were
repulsed, and in their turn pursued by the Prussian cavalry, that the
gallant veteran was raised and remounted.[136] Blucher's death, or
captivity, at that eventful moment, might have had most sinister effects
on the event of the campaign, as it may be fairly doubted whether any
thing short of his personal influence and exertion could, after this
hard-fought and unfortunate day, have again brought the Prussian army
into action on the eventful 18th of June. When relieved, and again
mounted, Blucher directed the retreat upon Tilly, and achieved it
unmolested by the enemy, who did not continue their pursuit beyond the
heights which the Prussians had been constrained to abandon.
Such was the battle of Ligny, in which the Prussians, as Blucher truly
said, "lost the field, but not their honour."[137] The victory was
attended with none of those decisive consequences which were wont to
mark the successes of Buonaparte. There were no corps cut off or
dispersed, no regiments which fled or flung down their arms, no line of
defence forced, and no permanent advantage gained. Above all, there was
not a man who lost heart or courage. The Prussians are believed to have
lost in this bloody action at least 10,000 men; the _Moniteur_ makes the
number of the killed and wounded 15,000, and General Gourgaud,
dissatisfied with this liberal allowance, rates them afterwards at no
less than 25,000 men, while writing under Napoleon's dictation. The loss
of the victors was, by the official accounts, estimated at 3000
men,[138] which ought to have been more than tripled. Still, the French
Emperor had struck a great blow--overpowered a stubborn and inveterate
enemy, and opened the campaign with favourable auspices. The degree of
advantage, however, which Napoleon might have derived from the Prussian
retreat was greatly limited by the indifferent success of Ney against
the forces of Lord Wellington. Of this second action we have now to give
some account.
[Sidenote: QUATRE-BRAS.]
Frasnes had been evacuated by the British, who, on the morning of the
16th, were in position at Quatre-bras, a point of importance, as four
roads diverge from it in different directions; so that the British
general might communicate from his left with the Prussian right at St.
Amand, besides having in his rear a causeway open for his retreat. On
the left of the causeway, leading from Charleroi to Brussels, is a wood,
called Bois de Bossu, which, during the early part of the day, was
strongly contested by the sharpshooters on both sides, but at length
carried by the French, and maintained for a time. About three o'clock in
the afternoon, the main attack commenced, but was repulsed. The British
infantry, however, and particularly the 42d Highlanders, suffered
severely from an unexpected charge of lancers, whose approach was hid
from them by the character of the ground, intersected with hedges, and
covered with heavy crops of rye. Two companies of the Highlanders were
cut off, not having time to form the square; the other succeeded in
getting into order, and beating off the lancers. Ney then attempted a
general charge of heavy cavalry; but they were received with such a
galling fire from the British infantry, joined to a battery of two guns,
that it could not be sustained; the whole causeway was strewed with men
and horses, and the fugitives, who escaped to the rear, announced the
loss of an action which was far from being decided, considering that the
British had few infantry and artillery, though reinforcements of both
were coming fast forward.
The French, as already noticed, had, about three o'clock, obtained
possession of the Bois de Bossu and driven out the Belgians. They were
in return themselves expelled by the British guards, who successfully
resisted every attempt made by the French to penetrate into the wood
during the day.
As the English reinforcements arrived in succession, Maréchal Ney became
desirous of an addition of numbers, and sent to procure the assistance
of D'Erlon's division, posted, as has been said, near Marchiennes. But
these troops had been previously ordered to succour Buonaparte's own
army. As the affair of Ligny was, however, over before they arrived, the
division was again sent back towards Frasnes to assist Ney; but his
battle was also by this time over, and thus D'Erlon's troops marched
from one flank to the other, without firing a musket in the course of
the day. The battle of Quatre-bras terminated with the light. The
British retained possession of the field, which they had maintained with
so much obstinacy, because the Duke of Wellington conceived that Blucher
would be able to make his ground good at Ligny, and was consequently
desirous that the armies should retain the line of communication which
they had occupied in the morning.
