Chapter V

1813

ON THE OCEAN

_Blockade of the American coast--The_ Essex _in the South

Pacific--The_ Hornet _captures the_ Peacock--_American privateers

cut out by British boats--Unsuccessful cruise of Commodore

Rodgers--The_ Chesapeake _is captured by the_ Shannon--_Futile

gun boat actions--Defence of Craney Island--Cutting out

expeditions--The_ Argus _is captured by the_ Pelican--_The_

Enterprise _captures the_ Boxer--_Summary._

By the beginning of the year 1813 the British had been thoroughly

aroused by the American successes, and active measures were at once

taken to counteract them. The force on the American station was

largely increased, and a strict blockade begun, to keep the American

frigates in port. The British frigates now cruised for the most part

in couples, and orders were issued by the Board of Admiralty that

an 18-pounder frigate was not to engage an American 24-pounder.

Exaggerated accounts of the American 44's being circulated, a new

class of spar-deck frigates was constructed to meet them, rating

50 and mounting 60 guns; and some 74's were cut down for the same

purpose. [Footnote: 1. James. vi, p. 206] These new ships were all

much heavier than their intended opponents.

As New England's loyalty to the Union was, not unreasonably, doubted

abroad, her coasts were at first troubled but little. A British

squadron was generally kept cruising off the end of Long Island

Sound, and another off Sandy Hook. Of course America had no means

of raising a blockade, as each squadron contained generally a 74

or a razee, vessels too heavy for any in our navy to cope with.

Frigates and sloops kept skirting the coasts of New Jersey, the

Carolinas, and Georgia. Delaware Bay no longer possessed the

importance it had during the Revolutionary War, and as the only war

vessels in it were some miserable gun-boats, the British generally

kept but a small force on that station. Chesapeake Bay became the

principal scene of their operations; it was there that their main

body collected, and their greatest efforts were made. In it a number

of line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and cutters had been

collected, and early in the season Admiral Sir John Warren and Rear

Admiral Cockburn arrived to take command. The latter made numerous

descents on the coast, and frequently came into contact with the

local militia, who generally fled after a couple of volleys. These

expeditions did not accomplish much, beyond burning the houses and

driving off the live-stock of the farmers along shore, and destroying

a few small towns--one of them, Hampton, being sacked with revolting

brutality. [Footnote: James (vi, 340) says: The conduct of the

British troops on this occasion was "revolting to human nature"

and "disgraceful to the flag."] The government of the United States

was, in fact, supported by the people in its war policy very largely

on account of these excesses, which were much exaggerated by American

writers. It was really a species of civil war, and in such a contest,

at the beginning of this century, it was impossible that some

outrages should not take place.

The American frigate _Constellation_ had by this time got ready for

sea, and, under the command of Captain Stewart, she prepared to put

out early in January. As the number of blockaders rendered a fight

almost certain within a few days of her departure, her crew were

previously brought to the highest state of discipline, the men being

exercised with especial care in handling the great guns and in firing

at a target. [Footnote: Life of Commodore Tatnall, by C. C. Jones

(Savannah, 1878), p. 15.] However, she never got out; for when she

reached Hampton Roads she fell in with a British squadron of

line-of-battle ships and frigates. She kedged up toward Norfolk,

and when the tide rose ran in and anchored between the forts; and

a few days later dropped down to cover the forts which were being

built at Craney Island. Here she was exposed to attacks from the

great British force still lying in Hampton Roads, and, fearing they

would attempt to carry her by surprise, Captain Stewart made every

preparation for defence. She was anchored in the middle of the

narrow channel, flanked by gun-boats, her lower ports closed, not

a rope left hanging over the sides; the boarding nettings, boiled in

half-made pitch till they were as hard as wire, were triced outboard

toward the yard arms, and loaded with kentledge to fall on the

attacking boats when the tricing lines were cut, while the carronades

were loaded to the muzzle with musket balls, and depressed so as

to sweep the water near the ship. [Footnote: For an admirable account

of these preparations, as well as of the subsequent events, see Cooper,

ii, 242.] Twice, a force of British, estimated by their foes to number

2,000 men, started off at night to carry the _Constellation_ by

surprise; but on each occasion they were discovered and closely

watched by her guard-boats, and they never ventured to make the

attack. However, she was unable to get to sea, and remained

blockaded to the close of the war.

At the beginning of the year several frigates and smaller craft were

at sea. The _Chesapeake_, Captain Evans, had sailed from Boston on

Dec. 13, 1812. [Footnote: Statistical "History of the U. S. Navy,"

by Lieutenant G. E. Emmons.] She ran down past Madeira, the Canaries,

and Cape de Verde, crossed the equator, and for six weeks cruised

to the south of the line between longitudes 16° and 25°. Thence she

steered to the west, passing near Surinam, over the same spot on

which the _Hornet_ had sunk the _Peacock_ but a day previous.

Cruising northward through the West Indies, she passed near the

Bermudas, where she was chased by a 74 and a frigate; escaping

from them she got into Boston on April 9th, having captured five

merchantmen, and chased unsuccessfully for two days a brigsloop.

The term of two years for which her crew were enlisted now being up,

they, for the most part, left, in consequence of some trouble about

the prize-money. Captain Evans being in ill health, Captain James

Lawrence was appointed to command her. He reached Boston about the

middle of May [Footnote: He was still on the _Hornet_ at New York

on May 10th, as we know from a letter of Biddle's, written on that

date (in letters of "Masters' Commandant," 1813, No. 58), and so

could hardly have been with the _Chesapeake_ two weeks before he

put out; and had to get his crew together and train them during

that time.] and at once set about enlisting a new crew, and tried,

with but partial success, to arrange matters with the old sailors,

who were now almost in open mutiny.

When the year 1812 had come to an end, the _Essex_, 32, was in the

South Atlantic, and Captain Porter shortly afterward ran into St.

Catherines to water. Being at a loss where to find his consorts,

he now decided to adopt the exceedingly bold measure of doubling

Cape Horn and striking at the British whalers in the Pacific. This

was practically going into the enemy's waters, the Portuguese and

Spanish countries being entirely under the influence of Britain,

while there were no stations where Porter could revictual or repair

in safety. However, the _Essex_ started, doubled the Horn, and on

March 13th anchored in the harbor of Valparaiso. Her adventurous

cruise in the Pacific was the most striking feature of the war; but

as it has been most minutely described by Commodore Porter himself,

by his son, Admiral Porter, by Admiral Farragut, and by Cooper, I

shall barely touch upon it.

On March 20th the _Essex_ captured the Peruvian corsair _Nereyda_,

16, hove her guns and small arms overboard, and sent her into port.

She made the island of San Gallan, looked into Callao, and thence

went to the Gallipagos, getting every thing she wanted from her

prizes. Then she went to Tumbez, and returned to the Gallipagos;

thence to the Marquesas, and finally back to Valparaiso again. By

this year's campaign in the Pacific, Captain Porter had saved all

our ships in those waters, had not cost the government a dollar,

living purely on the enemy, and had taken from him nearly 4,000

tons of shipping and 400 men, completely breaking up his whaling

trade in the South Pacific.

The cruise was something _sui generis_ in modern warfare, recalling

to mind the cruises of the early English and Dutch navigators. An

American ship was at a serious disadvantage in having no harbor of

refuge away from home; while on almost every sea there were British,

French, and Spanish ports into which vessels of those nations could

run for safety. It was an unprecedented thing for a small frigate

to cruise a year and a half in enemy's waters, and to supply herself

during that time, purely from captured vessels, with every

thing--cordage, sails, guns, anchors, provisions, and medicines,

and even money to pay the officers and men! Porter's cruise was the

very model of what such an expedition should be, harassing the enemy

most effectually at no cost whatever. Had the _Essex_ been decently

armed with long guns, instead of carronades, the end might have

been as successful as it was glorious. The whalers were many of them

armed letters-of-marque, and, though of course unable to oppose the

frigate, several times smart skirmishes occurred in attacking them

with boats, or in captured ships; as when Lieutenant Downs and 20

men in the prize _Georgiana_ after a short brush captured the _Hector_,

with 25 men, two of whom were killed and six wounded; and when, under

similar circumstances, the prize _Greenwich_, of 25 men, captured

the _Seringapatam_ of 40. The cruise of the _Essex_, the first

American man-of-war ever in the Pacific, a year and a half out and

many thousand miles away from home, was a good proof of Porter's

audacity in planning the trip and his skill and resource in

carrying it out.

[Illustration: Captain James Lawrence: a portrait by Gilbert Stuart

painted in Boston in 1812, shortly before Lawrence's promotion to

captain, showing him wearing the single epaulet of a master

commandant. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum) ]

To return now to the _Hornet_. This vessel had continued blockading

the _Bonne Citoyenne_ until January 24th, when the _Montagu_, 74,

arrived toward evening and chased her into port. As the darkness

came on the _Hornet_ wore, stood out to sea, passing into the open

without molestation from the 74, and then steered toward the

northeast, cruising near the coast, and making a few prizes, among

which was a brig, the _Resolution_, with $23,000 in specie aboard,

captured on February 14th. On the 24th of February, while nearing

the mouth of the Demerara River, Captain Lawrence discovered a

brig to leeward, and chased her till he ran into quarter less five,

when, having no pilot, he hauled off-shore. Just within the bar a

man-of-war brig was lying at anchor; and while beating round Caroband

Bank, in order to get at her, Captain Lawrence discovered another

sail edging down on his weather-quarter. [Footnote: Letter of

Captain Lawrence, March 29, 1813.] The brig at anchor was the

_Espiègle_, of 18 guns, 32-pound carronades, Captain John Taylor

[Footnote: James, vi, 278.]; and the second brig seen was the _Peacock_,

Captain William Peake, [Footnote: _Do_.] which, for some unknown

reason, had exchanged her 32-pound carronades for 24's. She had

sailed from the _Espiègle's_ anchorage the same morning at 10 o'clock.

At 4.20 P.M. the _Peacock_ hoisted her colors; then the _Hornet_

beat to quarters and cleared for action. Captain Lawrence kept close

by the wind, in order to get the weather-gage; when he was certain

he could weather the enemy, he tacked, at 5.10, and the _Hornet_

hoisted her colors. The ship and the brig now stood for each other,

both on the wind, the _Hornet_ being on the starboard and the

_Peacock_ on the port tack, and at 5.25 they exchanged broadsides,

at half pistol-shot distance, while going in opposite directions,

the Americans using their lee and the British their weather battery.

The guns were fired as they bore, and the _Peacock_ suffered severely,

while her antagonist's hull was uninjured, though she suffered

slightly aloft and had her pennant cut off by the first shot fired.

[Footnote: Cooper, p. 200.] One of the men in the mizzen-top was

killed by a round shot, and two more were wounded in the main-top.

[Footnote: See entry in her log for this day (In "Log-Book of _Hornet_,

_Wasp_, and _Argus_, from July 20, 1809, to October 6, 1813,") in

the Bureau of Navigation, at Washington.] As soon as they were clear,

Captain Peake put his helm hard up and wore, firing his starboard

guns; but the _Hornet_ had watched him closely, bore up as quickly,

and coming down at 5.35, ran him close aboard on the starboard quarter.

