_Preparations for War--Positions of the Allied Forces, amounting in
whole to One Million of Men--Buonaparte's Force not more than
200,000--Conscription not ventured upon--National Guard--their
reluctance to serve--Many Provinces hostile to Napoleon--Fouché's
Report makes known the Disaffection--Insurrection in La
Vendée--quelled--Military Resources--Plan of Campaign--Paris Placed
in a Complete State of Defence--Frontier Passes and Towns
fortified--Generals who accept Command under Napoleon--He Announces
his Purpose to measure himself with Wellington._
[Sidenote: PREPARATIONS FOR WAR.]
We are now to consider the preparations made for the invasion of France
along the whole eastern frontier--the means of resistance which the
talents of the Emperor presented to his numerous enemies--and the
internal situation of the country itself.
While the events now commemorated were passing in France, the allies
made the most gigantic preparations for the renewal of war. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer of England had achieved a loan of thirty-six
millions, upon terms surprisingly moderate, and the command of this
treasure had put the whole troops of the coalition into the most active
advance.
The seat of the Congress had been removed from Vienna to Frankfort, to
be near the theatre of war. The Emperors of Russia and Austria, with the
King of Prussia, had once more placed themselves at the head of their
respective armies. The whole eastern frontier was menaced by immense
forces. One hundred and fifty thousand Austrians, disengaged from Murat,
might enter France through Switzerland, the Cantons having acceded to
the coalition. An army equal in strength menaced the higher Rhine.
Schwartzenberg commanded the Austrians in chief, having under him
Bellegarde, and Frimont, Bianchi, and Vincent. Two hundred thousand
Russians were pressing towards the frontiers of Alsace. The Archduke
Constantine was nominated generalissimo, but Barclay de Tolly, Sacken,
Langeron, &c. were the efficient commanders. One hundred and fifty
thousand Prussians, under Blucher, occupied Flanders, and were united
with about eighty thousand troops, British, or in British pay, under the
Duke of Wellington. There were also to be reckoned the contingents of
the different princes of Germany, so that the allied forces were
computed grossly to amount to upwards of one million of men. The reader
must not, however, suppose that such an immense force was, or could be,
brought forward at once. They were necessarily disposed on various lines
for the convenience of subsistence, and were to be brought up
successively in support of each other.
To meet this immense array, Napoleon, with his usual talent and
celerity, had brought forward means of surprising extent. The regular
army, diminished by the Bourbons, had been, by calling out the retired
officers and disbanded soldiers, increased from something rather under
100,000 men, to double that number of experienced troops, of the first
quality. But this was dust in the balance; and the mode of conscription
was so intimately connected with Napoleon's wars of conquest and
disaster, that he dared not propose, nor would the Chamber of
Representatives have agreed, to have recourse to the old and odious
resource of conscription, which, however, Buonaparte trusted he might
still find effectual in the month of June, to the number of 300,000. In
the meantime, it was proposed to render moveable, for active service,
two hundred battalions of the national guard, choosing those most fit
for duty, which would make a force of 112,000 men. It was also proposed
to levy as many Federates, that is, volunteers of the lower orders, as
could be brought together in the different departments. The levy of the
national guards was ordered by an Imperial decree of 5th April, 1815,
and commissioners, chiefly of the Jacobin faction, were sent down into
the different departments, Buonaparte being well pleased at once to
employ them in their own sphere, and to get rid of their presence at
Paris. Their efforts were, however, unable to excite the spirit of the
country; for they had either survived their own energies, or the nation
had been too long accustomed to their mode of oratory, to feel any
responsive impulse. Liberty and fraternity was no longer a rallying
sound, and the summons to arms, by decrees as peremptory as those
relating to the conscription, though bearing another name, spread a
general spirit of disgust through many departments in the north of
France. There and in Brittany the disaffection of the inhabitants
appeared in a sullen, dogged stubbornness, rather than in the form of
active resistance to Napoleon's decrees. The national guards refused to
parade, and, if compelled to do so, took every opportunity to desert and
return home; so that it often happened that a battalion, which had
mustered six hundred men, dwindled down to a fifth before they had
marched two leagues.
In the departments of La Garde, of the Marne, and the Nether Loire, the
white flag was displayed, and the tree of liberty, which had been
replanted in many places after the political regeneration of Buonaparte,
was cut down. The public mind in many provinces displayed itself as
highly unfavourable to Napoleon.
[Sidenote: DISAFFECTION.]
