INNATE IDEAS.
192. Among the adversaries of innate ideas there exist profound
differences. The materialists maintain that man has received every
thing through the senses, in such a way as to make our understanding
nothing more than the product of an organism which has been advancing
in perfection, just as a machine acquires, by use, a greater facility
and delicacy of movement. They suppose nothing but the faculty of
sensation to pre-exist in the mind; or, to speak more correctly, they
admit no mind, but only a corporeal being, whose functions naturally
produce what is called the intellectual development.
The sensists who do not attribute to matter the faculty of thinking,
do not admit innate ideas; they confess the existence of the mind, but
concede to it non-sensitive faculties; all that it owns must have come
to it through the senses, and it can be nothing else than a transformed
sensation.
Innate ideas counted other adversaries who were neither materialists
nor sensists: such were the scholastics, who on the one hand defended
the principle that there is nothing in the understanding which has not
previously been in the senses; but, on the other hand, combated both
materialism and sensism. The difference between the scholastics and the
friends of innate ideas would not perhaps have been so great as it was
supposed to be, had the question been proposed in another manner.
193. The scholastics regarded ideas as accidental forms, in such a
way that an understanding with ideas may be compared to a piece of
canvas covered with figures. The defenders of innate ideas said; "The
figures already exist upon the canvas; to see them we have only to
raise the veil which covers them." This explanation is somewhat forced,
since it openly contradicts experience, which testifies: first, the
necessity of the understanding being excited by sensations; secondly,
the intellectual elaboration which we experience in thinking, and which
teaches us that there is within us a kind of production of ideas.
"The canvas," say the adversaries of innate ideas, is all white, "and
in proof witness the unceasing labor of the artist to cover it with
figures." But does their doctrine, forsooth, suppose that nothing
exists before experience? Do they admit man to be the simple work of
instruction, of education? Do they maintain that our interior world is
nothing more than a series of phenomena caused by impressions, and that
it would have been other than what it is, had it had other impressions?
Most certainly not. They admit: first, an inward activity excited and
improved by sensible experience: secondly, the necessity of first
principles as well intellectual as moral: thirdly, an interior light,
to enable us to see them when presented, and to assent to them by an
irresistible necessity. We find the words, "Signatum est super nos
lumen vultus tui Domine," cited upon every page of those authors.
194. Saint Thomas says that first principles, as well speculative
as practical, must be naturally communicated to us: "Oportet igitur
_naturaliter nobis esse indita_, sicut principia speculabilium, ita
et principia operabilium."[13] In another place, inquiring whether the
soul knows immaterial things in their eternal reasons, (in rationibus
æternis,) he says that the intellectual light which is within us, is
nothing else than a certain participated likeness of the uncreated
life, in which the eternal reasons are contained: "Ipsum enim lumen
intellectuale, quod est in nobis nihil est aliud, quam quædam
participata similitudo luminis increati, in quo continentur rationes
æternæ."[14]
[13] P. I., Q. L. XXIX. A. 12.
[14] _Ib.,_ Q. L. XXXIV. A. 5.
195. We find it, in these passages, expressly taught that there is
within us something besides what we have acquired by experience, in
which point the scholastics all agree with the defenders of innate
ideas. The difference between them is this: the former do not consider
the intellectual light to suffice for knowledge, if the forms or
_species_ upon which it may reflect are wanting; the latter distinguish
the light from the colors, and them they make originate in the light
itself.
196. The question of innate ideas, so warmly contested in the schools
of philosophy, would never have presented so great difficulties, had
it been stated with proper clearness. To do this it was necessary to
classify the inward phenomena called ideas in a corresponding manner,
and to determine with accuracy the sense of the word _innate_.
197. According to what we have already said, we hold that there are
in our mind sensible representations; intellectual action upon them,
or geometrical ideas; ideas purely intellectual, either intuitive or
non-intuitive; and general determinate and indeterminate ideas. I will
give examples of these cases that they may the better be understood.
A particular triangle is represented in our imagination; here, then,
is a sensible representation: intellectual act perceiving the nature
of the triangle considered in general; here is a geometrical idea, an
idea relating to the sensible order: cognition of one of our acts of
understanding or will; here is a pure and intuitive idea: intelligence,
will, conceived in general; here is a general determinate idea:
substance; here finally is a general indeterminate idea.[15]
[15] See Chs. XII. and XIII.
198. What is understood by innate? That which is not born, which the
mind possesses, not acquired by its own labor, nor by impressions
coming from the exterior, but by the immediate gift of the author of
its nature; the innate is opposed to the acquired, and to inquire if
there are innate ideas is to inquire if we have in our mind ideas,
before receiving any impressions or doing any act.
199. It cannot be maintained that sensible representations are innate.
Experience testifies that without the impressions of the organs we
cannot have representations corresponding to them; that once these
are placed in action in a proper manner, we cannot help experiencing
them. This is applicable to all sensations, whether they be actual,
existing, or only recollected. They who undertake to maintain that
sensible representations exist in our soul previously to all organic
impressions, also advance an opinion unsustainable either by facts of
experience or by arguments _a priori_.
200. It is to be remarked, that the argument founded upon the
impossibility of the body's transmitting impressions to the mind,
proves nothing in favor of the opinion we combat. Even were the
argument conclusive, the necessity of innate ideas could not thence be
inferred, since the physical non-communication of the body and the mind
would be saved in the system of occasional causes, and it could at the
same time be argued that there are no pre-existing ideas, but that they
have been caused in the presence, and on occasion of organic affections.
201. Ideas relative to sensible representations seem to consist, not in
forms of the understanding, but in its acts exercised upon these same
representations.[16]
[16] See Ch. XX.
To call these ideas innate is to contradict experience, and even to
ignore their nature. These acts cannot be performed if the object,
which is the sensible representation be wanting; and this does not
exist without an impression of the corporeal organs. To call these
ideas innate, has then, either no meaning at all, or can mean nothing
else than the pre-existence of the intellectual activity, subsequently
developed in the presence of sensible intuitions.
202. Neither can those intuitive ideas, not referable to sensibility,
such as are those we have when reflecting upon the acts of
understanding and will, be innate. What in this case serves as the
idea, is the very same act of the understanding or of the will which is
presented to our perception in consciousness: to say, then, that these
ideas are innate is equivalent to saying that these acts exist before
they exist. Even when the perception does not refer to present acts,
but to past acts now recollected, the argument retains the same force:
for it can have no recollection of them if they have not previously
existed, since our acts cannot exist before we have performed them.
203. Hence it may be inferred that no intuitive idea is innate, since
intuition supposes an object presented to the faculty of perception.
204. General determinate ideas are those which refer to an intuition:
they cannot, therefore, exist before it: and since, on the other hand,
intuition is impossible without an act, it follows that these ideas
cannot be innate.
205. Last of all remain general indeterminate ideas, that is to say,
those which of themselves alone offer to the mind, nothing either
existing or possible.[17] If we observe carefully the nature of these
ideas, we shall see that they are nothing else than perceptions of
one aspect of an object considered under a general reason. It cannot
be doubted, that one of the characteristics of intelligence is the
perception of these aspects; and it is no less indubitable, that it
does not thence follow, that we must imagine these ideas to a kind of
forms pre-existing in our mind, and distinct from the acts by which it
exercises its perceptive faculty. We do not see what ground there can
be for affirming these ideas to be innate, and to have lain hidden
in our mind previously to the development of all activity, just like
things stowed away in the corners of a museum, closed however to the
curiosity of spectators.
[17] See Ch. XXI.
206. Instead of abandoning ourselves to similar suppositions, it would
seem that we ought to recognize in the mind an innate activity, subject
to the laws imposed upon it by its Creator, the infinite intelligence.
Even granting ideas to be distinct from perceptive acts, it is not
necessary to admit them as pre-existing. True, that in such a case it
would be necessary to recognize in the mind a faculty productive of
the representative species, from which, however, we should not escape
by identifying ideas with perceptions. These last are acts springing,
so to speak, from the very bottom of our soul, and which appear and
disappear like the flowers of a plant: and thus we must in every way
recognize in ourselves a power which in due circumstances will not fail
to produce what before did not exist. Without this it is impossible to
form any idea of what activity is.
207. Resuming the doctrine thus far delivered upon innate ideas, we can
reduce it to a formula in the following manner:
I. There are in us sensitive faculties which are developed by organic
impressions, either as cause or occasion.
II. We perceive nothing by the senses not subject to the laws of
organism.
III. Internal sensible representations cannot be formed of other
elements than those furnished by sensations.
IV. Whatever is said concerning the pre-existence of sensible
representations to organic impressions, besides being said without any
reason, is in contradiction with experience.
V. Geometrical ideas, or ideas relating to sensible intuitions, are not
innate; since they are the acts of the understanding which operates
upon materials provided by the sensibility.
VI. Intuitive ideas of the intellectual order are not innate, because
they are nothing else than the acts of the understanding or will,
presented to our perception in reflex consciousness.
VII. General determinate ideas are not innate, since they are the
representation of intuitions, upon which some act has of necessity been
performed.
VIII. There is no ground of affirming that general indeterminate ideas,
which seem to be acts of the faculty perceptive of objects under a
general reason, are innate.
IX. All that there is of innate in our mind is sensitive and
intellectual activity; but both to be put into motion, require objects
to affect them.
X. The development of this activity begins with organic affections;
and although it goes far beyond the sphere of sensibility, it always
remains more or less subject to the conditions imposed by the union of
the soul and body.
XI. The intellectual activity has _a priori_ conditions totally
independent of sensibility, and applicable to all objects, no
matter what impressions may have been their cause. The principle of
contradiction figures as the first among these conditions.
XII. There is then in our mind something _a priori_ and absolute, which
cannot be altered, even although all the impressions we receive from
objects be totally varied, nor if all the relations we have with them
were to undergo a radical change.
BOOK FIFTH.
IDEA OF BEING.
CHAPTER I.
IDEA OF BEING.
