GREAT DECISIONS
While Washington was bearing with military fortitude the rigors and
annoyances of the imitation court in which he was confined, Congress
reached decisions that had a vast effect in determining the actual
character of the government. The first business in order of course was the
raising of revenue, for the treasury was empty, and payments of interest
due on the French and Spanish loans were years behind. Madison attacked
this problem before Washington arrived in New York to take the oath of
office. On April 8 he introduced in the House a resolution which aimed
only at giving immediate effect to a scheme of duties and imposts that had
been approved generally by the States in 1783. On the very next day debate
upon this resolution began in the committee of the whole, for there was
then no system of standing committees to intervene between the House and
its business. The debate soon broadened out far beyond the lines of the
original scheme, and in it the student finds lucidly presented the issues
of public policy that have accompanied tariff debates ever since.
Madison laid down the general principle that "commerce ought to be free,
and labor and industry left at large to find its proper object," but
suggested that it would be unwise to apply this principle without regard
to particular circumstances. "Although interest will, in general, operate
effectually to produce political good, yet there are causes in which
certain factitious circumstances may divert it from its natural channel,
or throw or retain it in an artificial one." In language which now
reads like prophecy he referred to cases "where cities, companies, or
opulent individuals engross the business from others, by having had an
uninterrupted possession of it, or by the extent of their capitals being
able to destroy a competition." The same situation could occur between
nations, and had to be considered. There was some truth, he also thought,
in the opinion "that each nation should have within itself the means of
defense, independent of foreign supplies," but he considered that this
argument had been urged beyond reason, as "there is good reason to believe
that, when it becomes necessary, we may obtain supplies abroad as readily
as any other nation whatsoever." He instanced as a cogent reason in favor
of protective duties that, as the States had formerly the power of making
regulations of trade to cherish their domestic interests, it must be
presumed that, when they put the exercise of this power into other hands
by adopting the Constitution, "they must have done this with the
expectation that those interests would not be neglected" by Congress.
Actuated by such views, and doubtless also influenced by the great need
for revenue, Madison was on the whole favorable to amendments extending
the list of dutiable articles. Though there were conflicts between members
from manufacturing districts and those from agricultural constituencies,
and though the salt protectionists of New York had some difficulty in
carrying their point, the contention did not follow sectional lines. Coal
was added to the list on the motion of a member from Virginia. The duties
levied were, however, very moderate, ranging from five to twelve and
one-half per cent, with an exception in the case of one article that might
be considered a luxury.
The bill as it passed the House discriminated in favor of nations with
which the United States had commercial treaties. That is to say, it
favored France and Holland as against Great Britain, which had the bulk of
America's foreign trade. Though Madison insisted on this provision and was
supported by a large majority of the House, the Senate would not agree to
it. During the early sessions of Congress the Senate met behind closed
doors, a practice which it did not abandon until five years later. From
the accounts of the discussion preserved in Maclay's diary it appears that
there was much wrangling. Maclay relates that on one occasion when
Pennsylvania's demands were sharply attacked, his colleague, Robert
Morris, was so incensed that Maclay "could see his nostrils widen and his
nose flatten like the head of a viper." Pierce Butler of South Carolina
"flamed away and threatened a dissolution of the Union, with regard to his
State, as sure as God was in the firmament." Thus began a line of argument
that was frequently pursued thereafter until it was ended by wager of
battle. On several occasions the division was so close that Vice-President
Adams gave the casting vote. Although there was much railing in the Senate
against imposts as a burden to the agricultural sections, yet some who
opposed duties in the abstract thought of particulars that ought not to be
neglected if the principle of protection were admitted. Duties on hemp and
cotton therefore found their way into the bill through amendments voted by
the Senate. Adjustment of the differences between the two houses was
hindered by the resentment of the House at the removal of the treaty
discrimination feature, but the Senate with characteristic address evaded
the issue by promising to deal with it as a separate measure and ended by
thwarting the House on that point.
On the whole, in view of the sharp differences of opinion, the action
taken on the tariff was remarkably expeditious. The bill, which passed the
House on May 16, was passed by the Senate on June 2, and although delay
now ensued because of the conflict over the discrimination issue, the bill
became law by the President's approval on July 4. This prompt conclusion
in spite of closely-balanced factions becomes more intelligible when it is
observed that the rules of the Senate then provided that, "in case of a
debate becoming tedious, four Senators may call for the question."
