MR. THOMAS GRENVILLE TO MR. FOX.

Paris, June 4th, 1782.

Dear Charles,

The _public_ letter which I send to you by Lauzun, is, as you

will see, of no other use than that of accounting for his

journey, and enabling him to carry to you this _private_ one, of

which I had once almost determined to be myself the bearer; an

apprehension, however, that so sudden an arrival might be

embarrassing to you, has decided me not to take that step, till

I had explained to you my reasons for wishing to do so, though I

should not care to write them, except in the full confidence

that they will be seen by no person whatever but yourself.

Recollect always that this letter is written in that confidence,

and I am sure I never can repent of having sent it.

You will easily see, from the tenor of the correspondence we

have hitherto had, that what little use I could be of to you

here, appeared to me to be in the communication that I had with

Franklin; I considered the rest of the negotiation as dependent

upon that, and the only possible immediate advantages which were

to be expected, seemed to me to rest in the jealousy which the

French Court would entertain of not being thoroughly supported

in everything by America. The degree of confidence which

Franklin seemed inclined to place in me, and which he expressed

to me more than once in the strongest terms, very much favoured

this idea, and encouraged me in wishing to learn from him what

might be in future ground for a partial connection between

England and America; I say in future, because I have hitherto

never much believed in any treaty of the year 1782; and my

expectation, even from the strongest of Franklin's expressions,

was not of an immediate turn in our favour, or any positive

advantage from the Commissioners in Europe, till the people in

America should cry out to them, from seeing that England was

meeting their wishes. It was in this light, too, that I saw room

to hope for some good effects from a voluntary offer of

unconditional independence to America, a chance which looked the

more tempting as I own I considered the sacrifice as but a small

one, and such as, had I been an American, I had thought myself

little obliged to Great Britain in this moment for granting,

except from an idea that if it was an article of treaty, it

would have been as much given by France as by England. I repeat

this only to remind you that, from these considerations, the

whole of my attention has been given to Franklin, and that I

should have considered myself as losing my time here, if it had

not been directed to that subject.

I believe I told you in my last, that I had very sanguine

expectations of Franklin's being inclined to speak out when I

should see him next; indeed, he expressly told me, that he would

think over all the points likely to establish a solid

reconciliation between England and America, and that he would

write his mind upon them, in order that we might examine them

together more in order; confiding, as he said, in me, that I

would not state them as propositions from him, but as being my

own ideas of what would be useful to both countries. (I

interrupt myself here to remind you of the obligation I must put

you under not to mention this). For this very interesting

communication, which I had long laboured to get, he fixed the

fourth day, which was last Saturday; but on Friday morning, Mr.

Oswald came, and having given me your letters, he went

immediately to Franklin, to carry some to him. I kept my

appointment at Passy the next morning, and in order to give

Franklin the greatest confidence, and at the same time, too, not

knowing how much Mr. Oswald might have told him, I began with

saying, that though under the difficulty which M. de Ve. and he

himself had made to my full power, it was not the moment as a

politician, perhaps, to make farther explanations till that

difficulty should be relieved; yet, to show him the confidence I

put in him, I would begin by telling him that I was authorized

to offer the independence in the first instance, instead of

making it an article of general treaty. He expressed great

satisfaction at this, especially, he said, because, by having

done otherwise, we should have seemed to have considered America

as in the same degree of connection with France which she had

been under with us; whereas, America wished to be considered as

a power, free and clear to all the world. But when I came to

lead the discourse to the subject which he had promised four

days before, I was a good deal mortified to find him put it off

altogether till he should be more ready; and notwithstanding my

reminding him of his promise, he only answered that it should be

in some days. What passed between Mr. Oswald and me will explain

to you the reason of this disappointment.

Mr. Oswald told me that Lord Shelburne had proposed to him, when

last in England, to take a commission to treat with the American

Ministers; that upon his mentioning it to Franklin now, it

seemed perfectly agreeable to him, and even to be what he had

very much wished; Mr. Oswald adding that he wished only to

assist the business, and had no other view; he mixed with this a

few regrets that there should be any difference between the two

offices; and when I asked upon what subject, he said, owing to

the Buckingham party being too ready to give up everything.

You will observe though, for it is on that account that I give

you this narrative, that this intended appointment has

effectually stopped Franklin's mouth to me; and that when he is

told that Mr. Oswald is to be the Commissioner to treat with

him, it is but natural that he should reserve his confidence for

the quarter so pointed out to him; nor does this secret seem

only known to Franklin; as Lafayette said, laughing, yesterday,

that he had just left _Lord Shelburne's ambassador_ at Passy.

Indeed, this is not the first moment of a separate and private

negotiation; for Mr. Oswald, suspecting, by something that I

dropped, that Franklin had talked to me about Canada, (though,

by the bye, he never had), told me this circumstance as follows.