1. There is in our understanding the idea of being. Independent of
sensations, and in an order far superior to them, there exist ideas in
our understanding, which extend to, and are a necessary element of all
thought. The idea of being, or of _ens_, holds the first rank among
these. When the scholastics said that the object of the understanding
was being, "objectum intellectus est ens," they enunciated a profound
truth, and pointed out one of the most certain and important of all
ideological facts.
2. Being, or ens in se, abstracted from all modification and
determination, is, considered in its greatest generality, conceived by
our understanding. Whatever may be the origin of this idea, or the mode
of its formation in our understanding, certain it is that it exists.
It is of continual application, and without it it is almost impossible
for us to think. The verb _to be_, expressive of this idea, is found in
every language: in every discourse, even in the simplest, we meet this
expression: the learned and the ignorant, alike, continually employ it
in the same sense, and with equal facility.
The only difference, as to the use of this idea, between the rustic
and the philosopher, is, that the one does, the other does not, reflect
upon it: but the direct perception is the same in both, equally clear
in all cases. Such a thing is or is not; was or was not; will be or
will not be; there is something or nothing; we had or did not have;
we shall have or shall not have, are all applications of the idea
of being, applications made alike by all persons, without the least
shadow of obscurity; all comprehend perfectly well the sense of these
words, and the mind consequently has the idea corresponding to them.
The difficulty, if any there be, begins with the reflex act, in the
perception, not of being, but of the idea of being. So far as the
direct act is concerned, the conception is so perfectly clear as to
leave nothing to be desired.
3. Experience teaches this, but it can also be proved by conclusive
arguments. All philosophers agree that the principle of contradiction
is evident of itself to all men, that it needs no application, to
understand the sense of the words sufficing; which could not be true
did not all men have the idea of being. The principle is, that "it is
impossible for a thing _to be_, and _not to be_ at same time." Here,
then, is no question of any thing determinate; neither of body nor
of mind, of substance nor of accidents, of infinite nor of finite,
but of being, of a _thing_, whatever it may be, in its greatest
generality; of which it is affirmed that it cannot both be and not
be at the same time. Had we no idea of being, the principle would
mean nothing: contradiction is inconceivable when we have no idea of
the contradicting extremes, and here the extremes are _being_ and
_not-being_.
4. The same is seen in another principle, closely resembling, if
not identical with, that of contradiction: "every thing either is
or is not." Here, also, there is question of being in its greatest
indeterminateness, considered only as being, as nothing more. Without
the idea of _being_, the axiom could have no meaning.
5. The principle of Descartes, "I think, therefore I am," also includes
the idea of being: "I am." When he undertakes to explain it, this
philosopher relies upon the fact that what is not, cannot act; thus the
idea of being enters not only into the principle of Descartes, but is
even the foundation upon which he rests it.
6. Whether we make the inward sense the basis of our cognitions, or
prefer the evidence by which one idea is contained in another, it is
always necessary to make the idea of being a primary element; we must
suppose the understanding _to be_ before it can think; we must suppose
thought _to be_ before we can make use of it; we must suppose our
sensations and sentiments, the operations and affections of our souls,
_to be_, before we can investigate their causes, their origin, and
inquire into their nature; we must suppose ourselves _to be_, that _we
are_, before we can advance one step in any sense. The idea of being
does then exist in our mind, and is an element indispensable to all
intellectual acts.
CHAPTER II.
SIMPLICITY AND INDETERMINATENESS OF THE IDEA OF BEING.
7. Nothing can be conceived more simple than the idea of being. It
cannot be composed of elements. It allows of nothing determinate, since
it is in itself absolutely indeterminate. The instant that something
determinate is made to enter it, it is in a manner destroyed; it is no
longer the idea of _being_, but of _such a being_; an idea applied,
but not the idea of the being in all its generality.
8. How shall we make it understood what we would express by the word
being, or ens? If we say that it comprises all, even the most unlike
and opposite things, there is no reason why it may not be understood
what it is. To join to the idea of being any determination, is to
introduce into it a heterogeneous element, which in no manner belongs
to it, and can only accompany it as a pure aggregation, but can never
combine with it, without rendering it what it is not. If the idea of
subsistence be combined with that of being, we no longer have the pure
idea of being, but that of subsistence.
9. The idea of being is then most simple; it cannot be resolved into
elements, and cannot consequently spring from speech, unless as from
an exciting cause. If we be asked, for example, what we understand
by substance, by modification, cause or effect, we explain it by
uniting to the idea of being that of subsistence or inherence, that
of productive force, or of a thing produced; but it is impossible for
us to explain being, otherwise than by itself. We may make use of the
words, something, what is, reality, and the like, but all these are
inadequate to explain the thing itself; they are but the efforts we
make to excite in the understanding of others the idea we contemplate
in our own. If we would give further explanations by showing how the
idea corresponding to the word being, is applicable to every thing,
and in order to do this enumerate the different classes of being,
applying the idea to them all, we only succeed in showing the use
of the idea and the applications of which it is susceptible; but we
do not decompose it. We say, indeed, that there is in all something
corresponding to it, but we do not decompose this something; we only
point it out.
10. From this we infer that the idea of being is not intuitive to
us, and that by its very indeterminateness it excludes all that a
determinate object can offer to our perception.
CHAPTER III.
SUBSTANTIVE AND COPULATIVE BEING.
11. For the more thorough understanding of this matter, it will be well
to distinguish between the absolute and relative ideas of being; that
is between what is expressed by the word being, when it designates
reality, simple existence, and when it marks the union of a predicate
and its subject. In the two following propositions we see very closely
the different meaning of the word _is_; Peter _is_; Peter _is_ good.
In the former the word _is_ designates the reality of Peter, or his
existence; in the latter, it expresses the union of the predicate
_good_ with the subject _Peter_. In the former the verb _to be_ is
substantive, in the latter it is copulative. The substantive simply
expresses the existence; the copulative a determination, a mode of
existing. The desk is, signifies the simple existence of the desk; the
desk is high, expresses a mode of being, height.
12. Purely substantive being, is nowhere met with, except in the
following proposition: being is, or what is is; in all other
propositions there is involved, even in the subject itself, some
predicate which determines the mode. When we say, the desk is,
notwithstanding that the direct predicate of the proposition is the
word _is_, there yet enters into the subject _desk_ a determination
of the being of which we speak, and that is of a being which is a
desk. We were, then, right in saying that the verb _to be_, in its
purely substantive meaning, is met with in no other proposition than
this: being is. This is perfectly identical, absolutely necessary and
convertible, that is, the predicate may be observed of all subjects,
and the subject of all predicates. Suppose we give the proposition
a different form; being is existing; we can still say all being is
existing, or the existing is being; that is, all that exists is being.
13. If it be objected that possible being does not exist, we answer
that purely possible being is not, strictly speaking, being; but
that it does exist, in the same mode in which it is, that is, in
the possible order. As we shall, however, treat this question more
fully hereafter, we now turn to the propositions in which being is
copulative. The desk is, is equivalent to this, the desk is existing.
It is true that every real desk is existing, but real is the same as
existing; and thus it might, in one sense, be said that the proposition
resembles this other: all being is. But here we detect a difference; it
consists in this, that the idea of existence does not necessarily enter
into that of desk, for we can conceive of a desk which does not exist,
but we cannot conceive of a being as such without a being, that is,
of a being which is not being. A very notable difference is every way
perceptible between the two propositions; in the former, the subject
may be affirmed of all predicates by saying, all that is existing is
being; but it is evident that we cannot say all that is existing is
desk.
14. The reason of this is that the proposition, being is, is absolutely
identical; it is the expression of a pure conception reduced to the
form of a proposition; and, consequently, the terms which serve as
extremes may be taken indiscriminately the one for the other; being
is, whatever is, is being; being is existing; every thing existing
is being. But different orders of ideas are combined in all other
propositions; and, although the common idea of being is applicable to
all, as this idea is essentially indeterminate, it does not thence
follow that one of the things to which the general idea corresponds is
identical with the other, alike entering into the same general idea.
Being belongs to every existing desk; but not, therefore, is every
thing a desk.
15. Copulative being may be applied without the substantive; thus when
we say that the ellipse is curvilinear, we abstract both the existence
and non-existence of any one ellipse; and the proposition would be true
although no ellipse at all were to exist. The reason is that the verb
_to be_, when copulative, expresses the relation of two ideas.
16. This relation is of identity, but in such a way that more than the
union of the two is needed before a predicate can be affirmed of a
subject. The head is united to the man, but it cannot, therefore, be
said, "man is his head;" the sensibility is united to the reason in the
same man, but we cannot say, "sensibility is reason;" whiteness is in
union with the wall, but we cannot say "the wall is whiteness."
The affirmation, then, of a predicate expresses the relation of
identity, and this is why, when this identity does not exist with
respect to the predicate in the abstract, it is expressed in the
concrete, in order that something involving identity may enter into it.
The wall is whiteness: this proposition is false, because it affirms an
identity which does not exist; the wall is white: this proposition is
true, because white means something which has whiteness, and the wall
is really something which has whiteness; here, then, is the identity
which the proposition affirms.[18]
[18] See Bk. I., Chs. XXXVI., XXVII., and XVIII.
17. The predicate is, then, in every affirmative proposition,
identified with the subject. When we perceive, therefore, we affirm the
identity. Judgment, then, is the perception of the identity. We do not,
however, deny that in what we call assent there is often something more
than the simple perception of identity; but we do not understand how we
need any thing more than to see it evidently in order to assent to it.
What we call assent, adhesion of the understanding, seems to be a kind
of metaphor, as if the understanding would adhere, would yield itself
to the truth, if it were presented; but in reality we very much doubt
if, with respect to what is evident, there be any thing but perception
of the identity.
18. Hence it follows, that if the same ideas were to correspond in the
very same manner to the same words, the opposition and diversity of
judgments in different understandings would be impossible. When, then,
this diversity or opposition does exist, there is always a discrepancy
in the ideas.