Captain Peake fell at this moment, together with many of his crew,

and, unable to withstand the _Hornet's_ heavy fire, the _Peacock_

surrendered at 5.39, just 14 minutes after the first shot; and

directly afterward hoisted her ensign union down in the forerigging

as a signal of distress. Almost immediately her main-mast went by

the board. Both vessels then anchored, and Lieutenant J. T Shubrick,

being sent on board the prize, reported her sinking. Lieutenant D.

Connor was then sent in another boat to try to save the vessel; but

though they threw the guns overboard, plugged the shot holes, tried

the pumps, and even attempted bailing, the water gained so rapidly

that the _Hornet's_ officers devoted themselves to removing the

wounded and other prisoners; and while thus occupied the short

tropical twilight left them. Immediately afterward the prize settled,

suddenly and easily, in 5 1/2 fathoms water, carrying with her three

of the _Hornet's_ people and nine of her own, who were rummaging

below; meanwhile four others of her crew had lowered her damaged

stern boat, and in the confusion got off unobserved and made their

way to the land. The foretop still remained above water, and four

of the prisoners saved themselves by running up the rigging into it.

Lieutenant Connor and Midshipman Cooper (who had also come on board)

saved themselves, together with most of their people and the

remainder of the _Peacock's_ crew, by jumping into the launch, which

was lying on the booms, and paddling her toward the ship with pieces

of boards in default of oars.

The _Hornet's_ complement at this time was 150, of whom she had 8

men absent in a prize and 7 on the sick list, [Footnote: Letter of

Captain Lawrence.] leaving 135 fit for duty in the action; [Footnote:

Letter of Lieutenant D. Connor, April 26, 1813] of these one man

was killed, and two wounded, all aloft. Her rigging and sails were

a good deal cut, a shot had gone through the foremast, and the

bowsprit was slightly damaged; the only shot that touched her hull

merely glanced athwart her bows, indenting a plank beneath the

cat-head. The _Peacock's_ crew had amounted to 134, but 4 were absent

in a prize, and but 122 [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant F. W. Wright

(of the _Peacock_), April 17, 1813.] fit for action; of these she

lost her captain, and seven men killed and mortally wounded, and

her master, one midshipman, and 28 men severely and slightly

wounded,--in all 8 killed and 30 wounded, or about 13 times her

antagonist's loss. She suffered under the disadvantage of light

metal, having 24's opposed to 32's; but judging from her gunnery

this was not much of a loss, as 6-pounders would have inflicted

nearly as great damage. She was well handled and bravely fought;

but her men showed a marvellous ignorance of gunnery. It appears

that she had long been known as "the yacht," on account of the

tasteful arrangement of her deck; the breechings of the carronades

were lined with white canvas, and nothing could exceed in brilliancy

the polish upon the traversing bars and elevating screws. [Footnote:

James, vi, 280.] In other words, Captain Peake had confounded the

mere _incidents_ of good discipline with the essentials. [Footnote:

Codrington ("Memoirs," i. 310) comments very forcibly on the

uselessness of a mere martinet.]

The _Hornet's_ victory cannot be regarded in any other light than

as due, _not_ to the heavier metal, but to the far more accurate

firing of the Americans; "had the guns of the _Peacock_ been of the

largest size they could not have changed the result, as the weight

of shot that do not hit is of no great moment." Any merchant-ship

might have been as well handled and bravely defended as she was; and

an ordinary letter-of-marque would have made as creditable a defence.

During the entire combat the _Espiégle_ was not more than 4 miles

distant and was plainly visible from the _Hornet_; but for some

reason she did not come out, and her commander reported that he knew

nothing of the action till the next day. Captain Lawrence of course

was not aware of this, and made such exertions to bend on new sails,

stow his boats, and clear his decks that by nine o'clock he was again

prepared for action, [Footnote: Letter of Captain Lawrence.] and at

2 P.M. got underway for the N.W. Being now overcrowded with people

and short of water he stood for home, anchoring at Holmes' Hole in

Martha's Vineyard on the 19th of March.

On their arrival at New York the officers of the _Peacock_ published

a card expressing in the warmest terms their appreciation of the way

they and their men had been treated. Say they: "We ceased to consider

ourselves prisoners; and every thing that friendship could dictate

was adopted by you and the officers of the _Hornet_ to remedy the

inconvenience we would otherwise have experienced from the unavoidable

loss of the whole of our property and clothes owing to the sudden

sinking of the _Peacock_." [Footnote: Quoted in full in "Niles'

Register" and Lossing's "Field Book."] This was signed by the first

and second lieutenants, the master, surgeon and purser.

[Illustration of _Peacock_ and _Hornet_ action from 5.10 to 5.35.]

Weight

Tonnage. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss.

_Hornet_ 480 10 279 135 3

_Peacock_ 477 10 210 122 38

Relative Relative Loss

Force. Inflicted.

_Hornet_ 1.00 1.00

_Peacock_ .83 .08

That is, the forces standing nearly as 13 is to 11, the relative

execution was about as 13 is to 1.

The day after the capture Captain Lawrence reported 277 souls aboard,

including the crew of the English brig _Resolution_ which he had

taken, and of the American brig _Hunter_, prize to the _Peacock_.

As James, very ingeniously, tortures these figures into meaning what

they did not, it may be well to show exactly what the 277 included.

Of the _Hornet's_ original crew of 150, 8 were absent in a prize, 1

killed, and 3 drowned, leaving (including 7 sick) 138; of the _Peacock's_

original 134, 4 were absent in a prize, 5 killed, 9 drowned, and 4

escaped, leaving (including 8 sick and 3 mortally wounded) 112; there

were also aboard 16 other British prisoners, and the _Hunter's_ crew

of 11 men--making just 277. [Footnote: The 277 men were thus divided

into: _Hornet's_ crew, 138; _Peacock's_ crew, 112; _Resolution's_

crew, 16; _Hunter's_ crew, 11. James quotes "270" men, which he divides

as follows: _Hornet_ 160, _Peacock_ 101, _Hunter_ 9,--leaving out

the _Resolution's_ crew, 11 of the _Peacock's_, and 2 of the _Hunter's_.]

According to Lieutenant Connor's letter, written in response to one

from Lieutenant Wright, there were in reality 139 in the _Peacock's_

crew when she began action; but it is, of course, best to take each

commander's account of the number of men on board his ship that were

fit for duty.

On Jan. 17th the _Viper_, 12, Lieutenant J. D. Henly was captured

by the British frigate _Narcissus_, 32, Captain Lumly.

On Feb. 8th, while a British squadron, consisting of the four frigates

_Belvidera_ (Captain Richard Byron), _Maidstone_, _Junon_, and

_Statira_, were at anchor in Lynhaven Bay, a schooner was observed

in the northeast standing down Chesapeake Bay. [Footnote: James,

vi, 325.] This was the _Lottery_, letter-of-marque, of six 12-pounder

carronades and 25 men, Captain John Southcomb, bound from Baltimore

to Bombay. Nine boats, with 200 men, under the command of Lieutenant

Kelly Nazer were sent against her, and, a calm coming on, overtook

her. The schooner opened a well-directed fire of round and grape,

but the boats rushed forward and boarded her, not carrying her till

after a most obstinate struggle, in which Captain Southcomb and 19

of his men, together with 13 of the assailants, were killed or wounded.

The best war ship of a regular navy might be proud of the discipline

and courage displayed by the captain and crew of the little _Lottery_.

Captain Byron on this, as well as on many another occasion, showed

himself to be as humane as he was brave and skilful. Captain Southcomb,

mortally wounded, was taken on board Byron's frigate, where he was

treated with the greatest attention and most delicate courtesy, and

when he died his body was sent ashore with every mark of the respect

due to so brave an officer. Captain Stewart (of the _Constellation_)

wrote Captain Byron a letter of acknowledgment for his great courtesy

and kindness. [Footnote: The correspondence between the two captains

is given in full in "Niles' Register," which also contains fragmentary

notes on the action, principally as to the loss incurred.]

On March 16th a British division of five boats and 105 men, commanded

by Lieutenant James Polkinghorne, set out to attack the privateer

schooner _Dolphin_ of 12 guns and 70 men, and the letters-of-marque,

_Racer_, _Arab_, and _Lynx_, each of six guns and 30 men. Lieutenant

Polkinghorne, after pulling 15 miles, found the four schooners all

prepared to receive him, but in spite of his great inferiority in

force he dashed gallantly at them. The _Arab_ and _Lynx_ surrendered

at once; the _Racer_ was carried after a sharp struggle in which

Lieutenant Polkinghorne was wounded, and her guns turned on the

_Dolphin_. Most of the latter's crew jumped overboard; a few rallied

round their captain, but they were at once scattered as the British

seamen came aboard. The assailants had 13, and the privateersmen 16

men killed and wounded in the fight. It was certainly one of the most

brilliant and daring cutting-out expeditions that took place during

the war, and the victors well deserved their success. The privateersmen

(according to the statement of the _Dolphin's_ master, in "Niles'

Register") were panic-struck, and acted in any thing but a brave

manner. All irregular fighting-men do their work by fits and starts.

No regular cruisers could behave better than did the privateers

_Lottery_, _Chasseur_, and _General Armstrong_; none would behave

as badly as the _Dolphin_, _Lynx_, and _Arab_. The same thing appears

on shore. Jackson's irregulars at New Orleans did as well, or almost

as well, as Scott's troops at Lundy's Lane; but Scott's troops would

never have suffered from such a panic as overcame the militia at

Bladensburg.

On April 9th the schooner _Norwich_, of 14 guns and 61 men,

Sailing-master James Monk, captured the British privateer _Caledonia_,

of 10 guns and 41 men, after a short action in which the privateer

lost 7 men.

On April 30th Commodore Rodgers, in the _President_. 44, accompanied

by Captain Smith in the Congress, 38, sailed on his third cruise.

[Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Sept. 30, 1813.] On May 2d

he fell in with and chased the British sloop _Curlew_, 18, Captain

Michael Head, but the latter escaped by knocking away the wedges of

her masts and using other means to increase her rate of sailing. On

the 8th, in latitude 39° 30' N., long. 60° W., the _Congress_ parted

company, and sailed off toward the southeast, making four prizes,

of no great value, in the North Atlantic; [Footnote: Letter of Captain

Smith, Dec. 15, 1813.] when about in long. 35° W. she steered south,

passing to the south of the line. But she never saw a man-of-war,

and during the latter part of her cruise not a sail of any kind;

and after cruising nearly eight months returned to Portsmouth Harbor

on Dec. 14th, having captured but four merchant-men. Being unfit to

cruise longer, owing to her decayed condition, she was disarmed and

laid up; nor was she sent to sea again during the war. [Footnote:

James states that she was "blockaded" in port by the _Tenedos_,

during part of 1814; but was too much awed by the fate of the

_Chesapeake_ to come out during the "long blockade" of Captain

Parker. Considering the fact that she was too decayed to put to sea,

had no guns aboard, no crew, and was, in fact, laid up, the feat of

the _Tenedos_ was not very wonderful; a row-boat could have "blockaded"

her quite as well. It is worth noticing, as an instance of the way

James alters a fact by suppressing half of it.]

