The Treaty of Campo Formio was signed on October 17th, 1797. The First
Coalition was dissolved. Of the powers which formed it there now
remained only Great Britain to oppose the domination of France over the
Continent. Saved by her geographical position from the horrors of war,
that power was successful in advancing her interests. It is true that
she had to bear the burden of subsidies advanced to her allies and of a
heavy war expenditure; but her gain was the conquest of naval supremacy,
the monopoly of new markets and the wresting of fine colonies from Spain
and Holland, the allies of the Republic.[17]
The negotiations with Malmesbury at Lille (July, 1797) showed the
difficulty of forming the basis of an equitable peace between two powers
who, the one as supreme on sea as the other was on land, clung to all
their conquests. There was, in addition, a great obstacle in the way of
an accommodation; namely, the fear which the propaganda inspired in the
enemies, as well as in the allies of France—fear which the old
Governments took care to exaggerate.[18]
This being the case, the question was, how and where was the blow to be
struck which would force the British Government to acquiesce in a French
peace? A naval war, properly so-called, was out of the question. For the
events of the Revolution had rapidly disorganised the French Navy and
imposed upon the various governments of France a timid and defensive
naval policy.[19] By the beginning of the year 1798 the supremacy of
Great Britain on the sea had become crushing.[20] The support of Spain
and of Holland secured by the Convention of Madrid (August 18th, 1796)
and by the Treaty of the Hague (May 16th, 1795) respectively was feeble
and incapable of redressing the balance. The opportune victories of
Jervis and Duncan had, moreover, greatly weakened the navies of these
two powers and cowed their spirit.[21]
To beat the English within their own boundaries seemed, consequently,
the only means of enabling the French to enjoy unchallenged the fruits
of long years of victories and sacrifices. Britain, it was argued, could
not raise armies capable of withstanding the onslaughts of the veterans
of Italy and the Rhineland. Moreover, was she not the victim of serious
domestic dissensions? Had she not, for instance, in Ireland her Vendée?
The naval inferiority of France was no insurmountable barrier. All that
was needed for such an enterprise, it was supposed, was an opportunity
to cross unmolested the narrow seas. France, possessing the initiative,
would never lack such an opportunity.
The project was not a new one. The French archives possess many schemes
of invasion, belonging, for the most part, to the latter half of the
eighteenth century.[22] The Committee of Public Safety and the Directory
successively examined several of them and attempts were made, on various
occasions, to carry them out, notably that of Hoche (December,
1796-January, 1797), which, in spite of its disastrous failure, showed
that the crossing, at any rate, could be achieved.
Public opinion was very clamorous for a descent upon England. The
Anglomania so fashionable in the early stages of the Revolution had
given place to a fierce hatred of the English, so that when the
Directory, on November 21st, 1797, proclaimed its intention “to dictate
the terms of peace in London” and “avenge the wrongs of the world,”
there was, throughout the whole country, a violent outbreak of
Anglophobia. Petitions couched in the fiercest of expressions poured
upon the legislative councils,[23] veritable hymns of hate obtained wide
circulation[24] and dramas taking the invasion for their theme proved
the successes of the season.[25]
A saying, ascribed to the Marechal de Saxe, “On ne vaincra jamais les
Anglais que dans Londres,” was on all lips, and books relating the
various invasions of which Great Britain was the victim were in great
demand.
The French were not, however, solely actuated by hatred. Judging from
the toasts drunk in patriotic _fêtes_[26] many of them were deluded as
to the true character of the reform movement in England and of the
parliamentary opposition. The Jacobins thirsted to pack off the House of
Lords and the royal family to the Guianas and to cut off the heads of
the king and his ministers. Others desired to pillage the Bank of
England and confiscate for the benefit of the Republic or for their own
the warehouses, the mines and other sources of English prosperity.[27]
Danton had, for a short time, been the victim of the delusion which led
Frenchmen to distinguish between the English nation and its Government,
to believe in the possibility of separating them. A greater man than
Danton, Bonaparte, was another victim. He admired the English and
praised their energy and adventurous spirit; but he imagined that with
Pitt fallen and the Whigs in power he would gain their acquiescence in
the supremacy of France,[28] in return for his helping them to ruin the
aristocracy. This was one of the motives for his desire to end the war
with Austria. But the destruction of English power, or, at least, the
relegation of England into the second or third order, would win for the
Republic the Empire of the East and realise the dreams which since the
Crusades, as we have seen, had haunted French imagination.
Already his mind was full of the East—the source of all glory—of Egypt,
of the Indies and of the Suez route. Already during his time in garrison
at Valence and Auxonne, he had, through a very remarkable concentration
of thought and effort, amassed a most unusual amount of information on
history and some of the sciences. From Marigny and Amelot he learnt
about the Arabs and the Republic of Venice, from Rollin about the
nations of antiquity; from Baron de Tott about Egypt and Ptolemy’s canal
through the Isthmus of Suez, “which could be made navigable with very
little trouble.”[29] Raynal, however, seems to have influenced him
most.[30] His _Histoire philosophique et politique des Etablissements et
du Commerce des Européens dans les Deux Indes_ was one of the most
widely read books of the day. The passage on Egypt is striking, “On
beholding this country, lying between the two seas, one of which is the
gate to the East, the other the gate to the West, Alexander conceived
the plan of transferring the capital of his kingdom to Egypt and of
making that country the centre of the world’s commerce. That prince, the
most enlightened of all conquerors, recognised that if there were any
means of binding in a permanent union the conquests he had already made
and those he intended to make, it was through this country, which seemed
to have been predestined by nature to link Africa and Asia with
Europe.”[31] He must have read the works of his friend Volney and must
have been impressed by that traveller’s account of the military weakness
of Egypt.[32] Already, at the age of twenty-six, the disillusioned
enthusiast, seeing his hopes shattered by the fall of Robespierre,
entertained for a moment the idea of going to Constantinople to
reorganise the Grand Signior’s artillery.[33]
In addition to the predilection of his youth, however, Bonaparte was
impelled by the exigencies of the Italian campaigns and the negotiations
with Austria to envisage schemes of colonial and imperial expansion. By
that time the Order of St. John at Malta was in full decadence.[34] As
with all institutions whose existence was prolonged beyond the term of
their utility, the knights were maintained by the force of a glorious
tradition. They were a set of idlers and debauchees recruited from the
younger sons of noble families and “animated by none of the motives
which led men to the braving of great dangers.”[35] Their minister at
the Court of St. Petersburg had just signed (January 15th, 1797) an
agreement with that Court whereby the possessions which the Order had in
Poland and which, on the Third Partition of that Kingdom, fell to
Russia, were restored to it.[36] The courier on his way to Malta with
the treaty was intercepted at Ancona.[37] Bonaparte attached great
importance to the agreement. It was, however, possessed of no other
significance than being an indication of the chivalrous nature of Paul,
of the financial embarrassments of the Order and of Russia’s conception
of her traditional _rôle_ in the Christian Near East. Of these
embarrassments Bonaparte acquired first-hand knowledge through one
Vincent Barbara, who belonged to the Republican party in the island and
who was banished.[38] Making his way to Milan, he reported on the
unsettled state of Malta, the disaffection of many of the knights to the
existing Government and the desire of many of the inhabitants to welcome
French intervention.