A report drawn up by Fouché, stated in high-coloured language the
general disaffection. Napoleon always considered this communication as
published with a view of prejudicing his affairs; and as that versatile
statesman was already in secret correspondence with the allies, it was
probably intended as much to encourage the Royalists, as to dismay the
adherents of Napoleon. This arch-intriguer, whom, to use an expression
of Junius, treachery itself could not trust, was at one moment nearly
caught in his own toils; and although he carried the matter with
infinite address, Napoleon would have made him a prisoner, or caused him
to be shot, but for the intimation of Carnot, that, if he did so, his
own reign would not last an hour longer.[132]
Thus Buonaparte was already, in a great measure, reduced to the office
of Generalissimo of the State; and there were not wanting many, who
dared to entreat him to heal the wounds of the country by a second
abdication in favour of his son--a measure which the popular party
conceived might avert the impending danger of invasion.
In the meantime, about the middle of May, a short insurrection broke out
in La Vendée, under De Autechamp, Suzannet, Sapineau, and especially the
brave La Rochejacquelein. The war was neither long nor bloody, for an
overpowering force was directed against the insurgents, under Generals
Lamarque and Travot. The people were ill prepared for resistance, and
the government menaced them with the greatest severities, the
instructions of Carnot to the military having a strong tincture of his
ancient education in the school of terror. Yet the Chamber of Deputies
did not in all respects sanction the severities of the government. When
a member, called Leguevel, made a motion for punishing with pains and
penalties the Royalists of the west, the assembly heard him with
patience and approbation, propose that the goods and estates of the
revolters (whom he qualified as brigands, priests, and Royalists) should
be confiscated; but when he added, that not only the insurgents
themselves, but their relations in the direct line, whether ascendants
or descendants, should be declared outlaws, a general exclamation of
horror drove the orator from the tribune.
After a battle near La Roche Servière, which cost the brave La
Rochejacquelein his life, the remaining chiefs signed a capitulation, by
which they disbanded their followers, and laid down their arms, at the
very time when holding out a few days would have made them acquainted
with the battle of Waterloo. Released from actual civil war, Napoleon
now had leisure to prepare for the external conflict.
The means resorted to by the French government, which we have already
alluded to, had enabled Carnot to represent the national means in a most
respectable point of view. By his report to the two Chambers, he stated,
that on 1st April 1814, the army had consisted of 450,000 men, who had
been reduced by the Bourbons to 175,000. Since the return of Napoleon,
the number had been increased to 375,000 combatants of every kind; and
before the 1st of August, was expected to amount to half a million. The
Imperial Guards, who were termed the country's brightest ornament in
time of peace, and its best bulwark in time of war, were recruited to
the number of 40,000 men.
Stupendous efforts had repaired, the report stated, the losses of the
artillery during the three disastrous years of 1812, 1813, 1814. Stores,
ammunition, arms of every kind, were said to be provided in abundance.
The remounting of the cavalry had been accomplished in such a manner as
to excite the surprise of every one. Finally, there was, as a body in
reserve, the whole mass of sedentary national guards, so called, because
they were not among the chosen bands which had been declared moveable.
But the bulk of these were either unfit for service, or unwilling to
serve, and could only be relied on for securing the public tranquillity.
Corps of Federates had been formed in all the districts where materials
could be found of which to compose them.
From these forces Napoleon selected a grand army to act under his
personal orders. They were chosen with great care, and the preparation
of their _matériel_ was of the most extensive and complete description.
The numbers in gross might amount to 150,000; as great a number of
troops, perhaps, as can conveniently move upon one plan of operations,
or be subjected to one generalissimo. A large deduction is to be made to
attain the exact amount of his effective force.
[Sidenote: PLAN OF THE CAMPAIGN.]
Thus prepared for action, no doubt was made that Buonaparte would open
the campaign, by assuming offensive operations. To wait till the enemy
had assembled their full force on his frontier, would have suited
neither the man nor the moment. It was most agreeable to his system, his
disposition, and his interest, to rush upon some separate army of the
allies, surprise them, according to his own phrase, in delict, and, by
its dispersion or annihilation, give courage to France, animate her to
fresh exertions in his cause, intimidate the confederated powers, and
gain time for sowing in their league the seeds of disunion. Even the
Royalists, whose interest was so immediately connected with the defeat
of Buonaparte, were dismayed by witnessing his gigantic preparations,
and sadly anticipated victories as the first result, though they trusted
that, as in 1814, he would be at length worn out by force of numbers and
reiterated exertions.
