1815
THE BATTLE OF NEW ORLEANS
_The war on land generally disastrous--British send great expedition
against New Orleans--Jackson prepares for the defence of the city--Night
attack on the British advance guard--Artillery duels--Great battle
of January 8, 1815--Slaughtering repulse of the main attack--Rout
of the Americans on the right bank of the river--Final retreat of
the British--Observations on the character of the troops and
commanders engaged._
While our navy had been successful, the war on land had been for
us full of humiliation. The United States then formed but a loosely
knit confederacy, the sparse population scattered over a great expanse
of land. Ever since the Federalist party had gone out of power in
1800, the nation's ability to maintain order at home and enforce
respect abroad had steadily dwindled; and the twelve years' nerveless
reign of the Doctrinaire Democracy had left us impotent for attack
and almost as feeble for defence. Jefferson, though a man whose views
and theories had a profound influence upon our national life, was
perhaps the most incapable Executive that ever filled the presidential
chair; being almost purely a visionary, he was utterly unable to
grapple with the slightest actual danger, and, not even excepting
his successor, Madison, it would be difficult to imagine a man less
fit to guide the state with honor and safety through the stormy times
that marked the opening of the present century. Without the prudence
to avoid war or the forethought to prepare for it, the Administration
drifted helplessly into a conflict in which only the navy prepared
by the Federalists twelve years before, and weakened rather than
strengthened during the intervening time, saved us from complete
and shameful defeat. True to its theories, the House of Virginia
made no preparations, and thought the war could be fought by "the
nation in arms"; the exponents of this particular idea, the militiamen,
a partially armed mob, ran like sheep whenever brought into the field.
The regulars were not much better. After two years of warfare, Scott
records in his autobiography that there were but two books of tactics
(one written in French) in the entire army on the Niagara frontier;
and officers and men were on such a dead level of ignorance that
he had to spend a month drilling all of the former, divided into
squads, in the school of the soldier and school of the company.
[Footnote: "Memoirs of Lieutenant-General Scott," written by himself
(2 vols., New York, 1864), i, p. 115.] It is small wonder that such
troops were utterly unable to meet the English. Until near the end,
the generals were as bad as the armies they commanded, and the
administration of the War Department continued to be a triumph of
imbecility to the very last. [Footnote: Monroe's biographer (see
"James Monroe," by Daniel C. Gilman, Boston, 1883, p. 123) thinks
he made a good Secretary of War. I think he was as much a failure
as his predecessors, and a harsher criticism could not be passed
on him. Like the other statesmen of his school, he was mighty in
word and weak in action; bold to plan but weak to perform. As an
instance, contrast his fiery letters to Jackson with the fact that
he never gave him a particle of practical help.] With the exception
of the brilliant and successful charge of the Kentucky mounted infantry
at the battle of the Thames, the only bright spot in the war in the
North was the campaign on the Niagara frontier during the summer of
1814; and even here, the chief battle, that of Lundy's Lane, though
reflecting as much honor on the Americans as on the British, was
for the former a defeat, and not a victory, as most of our writers
seem to suppose.
But the war had a dual aspect. It was partly a contest between the
two branches of the English race, and partly a last attempt on the
part of the Indian tribes to check the advance of the most rapidly
growing one of these same two branches; and this last portion of
the struggle, though attracting comparatively little attention, was
really much the most far-reaching in its effect upon history. The
triumph of the British would have distinctly meant the giving a new
lease of life to the Indian nationalities, the hemming in, for a time,
of the United States, and the stoppage, perhaps for many years, of
the march of English civilization across the continent. The English
of Britain were doing all they could to put off the day when their
race would reach to a worldwide supremacy.
There was much fighting along our Western frontier with various Indian
tribes; and it was especially fierce in the campaign that a backwoods
general of Tennessee, named Andrew Jackson, carried on against the
powerful confederacy of the Creeks, a nation that was thrust in like
a wedge between the United States proper and their dependency, the
newly acquired French province of Louisiana. After several slaughtering
fights, the most noted being the battle of the Horse-shoe Bend, the
power of the Creeks was broken for ever; and afterward, as there
was much question over the proper boundaries of what was then the
Latin land of Florida, Jackson marched south, attacked the Spaniards
and drove them from Pensacola. Meanwhile the British, having made
a successful and ravaging summer campaign through Virginia and
Maryland, situated in the heart of the country, organized the most
formidable expedition of the war for a winter campaign against the
outlying land of Louisiana, whose defender Jackson of necessity became.
Thus, in the course of events, it came about that Louisiana was the
theatre on which the final and most dramatic act of the war was played.
Amid the gloomy, semi-tropical swamps that cover the quaking delta
thrust out into the blue waters of the Mexican Gulf by the strong
torrent of the mighty Mississippi, stood the fair, French city of
New Orleans. Its lot had been strange and varied. Won and lost, once
and again, in conflict with the subjects of the Catholic king, there
was a strong Spanish tinge in the French blood that coursed so freely
through the veins of its citizens; joined by purchase to the great
Federal Republic, it yet shared no feeling with the latter, save
that of hatred to the common foe. And now an hour of sore need had
come upon the city; for against it came the red English, lords of
fight by sea and land. A great fleet of war vessels--ships of the
line--frigates and sloops--under Admiral Cochrane, was on the way
to New Orleans, convoying a still larger fleet of troop ships, with
aboard them some ten thousand fighting men, chiefly the fierce and
hardy veterans of the Peninsular War, [Footnote: "The British infantry
embarked at Bordeaux, some for America, some for England." ("History
of the War in the Peninsula," by Major-General Sir W. F. P. Napier,
K. C. B. New Edition. New York, 1882, vol. v, p. 200.) For discussion
of numbers, see farther on.] who had been trained for seven years
in the stern school of the Iron Duke, and who were now led by one
of the bravest and ablest of all Wellington's brave and able
lieutenants, Sir Edward Packenham.
On the 8th of December 1814, the foremost vessels, with among their
number the great two-decker _Tonnant_, carrying the admiral's flag,
anchored off the Chandeleur Islands [Footnote: See, ante, p. 343.];
and as the current of the Mississippi was too strong to be easily
breasted, the English leaders determined to bring their men by boats
through the bayous, and disembark them on the bank of the river ten
miles below the wealthy city at whose capture they were aiming. There
was but one thing to prevent the success of this plan, and that was
the presence in the bayous of five American gun-boats, manned by
a hundred and eighty men, and commanded by Lieutenant Comdg. Catesby
Jones, a very shrewd fighter. So against him was sent Captain Nicholas
Lockyer with forty-five barges, and nearly a thousand sailors and
marines, men who had grown gray during a quarter of a century of
unbroken ocean warfare. The gun-boats were moored in a head-and-stern
line, near the Rigolets, with their boarding-nettings triced up,
and every thing ready to do desperate battle; but the British rowed
up with strong, swift strokes, through a murderous fire of great
guns and musketry; the vessels were grappled amid fierce resistance;
the boarding-nettings were slashed through and cut away; with furious
fighting the decks were gained; and one by one, at push of pike and
cutlass stroke the gun-boats were carried in spite of their stubborn
defenders; but not till more than one barge had been sunk, while the
assailants had lost a hundred men, and the assailed about half as many.
There was now nothing to hinder the landing of the troops; and as the
scattered transports arrived, the soldiers were disembarked, and ferried
through the sluggish water of the bayous on small flat-bottomed craft;
and finally, Dec. 23d, the advance guard, two thousand strong, under
General Keane, emerged at the mouth of the canal Villeré, and camped on
the bank of the river, [Footnote: Letter of Major-General John Keane,
Dec. 26, 1814.] but nine miles below New Orleans, which now seemed a
certain prize, almost within their grasp.
Yet, although a mighty and cruel foe was at their very gates, nothing
save fierce defiance reigned in the fiery creole hearts of the Crescent
City. For a master-spirit was in their midst. Andrew Jackson, having
utterly broken and destroyed the most powerful Indian confederacy
that had ever menaced the Southwest, and having driven the haughty
Spaniards from Pensacola, was now bending all the energies of his
rugged intellect and indomitable will to the one object of defending
New Orleans. No man could have been better fitted for the task. He
had hereditary wrongs to avenge on the British, and he hated them
with an implacable fury that was absolutely devoid of fear. Born
and brought up among the lawless characters of the frontier, and
knowing well how to deal with them, he was able to establish and
preserve the strictest martial law in the city without in the least
quelling the spirit of the citizens. To a restless and untiring energy
he united sleepless vigilance and genuine military genius. Prompt
to attack whenever the chance offered itself, seizing with ready
grasp the slightest vantage-ground, and never giving up a foot of
earth that he could keep, he yet had the patience to play a defensive
game when it so suited him, and with consummate skill he always
followed out the scheme of warfare that was best adapted to this
wild soldiery. In after-years he did to his country some good and
more evil; but no true American can think of his deeds at New Orleans
without profound and unmixed thankfulness.
He had not reached the city till December 2d, and had therefore but
three weeks in which to prepare the defence. The Federal Government,
throughout the campaign, did absolutely nothing for the defence of
Louisiana; neither provisions nor munitions of war of any sort were
sent to it, nor were any measures taken for its aid. [Footnote:
"Historical Memoir of the War in West Florida and Louisiana" (by
Major A. Lacarriex Latour, translated from the French by H. P. Nugent,
Philadelphia, 1816), p. 66.] The inhabitants had been in a state of
extreme despondency up to the time that Jackson arrived, for they
had no one to direct them, and they were weakened by factional
divisions [Footnote: Latour, 53.]; but after his coming there was
nothing but the utmost enthusiasm displayed, so great was the confidence
he inspired, and so firm his hand in keeping down all opposition.