19. We conceive of things, and reason upon them abstracted from their
existence or non-existence; or we even suppose them not to exist, that
is, conceive of relations between predicates and subjects without the
existence of either predicates or subjects. And as all contingent
beings may either be or cease to be, and even the first moment of their
being be designated, it follows that science, or the knowledge of
the nature and relations of beings, founded upon certain and evident
principles, has nothing contingent for its object inasmuch as it
exists. There is, then, an infinite world of truths beyond contingent
reality.
We conclude, from our reflections upon this, that there must be beyond
the contingent world a necessary being in which may be founded that
necessary truth which is the object of science. Science cannot have
nothing for its object; but contingent beings, if we abstract their
existence, are pure nothing. There can be no essence, no properties,
no relations in what is pure nothing; something therefore is necessary
whereon to base the necessary truth of those natures, properties, and
relations which the understanding conceives of in contingent beings
themselves. There is, then, a God; and to deny him, is to make science
a pure illusion. The unity of human reason furnishes us one proof of
this truth; the necessity of human science furnishes a second, and
confirms the first.[19]
[19] See Bk. IV., Ch. XXIII. to Ch. XXVII.
20. We find a conditional proposition involved in every necessary
proposition, wherein substantive being is not affirmed nor denied, but
the relative, as in this; all the diameters of a circle are equal.
Thus, the one we have just cited is equivalent to this one; if there
exists a circle all its diameters are equal. For in reality did no
circle exist, there would be no diameters, no equality, or any thing
else; nothing can have no properties; wherefore in all that is thus
affirmed we must understand the condition of its existence.
21. In general propositions the union conceived of two objects is
affirmed; but we must take good care to notice that although we are
wont to say that what is affirmed is the union of two ideas; this is
not, therefore, perfectly exact. When we assert that all the diameters
of a circle are equal, we do not mean that this is so only in ideas,
that we conceive it so to be, but that it really is so, beyond our own
understanding and in reality, and this abstracting our ideas and even
our own existence. Our understanding sees then a relation, a union of
the objects; and it affirms that whenever these exist, there will also
really exist the union, provided the conditions under which the object
is conceived be fulfilled.
CHAPTER IV.
BEING, THE OBJECT OF THE UNDERSTANDING, IS NOT THE POSSIBLE, INASMUCH
AS POSSIBLE.
22. One very important point concerning the idea of being remains to
be illustrated, and that is, whether this idea has possible or real
being for its object. The scholastics taught that the object of the
understanding was being; nor were they altogether without reason in
so doing, since one of the things we conceive of with the greatest
distinctness, and which is found to be the most fundamental in all
our ideas, is the idea of being, containing as it does in a certain
manner all other ideas. But as being is distinguished into actual and
possible, a difficulty occurs as to which of these categories the idea
of being, the chief object of our understanding, is applicable to.
23. The Abbate Rosmini, in his _Nuovo Saggio sull' origine delle
idee_, pretends that the form and the light of our understanding, and
the origin of all our ideas, consists in the idea, not of real, but
of possible being. "The simple idea of being," he says, "is not the
perception of any existing thing, but the intuition of some possible
thing; it is no more than the idea of the possibility of the thing."[20]
[20] Sec. 5, P. 1, C. 3, A. 1, § 2.
I very much doubt the truth of this; and there seems also to be some
confusion of ideas here. He ought to have defined possibility itself
for us, before making the idea of it enter into that of being. I
will myself give a definition of it, and this may serve greatly to
facilitate the understanding of the whole matter.
24. What is possibility? The idea of possibility, abstracted from its
classifications, offers us a general idea of the non-repugnance, or
non-exclusion, of two things with respect to each other; just as the
idea of impossibility presents us such a repugnance or exclusion. A
triangle cannot be a circle. A triangle may be equilateral. In the
former case we affirm the repugnance of the ideas of the triangle and
of the circle: in the latter, the non-repugnance of a triangle having
its three sides equal. It may be said that in these cases there is no
question of the existence of the triangle or of the circle; and that
the possibility or impossibility is referred to the repugnance of their
essences, abstracted from their existence or non-existence, although
ideal impossibility draws along with it real impossibility.
25. Since, whenever impossibility is asserted, repugnance also, is
asserted, and there can be no repugnance of a thing with itself, it
follows that impossibility is only possible when two or more ideas
are compared. On the other hand, when there is no repugnance there is
possibility; then, no simple idea, of itself alone, can offer to us
an impossible object. The object, therefore, of every simple idea is
always possible, that is, is not repugnant.
26. Those things only are intrinsically impossible which involve the
being and the not-being of the same thing; wherefore they are styled
contradictory. When an absurdity of this nature is presented to us, we
at once recollect the principle of contradiction, and say, this cannot
be, "since it would be and would not be at the same time." Why is a
circular triangle impossible? Because it would be and it would not be a
triangle at one and the same time.
The idea of not-being does then enter into that of impossibility:
without it, there can be no exclusion of being, and consequently,
neither contradiction nor impossibility.
27. Possibility may be understood in two ways: I., inasmuch as it
expresses only simple non-repugnance; and then what does not exist, is
not only possible when it does not involve any contradiction, but also,
the existing, the actual; II., inasmuch as it expresses non-repugnance,
united to the idea of not being realized; and then it is only
applicable to non-existing things. The possible taken in the former
sense, is opposed to the impossible; in the latter, it is opposed to
the existing; it involves, however, the condition of non-repugnance. In
the former case we have possibility simply so called; in the second,
pure possibility.
From these remarks we conclude that the idea of possibility adds
something to that of being, that is, non-repugnance, non-exclusion;
and if there be question of pure possibility, the non-existence of the
possible being is likewise added.
28. When the understanding perceives being in itself, it cannot
distinguish whether there is or is not repugnance; this is only
discoverable by comparison; for the idea of being, in itself simple,
does not include comparable terms. The idea of being can encounter
no repugnance if it be not applied to some determinate thing, to an
essence in which contradictory conditions are imagined, as may be
verified by seeking to apply being to a circular triangle.
29. So far is the idea of being in itself from being susceptible
of abstraction from the idea of existence, that it is rather the
idea itself of existence. When we conceive of being, in all its
abstractness, we conceive of nothing else than of existence; these two
words denote one and the same idea.
30. We can, in determinate things, conceive of the essence without
existence; thus also we can very easily consider all imaginable
geometrical figures and examine their properties and relations,
abstracted from their existence or non-existence; but the idea of
being, as something absolutely indeterminate, if it be abstracted from
existence, is also abstracted from itself, is annihilated.
I should be much obliged to any one who would tell me to what the
idea of being in general corresponds, abstracted from existence. If,
after abstracting all determination, we also abstract being itself,
what remains? Some one may answer, there remains a thing which may be.
What does _a thing_ mean? In case we abstract every thing determinate,
_thing_ can only signify a being; we should have a thing which may be,
and this is equivalent to a being which may be. This is very well:
but when we speak of a being which may be, is there only a question
of an impure possibility? then we do not abstract existence, and
the conditions of the supposition are not kept. Is there question
of pure possibility? then existence is denied, and the proposition
is equivalent to this: a being which is not, but which involves
no repugnance. Let us examine the meaning of this expression: "a
being which is not." What does the subject, a being, mean? a thing,
or rather, that which is. What does a thing mean? a being: then
abstraction is made from every thing determinate. Therefore, either the
subject of the proposition means nothing, or the proposition is absurd,
since it is equivalent to this, a thing which is, which is not, but
which involves no repugnance.
31. The origin of the equivocation we combat consists in applying to
the idea itself of being that which belongs only to things that are
something determinate, conceivable without existence. Pure being, in
all its abstractness, is inconceivable without actual being, it is
existence itself.
32. Nor does pure possibility mean any thing except in order to
existence. What is possible being if it cannot be realized, cannot
exist? The idea of being is therefore independent of the idea of
possibility; and the latter is only applicable in relation to the
former.
33. The idea, then, of being is the very idea of existence, of
realization. If we conceive of pure being, without mixture or
modification, and subsisting in itself, we conceive of the infinite, we
conceive of God: but if we consider the idea of being as participated
in a contingent manner, by application to finite things, we then
conceive of their actuality or realization.
34. When we apply the idea of being to things, we have no intention of
applying to them that of possibility, but that of reality. If we say
the desk is, we affirm of the subject desk the predicate contained in
the idea of being: and still we do not mean to say that the desk is
possible, but that it really exists.
35. Nevertheless, the idea of being excludes that of not-being, in such
a way that if the idea of being were only of the possible, it would
not exclude that of not-being, since the purely possible even includes
not-being; possibility, therefore, does not enter into the sole idea of
being; and this idea expresses simply existence, reality.
CHAPTER V.
A DIFFICULTY SOLVED.
36. What means the idea of purely possible being? If we maintain that
the object of the idea of being is reality, these two ideas, being, and
purely possible, would seem to be contradictory: reality is not purely
possible, for were it purely possible, it would not exist, and in the
non-existing there is no reality. Let us examine this difficulty, and
investigate the origin of the idea of pure possibility.
37. Surrounded as we are by contingent beings, contingent beings
ourselves, we are incessantly aware of the destruction of some, and the
production of others, that is to say, of the transition from being to
not-being, and from not-being to being. Our inward sense attests to us
this transition from not-being to being; we have ourselves experienced
it; all our recollections are limited to a very brief term, before
which the world already existed. Thus, then, reason, experience, and
inward sense show us that there are some objects which are, and then
disappear, and that others, which before were not, now appear. In those
things in which we witness this change, we perceive properties and
relations which give occasion to a certain combination of our ideas,
and this combination subsists whether the objects to which they refer
continue or cease to exist. In this way we form a general idea of
things which, although they do not exist, may exist; but this subject
_things_, does not express being, but in general finite, determinate
objects.
38. Here, then, is the solution of the difficulty. Purely possible
being, such as we conceive it to be in the manner explained, involves
no contradiction; it does not denote _a reality which is not a
reality_, but an object, or a finite, determinate thing, the idea of
which we have, although it do not exist, and whose existence involves
no contradiction, or repugnance with any of the conditions contained
in its idea. The expression, then, purely possible being, if it be
explained in this manner, is nothing more than the generalization of
these and other similar propositions. A desk which is not is possible.
