The progress of Bonaparte in Syria had alarmed the Turkish Government,
without causing it to change its original plan of operations.[536] On
March 28th, General Koehler and the members of the “military mission”
arrived at Constantinople. The despatches of that officer to Grenville
afford full information on Turkish affairs in their military aspect. The
methods of the Porte and the obstacles which deranged its plans are
clearly set forth. One day, for instance—and that when the French were
reported to be making rapid advance—the Standard of the Prophet was
unfurled; the next it was sent back to the Seraglio that it might not be
sullied by the presence of infidels and regicides. The Janissaries at
once refused to march without the Standard of their Prophet.[537]
Koehler had in the meanwhile elaborated a plan for the invasion of Egypt
by the Grand Vizier himself.[538] It consisted of three operations:
firstly, naval, for cutting off communications between Egypt and France
and making a diversion on the coast; secondly, military, the main
principle of which was to avoid a general engagement and to harass the
enemy by detachments of light cavalry; and, lastly, political, for
raising insurrections in Egypt. The Grand Vizier readily approved; and
that was all. For as the help of the Janissaries was necessary,[539] the
Porte had to dismiss all reformers and entrust the administration to men
of the “old school.” The result was that “there was nothing like a
regular plan of campaign . . . nothing like a national consultation of
the best system of movements or operations.” “Half the audiences” at
which Koehler was present “were taken up by the Grand Vizier relating
the ingenious fable of a lion and a fox, a great part of the remaining
half with coffee, sherbet, rosewater, and frankincense.” The same
dignitary was, moreover, “more occupied upon the character and
dispositions of the persons whom he was going to leave behind than with
those who were to go with him.” At last, after securing himself against
his enemies, he left Constantinople on May 20th at the head of a
“heterogeneous army.”[540]
Contrary to what would be expected, Koehler did not accompany him. By
various excuses, the departure of the “mission” to the seat of war was
put off from day to day and, finally, they were sent to repair the
fortifications of the Dardanelles. If we may believe the brigadier, this
was due to the enmity or jealousy of the brothers Smith. Sir Sidney, on
the other hand, angrily repudiated this and attributed it to Koehler’s
“driving a bargain with the Porte for services we had officially
notified as a free offer of the King.”[541] The explanation of Lord
Elgin, the new ambassador, is probably the true one. While recognising
that the vanity of Koehler was such that he claimed for himself “the
respect paid to a Bonaparte or a Suvarow” and “disgusted all his
officers,”[542] Elgin thought that they would not have remained idle had
there been at Constantinople “a person vested with sufficient authority”
to co-ordinate the conflicting claims of the various “missions.”[543]
The recriminations of these did not fail to give rise to ludicrous
scenes. “Seeing Englishmen in authority in Turkey,” wrote the
Ambassador, “takes away all delight in reading _Don Quixote_.”[544]
Returning to more stirring events we find Sidney Smith elated at his
success and believing that he had “successfully sown discontent and
insubordination in the French camp by the distribution of the
proclamation of the Porte among them from high to low, so that a more
disorderly army never was seen under arms.” Nothing remained,
accordingly, but to press persuasion by making some show of force. The
main feature of the plan was to support the force penetrating from the
coast of the Delta by a “respectable” flotilla on the Nile. “Such a
combination,” he was confident, “is an overmatch for Bonaparte.”[545]
While Sir Sidney was collecting the necessary forces, the latter was
taking measures to meet a Turkish landing, though he did not think that
it was very probable.[546] But the fact that the indefatigable Murad had
emerged from his retreat and was pushing towards the coast and the
appearance of ships of war off the coast of the Eastern Delta indicated
the probability of a disembarkation. Warning Marmont at Alexandria and
reinforcing Kléber at Damietta, he set off in person against Murad.[547]
It was at the camp near the Great Pyramid that he received the news that
a hundred Turkish ships had sailed into Abukir Bay on July 11th and had
disembarked nearly 18,000 soldiers. Contrary to the advice of Smith,
Mustapha Pasha, the commander of that army, instead of landing near the
mouth of the Nile, “chose to knock his head against the Castle of Abukir
where there is only one well of brackish water,” and entrenched his army
in the peninsula.[548]
Bonaparte, in the meantime, was concentrating his forces, and even
ordered Desaix to be ready to evacuate Upper Egypt if necessary.[549]
Promising forgiveness to the unruly inhabitants of the Beheira province
and making overtures to Murad, he arrived near the scene of action on
July 19th.[550] With 10,000 troops and 1,000 cavalry, he attacked the
Turks in their positions on July 25th and gained a complete victory. He
wrote to Cairo—this time much nearer the truth than usual: “You will
have learnt from the staff the result of the Battle of Abukir, one of
the most brilliant victories I have ever seen. Of the Turkish Army
recently disembarked not one man has escaped.”[551]
The victory resulted in dislodging Ibrahim from the eastern frontier and
in offers from Murad for an accommodation.[552] But it had more
important consequences. Hitherto Bonaparte was waiting to know if the
second assumption on which he had acted in going to Egypt had been
realised, namely, whether the war which he knew to have broken out was
proving disastrous to France and discreditable to its government.
Mustapha Pasha, who had been taken prisoner, was but little versed in
European politics, and could not satisfy him on this point.[553] He took
advantage, consequently, of the negotiations with Smith about the
release of prisoners to obtain news. The English commander was, in his
turn, eager to gain first-hand knowledge of the conditions in
Alexandria. He sent his secretary on shore with newspapers dated as late
as June 10th. That at once determined Bonaparte, or, in his words, “Tout
lui annonçait que le moment désigné par le destin était arrivé.”[554]
The words in which he communicates his decision to Marmont reveal his
thoughts. “Our armies have been unsuccessful and it is hard to say how
far the enemy may have advanced. Italy is lost, and with it the price of
so many strenuous efforts and the sacrifice of so many lives. But what
can one expect from the incapable men who are at the head of affairs?