Under his direction earthworks were thrown up to defend all the
important positions, the whole population working night and day at
them; all the available artillery was mounted, and every ounce of
war material that the city contained was seized; martial law was
proclaimed; and all general business was suspended, every thing
being rendered subordinate to the one grand object of defence.
Jackson's forces were small. There were two war vessels in the river.
One was the little schooner _Carolina_, manned by regular seamen,
largely New Englanders. The other was the newly built ship _Louisiana_,
a powerful corvette; she had of course no regular crew, and her officers
were straining every nerve to get one from the varied ranks of the
maritime population of New Orleans; long-limbed and hard-visaged Yankees,
Portuguese and Norwegian seamen from foreign merchantmen, dark-skinned
Spaniards from the West Indies, swarthy Frenchmen who had served under
the bold privateersman Lafitte,--all alike were taken, and all alike
by unflagging exertions were got into shape for battle. [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Daniel G. Patterson, Dec. 20, 1814.] There were
two regiments of regulars, numbering together about eight hundred
men, raw and not very well disciplined, but who were now drilled
with great care and regularity. In addition to this Jackson raised
somewhat over a thousand militiamen among the citizens. There were
some Americans among them, but they were mostly French Creoles,
[Footnote: Latour, 110.] and one band had in its formation something
that was curiously pathetic. It was composed of free men of color,
[Footnote: Latour, 111.] who had gathered to defend the land which
kept the men of their race in slavery; who were to shed their blood
for the Flag that symbolized to their kind not freedom but bondage;
who were to die bravely as freemen, only that their brethren might
live on ignobly as slaves. Surely there was never a stranger instance
than this of the irony of fate.
But if Jackson had been forced to rely only on these troops New Orleans
could not have been saved. His chief hope lay in the volunteers of
Tennessee, who, under their Generals, Coffee and Carroll, were pushing
their toilsome and weary way toward the city. Every effort was made
to hurry their march through the almost impassable roads, and at last,
in the very nick of time, on the 23d of December, the day of which
the British troops reached the river bank, the vanguard of the
Tennesseeans marched into New Orleans. Gaunt of form and grim of
face; with their powder-horns slung over their buckskin shirts; carrying
their long rifles on their shoulders and their heavy hunting-knives
stuck in their belts; with their coon-skin caps and fringed leggings;
thus came the grizzly warriors of the backwoods, the heroes of the
Horse-Shoe Bend, the victors over Spaniard and Indian, eager to pit
themselves against the trained regulars of Britain, and to throw
down the gage of battle to the world-renowned infantry of the island
English. Accustomed to the most lawless freedom, and to giving free
reign to the violence of their passions, defiant of discipline and
impatient of the slightest restraint, caring little for God and nothing
for man, they were soldiers who, under an ordinary commander, would
have been fully as dangerous to themselves and their leaders as to
their foes. But Andrew Jackson was of all men the one best fitted
to manage such troops. Even their fierce natures quailed before the
ungovernable fury of a spirit greater than their own; and their sullen,
stubborn wills were bent as last before his unyielding temper and
iron hand. Moreover, he was one of themselves; he typified their
passions and prejudices, their faults and their virtues; he shared
their hardships as if he had been a common private, and, in turn,
he always made them partakers of his triumphs. They admired his
personal prowess with pistol and rifle, his unswerving loyalty to
his friends, and the relentless and unceasing war that he waged alike
on the foes of himself and his country. As a result they loved and
feared him as few generals have ever been loved or feared; they obeyed
him unhesitatingly; they followed his lead without flinching or murmuring,
and they ever made good on the field of battle the promise their
courage held out to his judgment.
It was noon of December 23d when General Keane, with nineteen hundred
men, halted and pitched his camp on the east bank of the Mississippi;
and in the evening enough additional troops arrived to swell his force
to over twenty-three hundred soldiers. [Footnote: James ("Military
Occurrences of the Late War," by Wm. James, London, 1818), vol. ii,
p. 362, says 2,050 rank and file; the English returns, as already
explained, unlike the French and American, never included officers,
sergeants, drummers, artillerymen, or engineers, but only "sabres and
bayonets" (Napier, iv, 252). At the end of Napier's fourth volume
is given the "morning state" of Wellington's forces on April 10, 1814.
This shows 56,030 rank and file and 7,431 officers, sergeants, and
trumpeters or drummers; or, in other words, to get at the real British
force in action, even supposing there are no artillerymen or engineers
present, 13 percent, must be added to the given number, which includes
only rank and file. Making this addition, Keane had 2,310 men. The
Americans greatly overestimated his force, Latour making it 4,980.]
Keane's encampment was in a long plain, rather thinly covered with
fields and farmhouses, about a mile in breadth, and bounded on one
side by the river, on the other by gloomy and impenetrable cypress
swamps; and there was no obstacle interposed between the British
camp and the city it menaced.
At two in the afternoon word was brought to Jackson that the foe had
reached the river bank, and without a moment's delay the old backwoods
fighter prepared to strike a rough first blow. At once, and as if
by magic, the city started from her state of rest into one of fierce
excitement and eager preparation. The alarm-guns were fired; in every
quarter the war-drums were beaten; while, amid the din and clamor,
all the regulars and marines, the best of the creole militia, and
the vanguard of the Tennesseeans, under Coffee,--forming a total of
a little more than two thousand men, [Footnote: General Jackson, in
his official letter, says only 1,500; but Latour. in a detailed
statement, makes it 2,024; exclusive of 107 Mississippi dragoons
who marched with the column, but being on horseback had to stay behind,
and took no part in the action. Keane thought he had been attacked
by 5,000 men.]--were assembled in great haste, and the gray of the
winter twilight saw them, with Old Hickory at their head, marching
steadily along the river bank toward the camp of their foes. Patterson,
meanwhile, in the schooner _Carolina_, dropped down with the current
to try the effect of a flank attack.
Meanwhile the British had spent the afternoon in leisurely arranging
their camp, in posting the pickets, and in foraging among the farm-houses.
There was no fear of attack, and as the day ended huge campfires were
lit, at which the hungry soldiers cooked their suppers undisturbed.
One division of the troops had bivouacked on the high levee that kept
the waters from flooding the land near by; and about half past seven
in the evening their attention was drawn to a large schooner which
had dropped noiselessly down, in the gathering dusk, and had come to
anchor a short distance offshore, the force of the stream swinging her
broadside to the camp. [Footnote: I have taken my account of the night
action chiefly from the work of an English soldier who took part in
it; Ensign (afterward Chaplain-General) H. R. Gleig's "Narrative of
the Campaigns of the British Army at Washington, Baltimore, and New
Orleans." (New edition, Philadelphia, 1821, pp. 286-300.) ] The soldiers
crowded down to the water's edge, and, as the schooner returned no
answer to their hails, a couple of musket-shots were fired at her.
As if in answer to this challenge, the men on shore heard plainly the
harsh voice of her commander, as he sung out, "Now then, give it to
them for the honor of America"; and at once a storm of grape hurtled
into their ranks. Wild confusion followed. The only field-pieces with
Keane were two light 3-pounders, not able to cope with the _Carolina's_
artillery; the rocket guns were brought up, but were speedily silenced;
musketry proved quite as ineffectual; and in a very few minutes the
troops were driven helter-skelter off the levee, and were forced to
shelter themselves behind it, not without having suffered severe loss.
[Footnote: General Keane, in his letter, writes that the British suffered
but a single casualty; Gleig, who was present, says (p. 288): "The
deadly shower of grape swept down numbers in the camp."] The night
was now as black as pitch; the embers of the deserted camp-fires,
beaten about and scattered by the schooner's shot, burned with a
dull red glow; and at short intervals the darkness was momentarily
lit up by the flashes of the _Carolina's_ guns. Crouched behind the
levee, the British soldiers lay motionless, listening in painful
silence to the pattering of the grape among the huts, and to the
moans and shrieks of the wounded who lay beside them. Things continued
thus till toward nine o'clock, when a straggling fire from the pickets
gave warning of the approach of a more formidable foe. The American
land-forces had reached the outer lines of the British camp, and the
increasing din of the musketry, with ringing through it the whip-like
crack of the Tennesseean rifles, called out the whole British army
to the shock of a desperate and uncertain strife. The young moon had
by this time struggled through the clouds, and cast on the battle-field
a dim, unearthly light that but partly relieved the intense darkness.
All order was speedily lost. Each officer, American or British, as fast
as he could gather a few soldiers round him, attacked the nearest
group of foes; the smoke and gloom would soon end the struggle, when,
if unhurt, he would rally what men he could and plunge once more into
the fight. The battle soon assumed the character of a multitude of
individual combats, dying out almost as soon as they began, because
of the difficulty of telling friend from foe, and beginning with
ever-increasing fury as soon as they had ended. The clatter of the
firearms, the clashing of steel, the rallying cries and loud commands
of the officers, the defiant shouts of the men, joined to the yells
and groans of those who fell, all combined to produce so terrible a
noise and tumult that it maddened the coolest brains. From one side
or the other bands of men would penetrate into the heart of the enemy's
lines, and would there be captured, or would cut their way out with
the prisoners they had taken. There was never a fairer field for the
fiercest personal prowess, for in the darkness the firearms were of
little service, and the fighting was hand to hand. Many a sword, till
then but a glittering toy, was that night crusted with blood. The
British soldiers and the American regulars made fierce play with
their bayonets, and the Tennesseeans, with their long hunting-knives.