But what was really effective in stimulating the young general’s
interest in the definite settlement of the Maltese question in a way
favourable to France was the conclusion of the Preliminaries of Leoben
(April 18th, 1797). The Venetian Republic was thereby sacrificed to
compensate Austria for her losses in the Netherlands and the Basin of
the Po. Objections were raised in France against this arrangement,
which, in addition to its palpable violation of the professed principles
of the Republic, would result in making Austria a strong naval power.
The navy of that country, it was argued, joined to that of Naples, would
wrest from the Republic the supremacy in the Mediterranean which fell to
her on the evacuation of that sea by the English fleet. Bonaparte
recognised the reality of the menace and sought to obviate it by the
acquisition of the Venetian fleet and the Ionian Islands.[39] Under
these circumstances, Malta acquired additional importance. The island,
if in the possession of France, would strengthen that country’s position
in the Eastern Mediterranean; but if, on the other hand, it belonged to
a hostile power it would render that position precarious by serving as a
wedge, as it were, between the French naval forces in the Adriatic and
their bases in Provence.
His correspondence at that epoch amply illustrates these points. “The
decadence of the Venetians,” he argues, “dates from the discovery of the
Cape of Good Hope and the rise of Ancona and Trieste.[40] Their fate,
being a cowardly people and unworthy of liberty, has long been sealed.
The Empire will take a long time to become a strong naval power, and,
whatever sacrifices she will make, she will not be able to rise above
the third order. Now is the time to take possession of Malta. The Grand
Master is dying, and it will be worth while to persuade the Prince of
Peace to try and have a Spaniard elected on his death.[41] The native
Maltese favour the French; the Knights do not exceed five hundred and
have at their disposal no more than six hundred men. A French or a
Spanish squadron can easily take possession of Valetta. There is no time
to lose, for Naples (to whose dissimulated hostility he calls now and
again the attention of the Directory)[42] is entertaining designs on the
island.”
The occupation of the Ionian Islands had, in the meantime, winged his
fancies eastwards. The spectacle of old nations struggling to shatter
their fetters and to free themselves from the yoke of the unspeakable
Turk fascinated him. “If the inhabitants are enamoured of independence,”
he instructs General Gentili,[43] “you will encourage that sentiment,
and, in the proclamations you will make, you will not fail to speak of
Greece, of Athens and of Sparta. . . . Arnault, a distinguished man of
letters, will help you in the composition of manifestoes.” The Turkish
Empire was, moreover, falling to pieces and France’s privileged position
in the Adriatic would enable her to benefit adequately from that event.
It was probably due to this that he made the strange declaration that
Corfu, Zante and Cephalonia were worth more to France than all
Italy.[44] There can be no mistake, however, as to this: he prefers the
isles and Italy—together.
The partition of Turkey suggests many combinations. France may, for
instance, acquire Egypt so that she may compass the ruin of her
inveterate enemy, England.
The irremediable decadence of the Turks, the passionate longing of the
Greeks for independence, the importance of the ex-Venetian
establishments, the vital interest of the “Great Nation” in these
matters, all these themes form the subject matter of a letter to
Talleyrand dated August 16th. The latter, who was appointed Minister for
Foreign Affairs on July 16th, 1797, probably discerned the coming ruler
under his thinly disguised superiority. He communicated to Bonaparte the
Directory’s approval of his projects and declared that France was
interested in all the countries washed by the Mediterranean and notably
in Egypt.[45]
Although Austria’s reluctance to abide by the Preliminaries of Leoben
had led Bonaparte to make some military dispositions,[46] his views as
regards the essential elements in the situation remained unchanged.
Austria was clearly counting on the domestic troubles of France. But the
_coup d’état_ of the 18th Fructidor, the triumph of the Jacobins, the
recalling of Moreau and the arrest of Pichegru left her no other course
but to sign the treaty and postpone all the great combinations till
France came to be torn once more by civil strife, and till England and
Russia were in a more accommodating mood.[47]
As a result of the new turn taken by affairs Bonaparte was now able to
count, for the realisation of some of his schemes, on the squadron
commanded by Admiral Brueys which had already co-operated in the
annexation of the Ionian Islands; Brueys, for instance, could easily,
bearing in mind the small number of the Knights and of the troops at
their disposal and the Gallophil sentiments of the Maltese, acquire
Malta.[48] The possession of that island, together with that of the Isle
of St. Pietro ceded to France by Sardinia, and of Corfu, would
inevitably render the Mediterranean a French lake.[49]
But he looked beyond the acquisition of naval dominance into the
possibility of establishing a French Colony in the Valley of the Nile.
We gather from notes left by General Desaix, who was Bonaparte’s guest
during his sojourn at Passeriano, that the annexation of Egypt was then
occupying his thoughts.[50] Already in the habit of confiding his ideas
to Talleyrand, he now communicated to him his new scheme. “If it
happen,” he wrote to him on September 13th, 1797,[51] “that at the
conclusion of peace with England we find ourselves obliged to acquiesce
in the loss of the Cape of Good Hope, then it will be necessary for us
to acquire Egypt. This country has never belonged to a European nation.
