_The Form of Education._
§ 23. The general form of Education is determined by the nature of the
mind, that it really is nothing but what it makes itself to be. The mind
is (1) immediate (or potential), but (2) it must estrange itself from
itself as it were, so that it may place itself over against itself as a
special object of attention; (3) this estrangement is finally removed
through a further acquaintance with the object--it feels itself at home
in that on which it looks, and returns again enriched to the form of
immediateness. That which at first appeared to be another than itself is
now seen to be itself. Education cannot create; it can only help to
develop to reality the previously existent possibility; it can only help
to bring forth to light the hidden life.
§ 24. All culture, whatever may be its special purport, must pass
through these two stages--of estrangement, and its removal. Culture must
hold fast to the distinction between the subject and the object
considered immediately, though it has again to absorb this distinction
into itself, in order that the union of the two may be more complete and
lasting. The subject recognizes then all the more certainly that what at
first appeared to it as a foreign existence, belongs to it as its own
property, and that it holds it as its own all the more by means of
culture.
--Plato, as is known, calls the feeling with which knowledge must begin,
wonder; but this can serve as a beginning only, for wonder itself can
only express the tension between the subject and the object at their
first encounter--a tension which would be impossible if they were not in
themselves identical. Children have a longing for the far-off, the
strange, and the wonderful, as if they hoped to find in these an
explanation of themselves. They want the object to be a genuine object.
That to which they are accustomed, which they see around them every day,
seems to have no longer any objective energy for them; but an alarm of
fire, banditti life, wild animals, gray old ruins, the robin's songs,
and far-off happy islands, &c.--everything high-colored and
dazzling--leads them irresistibly on. The necessity of the mind's making
itself foreign to itself is that which makes children prefer to hear of
the adventurous journeys of Sinbad than news of their own city or the
history of their nation, and in youth this same necessity manifests
itself in their desire of travelling.--
§ 25. This activity of the mind in allowing itself to be absorbed, and
consciously so, in an object with the purpose of making it his own, or
of producing it, is _Work_. But when the mind gives itself up to its
objects as chance may present them or through arbitrariness, careless as
to whether they have any result, such activity is _Play_. Work is laid
out for the pupil by his teacher by authority, but in his play he is
left to himself.
§ 26. Thus work and play must be sharply distinguished from each other.
If one has not respect for work as an important and substantial
activity, he not only spoils play for his pupil, for this loses all its
charm when deprived of the antithesis of an earnest, set task, but he
undermines his respect for real existence. On the other hand, if he does
not give him space, time, and opportunity, for play, he prevents the
peculiarities of his pupil from developing freely through the exercise
of his creative ingenuity. Play sends the pupil back refreshed to his
work, since in play he forgets himself in his own way, while in work he
is required to forget himself in a manner prescribed for him by another.
--Play is of great importance in helping one to discover the true
individualities of children, because in play they may betray
thoughtlessly their inclinations. This antithesis of work and play runs
through the entire life. Children anticipate in their play the earnest
work of after life; thus the little girl plays with her doll, and the
boy pretends he is a soldier and in battle.--
§ 27. Work should never be treated as if it were play, nor play as if it
were work. In general, the arts, the sciences, and productions, stand in
this relation to each other: the accumulation of stores of knowledge is
the recreation of the mind which is engaged in independent creation, and
the practice of arts fills the same office to those whose work is to
collect knowledge.
§ 28. Education seeks to transform every particular condition so that it
shall no longer seem strange to the mind or in anywise foreign to its
own nature. This identity of consciousness, and the special character of
anything done or endured by it, we call Habit [habitual conduct or
behavior]. It conditions formally all progress; for that which is not
yet become habit, but which we perform with design and an exercise of
our will, is not yet a part of ourselves.
§ 29. As to Habit, we have to say next that it is at first indifferent
as to what it relates. But that which is to be considered as indifferent
or neutral cannot be defined in the abstract, but only in the concrete,
because anything that is indifferent as to whether it shall act on these
particular men, or in this special situation, is capable of another or
even of the opposite meaning for another man or men for the same men or
in other circumstances. Here, then, appeal must be made to the
individual conscience in order to be able from the depths of
individuality to separate what we can permit to ourselves from that
which we must deny ourselves. The aim of Education must be to arouse in
the pupil this spiritual and ethical sensitiveness which does not
recognize anything as _merely_ indifferent, but rather knows how to
seize in everything, even in the seemingly small, its universal human
significance. But in relation to the highest problems he must learn that
what concerns his own immediate personality is entirely indifferent.