Man to man, in the grimmest hate, they fought and died, some by bullet
and some by bayonet-thrust or stroke of sword. More than one in his
death agony slew the foe at whose hand he himself had received the
mortal wound; and their bodies stiffened as they lay, locked in the
death grip. Again the clouds came over the moon; a thick fog crept
up from the river, wrapping from sight the ghastly havoc of the
battlefield; and long before midnight the fighting stopped perforce,
for the fog and the smoke and the gloom were such that no one could
see a yard away. By degrees each side drew off. [Footnote: Keane
writes: "The enemy thought it prudent to retire, and did not again
dare to advance. It was now 12 o'clock, and the firing ceased on
both sides"; and Jackson: "We should have succeeded... in capturing
the enemy, had not a thick fog, which arose about (?) o'clock,
occasioned some confusion.... I contented myself with lying on the
field that night." Jackson certainly failed to capture the British;
but equally certainly damaged them so as to arrest their march till
he was in condition to meet and check them. ] In sullen silence
Jackson marched his men up the river, while the wearied British
returned to their camp. The former had lost over two hundred,
[Footnote: 24 killed, 115 wounded, 74 missing.] the latter nearly
three hundred [Footnote: 46 killed, 167 wounded, 64 missing. I take
the official return for each side, as authority for the respective
force and loss.] men; for the darkness and confusion that added to
the horror, lessened the slaughter of the battle.
Jackson drew back about three miles, where he halted and threw up
a long line of breastworks, reaching from the river to the morass;
he left a body of mounted riflemen to watch the British. All the
English troops reached the field on the day after the fight; but
the rough handling that the foremost had received made them cautious
about advancing. Moreover, the left division was kept behind the
levee all day by the _Carolina_, which opened upon them whenever
they tried to get away; nor was it till dark that they made their
escape out of range of her cannon. Christmas-day opened drearily
enough for the invaders. Although they were well inland, the schooner,
by greatly elevating her guns, could sometimes reach them, and she
annoyed them all through the day [Footnote: "While sitting at table,
a loud shriek was heard.... A shot had taken effect on the body of
an unfortunate soldier... who was fairly cut in two at the lower
portion of the belly!" (Gleig, p. 306.) ]; and as the Americans had
cut the levee in their front, it at one time seemed likely that they
would be drowned out. However, matters now took a turn for the better.
The river was so low that the cutting of the levee instead of flooding
the plain [Footnote: Latour, 113.] merely filled the shrunken bayous,
and rendered it easy for the British to bring up their heavy guns;
and on the same day their trusted leader, Sir Edward Packenham, arrived
to take command in person, and his presence gave new life to the
whole army. A battery was thrown up during the two succeeding nights
on the brink of the river opposite to where the _Carolina_ lay; and
at dawn a heavy cannonade of red-hot shot and shell was opened upon
her from eleven guns and a mortar. [Footnote: Gleig, 307. The Americans
thought the battery consisted of 5 18- and 12-pounders; Gleig says 9
field-pieces (9--and 6-pounders), 2 howitzers, and a mortar.] She
responded briskly, but very soon caught fire and blew up, to the
vengeful joy of the troops whose bane she had been for the past few
days. Her destruction removed the last obstacle to the immediate
advance of the army; but that night her place was partly taken
by the mounted riflemen, who rode down to the British lines, shot
the sentries, engaged the out-posts, and kept the whole camp in a
constant state of alarm. [Footnote: Gleig, 310.] In the morning Sir
Edward Packenham put his army in motion, and marched on New Orleans.
When he had gone nearly three miles he suddenly, and to his great
surprise, stumbled on the American army. Jackson's men had worked
like beavers, and his breastworks were already defended by over three
thousand fighting men, [Footnote: 3,282 men in all, according to
the Adjutant-General's return for Dec. 28, 1814.] and by half a dozen
guns, and moreover were flanked by the corvette _Louisiana_, anchored
in the stream. No sooner had the heads of the British columns appeared
than they were driven back by the fire of the American batteries;
the field-pieces, mortars, and rocket guns were then brought up,
and a sharp artillery duel took place. The motley crew of the
_Louisiana_ handled their long ship guns with particular effect;
the British rockets proved of but little service [Footnote: Latour,
121.]; and after a stiff fight, in which they had two field-pieces
and a light mortar dismounted, [Footnote: Gleig, 314. The official
returns show a loss of 18 Americans and 58 British, the latter suffering
much less than Jackson supposed. Lossing, in his "Field Book of the
War of 1812," not only greatly overestimates the British loss, but
speaks as if this was a serious attack, which it was not. Packenham's
army, while marching, unexpectedly came upon the American intrenchment,
and recoiled at once, after seeing that his field-pieces were unable
to contend with the American artillery.] the British artillerymen
fell back on the infantry. Then Packenham drew off his whole army
out of cannon shot, and pitched his camp facing the intrenched lines
of the Americans. For the next three days the British battalions
lay quietly in front of their foe, like wolves who have brought to
bay a gray boar, and crouch just out of reach of his tusks, waiting
a chance to close in.
Packenham, having once tried the strength of Jackson's position,
made up his mind to breach his works and silence his guns with a
regular battering train. Heavy cannon were brought up from the ships,
and a battery was established on the bank to keep in check the
_Louisiana_. Then, on the night of the last day of the year, strong
parties of workmen were sent forward, who, shielded by the darkness,
speedily threw up stout earthworks, and mounted therein fourteen
heavy guns, [Footnote: 10 long 18s and 4 24-pound carronades (James,
ii, 368). Gleig says (p. 318), "6 batteries, mounting 30 pieces of
heavy cannon." This must include the "brigade of field-pieces" of
which James speaks. 9 of these, 9--and 6-pounders, and 2 howitzers,
had been used in the attack on the _Carolina_; and there were also
2 field-mortars and 2 3-pounders present; and there must have been
1 other field-piece with the army, to make up the 30 of which Gleig
speaks.] to face the thirteen [Footnote: viz.: 1 long 32, 3 long 24s,
1 long 18, 3 long 12s, 3 long 6s, a 6-inch howitzer, and a small
carronade (Latour, 147); and on the same day Patterson had in his
water-battery 1 long 24 and 2 long 12s (see his letter of Jan. 2d),
making a total of 16 American guns.] mounted in Jackson's lines,
which were but three hundred yards distant.
New Year's day dawned very misty. As soon as the haze cleared off
the British artillerymen opened with a perfect hail of balls,
accompanied by a cloud of rockets and mortar shells. The Americans
were taken by surprise, but promptly returned the fire, with equal
fury and greater skill. Their guns were admirably handled; some by
the cool New England seamen lately forming the crew of the _Carolina_,
others by the fierce creole privateersmen of Lafitte, and still others
by trained artillerymen of the regular army. They were all old hands,
who in their time had done their fair share of fighting, and were
not to be flurried by any attack, however unexpected. The British
cannoneers plied their guns like fiends, and fast and thick fell their
shot; more slowly but with surer aim, their opponents answered them.
[Footnote: The British historian, Alison, says ("History of Europe,"
by Sir Archibald Alison, 9th edition, Edinburgh and London, 1852, vol.
xii. p. 141): "It was soon found that the enemy's guns were so superior
in weight and number, that nothing was to be expected from that species
of attack." As shown above, at this time Jackson had on both sides of
the river 16 guns; the British, according to both James and Gleig,
between 20 and 30. Jackson's long guns were 1 32, 4 24s, 1 18, 5 12s,
and 3 6s, throwing in all 224 pounds; Packenham had 10 long 18s. 2
long 3s, and from 6 to 10 long 9s and 6s, thus throwing between 228
and 258 pounds of shot; while Jackson had but 1 howitzer and 1 carronade
to oppose 4 carronades, 2 howitzers, 2 mortars, and a dozen rocket guns;
so in both number and weight of guns the British were greatly superior.]
The cotton bales used in the American embrasures caught fire, and blew
up two powder caissons; while the sugar hogsheads of which the British
batteries were partly composed were speedily shattered and splintered
in all directions. Though the British champions fought with unflagging
courage and untiring energy, and though they had long been versed
in war, yet they seemed to lack the judgment to see and correct their
faults, and most of their shot went too high. [Footnote: In strong
contrast to Alison, Admiral Codrington, an eye-witness, states the
true reason of the British failure: ("Memoir of Admiral Sir Edward
Codrington," by Lady Bourchier, London, 1873, vol. i, p. 334.) "On
the 1st we had our batteries ready, by severe labor, in situation,
from which the artillery people were, as a matter of course, to destroy
and silence the opposing batteries, and give opportunity for a
well-arranged storm. But, instead, not a gun of the enemy appeared
to suffer, and our own firing too high was not discovered till" too
late. "Such a failure in this boasted arm was not to be expected,
and I think it a blot on the artillery escutcheon."] On the other
hand, the old sea-dogs and trained regulars who held the field against
them, not only fought their guns well and skilfully from the beginning,
but all through the action kept coolly correcting their faults and
making more sure their aim. Still, the fight was stiff and well
contested. Two of the American guns were disabled and 34 of their
men were killed or wounded. But one by one the British cannon were
silenced or dismounted, and by noon their gunners had all been driven
away, with the loss of 78 of their number.
The _Louisiana_ herself took no part in this action. Patterson had
previously landed some of her guns on the opposite bank of the river,
placing them in a small redoubt. To match these the British also
threw up some works and placed in them heavy guns, and all through
New Year's day a brisk cannonade was kept up across the river between
the two water-batteries, but with very little damage to either side.
For a week after this failure the army of the invaders lay motionless
facing the Americans. In the morning and evening the defiant, rolling
challenge of the English drums came throbbing up through the gloomy
cypress swamps to where the grim riflemen of Tennessee were lying
behind their log breastworks, and both day and night the stillness
was at short intervals broken by the sullen boom of the great guns
which, under Jackson's orders, kept up a never-ending fire on the
leaguering camp of his foes. [Footnote: Gleig, 322.] Nor could the
wearied British even sleep undisturbed; all through the hours of
darkness the outposts were engaged in a most harassing bush warfare
by the backwoodsmen, who shot the sentries, drove in the pickets,
and allowed none of those who were on guard a moment's safety or
freedom from alarm. [Footnote: Gleig, 323.]