Meanwhile Rodgers cruised along the eastern edge of the Grand Bank

until he reached latitude 48°, without meeting any thing, then stood

to the southeast, and cruised off the Azores till June 6th. Then

he crowded sail to the northeast after a Jamaica fleet of which he

had received news, but which he failed to overtake, and on June 13th,

in lat. 46°, long. 28°, he gave up the chase and shaped his course

toward the North Sea, still without any good luck befalling him.

On June 27th he put into North Bergen in the Shetlands for water,

and thence passed the Orkneys and stretched toward the North Cape,

hoping to intercept the Archangel fleet. On July 19th, when off the

North Cape, in lat. 71° 52' N., long. 20° 18' E., he fell in with

two sail of the enemy, who made chase; after four days' pursuit the

commodore ran his opponents out of sight. According to his letter

the two sail were a line-of-battle ship and a frigate; according

to James they were the 12-pounder frigate _Alexandria_, Captain

Cathcart, and _Spitfire_, 16, Captain Ellis. James quotes from the

logs of the two British ships, and it would seem that he is correct,

as it would not be possible for him to falsify the logs so utterly.

In case he is true, it was certainly carrying caution to an excessive

degree for the commodore to retreat before getting some idea of what

his antagonists really were. His mistaking them for so much heavier

ships was a precisely similar error to that made by Sir George Collier

and Lord Stuart at a later date about the _Cyane_ and _Levant_. James

wishes to prove that each party perceived the force of the other,

and draws a contrast (p. 312) between the "gallantry of one party

and pusillanimity of the other." This is nonsense, and, as in similar

cases, James overreaches himself by proving too much. If he had made

an 18-pounder frigate like the _Congress_ flee from another 18-pounder,

his narrative would be within the bounds of possibility and would

need serious examination. But the little 12-pounder _Alexandria_,

and the ship-sloop with her 18-pound carronades, would not have stood

the ghost of a chance in the contest. Any man who would have been

afraid of them would also have been afraid of the _Little Belt_, the

sloop Rodgers captured before the war. As for Captains Cathcart and

Ellis, had they known the force of the _President_, and chased her

with a view of attacking her, their conduct would have only been

explicable on the ground that they were afflicted with emotional

insanity.

The _President_ now steered southward and got into the mouth of the

Irish Channel; on August 2d she shifted her berth and almost circled

Ireland; then steered across to Newfoundland, and worked south along

the coast. On Sept. 23d, a little south of Nantucket, she decoyed

under her guns and captured the British schooner _Highflyer_, 6,

Lieut. William Hutchinson, and 45 men; and went into Newport on the

27th of the same month, having made some 12 prizes.

On May 24th Commodore Decatur in the _United States_, which had sent

ashore six carronades, and now mounted but 48 guns, accompanied by

Captain Jones in the _Macedonian_, 38, and Captain Biddle in the

_Wasp_, 20, left New York, passing through Hell Gate, as there was

a large blockading force off the Hook. Opposite Hunter's Point the

main-mast of the _States_ was struck by lightning, which cut off

the broad pendant, shot down the hatchway into the doctor's cabin,

put out his candle, ripped up the bed, and entering between the skin

and ceiling of the ship tore off two or three sheets of copper near

the waterline, and disappeared without leaving a trace! The

_Macedonian_, which was close behind, hove all aback, in expectation

of seeing the _States_ blown up.

At the end of the sound Commodore Decatur anchored to watch for a

chance of getting out. Early on June 1st he started; but in a couple

of hours met the British Captain R. D. Oliver's squadron, consisting

of a 74, a razee, and a frigate. These chased him back, and all his

three ships ran into New London. Here, in the mud of the Thames river,

the two frigates remained blockaded till the close of the war; but

the little sloop slipped out later, to the enemy's cost.

We left the _Chesapeake_, 38, being fitted out at Boston by Captain

James Lawrence, late of the _Hornet_. Most of her crew, as already

stated, their time being up, left, dissatisfied with the ship's ill

luck, and angry at not having received their due share of prize-money.

It was very hard to get sailors, most of the men preferring to ship

in some of the numerous privateers where the discipline was less

strict and the chance of prize-money much greater. In consequence

of this an unusually large number of foreigners had to be taken,

including about forty British and a number of Portuguese. The latter

were peculiarly troublesome; one of their number, a boatswain's mate,

finally almost brought about a mutiny among the crew which was only

pacified by giving the men prize-checks. A few of the _Constitution's_

old crew came aboard, and these, together with some of the men who

had been on the _Chesapeake_ during her former voyage, made an excellent

nucleus. Such men needed very little training at either guns or sails;

but the new hands were unpractised, and came on board so late that

the last draft that arrived still had their hammocks and bags lying

in the boats stowed over the booms when the ship was captured. The

officers were largely new to the ship, though the first lieutenant,

Mr. A. Ludlow, had been the third in her former cruise; the third

and fourth lieutenants were not regularly commissioned as such, but

were only midshipmen acting for the first time in higher positions.

Captain Lawrence himself was of course new to all, both officers and

crew. [Footnote: On the day on which he sailed to attack the _Shannon_,

Lawrence writes to the Secretary of the Navy as follows: "Lieutenant

Paige is so ill as to be unable to go to sea with the ship. At the

urgent request of Acting-Lieutenant Pierce I have granted him, also,

permission to go on shore; one inducement for my granting his request

was his being at variance with every officer in his mess." "Captains'

Letters," vol. 29, No. 1, in the Naval Archives at Washington. Neither

officers nor men had shaken together.] In other words, the _Chesapeake_

possessed good material, but in an exceedingly unseasoned state.

Meanwhile the British frigate _Shannon_, 38, Captain Philip Bowes

Vere Broke, was cruising off the mouth of the harbor. To give some

idea of the reason why she proved herself so much more formidable

than her British sister frigates it may be well to quote, slightly

condensing, from James:

"There was another point in which the generality of British crews,

as compared with any one American crew, were miserably deficient;

that is, skill in the art of gunnery. While the American seamen

were constantly firing at marks, the British seamen, except in

particular cases, scarcely did so once in a year; and some ships

could be named on board which not a shot had been fired in this way

for upward of three years. Nor was the fault wholly the captain's.

The instructions under which he was bound to act forbade him to use,

during the first six months after the ship had received her armament,

more shots per month than amounted to a third in number of the

upper-deck guns; and, after these six months, only half the quantity.

Many captains never put a shot in the guns till an enemy appeared;

they employed the leisure time of the men in handling the sails and

in decorating the ship. Captain Broke was not one of this kind.

From the day on which he had joined her, the 14th of September, 1806,

the _Shannon_ began to feel the effect of her captain's proficiency

as a gunner and zeal for the service. The laying of the ship's

ordnance so that it may be correctly fired in a horizontal direction

is justly deemed a most important operation, as upon it depends in

a great measure the true aim and destructive effect of the shot;

this was attended to by Captain Broke in person. By draughts from

other ships, and the usual means to which a British man-of-war is

obliged to resort, the _Shannon_ got together a crew; and in the

course of a year or two, by the paternal care and excellent regulations

of Captain Broke, the ship's company became as pleasant to command

as it was dangerous to meet." The _Shannon's_ guns were all carefully

sighted, and, moreover, "every day, for about an hour and a half

in the forenoon, when not prevented by chase or the state of the

weather, the men were exercised at training the guns, and for the

same time in the afternoon in the use of the broadsword, pike, musket,

etc. Twice a week the crew fired at targets, both with great guns

and musketry; and Captain Broke, as an additional stimulus beyond

the emulation excited, gave a pound of tobacco to every man that

put a shot through the bull's eye." He would frequently have a cask

thrown overboard and suddenly order some one gun to be manned to sink

the cask. In short, the _Shannon_ was very greatly superior, thanks

to her careful training, to the average British frigate of her rate,

while the _Chesapeake_, owing to her having a raw and inexperienced

crew, was decidedly inferior to the average American frigate of the

same strength.

In force the two frigates compared pretty equally, [Footnote: Taking

each commander's account for his own force.] the American being the

superior in just about the same proportion that the _Wasp_ was to

the _Frolic_, or, at a later date, the _Hornet_ to the _Penguin_.

The _Chesapeake_ carried 50 guns (26 in broadside), 28 long 18's

on the gun-deck, and on the spar-deck two long 12's, one long 18,

eighteen 32-pound carronades, and one 12-pound carronade (which was

not used in the fight however). Her broadside, allowing for the short

weight of metal was 542 lbs.; her complement, 379 men. The _Shannon_

earned 52 guns (26 in broadside), 28 long 18's on the gun-deck, and

on the spar-deck four long 9's, one long 6, 16 32-pound carronades,

and three 12-pound carronades (two of which were not used in the

fight). Her broadside was 550 lbs.; her crew consisted of 330 men,

30 of whom were raw hands. Early on the morning of June 1st, Captain

Broke sent in to Captain Lawrence, by an American prisoner, a letter

of challenge, which for courteousness, manliness, and candor is the

very model of what such an epistle should be. Before it reached Boston,

however, Captain Lawrence had weighed anchor, to attack the _Shannon_,

which frigate was in full sight in the offing. It has been often said

that he engaged against his judgment, but this may be doubted. His

experience with the _Bonne Citoyenne_, _Espiègle_, and _Peacock_

had not tended to give him a very high idea of the navy to which he

was opposed, and there is no doubt that he was confident of capturing

the _Shannon_. [Footnote: In his letter written just before sailing

(already quoted on p. 177) he says: An English frigate is now in

sight from our deck. * * * I am in hopes to give a good account of

her before night. My account of the action is mainly taken from

James' "Naval History" and Brighton's "Memoir of Admiral Broke"

(according to which the official letter of Captain Broke was tampered

with); see also the letter of Lieut. George Budd, June 15, 1813;

the report of the Court of Inquiry. Commodore Bainbridge presiding,

and the Court-martial held on board frigate _United States_, April 15,

1814, Commodore Decatur presiding.] It was most unfortunate that he

did not receive Broke's letter, as the latter in it expressed himself

willing to meet Lawrence in any latitude and longitude he might

appoint; and there would thus have been some chance of the American

crew having time enough to get into shape.