Theirs is a rule of ignorance, folly and corruption. I alone have borne
the burden and by constant successes have strengthened the government
which, without me, would neither have been able to obtain power nor keep
it. When I leave, everything falls to pieces. Let us not wait till the
ruin is complete. The news of my return will reach France simultaneously
with that of the destruction of the Turkish army at Abukir. My presence
will raise the people’s spirits, restore to the troops their lost
confidence, and to good citizens their hopes of happier days to
come.”[555]
It must be observed, however, that he had already thought of returning.
In several despatches to the Directory he referred to it. During the
siege of Acre he mentioned it to General Dommartin and promised to take
him back with him.[556] A week after his arrival at Cairo from Syria he
instructed Admiral Ganteaume to have the two frigates, “Muiron” and
“Carrère”—the vessels upon which he actually set sail for
France—ready.[557]
Before leaving Egypt, however, he decided to open negotiations with the
Porte. Whatever amount of truth his despatches and bulletins possessed,
he himself was not blind to what the ultimate fate of the expeditionary
force would be.[558] He had already explained to the Directory his need
for reinforcements and declared that in a year the army would be so
weakened as to be unable to meet simultaneous attacks from the coast and
the desert, and that if the Government found itself unable to help the
Army of the East it should make peace.[559] He could now count, however,
on the effect of the crushing defeat at Abukir upon the Porte.
Accordingly, he sent the treasurer of Mustapha Pasha with a letter to
the Grand Vizier, in which he very skilfully played upon the Porte’s
fears of Russia and declared that if the Vizier would only send a
plenipotentiary to Egypt all difficulties could be settled in a
“conference of two hours.”[560]
The chief command was entrusted to Kléber, whom Bonaparte considered the
ablest general in the army after Desaix. In his instructions he assured
him that he would do everything in his power to send him news and
reinforcements.[561] If by next May, however, no help from France had
reached him and if by that time the plague had carried off 1500
soldiers, Kléber was authorised to conclude peace even at the cost of
evacuating Egypt. But he was to postpone the execution of this condition
till the general peace and also to regulate his conduct by the successes
or reverses of France in Europe. He was, moreover, to demand that the
Porte should withdraw from the Coalition, accord France the privilege of
trading in the Black Sea and set free all imprisoned Frenchmen.
Having now completed his preparations and receiving word that Sir Sidney
Smith had left his station off Alexandria,[562] Bonaparte, under
pretence of making a tour of inspection in the Delta, invited Kléber to
meet him at Rosetta on August 24th, and left Cairo on the 18th. Without
waiting for his Lieutenant he set sail with a band of devoted followers
on August 23rd.
The new Commander-in-Chief bitterly resented the sudden departure of his
predecessor, which left him to face the problems of bankruptcy long
since imminent. Though avoiding making reflections in public, he gave
vent, among his confidants, to loud complaints against him.[563]
Uncompromisingly honest, Kléber suffered from the weakness of readily
disclosing his thoughts in letters and conversation. He had not the
prudence necessary to a man in his position, and enjoyed relieving his
feelings in jocular sallies and cartoons at the expense of Bonaparte,
which he indiscreetly allowed to circulate.[564] He was, however, fully
possessed of the confidence of the army and the people.[565]
Turning to Sidney Smith, we see that he had to set sail from Egypt
probably in quest of supplies. If we believe his story, he disappeared
in order to “give an opening” to Bonaparte and catch him at sea. He
attributed his failure to the fact that the “Theseus” failed to reach
the station designed for her to the westward through lack of
supplies.[566] The story is probably untrue. His next move, however, was
“concerted in a council of war held on the ‘Tigre’ off Limassol on
October 8th.”[567] Deeming Alexandria to be too well-fortified to be
taken by an army of irregulars, he landed his troops near the Damietta
branch of the Nile. His intention was to obtain a footing there and then
persuade the Grand Vizier to transport his army by sea, thus saving them
a desert march and affording them the protection of his river-flotilla.
He also believed that the landing on the coast would lead the French “to
establish a truce and treat to greater advantage”; he meant, in short,
to exploit the “‘mal du pays’ strong upon them.”[568] The operations
began on October 29th and were a repetition of Abukir. He did not,
however, despair. He believed that though the French would emerge every
time masters of the field, such actions would, in the long run, end in
their annihilation.[569]
The French general had the same belief and felt it was his duty to make
it known. Fifty years of age, he felt too old to shoulder the burden of
the chief command; “brave de cœur, mais poltron d’esprit”[570] he
underestimated his resources and exaggerated those of his enemies.
Intriguing men like Tallien excited him against his predecessor and
hinted that the return of the army to France would be the best means of
ruining his fortunes.[571] He felt that the Army would be unwilling to
make new sacrifices, that the “desertion” of Bonaparte had had the worst
effect on its spirit. He was thoroughly convinced that the fate of that
army had been sealed since the destruction of the fleet, and that it was
badly needed by France. On October 7th he addressed to the Directory a
despatch, in which he stated that the army, now reduced to half its
numbers, was short of ammunition and clothing; that the population of
Egypt, whom the Sultan had stirred up to animosity against the
Christians, was ready to revolt at any moment; that fresh Turkish troops
were advancing; that Alexandria was almost defenceless, since the heavy
artillery had been lost in the Syrian campaign and the rest taken to
equip Bonaparte’s two frigates; finally, that the difficulties of the
situation were aggravated by the want of money, the arrears of pay due
to the troops amounting to 4,000,000 francs, and there were 6,000,000
francs more of debt—and Bonaparte had not left a “sou” in the treasury.
