THE MASTER BUILDER
The subject of national finance had long interested Hamilton. His ideas
had been matured by a diligent and minute study of English precedents, and
now that his opportunity had come he was ready to grasp it. Soon after he
took office, the House resolved that "an adequate provision for the
support of the public credit" should be made, and it directed the
Secretary of the Treasury "to prepare a plan for that purpose and to
report the same to the House at its next meeting." This was, in effect, a
postponement until the second session of the First Congress, which began
in January, 1790. In his opening address to Congress, Washington pointedly
referred to the public credit resolution which he had noted "with peculiar
pleasure." On the next day a letter from Hamilton was read in the House
stating that he had prepared his plan and was ready to report the same to
the House when they should be pleased to receive it.
This announcement brought up anew the question in what manner the
Secretary should make his report. Gerry was on his feet at once with a
motion that it should be made in writing. Boudinot "hoped that the
Secretary of the Treasury might be permitted to make his report in person
in order to answer such inquiries as the members might be disposed to
make, for it was a justifiable surmise that gentlemen would not be able
clearly to comprehend so intricate a subject without oral illustration."
The allusion to the intricacy of the subject had the effect of turning
against the plan of oral communication some who had favored giving the
Secretary the same direct access to Congress that the Superintendent of
Finance had formerly enjoyed. Ames, for instance, now desired that the
Secretary's communications should be in writing since "in this shape they
would obtain a degree of permanency favorable to the responsibility of the
officer, while, at the same time, they would be less liable to be
misunderstood." Benson suggested that since the resolution of Congress had
directed the Secretary to make a report, it was left to his discretion to
"make it in the manner for which he is prepared." Gerry adroitly countered
by saying that the resolution provided for a report. That done, it would
be time enough "to give him the right to lay before them his explanations,
if he thinks explanations necessary." The debate was brief and one-sided;
the motion for receiving the report in writing was adopted without a
division. Five days later the written report was laid before the House,
but the Secretary was never accorded an opportunity to offer any personal
explanations.
This masterly report, which is justly regarded as the corner-stone of
American public credit, excites the admiration of the reader by the
clearness of its analysis, the cogency of its argument, and the broad
range of its vision. The principles of action that it embodied, however,
were few and simple, chief among them being exact and punctual fulfillment
of contract. "States, like individuals, who observe their engagements, are
respected and trusted; while the reverse is the fate of those who pursue
an opposite conduct." To discharge the principal of the public debt was of
course impracticable; nor was it desirable, as the creditors would be well
pleased to leave it at interest. Incidentally the funding of the debt
would provide securities that would serve trade as a species of currency,
and would set in motion a long train of benefits that would extend
throughout the community. In the funding operation the debts contracted by
the States should be included. As to this Hamilton remarked: "The general
principle of it seems to be equitable, for it seems difficult to conceive
a good reason why the expenses for the particular defense of a part in a
common war should not be a common charge, as well as those incurred
professedly for the general defense. The defense of each part is that of
the whole; and unless the expenditures are brought into a common mass, the
tendency must be to add to the calamities suffered by being the most
exposed to the ravages of war and increase of burthens."
Hamilton computed the amount of the foreign debt, principal and arrears,
at $11,710,378.62; the domestic debt, including that of the States, at
$42,414,085.94,--a total of over fifty-four millions with an annual
interest charge at existing rates amounting to $4,587,444.81,--a
staggering total for a nation whose revenue was then insufficient to meet
its current expenses. Nevertheless Hamilton refused to admit that "such a
provision would exceed the abilities of the country," but he was "clearly
of the opinion that to make it would require the extension of taxation to
a degree and to objects which the true interest of the public creditor
forbids." He therefore favored a composition, in arranging which there
would be strict adherence to the principle "that no change in the rights
of creditors ought to be attempted without their voluntary consent; and
that this consent ought to be voluntary in fact as well as in name." It
followed that "every proposal of a change ought to be in the shape of an
appeal to their interests; but not to their necessities." Hamilton then
went into details of a funding loan, in which various options were offered
to the creditors, including land grants in part payment, and conversion in
whole or in part into annuities, several sorts of which were offered. He
submitted estimates of how the various plans would work out in practice,
and he concluded that the annual revenue which would be required to enable
the government to meet its obligations under the scheme and also to
maintain its current service would amount to $2,239,163.09, a sum that
could be readily provided.