But Packenham was all the while steadily preparing for his last and
greatest stroke. He had determined to make an assault in force as
soon as the expected reinforcements came up; nor, in the light of
his past experience in conflict with foes of far greater military
repute than those now before him, was this a rash resolve. He had
seen the greatest of Napoleon's marshals, each in turn, defeated
once and again, and driven in headlong flight over the Pyrenees by
the Duke of Wellington; now he had under him the flower of the troops
who had won those victories; was it to be supposed for a moment that
such soldiers [Footnote: Speaking of Soult's overthrow a few months
previous to this battle, Napier says (v, 209): "He was opposed to
one of the greatest generals of the world, at the head of unconquerable
troops. For what Alexander's Macedonians were at Arbela, Hannibal's
Africans at Cannae, Caesar's Romans at Pharsalia, Napoleon's Guards
at Austerlitz--such were Wellington's British soldiers at this
period.... Six years of uninterrupted success had engrafted on their
natural strength and fierceness a confidence that made them invincible."]
who, in a dozen battles, had conquered the armies and captured the
forts of the mighty French emperor, would shrink at last from a mud
wall guarded by rough backwoodsmen? That there would be loss of life
in such an assault was certain; but was loss of life to daunt men
who had seen the horrible slaughter through which the stormers moved
on to victory at Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Sebastian? At the
battle of Toulouse an English army, of which Packenham's troops then
formed part, had driven Soult from a stronger position than was now
to be assailed, though he held it with a veteran infantry. Of a surety,
the dashing general who had delivered the decisive blow on the stricken
field of Salamanca, [Footnote: It was about 5 o'clock when Packenham
fell upon Thomieres.... From the chief to the lowest soldier, all
[of the French] felt that they were lost, and in an instant Packenham,
the most frank and gallant of men, commenced the battle. The British
columns formed lines as they marched, and the French gunners, standing
up manfully for the honor of their country, sent showers of grape
into the advancing masses, while a crowd of light troops poured in
a fire of musketry, under cover of which the main body endeavored
to display a front. But, bearing onwards through the skirmishers
with the might of a giant, Packenham broke the half-formed lines
into fragments, and sent the whole in confusion upon the advancing
supports... Packenham, bearing onwards with conquering violence,...
formed one formidable line two miles in advance of where Packenham
had first attacked; and that impetuous officer, with unmitigated
strength, still pressed forward, spreading terror and disorder on
the enemy's left. (Napier, iv, 57, 58. 59.)] who had taken part in
the rout of the ablest generals and steadiest soldiers of Continental
Europe, was not the man to flinch from a motley array of volunteers,
militia, and raw regulars, led by a grizzled old bush-fighter, whose
name had never been heard of outside of his own swamps, and there
only as the savage destroyer of some scarcely more savage Indian
tribes. Moreover, Packenham was planning a flank attack. Under his
orders a canal was being dug from the head of the bayou up which
the British had come, across the plain to the Mississippi. This was
to permit the passage of a number of ships' boats, on which one
division was to be ferried to the opposite bank of the river, where
it was to move up, and, by capturing the breastworks and water-battery
on the west side, flank Jackson's main position on the east side.
[Footnote: "A particular feature in the assault was our cutting a
canal into the Mississippi... to convey a force to the right bank,
which... might surprise the enemy's batteries on that side. I do
not know how far this measure was relied on by the general, but,
as he ordered and made his assault at daylight, I imagine he did
not place much dependence upon it." (Codrington, i, 335.) ] When
this canal was nearly finished the expected reinforcements, two
thousand strong, under General Lambert, arrived, and by the evening
of the 7th all was ready for the attack, which was to be made at
daybreak on the following morning. Packenham had under him nearly
10,000 [Footnote: James (ii, 373) says the British "rank and file"
amounted to 8,153 men, including 1,200 seamen and marines. The only
other place where he speaks of the latter is in recounting the attack
on the right bank, when he says "about 200" were with Thornton, while
both the admirals, Cochrane and Codrington, make the number 300; so
he probably underestimates their number throughout, and at least 300
can be added, making 1,500 sailors and marines, and a total of 8,453.
This number is corroborated by Major McDougal. the officer who received
Sir Edward's body in his arms when was killed; he says (as quoted
in the "Memoirs of British Generals Distinguished During the Peninsular
War," by John William Cole, London. 1856, vol. ii, p. 364) that after
the battle and the loss of 2,036 men, "we had still an effective
force of 6,400," making a total before the attack of 8,436 rank and
file. Calling it 8,450, and adding (see ante, note 10) 13.3 per cent,
for the officers, sergeants, and trumpeters, we get about 9,600 men.]
fighting men; 1,500 of these, under Colonel Thornton were to cross
the river and make the attack on the west bank. Packenham himself
was to superintend the main assault, on the east bank, which was to
be made by the British right under General Gibbs, while the left
moved forward under General Keane, and General Lambert commanded
the reserve.[Footnote: Letter of Major-General John Lambert to Earl
Bathurst, Jan. 10, 1815.] Jackson's [Footnote: 4,698 on the east bank,
according to the official report of Adjutant-General Robert Butler,
for the morning of January 8th. The details are as follow:
At batteries..................................................... 154
Command of Col. Ross (671 regulars and 742 Louisiana militia)... 1413
Command of General Carroll (Tennesseeans, and somewhat under 500
Kentuckians).................................................... 1562
General Coffee's command (Tennesseeans, and about 250 Louisiana
militia)........................................................ 813
Major Hind's dragoons........................................... 230
Col. Slaughter's command........................................ 526
_____
Total, 4,698
These figures tally almost exactly with those given by Major Latour,
except that he omits all reference to Col. Slaughter's command, thus
reducing the number to about 4,100. Nor can I anywhere find any allusion
to Slaughter's command as taking part in the battle; and it is possible
that these troops were the 500 Kentuckians ordered across the river
by Jackson; in which case his whole force but slightly exceeded 5,000 men.
On the west bank there were 546 Louisiana militia--260 of the First
regiment, 176 of the Second, and 110 of the Sixth. Jackson had ordered
500 Kentucky troops to be sent to reinforce them; only 400 started,
of whom but 180 had arms. Seventy more received arms from the Naval
Arsenal; and thus a total of 250 armed men were added to the 546
already on the west bank.] position was held by a total of 5,500 men.
[Footnote: Two thousand Kentucky militia had arrived, but in wretched
plight; only 500 had arms, though pieces were found for about 250 more;
and thus Jackson's army received an addition of 750 very badly
disciplined soldiers.
"Hardly one third of the Kentucky troops, so long expected, are armed,
and the arms they have are not fit for use." (Letter of Gen. Jackson
to the Secretary of War, Jan. 3d.) Having kept a constant watch on
the British, Jackson had rightly concluded that they would make the
main attack on the east bank, and had, accordingly, kept the bulk of
his force on that side. His works consisted simply of a mud breastwork,
with a ditch in front of it, which stretched in a straight line from
the river on his right across the plain, and some distance into the
morass that sheltered his left. There was a small, unfinished redoubt
in front of the breastworks on the river bank. Thirteen pieces of
artillery were mounted on the works. [Footnote: Almost all British
writers underestimate their own force and enormously magnify that
of the Americans. Alison, for example, quadruples Jackson's _relative_
strength, writing: "About 6,000 combatants were on the British side;
a slender force to attack double their number, intrenched to the
teeth in works bristling with bayonets and loaded with heavy artillery."
Instead of double, he should have said half; the bayonets only
"bristled" metaphorically, as less than a quarter of the Americans
were armed with them; and the British breaching batteries had a heavier
"load" of artillery than did the American lines. Gleig says that "to
come nearer the truth" he "will choose a middle course, and suppose
their whole force to be about 25,000 men," (p. 325). Gleig, by the
way, in speaking of the battle itself, mentions one most startling
evolution of the Americans, namely, that "without so much as lifting
their faces above the ramparts, they swung their firelocks by one
arm over the wall and discharged them" at the British. If any one
will try to perform this feat, with a long, heavy rifle held in one
hand, and with his head hid behind a wall, so as not to see the object
aimed at, he will get a good idea of the likelihood of any man in
his senses attempting it.] On the right was posted the Seventh regular
infantry, 430 strong; then came 740 Louisiana militia (both French
Creoles and men of color, and comprising 30 New Orleans riflemen,
who were Americans), and 240 regulars of the Forty-fourth regiment;
while the rest of the line was formed by nearly 500 Kentuckians and
over 1,600 Tennesseeans, under Carroll and Coffee, with 250 creole
militia in the morass on the extreme left, to guard the head of a
bayou. In the rear were 230 dragoons, chiefly from Mississippi, and
some other troops in reserve; making in all 4,700 men on the east
bank. The works on the west bank were farther down stream, and were
very much weaker. Commodore Patterson had thrown up a water-battery
of nine guns, three long 24's and six long 12's, pointing across
the river, and intended to take in flank any foe attacking Jackson.
This battery was protected by some strong earthworks, mounting three
field-pieces, which were thrown up just below it, and stretched from
the river about 200 yards into the plain. The line of defence was
extended by a ditch for about a quarter of a mile farther, when it
ended, and from there to the morass, half a mile distant, there were
no defensive works at all. General Morgan, a very poor militia officer,
[Footnote: He committed every possible fault, except showing lack of
courage. He placed his works at a very broad instead of a narrow part
of the plain, against the advice of Latour, who had Jackson's approval
(Latour, 167). He continued his earthworks but a very short distance
inland, making them exceedingly strong in front, and absolutely
defenceless on account of their flanks being unprotected. He did not
mount the lighter guns of the water-battery on his lines, as he ought
to have done. Having a force of 800 men, too weak anyhow, he promptly
divided it; and, finally, in the fight itself, he stationed a small
number of absolutely raw troops in a thin line on the open, with
their flank in the air; while a much larger number of older troops
were kept to defend a much shorter line, behind a strong breastwork,
with their flanks covered.] was in command, with a force of 550
Louisiana militia, some of them poorly armed; and on the night before
the engagement he was reinforced by 250 Kentuckians, poorly armed,
undisciplined, and worn out with fatigue. [Footnote: Latour, 170.]
