combats were too numerous for me to mention them here; and besides
it would be impossible to get at the truth without going to a great
deal of trouble--the accounts given by Cooper, Sohomberg, and Troude
differing so widely that they can often hardly be recognized as
treating of the same events. But it is certain that the British were
very much superior to the Americans. Some of the American ships
behaved most disgracefully, deserting their consorts and fleeing
from much smaller foes. Generally the American ship was captured
when opposed by an equal force--although there were some brilliant
exceptions to this. With the French things were more equal; their
frigates were sunk or captured time and again, but nearly as often
they sunk or captured their antagonists. Some of the most gallant
fights on record are recounted of French frigates of this period;
in 1781 the _Minerve_, 32, resisted the _Courageous_, 74, till she
had lost 73 men and had actually inflicted a loss of 17 men on her
gigantic antagonist, and the previous year the _Bellepoule_, 32,
had performed a similar feat with the _Nonsuch_, 64, while the
_Capricieuse_, 32, had fought for five hours before surrendering
to the _Prudente_ and _Licorne_, each of force equal to herself.
She lost 100 men, inflicting a loss of 55 upon her two antagonists.
Such instances make us feel rather ashamed when we compare them with
the fight in which the British ship _Glasgow_, 20, beat off an
American squadron of 5 ships, including two of equal force to herself,
or with the time when the _Ariadne_, 20, and _Ceres_, 14, attacked
and captured without resistance the _Alfred_, 20, the latter ship
being deserted in the most outrageously cowardly manner by her consort
the _Raleigh_, 32. At that period the average American ship was
certainly by no means equal to the average French ship of the same
force, and the latter in turn was a little, but only a little, inferior
to the average British ship of equal strength.
Thus in 1782 the British stood first in nautical prowess, separated
but by a very narrow interval from the French, while the Americans
made a bad third. In 1789 the British still stood first, while the
Americans had made a great stride forward, coming close on their
heels, and the French had fallen far behind into the third place.
In 1812 the relative positions of the British and French were
unchanged, but the Americans had taken another very decided step
in advance, and stood nearly as far ahead of the British as the
latter were ahead of the French.
The explanation of these changes is not difficult. In 1782 the American
war vessels were in reality privateers; the crews were unpracticed,
the officers untrained, and they had none of the traditions and
discipline of a regular service. At the same time the French marine
was at its highest point; it was commanded by officers of ability
and experience, promoted largely for merit, and with crews thoroughly
trained, especially in gunnery, by a long course of service on the
sea. In courage, and in skill in the management of guns, musketry,
etc., they were the full equals of their English antagonists; their
slight _average_ inferiority in seamanship may, it is possible, be
fairly put down to the difference in race. (It seems certain that,
when serving in a neutral vessel, for example, the Englishmen aboard
are apt to make better sailors than the Frenchmen.) In 1799 the
revolution had deprived the French of all their best officers, had
let the character of the marine run down, and the discipline of the
service become utterly disorganized; this exposed them to frightful
reverses, and these in turn prevented the character of the service
from recovering its former tone. Meanwhile the Americans had established
for the first time a regular navy, and, as there was excellent material
to work with, it at once came up close to the English; constant and
arduous service, fine discipline, promotion for merit, and the most
unflagging attention to practical seamanship and gunnery had in 1812
raised it far above even the high English standard. During all these
three periods the English marine, it must be remembered, did not fall
off, but at least kept its position; the French, on the contrary,
_did_ fall off, while the American navy advanced by great strides
to the first place.
Appendix C
After my work was in press I for the first time came across Prof.
J. Russell Soley's "Naval Campaign of 1812," in the "Proceedings
of the United States Naval Institute," for October 20, 1881. It is
apparently the precursor of a more extended history. Had I known
that such a writer as Professor Soley was engaged on a work of this
kind I certainly should not have attempted it myself.
In several points our accounts differ. In the action with the
_Guerrière_ his diagram differs from mine chiefly in his making the
_Constitution_ steer in a more direct line, while I have represented
her as shifting her course several times in order to avoid being
raked, bringing the wind first on her port and then on her
starboard-quarter. My account of the number of the crew of the
_Guerrière_ is taken from the _Constitution's_ muster-book (in the
Treasury Department at Washington), which contains the names of all
the British prisoners received aboard the _Constitution_ after the
fight. The various writers used "larboard" and "starboard" with
such perfect indifference, in speaking of the closing and the loss
of the _Guerrière's_ mizzen-mast, that I hardly knew which account
to adopt; it finally seemed to me that the only way to reconcile
the conflicting statements was by making the mast act as a rudder,
first to keep the ship off the wind until it was dead aft and then
to bring her up into it. If this was the case, it deadened her speed,
and prevented Dacres from keeping his ship yardarm and yardarm with
the foe, though he tried to steady his course with the helm; but,
in this view, it rather delayed Hull's raking than helped him. If
Professor Soley's account is right, I hardly know what to make of
the statement in one of the American accounts that the _Constitution_
"luffed across the enemy's bow," and of Cooper's statement (in
_Putnam's Magazine_) that the _Guerrière's_ bowsprit pressed against
the _Constitution's_ "lee or port quarter."
In the action of the _Wasp_ with the _Frolic_, I have adopted James'
statement of the latter's force; Professor Soley follows Captain
Jones' letter, which gives the brig three additional guns and 18
pounds more metal in broadside. My reason for following James was
that his account of the _Frolic's_ force agrees with the regular
armament of her class. Captain Jones gives her _two_ carronades on
the topgallant forecastle, which must certainly be a mistake; he
makes her chase-guns long 12's, but all the other British brigs
carried 6's; he also gives her another gun in broadside, which he
calls a 12-pounder, and Lieutenant Biddle (in a letter to his father)
a 32-pound carronade. His last gun should perhaps be counted in;
I excluded it because the two American officials differed in their
account of it, because I did not know through what port it could
be fought, and because James asserted that it was dismounted and
lashed to the forecastle. The _Wasp_ left port with 138 men; subtracting
the pilot and two men who were drowned, makes 135 the number on board
during the action. As the battle was fought, I doubt if the loss of
the brig's main-yard had much effect on the result; had it been her
object to keep on the wind, or had the loss of her after-sails enabled
her antagonist to cross her stern (as in the case of the _Argus_
and _Pelican_), the accident could fairly be said to have had a decided
effect upon the contest. But as a short time after the fight began
the vessels were running nearly free, and as the _Wasp_ herself was
greatly injured aloft at the time, and made no effort to cross her
foe's stern, it is difficult to see that it made much difference.