There could not have been a more striking contrast than there was between
the humiliating conditions which actually existed and the grand results
which Hamilton designed and confidently expected. The ardent and hopeful
tone of his plan, conceived in apparently desperate circumstances, is very
marked. He declared: "It cannot but merit particular attention that among
ourselves the most enlightened friends of good government are those whose
expectations are the highest. To justify and preserve their confidence; to
promote the increasing respectability of the American name; to answer the
calls of justice; to restore landed property to its due value; to furnish
new resources both to agriculture and commerce; to cement more closely the
union of the States; to add to their security against foreign attack; to
establish public order on the basis of a liberal and upright policy--these
are the great and invaluable ends to be secured by a proper and adequate
provision at the present period for the support of public credit."
All these great objects were indeed attained, but Hamilton's anticipation
of them was at the time regarded as either a pretext made to cajole
Congress or else merely an ebullition from his own sanguine nature not to
be taken too seriously by sensible people. Senator Maclay of Pennsylvania
regarded Hamilton's plans as wildly extravagant in their conception and
iniquitous in their practical effect. In his opinion, Hamilton had "a very
boyish, giddy manner, and Scotch-Irish people could well call him a
'skite.'" Jackson of Georgia exposed to the House the folly of Hamilton's
proposals by pointing out that a funded debt meant national decay. He
mentioned England as "a melancholy instance of the ruin attending such
engagements." To such a pitch had the "spirit of funding and borrowing
been carried in that country" that its national debt was now "a burthen
which the most sanguine mind can never contemplate they will ever be
relieved from." France also was "considerably enfeebled and languishes
under a heavy load of debt." He argued that by funding the debt in America
"the same effect must be produced that has taken place in other nations;
it must either bring on national bankruptcy, or annihilate her existence
as an independent empire."
Such dismal prognostications on the very eve of the Napoleonic era, with
its tremendous revelations of national power, were quite common at that
time. The long rambling debate that took place in the House when
Hamilton's report was taken up for consideration abounds with similar
instances of shortsightedness. Many members did not scruple to advise
repudiation, in whole or in part. Livermore of New Hampshire admitted that
the foreign debt should be provided for, since it was "lent to the United
States in real coin, by disinterested persons, not concerned or benefited
by the revolution," but that the domestic debt was "for depreciated paper,
or services done at exorbitant rates, or for goods or provisions supplied
at more than their real worth, by those who received all the benefits
arising from our change of condition." True, Congress had pledged its
faith to the redemption of issues at their face value, "but this was done
on a principle of policy, in order to prevent the rapid depreciation which
was taking place." He argued that "money lent in this depreciated and
depreciating state can hardly be said to be lent from a spirit of
patriotism; it was a mere speculation in public securities."
The distinction between the foreign debt and the domestic was seized by
many members as providing a just basis for discrimination. Page of
Virginia observed that "our citizens were deeply interested, and, I
believe, if they were never to get a farthing for what is owing to them
for their services, they would be well paid; they have gained what they
aimed at; they have secured their liberties and their laws; they will be
satisfied that this House has pledged itself to pay foreigners the
generous loans they advanced to us in the day of distress." In the course
of the debate the power to do was so often mentioned as implying the right
to do that Ames was moved to remark: "I have heard that in the East Indies
the stock of the labor and the property of the empire is the property of
the Prince; that it is held at his will and pleasure; but this is a
slavish doctrine, which I hope we are not prepared to adopt here." As a
matter of fact, there had already been extensive scaling of the debt, and
the note emissions had been pretty nearly wiped out. To save the public
credit from complete collapse, the Continental Congress had entered into
definite contracts under the most solemn pledges, and it was upon this
select class of securities that it was now proposed to start anew the
process of repudiation. But public opinion displayed itself so hostile to
such perfidy that the party of repudiation in Congress soon dwindled to
insignificance and the struggle finally settled upon two issues,
discrimination and assumption.