But though all guessed at the mode of tactics which Napoleon would
employ, there was a difference of opinion respecting the point on which
his first exertions would be made; and in general it was augured, that,
trusting to the strength of Lisle, Valenciennes, and other fortified
places on the frontiers of Flanders, his first real attack, whatever
diversion might be made elsewhere, would take place upon Manheim, with
the view of breaking asunder the Austrian and Russian armies as they
were forming, or rather of attacking them separately, to prevent their
communication in line. If he should succeed in thus overwhelming the
advance of the Austrians and Russians, by directing his main force to
this one point, before they were fully prepared, it was supposed he
might break up the plan of the allies for this campaign.
But Buonaparte was desirous to aim a decisive blow at the most
enterprising and venturous of the invading armies. He knew Blucher, and
had heard of Wellington; he therefore resolved to move against those
generals, while he opposed walls and fortified places to the more slow
and cautious advance of the Austrian general, Schwartzenberg, and
trusted that distance might render ineffectual the progress of the
Russians.
[Sidenote: PREPARATIONS OF WAR.]
According to this general system, Paris, under the direction of General
Haxo, was, on the northern side, placed in a complete state of defence,
by a double line of fortifications, so that, if the first were forced,
the defenders might retire within the second, instead of being
compelled, as in the preceding year, to quit the heights and fall back
upon the city. Montmartre was very strongly fortified. The southern part
of the city on the opposite side of the Seine was only covered with a
few field-works; time, and the open character of the ground, permitting
no more. But the Seine itself was relied upon as a barrier, having
proved such in 1814.
On the frontiers, similar precautions were observed. Intrenchments were
constructed in the five principal passes of the Vosgesian mountains, and
all the natural passes and strongholds of Lorraine were put in the best
possible state of defence. The posts on the inner line were strengthened
with the greatest care. The fine military position under the walls of
Lyons was improved with great expense and labour. A _tête-de-pont_ was
erected at Brotteau; a drawbridge and barricade protected the suburb la
Guillotière; redoubts were erected between the Saonne and Rhine, and
upon the heights of Pierre Encise and the Quarter of Saint John. Guise,
Vitri, Soissons, Chauteau-Thierry, Langres, and all the towns capable of
any defence, were rendered as strong as posts, palisades, redoubts, and
field-works could make them. The Russian armies, though pressing fast
forward, were not as yet arrived upon the line of operations; and
Napoleon doubtless trusted that these impediments, in front of the
Austrian line, would arrest any hasty advance on their part, since the
well-known tactics of that school declare against leaving in their rear
fortresses or towns possessed by the enemy, however insignificant or
slightly garrisoned, or however completely they might be masked.
About now to commence his operations, Napoleon summoned round him his
best and most experienced generals. Soult, late minister of war for
Louis XVIII., was named major-general. He obeyed, he says, not in any
respect as an enemy of the King, but as a citizen and soldier, whose
duty it was to obey whomsoever was at the head of the government, as
that of the Vicar of Bray subjected him in ghostly submission to each
head of the Church _pro tempore_. Ney was ordered to repair to the army
at Lisle, "if he wished," so the command was expressed, "to witness the
first battle." Macdonald was strongly solicited to accept a command, but
declined it with disdain. Davoust, the minister-at-war, undertook to
remove his scruples, and spoke to him of what his honour required. "It
is not from you," replied the maréchal, "that I am to learn sentiments
of honour," and persisted in his refusal. D'Erlon, Reille, Vandamme,
Gerard, and Mouton de Lobau, acted as lieutenant-generals. The cavalry
was placed under the command of Grouchy (whom Napoleon had created a
maréchal.) Pajol, Excelmans, Milhaud, and Kellerman, were his seconds in
command. Flahault, Dejean, Labédoyère, and other officers of
distinction, acted as the Emperor's aides-de-camp. The artillery were
three hundred pieces; the cavalry approached to twenty-five thousand
men; the guard to the same number; and there is little doubt that the
whole army amounted in effective force to nearly 130,000 soldiers, in
the most complete state as to arms and equipment, who now marched to a
war which they themselves had occasioned, under an Emperor of their own
making, and bore both in their hearts and on their tongues the
sentiments of death or victory.
For the protection of the rest of the frontier, during Napoleon's
campaign in Flanders, Suchet was intrusted with the command on the
frontiers of Switzerland, with directions to attack Montmellian as soon
as possible after the 14th of June, which day Buonaparte had fixed for
the commencement of hostilities. Massena was ordered to repair to Metz,
to assume the government of that important fortress, and the command of
the 3d and 4th divisions. All preparations being thus made, Napoleon at
length announced what had long occupied his secret thoughts. "I go," he
said, as he threw himself into his carriage to join his army, "I go to
measure myself with Wellington."