What do we mean by this? Simply that in the idea of desk there is
nothing repugnant to its existing; and purely possible being signifies
nothing more than that we have many ideas of finite things which may
exist without repugnance. The expression refers to determinate things
conceived of by us, but we abstract in this case whether this or that
be the essence of which we speak, and comprise all those which offer no
repugnance.
39. If it be objected that an infinite, non-existing being would
then be a contradictory thing, we admit it without hesitation. If
an infinite being do not exist it is an absurdity; and if, when we
compare these two ideas, infinity and non-existence, we do not see
the repugnance between them with perfect clearness, it is because we
do not comprehend the nature of infinity. This is the only reason why
the demonstration of the existence of God founded simply on his idea,
has been and still is exposed to difficulties. But it is certain that
if the infinite being did not exist, it would be impossible. For that
is impossible which cannot exist; and did it not already exist it
could not exist. This existence could not come from another, since the
infinite cannot be a being produced; nor from itself, since it would
not exist. We do, it is true, imagine the infinite in its essence,
abstracted from its existence; but I repeat that this abstraction is
only possible to us because we cannot well comprehend the infinite;
could we comprehend it, we should see the repugnance between these
terms, infinity and non-existence, with the same clearness as we see
that of the triangle and circle.
CHAPTER VI.
IN WHAT SENSE THE IDEA OF BEING IS THE FORM OF THE UNDERSTANDING.
40. When it is asserted that the object of the understanding is being,
there is room to doubt whether it is meant that the idea of being is
the general form of all conceptions, or only that all the understanding
conceives is being; or, in other words, whether the quality of object
is attributed to being, as being, in such a way that under this form
alone objects are conceivable, or only that the quality of being
belongs to all that the understanding conceives.
In the first case the proposition might be taken in a reduplicative
sense, and would then be equivalent to this: "The understanding
conceives nothing save inasmuch as it is being;" in the second it
might be taken formally, and be equivalent to this: "whatever the
understanding conceives is being."
41. We are of opinion that it cannot be said that the object of the
understanding is being only inasmuch as being; in such a way as to make
the idea of being the only form of the understanding's conceiving; but
that this form is an essential condition to all perception.
42. If we remark that the idea of being, in itself considered, neither
includes any determination or variety, nor expresses any thing more
than being, in its greatest abstractness, we shall not fail clearly
to perceive that this idea of being is not the only form conceived by
the understanding; if, therefore, the understanding do not perceive
any thing besides this idea in its objects, it cannot know their
differences; nor can its perception go beyond that which is common to
all, being.
43. If it be said that the differences perceived are modes of being,
modifications of that which is represented in the general idea, it is
at once agreed that being in itself is not the only form perceived;
since both modification and mode of being add something to the idea
of being. The rectangular triangle is a kind of triangle: its idea is
a modification of the general idea, and no one will pretend that the
idea of rectangular adds nothing to that of triangle, or that they are
both the same thing. The same is verified in the idea of being and its
modifications.
44. We have already seen[21] that indeterminate ideas by themselves
alone do not lead to positive cognitions; and certainly no idea
better merits the name of indeterminate than that of being. Were our
understanding limited to it, perception would be nothing but a vague
conception, incapable of any combination.
[21] See Book IV., Ch. XXI.
45. Negation itself, as we shall hereafter see, is known to us, but
this it could not be were we to admit that the understanding knows
nothing save inasmuch as it is being; in which case the indispensable
condition of all cognition, the principle of contradiction, would
deceive us.
46. These reasons suffice to place beyond all doubt what we have
proposed to show, but as this point is intimately connected with what
is most transcendental in logic and metaphysics, we will endeavor to
explain it more at large in the following chapter.
CHAPTER VII.
ALL SCIENCE IS FOUNDED IN THE POSTULATE OF EXISTENCE.
47. We have said that the idea of being is not the sole form perceived,
but that it is a form necessary to all perception. We do not mean by
this to say that we cannot perceive without the actually existing;
but that existence enters in some degree as a condition of every
thing perceived. We will explain ourselves. When we simply perceive
an object, and affirm nothing of it, it is always offered to us as a
reality. Our idea certainly expresses something, but it has nothing
excepting reality. Even the perception of the essential relations of
things involves the condition that they exist. Thus, when we say that
in the same circle or in equal circles equal arcs are subtended by
equal chords, we suppose impliedly this condition, "if a circle exists."
48. Since this manner of explaining the cognition of the essential
relations of things may seem far-fetched, we will endeavor to present
it under the clearest possible point of view. When we affirm or deny
an essential relation of two things, do we affirm or deny it of our
own ideas or of the things? Clearly of the things, not of our ideas.
If we say, "the ellipse is a curve," we do not say this of our idea,
but of the object of our idea. We are well aware that our ideas are not
ellipses, that there are none in our head, and that when we reflect,
for example, upon the orbit of the earth, that this orbit is not within
us. Of what, then, do we speak? Not of the idea, but of its object; not
of what is in us, but of what is without us.
49. Nor do we mean that we _see_ it thus, but that it _is_ thus; when
we say the circumference is greater than the diameter, we do not mean
that we see it thus, but that it is thus. So far are we from speaking
of our idea, that we should assert it to be true although we did not
see it, and even although it were not to exist. We speak of our idea
only when we doubt of its correspondence with the object; then we do
not speak of reality, but of appearance, and in such cases our language
is admirably exact, for we do not say, _it is_, but, _it seems to us_.
50. Our affirmations and negations, therefore, refer to their
objects. Now, we argue thus: what does not exist is pure nothing, and
nothing can either be affirmed or denied of nothing, since it has no
property or relation of any kind, but is a pure negation of every
thing; therefore, nothing can be affirmed or denied; there can be no
combination, no comparison, no perception, except on condition of
existence.
We say _on condition_, because we know the properties and relations of
many things which do not exist; but in all that we do know of them,
this condition always enters: if they exist.
51. Hence it follows that our science rests always on a postulate; and
we purposely use this mathematical expression in order to show that
those sciences which are called exact by antonomasy do not disdain this
condition which we exact from all science. The greater part of them
commence with this postulate: "Let a line be drawn, &c.," "Suppose B to
be a right angle, &c.," "Take a quantity A greater than B, &c." This
is the way the mathematician, with all his rigor, always supposes the
condition of existence.
52. It is necessary to suppose this existence, otherwise nothing
could be explained. Common sense teaches us what has escaped some
metaphysicians. To prove it, let us see how a mathematician, who never
dipped into metaphysics, would talk. We will suppose the interlocutor
to set out to demonstrate to us that in a rectangular triangle the
square of the hypothenuse is equal to the sum of the squares of
the base and perpendicular; and that we, in order to exercise his
intelligence, or rather to make him show us, without himself being
aware of it, what is passing in his own mind with respect to the
perception of its object, put various questions to him, in reality
searching, although apparently asked out of ignorance. We will adopt
the form of a dialogue for the sake of greater clearness, and will
suppose the demonstration to be given from memory, without the aid of
figures.
_Demonstration._ Drop a perpendicular from the right angle to the
hypothenuse.
Where?
Why, in the triangle of which we speak, of course.
But, sir, if there be no such triangle----
Why then, what are we talking of?
We are talking of a rectangular triangle, and the case supposed is that
there is none.
Is not, but can be. Take paper, a pencil, and ruler, and we will have
one right away.
That is to say, you speak of the triangle we may make?
Yes, sir.
Ah, I understand; but then we should have it; now, we have not got it.
All in good time. But if we had drawn it, could we not drop the
perpendicular?
Certainly.
That is all I meant to say.
But you were saying drop----
No doubt we cannot drop a perpendicular in a triangle unless the
triangle exists, since then there is neither vertex of a right angle,
hypothenuse, nor any thing else; but when I say, drop a perpendicular,
I always suppose a triangle; and as it is evident that the triangle may
exist, I do not express the supposition, but understand it.
I comprehend this; but then we should drop the perpendicular only in
this triangle, but you spoke as if we might drop it in all triangles.
I only took this triangle for an example; we can clearly do with all
others what we can do with this one.
With all?
Certainly. Can you not see how, in every rectangular triangle, a
perpendicular may be drawn from the right angle to the hypothenuse?
Yes, in your figure; but since what is in my head is not a triangle,
for I imagine some with sides a thousand miles long, and there is not
in my head room enough--
There is no question of what is in your head, but of triangles
themselves--
But these triangles do not exist; therefore, we can say nothing of them.
Yes; but may they not exist?
Who doubts it?
Well then, if they do exist, be they large or small, in one position
or another, here or there, is it not true that a perpendicular may be
drawn from the vertex of the right angle to the hypothenuse?
Evidently.
I have then only to say that, in every rectangular triangle, this
perpendicular may be drawn.
Then you do not speak of those which do not exist? Is it not so?
I speak of all, whether they do or do not exist.
But a perpendicular cannot be drawn in a triangle which does not exist.
What does not exist is nothing.
But perhaps that which does not exist may exist; and I see with perfect
clearness how every thing said would be verified, _supposing it to
exist_. Thus we can and do speak of all existences and non-existences
without any exception.
We leave it to the reader to judge if we have not, while thus rudely
troubling our good mathematician with our importunate questions, made
him reply as would have replied every one not at all acquainted with
metaphysics. It is evident that these replies ought to be accepted as
reasonable, as satisfactory, and as the only ones in this case that all
the mathematicians in the world could give.
This being so, all that we have advanced is found in these replies and
explications. All science is founded on the postulate of existence;
every argument, to demonstrate even the most essential properties and
relations of things, must start with the supposition of their existence.
CHAPTER VIII.
THE FOUNDATION OF PURE POSSIBILITY, AND THE CONDITION OF ITS EXISTENCE.
53. We have said that the foundation of the pure possibility of things,
and of their properties and relations, is founded in the essence of
God, wherein is the reason of every thing.[22] And it may at first sight
seem that science needs only this foundation, and does not require
to rest upon the condition of the existence of things; because, if
essences are represented in God, the object of science is found in
the Divine essence; and consequently, the argument founded upon the
impossibility of asserting any thing of nothing, is not conclusive.