Weeks of debate ensued, and the deepest impression made by a careful
perusal of the record is the inability of members to appreciate the
importance of the issues. Much of the tedious and pointless character of
their speeches may be ascribed to the lack of the personal presence of the
Secretary. There being nothing to focus the debate and exclude the
fictitious and irrelevant, it rambled in any direction a speaker's
fancy might suggest. Moreover, its quality was impaired because any
consideration of motive was of the nature of talking about a man behind
his back and this, everyone knows, is very different from saying things to
his face. Assertions and innuendos which would hardly have been hazarded
had Hamilton been present, or which, had they been made, would have been
forthwith met and refuted, were indulged in without restraint. Although
one of the reasons given for requiring a written report was that the House
would be the better informed, the debate does not indicate that the
arguments by which Hamilton had vindicated his proposals had really been
apprehended.
The question whether or not any discrimination could be made between
original holders of the public securities and those who had acquired them
by purchase was considered at length by Hamilton in his report. The public
securities had been at such a heavy discount that now, if they were to be
met at face value, speculators would reap large profits. Hamilton put the
case of the opposition as strongly as possible. It might be urged that it
was unreasonable "to pay twenty shillings in the pound to one who had not
given more for it than three or four; and it is added that it would be
hard to aggravate the misfortune of the first owner, who, probably through
necessity, parted with, his property at so great a loss, by obliging him
to contribute to the profit of the person who had speculated on his
distresses." Nevertheless, Hamilton submitted considerations showing that
discrimination would be "equally unjust and impolitic, as highly injurious
even to the original holders of public securities, as ruinous to public
credit." It is unnecessary to repeat the lucid argument by which Hamilton
demonstrated the soundness of his position, for security of transfer is
now well understood to be an essential element of public credit; but the
special point of interest is that the debate simply ignored Hamilton's
argument and rambled along over the superficial aspects of the case,
dwelling upon the sorrows of those who had parted with their holdings, and
exhibiting their situation as the most important matter to be considered.
Madison was most active in making that branch of the case the leading
issue, and in a series of elaborate speeches which cannot now be read
without regret, he urged that the present holders should be allowed only
the highest market price previously recorded, and that the residue should
go to the original holders. Boudinot at once pointed out that there was
nothing on record to show who might be an original bona fide holder. Great
quantities of the certificates of indebtedness had, as a mere matter of
convenience, been issued to government clerks who afterwards distributed
them among those who furnished supplies to the government or who performed
services entitling them to pay. He mentioned that he himself appeared on
the record as original holder in cases wherein he had really acted in
behalf of his neighbors to relieve them of the trouble of personal
appearance. Madison's proposition would therefore invest him with a legal
title to property which really belonged to others. But this and other
evidence of the real effect of Madison's proposal failed to move him,
further than to cause him to declare that "all that he wished was that the
claims of the original holders, not less than those of the actual holders,
should be fairly examined and justly decided," Finally Benson of New York
gave him a shrewd home thrust that plainly embarrassed him. He put the
question whether, if he had purchased a certificate from Madison, and the
Treasury withheld part of the amount for Madison as the original holder,
Madison would keep the money? "I ask," said Benson, "whether he would take
advantage of the law against me, and refuse to give me authority to take
it up in his name?" Madison evaded the query by saying that everything
would depend upon the circumstances of any particular case, and that
circumstances were conceivable in which the most tender conscience need
not refrain from taking the benefit of what the government had determined.
The debate on Madison's discrimination amendment lasted from the eleventh
to the twenty-second day of February--Washington's birthday. The House did
honor to the day when it rejected Madison's motion by the crushing vote of
36 to 13. With that, his pretensions to the leadership of the House quite
disappeared.