The brig's head-sails were all right, and, as she was not close-hauled,
the cause of her not being kept more under command was probably purely
due to the slaughter on her decks.
Professor Soley represents the combat of the _States_ and _Macedonian_
as a plain yardarm and yardarm action after the first forty minutes.
I have followed the English authorities and make it a running fight
throughout. If Professor Soley is right, the enormous disparity in
loss was due mainly to the infinitely greater accuracy of the American
fire; according to my diagram the chief cause was the incompetency
of the _Macedonian's_ commander. In one event the difference was
mainly in the gunnery of the crews, in the other, it was mainly in
the tactical skill of the captains. The question is merely as to
how soon Carden, in his headlong, foolishly rash approach, was enabled
to close with Decatur. I have represented the closing as taking place
later than Professor Soley has done; very possibly I am wrong. Could
my work now be rewritten I think I should adopt his diagram of the
action of the _Macedonian_.
But in the action with the _Java_ it seems to me that he is mistaken.
He has here followed the British accounts; but they are contradicted
by the American authorities, and besides have a very improbable look.
When the _Constitution_ came round for the second time, on the port
tack, James declares the _Java_ passed directly across her stern,
almost touching, but that the British crew, overcome by astonishment
or awe, did not fire a shot; and that shortly afterward the manoeuvre
was repeated. When this incident is said to have occurred the _Java's_
crew had been hard at work fighting the guns for half an hour, and
they continued for an hour and a half afterward; it is impossible
to believe that they would have foreborne to fire more than one gun
when in such a superb position for inflicting damage. Even had the
men been struck with temporary lunacy the officers alone would have
fired some of the guns. Moreover, if the courses of the vessels were
such as indicated on Professor Soley's diagram the _Java_ would herself
have been previously exposed to a terrible raking fire, which was
not the case. So the alleged manoeuvres have, _per se_, a decidedly
apocryphal look; and besides they are flatly contradicted by the
American accounts which state distinctly that the _Java_ remained
to windward in every portion of the fight. On this same tack Professor
Soley represents the _Java_ as forereaching on the _Constitution_;
I have reversed this. At this time the _Java_ had been much cut up
in her rigging and aloft generally, while the _Constitution_ had
set much additional sail, and in consequence the latter forged ahead
and wore in the smoke unperceived. When the ships came foul Professor
Soley has drawn the _Constitution_ in a position in which she would
receive a most destructive stern rake from her antagonist's whole
broadside. The positions could not have been as there represented.
The _Java's_ bowsprit came foul in the _Constitution's_ mizzen rigging
and as the latter forged ahead she pulled the former gradually round
till when they separated the ships were in a head and stern line.
Commodore Bainbridge, as he particularly says, at once "kept away
to avoid being raked," while the loss of the head-sails aboard the
_Java_ would cause the latter to come up in the wind, and the two
ships would again be running parallel, with the American to leeward.
I have already discussed fully the reasons for rejecting in this
instance the British report of their own force and loss. This was
the last defeat that the British officially reported; the admiralty
were smarting with the sting of successive disasters and anxious
at all costs to put the best possible face on affairs (as witness
Mr. Croker's response to Lord Dundonald's speech in the House). There
is every reason for believing that in this case the reports were
garbled; exactly as at a later date the official correspondence
preceding the terrible disasters at Cabul was tampered with before
being put before the public (see McCarthy's "History of our Own Times").
It is difficult to draw a diagram of the action between the _Hornet_
and _Peacock,_ although it was so short, the accounts contradicting
one another as to which ship was to windward and which on the "larboard
tack;" and I do not know if I have correctly represented the position
of the combatants at the close of the engagement. Lieutenant Conner
reported the number of men aboard the _Hornet_ fit for duty as 135;
Lawrence says she had 8 absent in a prize and 7 too sick to be at
quarters. This would make an original complement of 150, and tallies
exactly with the number of men left on the _Hornet_ after the action
was over, as mentioned by Lawrence in his account of the total number
of souls aboard. The log-book of the _Hornet_ just before starting
on her cruise, states her entire complement as 158; but 4 of these
were sick and left behind. There is still a discrepancy of 4 men,
but during the course of the cruise nothing would be more likely
than that four men should be gotten rid of, either by sickness,
desertion, or dismissal. At any rate the discrepancy is very trivial.
In her last cruise, as I have elsewhere said, I have probably
overestimated the number of the _Hornet's_ crew; this seems especially
likely when it is remembered that toward the close of the war our
vessels left port with fewer supernumeraries aboard than earlier
in the contest. If such is the case, the _Hornet_ and _Penguin_ were
of almost exactly equal force.
My own comments upon the causes of our success, upon the various
historians of the war, etc., are so similar to those of Professor
Soley, that I almost feel as if I had been guilty of plagiarism;
yet I never saw his writings till half an hour ago. But in commenting
on the actions of 1812, I think the Professor has laid too much stress
on the difference in "dash" between the combatants. The _Wasp_ bore
down with perfect confidence to engage an equal foe; and the _Hornet_
could not tell till the _Peacock_ opened fire that the latter was
inferior in force, and moreover fought in sight of another hostile
vessel. In the action with the _Guerrière_ it was Hull and not Dacres
who acted boldly, the Englishman delaying the combat and trying to
keep it at long range for some time. In this fight it must be remembered
that neither foe knew the exact force of the other until the close
work began; then, it is true, Dacres fought most bravely. So with
the _Macedonian;_ James particularly says that she did not know the
force of her foe, and was confident of victory. The _Java,_ however,
must have known that she was to engage a superior force. In neither
of the first two frigate actions did the Americans have a chance
to display any courage in the actual fighting, the victory was won
with such ease. But in each case they entered as bravely, although
by no means as rashly or foolishly, into the fight as their antagonists
did. It must always be remembered that until this time it was by
no means proved that 24-pounders were better guns than 18's to put
on frigates; exactly as at a little later date it was vigorously
contended that 42-pounders were no more effective guns for two-deckers
than 32-pounders were. Till 1812 there had been no experience to
justify the theory that the 24-pounder was the better gun. So that
in the first five actions it cannot be said that the British showed
any especial courage in _beginning_ the fight; it was more properly
to be called ignorance. After the fight was once begun they certainly
acted very bravely, and, in particular, the desperate nature of the
_Frolic's_ defence has never been surpassed.