Under these circumstances, Kléber thought that he should proceed with
the negotiations begun by his predecessor at once, without waiting to
have 1500 soldiers carried off by the plague, and with the aim of
gaining time at least.[572] In the meantime—contrary to the strategy of
the Syrian campaign—he would leave the Turks to cross the desert.[573]
On September 17th he wrote to the Grand Vizier in similar terms as his
predecessor had done; namely, vague protestations of friendship with no
specific offers.[574]
To these two overtures, the Ottoman dignitary answered in two typically
Turkish letters, declaring that as the Law of Mohammad enjoined
forgiving the repentant the Porte would allow the French to return to
their country and consider, after that step, the re-establishing of its
friendship with France.[575]
In spite of this haughty tone, the Turks must have been delighted at the
overtures. Their prospects of a victory in the field could not have
been, even to themselves, roseate. Djezzar was in revolt. “He has just
shut himself up in Acre,” wrote Sidney Smith, “and laughs at the Grand
Vizier, having discharged all his Turkish troops and kept nothing but
his Albanian regiments. . . . He has cut off all communications with
Constantinople and he will not take a bill of exchange on it as
heretofore (being a monopolist merchant).”[576] He was even believed to
be contemplating an attack on his suzerain’s armies.[577] It was widely
believed at Constantinople that the march of the Grand Vizier had more
to do with the punishment of rebel pashas than with expelling the French
from Egypt.[578] Refinement of intrigue was carried to such a point as
to give rise to the rumour that the Porte was not really at war with the
Republic.[579] The predominant factor in the situation was fear of
Russia, especially when her fleets were freely cruising under the
windows of the Seraglio. The Capitan Pasha told Koehler “that the Sultan
esteems this service (i.e. repairing the fortifications of the
Dardanelles) as the most important of all others, that his own
expressions were that Egypt or any other province of the Empire were the
members, but that this was his throat which lay open to the first attack
of his enemies.”[580] Under these circumstances the overtures of the
French would be welcome. Knowing, however, that a separate peace would
expose them to the tender mercies of their allies, the Turks aimed at
obtaining, at any rate, the evacuation of Egypt. On October 30th,[581]
accordingly, the Reis Effendi informed Spencer Smith of what had taken
place between the French generals and the Grand Vizier and stated that
it was the wish of the Porte to extend the measure of evacuation, by the
consent of the Ministers of the Allied Courts, to the grant of a passage
home to the French troops; that the Russian envoy had already consented
and promised to send twenty-four passports, and that these were being
printed. The Turks skilfully represented this arrangement as an
application of the policy, which Sir Sidney had recommended, of
encouraging the French to leave Egypt. The English Minister endeavoured
“to gain time for reflection and further information.” He pointed out
that the departure of the French _en masse_ would be a serious danger to
the Allies. The Turks had their solution for this difficulty. The danger
to the Allies would not arise if by “a ‘ruse’ means are found of taking
them to some place where half of them are massacred and the rest are
despoiled of everything and are even left with nothing but their
shirts.” Smith was further to be tempted by the Reis Effendi’s
declaration that Egypt under the new _régime_—i.e. when the Beys would
be replaced by administrators from Constantinople—would be “infinitely
more interesting to the Allies than in the past.” The English Minister,
however, was not tempted and the conference broke up.
The odium of the treacherous “ruse” referred to by the Reis Effendi had
naturally fallen on the Turks. But its author, it must be observed, was
none other than Tamara, the Russian envoy, who, during an interview with
the Turkish Minister, suggested “that while the Grand Vizier should
encourage the capitulation, he ought to prepare for them (the French) a
punishment equal to the perfidy they had employed to occupy Egypt.”[582]
Smith had, in the meantime, and at the repeated requests of the Divan,
consented to grant the passports,[583] pending the decision of the new
Ambassador. Lord Elgin arrived at Constantinople on November 3rd, and,
being without information on the situation in Egypt and finding the
“affair” in an advanced state, was greatly embarrassed.[584] He set his
face, however—at that stage, at any rate—against the suggested
“ruse.”[585] But he was soon won over to the Turkish view. While
admitting that the destruction of Tippoo had removed the great cause of
anxiety at the presence of the French in Egypt, he recognised that no
Turkish Army could succeed in dislodging them, and that Egypt could be
employed as a basis for revolutionising the Ottoman Empire and bringing
about its downfall. With Malta unsubdued, with Switzerland under the
heel of the Gallic invaders, Great Britain had ample cause to feel
disquietened at Egypt being a French colony. The Turks, moreover, had
certainly the right to conclude a convention for the evacuation of that
country, and the Russians (though it was not in their interest to swell
the Republican armies in Europe) had already consented. Thus Elgin
convinced himself and believed that the only thing to be modified was
“the degree of security to be granted to the French by the British
flag.”[586] He notified the dragoman of the Porte that the matter had
better be left to the Grand Vizier and Sidney Smith, for the “protection
which the latter, as commanding officer of His Majesty’s ships in these
seas was authorised to give to the French, by virtue of a capitulation
was equivalent to any passports in our name.”[587] Sir Sidney had not
waited for the matter to be referred to him: the affair had already
become his own.
He was fully informed of the overtures of the French in spite of the
Grand Vizier’s efforts to keep them a secret; and decided to interfere
in the negotiations.[588]
I. _His motives._[589] He knew that Mustapha Pasha, who was taken
prisoner at the land battle of Abukir, and whom he described as
“ignorant, obstinate and ambitious,” had been won over by the promise of
the nominal pashalik of Egypt “while a French colony succeeds the Beys
in the administration of the province,” that it was a person of his
household who carried the letters of Kléber and of Bonaparte. “An evil
known is half-removed,” he wrote. He was aware that the French were
playing on the antipathy of the Turks to the Russians, and his
interference would prevent the Porte from throwing itself into the arms
of the Republic. Convinced that the French, who had bought Malta, would
be lavish in their “presents,” he considered his presence necessary
“lest oriental customs might so far prevail as for great interests to be
sacrificed for trifling conditions.”[590] He believed that the changes
which the Turks contemplated introducing in Egypt would cause those “who
were to gain from the proposed new régime to come to a hasty decision to
grant the Frenchmen everything they ask in order to get rid of them and
the question at once and take possession of the means of gratifying
their rapacity.”[591] Sidney Smith, moreover, had from the outset
entertained no illusions as to the capacity of the Turks to drive out
the French by force of arms.