At midday of June 1, 1813, the _Chesapeake_ weighed anchor, stood

out of Boston Harbor, and at 1 P.M. rounded the Light-house. The

_Shannon_ stood off under easy sail, and at 3.40 _Shannon_ up and

reefed top-sails. At 4 P.M. she again bore away with her foresail

brailed up, and her main top-sail braced flat and shivering, that

the _Chesapeake_ might overtake her. An hour later, Boston Light-house

bearing west distant about six leagues, she again hauled up, with

her head to the southeast and lay to under top-sails, top-gallant

sails, jib, and spanker. Meanwhile, as the breeze freshened the

_Chesapeake_ took in her studding-sails, top-gallant sails, and

royals, got her royal yards on deck, and came down very fast under

top-sails and jib. At 5.30, to keep under command and be able to

wear if necessary, the _Shannon_ filled her main top-sail and kept

a close luff, and then again let the sail shiver. At 5.25 the

_Chesapeake_ hauled up her foresail, and, with three ensigns flying,

steered straight for the _Shannon's_ starboard quarter. Broke was

afraid that Lawrence would pass under the _Shannon's_ stern, rake

her, and engage her on the quarter; but either overlooking or waiving

this advantage, the American captain luffed up within 50 yards upon

the _Shannon's_ starboard quarter, and squared his main-yard. On

board the _Shannon_ the captain of the 14th gun, William Mindham,

had been ordered not to fire till it bore into the second main-deck

port forward; at 5.50 it was fired, and then the other guns in quick

succession from aft forward, the _Chesapeake_ replying with her

whole broadside. At 5.53 Lawrence, finding he was forging ahead,

hauled up a little. The _Chesapeake's_ broadsides were doing great

damage, but she herself was suffering even more than her foe; the

men in the _Shannon's_ tops could hardly see the deck of the

American frigate through the cloud of splinters, hammocks, and other

wreck that was flying across it. Man after man was killed at the

wheel; the fourth lieutenant, the master, and the boatswain were

slain; and at 5.56, having had her jib sheet and foretop-sail tie

shot away, and her spanker brails loosened so that the sail blew

out, the _Chesapeake_ came up into the wind somewhat, so as to expose

her quarter to her antagonist's broadside, which beat in her

stern-ports and swept the men from the after guns. One of the arm

chests on the quarter-deck was blown up by a hand-grenade thrown

from the _Shannon_. [Footnote: This explosion may have had more effect

than is commonly supposed in the capture of the _Chesapeake_.

Commodore Bainbridge, writing from Charleston, Mass., on June 2,

1813 (see "Captains' Letters," vol. xxix. No. 10), says: "Mr. Knox,

the pilot on board, left the _Chesapeake_ at 5 P.M. * * * At 6 P.M.,

Mr. Knox informs me, the fire opened, and at 12 minutes past six

both ships were laying alongside one another as if in the act of

boarding; at that moment an explosion took place on board the

_Chesapeake_, which spread a fire on her upper deck from the foremast

to the mizzen-mast, as high as her tops, and enveloped both ships

in smoke for several minutes. After it cleared away they were seen

separate, with the British flag hoisted on board the _Chesapeake_

over the American." James denies that the explosion was caused by

a hand-grenade, though he says there were some of these aboard the

_Shannon_. It is a point of no interest.] The _Chesapeake_ was now

seen to have stern-way on and to be paying slowly off; so the

_Shannon_ put her helm a-starboard and shivered her mizzen top-sail,

so as to keep off the wind and delay the boarding. But at that moment

her jib stay was shot away, and her head-sails becoming becalmed, she

went off very slowly. In consequence, at 6 P.M. the two frigates fell

aboard, the _Chesapeake's_ quarter pressing upon the _Shannon's_ side

just forward the starboard main-chains, and the frigates were kept

in this position by the fluke of the _Shannon's_ anchor catching

in the _Chesapeake's_ quarter port.

The _Shannon's_ crew had suffered severely, but not the least panic

or disorder existed among them. Broke ran forward, and seeing his

foes flinching from the quarter-deck guns, he ordered the ships to

be lashed together, the great guns to cease firing, and the boarders

to be called. The boatswain, who had fought in Rodney's action, set

about fastening the vessels together, which the grim veteran succeeded

in doing, though his right arm was literally hacked off by a blow

from a cutlass. All was confusion and dismay on board the _Chesapeake_.

Lieutenant Ludlow had been mortally wounded and carried below;

Lawrence himself, while standing on the quarterdeck, fatally conspicuous

by his full-dress uniform and commanding stature, was shot down, as

the vessels closed, by Lieutenant Law of the British marines. He fell

dying, and was carried below, exclaiming: "Don't give up the ship"--a

phrase that has since become proverbial among his countrymen. The

third lieutenant, Mr. W. S. Cox, came on deck, but, utterly demoralized

by the aspect of affairs, he basely ran below without staying to

rally the men, and was court-martialled afterward for so doing. At

6.02 Captain Broke stepped from the _Shannon's_ gangway rail on to

the muzzle of the _Chesapeake's_ aftermost carronade, and thence over

the bulwark on to her quarter-deck, followed by about 20 men. As they

came aboard, the _Chesapeake's_ foreign mercenaries and the raw natives

of the crew deserted their quarters; the Portuguese boatswain's mate

removed the gratings of the berth-deck, and he ran below, followed

by many of the crew, among them one of the midshipmen named Deforest.

On the quarter-deck almost the only man that made any resistance was

the chaplain, Mr. Livermore, who advanced, firing his pistol at Broke,

and in return nearly had his arm hewed off by a stroke from the latter's

broad Toledo blade. On the upper deck the only men who behaved well

were the marines, but of their original number of 44 men, 14, including

Lieutenant James Broom and Corporal Dixon, were dead, and 20, including

Sergeants Twin and Harris, wounded, so that there were left but one

corporal and nine men, several of whom had been knocked down and

bruised, though reported unwounded. There was thus hardly any resistance,

Captain Broke stopping his men for a moment till they were joined by

the rest of the boarders under Lieutenants Watt and Falkiner. The

_Chesapeake's_ mizzen-topmen began firing at the boarders, mortally

wounding a midshipman, Mr. Samwell, and killing Lieutenant Watt; but

one of the _Shannon's_ long nines was pointed at the top and cleared

it out, being assisted by the English main-topmen, under Midshipman

Coshnahan. At the same time the men in the _Chesapeake's_ main-top

were driven out of it by the fire of the _Shannon's_ foretopmen,

under Midshipman Smith. Lieutenant George Budd, who was on the

main-deck, now for the first time learned that the English had boarded,

as the upper-deck men came crowding down, and at once called on his

people to follow him; but the foreigners and novices held back, and

only a few of the veterans followed him up. As soon as he reached

the spar-deck, Budd, followed by only a dozen men, attacked the

British as they came along the gangways, repulsing them for a moment,

and killing the British purser, Aldham, and captain's clerk, Dunn;

but the handful of Americans were at once cut down or dispersed,

Lieutenant Budd being wounded and knocked down the main hatchway.

"The enemy," writes Captain Broke, "fought desperately, but in

disorder." Lieutenant Ludlow, already mortally wounded, struggled

up on deck followed by two or three men, but was at once disabled

by a sabre cut. On the forecastle a few seamen and marines turned

to bay. Captain Broke was still leading his men with the same

brilliant personal courage he had all along shown. Attacking the

first American, who was armed with a pike, he parried a blow from

it, and cut down the man; attacking another he was himself cut down,

and only saved by the seaman Mindham, already mentioned, who slew

his assailant. One of the American marines, using his clubbed musket,

killed an Englishman, and so stubborn was the resistance of the little

group that for a moment the assailants gave back, having lost several

killed and wounded; but immediately afterward they closed in and slew

their foes to the last man. The British fired a volley or two down

the hatchway, in response to a couple of shots fired up; all resistance

was at an end, and at 6.05, just fifteen minutes after the first gun

had been fired, and not five after Captain Broke had come aboard, the

colors of the _Chesapeake_ were struck. Of her crew of 379 men, 61

were killed or mortally wounded, including her captain, her first

and fourth lieutenants, the lieutenant of marines, the master (White),

boatswain (Adams), and three midshipmen, and 85 severely and slightly

wounded, including both her other lieutenants, five midshipmen, and

the chaplain; total, 148; the loss falling almost entirely upon the

American portion of the crew.

[Illustration: Chesapeake vs. _Shannon_: an engraving published in

London in or before 1815 from a painting done under the supervision

of the _Shannon's_ first lieutenant. (Courtesy Beverly R. Robinson

Collection, U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

Of the _Shannon's_ men, 33 were killed outright or died of their

wounds, including her first lieutenant, purser, captain's clerk,

and one midshipman, and 50 wounded, including the captain himself

and the boatswain; total, 83.

The _Chesapeake_ was taken into Halifax, where Captain Lawrence and

Lieutenant Ludlow were both buried with military honors. Captain

Broke was made a baronet, very deservedly, and Lieutenants Wallis

and Falkiner were both made commanders.

The British writers accuse some of the American crew of treachery;

the Americans, in turn, accuse the British of revolting brutality.

Of course in such a fight things are not managed with urbane courtesy,

and, moreover, writers are prejudiced. Those who would like to hear

one side are referred to James; if they wish to hear the other, to

the various letters from officers published in "Niles' Register,"

especially vol. v, p. 142.

[Illustration of _Chesapeake_ and _Shannon_ action from 5.50 to 6.04.]

"CHESAPEAKE" STRUCK BY "SHANNON" STRUCK BY

29 eighteen-pound shot, 12 eighteen-pound shot,

25 thirty-two-pound shot, 13 thirty-two pound shot,

2 nine-pound shot, 14 bar shot,

306 grape, 119 grape,

---------- ----------

362-shot. 158 shot.

Neither ship had lost a spar, but all the lower masts, especially

the two mizzen-masts, were badly wounded. The Americans at that

period were fond of using bar shot, which were of very questionable

benefit, being useless against a ship's hull, though said to be

sometimes of great help in unrigging an antagonist from whom one

was desirous of escaping, as in the case of the _President_ and

_Endymion_.

It is thus seen that the _Shannon_ received from shot alone only

about half the damage the _Chesapeake_ did; the latter was thoroughly

beaten at the guns, in spite of what some American authors say to

the contrary. And her victory was not in the slightest degree to be

attributed to, though it may have been slightly hastened by, accident.

Training and discipline won the victory, as often before; only in

this instance the training and discipline were against us.

It is interesting to notice that the _Chesapeake_ battered the

_Shannon's_ hull far more than either the _Java_, _Guerrière_, or

_Macedonian_ did the hulls of their opponents, and that she suffered

less in return (not in _loss_ but in _damage_) than they did. The

_Chesapeake_ was a better fighter than either the _Java_, _Guerrière_,

or _Macedonian_, and could have captured any one of them. The

_Shannon_ of course did less damage than any of the American 44's,

probably just about in the proportion of the difference in force.

Almost all American writers have treated the capture of the

_Chesapeake_ as if it was due simply to a succession of unfortunate

accidents; for example, Cooper, with his usual cheerful optimism,

says that the incidents of the battle, excepting its short duration,

are "altogether the results of the chances of war," and that it was

mainly decided by "fortuitous events as unconnected with any particular

merit on the one side as they are with any particular demerit on the

other." [Footnote: The worth of such an explanation is very aptly

gauged in General Alexander S. Webb's "The Peninsula; McClellan's

Campaign of 1862" (New York, 1881), p. 35, where he speaks of "those

unforeseen or uncontrollable agencies which are vaguely described

as the 'fortune of war,' but which usually prove to be the superior

ability or resources of the antagonist."] Most naval men consider

it a species of treason to regard the defeat as due to any thing

but extraordinary ill fortune. And yet no disinterested reader can

help acknowledging that the true reason of the defeat was the very

simple one that the _Shannon_ fought better than the _Chesapeake_.