But admitting this is a very different thing from admitting that
the British fought more bravely than their foes; the combatants were
about on a par in this respect. The Americans, it seems to me, were
always to the full as ready to engage as their antagonists were;
on each side there were few over-cautious men, such as Commodore
Rodgers and Sir George Collier, the opposing captains on Lake
Ontario, the commander of the _Bonne Citoyenne_, and perhaps
Commodore Decatur, but as a rule either side jumped at the chance
of a fight. The difference in tactics was one of skill and common
sense, not one of timidity. The _United States_ did not "avoid close
action" from over-caution, but simply to take advantage of her
opponent's rashness. Hull's approach was as bold as it was skilful;
had the opponent to leeward been the _Endymion_, instead of the
_Guerrière_, her 24-pounders would not have saved her from the fate
that overtook the latter. Throughout the war I think that the Americans
were as bold in beginning action, and as stubborn in continuing it,
as were their foes--although no more so. Neither side can claim any
superiority on the average, though each can in individual cases,
as regards courage. Foolhardiness does not imply bravery. A
prize-fighter who refused to use his guard would be looked upon as
exceptionally brainless, not as exceptionally brave; yet such a case
is almost exactly parallel to that of the captain of the _Macedonian_.
Appendix D
In the "Historical Register of the United States" (Edited by T. H.
Palmer, Philadelphia, 1814), vol. 1 p. 105 (State Papers), is a letter
from Lieut. L. H. Babbitt to Master-commandant Wm. U. Crane, both
of the _Nautilus_, dated Sept. 13, 1812, in which he says that of
the six men imprisoned by the British on suspicion of being of English
birth, four were native-born Americans, and two naturalized citizens.
He also gives a list of six men who deserted, and entered on the
_Shannon_, of whom two were American born--the birthplaces of the
four others not being given. Adding these last, we still have but
six men as the number of British aboard the _Nautilus_, It is thus
seen that the crack frigate _Shannon_ had American deserters aboard
her--although these probably formed a merely trifling faction of
her crew, as did the British deserters aboard the crack frigate
_Constitution._
On p. 108, is a letter of Dec. 17, 1812, from Geo. S. Wise, purser
of the _Wasp_, stating that twelve of that ship's crew had been
detained "under the pretence of their being British subjects"; so
that nine per cent. of her crew may have been British--or the
proportion may have been very much smaller.
On p. 117, is a letter of Jan. 14, 1813, from Commodore J. Rodgers,
in which he states that he encloses the muster-rolls of H. B. M.
ships, _Moselle_ and _Sappho_, taken out of the captured packet
_Swallow_; and that these muster-rolls show that in August 1812,
one eighth of the crews of the _Moselle_ and _Sappho_, was composed
of Americans.
These various letters thus support strongly the conclusions reached
on a former page as to the proportion of British deserters on American
vessels.
In "A Biographical Memoir of the late Commodore Joshua Barney, from
Autographical Notes and Journals" (Edited by Mary Barney, Boston,
1832), on pages 263, and 315, are descriptions of the flotilla destroyed
in the Patuxent. It consisted of one gun-boat, carrying a long 24;
one cutter, carrying a long 18, a columbiad 18, and four 9-pound
carronades, and thirteen row barges, each carrying a long 18 or 12
in the bow, with a 32-pound or 18-pound carronade in the stern. On
p. 256, Barney's force in St. Leonard's creek, is described as
consisting of one sloop, two gun-boats, and thirteen barges, with
in all somewhat over 500 men; and it is claimed that the flotilla
drove away the blockading frigates, entirely unaided; the infantry
force on shore rendering no assistance. The work is of some value,
as showing that James had more than doubled the size, and almost
doubled the strength, of Barney's various gun-boats.
It may be mentioned that on p. 108, Commodore Barney describes the
Dutch-American frigate _South Carolina_, which carried a crew of
550 men, and was armed with 28 long 42's on the maindeck, and 12
long 12's on the spardeck. She was far heavier than any of our
44-gun frigates of 1812, and an overmatch for anything under the
rank of a 74. This gives further emphasis to what I have already
stated--that the distinguishing feature of the war of 1812, is _not_
the introduction of the heavy frigate, for heavy frigates had been
in use among various nations for thirty years previously, but the
fact that for the first time the heavy frigate was used to the best
possible advantage.
Appendix E
In the last edition of James' "Naval History of Great Britain,"
published in London, in 1886, by Richard Bentley & Son, there is
an appendix by Mr. H. T. Powell, devoted to the war of 1812, mainly
to my account thereof.
Mr. Powell begins by stating with naïf solemnity that "most British
readers will be surprised to learn that, notwithstanding the infinite
pains taken by William James to render his history a monument of
accuracy, and notwithstanding the exposure he brought upon contemporary
misstatements, yet to this day the Americans still dispute his facts."