II. _His “powers.”_ It was obvious, in addition to these statesmanlike
considerations, that England must be a party to any negotiations. But
did he, Sidney Smith, possess the powers to represent his country?
Undoubtedly he did not, for he was accredited in a diplomatic capacity
for the sole purpose of giving him a commanding position among the
Allied Commanders, and his functions as “Minister plenipotentiary”
should have ceased with the arrival of Lord Elgin. In a letter to the
latter, he defined his position as “a link of the chain between our
Government, your Lordship, and the extremity of our Empire in India” and
declared himself “desirous faithfully to transmit the impressions and
the impulse you may give me from time to time; meanwhile I go on to the
best of my judgment.”[592] What that “judgment” was, was perfectly known
to the Cabinet, and it did not feel itself bound to correct it.[593]
Elgin, instead of sending him “impressions,” decided to leave everything
to the man on the spot. His only resource, accordingly, was “to go on to
the best of his judgment.”
III. _The Interests of the Allies._ He saw the danger of allowing a
large body of troops to reinforce the hard-pressed armies of France. “I
shall not lose sight of the impolicy of allowing this exiled, nay
imprisoned, army,” he wrote, “to reappear in the theatre of war in
Europe as an armed body otherwise than under such restrictions as shall
render them unable to throw themselves into the balance against us by
opposing the progress of the Allied arms, which bids so fair to
emancipate Europe from the tyranny of the French Directory.”[594] Of
these “restrictions” we shall hear no more. Nay, in the same letter from
which the above passage was taken, he expatiated on the “indignation of
the French against the Jacobin faction for having brought it and them
into such a desperate state,” deluded himself with the significance of
the fact that none of them wore the tricolour cockade and with the
belief that Kléber and his officers were animated by one sentiment of
indignation against their “ci-devant” commander. He thus lost sight of
the “impolicy” of their return home. He even thought that they would
play the Royalists’ game,[595] or, at worst, that “they are so worn out
with their campaign in Africa that they would cease to be an army on
their landing in France,” that though formidable in the East they “will
be lost in the vast map of the population in France, like a drop of
water in the sea.”[596]
IV. _The interest of Great Britain._ The aim of his operations, he
declared, was the restoration of Egypt to Great Britain’s ally and the
security of the British possessions in the East.[597] And if
negotiations could realise that aim—even if they allowed the French to
carry the Pyramids with them[598]—why should Englishmen be sacrificed
“under the same disadvantages of climate and hardship that the French
have surmounted with incredible difficulty and loss?”[599]
He, accordingly, wrote to Kléber on October 26th, quoting the important
articles of the Treaty of Alliance between the Porte and England and
pointing out that the evacuation could not be carried out without the
permission of the latter power.[600] Kléber had sincerely desired the
intervention of the English in the negotiations and probably, in his
eagerness, omitted to consider whether Smith possessed the necessary
powers or not.[601] Without immediately answering this overture, the
French General asked Smith to provide a conveyance for a messenger
charged with acquainting the Grand Vizier with the results of a
conference between Mustapha Pasha and Kléber. What had passed in that
conference amply justified the English officer in interfering to thwart
the intrigue.[602] Starting with the premise that Russia was the enemy
to be guarded against, the two Generals decided that the negotiations
should be partly secret and partly patent. The Grand Vizier would
ostensibly and haughtily reject any other terms than the evacuation pure
and simple and proclaim his intention to push the war to the bitter end.
The secret negotiations, in which the English were to be admitted, would
have for aim the restoration of Egypt. But, for various reasons, this
was not to be carried out at once. The Russians, for instance, would, on
hearing of it, pounce upon the defenceless dominions of the Sultan.
Again, the French could not return home unless their Government was at
peace with England. In the meantime, however, the Government of Egypt
would be carried on in the name of a Turkish Pasha, who would enjoy more
power and freedom than any of his predecessors during the usurpation of
the Beys.
Sidney Smith set sail to Jaffa with the bearer of the above-analysed
minutes. Immediately on his arrival he was joined by General Morand with
a letter from Kléber.[603] The French General declared that he offered
to evacuate Egypt merely in order to put an end to the war, for his
position in that country was as strong as ever and could not be affected
by the reverses of the Republic in another continent.[604] The
“Commodore” was now able “to bring the whole question under one point of
view”[605] and placed the whole matter on utterly new bases. In the
first place, the Vizier’s haughty refusal to listen to anything prior to
the evacuation gave place to the principle of holding conferences
between duly accredited plenipotentiaries.[606] In the second place, the
solidarity of the three Allied Courts was emphasised.[607] In the third
place, the conferences were to be held on board the “Tigre” off
Alexandria.[608]
[609]Thus did the “captain of so small a naval force” succeed in
“drawing to himself a negotiation hitherto carried on by the commanders
of the French and Turkish armies.” This was probably due to the fact
that “though the Grand Vizier was a man of superior good sense and
judgment and in high estimation, he has already been twice on the point
of being deposed and punished and has thence acquired a great degree of
prudence, perhaps of timidity, while acting without the immediate
direction of his sovereign,” and to Sir Sidney’s assumption of the rank
of Minister plenipotentiary. The indignation of the Turks, however, can
be easily realised. Already the defeats of Abukir and Damietta were
attributed to him, and his meddling in the affairs of the Druses and the
Christians of Syria had given great offence. But now to transfer the
centre of activity from the Vizier’s Camp to his ship and to have the
conferences ungraced by the presence of a Turkish dignitary was worse.