Supposing there to be such a representation, science is not occupied
with a pure nothing, but with a real thing; and it has consequently in
view a positive object, even when it abstracts the reality of the thing
considered.
[22] See L. IV., C. XXIII. to XXVII.
Let us see how we can solve this difficulty.
54. The necessary relations of things, independently of their
existence, must have a sufficient reason; and this can only be in
necessary being. The condition, therefore, of existence, presupposes
the representation of the essence of the contingent being in necessary
being; the condition, therefore, "if it exist," cannot be brought in
unless it presupposes the foundation of possibility.
55. This remark shows that there are two questions:--1st: What is
the foundation of the intrinsic possibility of things? 2d: Supposing
possibility, what condition is involved in so much as it is affirmed
or denied of the possible object? The foundation of the possibility is
God; and the condition is the existence of the objects considered.
Both are requisite to science; if the foundation of intrinsic
possibility be wanting, the condition of existence cannot come in; and
if, admitting the possibility, we omit the condition, science has no
object.
56. We would remark, for the better understanding of this whole
subject, that we do not, in affirming or denying the relations of
beings represented in God, treat of what these beings are in God, but
of what they would be in themselves were they to exist. In God, all are
the same God; for all that is in God, is identical with God. If, then,
we consider things only as they are in him, we shall have God, not the
things, for object. Certain it is, that in God is the foundation, or
the sufficient reason, of geometrical truths: but geometry does not
consider them such as they are in God, but such as they are or may
be realized. In God, there are neither lines nor dimensions of any
kind; he, therefore, is not the object of geometry properly so called.
Geometrical truths have in him an objective value or representative
value, but not subjective; we should otherwise be obliged to say that
God is extensive.
57. Here, then, is seen that what we said above in the place cited,
does not conflict with what we have here established; and that to make
God the foundation of all possibility, does not exclude the scientific
necessity of the condition of existence.
58. We will, in order to place this beyond all doubt, present the
question under another aspect, by showing that when God knows finite
truths, he sees in them this condition likewise: "If they exist." God
knows the truth of this proposition: "Triangles of equal base and
altitude are of equal superfices:" this is true as well in the eyes of
infinite intelligence, as in ours; were it not thus the proposition
would not be true in itself, and we should be in error. This being so,
there are in God, who is most simple being, no true figures, although
he has the intellectual perception of them. The cognition, then,
of God, in what relates to finite things, refers to their possible
existence, and consequently involves the condition that they exist.
The cognition of God does not refer to their purely ideal
representation, but to their actual or possible reality; when God
knows a truth of finite beings, he does not know it from the sole
representation of those truths which he has in himself, but from that
which they would be were they to exist.
59. Every object may be considered either in the real or in the ideal
order. The ideal is their representation in an understanding, which
has a value only inasmuch as it refers to possible or actual reality.
In this manner alone can the idea have objectiveness, since otherwise
it could only be a purely subjective fact, of which, excepting the
purely subjective, nothing could be either affirmed or denied. The idea
which we have of the triangle aids us, in so far as it has a real or
possible object, to know and combine: we refer what we affirm or deny
of it to its object: if this disappear, the idea is converted into a
purely subjective fact, to which we cannot apply the properties of a
triangular figure without an open contradiction.
CHAPTER IX.
IDEA OF NEGATION.
60. It is said that the understanding does not conceive nothing: this
is true in the sense that we do not conceive nothing as something,
which would be a contradiction; but it does not therefore follow, that
we do not in any mode conceive nothing. Not-being is nothing, and yet
we conceive not-being. This perception is necessary to us; without it
we could not perceive contradiction; for which reason the principle of
contradiction: "It is impossible for a thing to exist and not to exist
at the same time:" fundamental as it is in our cognitions, would fail
us.
61. It may be said that to conceive nothing, not-being, is not to
conceive, but to not-conceive: this, however, is false, for it is not
the same thing to conceive that a thing is not, and not to conceive
it. The former involves a negative judgment, and may be expressed by a
negative proposition; and the latter is the simple absence of the act
of perception; the former is objective, the latter subjective. We do
not when asleep perceive things; but this non-perception is by no means
equivalent to perceiving that they are not. It may be said of a stone
that it does not perceive another stone; but not that it perceives the
non-being of the other stone.
62. The perception of not-being is a positive act; and it would be
a contradiction to say that it is the very perception of being; for
it would follow, that whenever we perceive being, we perceive its
negation, not-being, and _vice versa_, which is an absurdity.
63. When we perceive not-being, we do, it is true, perceive it in
relation to being; and it is equally true, an understanding perceiving
absolute not-being, without any idea of being, is altogether
inconceivable; but this does not prove the two ideas not to be distinct
and contradictory.
64. It is remarkable that the idea of negation, besides entering into
the fundamental principles of our understanding: "It is impossible for
a thing to be and not to be at the same time:" "Every thing either is
or is not:" is also necessary to almost all of our perceptions. We do
not conceive distinct beings without conceiving that one _is not_ the
other, and we cannot form a negative judgment into which negation does
not enter. Hence it results that just as the idea of being is absolute
and relative, also is the idea of not-being: thus, we say, "The sun
_is_;" "All the diameters of a circle _are_ equal;" and we also say,
"The phœnix _is not_:" "The diameters of an ellipse _are not_ equal."
65. We may ask those who hold that every idea is the image of the
object, what sort of an image the idea of not-being would form? This
confirms what we have already advanced, that it is a mistake to
imagine all ideas as a kind of types, similar to things, and that we
cannot oftentimes explain any of those inward phenomena, called ideas,
notwithstanding we know and explain their objects by them.
66. It is also said that the object of the understanding is being;
but this is inexplicable in the sense that the understanding does
not perceive not-being; and can be understood only in the sense that
we perceive not-being as coordinated to being, and that not-being of
itself alone, cannot be the origin of any cognition.
Remark here an important difference. By the idea of being every thing
may be understood; and the more of being there is in the idea, the
more do we understand; and if an idea be supposed to represent a
being without any limitation, or, which is the same thing, without
any negation, we should have a cognition of an infinite being. On
the contrary, the perception of not-being teaches us nothing, save
inasmuch as it shows us the limitation of determinate beings and their
relations; and if we suppose the idea of not-being to be gradually
extended, we shall see that in proportion as it approaches its limits,
that is, pure not-being, absolute nothing, the understanding loses its
object; the points of comparison and the elements of combination fail;
all light goes out, and intelligence dies.
67. We know universal, absolute nothing, only as a momentary condition
which we imagine, but do not admit. In it we see that it is impossible
that something should not exist; for, could any one instant be
designated in which nothing existed, nothing could now exist. In
this imaginary nothing, we discover no point of departure for the
understanding; all combinations become impossible and absurdities; the
mind sees itself perishing in the vacuum it has itself created.
68. If the idea of negation be not combined with that of being, it
is perfectly sterile; but thus combined, it has a kind of fecundity
peculiar to itself. The ideas of distinction, of limitation, and of
determination, involve a relative negation, for we do not conceive
distinct beings without conceiving that one is not another; nor
limited beings, without conceiving that they _are wanting_, that is,
that in some sense they _are not_; nor determinate beings, without
conceiving something which makes them what they are and not others.
CHAPTER X.
IDENTITY; DISTINCTION; UNITY; MULTIPLICITY.
69. Let us examine how we may draw from the idea of not-being the
explication of the ideas of identity and distinction, unity and
multiplicity.
Let us conceive a being, and fix our attention solely on it, and
compare it with nothing which is not it, nor permit any idea of
not-being to come in; we shall then, with respect to it, have the
ideas of identity and unity; or, to speak more exactly, these ideas
of identity and unity will be nothing else than ideas of this same
being. Ideas of unity and identity are for this reason inexplicable
by themselves alone; they are simple, or are confounded with a simple
idea in which can be no comparison, and into which if negation enter,
it is not noted, nor can be made the object of reflection. Thus,
for instance, the idea of not-being enters in some manner into the
perception of every limited being; but we can abstract this negation,
and consider what the object _is_, not what it _is not_.
70. If we perceive a being, and afterwards another being, the
perception that one is not the other gives the idea of distinction, and
consequently that also of multiplicity. There is, then, no distinction
or number without perception of relative _not-being_ combined with
_being_; but this perception is all that is requisite to distinction
and number.
71. The ideas of identity and unity are simple, those of distinction
and number composite; the former involve no negation, the latter imply
a negative judgment; "this is not that." It is impossible for A to be
presented to us as distinct from B, if we do not perceive that B is
not A; and on the other hand, we need only to know that B is not A, in
order to enable us to say they are distinct. These expressions, "A is
not B," or, "A and B are distinct," are perfectly identical.
72. From this we infer that the primary combination of our intelligence
consists in the perception of being and not-being. By it we perceive
identity and distinction, unity and number; by it we compare, affirm,
or deny; without it we cannot even think. Without the perception
of negation, we can have only the perception of being, that is, an
intuition fixed upon an identical object, one and immutable, such as we
conceive the Divine Intelligence to be, contemplating the infinity of
being in the infinite essence.
73. Does God know negations? Certainly; for when a being ceases
to exist, God knows this truth, in which there is a negation. He
knows the truth of all negative propositions, whether it expresses
substantive or relative being; therefore, he knows negation. But this
is no imperfection, since it cannot be an imperfection to know truth;
the imperfection is in the objects, which, by the very fact of being
finite, include negation, being combined with not-being. Were God not
to know negation, it would be because negation is in itself impossible;
which would be equivalent to the impossibility of the existence of the
finite, and would lead to the absolute and exclusive necessity of one
sole infinite being.
CHAPTER XI.
ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF BEING.
74. If it be impossible to think without the idea of being, it exists
prior to any reflex act, and it cannot have sprung from reflection.
The idea of being must therefore be innate. Let us investigate this
question.
