KANT AND THE ARISTOTELIANS.
51. Lest I be accused of levity in comparing Kant's philosophy with
that of the schools, in what relates to the distinction between the
sensitive and intellectual faculties, I shall give a rapid examination
of this philosopher's doctrine so far as the present matter is
concerned.
Since the German philosopher is in the habit of expressing himself with
great obscurity, and of using an obsolete language liable to different
interpretations, I shall insert his own words, so that the reader may
judge for himself, and rectify any inaccuracies into which I may fall,
in comparing Kant's doctrine with that of the Aristotelians.
"In whatever manner," says Kant, "and by whatever means a cognition
may be referred to objects, that which makes the cognition refer
immediately to things, and to which all thought is a means, is
_intuition_. This intuition exists only inasmuch as the object is given
us, which is not possible, at least for us men, except so far as it
affects the mind in some way. The capacity of receiving impressions
by the manner in which objects affect us is called _sensibility_. By
means of sensibility objects are given to us: it alone supplies us with
_intuitions_: but they are thought by the understanding, and from it
arise _conceptions_. All thought must ultimately be referred, either
directly, or indirectly by means of certain signs, to intuitions, and
consequently to sensibility, since no object can be given to us in any
other.
"The action of an object upon the representative faculty, so far as we
are affected by it, is _sensation_. The intuition, which is referred to
an object by means of sensation, is called _empirical_. The immediate
object of an empirical intuition is called a _phenomenon_."[4]
[4] _Transcendental Æsthetics_, § 1.
The distinction between the faculty of feeling and that of conceiving
is fundamental in Kant's system: and we see that he gives it a hasty
exposition before beginning his investigations on _Æsthetics_ or the
theory of sensibility. Further on, in treating of the operations of the
understanding, he has more fully developed his doctrine: and by the
emphasis he puts upon it, it would seem evident that he regarded it as
of high importance, and perhaps as a discovery of a region entirely
unknown to the philosophical world. Thus he speaks of it in his
_Transcendental Logic_:
"Our knowledge proceeds from two intellectual sources; the first
is the capacity of receiving representations, (the receptivity of
impressions,) the second is the faculty of knowing an object by these
representations, (the spontaneity of conceptions.) By the former the
object is given to us; by the latter, it is _thought_ in relation to
this representation (as mere determination of the mind.) Intuition
and conception constitute the elements of all our knowledge; so that
neither conceptions without an intuition in some manner corresponding
to them, nor an intuition without conceptions, can give knowledge.
* * * * *
"We call _sensibility_ the capacity (receptivity) of our mind to
receive representations, so far as affected in any way whatever:
on the contrary, the faculty of producing representations, or the
_spontaneity_ of knowledge, is called _understanding_. Our nature is
such that there can be no intuition not _sensible_, that is to say,
which only comprehends the manner in which we are affected by objects.
The _understanding_ is the faculty of _thinking_ the object of sensible
intuition. Neither of these properties of the soul is preferable to
the other. Without sensibility no object could be given to us; without
the understanding none could be thought. Thoughts without contents are
empty; intuitions without conceptions are blind. It is, then, just
as necessary to make conceptions sensible,--that is, to give them an
object in intuition, as to make intuitions intelligible, by subjecting
them to conceptions. These two faculties or capacities cannot
interchange their functions. The understanding can perceive nothing,[5]
and the senses can think nothing. Knowledge results only from their
union. Their attributes, therefore, ought not to be confounded; on the
contrary, there is every reason to distinguish them, and to separate
them with great care. We distinguish then the science of the laws of
sensibility in general, that is to say, _Æsthetics_, from the science
of the laws of the understanding in general, that is, from _Logic_."[6]
[5] He speaks of intuitive perception, not of perception in general.
[6] _Transcendental Logic._ Introduction.
Mark well the meaning of this doctrine. Two facts are established;
sensible intuition, and the conception of it; consequently the
existence of two faculties, sensibility, and the understanding, is
affirmed. To the first correspond sensible representations; to the
latter conceptions. These two faculties, though different, are closely
interlinked; and they are mutually necessary in order to produce
cognitions. But how do they give each other that mutual aid they stand
in need of?