It has often been said that up to the moment when the ships came

together the loss and damage suffered by each were about the same.

This is not true, and even if it was, would not affect the question.

The heavy loss on board the _Shannon_ did not confuse or terrify

the thoroughly trained men with their implicit reliance on their

leaders; and the experienced officers were ready to defend any point

that was menaced. An equal or greater amount of loss aboard the

_Chesapeake_ disheartened and confused the raw crew, who simply had

not had the time or chance to become well disciplined. Many of the

old hands, of course, kept their wits and their pluck, but the novices

and the disaffected did not. Similarly with the officers; some, as

the Court of Inquiry found, had not kept to their posts, and all

being new to each other and the ship, could not show to their best.

There is no doubt that the _Chesapeake_ was beaten at the guns before

she was boarded. Had the ships not come together, the fight would have

been longer, the loss greater, and more nearly equal; but the result

would have been the same. Cooper says that the enemy entered with

great caution, and so slowly that twenty resolute men could have

repulsed him. It was no proof of caution for Captain Broke and his

few followers to leap on board, unsupported, and then they only

waited for the main body to come up; and no twenty men could have

repulsed such boarders as followed Broke. The fight was another

lesson, with the parties reversed, to the effect that want of

training and discipline is a bad handicap. Had the _Chesapeake's_

crew been in service as many months as the _Shannon's_ had been years,

such a captain as Lawrence would have had his men perfectly in hand;

they would not have been cowed by their losses, nor some of the

officers too demoralized to act properly, and the material advantages

which the _Chesapeake_ possessed, although not very great, would

probably have been enough to give her a good chance of victory. It

is well worth noticing that the only thoroughly disciplined set of

men aboard (all, according to James himself, by the way, native

Americans), namely, the marines, did excellently, as shown by the

fact that three fourths of their number were among the killed and

wounded. The foreigners aboard the _Chesapeake_ did not do as well

as the Americans, but it is nonsense to ascribe the defeat in any

way to them; it was only rendered rather more disastrous by their

actions. Most of the English authors give very fair accounts of the

battle, except that they hardly allude to the peculiar disadvantages

under which the _Chesapeake_ suffered when she entered into it. Thus,

James thinks the _Java_ was unprepared because she had only been to

sea six weeks; but does not lay any weight on the fact that the

_Chesapeake_ had been out only as many hours.

Altogether the best criticism on the fight is that written by M. de

la Gravière. [Footnote: "Guerres Maritimes," ii, 272.] "It is

impossible to avoid seeing in the capture of the _Chesapeake_ a new

proof of the enormous power of a good organization, when it has

received the consecration of a few years' actual service on the sea.

On this occasion, in effect, two captains equally renowned, the honor

of two navies, were opposed to each other on two ships of the same

tonnage and number of guns. Never had the chances seemed better

balanced, but Sir Philip Broke had commanded the _Shannon_ for nearly

seven years, while Captain Lawrence had only commanded the _Chesapeake_

for a few days. The first of these frigates had cruised for eighteen

months on the coast of America; the second was leaving port. One had

a crew long accustomed to habits of strict obedience; the other was

manned by men who had just been engaged in mutiny. The Americans were

wrong to accuse fortune on this occasion. Fortune was not fickle,

she was merely logical. The _Shannon_ captured the _Chesapeake_ on

the first of June, 1813, but on the 14th of September, 1806, the day

when he took command of his frigate, Captain Broke had begun to

prepare the glorious termination to this bloody affair."

Hard as it is to breathe a word against such a man as Lawrence,

a very Bayard of the seas, who was admired as much for his dauntless

bravery as he was loved for his gentleness and uprightness, it must

be confessed that he acted rashly. And after he had sailed, it was,

as Lord Howard Douglass has pointed out, a tactical error, however

chivalric to neglect the chance of luffing across the _Shannon's_

stern to rake her; exactly as it was a tactical error of his equally

chivalrous antagonist to have let him have such an opportunity. Hull

would not have committed either error, and would, for the matter of

that, have been an overmatch for either commander. But it must always

be remembered that Lawrence's encounters with the English had not

been such as to give him a high opinion of them. The only foe he

had fought had been inferior in strength, it is true, but had hardly

made any effective resistance. Another sloop, of equal, if not

superior force, had tamely submitted to blockade for several days,

and had absolutely refused to fight. And there can be no doubt that

the _Chesapeake_, unprepared though she was, would have been an

overmatch for the _Guerrière_, _Macedonian_, or _Java_. Altogether

it is hard to blame Lawrence for going out, and in every other respect

his actions never have been, nor will be, mentioned, by either friend

or foe, without the warmest respect. But that is no reason for

insisting that he was ruined purely by an adverse fate. We will do

far better to recollect that as much can be learned from reverses

as from victories. Instead of flattering ourselves by saying the

defeat was due to chance, let us try to find out what the real cause

was, and then take care that it does not have an opportunity to act

again. A little less rashness would have saved Lawrence's life and

his frigate, while a little more audacity on one occasion would have

made Commodore Chauncy famous for ever. And whether a lesson is to

be learned or not, a historian should remember that his profession

is not that of a panegyrist. The facts of the case unquestionably

are that Captain Broke, in fair fight, within sight of the enemy's

harbor, proved conqueror over a nominally equal and in reality slightly

superior force; and that this is the only single-ship action of the

war in which the victor was weaker in force than his opponent. So

much can be gathered by reading only the American accounts. Moreover

accident had little or nothing to do with the gaining of the victory.

The explanation is perfectly easy; Lawrence and Broke were probably

exactly equal in almost every thing that goes to make up a first-class

commander, but one had trained his crew for seven years, and the

other was new to the ship, to the officers, and to the men, and the

last to each other. The _Chesapeake's_ crew must have been of fine

material, or they would not have fought so well as they did.

So much for the American accounts. On the other hand, the capture

of the _Chesapeake_ was, and is, held by many British historians

to "conclusively prove" a good many different things; such as, that

if the odds were anything like equal, a British frigate could always

whip an American, that in a hand-to-hand conflict such would invariably

be the case, etc.; and as this was the only single-ship action of

the war in which the victor was the inferior in force, most British

writers insist that it reflected more honor on them than all the

frigate actions of 1812 put together did on the Americans.

These assertions can be best appreciated by reference to a victory

won by the French in the year of the Battle of the Nile. On the 14th

of December, 1798, after two hours' conflict, the French 24-gun

corvette _Bayonnaise_ captured, by boarding, the English 32-gun

frigate _Ambuscade_. According to James the _Ambuscade_ threw at

a broadside 262 pounds of shot, and was manned by 190 men, while

the _Bayonnaise_ threw 150 pounds, and had on board supernumeraries

and passenger soldiers enough to make in all 250 men. According

to the French historian Rouvier [Footnote: "Histoire des Marins

Français sous la République," par Charles Rouvier, Lieutenant de

Vaisseau. Paris, 1868.] the broadside force was 246 pounds against

80 pounds; according to Troude [Footnote: "Batailles Navales."] it

was 270 pounds against 112. M. Léon Guérin, in his voluminous but

exceedingly prejudiced and one-sided work, [Footnote: "Histoire

Maritime de France" (par Léon Guérin, Historien titulaire de la

Marine, Membre de la Legion d'Honneur), vi. 142 (Paris, 1852).] makes

the difference even greater. At any rate the English vessel was

vastly the superior in force, and was captured by boarding, after

a long and bloody conflict in which she lost 46, and her antagonist

over 50, men. During all the wars waged with the Republic and the

Empire, no English vessel captured a French one as much superior

to itself as the _Ambuscade_ was to the _Bayonnaise_, precisely as

in the war of 1812 no American vessel captured a British opponent

as much superior to itself as the _Chesapeake_ was to the _Shannon_.

Yet no sensible man can help acknowledging, in spite of these and

a few other isolated instances, that at that time the French were

inferior to the English, and the latter to the Americans.

It is amusing to compare the French histories of the English with

the English histories of the Americans, and to notice the similarity

of the arguments they use to detract from their opponents' fame.

Of course I do not allude to such writers as Lord Howard Douglass

or Admiral de la Gravière, but to men like William James and Léon

Guérin, or even O. Troude. James is always recounting how American

ships ran away from British ones, and Guérin tells as many anecdotes

of British ships who fled from French foes. James reproaches the

Americans for adopting a "Parthian" mode of warfare, instead of

"bringing to in a bold and becoming manner." Precisely the same

reproaches are used by the French writers, who assert that the English

would not fight "fairly," but acquired an advantage by manoeuvring.

James lays great stress on the American long guns; so does Lieutenant

Rouvier on the British carronades. James always tells how the

Americans avoided the British ships, when the crews of the latter

demanded to be led aboard; Troude says the British always kept at

long shot, while the French sailors "demandérent, à grands cris,

l'abordage." James says the Americans "hesitated to grapple" with

their foes "unless they possessed a twofold superiority"; Guérin

that the English "never dared attack" except when they possessed

"une supériorité énorme." The British sneer at the "mighty dollar";

the French at the "eternal guinea." The former consider Decatur's

name as "sunk" to the level of Porter's or Bainbridge's; the latter

assert that the "presumptuous Nelson" was inferior to any of the

French admirals of the time preceding the Republic. Says James:

"The Americans only fight well when they have the superiority of

force on their side"; and Lieutenant Rouvier: "Never have the

English vanquished us with an undoubted inferiority of force."

On June 12, 1813, the small cutter _Surveyor_, of 6 12-pound

carronades, was lying in York River, in the Chesapeake, under the

command of Mr. William S. Travis; her crew consisted of but 15 men.

[Footnote: Letter of W. S. Travis, June 16, 1813.] At nightfall

she was attacked by the boats of the _Narcissus_ frigate, containing

about 50 men, under the command of Lieutenant John Creerie. [Footnote:

James, vi. 334.] None of the carronades could be used; but Mr. Travis

made every preparation that he could for defence. The Americans

waited till the British were within pistol shot before they opened

their fire; the latter dashed gallantly on, however, and at once

carried the cutter. But though brief, the struggle was bloody;

5 of the Americans were wounded, and of the British 3 were killed

and 7 wounded. Lieutenant Creerie considered his opponents to have

shown so much bravery that he returned Mr. Travis his sword, with

a letter as complimentary to him as it was creditable to the writer.

[Footnote: The letter, dated June 13th, is as follows: "Your gallant

and desperate attempt to defend your vessel against more than double

your number, on the night of the 12th instant, excited such admiration

on the part of your opponents as I have seldom witnessed, and induced

me to return you the sword you had so nobly used, in testimony of

mine. Our poor fellows have suffered severely, occasioned chiefly,

if not solely, by the precautions you had taken to prevent surprise.

In short, I am at a loss which to admire most, the previous arrangement

aboard the _Surveyor_, or the determined manner in which her deck

was disputed inch by inch. I am, sir," etc.]