§ 30. Habit lays aside its indifference to an external action through
reflection on the advantage or disadvantage of the same. Whatever tends
as a harmonious means to the realization of an end is advantageous, but
that is disadvantageous which, by contradicting its idea, hinders or
destroys it. Advantage and disadvantage being then only _relative_
terms, a habit which is advantageous for one man in one case may be
disadvantageous for another man, or even for the same man, under
different circumstances. Education must, therefore, accustom the youth
to judge as to the expediency or inexpediency of any action in its
relation to the essential vocation of his life, so that he shall avoid
that which does not promote its success.
§ 31. But the _absolute_ distinction of habit is the moral distinction
between the good and the bad. For from this standpoint alone can we
finally decide what is allowable and what is forbidden, what is
advantageous and what is disadvantageous.
§ 32. As relates to form, habit may be either passive or active. The
passive is that which teaches us to bear the vicissitudes of nature as
well as of history with such composure that we shall hold our ground
against them, being always equal to ourselves, and that we shall not
allow our power of acting to be paralyzed through any mutations of
fortune. Passive habit is not to be confounded with obtuseness in
receiving impressions, a blank abstraction from the affair in hand which
at bottom is found to be nothing more than a selfishness which desires
to be left undisturbed: it is simply composure of mind in view of
changes over which we have no control. While we vividly experience joy
and sorrow, pain and pleasure--inwoven as these are with the change of
seasons, of the weather, &c.--with the alternation of life and death, of
happiness and misery, we ought nevertheless to harden ourselves against
them so that at the same time in our consciousness of the supreme worth
of the mind we shall build up the inaccessible stronghold of Freedom in
ourselves.--Active habit [or behavior] is found realized in a wide range
of activity which appears in manifold forms, such as skill, dexterity,
readiness of information, &c. It is a steeling of the internal for
action upon the external, as the Passive is a steeling of the internal
against the influences of the external.
[Sidenote: _Formation of Habits._]
§ 33. Habit is the general form which instruction takes. For since it
reduces a condition or an activity within ourselves to an instinctive
use and wont, it is necessary for any thorough instruction. But as,
according to its content, it may be either proper or improper,
advantageous or disadvantageous, good or bad, and according to its form
may be the assimilation of the external by the internal, or the impress
of the internal upon the external, Education must procure for the pupil
the power of being able to free himself from one habit and to adopt
another. Through his freedom he must be able not only to renounce any
habit formed, but to form a new one; and he must so govern his system of
habits that it shall exhibit a constant progress of development into
greater freedom. We must discipline ourselves, as a means toward the
ever-changing realization of the Good in us, constantly to form and to
break habits.
--We must characterize those habits as bad which relate only to our
convenience or our enjoyment. They are often not blamable in themselves,
but there lies in them a hidden danger that they may allure us into
luxury or effeminacy. But it is a false and mechanical way of looking at
the affair if we suppose that a habit which has been formed by a certain
number of repetitions can be broken by an equal number of denials. We
can never renounce a habit utterly except through a clearness of
judgment which decides it to be undesirable, and through firmness of
will.--
§ 34. Education comprehends also the reciprocal action of the
opposites, authority and obedience, rationality and individuality, work
and play, habit and spontaneity. If we imagine that these can be
reconciled by rules, it will be in vain that we try to restrain the
youth in these relations. But a failure in education in this particular
is very possible through the freedom of the pupil, through special
circumstances, or through the errors of the educator himself. And for
this very reason any theory of Education must take into account in the
beginning this negative possibility. It must consider beforehand the
dangers which threaten the pupil in all possible ways even before they
surround him, and fortify him against them. Intentionally to expose him
to temptation in order to prove his strength, is devilish; and, on the
other hand, to guard him against the chance of dangerous temptation, to
wrap him in cotton (as the proverb says), is womanish, ridiculous,
fruitless, and much more dangerous; for temptation comes not alone from
without, but quite as often from within, and secret inclination seeks
and creates for itself the opportunity for its gratification, often
perhaps an unnatural one. The truly preventive activity consists not in
an abstract seclusion from the world, all of whose elements are innate
in each individual, but in the activity of knowledge and discipline,
modified according to age and culture.