Brief as was the period of consideration as compared with the practice
since that day, Maclay noted indignantly that the merchants had "already
added the amount of the duties to the price of their goods" so that a
burden fell upon the consumers without advantage to the Treasury. Such
consequence is evidence of defect in procedure which the experience of
other nations has led them to correct, but which has continued to increase
in the United States until it has attained monstrous proportions. Under
the English budget system new imposts now take effect as soon as they are
proposed by the government, the contingency of alteration in the course of
enactment being provided for by return of payments made in error. The
general tendency of civilized government is now strongly in favor of
attaching the process of deliberation upon financial measures to the
period of their administrative incubation, and of shortening the period of
formal legislative consideration.
One of the tasks of Congress in its first session was to draught
amendments to the Constitution. The reasons for such action were stated by
Madison to be a desire to propitiate those who desired a bill of rights,
and an effort to secure acceptance of the Constitution in Rhode Island and
North Carolina. Promises had been made, in the course of the struggle for
adoption, that this matter would be taken up, and there was a general
willingness to proceed with it. Under the leadership of Madison, the House
adopted seventeen amendments, which were reduced by the Senate to twelve.
Of these, ten were eventually ratified and formed what is commonly known
as the Bill of Rights.
Apart from this matter, the session, which lasted until September 29, was
almost wholly occupied with measures to organize the new government. To
understand the significance of the action taken, it should be remembered
that the passions excited by the struggle over the new Constitution were
still turbulent. Fisher Ames of Massachusetts, a member without previous
national experience, who watched the proceedings with keen observation,
early noticed the presence of a group of objectors whose motives he
regarded as partly factious and partly temperamental. Writing to a friend
about the character of the House, he remarked: "Three sorts of people are
often troublesome: the anti-federals, who alone are weak and some of them
well disposed; the dupes of local prejudices, who fear eastern influence,
monopolies, and navigation acts; and lastly the violent republicans, as
they think fit to style themselves, who are new lights in politics, who
are more solicitous to establish, or rather to expatiate upon, some
sounding principle of republicanism, than to protect property, cement the
union, and perpetuate liberty." The spirit of opposition had from the
first an experienced leader in Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts. He had
seen many years of service in the Continental Congress which he first
entered in 1776. He was a delegate to the Philadelphia convention, in
whose sessions he showed a contentious temper, and in the end refused to
subscribe to the new Constitution. In the convention debates he had
strongly declared himself "against letting the heads of the departments,
particularly of finance, have anything to do with business connected with
legislation." Defeated in the convention, Gerry was now bent upon making
his ideas prevail in the organization of the government.
On May 19, the matter of the executive departments was brought up in
committee of the whole by Boudinot of New Jersey. At this time it was the
practice of Congress to take up matters first in committee of the whole,
and, after general conclusions had been reached, to appoint a committee to
prepare and bring in a bill. A warm discussion ensued on the question
whether the heads of the departments should be removable by the President.
Gerry, who did not take a prominent part in the debate, spoke with a
mildness that was in marked contrast with the excitement shown by some of
the speakers. He was in favor of supporting the President to the utmost
and of making him as responsible as possible, but since Congress had
obviously no right to confer a power not authorized by the Constitution,
and since the Constitution had conditioned appointments on the consent of
the Senate, it followed that removals must be subject to the same
condition. He spoke briefly and only once, although the debate became long
and impassioned. But he was merely reserving his fire, as subsequent
developments soon showed. Without a call for the ayes and nays, the
question was decided in favor of declaring the power of removal to be in
the President. The committee then proceeded to the consideration of the
Treasury Department. Gerry at once made a plea for delay. "He thought they
were hurrying on business too rapidly. Gentlemen had already committed
themselves on one very important point." He "knew nothing of the system
which gentlemen proposed to adopt in arranging the Treasury Department,"
but the fact was worth considering that "the late Congress had, on long
experience, thought proper to organize the Treasury Department, in a mode
different from that now proposed." He "would be glad to know what the
reasons were that would induce the committee to adopt a different system
from that which had been found most beneficial to the United States."