But the Prussians, evacuating all the villages which they held in the
neighbourhood of Ligny, had concentrated their forces to retreat upon
the river Dyle, in the vicinity of Wavre. By this retrograde movement,
they were placed about six leagues to the rear of their former position,
and had united themselves to Bulow's division, which had not been
engaged in the affair at Ligny. Blucher had effected this retreat, not
only without pursuit by the French, but without their knowing for some
time in what direction he had gone.
This doubt respecting Blucher's movements, occasioned an uncertainty and
delay in those of the French, which were afterwards attended with the
very worst consequences. Napoleon, or General Gourgaud in his name, does
not hesitate to assert, that the cause of this delay rested with
Maréchal Grouchy, on whom was devolved the duty of following up the
Prussian retreat. "If Maréchal Grouchy," says the accusation, "had been
at Wavre on the 17th, and in communication with _my_ (Napoleon's) right,
Blucher would not have dared to send any detachment of his army against
me on the 18th; or if he had, I would have destroyed them."[139] But the
maréchal appears to make a victorious defence. Grouchy says, that he
sought out the Emperor on the night of the 16th, so soon as the Prussian
retreat commenced, but that he could not see him till he returned to
Fleurus; nor did he obtain any answer to his request of obtaining some
infantry to assist his cavalry in following Blucher and his retreating
army, excepting an intimation that he would receive orders next day. He
states, that he went again to headquarters in the morning of the 17th,
aware of the full importance of following the Prussians closely up, but
that he could not see Buonaparte till half-past seven, and then was
obliged to follow him to the field of battle of the preceding day,
previous to receiving his commands. Napoleon talked with various persons
on different subjects, without giving Grouchy any orders until near
noon, when he suddenly resolved to send the maréchal with an army of
32,000 men, not upon Wavre, for he did not know that the Prussians had
taken that direction, but to follow Blucher wherever he might have gone.
Lastly, Grouchy affirms that the troops of Gérard and Vandamme, who were
placed under his command, were not ready to move until three o'clock.
Thus, according to the maréchal's very distinct narrative, the first
orders for the pursuit were not given till about noon on the 17th, and
the troops were not in a capacity to obey them until three hours after
they were received. For this delay Grouchy blames Excelmans and Gérard,
who commanded under him. His corps, at any rate, was not in motion until
three o'clock upon the 17th.[140]
Neither could his march, when begun, be directed with certainty on
Wavre. The first traces of the Prussians which he could receive, seemed
to intimate, on the contrary, that they were retiring towards Namur,
which induced Grouchy to push the pursuit in the latter direction, and
occasioned the loss of some hours. From all these concurring reasons,
the maréchal shows distinctly, that he could not have attained Wavre on
the evening of the 17th June, because he had no orders to go there till
noon, nor troops ready to march till three o'clock; nor had either
Napoleon or his general any foreknowledge of the motions of Blucher,
which might induce them to believe Wavre was the true point of his
retreat. It was not till he found the English resolved to make a stand
at Waterloo, and the Prussians determined to communicate with them, that
Napoleon became aware of the plan arranged betwixt Wellington and
Blucher, to concentrate the Prussian and English armies at Waterloo.
This was the enigma on which his fate depended, and he failed to solve
it. But it was more agreeable, and much more convenient, for Napoleon to
blame Grouchy, than to acknowledge that he himself had been surprised by
the circumstances in which he unexpectedly found himself on the 18th.
Meantime, having detached Grouchy to pursue the Prussians, Napoleon
himself moved laterally towards Frasnes, and there united himself with
the body commanded by Maréchal Ney. His purpose was to attack the Duke
of Wellington, whom he expected still to find in the position of
Quatre-bras.