The Venetians only possessed some precarious preponderance in it. With
25,000 men from here and with some eight or ten ships-of-the-line or
frigates of Venetian construction we can take possession of it. Egypt
does not belong to the Grand Signior. I wish, citizen minister, you
would find out for me in Paris what sort of effect our Egyptian
expedition would have on the Porte. With armies like ours, for whom all
religions are the same, Mahometans, Cophts [_sic_], Arabs, idolators,
etc., all is to us indifferent, we will respect them each and all.” We
must, however, regard this as nothing more than a flight of imagination
towards some future indefinite enterprise, probably the partition of
Turkey. The relations he established with the Greeks and with the
Albanians may be taken as further evidence of his contemplating such a
design.[52] The realisation of this grandiose scheme, however, was, for
the present, out of the question. It was, moreover, scarcely consistent
with his ambitious plans that he should embark with 25,000 troops on an
adventure in a distant country, risk his great and rapidly won fame in
engagements which might prove of very uncertain value, renounce his
powerful influence in France, and rid the Directory—so unprofitably for
himself—of the anxieties his ambition caused them. He did eventually
lead the expedition, but only when he was compelled to do so by
circumstances upon which he had not reckoned in the autumn of 1797. This
conjecture is further strengthened if we take account of the way he set
about to realise his project on Malta.
For that realisation, the co-operation of the Navy was essential. Indeed
he had already emphasised the close connection between naval and
military operations,[53] and a proclamation issued to the seamen of
Brueys’ squadron well expressed his thoughts.[54] “Without you,” so it
ran, “we cannot carry the glory of the French name further than the
limits of the continent; but with you, we can traverse the seas and the
glory of France can reach the farthest regions of the earth.” He
thereupon proposed to the Directory to allow him to keep Brueys’
squadron near at hand and ready, when the opportunity occurred, to
disembark 2000 soldiers in Malta. “That island,” he declared, “will fall
sooner or later into the hands of the English if we are foolish enough
not to anticipate them.” He therefore asked the Directory to authorise
him to extend the secret relations he had already opened in Malta and to
take possession of it at any moment he judged opportune.[55]
Meanwhile, De Hompesch, a German, was elected to succeed the deceased
Grand Master. Though the new Grand Master wrote a propitiatory letter to
the Directory,[56] his election was considered by the latter as a
triumph of Austrian diplomacy, and an additional indication of the
scheming of the Court of Vienna to appropriate Malta for the realisation
of an elaborate project on the Turkish Empire to which Russia was
understood to be a party. Talleyrand was consequently charged to
communicate to Bonaparte the Directory’s approval of his ideas with
regard to Malta and her desire that he should take the necessary
measures to frustrate the designs of Austria.[57] As regards Egypt, the
Directory satisfied itself by declaring Bonaparte’s views to be
excellent. Talleyrand, however, promised to write in greater detail and,
for the present, suggested that French intervention in Egypt should have
as a professed aim the thwarting of the intrigues of Russia and England
with the rebellious Mamelukes. The conclusion of the letter is striking:
“L’Egypte comme colonie remplacerait bientôt les produits des Antilles,
et, comme chemin, nous donnerait le commerce de l’Inde; car, tout, en
matière de commerce, réside dans le temps, et le temps nous donnerait 5
voyages contre 3 par la route ordinaire.” Four days later, September
27th, the Directory repeated its wishes as regards Malta in a more
positive manner.[58] Within that short interval, it seems, fresh
intelligence had come to it of the intrigues not only of Austria but
also of England and Russia, whose possession of Malta was declared to be
more dangerous to the Republic than Austria’s. Bonaparte was,
consequently, authorised to employ the squadron of Brueys in the manner
he had indicated. And, as it was necessary to “prepare” opinion in Malta
for the coming event, certain letters “of great importance” were sent to
him for that end. A little later, three letters of the same nature were
also sent and the director, Barras, suggested that his cousin—a
disaffected knight—should carry them to Malta.[59]
In addition to the employment of a naval force, Bonaparte seemed to have
thought of another means, namely, the purchase of the island. We infer
from a letter of the Directory to him that he confided this proposal to
one Bottot. It was, in its turn, approved and Bonaparte was reminded not
to let the island escape.[60]
Thus affairs stood at the time of the signature of the treaty of Campo-
Formio. Anticipating objections to it as too advantageous to Austria,
Bonaparte thus justified himself in a letter to Talleyrand.[61] “Lorsque
la Cisalpine a les frontières les plus militaires peut-être de l’Europe,
que la France a Mayence et le Rhin, qu’elle a dans le Levant Corfu,
place extrêmement bien fortifiée, et les autres îles, que veut-on
davantage? Diverger nos forces pour que l’Angleterre continue à nous
enlever, à nous, à l’Espagne, à la Hollande, nos colonies, et éloigne
encore pour longtemps le rétablissement de notre commerce et de notre
marine? Les Autrichiens sont lourds et avares; aucun people moins
intrigant et moins dangereux pour nos affaires intérieures que le peuple
Autrichien. L’Anglais, au contraire, est généreux, intrigant et actif.
Il faut que notre gouvernement détruise la monarchie anglicane, ou il
doit s’attendre lui—même à être détruit par la corruption et les
intrigues de ces actifs insulaires. Le moment actuel nous offre un beau
jeu. Concentrons toute notre activité du côté de la marine et détruisons
l’Angleterre. Cela fait, l’Europe est à nos pieds.”