The assumption of state debts was the subject of a debate in committee of
the whole which lasted from the twenty-third of February to the second of
March. New factional lines now revealed a supposed diversity of interest
of the several States. The false notions of finance then current were
illustrated by an argument that was in continual use, either on the floor
or in the lobby. Members would figure how much their States would have to
pay as their share of the debt that would be assumed, and on that basis
would reach conclusions as to how their States stood to win or lose by the
transaction. By this reckoning, of course, the great gainer would appear
to be the State upon whom the chances of war had piled the largest debt.
This calculation made Burke of South Carolina, usually an opponent of
anything coming from Hamilton, a strong advocate of assumption. He told
the House that "if the present question was lost, he was almost certain it
would end in her bankruptcy, for she [South Carolina] was no more able to
grapple with her enormous debt than a boy of twelve years of age is able
to grapple with a giant." Livermore, representing a State never within the
actual field of military operations, at once replied: "I conceive that the
debt of South Carolina, or Massachusetts, or of an individual, has nothing
to do with our deliberations. If they have involved themselves in debt, it
is their misfortune, and they must extricate themselves as well as they
can." On a later occasion Stone of Maryland, another State that lay
outside the track of war, gave the leading war-debt States an admonition
of the kind that adds insult to injury, saying "however inconvenient it
may be to Massachusetts or South Carolina to make a bold exertion, and
nobly bear the burthens of their present debt, I believe in the end it
would be found to conduce greatly to their advantage." Burke made a
crushing rejoinder. "Was Maryland like South Carolina constantly grappling
with the enemy during the whole war? There is not a road in the State but
has witnessed the ravages of war; plantations were destroyed, and the
skeletons of houses, to this day, point out to the traveler the route of
the British army; her citizens were exposed to every violence, their
capital taken, and their country almost overrun by the enemy; men, women,
and children murdered by the Indians and Tories; all the personal property
consumed, and now is it to be wondered at that she is not able to make
exertions equal with other States, who have been generally in an
undisturbed condition?"
The argument pressed by the advocates of assumption was that the state
debts contracted during the Revolutionary War were for the common defense,
and that, unless these were assumed by the general government, the
adoption of the new Constitution would do injury by withdrawing revenue
resources which the States had formerly possessed. This position at the
present day seems reasonable enough, but it is certain that at that time
people worked themselves into a genuine rage over the matter and were able
to persuade themselves into a sincere belief that it was outrageous the
unfortunate States should expect the others to bear their troubles, and
that Hamilton was a great rogue for proposing such a scheme. Writing in
his private diary, Maclay characterized the plan as "a monument of
political absurdity," and he was in the habit of referring to Hamilton's
supporters as his "gladiators" and as a "corrupt squadron."
On the whole the records make painful reading. The prevailing tone of
public life was one of dull and narrow provincialism, at times thickening
into stupidity, at times sharpening into spite, although ordinarily made
respectable by a serious attitude to life and by a stolid fortitude in
facing whatever the distracted times might present. It was the influence
of a few great men that made America a nation. If one is not subject to
the spirit of ancestor worship that has long ruled American history, one
is bound to say that--apart from some forceful pamphleteering of transient
purpose--the voluminous political literature of the formative period
displays much pedantic erudition but has little that goes really deep. The
_Federalist_, the artillery of a hard fought battle, is a striking
exception. So, too, is the series of reports by Hamilton. But his plans
could not prevail by force of reason against the general spirit of selfish
particularism. Although on March 2 a motion adverse to assumption in
committee of the whole was defeated by a vote of 28 to 22, it was then
known that a majority could not be procured for enactment, and on April 12
the assumption bill was defeated outright in the House, 31 to 29. Maclay,
who went over to the House from the Senate to witness the event, gloated
over the defeat in his diary:
"Sedgwick, from Boston, pronounced a funeral oration over it. He was
called to order; some confusion ensued; he took his hat and went out. When
he returned, his visage bore the visible marks of weeping. Fitzsimmons
reddened like scarlet; his eyes were brimful. Clymer's color, always pale,
now merged to a deadly white; his lips quivered, and his nether jaw shook
with convulsive motions; his head, neck, and breast contracted with
gesticulations resembling those of a turkey or goose nearly strangled in
the act of deglutition. Benson bungled like a shoemaker who has lost his
end.... Wadsworth hid his grief under the rim of a round hat. Boudinot's
wrinkles rose in ridges and the angles of his mouth were depressed and
assumed a curve resembling a horse's shoe." The defeat did not discourage
Hamilton. He had successfully handled a more difficult situation in
getting New York to ratify the Constitution, and, resorting now to the
same means he had then employed, he used pressure of interest to move
those who could not be stirred by reason. The intense concern felt by
members in the choice of the site of the national capital supplied him
with the leverage which he brought to bear on the situation. Most of the
members were more stirred by that question than by any other before
Congress. It was a prominent topic in Madison's correspondence from the
time the Constitution was adopted. Maclay's diary abounds with references
to the subject. Some of his bitterest sentences are penned about the
conduct of those who preferred some other site to that on the Susquehanna
River which he knew to be the best because he lived there himself.