What Gerry had in view was the retention of the then existing system of
Treasury management by a Board of Commissioners. In 1781 the Continental
Congress had been forced to let the Treasury pass out of its own hands
into those of a Superintendent of Finance, through sheer inability to get
any funds unless the change was made. Robert Morris, who held the
position, had resigned in January, 1783, because of the behavior of
Congress, but the attitude of the army had become so menacing that he was
implored to remain in office and attend to the arrears of military pay. He
had managed to effect a settlement, and at length retired from office on
November 1, 1784. Congress then put the Treasury in the hands of three
commissioners appointed and supervised by it. Gerry was now striving to
continue this arrangement with as little change as possible.
When debate was resumed the next day, Gerry made a long, smooth speech on
the many superior advantages of the Board system. The extent and variety
of the functions of the office would be a trial to any one man's
integrity. "Admit these innumerable opportunities for defrauding the
revenue, without check or control, and it is next to impossible he should
remain unsullied in reputation, or innoxious with respect to misapplying
his trust." The situation would be "Very disagreeable to the person
appointed, provided he is an honest, upright man; it will be disagreeable
also to the people of the Union, who will always have reason to suspect"
misconduct. "We have had a Board of Treasury and we have had a Financier.
Have not express charges, as well as vague rumors, been brought against
him at the bar of the public? They may be unfounded, it is true; but it
shows that a man cannot serve in such a station without exciting popular
clamor. It is very well known, I dare say, to many gentlemen in this
House, that the noise and commotion were such as obliged Congress once
more to alter their Treasury Department, and place it under the management
of a Board of Commissioners." He descanted upon the perils to liberty
involved in the course they were pursuing. Surround the President with
Ministers of State and "the President will be induced to place more
confidence in them than in the Senate.... An oligarchy will be confirmed
upon the ruin of the democracy; a government most hateful will descend to
our posterity and all our exertions in the glorious cause of freedom will
be frustrated."
Gerry's speech as a whole was tactful and persuasive, but he made a
blunder when he appealed to the recollections of the old members, men who
had been in the Continental Congress, or else in some position where they
could view its springs of action. Their recollections now came forward to
his discomfiture. "My official duty," said Wadsworth of Connecticut, "has
led me often to attend at the Treasury of the United States, and, from my
experience, I venture to pronounce that a Board of Treasury is the worst
of all institutions. They have doubled our national debt." He contrasted
the order and clearness of accounts while the Superintendent of Finance
was in charge with the situation since then. If the committee had before
them the transactions of the Treasury Board, "instead of system and
responsibility they would find nothing but confusion and disorder, without
a possibility of checking their accounts." Boudinot of New Jersey said he
"would state a circumstance which might give the committee some small idea
of what the savings under the Superintendent were. The expenditure of hay
at a certain post was one hundred and forty tons; such was the estimate
laid before him; yet twelve tons carried the post through the year, and
the supply was abundant, and the post was as fully and usefully occupied
as it had ever been before." Of course there was an outcry against the
Superintendent of Finance; "he rather wondered that the clamor was not
more loud and tremendous." He remembered that "one hundred and forty-six
supernumerary officers were brushed off in one day, who had long been
sucking the vital blood and spirit of the nation. Was it to be wondered
at, if this swarm should raise a buzz about him?" Gerry fought on almost
singlehanded, but he could not refute the evidence that he had invited. He
lost his temper and resorted to sarcasm. If a single head of the Treasury
was so desirable, why not "have a single legislator; one man to make all
the laws, the revenue laws particularly, because among many there is less
responsibility, system, and energy; consequently a numerous representation
in this House is an odious institution."
The case for the Treasury Board was so hopeless that nothing more was
heard of it; but the battle over the removal question was renewed with
added violence, when the bill for establishing the Department of Foreign
Affairs came up for consideration. White of Virginia now led the attack.
