PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN DURING THE RUSSIAN-JAPANESE WAR]

Other available information is to the effect that the bodies of 60,624

killed were buried in the cemetery of honor in Tokio, and that, in

addition to these, 75,545 men died from wounds or disease. The Japanese

thus admit the loss of 135,000 men by death.[C]

Their Chief Medical Inspector says that their killed and wounded

amounted to 14.58 per cent of their entire force, from which it would

appear that they put into the field against us troops of various

categories to the number of 1,500,000--or more than three times the

estimate of our General Staff. In view of these facts, it is evident

that our information with regard to their fighting strength was

insufficient. At the time when they had hundreds of avowed and secret

agents in the Far East, studying the strength of our land and naval

forces, we entrusted the collection of data with regard to their

military strength and resources to a single officer of the General

Staff, and, unfortunately, our military observers were not always

well selected. One of these experts in Japanese affairs said, in

Vladivostok, before hostilities began, that, in the event of war, we

might count on one Russian soldier as equal to three Japanese. After

the first engagements he moderated his tone and admitted that it might

be necessary to put one Russian against every Japanese. At the end of

another month he declared that, in order to win victories, we must meet

every Japanese soldier in the field with three Russians. Another of

our military agents, who had been in Japan, predicted authoritatively

that Port Arthur would fall in a very short time, and that immediately

thereafter the same fate would overtake Vladivostok. I sharply

reprimanded the faint-hearted babbler and threatened to dismiss him

from the army if he continued to make such injurious and inopportune

remarks.

_Moral Superiority of the Japanese_

But it was not only with regard to Japan's material strength that

our information was insufficient. We underestimated, or entirely

overlooked, her moral strength. According to that great leader

Napoleon, three fourths of an army's success in war is due to the moral

character of its soldiers. This relation of moral character to material

success still exists, although the conditions of battle, in these

days, are more trying than they were in the Napoleonic wars. And now,

more than ever before, the moral strength of the army depends upon the

temper of the nation. Armies are now so organized that, in case of war,

soldiers are drawn, for the most part, from the reserves. A successful

war, therefore, must be a popular war, and victory must be attained by

the hearty coöperation of the whole people with its Government.

The recent contest in Manchuria was a popular war for the Japanese, but

not for us. The Korean question, and the question of naval supremacy

on the waters of the Pacific, involved vital Japanese interests, and

the immense importance of these interests was so clearly understood

and so fully appreciated by the Japanese people that the war for their

protection was a national war. Japan spent ten years in preparing

for it, and then the whole nation carried it on. Japanese soldiers,

deeply conscious of the bearing that their exploits might have on

the future of the country, fought with a self-sacrificing devotion

and a stubbornness that we had never seen in any war in which we had

previously been engaged. Sometimes, in villages that we had taken by

assault, a handful of Japanese soldiers would barricade themselves in

native houses and die there rather than retreat or surrender. Japanese

officers who fell into our hands--even wounded officers--generally

committed suicide.

It is quite possible that when we have a true history of the war based

on Japanese sources of information, our pride may receive another blow.

We already know that in many cases we outnumbered the enemy, and still

we were not victorious. The explanation of this, however, is very

simple. The Japanese, in these cases, were inferior to us materially,

but they were stronger than we morally.[D] To this aspect of the

struggle we should give particular attention, because military history

shows that, in all wars, the antagonist who is strongest morally wins

the victory. The only exceptions are such contests as that between the

English and the Boers in South Africa and that between the North and

the South in America. The English were weaker than the Boers morally,

but they put into the field an overwhelming force, and, in spite of

many defeats, they finally conquered. In the American war, the army

of the South was in the same position that the Boer army was, and the

Northerners had to put a superior force into the field in order to

overcome it.

[Illustration: GENERAL TERAUCHI

McClure's Magazine, Vol. XXXI, No. 6, October, 1908 · 第 20 / 83 题