It is difficult to discuss seriously any question with a man capable
of writing down in good faith such a sentence as the above. James
(unlike Brenton and Cooper) knew perfectly well how to be accurate;
but if Mr. Powell will read the comments on his accounts which I
have appended to the description of almost every battle, he will
see that James stands convicted beyond possibility of doubt, not
merely of occasional inaccuracies or errors, but of the systematic,
malicious, and continuous practice of every known form of wilful
misstatement, from the suppression of the truth and the suggestion
of the false to the lie direct. To a man of his character the
temptation was irresistible; for when he came to our naval war, he
had to appear as the champion of the beaten side, and to explain
away defeat instead of chronicling victory. The contemporary American
writers were quite as boastful and untruthful. No honorable American
should at this day endorse their statements; and similarly, no
reputable Englishman should permit his name to be associated in any
way with James' book without explicitly disclaiming all share in,
or sympathy with, its scurrilous mendacity.
Mr. Powell's efforts to controvert my statements can be disposed
of in short order. He first endeavors to prove that James was right
about the tonnage of the ships; but all that he does is to show that
his author gave for the English frigates and sloops the correct
tonnage by English and French rules. This I never for a moment
disputed. What I said was that the _comparative_ tonnage of the
various pairs of combatants as given by James was all wrong; and
this Mr. Powell does not even discuss. James applied one system
correctly to the English vessels; but he applied quite another to
the American (especially on the lakes). Mr. Powell actually quotes
Admiral Chads as a witness, because he says that his father considered
James' account of the _Java's_ fight accurate; if he wishes such
testimony, I can produce many relatives of the Perrys, Porters, and
Rodgers of 1812, who insist that I have done much less than justice
to the American side. He says I passed over silently James' schedule
of dimensions of the frigates and sloops. This is a mistake; I showed
by the testimony of Captains Biddle and Warrington and Lieutenant
Hoffman that his _comparative_ measurements (the absolute measurements
being of no consequence) for the American and British sloops are
all wrong; and the same holds true of the frigates.
Mr. Powell deals with the weight of shot exactly as he does with
the tonnage--that is, he seeks to show what the _absolute_ weight
of the British shot was; but he does not touch upon the point at
issue, the _comparative_ weight of the British and American shot.
When he comes to the lake actions, Mr. Powell is driven to conclude
that what I aver must be accurate, because he thinks the _Confiance_
was the size of the _General Pike_ (instead of half as large again;
she mounted 30 guns in battery on her main deck, as against the
_Pike's_ 26, and stood to the latter as the _Constellation_ did to
the _Essex_), and because an American writer (very properly) expresses
dissatisfaction with Commodore Chauncy! What Mr. Powell thinks this
last statement tends to prove would be difficult to say. In the body
of my work I go into the minute details of the strength of the
combatants in the lake action; I clearly show that James was guilty
of gross and wilful falsification of the truth; and no material
statement I make can be successfully controverted.
So much for Mr. Powell. But a much higher authority, Mr. Frank Chiswell,
has recently published some articles which tend to show that my
conclusions as to the tonnage of the sea vessels (not as to the lake
vessels, which are taken from different sources) are open to question.
In the appendix to my first edition I myself showed that it was quite
impossible to reconcile all the different statements; that the most
that could be done was to take one method and apply it all through,
admitting that even in this way it would be impossible to make all
the cases square with one another.
Mr. Chiswell states that "the American tonnage measurements, properly
taken, never could give results for frigates varying largely from the
English tonnage." But a statement like this is idle; for the answer
to the "never could" is that they _did_. If Mr. Chiswell will turn
to James' "Naval Occurrences," he will find the _Chesapeake_ set down
as 1,135 tons, and the _Macedonian_ as of 1,081; but in the American
Navy lists, which are those I followed, the _Chesapeake_ is put down
as of 1,244 tons. A simple application of the rule of three shows
that even if I accepted James' figures, I would be obliged to consider
the _Macedonian_ as of about 1,185 tons, to make her correspond with
the system I had adopted for the American ships.
But this is not all. James gives the length of the _Macedonian_ as
154 ft. 6 in. In the Navy Department at Washington are two plans
of the _Macedonian_. One is dated 1817, and gives her length as
157 ft. 3 in. This difference in measurement would make a difference
of 20 odd tons; so that by the American mode she must certainly
have been over 1,200 tons, instead of under 1,100, as by the British
rules. The second plan in the Navy Department, much more elaborate
than the first, is dated 1829, and gives the length as 164 ft.; it
is probably this that Emmons and the United States Navy lists have
followed--as I did myself in calling the tonnage of the _Macedonian_
1,325. Since finding the plan of 1817, however, I think it possible
that the other refers to the second vessel of the name, which was
built in 1832. If this is true, then the _Macedonian_ (as well as
the _Guerrière_ and _Java_) should be put down as about 120 tons
less than the measurements given by Emmons and adopted by me; but
even if this is so, she must be considered as tonning over 1,200,
using the method I have applied to the _Chesapeake_. Therefore,
adopting the same system that I apply to the American 38-gun frigates,
the British 38-gun frigates were of over 1,200, not under 1,100, tons.
As for the _Cyane_, James makes her but 118 ft. and 2 in. long, while
the American _Peacock_ he puts at 119 ft. 5 in. But Lieut. Hoffman's
official report makes the former 123 ft. 3 in., and the plans in the
State Department at Washington make the latter 117 ft. 11 in. in
length. I care nothing for the different methods of measuring different
vessels; what I wish to get at is the comparative measurement, and
this stands as above. The comparative tonnage is thus the very reverse
of that indicated by James' figures.
Finally, as to the brigs, James makes them some ten feet shorter
than the American ship-sloops. In the Washington archives I can
find no plan on record of the measurements of the captured
_Epervier_; but in the Navy Department, volume 10, of the "Letters
of Master Commandants, 1814," under date of May 12th, is the statement
of the Surveyor of the Port of Charleston that she measured 467 tons
(in another place it is given as 477). James makes her 388; but as
he makes the American _Wasp_ 434, whereas she stands on our list
as of 450, the application of the same rule as with the frigates
gives us, even taking his own figures, 400 as her tonnage, when measured
as our ships were. But the measurements of the Surveyor of the Port
who examined the _Epervier_ are corroborated by the statements of
Captain Biddle, who captured her sister brig, the _Penguin_. Biddle
reported that the latter was two feet shorter and a little broader
than his own ship, the _Hornet_, which was of 480 tons. This would
correspond almost exactly with the Surveyor's estimate.