"The understanding," Kant elsewhere says, "has been thus far defined
only negatively, as a not-sensible faculty of knowing." But as we can
have no intuition independently of sensibility, it follows that the
understanding is not a faculty of intuition. Excepting intuition, there
remains no way of knowing other than by conceptions; wherefore we infer
that the knowledge of every intellect, at least every human intellect,
is a knowledge by conceptions; not intuitive, but discursive. All
intuitions, as sensible, rest upon affections, and consequently, all
conceptions upon functions. I understand by functions, the unity of
action necessary to arrange different representations under one common
representation. Conceptions, then, are grounded on the spontaneity of
thought, as sensible intuitions on the receptivity of impressions. The
understanding can make no use of these conceptions except to judge by
means of them, and as intuition is the only representation which has
an immediate object, no conception can ever be immediately referred
to an object, but only to some other representation of this object,
whether this be an intuition, or even a conception. _Judgment_ is the
mediate cognition of an object, and consequently the representation of
a representation of the object. In every judgment there is a conception
applicable to many things, and under this plurality it comprises also
a given representation, immediately referable to the object. Thus, in
the judgment: _all bodies are divisible_; the conception of _divisible_
is common to different conceptions, among which that of body is the
one it here particularly refers to. But this conception of body
relates to certain phenomena we have in view; these objects are then
mediately represented by the conception of divisibility. All judgments
are functions of unity in our representations, since instead of one
immediate representation, there comes in another more elevated, which
includes the first and many others, and conduces to the cognition of
the object; and a great number of possible cognitions are reduced to
one alone. But we may reduce all the operations of the understanding
to judgment; so that the understanding in general may be represented
as _a faculty of judging_; because, from what has been said, it is
the faculty of thinking. Thought is cognition by conceptions; but
conceptions, as predicates of possible judgments, may be referred to
any representation whatever of an object, however indeterminate. Thus
the conception of body signifies something, for example, a metal, which
may be known by this conception. It is then a conception only because
it contains in itself other representations by means of which it may be
referred to objects. It is then the attribute of a possible judgment,
for instance, of this: _every metal is a body_.[7]
[7] _Transc. Log. Transc. Anal._ Book I., Chap. I., Sec. I.
52. There are in this doctrine of Kant, two things to be distinguished:
first, the facts upon which it is based; and secondly, the manner in
which he examines and applies them, and the consequences he deduces
from them.
We detect at once a radical difference, as far as the observation
of ideological facts is concerned, between Kant's system and that
of Condillac. While the latter discovers in the mind no fact but
sensation, no immediate faculty more noble than that of feeling, the
former upholds as a fundamental principle the distinction between
sensibility and the understanding. And here the German triumphs over
the French philosopher, for in his support stand both observation and
experience. But this triumph over sensism had already been obtained
by many philosophers, the scholastics in particular. With Kant and
Condillac they admitted that all our cognitions came from the senses;
but they had also noted what Kant afterwards saw, but Condillac did not
discover that sensations by themselves alone could never suffice to
explain all the phenomena of our soul, and that, besides the sensitive
faculty, it was necessary to admit another very different, called
understanding.
Kant regarded sensations as materials furnished to the understanding,
which it combined in various ways, and reduced to conceptions.
"Thoughts without contents," he said, "are empty; intuitions
without conceptions are blind. It is then just as necessary to make
conceptions sensible, that is, to give them an object in intuition, as
to make intuitions intelligible by subjecting them to conceptions."
Who does not perceive in this passage, the _acting intellect_ of
the Aristotelians, although expressed in other words? Substitute
_sensible species_ for _sensible intuition_, _intelligible species_
for _conception_ and we recognize a doctrine very like that of the
scholastics. Let us see. Kant says: to enable us to acquire knowledge,
the action of the senses, or sensible experience is necessary. The
scholastics said: there is nothing in the understanding which has not
previously been in the senses: _nihil est in intellectu quod prius non
fuerit in sensu_.
Kant says: sensible intuitions of themselves are blind. The scholastics
said: sensible species, or those of the imagination, also called
_phantasmata_, are not intelligible.
