=Source.=--Lord Cromer's _Modern Egypt_, vol. i., p. 488.
(Macmillans.)
On February 26th, thirty-nine days had elapsed since General Gordon
had left London, thirty-one days since he had left Cairo, and
eight days since he had arrived at Khartoum. During that period,
leaving aside points of detail, as to which his contradictions
had been numerous, General Gordon had marked out for himself no
less than five different lines of policy, some of which were
wholly conflicting one with another, whilst others, without being
absolutely irreconcilable, differed in respect to some of their
most important features. On January 18 he started from London with
instructions which had been dictated by himself. His wish then
was that he should be merely sent to "report upon the best means
of effecting the evacuation of the interior of the Soudan." He
expressed his entire concurrence in the policy of evacuation. This
was the first and original stage of General Gordon's opinions.
Before he arrived in Egypt, on January 24, he had changed his
views as to the nature of the functions he should fulfil. He
no longer wished to be a mere reporter. He wished to be named
Governor-General of the Soudan with full executive powers. He
supplemented his original ideas by suggesting that the country
should be handed over to "the different petty Sultans who existed
at the time of Mehemet Ali's conquest." This was the second stage
of General Gordon's opinions. Fifteen days later (February 8) he
wrote from Abu Hamed a memorandum in which he advocated "evacuation
but not abandonment." The Government of Egypt were to "maintain
their position as a Suzerain Power, nominate the Governor-General
and Moudirs, and act as a supreme Court of Appeal." This was the
third stage of General Gordon's opinions. Ten days later (February
18) General Gordon reverted to the principles of his memorandum
of the 8th, but with a notable difference. It was no longer
the Egyptian but the British Government which were to control
the Soudan administration. The British Government were also to
appoint a Governor-General, who was to be furnished with a British
commission, and who was to receive a British decoration. Zobeir
Pasha was the man whom General Gordon wished the British Government
to select. This was the fourth stage of General Gordon's opinions.
Eight days later (February 26), when General Gordon had learnt
that the British Government were not prepared to approve of Zobeir
Pasha being sent to the Soudan, he proposed that the Mahdi should
be "smashed up," and that, to assist in this object, 200 British
Indian troops should be sent to Wadi Halfa. This was the fifth
stage of General Gordon's opinions. In thirty-nine days, therefore,
General Gordon had drifted by successive stages from a proposal
that he should report on the affairs of the Soudan to advocating
the policy of "smashing up" the Mahdi. It would, he said, be
"comparatively easy to destroy the Mahdi."