The Directors sought to enmesh him in the net he had set. They took him
at his word. After a sitting of four hours, during which they
deliberated on the treaty and in which Rewbell and Merlin clamoured for
rejecting it, the majority, composed of Larevellière-Lépeaux, François
de Neufchâteau and Barras, decided to ratify it.[62] In the same
sitting, the Directory decreed, on the proposition of Barras, the
immediate concentration on the oceanic coast of an army to be described
as the “Army of England” and the appointment of Bonaparte to command
it,[63] wrote to him of the great work entrusted to him and instructed
him to proceed to Rastadt as soon as possible for the exchange of
ratifications and for negotiating peace with the Empire,[64] and issued
a proclamation to the nation on the coming punishment of England.[65]
The organisation of the Army of England was seriously taken in hand. Two
days after the above-mentioned decree, that is October 28th, the
Minister of Marine submitted to the Directory a report on the naval
operations of the coming campaign. His conclusion was that success was
possible if the necessary funds were advanced to the Navy.[66] The
Minister of War, in his turn, exposed the necessity of drawing upon the
army of Italy for the new expedition.[67]
Bonaparte, who was not deceived as to the intentions of the Directory in
giving him the new command,[68] expressed his willingness—though in
great need of rest—“to pay his tribute to the fatherland,” and stated
his views on the invasion.[69] For its success it was necessary to have
skilful naval officers, an intelligent and firm Admiral, numerous well-
commanded troops to menace the enemy on more than one point and,
finally, thirty million francs. He, moreover, asked the Directory to
send him the “very good maps of England which were once in the
possession of General Hoche,” and, about this time, began to choose the
officers and the troops which were to take part in the invasion,[70] to
regulate the financial measures necessary for the movement of troops
westwards,[71] to order improvements in the roads for the same end,[72]
and wrote to the Directory that, once the ratifications had been
exchanged at Rastadt, the columns would be put in motion towards the
western coast.[73] A strong indication of the reality of the scheme was
his order to General Andreossy to make cannon of the same calibre as the
English, so that once the landing had been effected English projectiles
could be readily used.[74]
In his thoughts, however, the project of invasion did not supersede the
design on Malta. The diplomatic preparation was entrusted to
Poussielgue, Secretary of the French Legation at Genoa, whose work on
_The History of the Revolution of Genoa_ was greatly admired by
Bonaparte.[75] Poussielgue’s ostensible mission was to examine—as
“inspector-general of the Levant Ports”[76]—the actual conditions of
French commerce and to suggest improvements.[77] His real work, however,
was “mettre la dernière main au projet que nous avons sur cette
île.”[78] While Poussielgue would be occupied in intriguing, Brueys was
to organise the Ionian Islands and to equip the ex-Venetian
warships.[79] Bonaparte, on November 14th, wrote to him on the
importance of his taking part in the invasion of England (“La grande
expédition”), informed him of the mission of Poussielgue and of the
possibility of his taking possession of the island of Malta with 3000
men (“La petite expédition”). Brueys, however, was to await further
orders.[80] Bonaparte finally left Milan on November 17th, and arrived
at Rastadt on the 25th. The next day, the Directory invited him to Paris
in order to confer with him “sur les intérêts majeurs et multiples de la
patrie” and to express to him the gratitude of the nation.[81] On
December 5th, he arrived in Paris.
As regards the composition of the naval forces to take part in the
projected invasion, the Minister of Marine submitted on December 12th a
rather optimistic report in which he stated that the concentration at
Brest of the French ships only would give the Republic forty-seven sail-
of-the-line, that a superiority over the English could be attained
through Spanish co-operation, that the French ports had all the
requisite light craft and that all that was necessary was the providing
of funds.[82] The Directory, thereupon, decreed, on December 13th, the
concentration of the French Navy at Brest.[83]
A detailed plan was then drawn up by Bonaparte and the Minister of
Marine. It consisted of eight operations, whereby French naval forces in
the Mediterranean and Spanish squadrons carrying 15,000 troops were to
assemble in Brest, the Batavian Republic was to provide the necessary
shipping for the embarkation of 15,000 soldiers and its ships were to be
ready to set sail by April 15th and the thirty-six sail gathered in
Brest were to be ready for sea by the end of March.[84]
There is no mention, it may be noticed, in these operations of the
attack on Malta—“la petite expédition” (p. 18). De la Jonquière
attributes this to the desire of the Directory not to add to the
complications already coming to a head in Switzerland, Germany and
Italy.[85] Whatever the cause was, we find Bonaparte, shortly after his
arrival in Paris, writing to his brother Joseph—then French Ambassador
at Rome—to stop the departure of Poussielgue.[86]
The countermanding letter, however, did not arrive in time. Poussielgue
arrived at Valetta on December 24th, was well received by the Government
there, and began “preparing the ground.”
The design on Malta thus postponed, the Directory concentrated all its
attention on the invasion of Britain. The preparations, however, were
seriously handicapped by financial difficulties. During the war, the
Republican armies were maintained by the occupied territories and the
finances of France were, to a certain extent, relieved by exactions from
the conquered. The conclusion of peace cut off that source of supply and
means had to be devised for maintaining the armies and defraying the
expense of the projected expedition.
Public credit practically did not exist and the revenue hardly sufficed
to meet ordinary expenditure. Some Frenchmen gave vent to their
Anglophobia in patriotic donations, but, it need hardly be remarked, the
value of such gifts was purely sentimental.[87] A loan of eighty
millions at five per cent interest was then floated, but, in spite of
ardent proclamations, hardly a quarter of it was taken.[88] Decrees
against English commerce[89] remained, as was the case in the past and
as in the days of the Empire, a dead letter through the all-round fraud
and complacency of which the authorities were not less guilty than the
merchants.[90]
In connection with these financial difficulties it is logical to
consider the French intervention in Rome and Switzerland; for although
the causes of that aggression were complex, the financial motive
predominated. Admitting this, however[91] the assertion of Madame de
Stael that the intervention in Switzerland (ordered on Bonaparte’s
counsel) was due to the desire of procuring funds specifically for the
Egyptian Expedition cannot be accepted.[92] For, as De la Jonquière
observes, the intervention in Switzerland—conceived of at least as early
as December 28th—took place several weeks before the Egyptian Expedition
was decreed; and the fact that the “Bernese Treasure” was allocated
actually to that Expedition is no proof of the assertion of Madame de
Stael.[93]
An event of the same nature as the two above-mentioned was the _coup
d’état_ of January 21st, 1798, in Holland, whereby a change in the
constitution of the Batavian Republic was effected. This _coup d’état_,
prepared by Charles Delacroix, French Minister at the Hague, and by
General Joubert, had for its aim the strengthening of the ties binding
the two republics and the securing of Dutch co-operation in the invasion
of England.