It still seems impossible to reconcile all these conflicting statements;
but I am inclined to think that, on the whole, in the sea (not the
lake) vessels I have put the British tonnage too high. On the scale
I have adopted for the American 44-gun and 38-gun frigates and 18-gun
sloops like the Hornet and _Wasp_, the British 38-gun frigates ought
to be put down as of a little over 1,200, and the British 18-gun
sloops as of between 400 and 450, tons. In other words, of the twelve
single-ship actions of the war five, those of the _Chesapeake_ and
_Shannon_, _Enterprise_ and _Boxer_, _Wasp_ and _Frolic_, _Hornet_
and _Peacock_, _Hornet_ and _Penguin_, were between vessels of nearly
equal size; in six the American was the superior about in the proportion
of five to four (rather more in the case of the frigates, rather
less in the case of the brigs); and in one, that of the _Argus_ and
_Pelican_, the British sloop was the bigger, in a somewhat similar ratio.
This correction would be in favor of the British. But in a more
important particular I think I have done injustice to the Americans.
I should have allowed for the short weight of American metal on the
lakes, taking off seven per cent, from the nominal broadsides of
Perry and Macdonough; for the American ordnance was of exactly the
same quality as that on the ocean vessels, while the British was
brought over from England, and must have shown the same superiority
that obtained on the sea-going ships.
Moreover, I am now inclined to believe that both the _Guerrière_
and the _Java_, which were originally French ships, still carried
French 18's on their main-deck, and that, therefore, about 20 pounds
should be added to the broadside weight of metal of each. The American
accounts stated this to be the case in both instances; but I paid
no heed to them until my attention was called to the fact that the
English had captured enormous quantities of French cannon and shot
and certainly used the captured ordnance on some of their ships.
In writing my history I have had to deal with a mass of confused
and contradictory testimony, which it has sometimes been quite
impossible to reconcile, the difficulty being greatly enhanced by
the calculated mendacity of James and some others of the earlier
writers, both American and British. Often I have had simply to balance
probabilities, and choose between two sets of figures, aware that,
whichever I chose, much could be said against the choice. It has,
therefore, been quite impossible to avoid errors; but I am confident
they have been as much in favor of the British as the Americans;
and in all important points my statements are substantially accurate.
I do not believe that my final conclusions on the different fights
can be disputed. James asserts that the American ships were officered
by cunning cowards, and manned to the extent of half their force in
point of effectiveness by renegade British. I show that the percentage
of non-American seamen aboard the American ships was probably but
little greater than the percentage of non-British seamen aboard the
British ships; and as for the charges of cowardice, there were but
two instances in which it could be fairly urged against a beaten
crew--that of the British _Epervier_ and that of the American _Argus_
(for the cases of Sir George Collier, Commodore Rodgers, Chauncy,
Yeo, the commander of the _Bonne Citoyenne_, etc., etc., cannot be
considered as coming under this head). James states that there was
usually a great superiority of force on the side of the Americans;
this is true; but I show that it was not nearly as great as he makes
it, and that in dealing with the lake flotillas his figures are
absolutely false, to the extent of even reversing the relative strength
of the combatants on Lake Champlain, where the Americans won, although
with an inferior force. In the one noteworthy British victory, that
of the _Shannon_, all British authors fail to make any allowance for
the vital fact that the _Shannon's_ crew had been drilled for seven
years, whereas the _Chesapeake_ had an absolutely new crew, and had
been out of port just eight hours; yet such a difference in length
of drill is more important than disparity in weight of metal.
As a whole, it must be said that both sides showed equal courage
and resolution; that the Americans usually possessed the advantage
in material force; and that they also showed a decided superiority
in fighting skill, notably in marksmanship.
INDEX
_Abeille_
Aboukir
_Acasta_
_Adams_
Adams, Chaplain
Adams, Lieutenant
Adonis
_Aeolus_
_Aetna_
_Africa_
_Alacrity_
_Albion_
_Alert_
_Alexandria_
_Alfred_
Alison, Mr.
_Allen_
Allen, Lieutenant William Henry
_Alligator_
Almy, Sailing-master Thomas C.
Alwyn, John C.
_Ambuscade_
_Amelia_
_American_
American Revolution
_American State Papers_
Angus, Commander S.
Annapolis, Maryland
Appling, Major
_Arab_
Arbuthnot, Captain James
_Arethuse_
_Argo_
_Argus_
_Ariadne_
_Ariel_
_Armada_
_Armide_
Armstrong, Lieutenant
Arundel, Sailing-master
_Asp_
Aspinwall, Lieutenant
_Atalanta_
_Atlas_
Austria
_Avenger_
_Avon_
_Aylwin_
Ayscough, Sir George
Azores
Babbit, Lieutenant L.H.
Badajos
_Badere Zaffer_
Bainbridge, Master Commandant
Baker, Captain
_Ballahou_
_Ballard_
Ballard, Captain
Baltic Sea
Baltimore, Maryland
Barbadoes
Barclay, Captain R.H.
Barney, Captain Joshua
Barnwell, Sailing-master
_Barossa_
Barras, Admiral
Barrie, Sir Robert
Barry, Captain
Bartholomew, Captain
Bartlett, Mr.
Bassett, Sailing-master R.
Bastard, Captain John
Bay of Fundy
Bayne, Adjutant General E.
_Bayonnaise_
Beale, George, Jr.
Bell, Lieutenant
_Bellepoule_
_Bellone_
_Belvidera_
Bentham, Captain George
_Berceau_
_Beresford_
Beresford, Captain John Poer
Bermuda
Biddle, Captain
Biddle, Lieutenant
Bignall, Lieutenant G.
Bingham, Captain
Black Rock
_Black Snake_
Bladensburg, Maryland
Blake, Mr.
Blakely, Captain Johnston
Bland, Francis
blockading
Blucher, Mr.