As has been already mentioned, the Americans possessed a large force

of gun-boats at the beginning of the war. Some of these were fairly

sea-worthy vessels, of 90 tons burden, sloop--or schooner-rigged,

and armed with one or two long, heavy guns, and sometime with several

light carronades to repel boarders. [Footnote: According to a letter

from Captain Hugh G. Campbell (in the Naval Archives, "Captains'

Letters," 1812, vol. ii. Nos. 21 and 192), the crews were distributed

as follows: ten men and a boy to a long 32. seven men and a boy to

a long 9. and five men and a boy to a carronade, exclusive of petty

officers. Captain Campbell complains of the scarcity of men, and

rather naively remarks that he is glad the marines have been

withdrawn from the gun boats, as this may make the commanders of

the latter keep a brighter lookout than formerly.] Gun-boats of this

kind, together with the few small cutters owned by the government,

were serviceable enough. They were employed all along the shores

of Georgia and the Carolinas, and in Long Island Sound, in protecting

the coasting trade by convoying parties of small vessels from one

port to another, and preventing them from being molested by the

boats of any of the British frigates. They also acted as checks

upon the latter in their descents upon the towns and plantations,

occasionally capturing their boats and tenders, and forcing them to

be very cautious in their operations. They were very useful in

keeping privateers off the coast, and capturing them when they

came too far in. The exploits of those on the southern coast will

be mentioned as they occurred. Those in Long Island Sound never

came into collision with the foe, except for a couple of slight

skirmishes at very long range; but in convoying little fleets of

coasters, and keeping at bay the man-of-war boats sent to molest

them, they were invaluable; and they also kept the Sound clear of

hostile privateers.

Many of the gun-boats were much smaller than those just mentioned,

trusting mainly to their sweeps for motive power, and each relying

for offence on one long pivot gun, a 12- or 18-pounder. In the

Chesapeake there was a quite a large number of these small gallies,

with a few of the larger kind, and here it was thought that by

acting together in flotillas the gun-boats might in fine weather

do considerable damage to the enemy's fleet by destroying detached

vessels, instead of confining themselves to the more humble tasks

in which their brethren elsewhere were fairly successful. At this

period Denmark, having lost all her larger ships of war, was confining

herself purely to gun-brigs. These were stout little crafts, with

heavy guns, which, acting together, and being handled with spirit

and skill, had on several occasions in calm weather captured small

British sloops, and had twice so injured frigates as to make their

return to Great Britain necessary; while they themselves had frequently

been the object of successful cutting-out expeditions. Congress

hoped that our gun-boats would do as well as the Danish; but for

a variety of reasons they failed utterly in every serious attack that

they made on a man-of-war, and were worse than useless for all but

the various subordinate employments above mentioned. The main

reason for this failure was in the gun-boats themselves. They were

utterly useless except in perfectly calm weather, for in any wind

the heavy guns caused them to careen over so as to make it difficult

to keep them right side up, and impossible to fire. Even in smooth

water they could not be fought at anchor, requiring to be kept in

position by means of sweeps; and they were very unstable, the recoil

of the guns causing them to roll so as to make it difficult to aim

with any accuracy after the first discharge, while a single shot

hitting one put it _hors de combat_. This last event rarely happened,

however, for they were not often handled with any approach to

temerity, and, on the contrary, usually made their attacks at a

range that rendered it as impossible to inflict as to receive harm.

It does not seem as if they were very well managed; but they were

such ill-conditioned craft that the best officers might be pardoned

for feeling uncomfortable in them. Their operations throughout the

war offer a painfully ludicrous commentary on Jefferson's remarkable

project of having our navy composed exclusively of such craft.

The first aggressive attempt made with the gun-boats was

characteristically futile. On June 20th 15 of them, under Captain

Tarbell, attacked the _Junon_, 38, Captain Sanders, then lying becalmed

in Hampton Roads, with the _Barossa_, 36, and _Laurestinus_, 24,

near her. The gun-boats, while still at very long range, anchored,

and promptly drifted round so that they couldn't shoot. Then they

got under way, and began gradually to draw nearer to the _Junon_.

Her defence was very feeble; after some hasty and ill-directed

vollies she endeavored to beat out of the way. But meanwhile, a

slight breeze having sprung up, the _Barossa_, Captain Sherriff,

approached near enough to take a hand in the affair, and at once

made it evident that she was a more dangerous foe than the _Junon_,

though a lighter ship. As soon as they felt the effects of the

breeze the gun-boats became almost useless and, the _Barossa's_ fire

being animated and well aimed, they withdrew. They had suffered

nothing from the _Junon_, but during the short period she was engaged,

the _Barossa_ had crippled one boat and slightly damaged another;

one man was killed and two wounded. The _Barossa_ escaped unscathed

and the _Junon_ was but slightly injured. Of the combatants, the

_Barossa_ was the only one that came off with credit, the _Junon_

behaving, if any thing, rather worse than the gun-boats. There was

no longer any doubt as to the amount of reliance to be placed on the

latter. [Footnote: Though the flotilla men did nothing in the boats,

they acted with the most stubborn bravery at the battle of Bladensburg.

The British Lieutenant Graig, himself a spectator, thus writes of

their deeds on that occasion ("Campaign at Washington," p. 119).

"Of the sailors, however, it would be injustice not to speak in the

terms which their conduct merits. They were employed as gunners, and

not only did they serve their guns with a quickness and precision

which astonished their assailants, but they stood till some of them

were actually bayoneted with fuses in their hands; nor was it till

their leader was wounded and taken, and they saw themselves deserted

on all sides by the soldiers, that they quitted the field." Certainly

such men could not be accused of lack of courage. Something else is

needed to account for the failure of the gun-boat system.]

On June 20, 1813, a British force of three 74's, one 64, four frigates,

two sloops, and three transports was anchored off Craney Island.

On the north-west side of this island was a battery of 18-pounders,

to take charge of which Captain Cassin, commanding the naval forces

at Norfolk, sent ashore one hundred sailors of the _Constellation_,

under the command of Lieutenants Neale, Shubrick, and Saunders, and

fifty marines under Lieutenant Breckenbridge.[Footnote: Letter of

Captain John Cassin, June 23, 1813.] On the morning of the 22d they

were attacked by a division of 15 boats, containing 700 men,

[Footnote: James, vi, 337.] seamen, marines, chasseurs, and soldiers

of the 102d regiment, the whole under the command of Captain Pechell,

of the _San Domingo_, 74. Captain Hanchett led the attack in the

_Diadem's_ launch. The battery's guns were not fired till the British

were close in, when they opened with destructive effect. While still

some seventy yards from the guns the _Diadem's_ launch grounded,

and the attack was checked. Three of the boats were now sunk by shot,

but the water was so shallow that they remained above water; and while

the fighting was still at its height, some of the _Constellation's_

crew, headed by Midshipman Tatnall, waded out and took possession

of them. [Footnote: "Life of Commodore Josiah Tatnall," by Charles

C. Jones, Jr. (Savannah, 1878), p. 17.] A few of their crew threw

away their arms and came ashore with their captors; others escaped

to the remaining boats, and immediately afterward the flotilla made

off in disorder having lost 91 men. The three captured barges were

large, strong boats, one called the Centipede being fifty feet long,

and more formidable than many of the American gun-vessels. The

_Constellation's_ men deserve great credit for their defence, but

the British certainly did not attack with their usual obstinacy. When

the foremost boats were sunk, the water was so shallow and the bottom

so good that the Americans on shore, as just stated, at once waded

out to them; and if in the heat of the fight Tatnall and his seamen

could get _out_ to the boats, the 700 British ought to have been

able to get _in_ to the battery, whose 150 defenders would then have

stood no chance. [Footnote: James comments on this repulse as "a

defeat as discreditable to those that caused it as honorable to those

that suffered in it." "Unlike most other nations, the Americans in

particular, the British, when engaged in expeditions of this nature,

always rest their hopes of success upon valor rather than on numbers."

These comments read particularly well when it is remembered that

the assailants outnumbered the assailed in the proportion of 5 to 1.

It is monotonous work to have to supplement a history by a running

commentary on James' mistakes and inventions; but it is worth while

to prove once for all the utter unreliability of the author who is

accepted in Great Britain as the great authority about the war. Still,

James is no worse than his compeers. In the American Coggeshall's

"History of Privateers," the misstatements are as gross and the

sneers in as poor taste--the British, instead of the Americans,

being the objects.]

On July 14, 1813, the two small vessels _Scorpion_ and _Asp_, the

latter commanded by Mr. Sigourney, got under way from out of the

Yeocomico Creek, [Footnote: Letter of Midshipman McClintock, July

15, 1813.] and at 10 A.M. discovered in chase the British brig-sloops

_Contest_, Captain James Rattray, and _Mohawk_, Captain Henry D.

Byng. [Footnote: James, vi, 343.] The _Scorpion_ beat up the

Chesapeake, but the dull-sailing _Asp_ had to reenter the creek;

the two brigs anchored off the bar and hoisted out their boats,

under the command of Lieutenant Rodger C. Curry; whereupon the _Asp_

cut her cable and ran up the creek some distance. Here she was

attacked by three boats, which Mr. Sigourney and his crew of twenty

men, with two light guns, beat off; but they were joined by two

others, and the five carried the _Asp_, giving no quarter. Mr.

Sigourney and 10 of his men were killed or wounded, while the

British also suffered heavily, having 4 killed and 7 (including

Lieutenant Curry) wounded. The surviving Americans reached the shore,

rallied under Midshipman H. McClintock (second in command), and when

the British retired after setting the _Asp_ on fire, at once boarded

her, put out the flames, and got her in fighting order; but they

were not again molested.

On July 29th, while the _Junon_, 38, Captain Sanders, and _Martin_,

18, Captain Senhouse, were in Delaware Bay, the latter grounded on

the outside of Crow's Shoal; the frigate anchored within supporting

distance, and while in this position the two ships were attacked by

the American flotilla in those waters, consisting of eight gun-boats,

carrying each 25 men and one long 32, and two heavier block-sloops,

[Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Angus, July 30, 1813.] commanded by

Lieutenant Samuel Angus. The flotilla kept at such a distance that

an hour's cannonading did no damage whatever to anybody; and during

that time gun-boat No. 121, Sailing-master Shead, drifted a mile

and a half away from her consorts. Seeing this the British made a

dash at her, in 7 boats, containing 140 men, led by Lieutenant Philip

Westphal. Mr. Shead anchored and made an obstinate defence, but at

the first discharge the gun's pintle gave way, and the next time

it was fired the gun-carriage was almost torn to pieces. He kept

up a spirited fire of small arms, in reply to the boat-carronades

and musketry of the assailants; but the latter advanced steadily

and carried the gun-boat by boarding, 7 of her people being wounded,

while 7 of the British were killed and 13 wounded. [Footnote: Letter

of Mr. Shead. Aug. 5, 1813.] The defence of No. 121 was very creditable,

but otherwise the honor of the day was certainly with the British;

whether because the gun-boats were themselves so worthless or because

they were not handled boldly enough, they did no damage, even to

the grounded sloop, that would seem to have been at their mercy.