[Sidenote: _Protection against Temptation._]
--If one endeavors to deprive the youth of all free and individual
intercourse with the world, one only falls into a continual watching of
him, and the consciousness that he is watched destroys in him all
elasticity of spirit, all confidence, all originality. The police shadow
of control obscures all independence and systematically accustoms him to
dependence. As the tragi-comic story of Peter Schlemihl shows, one
cannot lose his own shadow without falling into the saddest fatalities;
but the shadow of a constant companion, as in the pedagogical system of
the Jesuits, undermines all naturalness. And if one endeavors too
strictly to guard against that which is evil and forbidden, the
intelligence of the pupils reacts in deceit against such efforts, till
the educators are amazed that such crimes as come often to light can
have arisen under such careful control.--
§ 35. If there should appear in the youth any decided moral deformity
which is opposed to the ideal of his education, the instructor must at
once make inquiry as to the history of its origin, because the negative
and the positive are very closely connected in his being, so that what
appears to be negligence, rudeness, immorality, foolishness, or oddity,
may arise from some real needs of the youth which in their development
have only taken a wrong direction.
§ 36. If it should appear on such examination that the negative action
was only a product of wilful ignorance, of caprice, or of arbitrariness
on the part of the youth, then this calls for a simple prohibition on
the part of the educator, no reason being assigned. His authority must
be sufficient to the pupil without any reason. Only when this has
happened more than once, and the youth is old enough to understand,
should the prohibition, together with the reason therefor, be given.
--This should, however, be brief; the explanation must retain its
disciplinary character, and must not become extended into a doctrinal
essay, for in such a case the youth easily forgets that it was his own
misbehavior which was the occasion of the explanation. The statement of
the reason must be honest, and it must present to the youth the point
most easy for him to seize. False reasons are morally blamable in
themselves, and they tend only to confuse. It is a great mistake to
unfold to the youth the broadening consequences which his act may bring.
These uncertain possibilities seem to him too powerless to affect him
particularly. The severe lecture wearies him, especially if it be
stereotyped, as is apt to be the case with fault-finding and talkative
instructors. But more unfortunate is it if the painting of the gloomy
background to which the consequences of the wrong-doing of the youth may
lead, should fill his feelings and imagination prematurely with gloomy
fancies, because then the representation has led him one step toward a
state of wretchedness which in the future man may become fearful
depression and degradation.--
[Sidenote: _Reproof and Punishment._]
§ 37. If the censure is accompanied with a threat of punishment, then we
have the same kind of reproof which in daily life we call "scolding;"
but if reproof is given, the pupil must be made to feel that it is in
earnest.
§ 38. Only when all other efforts have failed, is punishment, which is
the real negation of the error, the transgression, or the vice,
justifiable. Punishment inflicts intentionally pain on the pupil, and
its object is, by means of this sensation, to bring him to reason, a
result which neither our simple prohibition, our explanation, nor our
threat of punishment, has been able to reach. But the punishment, as
such, must not refer to the subjective totality of the youth, or his
disposition in general, but only to the act which, as result, is a
manifestation of the disposition. It acts mediately on the disposition,
but leaves the inner being untouched directly; and this is not only
demanded by justice, but on account of the sophistry that is inherent in
human nature, which desires to assign to a deed many motives, it is even
necessary.
[Sidenote: _Correction_ VERSUS _Satisfaction of Justice._]
§ 39. Punishment as an educational means is nevertheless essentially
corrective, since, by leading the youth to a proper estimation of his
fault and a positive change in his behavior, it seeks to improve him. At
the same time it stands as a sad indication of the insufficiency of the
means previously used. On no account should the youth be frightened from
the commission of a misdemeanor, or from the repetition of his negative
deed through fear of punishment--a system which leads always to
terrorism: but, although it may have this effect, it should, before all
things, impress upon him the recognition of the fact that the negative
is not allowed to act as it will without limitation, but rather that the
Good and the True have the absolute power in the world, and that they
are never without the means of overcoming anything that contradicts
them.
--In the statute-laws, punishment has the opposite office. It must first
of all satisfy justice, and only after this is done can it attempt to
improve the guilty. If a government should proceed on the same basis as
the educator it would mistake its task, because it has to deal with
adults, whom it elevates to the honorable position of responsibility for
their own acts. The state must not go back to the psychological ethical
genesis of a negative deed. It must assign to a secondary rank of
importance the biographical moment which contains the deed in process
and the circumstances of a mitigating character, and it must consider
first of all the deed in itself. It is quite otherwise with the
educator; for he deals with human beings who are relatively undeveloped,
and who are only growing toward responsibility. So long as they are
still under the care of a teacher, the responsibility of their deed
belongs in part to him. If we confound the standpoint in which
punishment is administered in the state with that in education, we work
much evil.--
§ 40. Punishment as a negation of a negation, considered as an
educational means, cannot be determined _à priori_, but must always be
modified by the peculiarities of the individual offender and by the
peculiar circumstances. Its administration calls for the exercise of the
ingenuity and tact of the educator.