By the time the complaints reached Constantinople and Elgin took
measures to meet them, Sir Sidney had finished his work.
The new bases became known to Kléber about the end of November. He
considered the situation on the whole as satisfactory.[610] The
“conferences” would give him time to hear from his Government, and the
“solidarity” of the Allies would enable him to look beyond Egypt and to
raise his terms. His plenipotentiaries, Desaix and Poussielgue, were
accordingly instructed to demand as preliminary conditions to the
evacuation: The dissolution of the Triple Alliance, a new guarantee by
England of the integrity of Turkey, the restoration of the Ionian
Islands to France and the right of garrisoning them and Malta from the
“Army of the East,” the release of all imprisoned Frenchmen, and the
preservation of the privileges the French had enjoyed in Egypt prior to
the occupation. If the Vizier insisted on the evacuation pure and
simple, so the instructions proceeded, the French General was to be
given four months to consult his Government.[611]
The French envoys arrived at Damietta to find that the “Tigre” had set
sail. On December 21st, however, it reappeared and Sidney Smith proposed
“on account of the season to hold the conferences in the camp.”[612]
During the voyage thither the negotiations began. The English commander
proposed a truce, one of whose conditions was the surrender of the fort
of El-Arish to the Turks.[613] He knew the value attached by the Grand
Vizier to that fort. If the French accepted his proposal, well and good;
if not, the Turks would have time, during the protracted conferences, to
take it by force. The latter alternative took place, through the
treachery of a portion of the garrison.
The discussions on board the “Tigre” were begun by a note from the
French plenipotentiaries setting forth the indispensable preliminaries
to the evacuation.[614] Sir Sidney’s answer was so conceived that while
it did not “shut the door at once against all negotiations by the
absolute and total rejection of these unreasonable propositions” and
while it “drew the commissioners to the extent of their pretensions,” it
avoided “encouraging their hopes of these being admitted.”[615] He,
accordingly, declared that such matters as the dissolution of the
alliance or the restoration of the Ionian Islands were objects of a
definite peace which neither he nor the French had powers to conclude.
He promised nevertheless to lay these demands before the Grand Vizier
and frankly stated that he would advise him to reject them.[616] This
was done and was intimated to Desaix and his colleague on January
9th.[617] Kléber was likewise requested to authorise his envoys to treat
on a new basis.[618]
He had already done so. Early in January he received copies of the
_Journal of Frankfurt_ up to October 10th. He thus learnt that Italy was
lost, that Bruix’s fleet had withdrawn from the Mediterranean and was
blockaded at Brest, that the Dutch fleet was in the possession of the
enemy, that the Russians and the English had invaded Holland, that
Müller had been beaten on the Rhine, that the Vendée was in open revolt
and that the Egyptian Expedition was severely criticised in the press
and the legislature. Bonaparte had instructed him to regulate his
conduct by the position of affairs in Europe. He lost all hope of being
reinforced and considered that it was his duty to hasten with his
veteran troops to the help of the Fatherland. He authorised his envoys
accordingly to consent to the evacuation pure and simple, if the Porte
was to become neutral, and if the French were allowed to withdraw with
arms, baggage and munitions, and with the faculty of serving anywhere
and against anyone.[619] The news of the fall of El-Arish and the
massacre of its garrison did not affect this resolution. Nay, the
treason committed by a portion of the defenders and reports of mutiny in
Alexandria and elsewhere led him to forego the demand for the neutrality
of Turkey.[620]
By that time Desaix and Poussielgue had, after some hesitation,
consented to proceed to the Turkish Camp and the negotiations began on
the new basis. Desaix was opposed to the evacuation of Egypt.[621] He
warned the Commander-in-Chief that the “Turkish army was nothing but a
collection of banditti” and that there were rumours of a new revolution
in France which placed Bonaparte at the head of the Republic.[622]
Kléber was not convinced. He had not heard of the _coup d’état_ but he
was sure that Bonaparte had taken care to fly the country before being
forced to capitulate and that he would employ any reinforcements which
might be preparing for his own aggrandizement. If Desaix could prove
that he would do better, he was willing to hand the chief command to
him.[623] To place his position beyond assail, however, he convoked a
council of nine generals, which fully concurred in his views.[624]
At last, “after many long conferences and warm discussions,” the
convention of El-Arish was signed on January 24th, 1800.[625] Sidney
Smith did not sign it. His reason was, he informed Nelson, that “the
execution of the articles depended solely on the Ottoman Government and
on the discipline which may be preserved in the Turkish army.”[626] He
reserved for himself, nevertheless, the right of arbitration and
endeavoured “to prevent any untoward circumstance from again causing the
sword to be drawn after it has been happily sheathed.”[627]
While the negotiations were proceeding, inklings of the overtures of the
French began to reach England. After the victory of Nelson and the
launching of the programme of Grenville, Egyptian and other Oriental
affairs were relegated to the background. Now and again an event like
the capture of Seringapatam and the destruction of Tippoo or the failure
of the French before Acre would carry the statesmen’s thoughts “from the
opposite coast to contemplate triumphs on distant fields.”[628] The
intercepted correspondence from Egypt demonstrated that there was no
need for further exertion to restore that country to the Turks.
Grenville’s despatches dealt with such matters as the raising of
Albanian regiments to serve in Europe, the acquiring of trade privileges
in the Black Sea and the ordinary affairs of the Turkey Company. A new
ambassador was sent and his instructions dealt with the right of cutting
timber and kindred matters. Sidney Smith sent letters teeming with
ideas—wise and foolish—none of them met with commendation or reproof.