75. We have shown in the preceding chapter that we cannot think without
the idea of being; let whoever doubts this consult his own experience,
and make, if he can, a reflex act into which the idea of being will not
enter. We have already seen that we cannot exclude it in the conception
of first principles, and beyond these it is certain no one will go.
76. Can this idea have come to us from sensation? Sensation in itself
offers us only determinate objects, whereas the idea of being is an
indeterminate thing: sensation offers us only particular things,
whereas the idea of being is the most general it is possible to have:
sensation teaches us nothing, tells us nothing, except what it is, a
simple affection of our soul, whereas the idea of being is a vast idea,
extending to all, and, fecundating our mind in an admirable manner, is
the element of all reflection and alone sufficient to found a science:
sensation never leaves itself, nor extends to another sensation; the
sense of touch has nothing to do with that of hearing; all belong to an
instant of time, and only exist during it, whereas the idea of being
guides the mind through every class of beings, the corporeal and the
incorporeal, the real and the possible, the temporal and the eternal,
the finite and the infinite.
If we discover any thing by sensations, if they produce any
intellectual fruit, it is because we reflect upon them; but reflection
is impossible without the idea of being.
77. Neither does it seem that the idea of being can be formed by
abstraction. To abstract is of necessity to reflect; and reflection
is impossible without this idea; therefore, it is necessary to
abstraction, and consequently cannot have abstraction for its cause.
78. On the other hand, an exceedingly simple explication of the
method in which abstraction is made, may be opposed to this argument
apparently so conclusive. We see the paper upon which we write; this
sensation involves two things, whiteness and extension. Were we
limited to simple sensation, here we should stop, and receive only
the impression, extension and whiteness. But having within ourselves
a faculty distinct from that of feeling, which makes us capable of
reflecting upon the very sensation we experience, we can consider
that this sensation has some similarity to others which we recollect
to have experienced. We can then consider extension and whiteness in
themselves, abstracting the actual affection which they produce in us.
Afterwards we can reflect upon the fact that these sensations have
something in common with others, inasmuch as they all affect us in a
certain manner, and then we have the idea of sensation in general. If,
then, we consider that these sensations all have something in common
with all that is in us, in so far as they modify us in a certain
manner, we shall form an idea of a modification of the _me_, making
abstraction, however, of its being a sensation, a thought, or an act
of the will; and if, finally, we abstract from these things being in
us, their being substances or modifications, and attend only to the
fact that they are something, we shall have attained the idea of being.
This idea may, therefore, be formed by abstraction. This explication,
seductive as it is by reason of its simplicity, is open to grave
objections.
79. From the very beginning of this process we make use, without
adverting to it, of the idea of being; we therefore deceive ourselves
when we imagine that we form it. We cannot reflect upon extension and
whiteness without remarking that they exist, that they are _something_
similar to other sensations. When we think upon what affects us, we
know that _we are_, that that which affects us _is_, and we speak of
its being or not being, of its having or not having _something common_;
and finally, when we abstract the modifications of our mind as being
this or that, and regard them only as _thing_, as _something_, as
a _being_, we evidently cannot so consider them if there does not
exist in us the idea of _something_ in general, that is, of being.
Thus being is a predicate which we apply to things; we do, therefore,
know this predicate. We only collect in one general and indeterminate
idea, particular and determinate things, already existing in our
understanding. The successive operations made by means of abstraction
are only a decomposition of the object, a classification of it in
various general ideas so as to attain to the superior idea of being.
80. It is difficult in view of these reasons, which are all strong,
to decide without danger of erring for either of the opinions
advanced. Nevertheless, we shall give our own in accordance with
the principles we have laid down in different parts of this work.
We hold that the idea of being is not innate, in the sense that it
pre-exists in our understanding as a type anterior to all sensation
and to all intellectual acts;[23] but we see no impropriety in calling
it innate, if nothing more be meant than the _innate faculty_ of our
understanding to perceive objects under the general reason of being or
existence, so often as it reflects upon them. Thus the idea does not
flow from sensations; it is recognized as a primary element of pure
understanding; but it is not formed by abstraction, which separates it
from others, and purifies it, so to speak, itself contributing to this
purification. In this sense it may exist before reflection, and yet be
the fruit of reflection, according to the various stages in which we
consider it. Inasmuch as it is mixed and confused with other ideas, it
exists before reflection; but inasmuch as it has been separated and
purified, it is the fruit of the same reflection.
[23] See L. IV., C. XXX.
81. We must, in order to give a complete solution of the difficulties
proposed, give our ideas precision and exactness.
The idea of being is not only general but also indeterminate; it offers
to the mind nothing real or even possible, since we do not conceive
that a being, which is only being, does or can exist, if no property
besides that of being can be affirmed of it. In God is the plenitude
of being; he is his own being; with reason does he call himself, I
AM, WHO AM; but we also affirm of him, with all truth, that he is
intelligent, that he is free, and that he possesses other perfections
not expressed in the pure and general idea of being.
From this we infer that we ought not to regard the idea of being as
a type representing to us something determinate, even something in
general.
82. The act by which we perceive being, existence, reality, is
necessary to our understanding, but it is confounded with all other
intellectual acts, as a condition _sine qua non_ of them all, until
reflection comes to separate it from them, purifying it, and making it
the object of our perception.
Since, when we perceive, we perceive something, it is evident that
the reason of being is always involved in all our perceptions; by
the simple fact of knowing we know being, that is, we know _a thing_.
But as we do not always, when we fix our perception upon an object,
distinguish the various reasons into which it may be decomposed,
although the idea of being is contained in every object perceived,
it is not directly perceived by our understanding until reflection
separates it from all else.
83. If we reflect upon an azure object, evidently the idea of color
enters into that of azure; but without reflection we shall not
distinguish the genus, color, and the difference, azure. These two
things are not really distinguished in the object perceived; for it
would be ridiculous to pretend that in a particular azure-colored
object, color is one thing and azure another. Nevertheless we can,
when we reflect upon the object, very easily distinguish between the
two ideas of color and azure, and we can discuss one without paying
attention to the other. Must we say we have the idea of color in
general, prior to the sensible representation? Most certainly not:
it is only necessary to recognize an innate force of the mind to
generalize what is presented to it in particular, and to decompose a
simple object into various ideas or aspects.
84. Our understanding is endowed with an intellectual force, by virtue
of which it can conceive unity under the idea of multiplicity, and
multiplicity under the idea of unity. We discover an example of the
latter when we unite what is really multiple in a single conception.
Our understanding may be compared to a prism which decomposes a ray
of light into many colors; hence different conceptions relating to
one simple object. When multiplicity is to be reduced to unity, the
intellectual force operates in an altogether contrary manner; instead
of dispersing, it unites; the variety of colors disappears, and the ray
of light is restored in all its purity and simplicity.
85. Our mind, from the fact that it is limited to know many things
by conceptions only, and not by intuitions, requires the faculty of
composing and decomposing, of seeing a simple thing under distinct
aspects, and of joining different things under a common reason.
We must not fail to observe that the power of generalizing and
of dividing, given to our understanding, is a great help to it,
indicating, however, its weakness in the intellectual order, and
continually warning it to proceed with due circumspection, when it has
to decide upon the intimate nature of things.
86. According to this doctrine, general, and more particularly
indeterminate ideas result from the exercise of reflection upon our own
perceptive acts; and there is in the general idea nothing more than
is seen in the particular perception, excepting its own generality
produced by the elimination of all individuating conditions. This is
especially verified in the idea of being, which, as we have seen,
enters as a necessary condition into all our perceptions, and is,
moreover, requisite to all operations as well of composition as of
decomposition.
We cannot conceive, without conceiving _some thing, a being_; and
this is substantive being. We cannot affirm or deny without saying,
_is_, or _is not_; and this is copulative being. The idea of being
is, therefore, less an idea than a condition necessary to enable our
understanding to exercise its functions; it is not a type representing
nothing determinate; it is rather the very condition of its life,
without which it cannot possibly exercise its activity.
87. But we can, by reflection, perceive this condition of all our
thoughts; the idea of being, standing, as it does, involved with
the others, is then presented purified to our eyes, and we conceive
that general reason of _being_, or _thing_, which enters into all
our perceptions, but which we had not previously distinguished with
sufficient clearness.
CHAPTER XII.
DISTINCTION BETWEEN ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE.
88. It has been much disputed in the schools whether existence is
distinct from essence. At first sight, this seems an indifferent
question; but such it is not, if we attend to the consequences which,
in the opinion of respectable authors, flow from it; for they pretend
to no less than establishing upon the distinction between essence and
existence a characteristic note of the finite, attributing to infinite
being alone, the identity of its essence with its existence.
89. That we distinguish between the essence and the existence of things
is beyond all doubt; for inasmuch as we know an object realized, we
conceive its existence; and inasmuch as we know that this object exists
with this or that determination, constituting it in such or such a
species, we conceive its essence. The idea of existence represents
to us pure reality; the idea of essence offers us the determination
of this reality. The schools, however, not satisfied with this, have
endeavored to transfer to things that distinction which we discover in
our conceptions; but their opinion seems to be subtle rather than solid.
90. The essence of a thing is that which makes it what it is, and
distinguishes it from all else; and existence is the act which gives
being to essence, or that by which essence exists. It would appear,
from these definitions, that there really is no distinction between
essence and existence. To render two things distinct, it is requisite
that one be not the other; but since essence, abstracted from
existence, is nothing, we cannot say that there is a real distinction
between them. To what is the essence of a man, if we abstract his
existence, reduced? To nothing; and therefore, no relation between them
is admissible. We grant that when we abstract the existence of man, we
do yet conceive the essence of man; but the question is not whether
we distinguish between the idea of man and his existence, but whether
there is a real distinction between his own essence and existence.
91. In God are the essences of all things, and in this sense they may
be said to be distinguished from finite existence; this does not,
however, if we consider it well, at all affect the present question.
When things exist in God, they are not any thing distinct from him;
they are represented in the Infinite Intelligence, which is, with
all its representations, the infinite essence itself. To compare,
therefore, the finite existence of things with their essence, as this
is in God, is entirely to change the state of the question, and to seek
the relation of things, not with their particular essences, but with
the representations of the Divine understanding.