[Footnote: The explanation possibly lies in the fact that the

gun-boats had worthless powder. In the Naval Archives there is a

letter from Mr. Angus ("Masters' Commandant Letters," 1813, No. 3:

see also No. 91), in which he says that the frigate's shot passed

over them, while theirs could not even reach the sloop. He also

encloses a copy of a paper, signed by the other gun-boat officers,

which runs: "We, the officers of the vessels comprising the Delaware

flotilla, protest against the powder as being unfit for service."]

On June 18th the American brig-sloop _Argus_, commanded by Lieutenant

William Henry Allen, late first of the _United States_, sailed from

New York for France, with Mr. Crawford, minister for that country,

aboard, and reached L'Orient on July 11th, having made one prize

on the way. On July 14th she again sailed, and cruised in the chops

of the Channel, capturing and burning ship after ship, and creating

the greatest consternation among the London merchants; she then

cruised along Cornwall and got into St. George's Channel, where the

work of destruction went on. The labor was very severe and harassing,

the men being able to get very little rest. [Footnote: Court of

Inquiry into loss of _Argus_, 1815.] On the night of August 13th,

a brig laden with wine from Oporto was captured and burnt, and

unluckily many of the crew succeeded in getting at some of the

cargo. At 5 A.M. on the 14th a large brig-of-war was discovered

standing down under a cloud of canvas. [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant

Watson, March 2, 1815.] This was the British brig-sloop _Pelican_,

Captain John Fordyce Maples, which, from information received at

Cork three days previous, had been cruising especially after the

_Argus_, and had at last found her; St. David's Head bore east

five leagues (lat. 52° 15' N. and 5° 50' W.)

The small, fine-lined American cruiser, with her lofty masts and

long spars, could easily have escaped from her heavier antagonist:

but Captain Allen had no such intention, and, finding he could not

get the weather-gage, he shortened sail and ran easily along on the

starboard tack, while the _Pelican_ came down on him with the wind

(which was from the south) nearly aft. At 6 A.M. the _Argus_ wore

and fired her port guns within grape distance, the _Pelican_ responding

with her starboard battery, and the action began with great spirit

on both sides. [Footnote: Letter of Captain Maples to Admiral

Thornborough, Aug. 14, 1813.] At 6.04 a round shot carried off Captain

Allen's leg, inflicting a mortal wound, but he stayed on deck till

he fainted from loss of blood. Soon the British fire carried away

the main-braces, main-spring-stay, gaff, and try-sail mast of the

_Argus_; the first lieutenant, Mr. Watson, was wounded in the head

by a grape-shot and carried below; the second lieutenant, Mr. U. H.

Allen (no relation of the captain), continued to fight the ship

with great skill. The _Pelican's_ fire continued very heavy, the

_Argus_ losing her spritsail-yard and most of the standing rigging

on the port side of the foremast. At 6.14 Captain Maples bore up

to pass astern of his antagonist, but Lieutenant Allen luffed into

the wind and threw the main-top-sail aback, getting into a beautiful

raking position [Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant Watson.]; had the

men at the guns done their duty as well as those on the quarter-deck

did theirs, the issue of the fight would have been very different;

but, as it was, in spite of her favorable position, the raking

broadside of the _Argus_ did little damage. Two or three minutes

afterward the _Argus_ lost the use of her after-sails through having

her preventer-main-braces and top-sail tie shot away, and fell off

before the wind, when the _Pelican_ at 6.18 passed her stern, raking

her heavily, and then ranged up on her starboard quarter. In a few

minutes the wheel-ropes and running-rigging of every description were

shot away, and the _Argus_ became utterly unmanageable. The _Pelican_

continued raking her with perfect impunity, and at 6.35 passed her

broadside and took a position on her starboard bow, when at 6.45

the brigs fell together, and the British "were in the act of boarding

when the _Argus_ struck her colors," [Footnote: Letter of Captain

Maples.] at 6.45 A.M. The _Pelican_ carried, besides her regular

armament, two long 6's as stern-chasers, and her broadside weight

of metal was thus: [Footnote: James, vi, 320.]

1 X 6

1 X 6

1 X 12

8 X 32

or 280 lbs. against the _Argus_':

1 X 12

9 X 24

or, subtracting as usual 7 per cent. for light weight of metal, 210

lbs. The _Pelican's_ crew consisted of but 116 men, according to

the British account, though the American reports make it much larger.

The _Argus_ had started from New York with 137 men, but having manned

and sent in several prizes, her crew amounted, as near as can be

ascertained, to 104. Mr. Low in his "Naval History," published just

after the event, makes it but 99. James makes it 121; as he placed

the crew of the _Enterprise_ at 125, when it was really 102; that

of the _Hornet_ at 162, instead of 135; of the _Peacock_ at 185,

instead of 166; of the _Nautilus_ at 106 instead of 95, etc., etc.,

it is safe to presume that he has overestimated it by at least 20,

which brings the number pretty near to the American accounts. The

_Pelican_ lost but two men killed and five wounded. Captain Maples

had a narrow escape, a spent grape-shot striking him in the chest

with some force, and then falling on the deck. One shot had passed

through the boatswain's and one through the carpenter's cabin; her

sides were filled with grape-shot, and her rigging and sails much

injured; her foremast, main-top-mast, and royal masts were slightly

wounded, and two of her carronades dismounted.

The injuries of the _Argus_ have already been detailed; her hull

and lower masts were also tolerably well cut up. Of her crew, Captain

Allen, two midshipmen, the carpenter, and six seamen were killed or

mortally wounded; her first lieutenant and 13 seamen severely and

slightly wounded: total, 10 killed and 14 wounded.

In reckoning the comparative force, I include the Englishman's

six-pound stern-chaser, which could not be fired in broadside with

the rest of the guns, because I include the _Argus_' 12-pound

bow-chaser, which also could not be fired in broadside, as it was

crowded into the bridle-port. James, of course, carefully includes

the latter, though leaving out the former.

[Illustration: _Argus_ vs. _Pelican_: an engraving published in

London in 1817. (Courtesy Beverley R. Robinson Collection, U.S.

Naval Academy Museum)]

COMPARISON.

Comparative

No. Weight Comparative Loss

Tons. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss. Force. Inflicted.

_Argus_ 298 10 210 104 24 .82 .29

_Pelican_ 467 11 280 116 7 1.00 1.00

[Illustration of _ARGUS_ and _PELICAN_ action from 6.00 A.M. to 6.45]

Of all the single-ship actions fought in the war this is the least

creditable to the Americans. The odds in force, it is true, were

against the _Argus_, about in the proportion of 10 to 8, but this

is neither enough to account for the loss inflicted being as 10 to

3, nor for her surrendering when she had been so little ill used.

It was not even as if her antagonist had been an unusually fine

vessel of her class. The _Pelican_ did not do as well as either

the _Frolic_ previously, or the _Reindeer_ afterward, though perhaps

rather better than the _Avon_, _Penguin_, or _Peacock_. With a

comparatively unmanageable antagonist, in smooth water, she ought

to have sunk her in three quarters of an hour. But the _Pelican's_

not having done particularly well merely makes the conduct of the

Americans look worse; it is just the reverse of the _Chesapeake's_

case, where, paying the highest credit to the British, we still

thought the fight no discredit to us. Here we can indulge no such

reflection. The officers did well, but the crew did not. Cooper

says: "The enemy was so much heavier that it may be doubted whether

the _Argus_ would have captured her antagonist under any ordinary

circumstances." This I doubt; such a crew as the _Wasp's_ or _Hornet's_

probably would have been successful. The trouble with the guns of

the _Argus_ was not so much that they were too small, as that they

did not hit; and this seems all the more incomprehensible when it

is remembered that Captain Allen is the very man to whom Commodore

Decatur, in his official letter, attributed the skilful gun-practice

of the crew of the frigate _United States_. Cooper says that the

powder was bad; and it has also been said that the men of the _Argus_

were over-fatigued and were drunk, in which case they ought not to

have been brought into action. Besides unskilfulness, there is

another very serious count against the crew. Had the _Pelican_ been

some distance from the _Argus_, and in a position where she could

pour in her fire with perfect impunity to herself, when the surrender

took place, it would have been more justifiable. But, on the contrary,

the vessels were touching, and the British boarded just as the

colors were hauled down; it was certainly very disgraceful that the

Americans did not rally to repel them, for they had still four fifths

of their number absolutely untouched. They certainly _ought_ to have

succeeded, for boarding is a difficult and dangerous experiment;

and if they had repulsed their antagonists they might in turn have

carried the _Pelican_. So that, in summing up the merits of this

action, it is fair to say that both sides showed skilful seamanship

and unskilful gunnery; that the British fought bravely and that the

Americans did not.

It is somewhat interesting to compare this fight, where a weaker

American sloop was taken by a stronger British one, with two or three

others, where both the comparative force and the result were reversed.

Comparing it, therefore, with the actions between the _Hornet_ and

_Peacock_ (British), the _Wasp_ and _Avon_, and the _Peacock_

(American) and _Epervier_, we get four actions, in one of which, the

first-named, the British were victorious, and in the other three the

Americans.

Comparative Comparative Loss Per cent.

Force. Inflicted. Loss.

_Pelican_ (British) 1.00 1.00 .06

_Argus_ (American) .82 .29 .23

_Hornet_ (American) 1.00 1.00 .02

_Peacock_ (British) .83 .07 .31

_Wasp_ (American) 1.00 1.00 .02

_Avon_ (British) .80 .07 .33

_Peacock_ (American) 1.00 1.00 .01

_Epervier_ (British) .81 .08 .20

It is thus seen that in these sloop actions the superiority of force

on the side of the victor was each time about the same. The _Argus_

made a much more effectual resistance than did either the _Peacock_,

_Avon_, or _Epervier_, while the _Pelican_ did her work in poorer

form than either of the victorious American sloops; and, on the other

hand, the resistance of the _Argus_ did not by any means show as much

bravery as was shown in the defence of the _Peacock_ or _Avon_,

although rather more than in the case of the _Epervier_.

This is the only action of the war where it is almost impossible

to find out the cause of the inferiority of the beaten crew. In

almost all other cases we find that one crew had been carefully

drilled, and so proved superior to a less-trained antagonist; but

it is incredible that the man, to whose exertions when first lieutenant

of the _States_ Commodore Decatur ascribes the skilfulness of that

ship's men, should have neglected to train his own crew; and this

had the reputation of being composed of a fine set of men. Bad powder

would not account for the surrender of the _Argus_ when so little

damaged. It really seems as if the men _must_ have been drunk or

over-fatigued, as has been so often asserted. Of course drunkenness

would account for the defeat, although not in the least altering its

humiliating character.

"Et tu quoque" is not much of an argument; still it may be as well

to call to mind here two engagements in which British sloops suffered

much more discreditable defeats than the _Argus_ did. The figures

are taken from James; as given by the French historians they make

even a worse showing for the British.