Kant says: it is necessary to make conceptions sensible by giving
them an object in intuition. The scholastics said: it is impossible
to understand, either by acquiring science, or by using that already
acquired, unless the understanding directs itself to sensible species,
"_sine conversione ad phantasmata_."
Kant says: it is indispensable to render intuitions intelligible by
subjecting them to conceptions. The scholastics said: it is necessary
to make sensible species intelligible in order that they may be the
object of the understanding.
Kant says: we judge by means of conceptions; and that judgment is the
mediate cognition of an object, and consequently its representation.
The scholastics said: we know objects by means of an intelligible
species, which is derived from the sensible species, and is its
intelligible representation.
Kant says, that in every judgment there is a conception applicable
to many things, and that under this plurality it comprises also a
given representation which is referred immediately to its object. The
scholastics said, that the intelligible species was applicable to many
things, because universal; that, when separated from a sensible and
particular species, it abstracts from all material and _individuating_
conditions, and consequently embraces all individual objects in one
common representation.
Kant uses the words _conception_, and _to conceive_, to denote
the intellectual act, form, or whatever it may be, by which the
understanding, making use of sensible intuitions, combines the
materials offered by sensibility conformably to the laws of the
intellectual order. The scholastics likewise taught that the
intelligible species, called also species _impressed_, fecundated the
understanding by producing in it an intellectual conception, whence
resulted the _word_, internal locution, or species _expressed_, which
they also styled _conception_.
Kant says, that the cognition of human intelligence is a cognition by
conceptions, not intuitive, but discursive and general, and that out
of the sphere of sensibility there is for us no true intuition. The
scholastics said: our understanding, in this life, has a necessary
relation to the nature of material things, and for this reason it
cannot _primo et per se_, know immaterial substances: hence it happens
that we know them perfectly only by certain comparisons with material
things, and chiefly by way of removal, _per viam remotionis_, in a
negative way.
53. The sample we have just given is exceedingly interesting, since
it enables us to appreciate as they merit the points of similarity in
these two systems, which occupy a prominent place in the history of
ideology,--a similarity which has not always hitherto been sufficiently
noticed, although apparent upon the simple perusal of the German
philosopher. Nor is this extraordinary: the study of the scholastics
is exceedingly difficult; one must accommodate one's self to the
language, the style, the opinions, and the prejudices of their epoch,
and travel over much useless ground to collect a little pure ore. Note
well, however, that I do not pretend to discover the "_Critic of Pure
Reason_" in the works of the scholastics, I would only mark a fact but
little known; it is that whatever is good, fundamental, and conclusive
against the sensism of Condillac, in the German philosopher's system,
had been said ages before by the scholastics.
Are we hence to infer that Kant took his doctrine from these authors?
We cannot say; but we believe it may, with some reason, be asserted,
that possibly the German philosopher, a man of vast reading, most
retentive memory, and very laborious, may have received certain
inspirations, reminiscences of which glimmer through his doctrines.
A writer is not a plagiarist, although he make ideas his own which
have originated with others. But it is often true that man imagines he
creates, when he only recollects.
54. Although the German philosopher agrees with the scholastics in
the observation of the primitive faculties of our mind, he differs
from them in their application; and whilst they go on preparing a
philosophical dogmatism, he marches towards a despairing skepticism.
Nothing that all the most eminent philosophers have regarded as
indisputable, can stand in the eyes of the German philosopher. True,
he has distinguished the sensible from the intelligible order; he
has recognized two primitive faculties in our soul; sensibility and
the understanding; he has indicated the line which divides them,
and carefully remarked that it should never be effaced; but, on the
other hand, he has reduced the sensible world to a collection of pure
phenomena, and explains space in such a way as to render it extremely
difficult to avoid the idealism of Berkeley. He has also, so to
speak, walled in the understanding by preventing all communication
with it, excepting by sensible experience, and has resolved all the
elements that meet in it into empty forms, which lead to nothing when
there is question of applying them to the not-sensible, and which can
teach us nothing concerning the great ontological, psychological, and
cosmological problems which have been the object of the meditations of
the profoundest metaphysicians, who, to resolve them, have published a
vast amount of sublime doctrines, just cause of a noble pride in the
human mind which knows the dignity of its nature, vindicates its lofty
origin, and discerns from afar the immensity of its destiny.