Blyth, Captain Samuel
Boerstler, Colonel
_Bonne Citoyenne_
_Boston_
Boston, Massachusetts
_Boxer_
Boyce, Lieutenant
Boyd, General
Boyd, Master's Mate
Boyle, Captain Thomas
Brailesford, Midshipman
Braimer, Captain
_Brant_
Breckenbridge, Lieutenant
Brenton, Edward P.
Brine, Captain
Brock, General
Broke, Admiral Philip Vere
Brooks, Lieutenant
Broom, Lieutenant James
Brown, Captain Thomas
Brown, General
Brown, Lieutenant
Bruce, Lieutenant
Buchan, Lieutenant Edward
Budd, Lieutenant Charles
Budd, Lieutenant George
Buffalo, New York
Bulger, Lieutenant
Bulloch, Captain James D.
Bunker Hill,
Burleton, Admiral Sir George
Burlington, Vermont
_Burrows_
Burrows, Lieutenant William
Bush, Lieutenant William S.
Byng, Captain Henry D.
Byron, Captain Richard
Cabul, Mr.
Calder, Sir Robert
_Caledonia_
Call, William
Campbell, Lieutenant
Campbell, Master's Mate J.
Camperdown
Canada
Cape of Good Hope
Cape Race
_Capricieuse_
Carden, Captain John Surnam
_Carnation_
_Carolina_
Carroll, General
_Carron_
Carter, Sailing-master
Cassin, Captain
_Castilian_
Cathcart, Captain
_Centipe_
_Ceres_
_Cerf_
Chads, Lieutenant Henry D.
_Chameleon_
Champlin, Sailing-master Stephen
Chandeleur Islands
Chandler, General
Charleston, South Carolina
_Charwell_
Chauncy, Commodore
Chauncy, Lieutenant Wolcott
_Chausseur_
_Cherub_
_Chesapeake_
Chesapeake Bay
Chicago, Illinois
_Childers_
_Chippeway_
Chippeway
Chiswell, Frank
_Chlorinde_
Chrystler's Farm
_Chubb_
Civil War
Claxton, Lieutenant
Clement, Sailing-master George
_Cleopatra_
_Clyde_
Cochrane, Admiral Sir Alexander
Cockburn, Rear Admiral
Codrington, Lord Edward
Coffee, General
Collier, Sir George
Collier, Sir Ralph
_Columbia_
_Comus_
_Confiance_
_Congress_
Congress
Conklin, Lieutenant A.H.M.
Conkling, Lieutenant
Conner, Lieutenant
Connor, Lieutenant D.
_Conquest_
_Constellation_
_Constitution_
_Contest_
Cooper, J. Fenimore
Copenhagen
Cornick, Lieutenant H.D.
_Cornwallis_
Coshnahan, Midshipman
Coswell, Lieutenant J.G.
_Courageous_
_Courier-National_
_Courser_
Cox, W.S.
Cox, Lieutenant
Crab Island
Crane, Lieutenant
Crane, Master Commandant William V
Craney Island
Crawford, Minister
Creerie, Lieutenant John
Croghan, Colonel
Croker, Mr.
Cuba
Cumberland Island
Cummings, Midshipman J.C.
_Curlew_
Curry, Lieutenant Rodger C.
_Cyane_
_Cyprus_
Dacres, Captain James R.
_Daedalus_
Daily, Sailing-master
_Dant_
Davies, Lieutenant David
Dearborn, General
Decatur, Stephen
Deforest, Midshipman
de Grasse, Comte
de la Gravière, Admiral Jurien
Delaware Bay
Denmark
Dent, Captain
De Ruyter
_Desiree_
_Despatch_
De Suffrein
_Detroit_
Detroit, Michigan
_Devastation_
_Diadem_
Dickenson, Captain James
_Dictator_
_Didon_
Dixon, Sailing-master
Dobbs, Captain
Doggerbank
_Dolphin_
_Dover_
Douglass, Captain George
Douglass, Lord Howard
Downie, Captain George.
Downes, Lieutenant
Downs, Lieutenant
_Dragon_
_Drummond_
Drummond, General
Dudley, Midshipman
Dundonald, Lord
Durham, Admiral
_Eagle_
_Earl of Moira_
Earle, Commodore
East Indies
Eckford, Henry
Edwards, Lieutenant
_Egyptienne_
Elliott, Lieutenant
Ellis, Captain
Emmons, Lieutenant George E.
_Endymion_
English Channel
_Enterprise_
_Epervier_
Epworth, Captain
_Erebus_
_Erie_
_Espiegle_
_Essex_
_Essex Junior_
_Etoile_
_Eurotas_
_Euryalus_
_Eurydice_
Evans, Amos A.
Everard, Captain Thomas
_Experiment_
_Fair American_
_Fairy_
Falcon, Captain Gordon Thomas
Falkiner, Lieutenant
False Duck Island
Farragut, Admiral David Glasgow
Ferris, Sailing-master John D.
_Finch_
Finch, Lieutenant Bolton
Finnis, Captain
_Firefly_
Fischer, Lieutenant Colonel
_Flambeau_
_Florida_
Florida
Floyd, Captain Robett
Forrest, Lieutenant
Fort Bowyer
Fort Erie
Fort George
Fort McHenry
Fort Mackinaw
Fort Meigs
Fort St. Philip
Fort Stephenson
Fort Washington
_Forte_
_Fortune of War_
Forty Mile Creek
14th Light Dragoons
France
_Franklin_
_Fredrickscoarn_
Frenchtown
French Revolution
_Frolic_
_Fulton_
Funk, John Messer
_Funon_
Gaines, General
_Galatea_
Gamble, Lieutenant Peter
_Gamo_
Garden, Captain S.J.
_Garland_
Garland, Lieutenant
_General Armstrong_
_General Pike_
Georgia
_Georgiana_
Ghent
Gibbs, General
_Glasgow_
_Gloire_
_Gloucester_
Gordon, Captain James A.
Gordon, Lieutenant H.C.
_Governor Tompkins_
Grand Banks
Graves, Sir Thomas
Greene, Captain Pill Barnaby
_Greenwich_
Gregory, Lieutenant Francis A.