When he was in England, the last time but one, he carried with

him a paper, entrusted to him by Franklin, under condition that

it should be shown only to Lord Shelburne, and returned into his

own hands at Passy; this paper, under the title of "Notes of a

Conversation," contained an idea of Canada being spontaneously

ceded by England to the Thirteen Provinces, in order that

Congress might sell the unappropriated lands, and make a fund

thereby, in order to compensate the damages done by the English

army, and even those sustained too by the royalists. This paper,

given with many precautions, for fear of its being known to the

French Court, to whom it was supposed not to be agreeable, Mr.

Oswald showed to Lord Shelburne, who, after keeping it a day, as

Mr. Oswald supposes to show to the King, returned it to him, and

it was by him brought back to Franklin.

I say nothing to the proposition itself, to the impolicy of

bringing a strange neighbourhood to the Newfoundland Fishery, or

to the little reason that England would naturally see in having

lost thirteen provinces to give away a fourteenth; but I mention

it to show you an early trace of separate negotiation, which

perhaps you did not before know. Under these circumstances, I

felt very much tempted to go over and explain them to you _vivâ

voce_ rather than by letter, and I must say, with the farther

intention of suggesting to you the only idea that seems likely

to answer your purpose, and it is this: the Spanish Ambassador

will in a day or two have the powers from his Court; the

Americans are here, so are the French; why should you not

consider this then as a Congress in full form, and send here a

person of rank, such as Lord Fitzwilliam, if he would come, so

as to have the whole negotiation in the hands of one person; you

would by that means recover within your compass the essential

part which is now out of it; nor do I see how Lord Shelburne

could object to such an appointment, which would in every

respect very much facilitate the business. Let me press this a

little strongly to you, for another reason: you may depend upon

it, people here have already got an idea of a difference between

the two offices, and consider how much that idea will be

assisted by the embarrassments arising from two people

negotiating to the same purpose, but under different and

differing authorities, concealing and disguising from each other

what with the best intentions they could hardly make known, and

common enough to each. I am almost afraid of pressing this as

strongly as I should, for fear you should think me writing

peevishly; but if I did not state the thing to you in the

situation in which I see it, I should think I was betraying your

interests instead of giving attention to them. I must entreat

you very earnestly to consider this, to see the impossibility of

my assisting you under this contrariety, to see how much the

business itself will suffer if carried on with the jealousy of

these clashing interests, and to see whether it may not all be

prevented by some such single appointment in high rank as that I

mentioned; _au reste_, I cannot but say that I feel much easier

with the hope of making over what remains of this business. I

begin to feel it weighty, and you know how much I dislike the

_publicity_ you packed off to me in that confounded silver box;

I could not bring myself to say anything civil about it in my

last letter, and you ought to give me credit for great

self-denial in not taking this opportunity of telling you my own

story at the Secretary's office, as nothing but the

embarrassment it might give you upon the sudden, prevented me.

Once more, I tell you I cannot fight a daily battle with Mr.

Oswald and _his secretary_; it would be neither for the

advantage of the business, for your interest, or your credit or

mine; and even if it was, I could not do it.

Concluding then the American business as out of the question,

which _personally_ I cannot be sorry for, you surely have but

one of two things to do: either to adopt the proposition of a

new _dignified_ peer's appointment, which being single, may

bring back the business to you by comprehending it all in one;

or Lord Shelburne must have his minister here, and Mr. Fox his;

by doing which, Mr. Fox will be pretty near as much out of the

secret, at least of what is most essential, as if he had nobody

here; and the only real gainers by it will be the other

Ministers, who cannot fail to profit of such a jumble. Besides

which, upon this latter part of the subject, I must very

seriously entreat you not to ask me to keep a situation here, in

no circumstances pleasant, and in none less so than those I have

described. The grievance is a very essential one, the remedy is

Lord Fitzwilliam.

Adieu. I recommend to Lauzun to make all the haste he can, as I

shall not stir a step till you answer this letter, and my step

then will, I hope, be towards you. Sheridan's letter of

suspicion was written, as you see, in the spirit of prophecy. I

owe him an answer, which, by word of mouth or word of letter, he

shall have very soon. The news of the day is, that the Cadiz

fleet, twenty-six of the line and five French, are sailed for

Brest, but I rather imagine they have no authentic account of it

yet.

I enclose to you P. Guemené's offer of some good champagne; if

you choose to have any, tell me what number of bottles, and let

Brooks or somebody let me know how they are to be sent to

England. I don't understand champagne, but this has a good

character.

Adieu. Let Lord Fitzwilliam answer my letter.

Memoirs of the Courts and Cabinets of George the Third From the Original Family Documents, Volume 1 · 第 29 / 201 题