With the preparations for that invasion, Bonaparte was, in the meantime,
busily occupied. Forfait, an engineer, was directed to collect the
necessary transports, and the Minister of Marine was ordered to pay him
half a million out of the four millions assigned by the Directory for
the Navy.[94] To examine the real state of affairs on the coast,
however, he decided, early in February, to make a tour of inspection and
ordered Generals Kléber and Desaix to inspect certain sections of
it.[95] The former of these generals was, likewise, charged to take
possession of the Isles of Saint Marcouf.[96] He, accordingly, left
Paris on February 9th, and returned on the 21st after a rapid tour
during which he visited, among other places, Etaples, Ambleteuse,
Boulogne, Calais, Dunkirk and Ostend. “Il prit,” writes his secretary,
Bourrienne, “dans les différents ports tous les renseignements dont il
avait besoin, avec cette patience, cette présence d’esprit, ce savoir,
ce tact, cette perspicacité qu’il possédait à un si haut degré.”[97] The
same writer asserts that Bonaparte, in a conversation he had with him on
January 29th, said that little Europe offered too small a field, that
one should go to the East to gain power and greatness, that,
nevertheless, he was willing to make a tour of inspection on the
northern coast in order to convince himself of what might be ventured
and that if, as he feared, the success of a landing in England should
appear doubtful, he would make his “Army of England” the “Army of the
East” and go to Egypt.[98] Now a conversation of that description is
very probable, but it needs a far more reliable authority than that of
Bourrienne to establish that it took place before the departure on the
tour of inspection.[99] It should be observed, however, that there is a
general tendency to look upon that tour as a mere “ruse” to put the
English on a false track and to give a formal excuse for a foregone
conclusion.[100] Probably this attitude is based less on precise and
trustworthy evidence than on the suspicion—only too justified—of what
Bonaparte says or does. The safest course, however, is to base our
judgment on inference from contemporary documents. What is the evidence
of these? We see him at Dunkirk conferring with General Caffarelli, whom
he had ordered to proceed thither,[101] with the engineer Forfait and
with General Andreossy, issuing orders for putting into immediate use
whatever resources the ports he had just inspected possessed, sending
privateers to “reconnoitre the English coast from Rye to Folkestone” and
to find out the positions of the coast-batteries “so that these might be
easily captured and the landing effected,”[102] instructing Forfait and
Andreossy to arrange with the Dutch authorities the means of
transport,[103] pointing out to the latter the vital interest they had
in the success of the project.[104] We see him at La Fère, on the return
journey, giving orders for the manufacture of searchlight engines to
facilitate the disembarkation of troops.[105] The activity with which
Caffarelli worked and the tone of his letters to Bonaparte, as De la
Jonquière, who has published copious extracts of them truly
observes,[106] do not leave any doubts as to the fact that he was
engaged in a real task, in a work of truly “national importance.” And
when we remember the high esteem in which Bonaparte held Caffarelli, who
was acting—in the absence of Berthier in Italy—as his chief of staff, we
cannot admit that he was keeping him in the dark as to his veritable
intentions. To think, moreover, that Bonaparte would allow the one-
legged general to toil at an unreal task, exploit so callously the
energy and the devotion of a friend, knowing all the time that it was a
mere farce to deceive the English, is to make him a much worse man than
he really was. Is it possible, lastly, to suppose that Caffarelli was in
the alleged secret and that by his display of activity he only aimed at
confirming the illusion of the enemy? If that was so, why did he not in
his confidential letters and reports drop a hint or make as much as a
faint allusion to the veritable project? No! The tour of inspection was
genuine, and we have to search for the reasons why the invasion was
abandoned and the Oriental scheme revived.
One determining factor was the arrival in Paris, two or three days after
the return of Bonaparte, of Poussielgue’s report on his mission (p.
18).[107] Describing the conditions at Malta, the agent states that
though the French knights, who actually formed half the whole number,
were well-affected towards the Republic, they could not take sides
against the Order, which was their sole means of subsistence; and that
the well-to-do Maltese and seamen were disaffected to the Government of
the knights, the former for being excluded from public affairs, the
latter on account of that eternal feud with the Barbary Corsairs which
was the very _raison d’être_ of the Order. After ten or twelve
conferences with “the most active as well as the most enlightened
patriots,” Poussielgue came to the conclusion that there was not one
moment to lose in attempting the annexation of the island, and that, in
this attempt, the Directory should count on no more than the “benevolent
neutrality” of the native Maltese. What Poussielgue, accordingly,
suggested was a combination of diplomacy and force. The Directory might,
for instance, increase the embarrassments of the Grand Master by
persuading the Court of Madrid to confiscate the possessions of the
Order in Spain, or get the Pope to abolish the Order altogether, a
measure which would be welcomed by all the powers alike, or negotiate
with De Hompesch for the cession of Malta in return for a sum of money
or for the life-sovereignty of a small Mediterranean island.
Poussielgue deserved well of his employers. In his short sojourn, he had
worked for the reconciliation of the French knights with the new regime
in the country of their birth, and, “with due caution” had not failed
“to make promises and raise hopes.”[108]
In a covering letter addressed to Bonaparte, he called his attention to
the distressing condition of the squadron under Brueys and adduced that
condition as an argument for the employment of the diplomatic
weapon.[109] This leads us to consider the second cause for abandoning
the invasion.
Brueys found his ships in such disorder that he declared his inability
to carry out “the small expedition” or to proceed to Brest to take part
in the invasion.[110] On January 10th, seeing the situation daily
becoming worse, he announced to the Minister of Marine his resolve to
return to Toulon if his affairs were not ameliorated.[111] On receiving
this information the Minister reported to the Directory, on February
10th, his fears that Brueys’ squadron could not, before many months had
elapsed, join the rest of the Navy at Brest and proposed recalling it to
Toulon to refit.[112] This was approved,[113] but Brueys had not waited,
and had left Corfu on February 24th.
The invasion, under these circumstances, was impracticable. But
Bonaparte could not afford inaction. For his attitude in the winter of
1797-1798 there is still unfortunately a dearth of material. Of one
thing we must, however, be certain; he had long ceased to play the part
of “obedient servant” to the Directory. A conversation he had with Miot,
during his “proconsulate” in Italy, as Sorel well terms it, is
illuminating. “What I have done up to now,” he said, “is nothing. I am
only at the beginning of the course I must run. Do you imagine that I
triumph in Italy in order to aggrandize the pack of lawyers who form the
Directory, and men like Carnot and Barras? What an idea! A Republic of
30 million men! and with our manners, our vices! how is it possible? . .