Now and again we hear of Dundas lamenting this negligence of Egypt.[629]
But the Cabinet’s attitude in this matter was influenced by other men’s
views. This attitude can thus be described: So long as the French were
in Egypt, it was absolutely necessary to watch the exits on both seas.
The mere fact of their presence in Egypt was nothing compared with the
danger of their carrying operations elsewhere. And as they had not the
means of doing this, there was no cause for alarm.[630]
On December 8th there arrived at London a despatch from Spencer Smith
which dealt with the demand for passports to enable the French army to
return home. The next day communications were received from Elgin on the
same matter.[631] Grenville recommended to Elgin the “utmost caution in
entering into any positive engagement of whatever nature till such time
as he can be fully informed of the sentiments of His Majesty’s servants
upon this most critical and important subject.”[632] Two days later, a
council was held to formulate a more definite answer.[633] It was
decided to “prevent, if possible, Lord Elgin’s consent to permit
Bonaparte, i.e. the army, to evacuate, or if he should have done so to
counteract the effects, by sending orders to Lord Keith to force them
back again.” Windham, though admitting the difficulties of the question,
was “hardly inclined to the opinion adopted.” Such a termination for the
Egyptian Expedition was far from the wishes of men who believed that the
French army was within an ace of destruction. The Cabinet thought that
the object of the overtures was merely to gain time and “take the chance
of assistance from home.”[634] The return of the French, moreover, might
jeopardise the operations of the Allied armies.
But that the Turks should not feel that they had been sacrificed for the
other allies, promises of aid were to be made to them.
These themes are dealt with in an important despatch to Lord Elgin,
dated December 15th.[635] The Ambassador was informed that the power to
conclude capitulations and grant passports belonged to the proper
officers of His Majesty’s fleets and armies and was directed to
communicate to the Porte that the commanding officer in the
Mediterranean had been ordered “not to consent to the safe return of the
French army or to admit of their capitulating otherwise than jointly to
the allied powers whose forces are employed against them or on any terms
short of their surrender as prisoners of war and of the actual detention
of the officers and men in the territory of the allied powers till
exchanged, the experience of the war having proved the futility of all
capitulations upon parole of not serving and the bad faith with which
such engagements are observed by the enemy.” Grenville pointed out that
the result of the war would not depend on the “transitory occupation of
a particular portion of territory placed in the hands of the enemy by
the events of war” but on the “comparative strength or weakness of the
French Republic as opposed to its enemies upon the frontier and in the
interior.” While Elgin should impress the Porte with arguments of this
nature, he was to hold out the promise that the British naval forces in
that part of the Mediterranean would be speedily augmented and “that it
is in contemplation to prepare such other means of annoying and
distressing the enemy either from Europe or India or perhaps by an
operation concerted from both sides, co-operating with those efforts
which the Turkish Government will no doubt feel itself obliged to make
for this object, as may induce them (the French) to such terms of
capitulation as are suited to their present situation and consistent
with the dignity of the Turkish Government.”
Keith, in accordance with these orders, communicated to Kléber, on
January 8th, the decision of the Government.[636] Nelson, acting under
Keith, gave the necessary orders to Troubridge and Sidney Smith.[637]
Before the Porte was acquainted with these decisions, its diplomacy
employed various means to get rid of the French. Seeing that the affair
of the Passports had come to no definite end and ignorant as yet of the
results of Sidney Smith’s offensive intrusion, the Reis Effendi sought
to benefit by Paul’s ill-humour against Austria in order to negotiate
peace with France. Assuming, accordingly, that the Court of Vienna was
contemplating a separate peace with the Republic,[638] he proposed that
England, Russia and Turkey should ask the mediation of Prussia, conclude
peace with France and thus frustrate Austria’s design. Nothing came of
this quaint affair. Elgin, however, was now converted to the “stratagem
of war” which the Turks had in view for rescuing Egypt, sent his
Secretary Morier to report on conditions in the Vizier’s camp and to
carry out the “stratagem,”[639] and began to be impressed by the
necessity of curbing Sidney Smith in order to keep the Turks faithful to
their engagements. At the eleventh hour, he hinted to him that he was
going beyond his powers.[640]
Sir Sidney went on his course unchecked. The Porte ratified the
convention and began gathering the necessary transports to carry the
French home,[641] when instructions reached Tamara and Elgin to stop its
execution.
Kléber had by this time heard of the opposition of Great Britain to the
evacuation. His correspondence clearly indicates that he was not
perfectly satisfied with the _œuvre de raison_ he had just accomplished.
The laborious attempts that he made to convince his colleagues that he
had adopted the only reasonable policy showed that he had not completely
convinced himself. Hence the bitterness with which he inveighed against
his predecessor for placing him in so difficult a situation. The news of
the 18 brumaire and the elevation of Bonaparte “from the position of a
party to that of a judge”[642] and of the refusal of England to allow
the army to withdraw came to the rescue and enabled him to rise to the
full height of his talents.