He had been a member of the Continental Congress from 1786 to 1788, and a
member of the ratifying convention of his State. Although he voted for
a provisional acceptance of the Constitution, he had supported an
amendment requiring Congress to collect direct taxes or excises through
State agency, which would have been in effect a return to the plan of
requisitions--the bane of the Confederation. In an elaborate speech he
attacked the clause giving the President power to remove from office, as
an attempt to impart an authority not conferred by the Constitution, and
inconsistent with the requirement that appointments should be made with
the advice and consent of the Senate. The debate soon became heated. "Let
us look around at this moment," said Jackson of Georgia, "and see the
progress we are making toward venality and corruption. We already hear the
sounding title of _Highness_ and _Most Honorable_ trumpeted in our ears,
which, ten years since, would have exalted a man to a station as high as
Haman's gibbet." Page of Virginia was ablaze with indignation. "Good God!"
he exclaimed. "What, authorize in a free republic, by law, too, by your
first act, the exertion of a dangerous royal prerogative in your Chief
Magistrate!" Gerry, in remarks whose oblique criticism upon arrangements
at the President's house was perfectly well understood, dwelt upon the
possibility that the President might be guided by some other criterion
than discharge of duty as the law directs. "Perhaps the officer is not
good natured enough; he makes an ungraceful bow, or does it left leg
foremost; this is unbecoming in a great officer at the President's levee.
Now, because he is so unfortunate as not to be so good a dancer as he is a
worthy officer, he must be removed." These rhetorical flourishes, which
are significant of the undercurrent of sentiment, hardly do justice to the
general quality of the debate which was marked by legal acuteness on both
sides. Madison pressed home the sensible argument that the President could
not be held to responsibility unless he could control his subordinates.
"And if it should happen that the officers connect themselves with the
Senate, they may mutually support each other, and for want of efficacy
reduce the power of the President to a mere vapor; in which case, his
responsibility would be annihilated and the expectation of it unjust."
The debate lasted for several days, but Madison won by a vote of 34 to 20
in committee, in favor of retaining the clause. On second thought,
however, and probably after consultation with the little group of
constructive statesmen who stood behind the scenes, he decided that it
might be dangerous to allow the President's power of removal to rest upon
a legislative grant that might be revoked. When the report from the
committee of the whole was taken up in the House, a few days later, Benson
of New York proposed that the disputed clause should be omitted and the
language of the bill should be worded so as to imply that the power of
removal was in the President. Madison accepted the suggestion, and the
matter was thus settled. The point was covered by providing that the chief
clerk of the Department should take charge "whenever the principal officer
shall be removed from office by the President." The clause got through the
Senate by the casting vote of the Vice-President, and a similar provision
was inserted, without further contest, in all the acts creating the
executive departments. It is rather striking evidence of the Utopian
expectations which could then be indulged that Daniel Carroll of Maryland
was persistent in urging that the existence of the office should be
limited to a few years, "under a hope that a time would come when the
United States would be disengaged from the necessity of supporting a
Secretary of Foreign Affairs." Although Gerry and others expressed
sympathy with the motion it was voted down without a division.
When the bill establishing the Treasury Department was taken up, Page of
Virginia made a violent attack upon the clause authorizing the Secretary
to "digest and report plans." He denounced it as "an attempt to create an
undue influence" in the House. "Nor would the mischief stop here; it would
establish a precedent which might be extended until we admitted all the
Ministers of the government on the floor, to explain and support the plans
they have digested and reported; thus laying the foundation for an
aristocracy or a detestable monarchy." As a matter of fact, a precedent in
favor of access to Congress already existed. The old Superintendent of
Finance and the Board which succeeded him had the power now proposed for
the Secretary of the Treasury. Livermore of New Hampshire, who had been a
member of the Continental Congress, admitted this fact, but held that such
power was not dangerous at that time since Congress then possessed both
legislative and executive authority. They could abolish his plans and his
office together, if they thought proper; "but we are restrained by a
Senate and by the negative of the President," Gerry declared his assent to
the views expressed by Page. "If the doctrine of having prime and great
ministers of state was once well established, he did not doubt but that we
should soon see them distinguished by a green or red ribbon, or other
insignia of court favor and patronage."