. Let the Directory try to take the command from me and they will see
who is master.”[114] On his way to Rastadt he said to the same man, “As
for myself, my dear Miot, I may inform you, I can no longer obey; I have
tasted command, and I cannot give it up. I have made up my mind. If I
cannot be master I shall leave France.”[115]
He tried to be master. He assumed, as Barras complains in his _Memoirs_,
the functions of a generalissimo.[116] His influence may be traced in
important political events; for instance, in the intervention in
Switzerland and Rome and in the _coup d’état_ in Holland.[117] He even
had a share in personal matters. Bernadotte, for example, received the
post of Ambassador at Vienna instead of the command in Italy, because
Bonaparte preferred to see this ambitious soldier transferred from a
military career to a diplomatic one, and also because Bonaparte wished
to keep in his own hand Italian affairs.[118] In short, “without him,
the Directory can no longer do anything,” so Barras ironically comments
in his “notes.”[119] But he did not possess a recognised official
position commensurate with the influence he exercised. He sought to be
admitted into the Directory, but, being under the prescribed age, he was
refused.[120] He allied himself with Talleyrand and Tallien and other
“Thermidoriens.”[121]
The concluding sentence of his speech at the _fête_ given in his honour
by the Directory—“When once the welfare of the French nation has been
established upon the best organic laws, all Europe will then be
free”—revealed his disapproval of the much-vaunted Constitution of the
year III.[122] He seems to have contemplated overthrowing that
inconvenient constitution which required that Directors must not be
under forty years of age. He recognised, however, that the “pear was not
ripe.” One evening he told Barras that, had he so desired, the Italians
would have made him king. The director warned him not to entertain such
an idea, for, he continued, “if the Directory send you to-morrow to the
Temple not four persons would oppose that measure.”[123] He saw “that
the Directors were not liked, but also that for the time being it was
counter to the general republican sentiment to put a general in the
place of the civil councils.”[124]
“He knew,” however, “that without an army he was nothing,” as Carnot
observed in his exile.[125] The Jacobins began to attack openly the
conqueror of Italy.[126] On December 22nd, Mallet du Pan wrote to the
Court of Vienna, “Ce scarmouche à tête sulfureuse n’a eu qu’un succès de
curiosité. C’est un homme fini . . . décidément fini. . . .”[127] On
February 18th, the well-informed Prussian envoy, Sandoz, wrote to his
Court, “Il n’est plus question de lui . . . le peuple de Paris, toujours
léger et frivole, dit déjà de lui:—Que fait-il ici? Pourquoi n’est-il
pas embarqué pour attaquer l’Angleterre?”[128] Bonaparte, in spite of
all the incense offered, was alive to the insecurity of his position. To
his secretary, Bourrienne, he remarked, “In Paris things are quickly
forgotten. If I were to remain long inactive, I should be lost. In this
Babel one reputation crowds out another. If I had been seen even three
times at the theatre they would have thought no more about me; therefore
I go very seldom.”[129] Bourrienne observed that he must feel flattered
at the way in which the crowds flocked to see him.[130] “Bah,” he
replied, “the crowd would flock to see me just as eagerly if I were
going to the scaffold!” Thibaudeau even speaks of a plot against his
life.[131] In short, he felt, in the words of the same writer, “que le
pavé de Paris serait brûlant pour lui.”[132] He felt the necessity of
“keeping his glory warm”; therefore a new sphere of activity was needed.
By that time the Egyptian project—an old tradition of French diplomacy
the history of which has been already sketched—had assumed, thanks to
Talleyrand, an official character.
Appointed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 16th, 1797, through
the influence of Madame de Stael,[133] who desired, with all “honest
folk,” the establishment of peace with Europe and the reconciliation of
all parties in France, Talleyrand’s programme has been already
formulated in his “mémoire sur les rapports actuels de la France avec
les autres états de l’Europe.”[134] Like Mirabeau, he fully grasped the
profound transformation which was the result of the abolition of the
privileges of individuals and of corporations and the advent of national
sovereignty. He foresaw the coming revolution in the industrial life of
the nation and accepted in full Mirabeau’s famous dictum, “La paix
extérieure, il le faut aux auteurs de la Révolution, car rien ne
s’achève pendant la guerre.”[135] Returning from America in September,
1796, the ex-bishop of Autun, seeking to propitiate public opinion,
addressed the members of the National Institute on the “avantages à
retirer de colonies nouvelles après les révolutions” and, in that
discourse, called attention to Egypt and claimed for Choiseul the merit
of being the first to advocate this idea.[136]
One means of securing the peace so much desired, he thought, would be
the partition of the Turkish Empire. He had early contemplated such an
event. On January 19th, he wrote to Bernadotte, then Ambassador at
Vienna, “Il est certain que Catherine et Joseph ont songé à partager la
Turquie. Il y a lieu de supposer que leurs successeurs n’ont pas
abandonné ce plan. La France jadis s’est plusieurs fois efforcée de
quelque peu fortifier cet état; mais toutes ces tentatives sont restées
infructueuses, et n’ont fait que hâter la ruine des Osmanlis.
Aujourd’hui, la République est fortement résolue à ne pas laisser
s’accomplir la ruine de la Porte sans s’assurer à elle—même une part
assez considérable pour que le commerce de la mer Méditerranée ne puisse
pas lui être enlevé.” Egypt should be France’s share in the spoils.[137]
Once that country was conquered, France would be free to propose to the
two imperial courts to combine with her in the dismemberment of Turkey,
or, should they prove refractory, Egypt might be used as a trump-card to
force the Porte into an alliance with the Republic against them. But how
could the Porte ally itself with France after such an act of unprovoked
aggression? Talleyrand’s answer to this obvious objection was that the
Sultan only possessed the shadow of authority in Egypt.[138]
Finding his pacific inclinations overborne by the jingoism of the
Director Rewbell, he sought to attenuate the consequences of the rupture
of the Lille negotiations by diverting the attention of the Directory
from the invasion of England to the conquest of Egypt and skilfully gave
the latter course the guise of an indirect but deadly blow to English
commerce.[139] He, accordingly, took the earliest opportunity to push
his Egyptian project upon the Directory. The news of the death of the
French Ambassador at Constantinople enabled him to call the attention of
the Directory to the inevitable disruption of the Turkish Empire and to
the value to the Republic of Egypt, Crete and Lemnos, and to point out
that the sending of a new ambassador to Constantinople would be
superfluous if the Directory decided to introduce a radical change in
the traditional relations of France with the Porte.[140] On February
13th, he submitted a detailed memorandum on the subject of Egypt which
was based on Magallon and Volney.[141]
As Egypt, so the memorandum began, formed a province of the Roman
Republic, it should be one of the French Republic, to whom had fallen
the opportunity of realising a project long contemplated by the old
Government of France. The authority of the Porte in that country was
purely nominal, and, moreover, the ill-treatment of French merchants by
the Mamelukes, due to English intrigues, called for exemplary vengeance.