A short time before our war the British brig _Carnation_, 18, had

been captured, by boarding, by the French brig _Palinure_, 16, and

the British brig _Alacrity_, 18, had been captured, also by boarding,

by the corvette _Abeille_, 20.

The following was the comparative force, etc., of the combatants:

Weight Metal. No. Crew. Loss.

_Carnation_ 262 117 40

_Palmure_ 174 100 20

_Alacrity_ 262 100 18

_Abeille_ 260 130 19

In spite of the pride the British take in their hand-to-hand prowess

both of these ships were captured by boarding. The _Carnation_ was

captured by a much smaller force, instead of by a much larger one,

as in the case of the _Argus_; and if the _Argus_ gave up before

she had suffered greatly, the _Alacrity_ surrendered when she had

suffered still less. French historians asserted that the capture of

the two brigs proved that "French valor could conquer British

courage"; and a similar opinion was very complacently expressed by

British historians after the defeat of the _Argus_. All that the

three combats really "proved" was, that in eight encounters between

British and American sloops the Americans were defeated once, and

in a far greater number of encounters between French and British

sloops the British were defeated twice. No one pretends that either

navy was invincible; the question is, which side averaged best?

At the opening of the war we possessed several small brigs; these

had originally been fast, handy little schooners, each armed with

12 long sixes, and with a crew of 60 men. As such they were effective

enough; but when afterward changed into brigs, each armed with a

couple of extra guns, and given 40 additional men, they became too

slow to run, without becoming strong enough to fight. They carried

far too many guns and men for their size, and not enough to give

them a chance with any respectable opponent; and they were almost

all ignominiously captured. The single exception was the brig

_Enterprise_. She managed to escape capture, owing chiefly to good

luck, and once fought a victorious engagement, thanks to the fact

that the British possessed a class of vessels even worse than our

own. She was kept near the land and finally took up her station off

the eastern coast, where she did good service in chasing away or

capturing the various Nova Scotian or New Brunswick privateers,

which were smaller and less formidable vessels than the privateers

of the United States, and not calculated for fighting.

By crowding guns into her bridle-ports, and over-manning herself,

the _Enterprise_, now under the command of Lieutenant William

Burrows, mounted 14 eighteen-pound carronades and 2 long 9's, with

102 men. On September 5th, while standing along shore near Penguin

Point, a few miles to the eastward of Portland, Me., she discovered,

at anchor inside, a man-of-war brig [Footnote: Letter from Lieutenant

Edward R. McCall to Commodore Hull, September 5, 1813.] which proved

to be H.M.S. _Boxer_, Captain Samuel Blyth, of 12 carronades,

eighteen-pounders and two long sixes, with but 66 men aboard, 12 of

her crew being absent.[Footnote: James, "Naval Occurrences," 264.

The American accounts give the _Boxer_ 104 men, on very insufficient

grounds. Similarly, James gives the _Enterprise_ 123 men. Each side

will be considered authority for its own force and loss.] The _Boxer_

at once hoisted three British ensigns and bore up for the _Enterprise_,

then standing in on the starboard tack; but when the two brigs were

still 4 miles apart it fell calm. At midday a breeze sprang up from

the southwest, giving the American the weather-gage, but the latter

manoeuvred for some time to windward to try the comparative rates

of sailing of the vessels. At 3 P.M. Lieutenant Burrows hoisted three

ensigns, shortened sail, and edged away toward the enemy, who came

gallantly on. Captain Blyth had nailed his colors to the mast, telling

his men they should never be struck while he had life in his body.

[Footnote: "Naval Chronicle," vol. xxxii, p. 462.] Both crews cheered

loudly as they neared each other, and at 3.15, the two brigs being

on the starboard tack not a half pistol-shot apart, they opened fire,

the American using the port, and the English the starboard, battery.

Both broadsides were very destructive, each of the commanders falling

at the very beginning of the action. Captain Blyth was struck by

an eighteen-pound shot while he was standing on the quarter-deck;

it passed completely through his body, shattering his left arm and

killing him on the spot. The command, thereupon, devolved on Lieutenant

David McCreery. At almost the same time his equally gallant antagonist

fell. Lieutenant Burrows, while encouraging his men, laid hold of

a gun-tackle fall to help the crew of a carronade run out the gun;

in doing so he raised one leg against the bulwark, when a canister

shot struck his thigh, glancing into his body and inflicting a

fearful wound. [Footnote: Cooper, "Naval History," vol. ii, p. 259.]

In spite of the pain he refused to be carried below, and lay on the

deck, crying out that the colors must never be struck. Lieutenant

Edward McCall now took command. At 3.30 the _Enterprise_ ranged

ahead, rounded to on the starboard tack, and raked the _Boxer_ with

the starboard guns. At 3.35 the _Boxer_ lost her main-top-mast and

top-sail yard, but her crew still kept up the fight bravely, with

the exception of four men who deserted their quarters and were

afterward court-martialed for cowardice. [Footnote: Minutes of

court-martial held aboard H.M.S. _Surprise_, January 8, 1814.] The

_Enterprise_ now set her fore-sail and took position on the enemy's

starboard bow, delivering raking fires; and at 3.45 the latter

surrendered, when entirely unmanageable and defenceless. Lieutenant

Burrows would not go below until he had received the sword of his

adversary, when he exclaimed, "I am satisfied, I die contented."

[Illustration of action between _ENTERPRISE_ and _BOXER_ from

3.15 to 3.45]

Both brigs had suffered severely, especially the _Boxer_, which had

been hulled repeatedly, had three eighteen-pound shot through her

foremast, her top-gallant forecastle almost cut away, and several

of her guns dismounted. Three men were killed and seventeen wounded,

four mortally. The _Enterprise_ had been hulled by one round and

many grape; one 18-pound ball had gone through her foremast, and

another through her main-mast, and she was much cut up aloft. Two

of her men were killed and ten wounded, two of them (her commander

and Midshipman Kervin Waters) mortally. The British court-martial

attributed the defeat of the _Boxer_ "to a superiority in the enemy's

force, principally in the number of men, as well as to a greater

degree of skill in the direction of her fire, and to the destructive

effects of the first broadside." But the main element was the

superiority in force, the difference in loss being very nearly

proportional to it; both sides fought with equal bravery and equal

skill. This fact was appreciated by the victors, for at a naval dinner

given in New York shortly afterward, one of the toasts offered was:

"The crew of the _Boxer_; enemies by law, but by gallantry brothers."

The two commanders were both buried at Portland, with all the honors

of war. The conduct of Lieutenant Burrows needs no comment. He was

an officer greatly beloved and respected in the service. Captain

Blyth, on the other side, had not only shown himself on many occasions

to be a man of distinguished personal courage, but was equally noted

for his gentleness and humanity. He had been one of Captain Lawrence's

pall-bearers, and but a month previous to his death had received a

public note of thanks from an American colonel, for an act of great

kindness and courtesy. [Footnote: "Naval Chronicle," xxxii, 466.]

The _Enterprise_, under Lieut.-Com. Renshaw, now cruised off the

southern coast, where she made several captures. One of them was

a heavy British privateer, the _Mars_, of 14 long nines and 75 men,

which struck after receiving a broadside that killed and wounded 4

of her crew. The _Enterprise_ was chased by frigates on several

occasions; being once forced to throw overboard all her guns but

two, and escaping only by a shift in the wind. Afterward, as she

was unfit to cruise, she was made a guard-ship at Charlestown; for

the same reason the _Boxer_ was not purchased into the service.

On October 4th some volunteers from the Newport flotilla captured,

by boarding, the British privateer _Dart_, [Footnote: Letter of

Mr. Joseph Nicholson, Oct. 5, 1813.] after a short struggle in

which two of the assailants were wounded and several of the

privateersmen, including the first officer, were killed.

On December 4th, Commodore Rodgers, still in command of the

_President_, sailed again from Providence, Rhode Island. On the

25th, in lat. 19° N. and long. 35° W., the _President_, during the

night, fell in with two frigates, and came so close that the head-most

fired at her, when she made off. These were thought to be British,

but were in reality the two French 40-gun frigates _Nymphe_ and

_Meduse_, one month out of Brest. After this little encounter Rodgers

headed toward the Barbadoes, and cruised to windward of them.

On the whole the ocean warfare of 1813 was decidedly in favor of

the British, except during the first few months. The _Hornet's_

fight with the _Peacock_ was an action similar to those that took

place in 1812, and the cruise of Porter was unique in our annals,

both for the audacity with which it was planned, and the success

with which it was executed. Even later in the year the _Argus_ and

the _President_ made bold cruises in sight of the British coasts,

the former working great havoc among the merchant-men. But by that

time the tide had turned strongly in favor of our enemies. From the

beginning of summer the blockade was kept up so strictly that it

was with difficulty any of our vessels broke through it; they were

either chased back or captured. In the three actions that occurred,

the British showed themselves markedly superior in two, and in the

third the combatants fought equally well, the result being fairly

decided by the fuller crew and slightly heavier metal of the

_Enterprise_. The gun-boats, to which many had looked for harbor

defence, proved nearly useless, and were beaten off with ease

whenever they made an attack.

The lessons taught by all this were the usual ones. Lawrence's

victory in the _Hornet_ showed the superiority of a properly trained

crew to one that had not been properly trained; and his defeat in

the _Chesapeake_ pointed exactly the same way, demonstrating in

addition the folly of taking a raw levy out of port, and, before

they have had the slightest chance of getting seasoned, pitting them

against skilled veterans. The victory of the _Enterprise_ showed

the wisdom of having the odds in men and metal in our favor, when

our antagonist was otherwise our equal; it proved, what hardly

needed proving, that, whenever possible, a ship should be so

constructed as to be superior in force to the foes it would be likely

to meet. As far as the capture of the _Argus_ showed any thing, it

was the advantage of heavy metal and the absolute need that a crew

should fight with pluck. The failure of the gun-boats _ought_ to

have taught the lesson (though it did not) that too great economy

in providing the means of defence may prove very expensive in the

end, and that good officers and men are powerless when embarked

in worthless vessels. A similar point was emphasized by the strictness

of the blockade, and the great inconvenience it caused; namely,

that we ought to have had ships powerful enough to break it.

We had certainly lost ground during this year; fortunately we

regained it during the next two.

BRITISH VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN.

Name. Guns. Tonnage.

_Peacock_ 20 477

_Boxer_ 14 181

_Highflyer_ 6 96

___ ____

40 754

AMERICAN VESSELS SUNK OR TAKEN.

Name. Guns. Tonnage.

_Chesapeake_ 50 1,265

_Argus_ 20 298

_Viper_ 10 148

___ _____

80 1,711

VESSELS BUILT OR PURCHASED.

Name. Rig. Guns. Tonnage. Where Built. Cost.

_Rattlesnake_ Brig 14 278 Medford, Pa. $18,000

_Alligator_ Schooner 4 80

_Asp_ Sloop 3 56 2,600

PRIZES MADE.

Name of Ship. No. of Prizes.

_President_ 13

_Congress_ 4

_Chesapeake_ 6

_Essex_ 14

_Hornet_ 3

_Argus_ 21

Small craft 18

___

79