All through the night of the 7th a strange, murmurous clangor arose
from the British camp, and was borne on the moist air to the lines
of their slumbering foes. The blows of pickaxe and spade as the ground
was thrown up into batteries by gangs of workmen, the rumble of the
artillery as it was placed in position, the measured tread of the
battalions as they shifted their places or marched off under
Thornton,--all these and the thousand other sounds of warlike
preparation were softened and blended by the distance into one
continuous humming murmur, which struck on the ears of the American
sentries with ominous foreboding for the morrow. By midnight Jackson
had risen and was getting every thing in readiness to hurl back the
blow that he rightly judged was soon to fall on his front. Before
the dawn broke his soldiery was all on the alert. The bronzed and
brawny seamen were grouped in clusters around the great guns. The
creole soldiers came of a race whose habit it has ever been to take
all phases of life joyously; but that morning their gayety was tempered
by a dark undercurrent of fierce anxiety. They had more at stake
than any other men on the field. They were fighting for their homes;
they were fighting for their wives and their daughters. They well
knew that the men they were to face were very brave in battle and
very cruel in victory [Footnote: To prove this, it is only needful
to quote from the words of the Duke of Wellington himself; referring,
it must be remembered, to their conduct in a friendly, not a hostile
country. "It is impossible to describe to you the irregularities and
outrages committed by the troops. They are never out of sight of their
officers, I might almost say, out of sight of the commanding officers
of the regiments that outrages are not committed... There is not an
outrage of any description which has not been committed on a people
who have uniformly received them as friends." "I really believe that
more plunder and outrages have been committed by this army than by
any other that ever was in the field." "A detachment seldom marches...
that a murder, or a highway robbery, or some act of outrage is not
committed by the British soldiers composing it. They have killed
eight people since the army returned to Portugal." "They really forget
every thing when plunder or wine is within reach."]; they well knew
the fell destruction and nameless woe that awaited their city should
the English take it at the sword's point. They feared not for themselves;
but in the hearts of the bravest and most careless there lurked a
dull terror of what that day might bring upon those they loved.
[Footnote: That these fears were just can be seen by the following
quotations, from the works of a British officer, General Napier,
who was an eye-witness of what he describes. It must be remembered
that Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajos, and San Sebastian were friendly towns,
only the garrisons being hostile. "Now commenced that wild and
desperate wickedness which tarnished the lustre of the soldiers'
heroism. All, indeed, were not alike, for hundreds risked and many
lost their lives in striving to stop the violence; but the madness
generally prevailed, and as the worst men were leaders here, all
the dreadful passions of human nature were displayed. Shameless
rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust, cruelty and murder,
shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans, shouts, imprecations, the
hissing of fires bursting from the houses, the crashing of doors and
windows, the reports of muskets used in violence, resounded for two
days and nights in the streets of Badajos. On the third, when the
city was sacked, when the soldiers were exhausted by their own
excesses, the tumult rather subsided than was quelled." (Vol. iii,
377). And again: "This storm seemed to be a signal from hell for
the perpetration of villainy which would have shamed the most ferocious
barbarians of antiquity. At Rodrigo intoxication and plunder had
been the principal object; at Badajos lust and murder were joined
to rapine and drunkenness; but at San Sebastian the direst, the most
revolting cruelty was added to the catalogue of crimes--one atrocity,
of which a girl of seventeen was the victim, staggers the mind by
its enormous, incredible, indescribable barbarity... a Portuguese
adjutant, who endeavored to prevent some wickedness, was put to death
in the market-place, not with sudden violence from a single ruffian,
but deliberately, by a number of English soldiers.... and the disorder
continued until the flames, following the steps of the plunderer,
put an end to his ferocity by destroying the whole town." Packenham
himself would have certainly done all in his power to prevent excesses,
and has been foully slandered by many early American writers. Alluding
to these, Napier remarks, somewhat caustically: "Pre-eminently
distinguished for detestion of inhumanity and outrage, he has been,
with astounding falsehood, represented as instigating his troops to
the most infamous excesses; but from a people holding millions of
their fellow-beings in the most horrible slavery, while they prate
and vaunt of liberty until all men turn in loathing from the sickening
folly, what can be expected?" (Vol. v, p. 31.) Napier possessed to
a very eminent degree the virtue of being plain-spoken. Elsewhere
(iii, 450), after giving a most admirably fair and just account of
the origin of the Anglo-American war, he alludes, with a good deal
of justice, to the Americans of 1812, as "a people who (notwithstanding
the curse of black slavery which clings to them, adding the most
horrible ferocity to the peculiar baseness of their mercantile spirit,
and rendering their republican vanity ridiculous) do, in their general
government, uphold civil institutions which have startled the crazy
despotisms of Europe."] The Tennesseeans were troubled by no such
misgivings. In saturnine, confident silence they lolled behind their
mud walls, or, leaning on their long rifles, peered out into the
gray fog with savage, reckless eyes. So, hour after hour, the two
armies stood facing each other in the darkness, waiting for the light
of day.
At last the sun rose, and as its beams struggled through the morning
mist they glinted on the sharp steel bayonets of the English, where
their scarlet ranks were drawn up in battle array, but four hundred
yards from the American breastworks. There stood the matchless infantry
of the island king, in the pride of their strength and the splendor
of their martial glory; and as the haze cleared away they moved
forward, in stern silence, broken only by the angry, snarling notes
of the brazen bugles. At once the American artillery leaped into
furious life; and, ready and quick, the more numerous cannon of the
invaders responded from their hot, feverish lips. Unshaken amid
the tumult of that iron storm the heavy red column moved steadily
on toward the left of the American line, where the Tennesseeans
were standing in motionless, grim expectancy. Three fourths of the
open space was crossed, and the eager soldiers broke into a run.
Then a fire of hell smote the British column. From the breastwork
in front of them the white smoke curled thick into the air, as rank
after rank the wild marksmen of the backwoods rose and fired, aiming
low and sure. As stubble is withered by flame, so withered the British
column under that deadly fire; and, aghast at the slaughter, the
reeling files staggered and gave back. Packenham, fit captain for
his valorous host, rode to the front, and the troops, rallying round
him, sprang forward with ringing cheers. But once again the pealing
rifle-blast beat in their faces; and the life of their dauntless
leader went out before its scorching and fiery breath. With him
fell the other general who was with the column, and all of the men
who were leading it on; and, as a last resource, Keane brought up
his stalwart Highlanders; but in vain the stubborn mountaineers rushed
on, only to die as their comrades had died before them, with
unconquerable courage, facing the foe, to the last. Keane himself
was struck down; and the shattered wrecks of the British column,
quailing before certain destruction, turned and sought refuge beyond
reach of the leaden death that overwhelmed their comrades. Nor did
it fare better with the weaker force that was to assail the right
of the American line. This was led by the dashing Colonel Rennie,
who, when the confusion caused by the main attack was at its height,
rushed forward with impetuous bravery along the river bank. With
such headlong fury did he make the assault, that the rush of his
troops took the outlying redoubt, whose defenders, regulars and
artillerymen, fought to the last with their bayonets and clubbed
muskets, and were butchered to a man. Without delay Rennie flung
his men at the breastworks behind, and, gallantly leading them,
sword in hand, he, and all around him, fell, riddled through and
through by the balls of the riflemen. Brave though they were, the
British soldiers could not stand against the singing, leaden hail,
for if they stood it was but to die. So in rout and wild dismay they
fled back along the river bank, to the main army. For some time
afterward the British artillery kept up its fire, but was gradually
silenced; the repulse was entire and complete along the whole line;
nor did the cheering news of success brought from the west bank give
any hope to the British commanders, stunned by their crushing overthrow.
[Footnote: According to their official returns the British loss was
2,036; the American accounts, of course, make it much greater. Latour
is the only trustworthy American contemporary historian of this war,
and even he at times absurdly exaggerates the British force and loss.
Most of the other American "histories" of that period were the most
preposterously bombastic works that ever saw print. But as regards
this battle, none of them are as bad as even such British historians
as Alison; the exact reverse being the case in many other battles,
notably Lake Erie. The devices each author adopts to lessen the
seeming force of his side are generally of much the same character.
For instance, Latour says that 800 of Jackson's men were employed
on works at the rear, on guard duty, etc., and deducts them; James,
for precisely similar reasons, deducts 853 men: by such means one
reduces Jackson's total force to 4,000, and the other gives Packenham
but 7,300. Only 2,000 Americans were actually engaged on the east banks.]
Meanwhile Colonel Thornton's attack on the opposite side had been
successful, but had been delayed beyond the originally intended hour.
The sides of the canal by which the boats were to be brought through
to the Mississippi caved in, and choked the passage, [Footnote:
Codrington, i, 386.] so that only enough got through to take over
a half of Thornton's force. With these, seven hundred in number,
[Footnote: James says 298 soldiers and about 200 sailors; but Admiral
Cochrane in his letter (Jan. 18th) says 600 men, half sailors; and
Admiral Codrington also (p. 335) gives this number, 300 being
sailors: adding 13 1/3 per cent. for the officers, sergeants, and
trumpeters, we get 680 men.] he crossed, but as he did not allow
for the current, it carried him down about two miles below the proper
landing-place. Meanwhile General Morgan, having under him eight
hundred militia [Footnote: 796. (Latour, 164-172.)] whom it was of
the utmost importance to have kept together, promptly divided them
and sent three hundred of the rawest and most poorly armed down to
meet the enemy in the open. The inevitable result was their immediate
rout and dispersion; about one hundred got back to Morgan's lines.