The strongest argument in favor of retaining the clause referred to was
made by Fisher Ames, who had begun to display the powers of clear
statement and of convincing argument that soon established his supremacy
in debate. He brought the debate at once to its proper bearings by
pointing out that there were really only two matters to be considered:
whether the proposed arrangement was useful, and whether it could be
safely guarded from abuse. "The Secretary is presumed to acquire the best
knowledge of the subject of finance of any member of the community. Now,
if this House is to act on the best knowledge of circumstances, it seems
to follow logically that the House must obtain the evidence from that
officer: the best way of doing this will be publicly from the officer
himself, by making it his duty to furnish us with it." In one of those
eloquent passages which brighten the records of debate whenever Ames spoke
at any length, he pictured the difficulties that had to be surmounted. "If
we consider the present situation of our finances, owing to a variety of
causes, we shall no doubt perceive a great, although unavoidable confusion
throughout the whole scene; it presents to the imagination a deep, dark,
and dreary chaos; impossible to be reduced to order without the mind of
the architect is clear and capacious, and his power commensurate to the
occasion." He asked, "What improper influence could a plan reported openly
and officially have on the mind of any member, more than if the scheme and
information were given privately at the Secretary's office?" Merely to
call for information would not be advantageous to the House. "It will be
no mark of inattention or neglect, if he take time to consider the
questions you propound; but if you make it his duty to furnish you plans
... and he neglect to perform it, his conduct or capacity is virtually
impeached. This will be furnishing an additional check."
Sedgwick of Massachusetts made a strong speech to the same effect. "Make
your officer responsible," he said with prophetic vision, "and the
presumption is, that plans and information are properly digested; but if
he can secrete himself behind the curtain, he might create a noxious
influence, and not be answerable for the information he gives."
The weight of the argument was heavily on the side of the supporters of
the clause, and it looked as though the group of objectors would again be
beaten. But now a curious thing happened. Fitzsimmons remarked that, if he
understood the objection made to the clause, "it was a jealousy arising
from the power given the Secretary to report plans of revenue to the
House." He suggested that "harmony might be restored by changing the word
'report' into 'prepare'." Fitzsimmons was esteemed by the House because of
his zealous support of the War of Independence and also because he stood
high as a successful Philadelphia merchant, but he did not, however, rank
as a leader. Early in the session Ames described him as a man who "is
supposed to understand trade, and he assumes some weight in such matters.
He is plausible, though not over civil; is artful, has a glaring eye, a
down look, speaks low, and with apparent candor and coolness." He was
hardly the man to guide the House on a matter pertaining to the
organization of public authority.
While the removal issue was before the House, Madison had been prominent
in debate, and had spoken with great power and earnestness; but up to this
time he had said nothing on the issue now pending. He now remarked that he
did not believe that the danger apprehended by some really existed, but
twice in his speech he admitted that "there is a small possibility,
though it is but small, that an officer may derive a weight from this
circumstance, and have some degree of influence upon the deliberations of
the legislature." In its practical effect the speech favored the
compromise which Fitzsimmons had just proposed; in fact, the only
opposition to the change of phrasing now came from a few extremists who
still clamored for the omission of the entire clause. The decisive effect
of Madison's intervention was a natural consequence of the leadership he
had held in the movement for the new Constitution and of his standing
as the representative of the new Administration, of his possessing
Washington's confidence and acting as his adviser. Washington, then being
without a cabinet, had turned to Madison for help in discharging the
duties of his office, and at Washington's written request Madison had
drafted for him his replies to the addresses of the House and the Senate
at the opening of the session. It was a matter of course in such
circumstances that the House accepted Fitzsimmons' amendment,--"by a great
majority," according to the record,--and thus the Secretary of the
Treasury was shut out of the House and was condemned to work in the lobby.
The consequences of this decision have been so vast that it is worth while
making an inquiry into motive, although the materials upon which judgment
must rest are scant. No one can read the record of this discussion without
noting that Madison's approval of the original clause was lukewarm as
compared with the ardor he had shown when the question was whether
Washington should be allowed to remove his subordinates. This contrast
suggests that Madison's behavior was affected by fear of Hamilton's
influence. Would it be prudent for him to give Hamilton the advantage of
being able to appear in person before the House, and probably to supplant
Madison himself as the spokesman of the Administration? Divergence between
the two men had already begun in details. At the time the vote on the
powers of the Secretary of the Treasury was taken, the tariff bill and the
tonnage bill were still pending, and Hamilton's influence operated against
Madison's views on some points. Moreover, the question of the permanent
residence of the federal government was coming forward and was apparently
overshadowing everything else in the minds of members. Ames several
times in his correspondence at this period remarks upon Madison's
timidity, which was due to his concern about Virginia State politics. Any
arrangement that might enable Hamilton to cross swords with an opponent on
the floor of the House could not be attractive to Madison, who was a lucid
reasoner but not an impressive speaker. Hamilton was both of these, and he
possessed an intellectual brilliancy which Madison lacked. Ames, who
respected Madison's abilities and who regarded him as the leading member
of the House, wrote that "he speaks low, his person is little and
ordinary; he speaks decently as to manner, and no more; his language is
very pure, perspicuous, and to the point." Why Fitzsimmons should be
opposed to the appearance of the Secretary in person in the House, as had
been Robert Morris's practice when he was Superintendent of Finance, is
plain enough. Maclay's diary has many references to Fitzsimmons's
negotiations with members on tariff rates. It was not to the advantage of
private diplomacy to allow the Secretary to shape and define issues on the
floor of the House. But Fitzsimmons could not have had his way about the
matter without Madison's help.