The Republic, in addition to the amelioration of the lot of the
oppressed peasantry, would draw great advantages from the new colony.
The conquest was likely to be very easy, for England would be fully
occupied with her own defence, the Porte, by the efforts of skilled
diplomats, could be kept quiet, and Austria and Russia could not, after
their partition of Poland, set their face against it. The Beys,
moreover, would not be able to dispose of more than 8000 cavalrymen who
were brave but utterly unacquainted with scientific warfare, and the
inhabitants, if given arms, would side with the French against their
oppressors. He accordingly stated that, though 12,000 to 15,000 troops
were enough for the mere conquest of Egypt, 20,000 to 25,000 men, five
sail-of-the-line and six frigates would be required. If the Directory,
however, would desire to drive the English out of India, the
expeditionary force should be composed of 35,000 troops. The ships
necessary for carrying them to India could be sent from Mauritius (l’île
de France) up the Red Sea to Suez. As regards the chief command,
Talleyrand made an original proposal. Arguing that the ignorance of the
enemy made military talents unnecessary and that all that was needed was
tact, he concluded that the command should be vested in a commission of
two or three wise and firm men versed, if possible, in Egyptian affairs.
This memorandum is usually considered as the result of an entente
between Bonaparte and Talleyrand.[142] It is true that such an entente
existed, but there is evidence that the former did not see that document
till after his return from Egypt in 1799. His marginal comments on it
which De la Jonquière has published definitely prove this. Some of
Talleyrand’s assertions he candidly branded as false and some of his
proposals he judged to be “dignes des petites maisons.” Further, would
Talleyrand—had he been in secret understanding with Bonaparte—have
resorted to the cumbersome commission invested with the chief command?
On February 21st, we find him pressing Bonaparte to go to Rastadt. A few
days later—February 27th—he expressed to Treilhard, the French envoy at
the Congress, his desire to see Bonaparte negotiating with the imperial
diplomats.[143]
His memorandum links two traditions of French diplomacy; occupation of
Egypt and intervention in India, and shows that the former is a sure
means of obtaining the latter.[144]
On February 23rd, Bonaparte addressed a long despatch to the Directory.
The opening sentence is far from encouraging, “Quelques efforts que nous
fassions, nous n’acquerrons pas d’ici à plusieurs années la supériorité
des mers.” He calls attention to the fact that the naval preparations
are as little advanced to-day as they were when the concentration was
decreed. If his suggestions, however, are accepted—if a commission of
three persons whom he names is formed, if it is given 800,000 (francs)
per decade, if by March all the gunboats are assembled at Dunkirk and
Ostend, if in a month’s time twenty-five out of the thirty ships-of-the-
line now at Brest, together with an appropriate number of frigates, are
ready to set sail, and if 300,000 (francs) per decade are allocated for
the extraordinary expenses of the Army, the invasion is still possible.
If, however, the measures suggested cannot be taken, it is necessary to
consider other undertakings against England, such as the conquest of
Hanover and of Hamburg, or the Egyptian expedition. If nothing comes of
these various schemes, the Directory can fall back on peace with
England.[145]
In the face of this long array of requirements and the short time within
which they had to be carried out, it is difficult to accept De la
Jonquière’s description of the above-mentioned despatch as a _mise en
demeure_ calculated to stimulate activity[146] and not as a renunciation
of the project of invasion altogether, as Bonaparte told Marmont.[147]
The Directory, in any case, took him at his word and in its Sessions of
February 24th and 25th decreed all the suggested measures.[148]
A week later, the Directory ordered such modifications in the
preparations as indicate that it began to think of renouncing, in its
turn, the project of invasion.[149] De la Jonquière explains this by the
arrival of reports from General Desaix which were less hopeful than
those of General Kléber upon which were based the decrees of February
24th and 25th.[150]
It seems that we must give up all hope of knowing precisely the
discussions immediately preceding the decreeing of the Egyptian
Expedition. A year later, when its success was despaired of and the
frontiers of France were menaced by the allied armies, everyone—and
Talleyrand foremost—disclaimed any share in it. The truest account,
probably, is a statement by the ex-Director Merlin: “Si l’on ne peut pas
dire que c’est lui (Bonaparte) qui a conçu le premier l’idée de cette
expédition, du moins on peut assurer que sans lui elle aurait restée en
projet.”[151]
The interests of the various parties in the Expedition are, however,
evident. Bonaparte knew that when a man was not born in the purple he
had to captivate men’s imagination in order to be able to govern
them.[152] The war carried into Africa, into an almost fabulous country,
would heighten his prestige, would appeal to the “friends of liberty”
who longed to shatter the fetters of the nations of the East, to bring
back within the fold of civilisation the country where science and art
first saw light, to change the face of the earth.[153] He was conscious
that as things then stood, such was the programme of his unpatriotic
ambition, it was only too probable that within a few months a fresh war
would break out on the continent of Europe which would necessarily bring
his name again into public notice. When Bourrienne asked him how long he
meant to remain in Egypt, he answered, “A few months or six years, it
all depends upon circumstances.”[154] To his brother Joseph he said that
“l’opinion publique n’était pas encore suffisamment formé sur ce que
l’on devait mettre à la place (of the republic) et qu’il partait pour
l’Egypte afin de lui laisser le temps de s’éclairer; que, si elle lui
était favorable, et si la guerre se rallumait et tournait mal pour la
France, il reviendrait alors, avec la certitude d’être l’élu du peuple
dont il se montrerait le sauveur mais que, s’il surgissait pendant la
guerre un nouveau général victorieux, l’Orient lui fournira peut-être le
moyen de rendre des services encore plus grands que les siens et
d’acquérir une plus grands gloire.”[155] Afterwards, at St. Helena, he
was even more explicit: “Pour que je devinsse le maître en France, il
fallait qu’en mon absence le Directoire éprouvât des revers, et que mon
retour ramenât la victoire sous mes drapeaux.”[156]
As for the Directory, the design commended itself to that restless
spirit animating France from the day when she began her self-appointed
task of sowing the seeds of disorder in the dominions of her enemies as
well as those of her allies. No objection, neither the dangers of the
sea and of the distant unknown land, nor the staking of the best fleet
the Republic had and of 40,000 men of choice troops to a gambler’s
chance, could weigh with the likelihood—small as that was—of conquering
a country to which the Roman eagle had flown, of astonishing the world
and of confounding the English or—above all—with the certainty of
getting rid of Bonaparte, of his ambition and his masterful personality,
and of his retinue of menacing and faithful warriors, of the military
dominance of bold and enterprising men who had flocked to France from
every front when the war came to an end.