On hearing of the decision of his Government, Sidney Smith wrote to
Kléber that it was “evidently dictated by the idea that the French
General was treating separately with the Turks and to prevent the
execution of any measures contrary to the Anglo-Turkish alliance.” He
was confident that once the Cabinet knew what had really happened it
would ratify the Convention. He, consequently, asked both the Grand
Vizier and Kléber to wait.[643]
He proved right. Lord Keith wrote to the Secretary of the Admiralty
detailing what had taken place and stating that Sir Sidney “has been an
officer on the spot and may be considered as capable of granting terms
to an enemy, that Lord Elgin has not only conceived but strongly
recommended the measure, that the Russian Ambassador has by a formal
deed consented to the terms.”[644] The arrival of this in London put the
affair on a new basis. Grenville described the Convention as “a most
mortifying event” and felt very “grieved at the discredit which it will
throw on Sir Sidney Smith after having deserved so well of his
country.”[645] Though he thought that the Government had strictly the
right to reject it and that the allies expected her to do so, he feared
that “the bringing of the public faith into any sort of question is a
thing not to be done.”[646] Probably personal regard for Sir Sidney
influenced the decision to allow the Convention to be executed. On March
29th, accordingly, orders were sent to Keith to permit the French to
return and—if he suspected treachery on the part of the Russians and the
Turks—to use “his utmost endeavours to persuade them to all such
measures as may be most consistent with the faithful observance of the
engagements contracted with the enemy.”[647]
Before the news of this decision reached Egypt, Kléber had resumed
hostilities and destroyed the Turkish army at the battle of Heliopolis
(March 20th).
The relief in England at this rupture was great. The Russian Ambassador
had bitterly complained against the “Convention,” and Grenville had to
throw all the blame on Sidney Smith and the Grand Vizier and to announce
that the former had been recalled.[648] “Kléber and his army,” wrote
Grenville on learning of that general’s resumption of hostilities, “can
annoy us much less where they are than in almost any other possible
situation.” There was no need, accordingly, to take new decisions.[649]
The need was further diminished by the assassination of Kléber by a
Syrian fanatic and the succession to the chief command of General Menou,
who belonged to the so-called “colonialist” party and set his face
against the evacuation of Egypt.
[Footnote 536: Spencer Smith to his brother, 26 March, 1799. F.O.
Turkey, 21.]
[Footnote 537: Koehler’s despatch, 10 April, 1799. F.O. Turkey, 26.]
[Footnote 538: 14 April. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 539: Despatch of 15 April. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 540: Despatch of 25 May. F.O. Turkey, 26.]
[Footnote 541: 18 Oct. _Dropmore Papers_, V, p. 476.]
[Footnote 542: Elgin to Grenville, 29 Dec. _Dropmore Papers_, VI, p.
91.]
[Footnote 543: Despatch of same date. F.O. Turkey, 24.]
[Footnote 544: Elgin to Grenville, 29 Dec. _Dropmore Papers_, VI, p.
91.]
[Footnote 545: Sidney Smith to Koehler, 4 June. _Dropmore Papers_, V, p.
80.]
[Footnote 546: _Correspondance_, V, 4174.]
[Footnote 547: _Ibid._, V, 4277, 4278.]
[Footnote 548: To Grenville, 18 Oct. _Dropmore Papers_, V, p. 478.]
[Footnote 549: _Correspondance_, V, 4281.]
[Footnote 550: _Ibid._, 4287. Jonquière, V, p. 394.]
[Footnote 551: _Correspondance_, V, 4331.]
[Footnote 552: Jonquière, V, pp. 487, 497.]
[Footnote 553: Martin, _Histoire de l’Expédition_, I, p. 395.]
[Footnote 554: _Correspondance_, XXX, 146.]
[Footnote 555: _Mémoires du duc de Raguse_, II, p. 32.]
[Footnote 556: Richardot, _Nouveaux Mémoires_, p. 188.]
[Footnote 557: 21 June, 1799. _Correspondance_, V, 4197.]
[Footnote 558: Afterwards he let it escape that after the loss of the
fleet he was convinced that the expedition would end in disaster.
Fournier, I, p. 177.]
[Footnote 559: _Correspondance_, V, 4225.]
[Footnote 560: 17 Aug. _Correspondance_, V, 4364.]
[Footnote 561: Instructions dated 22 Aug. _Ibid._, V, 4374.]
[Footnote 562: Jonquière, V, p. 573.]
[Footnote 563: Desgenettes, _Souvenirs_, III, p. 273.]
[Footnote 564: Cf. Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, XLII. One of his
cartoons represented his predecessor “chassant,” the Directory.]
[Footnote 565: _Memoirs of Desvernois_, p. 202; cf. Rovigo, I, p. 291;
cf. Villiers du Terrage, p. 223, etc.]
[Footnote 566: To Spencer Smith, 20 Oct. F.O. Turkey, 22; also _Dropmore
Papers_, V, pp. 484.]
[Footnote 567: Minutes. F.O. Turkey, 24.]
[Footnote 568: _Dropmore Papers_, V, pp. 478, 479.]
[Footnote 569: To Nelson, 8 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 23.]
[Footnote 570: A. Colbert, _Traditions et Souvenirs_, II, p. 301 note.]
[Footnote 571: Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, XXVIII.]
[Footnote 572: _Int. Corr._, III, p. 28 f.]
[Footnote 573: To Menou, 8 Oct. Pajol, p. 368.]
[Footnote 574: _Ibid._, p. 352. _Int. Corr._, III, p. 179.]
[Footnote 575: Undated letters. Pajol, p. 390 f., p. 382 f.]
[Footnote 576: To Grenville, 18 Oct. _Dropmore Papers_, V, p. 480.]
[Footnote 577: Koehler’s despatch, 23 Sept. F.O. Turkey, 26.]
[Footnote 578: Despatch of 9 Sept. F.O. Turkey, 26.]
[Footnote 579: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 580: Despatch of 5 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 26.]
[Footnote 581: Minutes of a Conference; Spencer Smith to Grenville, 12
Nov. F.O. Turkey, 23.]
[Footnote 582: Undated letter of Tamara to Spencer Smith. F.O. Turkey,
23.]
[Footnote 583: Smith to Tamara, 3 Nov. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 584: Despatch to Grenville, undated. F.O. Turkey, 24.]
[Footnote 585: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 586: Undated despatch. F.O. Turkey, 24.]
[Footnote 587: Despatch of 17 Nov. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 588: To Spencer Smith, 9 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 23.]