[Sidenote: _Three Kinds of Punishment._]
§ 41. Generally speaking, we must make a distinction between the sexes,
as well as between the different periods of youth; (1) some kind of
corporal punishment is most suitable for children, (2) isolation for
older boys and girls, and (3) punishment based on the sense of honor for
young men and women.
§ 42. (1) Corporal punishment is the production of physical pain. The
youth is generally whipped, and this kind of punishment, provided always
that it is not too often administered or with undue severity, is the
proper way of dealing with wilful defiance, with obstinate carelessness,
or with a really perverted will, so long or so often as the higher
perception is closed against appeal. The imposing of other physical
punishment, e.g. that of depriving the pupil of food, partakes of
cruelty. The view which sees in the rod the panacea for all the
teacher's embarrassments is censurable, but equally undesirable is the
false sentimentality which assumes that the dignity of humanity is
affected by a blow given to a child, and confounds self-conscious
humanity with child-humanity, to which a blow is the most natural form
of reaction, in which all other forms of influence at last end.
--The fully-grown man ought never to be whipped, because this kind of
punishment reduces him to the level of the child, and, when it becomes
barbarous, to that of a brute animal, and so is absolutely degrading to
him. In the English schools the rod is much used. If a pupil of the
first class be put back into the second at Eton, he, although before
exempt from flogging, becomes liable to it. But however necessary this
system of flogging of the English aristocracy may be in the discipline
of their schools, flogging in the English army is a shameful thing for
the free people of Great Britain.--
§ 43. (2) By Isolation we remove the offender temporarily from the
society of his fellows. The boy left alone, cut off from all
companionship, and left absolutely to himself, suffers from a sense of
helplessness. The time passes heavily, and soon he is very anxious to be
allowed to return to the company of parents, brothers and sisters,
teachers and fellow-pupils.
--To leave a child entirely to himself without any supervision, even if
one shuts him up in a dark room, is as mistaken a practice as to leave a
few together without supervision, as is too often done where they are
kept after school, when they give the freest rein to their childish
wantonness and commit the wildest pranks.--
[Sidenote: _Sense of Honor in the Pupil._]
§ 44. (3) This way of isolating a child does not touch his sense of
honor at all, and is soon forgotten because it relates to only one side
of his conduct. It is quite different from punishment based on the sense
of honor, which, in a formal manner, shuts the youth out from
companionship because he has attacked the principle which holds society
together, and for this reason can no longer be considered as belonging
to it. Honor is the recognition of one individual by others as their
equal. Through his error, or it may be his crime, he has simply made
himself unequal to them, and in so far has separated himself from them,
so that his banishment from their society is only the outward expression
of the real isolation which he himself has brought to pass in his inner
nature, and which he by means of his negative act only betrayed to the
outer world. Since the punishment founded on the sense of honor affects
the whole ethical man and makes a lasting impression upon his memory,
extreme caution is necessary in its application lest a permanent injury
be inflicted upon the character. The idea of his perpetual continuance
in disgrace, destroys in a man all aspiration for improvement.
--Within the family this feeling of honor cannot be so actively
developed, because every member of it is bound to every other
immediately by natural ties, and hence is equal to every other. Within
its sacred circle, he who has isolated himself is still beloved, though
it may be through tears. However bad may be the deed he has committed,
he is never given up, but the deepest sympathy is felt for him because
he is still brother, father, &c. But first in the contact of one family
with another, and still more in the contact of an individual with any
institution which is founded not on natural ties, but is set over
against him as a distinct object, this feeling of honor appears. In the
school, and in the matter of ranks and classes in a school, this is very
important.--
§ 45. It is important to consider well this gradation of punishment
(which, starting with sensuous physical pain, passes through the
external teleology of temporary isolation up to the idealism of the
sense of honor), both in relation to the different ages at which they
are appropriate and to the training which they bring with them. Every
punishment must be considered merely as a means to some end, and, in so
far, as transitory. The pupil must always be deeply conscious that it is
very painful to his instructor to be obliged to punish him. This pathos
of another's sorrow for the sake of his cure which he perceives in the
mien, in the tone of the voice, in the delay with which the punishment
is administered, will become a purifying fire for his soul.