He then had six hundred men, all militia, to oppose to seven hundred
regulars. So he stationed the four hundred best disciplined men to
defend the two hundred yards of strong breastworks, mounting three
guns, which covered his left; while the two hundred worst disciplined
were placed to guard six hundred yards of open ground on his right,
with their flank resting in air, and entirely unprotected. [Footnote:
Report of Court of Inquiry, Maj.-Gen. Wm. Carroll presiding.] This
truly phenomenal arrangement ensured beforehand the certain defeat
of his troops, no matter how well they fought; but, as it turned
out, they hardly fought at all. Thornton, pushing up the river, first
attacked the breastwork in front, but was checked by a hot fire;
deploying his men he then sent a strong force to march round and
take Morgan on his exposed right flank. [Footnote: Letter of Col.
W. Thornton, Jan. 8. 1815.] There, the already demoralized Kentucky
militia, extended in thin order across an open space, outnumbered,
and taken in flank by regular troops, were stampeded at once, and
after firing a single volley they took to their heels. [Footnote:
Letter of Commodore Patterson, Jan. 13, 1815.] This exposed the flank
of the better disciplined creoles, who were also put to flight; but
they kept some order and were soon rallied. [Footnote: Alison outdoes
himself in recounting this feat. Having reduced the British force
to 340 men, he says they captured the redoubt, "though defended by
22 guns and 1,700 men." Of course, it was physically impossible
for the water-battery to take part in the defence; so there were
but 3 guns, and by halving the force on one side and trebling it
on the other, he makes the relative strength of the Americans just
sixfold what it was,--and is faithfully followed by other British
writers.] In bitter rage Patterson spiked the guns of his water-battery
and marched off with his sailors, unmolested. The American loss had
been slight, and that of their opponents not heavy, though among
their dangerously wounded was Colonel Thornton.
This success, though a brilliant one, and a disgrace to the American
arms, had no effect on the battle. Jackson at once sent over
reinforcements under the famous French general, Humbert, and
preparations were forthwith made to retake the lost position. But
it was already abandoned, and the force that had captured it had
been recalled by Lambert, when he found that the place could not
be held without additional troops.[Footnote: The British Col. Dickson,
who had been sent over to inspect, reported that 2,000 men would be
needed to hold the battery; so Lambert ordered the British to retire.
(Lambert's letter, Jan. 10th.)] The total British loss on both sides
of the river amounted to over two thousand men, the vast majority
of whom had fallen in the attack on the Tennesseeans, and most of
the remainder in the attack made by Colonel Rennie. The Americans
had lost but seventy men, of whom but thirteen fell in the main
attack. On the east bank, neither the creole militia nor the
Forty-fourth regiment had taken any part in the combat.
The English had thrown for high stakes and had lost every thing,
and they knew it. There was nothing to hope for left. Nearly a
fourth of their fighting men had fallen; and among the officers the
proportion was far larger. Of their four generals, Packenham was
dead, Gibbs dying, Keane disabled, and only Lambert left. Their
leader, the ablest officers, and all the flower of their bravest
men were lying, stark and dead, on the bloody plain before them;
and their bodies were doomed to crumble into mouldering dust on the
green fields where they had fought and had fallen. It was useless
to make another trial. They had learned to their bitter cost, that
no troops, however steady, could advance over open ground against
such a fire as came from Jackson's lines. Their artillerymen had
three times tried conclusions with the American gunners, and each
time they had been forced to acknowledge themselves worsted. They
would never have another chance to repeat their flank attack, for
Jackson had greatly strengthened and enlarged the works on the west
bank, and had seen that they were fully manned and ably commanded.
Moreover, no sooner had the assault failed, than the Americans
again began their old harassing warfare. The heaviest cannon, both
from the breastwork and the water-battery, played on the British
camp, both night and day, giving the army no rest, and the mounted
riflemen kept up a trifling, but incessant and annoying, skirmishing
with their pickets and outposts.
The British could not advance, and it was worse than useless for
them to stay where they were, for though they, from time to time,
were reinforced, yet Jackson's forces augmented faster than theirs,
and every day lessened the numerical inequality between the two
armies. There was but one thing left to do, and that was to retreat.
They had no fear of being attacked in turn. The British soldiers were
made of too good stuff to be in the least cowed or cast down even
by such a slaughtering defeat as that they had just suffered, and
nothing would have given them keener pleasure than to have had
a fair chance at their adversaries in the open; but this chance was
just what Jackson had no idea of giving them. His own army, though
in part as good as an army could be, consisted also in part of
untrained militia, while not a quarter of his men had bayonets; and
the wary old chief, for all his hardihood, had far too much wit to
hazard such a force in fight with a superior number of seasoned
veterans, thoroughly equipped, unless on his own ground and in his
own manner. So he contented himself with keeping a sharp watch on
Lambert; and on the night of January 18th the latter deserted his
position, and made a very skilful and rapid retreat, leaving eighty
wounded men and fourteen pieces of cannon behind him. [Footnote:
Letter of General Jackson, Jan. 19th, and of General Lambert, Jan.
28th.] A few stragglers were captured on land, and, while the troops
were embarking, a number of barges, with over a hundred prisoners,
were cut out by some American seamen in row-boats; but the bulk of
the army reached the transports unmolested. At the same time, a
squadron of vessels, which had been unsuccessfully bombarding Fort
Saint Philip for a week or two, and had been finally driven off when
the fort got a mortar large enough to reach them with, also returned;
and the whole fleet set sail for Mobile. The object was to capture
Fort Bowyer, which contained less than four hundred men, and, though
formidable on its sea-front, [Footnote: "Towards the sea its
fortifications are respectable enough; but on the land side it is
little better than a block-house. The ramparts being composed of
sand not more than three feet in thickness, and faced with plank,
are barely cannon-proof; while a sand hill, rising within pistol-shot
of the ditch, completely commands it. Within, again, it is as much
wanting in accommodation as it is in strength. There are no bomb-proof
barracks, nor any hole or arch under which men might find protection
from shells; indeed, so deficient is it in common-lodging rooms,
that great part of the garrison sleep in tents ... With the reduction
of this trifling work all hostilities ended." (Gleig, 357.)
General Jackson impliedly censures the garrison for surrendering so
quickly; but in such a fort it was absolutely impossible to act
otherwise, and not the slightest stain rests upon the fort's defenders.]
was incapable of defence when regularly attacked on its land side.
The British landed, February 8th, some 1,500 men, broke ground, and
made approaches; for four days the work went on amid a continual
fire, which killed or wounded 11 Americans and 31 British; by that
time the battering guns were in position and the fort capitulated,
February 12th, the garrison marching out with the honors of war.
Immediately afterward the news of peace arrived and all hostilities
terminated.
In spite of the last trifling success, the campaign had been to the
British both bloody and disastrous. It did not affect the results
of the war; and the decisive battle itself was a perfectly useless
shedding of blood, for peace had been declared before it was fought.
Nevertheless, it was not only glorious but profitable to the United
States. Louisiana was saved from being severely ravaged, and New
Orleans from possible destruction; and after our humiliating defeats
in trying to repel the invasions of Virginia and Maryland, the
signal victory of New Orleans was really almost a necessity for the
preservation of the national honor. This campaign was the great
event of the war, and in it was fought the most important battle as
regards numbers that took place during the entire struggle; and the
fact that we were victorious, not only saved our self-respect at home,
but also gave us prestige abroad which we should otherwise have
totally lacked. It could not be said to entirely balance the numerous
defeats that we had elsewhere suffered on land--defeats which had so
far only been offset by Harrison's victory in 1813 and the campaign
in Lower Canada in 1814--but it at any rate went a long way
toward making the score even.
Jackson is certainly by all odds the most prominent figure that
appeared during this war, and stands head and shoulders above any
other commander, American or British, that it produced. It will be
difficult, in all history, to show a parallel to the feat that he
performed. In three weeks' fighting, with a force largely composed
of militia, he utterly defeated and drove away an army twice the
size of his own, composed of veteran troops, and led by one of the
ablest of European generals. During the whole campaign he only erred
once, and that was in putting General Morgan, a very incompetent
officer, in command of the forces on the west bank. He suited his
movements admirably to the various exigencies that arose. The
promptness and skill with which he attacked, as soon as he knew
of the near approach of the British, undoubtedly saved the city;
for their vanguard was so roughly handled that, instead of being
able to advance at once, they were forced to delay three days, during
which time Jackson entrenched himself in a position from which he
was never driven. But after this attack the offensive would have
been not only hazardous, but useless, and accordingly Jackson,
adopting the mode of warfare which best suited the ground he was
on and the troops he had under him, forced the enemy always to fight
him where he was strongest, and confined himself strictly to the
pure defensive--a system condemned by most European authorities,
[Footnote: Thus Napier says (vol. v, p. 25): "Soult fared as most
generals will who seek by extensive lines to supply the want of
numbers or of hardiness in the troops. Against rude commanders and
undisciplined soldiers, lines may avail; seldom against accomplished
commanders, never when the assailants are the better soldiers." And
again (p. 150), "Offensive operations must be the basis of a good
defensive system."] but which has at times succeeded to admiration
in America, as witness Fredericksburg, Gettysburg, Kenesaw Mountain,
and Franklin. Moreover, it must be remembered that Jackson's success
was in no wise owing either to chance or to the errors of his
adversary. [Footnote: The reverse has been stated again and again
with very great injustice, not only by British, but even by American
writers (as e.g., Prof. W. G. Sumner, in his "Andrew Jackson as a
Public Man," Boston, 1882). The climax of absurdity is reached by
Major McDougal, who says (as quoted by Cole in his "Memoirs of
British Generals," ii, p. 364): "Sir Edward Packenham fell, not
after an utter and disastrous defeat, but at the very moment when
the arms of victory were extended towards him"; and by James, who
says (ii, 388): "The premature fall of a British general saved an
American city." These assertions are just on a par with those made
by American writers, that only the fall of Lawrence prevented the
_Chesapeake_ from capturing the _Shannon_.