But about seven in the morning, the duke, having received intelligence
of the Prince Maréchal Blucher's retreat to Wavre, commenced a retreat
on his part towards Waterloo, in order to recover his communication with
the Prussians, and resume the execution of the plan of co-operation,
which had been in some degree disconcerted by the sudden irruption of
the French, and the loss of the battle of Ligny by the Prussians. The
retreat was conducted with the greatest regularity, though it was as
usual unpleasant to the feelings of the soldier. The news of the battle
of Ligny spread through the ranks, and even the most sanguine did not
venture to hope that the Prussians would be soon able to renew the
engagement. The weather was dreadful, as the rain fell in torrents; but
this so far favoured the British, by rendering the ploughed fields
impracticable for horse, so that their march was covered from the
attacks of the French cavalry on the flanks, and the operations of those
by whom they were pursued were confined to the causeway.
[Sidenote: GENAPPE--WATERLOO.]
At Genappe, however, a small town, where a narrow bridge over the river
Dyle can only be approached by a confined street, there was an attack on
the British rear, which the English light cavalry were unable to repel;
but the heavy cavalry being brought up, repulsed the French, who gave
the rear of the army no farther disturbance for the day.
At five in the evening, the Duke of Wellington arrived on the memorable
field of WATERLOO, which he had long before fixed as the position in
which he had, in certain events, determined to make a stand for covering
Brussels.
The scene of this celebrated action must be familiar to most readers,
either from description or recollection. The English army occupied a
chain of heights, extending from a ravine and village, termed Merke
Braine, on the right, to a hamlet called Ter la Haye, on the left.
Corresponding to this chain of heights there runs one somewhat parallel
to them, on which the French were posted. A small valley winds between
them of various breadth at different points, but not generally exceeding
half a mile. The declivity on either side into the valley has a varied,
but on the whole a gentle slope, diversified by a number of undulating
irregularities of ground. The field is crossed by two highroads, or
causeways, both leading to Brussels--one from Charleroi through
Quatre-bras and Genappe, by which the British army had just retreated,
and another from Nivelles. These roads traverse the valley, and meet
behind the village of Mont St. Jean, which was in the rear of the
British army. The farm-house of Mont St. Jean, which must be carefully
distinguished from the hamlet, was much closer to the rear of the
British than the latter. On the Charleroi causeway in front of the line,
there is another farm-house, called La Haye Sainte, situated nearly at
the foot of the declivity leading into the valley. On the opposite chain
of eminences, a village called La Belle Alliance gives name to the
range of heights. It exactly fronts Mont St. Jean, and these two points
formed the respective centres of the French and English positions.
An old-fashioned Flemish villa, called Goumont, or Hougomont, stood in
the midst of the valley, surrounded with gardens, offices, and a wood,
about two acres in extent, of tall beech-trees. Behind the heights of
Mont St. Jean, the ground again sinks into a hollow, which served to
afford some sort of shelter to the second line of the British. In the
rear of this second valley, is the great and extensive forest of
Soignies, through which runs the causeway to Brussels. On that road, two
miles in the rear of the British army, is placed the small town of
Waterloo.
FOOTNOTES:
[133] Las Cases, tom. ii., p. 276.
[134] "The madmen! a moment of prosperity has blinded them. The
oppression and humiliation of the French people are beyond their power:
if they enter France, they will there find their tomb. Soldiers! we have
forced marches to make, battles to fight, hazards to run; but, with
firmness, victory will be ours: the rights, honour, and happiness of our
country will be reconquered. To every Frenchman who has any heart, the
moment is arrived--to conquer or to die!"--_Moniteur, June 17._
[135] The reader will find this statement corrected, on some points, in
a note of chap. lxxxix., _post_.
[136] Blucher's Official Report.
[137] Blucher's Official Report.
[138] Bulletin, Moniteur, June 21. Gourgaud, however, states the actual
loss, on the part of the French, to have been 7000.
[139] Gourgaud, Campaign de 1815, ou Relation des Opérations, &c.
[140] Grouchy, Observations sur la Relation de Gourgaud.