In the excellent articles referred to above, M. Charles-Roux considers
that Sidney Smith, in working for the evacuation of Egypt, was
actuated by the desire to see them quit that country and by the
conviction that the Turks could never succeed in driving them out.
These, doubtless, were important motives. But there was another one
not less important, and not, by any means, disguised, namely, turning
the Army of the East into an anti-revolutionary force.
His view of the Revolution was moderate and his methods of fighting
were at one with those of Windham, namely, co-operation with those
opposed to extremism. “My experience,” he wrote to Windham on the 13th
August, 1794, “has proved to me that this (a rising against the
‘Convention’) never can be expected if the ‘white flag’ is shewn to
them as an earnest of the return of the antient [_sic_] system in its
full extent. . . . There can be no doubt that there exists a party in
France and even in Paris itself of the moderate kind impotent under
the present tyranny, which put their persons and property in such an
irksome state of insecurity. This party might be induced to shew
itself if support were near and such support cannot be so quickly
conveyed as by the shortest route and that on which there are the
fewest barriers.” (Namely, that of Dieppe) (B.M. Add. MSS. 37852, f.
32.)
In the years that followed he was in close touch with “émigrés” of all
kinds. His escape from the Temple was effected by them. He maintained
his relations with them with the approval of Lord Grenville. (Lord
Grenville to Windham, 12th May, 1798, B.M. Add. MSS. 37846.) When he
went to the Levant at the end of the year, he took with him, among
others, Phélippeaux, the codisciple of Bonaparte, de Fromelin, alias
Bromley, and the young Frotté, for no other object than to attract by
their influence most of the discontented officers of Bonaparte’s army,
many of whom, to his knowledge, belonged to the same school of thought
as Phélippeaux. He advised the Porte to encourage would-be deserters
by promising them posts in its armies or a safe return home to rise
against the Directory. (Minutes of a Conference on 17th January, 1799,
F.O., Turkey, 21.) He was convinced that the Army of the East
“belonged to the dissatisfied part of the army which the Republican
tyrants wished to get rid of,” “that France can only be set to rights
by Frenchmen,” and that, till then, there could be no peace. (To
Keith, 13th March, 1800. Barrow, I, 385, 387.)
During the siege of Acre he did not neglect to use these means of
seduction. (De La Jonquière, IV, pp. 526-7; to Nelson, 30th May, 1799,
Barrow, I, 307; to Spencer Smith, 14th May, 1799, Barrow, I, 296.) The
result was a violent proclamation from Bonaparte against Sir Sidney,
whom he dubbed for his achievements in Toulon, “Le Capitaine des
brûlots,” and strict injunctions to his men not to enter into
communications with him. (“Correspondance,” t. V, 4098.)
With the accession of Kléber to the command, the prospects brightened.
He believed that Kléber and his officers were animated by one
sentiment of indignation against their “ci-devant” commander, deluded
himself with the fact that none of them wore the tricolour cockade and
the “indignation of the French against the Jacobin faction for having
brought it and them into such a desperate state.” (9th November, 1800,
F.O., Turkey, 23.)
Sidney Smith had no success. But was his failure complete? By no
means. His insinuations had created a strong party in the army,
opposed to the occupation of Egypt. As for the wider aspect of his
programme, it was impossible of realisation. In the way, however, that
Bonaparte treated Poussielgue, Reynier and Damas—exactly the men who
were in close touch with Sidney Smith—there is evidence of his
suspicion that Sir Sidney had created enemies of his person and
grandeur.