Bargaining among the members as to the selection had been going on almost
from the first. As early as April 26, 1789, before Washington had been
installed in his office, Maclay mentions a meeting "to concert some
measures for the removal of Congress." Thereafter notices of pending deals
appear frequently in his diary. After the defeat of the assumption bill,
the diary notes the activity of Hamilton in this matter. An entry of June
14, 1790, ascribes to Robert Morris the statement that "Hamilton said he
wanted one vote in the Senate and five in the House of Representatives;
that he was willing and would agree to place the permanent residence of
Congress at Germantown or Falls of the Delaware (Trenton), if he would
procure him those votes." Although definite knowledge is unattainable, one
gets the impression, in following the devious course of these intrigues,
that had Pennsylvania interests been united they could have decided the
site of the national capital; but the delegation was divided over the
relative merits of the Delaware and the Susquehanna as well as on
the question of assumption. Hamilton's efforts in this quarter were
ineffectual, and the winning combination was finally arranged elsewhere
and otherwise by the aid of Jefferson.
Thomas Jefferson was at this time forty-seven years old, and owing both to
seniority and to the distinguished positions he had held, he ranked as the
most illustrious member of the Administration. His correspondence at this
period shows that he was fully aware of the importance of the crisis, and
he did not overrate it when he wrote to James Monroe, June 20, 1790, that,
unless the measures of the Administration were successful, "our credit
will burst and vanish, and the States separate to take care everyone of
itself." In this letter Jefferson outlined the compromise that was
actually adopted by Congress. The strongest opposition to the assumption
bill had come from Virginia, although Maryland, Georgia, and New Hampshire
also opposed it, and the Middle States were divided. Jefferson was able to
get enough Southern votes to carry assumption in return for enough votes
from Hamilton's adherents to carry the Potomac site. An agreement was
reached at a dinner given by Jefferson to which he invited Hamilton and
Madison. According to this arrangement, the capital was to remain in
Philadelphia for ten years and after that to be on the Potomac River in a
district ten miles square to be selected by the President. The residence
act was approved July 16, 1790; the funding and assumption measures, now
combined in one bill, became law on August 4.
After Jefferson turned against the Administration, his participation in
the passage of the assumption bill was such an awkward circumstance that
he discredited his own intelligence by professing that he "was most
ignorantly and innocently made to hold the candle" to Hamilton's "game."
In reality the public service Jefferson then performed was the most useful
in all his long and fruitful career. But for this action, the Declaration
of Independence, to the drafting of which he owes his greatest fame, might
now be figuring among the historical documents of lost causes, like
similar elaborate statements of principle made during the Commonwealth
period in England. Had the national forces failed at the critical period
of financial organization, and the States, bankrupt by the revolutionary
struggle, been left in the lurch, the republic would have followed the
usual course of disintegration displayed by federations from the time of
the Greek amphictyonies down to that of the Holy Roman Empire.