[Footnote 17: “Are not Martinique, Cape Nichola Mole and the Cape of
Good Hope most important conquests?”—Pitt, speech of 9 Dec., 1795.]
[Footnote 18: Cf. Talleyrand’s report to the Directory, 26 June, 1799,
Pallain, pp. 425-6.]
[Footnote 19: “L’émigration des officiers nobles et de ceux qui ne
voulaient pas admettre les idées du jour, mit la Convention dans
l’obligation d’improviser des officiers.” O. Troude, _Batailles
Navales_, II, p. 252. _See also_ p. 264.]
[Footnote 20: In the period January, 1793-December, 1797, France lost 35
line-of-battle ships, 61 frigates, 108 smaller ships, in all 204. While
England lost 14 line-of-battle ships, 20 frigates, 43 smaller ships, in
all 77.—_Ibid._]
[Footnote 21: On the opportuneness of these victories. _See_ Rose, _Pitt
and the Great War_, p. 547.]
[Footnote 22: Jonquière, I, p. 18 note.]
[Footnote 23: Extract from a petition from the “Agents du Bureau
Central”: “Au nom de l’Angleterre, le sang brouillonne dans les veines,
et le cœur frémit d’indignation. La haine contre le gouvernement anglais
s’est accrue en proportion de ses crimes.”—Rédacteur of 4 Jan., 1798,
Aulard, _Paris pendant la réaction thermidorienne_, etc., IV, p. 519.]
[Footnote 24: e.g. “Le chant des Vengeances,” by Rouget de Lille, in the
_Ami des Lois_ of 4 Dec., 1797.—op. cit., IV, p. 504.]
[Footnote 25: e.g. the _Rapport du Bureau Central_ of 24 Dec., 1797,
gives an account of the success of the “Descente en Angleterre.”—op.
cit., IV, p. 505.]
[Footnote 26: In a _fête_ of the employees of the Ministry of Police:
“Aux victimes du despotisme du gouvernement anglais: puisse le sang
qu’elles ont versé féconder promptement dans leur pays les germes de la
liberté et de l’égalité,” etc.—op. cit., IV, p. 504.]
[Footnote 27: Mallet du Pan to the Court of Vienna, 13 Jan., 1798.]
[Footnote 28: Conversation with Sandoz, the Prussian envoy, in Dec.,
1797, Bailleu, I, p. 165.]
[Footnote 29: Napoleon manuscripts dealing with these respective books
are numbered XXVII and XXIX, XV and XVI, XXIII, in Masson, _Napoleon
Inconnu_, I.]
[Footnote 30: For Raynal the MS. is numbered XVII—op. cit. _See_ the
influence of Raynal in Fournier, I, p. 20.]
[Footnote 31: Cited by Fournier, I, p. 147.]
[Footnote 32: Volney was in Corsica in 1792. Bonaparte to Sucy, 17 Feb.,
1792, Masson, _Napoléon dans sa Jeunesse_, p. 271, Paris, 1907.]
[Footnote 33: Fournier, I, p. 67.]
[Footnote 34: Cantu, _Histoire des Cent Ans_, Fr. Trans., II, p. 105.
Hardman, _History of Malta_, chap. i.]
[Footnote 35: _Correspondance_, XXIX, 369.]
[Footnote 36: Hardman, op. cit., 361.]
[Footnote 37: _Ibid._, 362.]
[Footnote 38: _Ibid._, 7.]
[Footnote 39: Venetian fleet composed of 6 sail, 4 frigates and 4 brigs.
Jurien de la Gravière, _Guerres Maritimes_, I, p. 323.]
[Footnote 40: 27 May, _Correspondance_, III, 1836.]
[Footnote 41: Godoy, favourite of Queen of Spain.]
[Footnote 42: 1 June, _Correspondance_, III, 1852, 1835.]
[Footnote 43: 26 May, _Correspondance_, III, 1829.]
[Footnote 44: 16 August, _Ibid._, III, 2103.]
[Footnote 45: 23 August, Pallain, 124.]
[Footnote 46: To the Directory, 16 Aug., 1797, _Correspondance_, III,
2103. One of his measures was to reinforce the garrison of Corfu with
two battalions.]
[Footnote 47: Sorel, _Bonaparte et Hoche_, p. 183.]
[Footnote 48: Bonaparte to Talleyrand, 13 Sept., 1797, _Correspondance_,
III, 2195.]
[Footnote 49: _Ibid._]
[Footnote 50: Extract from Desaix’ notes:—
“Idées sur l’Egypte. S’en emparer. Avantages. Détail. Avec 5 divisions.
Paix avec l’Autriche et l’Angleterre. Départ de Venise de 10,000 hommes
et 8000 Polonais. Assemblages de tous les moyens d’être bien instruit.
Voyages. Savari [_sic_]. Volney, etc.” Jonquière, I, p. 32 note.
About the same time, Monge, the mathematician, who was then in Italy
collecting the fine art objects to be sent to France received from Paris
a collection of documents and memoirs on Egypt and its commercial
relations with India. Jonquière, I, p. 37.