British writers have always attributed the defeat largely to the
fact that the 44th regiment, which was to have led the attack with
fascines and ladders, did not act well. I doubt if this had any
effect on the result. Some few of the men with ladders did reach
the ditch, but were shot down at once, and their fate would have
been shared by any others who had been with them; the bulk of the
column was never able to advance through the fire up to the breastwork,
and all the ladders and fascines in Christendom would not have helped
it. There will always be innumerable excuses offered for any defeat;
but on this occasion the truth is simply that the British regulars
found they could not advance in the open against a fire more deadly
than they had ever before encountered.] As far as fortune favored
either side, it was that of the British [Footnote: E.g.: The
unexpected frost made the swamps firm for them to advance through;
the river being so low when the levee was cut, the bayous were filled,
instead of the British being drowned out; the Carolina was only
blown up because the wind happened to fail her; bad weather delayed
the advance of arms and reinforcements, etc., etc.]; and Packenham
left nothing undone to accomplish his aim, and made no movements
that his experience in European war did not justify his making. There
is not the slightest reason for supposing that any other British
general would have accomplished more or have fared better than he
did. [Footnote: "He was the next man to look to after Lord Wellington"
(Codrington, i, 339).] Of course Jackson owed much to the nature
of the ground on which he fought; but the opportunities it afforded
would have been useless in the hands of any general less ready,
hardy, and skilful than Old Hickory.
A word as to the troops themselves. The British infantry was at that
time the best in Europe, the French coming next. Packenham's soldiers
had formed part of Wellington's magnificent peninsular army, and
they lost nothing of their honor at New Orleans. Their conduct
throughout was admirable. Their steadiness in the night battle,
their patience through the various hardships they had to undergo,
their stubborn courage in action, and the undaunted front they showed
in time of disaster (for at the very end they were to the full as
ready and eager to fight as at the beginning), all showed that their
soldierly qualities were of the highest order. As much cannot be
said of the British artillery, which, though very bravely fought
was clearly by no means as skilfully handled as was the case with
the American guns. The courage of the British officers of all arms
is mournfully attested by the sadly large proportion they bore to
the total on the lists of the killed and wounded.
An even greater meed of praise is due to the American soldiers, for
it must not be forgotten that they were raw troops opposed to veterans;
and indeed, nothing but Jackson's tireless care in drilling them
could have brought them into shape at all. The regulars were just
as good as the British, and no better. The Kentucky militia, who
had only been 48 hours with the army and were badly armed and
totally undisciplined, proved as useless as their brethren of New
York and Virginia, at Queenstown Heights and Bladensburg, had
previously shown themselves to be. They would not stand in the open
at all, and even behind a breastwork had to be mixed with better
men. The Louisiana militia, fighting in defence of their homes, and
well trained, behaved excellently, and behind breastworks were as
formidable as the regulars. The Tennesseeans, good men to start with,
and already well trained in actual warfare under Jackson, were in
their own way unsurpassable as soldiers. In the open field the
British regulars, owing to their greater skill in manoeuvring, and
to their having bayonets, with which the Tennesseeans were unprovided,
could in all likelihood have beaten them; but in rough or broken
ground the skill of the Tennesseeans, both as marksmen and woodsmen,
would probably have given them the advantage; while the extreme
deadliness of their fire made it far more dangerous to attempt to
storm a breastwork guarded by these forest riflemen than it would
have been to attack the same work guarded by an equal number of the
best regular troops of Europe. The American soldiers deserve great
credit for doing so well; but greater credit still belongs to Andrew
Jackson, who, with his cool head and quick eye, his stout heart and
strong hand, stands out in history as the ablest general the United
States produced, from the outbreak of the Revolution down to the
beginning of the Great Rebellion.
Appendix A
TONNAGE OF THE BRITISH
AND AMERICAN MEN-OF-WAR
IN 1812-15
According to Act of Congress (quoted in "Niles' Register," iv, 64),
the way of measuring double-decked or war-vessels was as follows:
"Measure from fore-part of main stem to after-part of stern port,
above the upper deck; take the breadth thereof at broadest part
above the main wales, one half of which breadth shall be accounted
the depth. Deduct from the length three fifths of such breadth,
multiply the remainder by the breadth and the product by the depth;
divide by 95; quotient is tonnage."
(_i.e._, if length = x, and breadth = y;
(x - 3/5 y) X y X 1/2 y
Tonnage = ----------------------- .)
95
Niles states that the British mode, as taken from Steele's "Shipmaster's
Assistant," was this: Drop plumb-line over stem of ship and measure
distance between such line and the after part of the stern port at
the load water-mark; then measure from top of said plumb-line in
parallel direction with the water to perpendicular point immediately
over the load water-mark of the fore part of main stem; subtract
from such admeasurement the above distance; the remainder is ship's
extreme length, from which deduct 3 inches for every foot of the
load-draught of water for the rake abaft, and also three fifths of
the ship's breadth for the rake forward; remainder is length of keel
for tonnage. Breadth shall be taken from outside to outside of the
plank in broadest part of the ship either above or below the main
wales, exclusive of all manner of sheathing or doubling. Depth is
to be considered as one half the length. Tonnage will then be the
length into the depth into breadth, divided by 94.
Tonnage was thus estimated in a purely arbitrary manner, with no
regard to actual capacity or displacement; and, moreover, what is
of more importance, the British method differed from the American
so much that a ship measured in the latter way would be nominally
about 15 per cent. larger than if measured by British rules. This
is the exact reverse of the statement made by the British naval
historian, James. His mistake is pardonable, for great confusion
existed on the subject at that time, even the officers not knowing
the tonnage of their own ships. When the _President_ was captured,
her officers stated that she measured about 1,400 tons; in reality
she tonned 1,576, American measure. Still more singular was the
testimony of the officers of the _Argus_, who thought her to be of
about 350 tons, while she was of 298, by American, or 244, by British
measurement. These errors were the more excusable as they occurred
also in higher quarters. The earliest notice we have about the three
44-gun frigates of the _Constitution's_ class, is in the letter of
Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddart, on Dec. 24, 1798, [Footnote:
"American State Papers," xiv, 57.] where they are expressly said to
be of 1,576 tons; and this tonnage is given them in every navy list
that mentions it for 40 years afterward; yet Secretary Paul Hamilton
in one of his letters incidentally alludes to them as of 1,444 tons.
Later, I think about the year 1838, the method of measuring was changed,
and their tonnage was put down as 1,607. James takes the American
tonnage from Secretary Hamilton's letter as 1,444, and states (vol.
vi, p. 5), that this is equivalent to 1,533 tons, English. But in
reality, by American measurement, the tonnage was 1,576; so that
even according to James' own figures the British way of measurement
made the frigate 43 tons smaller than the American way did; actually
the difference was nearer 290 tons. James' statements as to the size
of our various ships would seem to have been largely mere guesswork,
as he sometimes makes them smaller and sometimes larger than they
were according to the official navy lists. Thus, the _Constitution_,
_President_, and _United States_, each of 1,576, he puts down as of
1,533; the _Wasp_, of 450, as of 434; the _Hornet_, of 480, as of 460;
and the _Chesapeake_, of 1,244, as of 1,135 tons. On the other hand
the _Enterprise_, of 165 tons, he states to be of 245; the _Argus_
of 298, he considers to be of 316, and the _Peacock_, _Frolic_, etc.,
of 509 each, as of 539. He thus certainly adopts different standards
of measurement, not only for the American as distinguished from the
British vessels, but even among the various American vessels themselves.
And there are other difficulties to be encountered; not only were
there different ways of casting tonnage from given measurements,
but also there were different ways of getting what purported to be
the same measurement. A ship, that, according to the British method
of measurement was of a certain length, would, according to the
American method, be about 5 per cent. longer; and so if two vessels
were the same size, the American would have the greatest nominal
tonnage. For example, James in his "Naval Occurrences" (p. 467) gives
the length of the _Cyane's_ main deck as 118 feet 2 inches. This
same _Cyane_ was carefully surveyed and measured, under orders from
the United States navy department, by Lieut. B. F. Hoffman, and in
his published report [Footnote: "American State Papers," xiv, p.