The charge was made soon after Hamilton's victory that it was largely due
to the influence of speculators. The advance in the market value of
securities produced by Hamilton's measures certainly gave an opportunity
to speculators of which they availed themselves with the unscrupulous
activity characteristic of the sordid tribe. Jefferson has left an account
of "the base scramble." "Couriers and relay horses by land, and swift
sailing pilot boats by sea, were flying in all directions. Active partners
and agents were associated and employed in every state, town, and country
neighborhood, and this paper was bought up at five shillings, and even as
low as two shillings in the pound, before the holder knew that Congress
had already provided for its assumption at par. Immense sums were thus
filched from the poor and ignorant, and fortunes accumulated by those who
had themselves been poor enough before."
This account is highly colored. The struggle was too close, and the issue
was long too doubtful, to admit of speculative preparations extending to
every "town and country neighborhood." If speculation took place on such a
large scale, it must have been also taking risks on a large scale, for
assumption was not assured until Jefferson himself put his shoulder to the
wheel. The lack of means for prompt diffusion of intelligence naturally
provided large opportunity for speculation by those in a position to
keep well-informed, and undoubtedly large profits were made; but the
circumstances were such that it seems most probable that profits were less
than market opportunities would have allowed had not the issue been so
long in doubt. Nevertheless there was much speculative activity, and the
charge was soon made that it extended into Congress.[Footnote: This charge
was put forth by John Taylor in pamphlets printed in 1793 and 1794, in
which he reviewed the financial policy of the Administration and gave a
list of Congressmen who had invested in the public funds. The facts on
which this charge rests have been collected and examined by Professor
Beard in his _Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy_. His analysis
shows that out of sixty-four members of the House, twenty-nine were
security holders, and of these twenty-one voted for and eight voted
against assumption. But the facts disclosed do not sustain his theory that
the issue was essentially a conflict between capitalism and agrarianism.
The assumption bill was lifted to its place on the statute book through
the leverage exerted by Hamilton and Jefferson, with Washington's prestige
as their fulcrum. The characters of these three men resist schemes of
classification according to economic interest. The principal value of
analysis of the economic elements of the struggle is to protect from
undervaluation the motives that actuated the opposition to Hamilton's
measures. The historian has the advantage of a perspective denied to
participants in events, and this fact is apt to turn unduly to the
discredit of lost causes.]
The passage of assumption was the turning point. Other important measures
followed, but none of them met with difficulties which the Administration
could not overcome by ordinary methods of persuasion and appeal. A
national bank was authorized by an act approved on February 25, 1791.
Hamilton's famous report on manufactures, a masterly analysis of the
sources of national wealth and of the means of improving them, was sent to
Congress on December 5, 1791. Upon his recommendation Congress established
the mint, the only point which excited controversy being Hamilton's
proposal that the coins should be stamped with the head of the President
in whose administration they were issued. This suggestion was rejected on
the ground that it smacked too much of the practice of monarchies. The
queer totemistic designs of American coinage are a consequence of this
decision.
The formation of national government by voluntary agreement is a unique
event. The explanation of this peculiar result in the case of America is
the unifying influence of Hamilton's measures. They interested in the
support of the government economic forces strong enough to counteract the
separatist tendencies that had always before broken up states unless
they were held together by sheer might of power in their rulers. The
means employed have been cited as evidence in support of the economic
interpretation of history now in fashion. Government, it is true, like
every other form of life, must meet the fundamental needs of subsistence
and defense, but this truism supplies no explanation of the particular
mode of doing so that may be adopted. Those needs account for motion but
not for direction. Human will, discernment, and purpose enter and
complicate the situation in a way that makes theories of determinism
appear absurd. No one has ever contended that Hamilton was prompted by an
economic motive in giving up his law practice to accept public office. He
did so against the remonstrances of his friends, whose predictions that
what he would get out of it for himself would be calumny, persecution, and
loss of fortune, were all fully verified; but he possessed a nature which
found its happiness in bringing high ideals to grand fulfillment, and in
applying his powers to that object he let everything else go. Hamilton's
career is one of the greatest of those facts that baffle attempts to
reduce history to an exhibition of the play of economic forces.