92. It may be objected that, if the existence of finite beings is the
same as their essence, it will follow that existence will be essential
to these beings; for, since nothing is more essential than essence
itself, finite beings would exist of necessity, as all that pertains
to essence is necessary. The radii of a circle are all equal, for
equality is contained in the essence of the circle; and in like manner,
if existence belong to the essence of things, they must exist, and
non-existence would be a veritable contradiction.
This difficulty rests upon the ambiguous meaning of the word _essence_,
and the want of exactness in joining the ideas of essential and
necessary. The relation of essential properties is necessary, for we
cannot destroy it without falling into contradiction. The radii of a
circle are equal, because equality is involved in the very idea of
the circle; consequently, if this be denied, it would be affirmed and
denied at one and the same time. There is, however, no contradiction
when some properties are not compared with others; but this comparison
is not made when there is question of essence and existence, for in
this case one thing is not compared with another, but with itself;
if the distinction be introduced, it does not refer to two things,
but to one and the same thing considered under two aspects, or in two
different states, in the ideal order and in the real.
When we consider essence abstracted from existence, the object is the
union of the properties which give to beings such or such a nature;
we abstract their existence or non-existence, and attend only to
what they would be were they to exist. The condition of existence is
either expressly or impliedly involved in all that we affirm or deny
of properties; but when we consider essence realized or existing,
we do not compare property with property but the thing with itself.
In this case, non-existence does not imply contradiction; for when
existence disappears, the essence also disappears, with all that it
included. There would be a contradiction were we to assert that essence
implies existence, and to endeavor, while the former remains, to make
the latter disappear, which is not verified in this supposition. The
equality of the radii of a circle cannot fail, so long as the circle
does not fail; and the contradiction would be to make the radii unequal
while the circle continues to be a circle; but were the circle to cease
to be a circle, there would be no reason why the radii should not be
unequal. Essence is the same as existence; so long as there is essence,
so long will there be existence; if the essence fail the existence
will likewise fail; where, then, is the contradiction? Life is of the
essence of man, and yet man dies; we may then say man is destroyed, and
therefore there is in this no contradiction. If the essence cease to
exist, it also will be destroyed, and existence, which is identified
with it, may fail without any contradiction.
93. The scholastics taught that the being whose essence was the same
as its existence would be infinite and absolutely immutable, because,
since existence is the complement in the line of being or of act, it
could receive nothing more. This difficulty also originates in the
equivocal sense of words. What is meant by _complement_ in the line
of being or act? If it mean that nothing can supervene to essence
identified with existence, here is a begging of the question, since
what was to be proved is asserted. If it mean that existence is the
complement in the line of being or act in the sense that, given it,
nothing more is wanted to make the things, whose existence it is,
really existing, an indubitable truth is advanced, but not one from
which what was to be demonstrated can be inferred.
94. It would seem, therefore, that there is no real distinction in
things corresponding to the distinction between essence and existence
in our conceptions. Essence is not distinguished from existence, but it
does not therefore cease to be finite, nor existence to be contingent.
In God existence is identified with essence; but in such a manner, that
his non-existence implies contradiction, and his essence is infinite.
CHAPTER XIII.
KANT'S OPINION OF REALITY AND NEGATION.
95. Kant numbers among his categories reality and negation, or
existence and non-existence, and, conformably to his principles,
defines them thus: "Reality is a pure conception of the understanding;
it is what corresponds, in general, to any sensation whatever,
consequently that whose conception denotes a being in itself, in time.
Negation is that whose conception represents a not-being in time.
The opposition of these two things consists in the difference of the
same time, as full or void. Since then, time consists solely in the
form of the intuition, and consequently in the form of the objects
as phenomena, it follows that that which in them corresponds to the
sensation, is the transcendental matter of all objects, as things
in themselves, essential reality. Every sensation has a degree or
intensity, by which it may fill more or less the same time, that is,
the inward sense relatively to the representation of an object, until
it be reduced to nothing = 0 = negation."
There is in this passage a fundamental error which ruins the whole
basis of all intelligence: there is also much confusion in his
application of the idea of time.
96. According to Kant, reality alone refers to sensations; therefore
the idea of being will be the idea of the phenomena of sensibility in
general; this idea will mean nothing, if applied to the non-sensible;
the very principle of contradiction will necessarily be limited to the
sphere of sensibility; and we neither shall know, or be able to know
any thing without the sensible order. Such are the consequences of this
doctrine; let us now examine the solidity of the principle from which
they flow.
97. Were the idea of reality only the idea of the sensible in
general, we could never apply it to non-sensible things, which,
however, experience teaches we can do. We speak incessantly of the
possibility and even of the existence of non-sensible beings, and we
even distinguish the phenomena of our mind into those belonging to
sensibility, and those which correspond to the purely intellectual
order. The idea of being, therefore, for us, denotes a general
conception non-circumscribed by the sensible order.
98. Kant will answer that the applications we make of this idea,
extending it beyond the sphere of sensibility, are vain illusions
expressed in unmeaning words. To this we reply.
I. There is now no question of ascertaining whether the applications of
the idea of being or reality beyond the sensible order be founded or
unfounded; there is question only of ascertaining what it is that this
idea represents to us, whether the object represented be illusory or
not. Kant, when defining reality, regards it as one of his categories,
and consequently, as one of the pure conceptions of the understanding.
To make his definition good, he ought to employ this conception in its
greatest possible extent: but as he has demonstrated that conception,
in itself, is not limited to the sphere of sensibility, it must follow
that his definition is inadmissible. Had he said that the applications
of the conception beyond the sensible order were unfounded, he would
indeed have erred, but would not have destroyed conception itself;
yet he equivocates not only in the uses of conception, but also in
its nature, which he can only ruin, if he limit it to the sphere of
sensibility.
II. The principle of contradiction is founded in the idea of being,
and extends as well to the non-sensible as to the sensible. It would
follow, were we to admit Kant's doctrine, that the principle of
contradiction, "It is impossible for a thing to be and not to be at the
same time," would be equivalent to this proposition; "It is impossible
for a phenomenon of sensibility to appear and not to appear at the same
time." Evidently neither philosophy nor common sense ever gave such a
meaning to the principle of contradiction. When the impossibility of
a thing's being and not being at the same time is affirmed, this is
asserted in general, and abstraction is absolutely made of the things
pertaining or not pertaining to the sensible order. Were it not thus,
we should be obliged to say that non-sensible beings are absolutely
impossible, which even Kant does not venture to maintain, or, supposing
them to exist, to doubt whether the principle of contradiction is
applicable to them. Who sees not the absurdity of such a doubt,
and that, if it be admitted for a single instant, all intelligence
is destroyed? If we limit the generality of the principle of
contradiction, the impossibility is no longer absolute: and supposing
it to fail in certain cases, who shall assure us that it does not in
all?
III. Kant himself admits the distinction between the phenomena of
sensibility and purely intellectual conceptions: with him, therefore,
reality comprises something more than the sensible. Purely intellectual
conceptions are a reality, are something at least as subjective
phenomena of our mind, and yet are not sensible, as Kant himself
confesses; he therefore falls into a contradiction, when he limits the
idea of reality to the purely sensible.
99. Kant conceives reality and negation only as filling, or leaving
void, time, which, in his opinion, is the primitive form of our
intuitions, and a kind of back-ground upon which the mind sees all
objects, even its own operations. According to this doctrine, the ideas
of time precede those of reality and negation, since only in relation
to it are the two latter conceivable. And now we see the singularity
of a form, or whatever else it be called, to which the ideas of
reality and negation are made to refer when nothing is conceivable
without the idea of reality. Kant, scrupulous as he is in the analysis
of the elements of our mind, and contemptuous as he is towards all
metaphysicians who preceded him, ought to have explained to us the
nature of this form in which we see reality, and which, nevertheless,
is not contained in the idea of reality. If it is something, it will be
a reality; and if it is not something, it will be a pure nothing; and
consequently, it cannot be a form which can, by filling and becoming
void, present to our mind the ideas of reality or negation. It would
be easy to show, by an abundance of reason, the German philosopher's
equivocation, when he so inexactly determines the relations between
time and the idea of being; but as we propose to explain at length the
idea of time, we will pass over here what belongs to another part of
this work.
CHAPTER XIV.
RECAPITULATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE DOCTRINE CONCERNING THE IDEA OF
BEING.
100. We wish now to recapitulate the doctrine brought out in the
preceding chapters, so that it may be seen at a glance in all its
bearings and connections.
The idea of being is so fruitful in results, that we must sound it
under all its aspects, and never lose sight of it in investigating
transcendental philosophy.
101. We have the idea of _ens_, or of being in general; reason and our
inward sense both attest it.
102. This idea is simple, and cannot be resolved into other elements:
it expresses a general reason of things, and its nature is in a
certain manner destroyed if it be mingled with particular ideas. It is
intuitive, but indeterminate to such a degree that, by itself alone, it
affords us no idea of a real or possible being. We not only know that
every being is, but that it is _some thing_ which is its predicate:
even the Infinite Being is not only a being, but is an intelligent
and free being, and formally possesses all perfections which imply no
imperfection.
103. The idea of being may express either simple existence, in which
case it is substantive, or the relation of a predicate with a subject,
and then it is copulative. In the proposition, "the sun _is_," being is
substantive, that is, expresses existence; in the proposition, "the sun
_is luminous_," being is copulative, that is, it denotes the relation
of the predicate with a subject.
104. The ideas of identity and distinction originate in the ideas of
being and of not-being; and thus the idea of copulative being, which
affirms the identity of a predicate with a subject, flows also in a
manner from the idea of substantive being.
105. Being, which is the principal object of the understanding, is not
the possible inasmuch as possible. We conceive possibility only in
order to actuality. Possibility flows from actuality, not actuality
from possibility. We could not conceive pure possibility, that is,
possibility without existence, did we not conceive finite beings in
whose idea being is not of necessity involved, and of whose appearance
and disappearance we are incessantly reminded by experience.
