=Source.=--_Parliamentary Papers_, "Egypt," No. 12 of 1884.
_P. 156. Major-General Gordon to Sir E. Baring. Khartoum, March 3,
1884._
... I am strongly against any permanent retention of the Soudan,
but I think we ought to leave it with decency, and give the
respectable people a man to lead them, around whom they can rally,
and we ought to support that man by money and by opening road to
Berber. Pray do not consider me in any way to advocate retention of
Soudan; I am quite averse to it, but you must see that you could
not recall me, nor could I possibly obey, until the Cairo employés
get out from all the places. I have named men to different places,
thus involving them with Mahdi: how could I look the world in the
face if I abandoned them and fled? As a gentleman, could you advise
this course? It may have been a mistake to send me up, but that
having been done I have no option but to see evacuation through,
for even if I was mean enough to escape I have no power to do so.
_P. 161. The Same to the Same. Khartoum, March 9, 1884, 11.30 p.m._
If you mean to make the proposed diversion to Berber [of British
troops], and to accept my proposal as to Zobeir, to install him
in the Soudan and evacuate, then it is worth while to hold on to
Khartoum. If, on the other hand, you determine on neither of these
steps, then I can see no use in holding on to Khartoum, for it is
impossible for me to help the other garrisons, and I shall only
be sacrificing the whole of the troops and employés here. In this
latter case your instructions to me had better be that I should
evacuate Khartoum, and, with all the employés and troops, remove
the seat of Government to Berber. You would understand that such
a step would mean the sacrificing of all outlying places except
Berber and Dongola. You must give a prompt reply to this, as
even the retreat to Berber may not be in my power in a few days;
and even if carried out at once, the retreat will be of extreme
difficulty.
_P. 161. Same Date, 11.40 p.m._
If the immediate evacuation of Khartoum is determined upon,
irrespective of outlying towns, I would propose to send all Cairo
employés and white troops with Colonel Stewart to Berber, where he
would await your orders. I would also ask Her Majesty's Government
to accept the resignation of my commission, and I would take
all steamers and stores up to the Equatorial and Bahr Gazelle
provinces, and consider those provinces as under the King of the
Belgians.
[_P. 160._ Sir E. Baring comments that, owing to interruption of
the telegraph line, these and other messages did not reach him till
March 12. He instructed Gordon to hold on at Khartoum until he
could communicate further with the British Government, and on no
account to proceed to the Bahr Gazelle and Equatorial provinces.]
_P. 152. Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring, March 13, 1884._
If General Gordon is of opinion that the prospect of his early
departure diminishes the chance of accomplishing his task, and that
by staying at Khartoum himself for any length of time which he may
judge necessary he would be able to establish a settled Government
at that place, he is at liberty to remain there. In the event of
his being unable to carry out this suggestion, he should evacuate
Khartoum and save that garrison by conducting it himself to Berber
without delay.