417.] he gives, among the other dimensions: "Length of spar-deck,
124 feet 9 inches," and "length of gun-deck 123 feet 3 inches." With
such a difference in the way of taking measurements, as well as of
computing tonnage from the measurements when taken, it is not surprising
that according to the American method the _Cyane_ should have ranked
as of about 659 tons, instead of 539. As James takes no account of
any of these differences I hardly know how to treat his statements
of comparative tonnage. Thus he makes the _Hornet_ 460 tons, and
the _Peacock_ and _Penguin_, which she at different times captured,
about 388 each. As it happens both Captain Lawrence and Captain Biddle,
who commanded the _Hornet_ in her two successful actions, had their
prizes measured. The _Peacock_ sank so rapidly that Lawrence could
not get very accurate measurements of her; he states her to be four
feet shorter and half a foot broader than the _Hornet_. The British
naval historian, Brenton (vol. v, p. 111), also states that they
were of about the same tonnage. But we have more satisfactory evidence
from Captain Biddle. He stayed by his prize nearly two days, and
had her thoroughly examined in every way; and his testimony is, of
course, final. He reports that the _Penguin_ was by actual measurement
two feet shorter, and somewhat broader than the _Hornet_, and with
thicker scantling. She tonned 477, compared to the _Hornet's_ 480--a
difference of about one half of one per cent. This testimony is
corroborated by that of the naval inspectors who examined the
_Epervier_ after she was captured by the _Peacock_. Those two vessels
were respectively of 477 and 509 tons, and as such they ranked on
the navy lists. The American _Peacock_ and her sister ships were
very much longer than the brig sloops of the _Epervier's_ class,
but were no broader, the latter being very tubby. All the English
sloops were broader in proportion than the American ones were; thus
the _Levant_, which was to have mounted the same number of guns as
the _Peacock_, had much more beam, and was of greater tonnage,
although of rather less length. The _Macedonian_, when captured,
ranked on our lists as of 1,325 tons, [Footnote: See the work of
Lieutenant Emmons, who had access to all the official records.] the
_United States_ as of 1,576; and they thus continued until, as I
have said before, the method of measurement was changed, when the
former ranked as of 1,341, and the latter as of 1,607 tons. James,
however, makes them respectively, 1,081, and 1,533. Now to get the
comparative force he ought to have adopted the first set of measurements
given, or else have made them 1,081 and 1,286. Out of the twelve
single-ship actions of the war, four were fought with 38-gun frigates
like the _Macedonian_, and seven with 18-gun brig sloops of the
_Epervier's_ class; and as the _Macedonian_ and _Epervier_ were both
regularly rated in our navy, we get a very exact idea of our antagonists
in those eleven cases. The twelfth was the fight between the
_Enterprise_ and the _Boxer_, in which the latter was captured; the
_Enterprise_ was apparently a little smaller than her foe, but had
two more guns, which she carried in her bridle ports.
As my purpose in giving the tonnage is to get it comparatively, and
not absolutely, I have given it throughout for both sides as estimated
by the American method of that day. The tonnage of the vessels on
the lakes has been already noticed.
Appendix B
PREVIOUS HISTORY OF
UNITED STATES NAVY
Very few students of naval history will deny that in 1812 the average
American ship was superior to the average British ship of the same
strength; and that the latter was in turn superior to the average
French ship. The explanation given by the victor is in each case
the same; the American writer ascribes the success of his nation
to "the aptitude of the American character for the sea," and the
Briton similarly writes that "the English are inherently better suited
for the sea than the French." Race characteristics may have had some
little effect between the last pair of combatants (although only
a little), and it is _possible_ that they somewhat affected the
outcome of the Anglo-American struggle, but they did not form the
main cause. This can best be proved by examining the combats of
two preceding periods, in which the English, French, and Americans
were at war with one another.
During the years 1798-1800, the United States carried on a desultory
conflict with France, then at war with England. Our navy was just
built, and was rated in the most extraordinary manner; the _Chesapeake_,
carrying 18-pounders, was called a 44; and the _Constellation_ which
carried 24's, a 36, while the _Washington_, rating 24, was really
much heavier than the _Boston_, rating 28. On Feb. 9, 1799, after
an hour's conflict, the _Constellation_ captured the French frigate
_Insurgente_; the Americans lost 3, the French 70 men, killed and
wounded. The _Constitution_ carried but 38 guns; 28 long 24's, on
the main-deck, and 10 long 12's on the quarter-deck, with a crew
of 309 men. According to Troude (iii, 169), _l'lnsurgente_ carried
26 long 12's, 10 long 6's, and 4 36-pound carronades; the Americans
report her number of men as nearly four hundred. Thus in actual
[Footnote: French shot was really very much heavier than the nominally
corresponding English shot, as the following table, taken from Captain
T. L. Simmon's work on "Heavy Ordnance" (London, 1837, p. 62) will show:
Nominal French Weight Actual Weight of Same Shot in
of Shot. English Pounds.
36 lbs. 43 lbs 4 oz.
24 " 28 " 8 3/4"
18 " 21 " 4 1/2"
12 " 14 " 7 "
] (not nominal) weight of shot the _Constitution_ was superior by
about 80 pounds, and was inferior in crew by from 50 to 100 men.
This would make the vessels apparently nearly equal in force; but
of course the long 24's of the Constellation made it impossible that
_l'lnsurgente_, armed only with long 12's, should contend with her.
As already said, a superiority in number of men makes very little
difference, provided each vessel has ample to handle the guns, repair
damages, work the sails, etc. Troude goes more into details than
any other French historian; but I think his details are generally
wrong. In this case he gives the _Constellation_ 12's, instead of
the 24's she really carried; and also supplies her with 10 32-pound
carronades--of which species of ordnance there was then not one piece
in our navy. The first carronades we ever had were those carried
by the same frigate on her next voyage. She had completely changed
her armament, having 28 long 18's on the main-deck, ten 24-pound
carronades on the quarter-deck; and, I believe, 6 long 12's on the
forecastle, with a crew of 310 men. Thus armed, she encountered and
fought a drawn battle with _la Vengeance_. Troude (vol. iii, pp.
201, and 216) describes the armament of the latter as 26 long 18's,
10 long 8's, and 4 36-pound carronades. On board of her was an
American prisoner, James Howe, who swore she had 52 guns, and 400
men (see Cooper, i, 306). The French and American accounts thus
radically disagree. The point is settled definitely by the report
of the British captain Milne, who, in the _Seine_ frigate, captured
_la Vengeance_ in the same year, and then reported her armament as
being 28 long 18's, 16 long 12's, and 8 36-pound carronades, with
326 men. As the American and British accounts, written entirely
independently of one another, tally almost exactly, it is evident
that Troude was very greatly mistaken. He blunders very much over
the _Constellation's_ armament.
Thus in this action the American frigate fought a draw with an
antagonist, nearly as much superior to herself as an American 44
was to a British 38. In November, 1800, the "28-gun frigate,"
_Boston_, of 530 tons, 200 men, carrying 24 long 9's on the main-deck,
and on the spar-deck 8 long 6's (or possibly 12-pound carronades)
captured, after two hours action, the French corvette _Berceau_,
of 24 guns, long 8's; the _Boston_ was about the same size as her
foe, with the same number of men, and superior in metal about as
ten to nine. She lost 15, and the _Berceau_ 40 men. Troude (iii,
p. 219) gives the _Berceau_ 30 guns, 22 long 8's, and 8 12-pound
carronades. If this is true she was in reality of equal force with
the _Boston_. But I question if Troude really knew anything about
the combatants; he gives the _Boston_ (of the same size and build
as the _Cyane_) 48 guns--a number impossible for her to carry. He
continually makes the grossest errors; in this same (the third)
volume, for example, he arms a British 50-gun-ship with 72 cannon,
giving her a broadside fifty per cent. heavier than it should be
(p. 141); and, still worse, states the ordinary complement of a
British 32-gun frigate to be 384 men, instead of about 220 (p. 417).
He is by no means as trustworthy as James, though less rancorous.
The United States schooner _Experiment_, of 12 guns, long 6's, and
70 men, captured the French man-of-war three-masted-schooner _La
Diane_, of 14 guns (either 4- or 6-pounders), with a crew of 60 men,
and 30 passengers; and the _Enterprise_, the sister vessel of the
_Experiment_, captured numerous strong privateers. One of them, a
much heavier vessel than her captor, made a most obstinate fight.
She was the _Flambeau_ brig of fourteen 8-pounders and 100 men, of
whom half were killed or wounded. The _Enterprise_ had 3 killed and
7 wounded.
Comparing these different actions, it is evident that the Americans
were superior to the French in fighting capacity during the years
1799 and 1800. During the same two years there had been numerous
single contests between vessels of Britain and France, ending almost
invariably in favor of the former, which I mention first in each
couple. The 12-pounder frigate _Daedalus_ captured the 12-pounder
frigate _Prudente_, of equal force. The British 18-pounder frigate
_Sybille_ captured the frigate _Forte_, armed with 52 guns, 30 of
them long 24's on the main-deck; she was formidably armed and as
heavy as the _Constitution_. The _Sybille_ lost 22 and the _Forte_
145 men killed and wounded. The 18-pounder frigate _Clyde_, with
the loss of 5 men, captured the 12-pounder frigate _Vestale_, which
lost 32. The cutter _Courser_, of twelve 4-pounders and 40 men,
captured the privateer _Guerrière_, of fourteen 4-pounders and 44
men. The cutter _Viper_, of fourteen 4-pounders and 48 men, captured
the privateer _Suret_, of fourteen 4-pounders and 57 men. The 16-gun
ship-sloop, _Peterel_, with 89 men, engaged the _Cerf_, 14, _Lejoille_,
6, and _Ligurienne_, 16, with in all 240 men, and captured the
_Ligunenne_. The 30-gun corvette _Dart_ captured by surprise the
38-gun frigate _Desirée_. The _Gypsey_, of ten 4-pounders and 82
men, captured the _Quidproquo_, of 8 guns, 4- and 8-pounders, and
98 men. The schooner _Milbrook_ of sixteen 18-pounder carronades
and 47 men, fought a draw with the privateer _Bellone_, of 24 long
8's and six 36-pound carronades. Finally, six months after the
_Vengeance_ had escaped from the _Constellation_ (or beaten her off,
as the French say) she was captured by the British frigate _Seine_,
which threw a broadside about 30 pounds more than the American did
in her action, and had some 29 men less aboard. So that her commander,
Captain Milne, with the same force as Commodore Truxtun, of the
_Constellation_, accomplished what the latter failed to do.
Reviewing all these actions, it seems pretty clear that, while the
Americans were then undoubtedly much superior to the French, they
were still, at least slightly, inferior to the British.