Griffeth, Rear Admiral
_Growler_
Guérin, Leon
_Guerres Maritimes_
_Guerrière_
_Guemere_
Gunboat #5
Gunboat #23
Gunboat #156
Gunboat #162
Gunboat #163
Gunboat #168
_Gypsy_
_Hamilton_
Hamilton, Secretary Paul
Hampton, General Wade
Hampton Roads
Hanahett, Captain
Hardy, Captain
Hardy, Sir Thomas
Harrison, General
Hart, Midshipman
_Havannah_
Hawkins, Captain Richard
Hayes, Captain John
Head, Captain Michael
_Hebrus_
_Hector_
Henderson, Captain
Henly, Captain J.D.
Henly, Captain Robert
_Hermes_
Hicks, Lieutenant William
_Highflyer_
Hilyar, Captain James
Hinn, Mr.
Hislop, Lieutenant General
_History of the British Navy_
_History of the U.S. Navy_
Hoffman, Lieutenant B.F.
Holdup, Lieutenant
Hollaway, Captain
Holmes, Captain
Honduras
Hood, Sir Samuel
Hope, Captain Henry
Hope, Lieutenant David
_Hornet_
Horseshoe Bend
Howe, James
Hughes, Sit Edward
Hull, General Isaac
Humbert, General
Humble, James
Hunt, William H.
_Hunter_
Hurlburt, Mr.
Hutchinson, Lieutenant William
_Icarus_
impressment
_Indefatigable_
_Independence_
Indian Ocean
Indians
Inglis, Lieutenant George
Ingram, Lieutenant William
_Insurgente_
Irvine, Lieutenant
Isle-au-noix
Italy
Izard, General
Jackson, General Andrew
Jamaica Plate
James, William
_Jasseur_
_Java_
_Jefferson_
Jefferson, Thomas
_John Adams_
John, Lieutenant Colonel
Johnson, Lieutenant Robert
Johnson, Sailing-master
Johnston, Sailing-master
_Jones_
Jones, Captain Jacob
Jones, Lieutenant Thomas Catesby
_Julia_
_Junon_
Keane, General
Kearney. Captain Palmer
Kent, Lieutenant Bartholomew
Kentucky
Kerr, Captain Robert
King, Captain
King, Lieutenant
Kingston
Klaeson, Captain
LaColle Mill
_La Diane_
_Lady Gore_
_Lady Murray_
_Lady of the Lake_
_Lady Prevost_
Lafitte
Lake Borgne
Lake Champlain
Lake Erie
Lake Huron
Lake Ontario
Lamb, Midshipman
Lambert, Captain
Lambert, General
Landon, Captain H.
_Landrail_
Lang, Jack
Laugharne, T.L.O.
_Lawrence_
Lawrence, Captain
_Leander_
_Lejoille_
_Leopard_
Les Petites Coquilles
_Levant_
_Linnet_
_Little Belt_
Lockyer, Captain
_Loire_
_London Naval Chronicle_
Long Island Sound
Losack, Captain Woodley
_Lottery_
_Louisiana_
Low. Lieutenant
_Ludlow_
Ludlow, Lieutenant A.
Lumly, Captain
Lundy's Lane
_Lynx_
McCall, Lieutenant Edward
McClintock, Midshipman
McClure, General
McCreery, Lieutenant David
McDonald, Lieutenant
Macdonough, Commodore
_Macedonia_
McGhie, Lieutenant James
McGowan, Midshipman
McKay, Charles
McKeever, Lieutenant Isaac
McKnight, Lieutenant Decatur
Macomb, General
McPherson, Lieutenant
_Madison_
Madison, James
_Magnet_
Maine
Maitland, Captain
_Majestic_
_Manly_
Manners, Captain William
Maples, Captain John F
Marblehead, Massachusetts
_Mars_
Marshall, Lieutenant John
_Martin_
_Mary_
Maryland
Matterface, Lieutenant William
_Meduse_
_Medway_
_Melville_
_Menelaus_
Mensing, Commander Adolf
_Merrimac_
_Meteor_
Mexico
_Milan_
_Milbrook_
Miller, Captain
Mills, Colonel
Milne, Captain
Mindham, William
_Minerva_
_Minerve_
Mississippi River
Mitchell, Colonel
Mix, Sailing-master
Mobile Point
_Mohawk_
Moltke
Monk, Sailing-master James
_Montagu_
_Montgomery_
_Montreal_
Montresor, Captain
Morgan, General
Morgan, Major
Morris, Captain Charles
_Moselle_
Muir, Captain
Mulcaster, Captain William Howe,
Murray, Colonel J.
_Nancy_
Nantucket
Napoleon
_Narcissus_
_Nautilus_
_Naval Chronicle_
_Naval Gunnery_
_Naval History of Great Britain_
_Naval History of the United States_
_Naval Occurrences_
Navy Department
_Nayaden_
Nazer, Lieutenant Kelly
Neale, Lieutenant
Nelson, Lord
_Nereide_
_Nereyda_
_Netly_
_Nettle_
_Neufchatel_
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Orleans
_New York_
New York
Newark
_Newcastle_
Newfoundland
_Niagara_
Niagara
Nicholson, Lieutenant N.J.
_Nile's Register_
_Nocton_
_Nonsuch_
Norman, Lieutenant Charles R.
North Point
_Norwich_
_Nymphe_
O'Brien, Mr.
O'Connor, Captain
Odenheimer, Lieutenant
Ogdensburg
_Ohio_
Oliver, Captain R.D.
_Oneida_
_Ontario_
Ordronaux, Captain
_Orpheus_
Osgood, Lieutenant
Oswego
Packenham, General Edward
Packet, Lieutenant John H.
Paine, Sailing-master Thomas
_Palunure_
Palmer, Captain
Parker, Captain
Parker, George
Parker, Lieutenant
Parker, Sir Peter
_Pasley_
Patterson, Captain
Patuxent River
Paulding, Admiral
Paulding, Midshipman Hiram
_Peacock_
_Peacock_ (British)
Peake, William
Pechell, Captain
_Pelican_
Pendleton, Thomas M.