Gibbon remarks that the greatest of theological controversies which racked
the Roman Empire and affected the peace of millions turned on the question
whether a certain word should be spelled with one diphthong or another. A
like disproportion between the vastness of results and the minuteness of
verbal distinction is exhibited in this decision by the House. The change
of "report" into "prepare" threw up a ridge in the field of constitutional
development that has affected the trend of American politics ever since.
This is the explanation of a problem of comparative politics that has
often excited much wondering notice: why it is that alone among modern
representative assemblies the American House of Representatives tends to
decline in prestige and authority. The original expectation was that the
House of Representatives would take a dominant position like that of the
House of Commons, but its degradation began so soon that Fisher Ames noted
it as early as 1797. Writing to Hamilton he observed:
"The heads of departments are chief clerks. Instead of being the ministry,
the organs of the executive power, and imparting a kind of momentum to the
operation of the laws, they are precluded even from communicating with the
House by reports.... Committees already are the Ministers and while the
House indulges a jealousy of encroachment in its functions, which are
properly deliberative, it does not perceive that these are impaired and
nullified by the monopoly as well as the perversion of information by
these committees."
Justice Story, who entered Congress in 1808 as a Jeffersonian Republican,
noted the process of degradation, and in his _Commentaries_ he pointed out
the cause: "The Executive is compelled to resort to secret and unseen
influences, to private interviews and private arrangements to accomplish
its own appropriate purposes, instead of proposing and sustaining its own
duties and measures by a bold and manly appeal to the nation in the face
of its representatives."
The last of the organic acts of the session was the one establishing the
judiciary. The student will be disappointed if he examines the record to
note whether there was any vision of the ascendancy which the judiciary
was to obtain in the development of the American constitutional system.
The debates were almost wholly about the possibilities of conflict between
the state and the federal courts. Although Maclay's diary gives a
one-sided and distorted account of the proceedings in the Senate, the
course of the debate is clear. Ellsworth of Connecticut had principal
charge of the bill. At the outset Lee and Grayson of Virginia made an
ineffectual effort to confine the original jurisdiction of the federal
courts to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, and argued that
jurisdiction over other cases involving federal law might be conferred
upon state courts. This was a point on which there had been some
difference of opinion between Hamilton and Madison. The former held that
it was within the competency of Congress, when instituting tribunals
inferior to the Supreme Court, to adopt the state courts for that purpose.
Madison held that nothing less than a system of federal courts quite
distinct from the state courts would satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution. When the bill was taken up in the House, there was a long
debate over this matter. The costly duplication of judicial establishments
that has ever since existed in the United States is certainly not
necessary to a federal system, but is an American peculiarity. The
advocates of a unified system were hampered by the fact that this view was
pressed by some in a spirit of hostility to the Constitution. The decisive
argument was the untrustworthiness of the state courts. Madison urged this
fact with great force and pointed out that in some of the States the
courts "are so dependent on the state legislatures, that to make the
federal laws dependent on them, would throw us back into all the
embarrassments which characterized our former situation." Such was the low
repute of the state legislatures that the only way in which this argument
could be met was to argue that "Congress shall have power, in its fullest
extent, to correct, reverse, or affirm, any decree of a state court." This
high assertion of federal authority was made by Jackson of Georgia in the
course of a long legal argument. The debate did not follow sectional
lines, and in general it was not unfairly described by Maclay as a
lawyer's wrangle. The bill was put into shape by the Senate, and reached
the House toward the close of the session when the struggle over the site
of the national capital was overshadowing everything else. It was so
generally believed that nothing important could be gained by attempts at
amendment that, after an airing of opinions, the House accepted the
measure just as it had come from the Senate.