106. The understanding perceives being, and this is a condition
indispensable to all its perceptions; but the idea of being is not the
only one offered to it, since it knows different modes of being, which,
by the very fact that they are _modes_, add something to the general
and absolute idea of existence.
107. When we consider the essences of things, and abstract their
reality, our cognitions always involve this condition,--if they exist.
There can be only a conditional science of the purely possible,
insomuch as it is not; that is, provided the object pass from
possibility to reality. We must, in order to establish pure possibility
so that it may have necessary relations, subject to the condition of
existence, have recourse to a necessary being, origin of all truth.
108. The essences of things in the abstract mean nothing, nor can they
become the object of affirmation or negation, unless we suppose a
necessary being in which is the reason of the relations of things, and
of the possibility of their existence.
109. Pure truth, independent of all understanding, of all being created
or uncreated, is an illusion, or rather an absurdity. With pure nothing
there is no truth. Truth cannot be _atheistic_; without God there is no
truth.
110. We not only know being, but also not-being. We have an idea of
negation, and it always refers to some being. Absolute nothing cannot
be the object of intelligence. The idea of not-being has its own
peculiar fecundity; combined with that of being, it gives the principle
of contradiction, engenders the ideas of distinction and multiplicity,
and makes negative judgments possible.
111. The idea of being does not flow from sensations; neither is
it innate, in the sense that it pre-exists in our understanding as
a type prior to all perceptions. There is no reason why it may not
be called innate, if this mean only a condition _sine qua non_ of
all our intellectual acts, and consequently of the exercise of our
innate faculties. The idea of being is mingled in every intellectual
perception, but it is not offered to us with perfect clearness and
distinctness until we separate it by reflection from the particular
ideas which accompany it.
112. Essence is not distinguished from existence even in finite
beings. It is a distinction in conceptions, to which there is no real
distinction corresponding.
113. The identity of essence with existence does not involve the
necessity of finite things. The arguments by which some pretend to
establish this consequence are founded upon an ambiguous meaning of
words.
114. Kant's opinion, which limits the idea of reality, and that also of
negation, to the purely sensible order, would destroy all intelligence,
since it overthrows the very principle of contradiction. This doctrine
of the German philosopher is also in opposition with what he himself
taught concerning purely intellectual conceptions, distinct from
sensible representations. When he refers the ideas of reality and
negation to that of time, as the primitive form of the inward sense,
he leaves out of the idea of reality what no less pertains to it, and
presents the idea of time under a point of view wholly equivocal.
115. As sensible representation is based upon the finite intuition
of extension, so the perceptive faculties of the pure understanding
receive the idea of being as their foundation. In the same manner
that extension is presented to sensibility as limitable, and from
limitability results figurability, and consequently all the objects
of geometrical science; so also does the idea of not-being, combined
with that of being, fecundate in a manner the metaphysical sciences.
The parallelism of the two ideas, extension and being, is not of such
a nature as to render the former independent of the latter. So far
as science is concerned, the idea of extension is sterile, if it be
not combined with the general idea of being and not-being. This may
be shown in many ways; but it will suffice to recollect that geometry
cannot take a single step without the principle of contradiction, into
which the ideas of being and of not-being enter.[24]
[24] See L. IV., C. V.
116. All our cognitions flow from the idea of being and not-being,
combined with intuitive ideas. We shall have occasion in the following
books to remark this admirable fecundity of an idea, which, although it
cannot of itself teach any thing, can yet, when united with others, and
modified itself in various ways, so illuminate the intellectual world
as to merit to be called the object of understanding.
BOOK SIXTH.
UNITY AND NUMBER.
CHAPTER I.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS ON THE IDEA OF UNITY.
1. Before analyzing the idea of number, let us examine its simplest
element, unity. Number is a connection of unities. We cannot know what
number is, if we do not know what unity is.[25]
[25] See L. V., C. X.
2. What is unity? When is a thing one? We all seem to know what unity
is, since upon it we found the fabric of all our arithmetic cognitions.
We all know when a thing is one, and we never equivocate on the meaning
of the word. In this the learned and the unlearned stand on the same
footing. The word _one_, in our language, has only one meaning for
all who understand it. The same may be said of the word which in
other languages expresses the same idea. When we meet the figure 1,
which corresponds to this idea, and expresses it in a general manner,
abstracting the difference of idioms, all men understand and apply it
in the same manner.
3. The idea of unity is the same in all men; it is a common patrimony
of the human race. It is not bound to this or that object, nor to this
or that act of the mind; it extends to all in the same manner. Even
composite and multiple things are called one only, inasmuch as they
participate in a general idea. The indivisible point is one. The line
composed of many points could not be one were there not a contiguous
enchainment of these points, and did they not all unite to form _one_
object, which gives us _one_ impression, and is submitted to _one_ act
of our understanding.
4. The idea of unity is not a particular sensation, since it applies
to all; neither is it sensation in general, since it pertains to
what is not sensation. The sensation of color is one; so, also, the
consciousness of the _me_ is one, although this is not a sensation.
The size of the rectangle which I see is one, and the relation of the
equality of its angles is also one, but is not a sensation.
5. The idea of unity is a simple idea, and accompanies our mind from
its first steps; we find it everywhere, and understand it well, but
cannot explain it as we would, because it is simple, and cannot be
decomposed and expressed by various words. We do not mean to say,
however, that we must abjure all explanation of it; we only propose to
warn the reader of the kind of explanation he may expect, which can be
no other than the analysis of the fact, inasmuch as it is an object,
and of the phenomenon as presented to our mind.
CHAPTER II.
WHAT IS UNITY.
6. The scholastics were right in teaching that every being is one, and
that whatever is one is being. Unity is a general attribute of every
being, but is not distinct from it. However little we reflect, we
cannot fail to perceive that unity and being are not distinguished:
the unity of unity, by itself, offers us nothing real or even possible.
What then would become of unity, if nothing but unity? This idea is
involved in that of being; it is an aspect of it, a reason under which
being is presented to the understanding.
7. But what is the conception of unity under which beings are presented
to us? There is unity in the object when there is no distinction in
the conception presenting it; and there is no distinction, when the
perception of relative _not-being_ is not combined in the object with
that of _being_. We have unity whenever we perceive an object simply.
Suppose that we perceive the object B. No matter what B is, it will to
us be always one, unless we perceive it as composed of C, D, one of
which is not the other. If we perceive in the object B, a distinction
between C and D, unity disappears.
Evidently when we are aware of this composition we can abstract it and
simply consider the result, the whole, B; and then unity appears anew.
8. We see by this that unity may be either real or fictitious. It is
real and existing when there is no distinction in the thing either real
or apparent; it is fictitious in those composites which of themselves
include distinct things that may be offered to the understanding,
inasmuch as they are subordinated to one unity of order, abstraction
made of the real distinction contained in them.
9. The schoolmen sometimes defined what is _one_ to be, "ens indivisum
in se, et divisum ab aliis." The former part seems sufficiently exact
if by _indivisum_ is meant _non-distinctum_ and not _non-separatum_;
but the second part must be regarded at the best as superfluous. If
there existed only one most simple and sole being, it would yet be one,
although we could not say that it was divided from others, _divisum ab
aliis_; for as there would be _no others_ it could not be divided from
them. This part of the definition is therefore superfluous.
10. It is no solution of the difficulty to say that this one being is
divided from others, real or possible, and that in the supposition of
one only being, others are possible although not real. The only being
would be _really one_, and the division from others would be only
_possible_; since there can be no real distinction between two terms
when one of them is only possible. The division from others, _divisis
ab aliis_, therefore is not a necessary element of unity, because unity
is real, and this element is only possible.
11. However, in confirmation of this doctrine, we may remark, that in
common parlance, unity is opposed to distinction, and there is no unity
where there is no distinction. If the only being be not conceived as
multiple there can be no distinction; and this is so independently of
its being compared with the rest. The words, _others_, and _the rest_,
suppose single beings; the idea of unity precedes that of distinction;
beings are not considered as distinct between themselves until after
they are conceived as individually single.
12. It seems, therefore, that a single being ought to be defined
as _ens indivisum in se_, or a being which includes no division.
Unity, then, will depend upon non-distinction. If non-division
denote _non-distinction_, there will be real unity; but if it denote
_non-separation_ or re-union, we shall only have a fictitious unity.
The molecules without extension, of which many suppose matter to be
composed, would be really _one_, because there is no distinction in
them. Bodies are fictitiously _one_ because their composite parts
though united are really distinct.
13. A difficulty may be raised by asking whether a being, indivisible
in itself, but not divided from others, would be really _one_, for
in case it would not be _one_, it might be inferred that we had
unjustly censured the definition of the schoolmen, since whatever
wants the second property required by the definition would not be one.
We reply, then, a being that includes no distinction in itself, and
is not distinguished from others, would indeed be one, but in such a
case there would be no _others_, since they cannot be when there is no
distinction. In such an hypothesis, there would be only one unity, the
unity of pantheism, the _great all_, the absolute in which all things
would be identified.
14. We have already said that the unity which is confounded with being,
is not the unity which originates number. We here in fact encounter
two different conceptions of unity, the one marking only want of
distinction, and the other expressing the property of engendering
number. But we are not thence to infer that the one which is identified
with being is distinct from that which engenders number. All beings,
one in themselves, but distinct from each other, no matter what they
may be, may be conceived under the idea of number. The number _three_
enters into the august mystery of the Trinity, and we say with all
truth that in God there are _three_ persons.
15. It is not necessary that the unity which engenders number should
be real; it suffices if it be fictitious. When we take a foot measure
for unity, we employ a fictitious unity, since the foot is composed of
parts, but the number which results therefrom is, nevertheless, a true
number.
CHAPTER III.
UNITY AND SIMPLICITY.
16. Real unity and simplicity are identical. What is really one has no
distinction in itself; nor is it composed of parts, of which it can be
said, this _is not_ that. Evidently simplicity requires nothing more;
the simple is opposed to the composite, to what is formed of many
beings whereof one _is not_ the other.