_Penguin_
_Perry_
Perry, Captain Oliver H.
_Pert_
_Peterel_
Pettigrew, Lieutenant
Pettipauge
_Philadelphia_
Phillot, Captain
_Phoebe_
_Phoenix_
_Pictou_
_Piedmontaise_
Pigot, Captain
_Pike_
Pike, Brigadier General
_Pilot_
_Pique_
_Plantagenet_
Plattsburg
_Poictiers_
Polkinghorne, Lieutenant James
_Pomona_
_Pomone_
Popham, Captain
_Porcupine_
Porter, Captain David
Porto Praya
Porto Rico
Portsmouth, New Hampshire
Portugal
Potomac River
Powell, H.T.
Pratt, Lieutenant
_Preble_
_President_
Presque Isle
Prevost, Sir George,
_Primrose_
_Prince Regent_
_Princess Charlotte_
Pring, Captain Daniel
privateers
Proctor, Colonel
_Prometheus_
_Prosperous_
_Prudente_
_Psyche_
Quasi-War (1799-1800)
_Queen Charlotte_
Queenstown
_Quidproquo_
_Racer_
Radchffe, Lieutenant
Raderhurst, Lieutenant
_Rainbow_
_Raleigh_
_Ramillies_
_Rattlesnake_
Rattray, Captain James
_Raven_
Rawle, Lieutenant Richard
Read, George Campbell
Reade, Colonel
Ready, Lieutenant Henry
Red House
Reid, Captain Samuel C.
_Reindeer_
Rennie, Colonel
Renshaw, Lieutenant Commander,
_Resolution_
Riall, General
_Rifleman_
Ripley, Mr.
_Rivoli_
Roach, Lieutenant Isaac
Roberts, Captain
Robinson, Batty
Rodgers, Commodore John,
Rodney
Rolette, Lieutenant
Ross, General
_Rota_
Rouvier, Charles
_Royal George_
Russia
Sackett's Harbor
_St. Lawrence_
St. Lawrence
Salamanca
Samwell, Midshipman
_San Domingo_
_San Florenzo_
San Salvador
San Sebastian
Sanders, Captain
Sandy Creek
Sandy Hook, New Jersey
_Sappho_
_Saranac_
_Saratoga_
Saunders, Lieutenant
Sawyer, Vice Admiral
_Schooner_
Scott, Colonel
Scott, General
Scott, Robert
_Scorpion_
_Scourge_
_Sea Horse_
_Seine_
_Seneca_
_Seringapatam_
_Severn_
_Shannon_
Sheafe, Major General
_Shelburne_
Sherbroke, Lieutenant General
Sherriff, Captain
Shields, Thomas
Shubrick, Lieutenant J.T.
Sigourney, Mr.
_Simco_
Simmons, Captain T.F.
Sisson, Sailing-master
Sinclair, Captain Arthur
Smith, Lieutenant Sydney
Smith, Midshipman
Sohomberg,
Solcy, J. Russell,
_Somers,_
Somerville, Captain Philip
Sorel River
_Soult_
_South Carolina_
_Southampton_
Southcombe, Captain
Spain
_Spark_
_Speedy_
Spilsbury, Captain,
_Spitfire_
Speddes, Lieutenant Robert
Squaw Island
_Star_
_Statira_
Stephens, John
Stewart, Captain George
Stoddart, Benjamin
Stokes, Lieutenant Thomas
Stone, Major-General
Stuart, Lord
_Superb_
_Superior_
_Suret_
_Surveyor_
_Swallow_
_Sybille_
_Sydney Smith_
Sykes, Lieutenant
_Sylph_
_Syren_
_Tagus_
Tarbell, Captain
_Tartarus_
Tattnall. Lieutenant
Taylor, Captain John
Taylor, Major-General
Tecumseh
_Tenedos_
Tennessee
_Terror_
_Thalia_
Thames River
_Thorn_
Thornton, Colone
_Ticonderoga_
_Tigress_
_Tigris_
_Tom Bowline_
_Tompkins_
tonnage,
_Tonnant_
_Torch_
Toronto (see York)
_Torpedo_
Toulouse
Townsend, Captain Lord James
Towson, Captain N.
Trafalgar
Trant. Sailing-master
Travis. William S.
_Trent_
Tripoli
_Trippe_
Tromp
Troude
Truxtun, Commodore
Tucker, Captain Thomas Tudor
Tucker, General
Turkey
Turner, Lieutenant Daniel
Tyler, Vice Admiral
Ulrick, Sailing-master George
_United States_
Upton. Captain
Valparaiso
Van Horne, Colonel
Van Rensselaer. General
Vashon. Captain
Vaughan, Sailing-master
_Vengeance_
Vermont
_Vestale_
_Victorious_
_Victory_
Villeneuve. M.
Vincent. General
_Viper_
_Virgin_
Virginia
_Vixen_
_Volcano_
Wadsworth, Colonel
Wales. Captain
War Department
Ward, Commander J.H.
Wareham
Warren, Admiral Sir John.
Warrington, Master Commandant Lewis.
_Washington_
Washington, D.C.
_Wasp_
Waters, Midshipman Kervin
Watson, Lieutenant
Watt, Lieutenant
Watts, George
_Weasel_
Wellington, Duke of
Wells, Lieutenant Henry
West Indies
Westphal, Lieutenant Philip
Whinyates, Captain Thomas
Wilkes, Commodore
Wilkinson, General
_William_
Williams, Lieutenant Alexander D.
_Wilmer_
Wilmer, Lieutenant
Winchester
Winder, General
Wintle, Lieutenant
Wise, George S.
_Wolfe_
Wood, Lieutenant Peter V.
_Woodbridge_
Woolsey, Captain M.T.
Worsely, Lieutenant
Worth, Lieutenant Frederick A.
Wragg, Midshipman
Wright, Lieutenant
Yarnall, Lieutenant
Yeo, Sir James Lucas
York (Toronto)
York Bay
_Young Wasp_
End of Project Gutenberg's The Naval War of 1812, by Theodore Roosevelt