But although Napoleon's expressions were those of confidence and
defiance, his internal feelings were of a different complexion. "I no
longer felt," as he afterwards expressed himself in his exile, "that
complete confidence in final success, which accompanied me on former
undertakings. Whether it was that I was getting beyond the period of
life when men are usually favoured by fortune, or whether the impulse of
my career seemed impeded in my own eyes, and to my own imagination, it
is certain that I felt a depression of spirit. Fortune, which used to
follow my steps to load me with her bounties, was now a severe deity,
from whom I might snatch a few favours, but for which she exacted severe
retribution. I had no sooner gained an advantage than it was followed by
a reverse."[133] With such feelings, not certainly unwarranted by the
circumstances under which the campaign was undertaken, nor disproved by
the event, Napoleon undertook his shortest and last campaign.
FOOTNOTES:
[132] The particulars of this intrigue show with what audacity, and at
what risk, Fouché waded, swam, or dived, among the troubled waters which
were his element. An agent of Prince Metternich had been despatched to
Paris, to open a communication with Fouché on the part of the Austrian
government. Falling under suspicion, from some banking transaction, this
person was denounced to Buonaparte as a suspicious person, and arrested
by his interior police, which, as there cannot be too much precaution in
a well-managed state, watched, and were spies upon, the general police
under Fouché. The agent was brought before Buonaparte, who threatened to
cause him be shot to death on the very spot, unless he told him the
whole truth. The man then confessed that Metternich sent him to Fouché,
to request the latter to send a secure agent to Bâle, to meet with a
confidential person on the part of the Austrian minister, whom Fouché's
envoy was to recognise by a peculiar sign, which the informer also made
known. "Have you fulfilled your commission so far as concerns Fouché?"
said the Emperor.--"I have," answered the Austrian agent.--"And has he
despatched any one to Bâle?"--"That I cannot tell." The agent was
detained in a secret prison. Baron Fleury de Chamboullon, an auditor,
was instantly despatched to Bâle, to represent the agent whom Fouché
should have sent thither, and fathom the depth and character of the
intrigue betwixt the French and Austrian ministers. Fouché soon
discovered that the agent sent to him by Metternich was missing,
conjectured his fate, and instantly went to seek an audience of the
Emperor. Having mentioned other matters, he seemed to recollect himself,
and begged pardon, with affected unconcern, for not having previously
mentioned an affair of some consequence, which, nevertheless, he had
forgotten amid the hurry of business. "An agent had come to him from the
Austrian government," he said, "requesting him to send a confidential
person to Bâle, to a correspondent of Metternich, and he now came to ask
whether it would be his Majesty's pleasure that he should avail himself
of the opening, in order to learn the secret purposes of the enemy?"
Napoleon was not deceived by this trick. There were several mirrors in
the room, by which he could perceive and enjoy his perfidious minister's
ill-concealed embarrassment. "Monsieur Fouché," he said, "it may be
dangerous to treat me as a fool: I have your agent in safe custody, and
penetrate your whole intrigue. Have you sent to Bâle?"--"No,
Sire."--"The happier for you: had you done so, you should have died."
Fleury was unable to extract any thing of consequence from Werner, the
confidant of Metternich, who met him at Bâle. The Austrian seemed to
expect communications from Fouché, without being prepared to make them.
Fleury touched on the plan of assassinating Buonaparte, which Werner
rejected with horror, as a thing not to be thought of by Metternich or
the allies. They appointed a second meeting, but in the interim Fouché
made the Austrian aware of the discovery, and Baron Fleury, on his
second journey to Bâle, found no Mr. Werner to meet him.--See Fleury de
Chamboullon, tom. ii., p. 6.
Buonaparte gives almost the same account of this intrigue in his St.
Helena Conversations as Fouché in his Memoirs. But Napoleon does not
mention Carnot's interposition to prevent Fouché from being put to death
without process of law. "You may shoot Fouché to-day," said the old
Jacobin, "but to-morrow you will cease to reign. The people of the
Revolution permit you to retain the throne only on condition you respect
their liberties. They account Fouché one of their strongest guarantees.
If he is guilty, he must be legally proceeded against." Buonaparte,
therefore, gaining no proof against Fouché by the mission of Fleury, was
fain to shut his eyes on what he saw but too well.--S.