[Footnote 589: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 590: To Lord Elgin, 17 December. F.O. Turkey, 23.]
[Footnote 591: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 592: To Elgin, 14 Jan., 1800. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 593: 7 May, 1799, Spencer wrote to Grenville showing his
knowledge of Smith’s peculiar policy as to the evacuation of Egypt.
_Dropmore Papers_, V, p. 42. Nelson, however, on 18 March, warned Smith
against it (_Despatches_, III, p. 296.) Smith maintained (Barrows, II,
p. 24) that he had not received it. But the Christian Knight was not
above telling a lie.]
[Footnote 594: 9 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 23.]
[Footnote 595: To Keith. Barrows, I, p. 385.]
[Footnote 596: To Spencer. Barrows, II, p. 33.]
[Footnote 597: To Nelson, 31 Jan., 1800. F.O. Turkey, 23.]
[Footnote 598: To Elgin, 20 Feb., 1800. Barrows, II, p. 21.]
[Footnote 599: To Spencer, undated. Barrow II, pp. 40, 50.]
[Footnote 600: F.O. Turkey, 23.]
[Footnote 601: To Menou, 11 Oct. Pajol, p. 370.]
[Footnote 602: Minutes. Pajol, p. 374 note.]
[Footnote 603: Morand’s interesting impressions of Sidney Smith may be
read in Rousseau’s _Kléber et Menou_, XXIV, XXV.]
[Footnote 604: Kléber to Sidney Smith, 30 Oct. Pajol, p. 378 f.]
[Footnote 605: To Spencer Smith, 9 Nov. F.O. Turkey, 23.]
[Footnote 606: Sidney Smith to Kléber, 8 Nov. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 607: Kléber was informed that Mustapha Pasha expressed his own
views. 8 Nov. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 608: Sidney Smith to Kléber, 8 Nov. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 609: Elgin’s despatch, 28 Dec. F.O. Turkey, 24.]
[Footnote 610: To the Directory, 3 Dec. Pajol, p. 396.]
[Footnote 611: Instructions dated 7 Dec. Pajol, p. 401 f.]
[Footnote 612: Sidney Smith to the Grand Vizier, 15 Dec. F.O. Turkey,
23.]
[Footnote 613: To Desaix and Poussielgue, 21 Dec. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 614: Dated 29 Dec. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 615: Marginal note in Sir Sidney’s hand. F.O. Turkey, 23.]
[Footnote 616: 29 Dec., 5 Jan. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 617: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 618: To Kléber, 9 Jan. _Ibid._]
[Footnote 619: To Desaix and Poussielgue, 3 Jan. Pajol, p. 416.]
[Footnote 620: To Poussielgue and Desaix, 15 Jan. Pajol, p. 429.]
[Footnote 621: To Kléber, 9 Nov. Rousseau, _Kléber et Menou_, XXV. “I am
apprehensive General Desaix will require to withdraw.” Sidney Smith to
Elgin, 14 Jan. F.O. Turkey, 23.]
[Footnote 622: Pajol, p. 432.]
[Footnote 623: To Desaix, 16 Jan. Pajol, p. 432.]
[Footnote 624: _Ibid._, p. 437.]
[Footnote 625: Sidney Smith to Nelson, 31 Jan., 1800. F.O. Turkey, 23.]
[Footnote 626: To Nelson, 31 Jan. F.O. Turkey, 23.]
[Footnote 627: To Nelson, 31 Jan. F.O. Turkey, 23.]
[Footnote 628: Pitt to Grenville, 13 Sept. _Dropmore Papers_, V, p.
397.]
[Footnote 629: Notably, Dundas to Pitt, 24 Nov., 1799. _Ibid._, VI, p.
39.]
[Footnote 630: Cf. Spencer to Sidney Smith, undated. Barrows, II, p.
59.]
[Footnote 631: _See_ above, pp. 106, 107.]
[Footnote 632: 10 Dec. F.O. Turkey, 24.]
[Footnote 633: Windham’s _Diary_, p. 419.]
[Footnote 634: Spencer to Sidney Smith, 30 March, 1800. Barrows, II, p.
36.]
[Footnote 635: F.O. Turkey, 24. Also, Grenville’s private letter, 16
Dec. _Dropmore Papers_, VI, p. 79.]
[Footnote 636: Pajol, p. 466.]
[Footnote 637: _Despatches_, IV, pp. 178, 179.]
[Footnote 638: Elgin’s despatch, 11 Dec. F.O. Turkey, 24.]
[Footnote 639: Instructions to Morier, 22 Dec. _Ibid._ These naturally
do not refer to the “stratagem,” but that Morier was to execute it is
beyond doubt. His papers intercepted and published in the _Courier
d’Egypte_, No. 70, prove it.]
[Footnote 640: 22 Dec. F.O. Turkey, 24.]
[Footnote 641: Spencer Smith to Grenville, 15 Feb., 1800. _Dropmore
Papers_, VI, p. 130.]
[Footnote 642: The news reached Egypt on 2 March, 1800. Rousseau,
_Kléber et Menou_, XXXII.]
[Footnote 643: Allardyce. _Keith_, pp. 230, 231, 232.]
[Footnote 644: To Evan Nepean, 1 March, 1800. Allardyce, _Keith_, pp.
230, 231.]
[Footnote 645: To Minto, 28 March. _Dropmore Papers_, VI, p. 286.]
[Footnote 646: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 647: Nelson, _Despatches_, IV, p. 216.]
[Footnote 648: Woronzow to Panin, 11 May. _Dropmore Papers_, VI, pp.
216-17.]
[Footnote 649: Grenville to Pitt, 2 June. Rose, _Pitt and Napoleon,
Letters and Papers_, pp. 271, 272. Also to Minto. _Dropmore Papers_, VI,
p. 243.]