the desired progress was made, and the _San Francisco_ had a serious
breakdown of her steering gear. Several men were injured while steering
by hand, which had to be discontinued, because the sea drove so heavily
on the rudder. The ship was then steered by the screws alone for four
days until temporary repairs could be made. Upon the weather clearing, it
was decided to divide the squadron, allowing _Roanoke_, _Canandaigua_,
_Housatonic_, and _Quinnebaug_ to continue the direct run, which their
remaining coal and daily consumption warranted doing, while the _San
Francisco_, _Canonicus_, and _Saranac_, with shorter fuel supply and
larger consumption, proceeded by the Azores.
Like other forces coming home, we wished to come into New York, for a
touch of the limelight after being so long in obscurity, and because the
location was central for letting the men go home. With mines on board,
we could not expect a welcome anywhere, and at New York bare permission
was doubtful—especially so soon after the Perth Amboy explosions. With no
prospect of being _invited_ there, we sailed with destination announced
as New York as the one possible chance of getting there, but orders soon
came to steer for Hampton Roads instead.
Near mid-passage on Christmas night, after dinner, a British collier
collided with the _Roanoke_, opening a good-sized hole in her port side
forward. Supports of the bridge being knocked away, its end sloped down,
making it seem at first that the ship was rapidly settling. Steam from
a broken pipe came forth in volumes, to which the red glow of the port
sidelight lent the appearance of smoke and flames. Collision and fire,
with 500 mines on board, far at sea in cold, misty weather, would have
been indeed serious. It needed just that to round out our experiences,
but fortune was with us, and the situation was promptly brought under
control.
The _Quinnebaug_ saw the collier safe into Halifax, and then overtook
the other three, all four minelayers arriving at Hampton Roads without
further incident on 30 December. The _Shawmut_ and _Aroostook_ had
already come in on the 27th. The rest, pursued by bad weather 10 days out
of 16, both Christmas and New Year spent at sea, and feeling our way into
port through fog, the _San Francisco_ and the two with her arrived early
January 3, 1919, making the squadron once more complete, except for the
_Baltimore_, still absent on experimenting duty.
In due course, the last mine was safely discharged from our ships, making
a clear record of over 60,000 mines handled without mishap. And yet we
were not to disperse without one more experience—a serious fire. The very
night after the _Saranac_ had landed her mines, a fire broke out in the
wardroom, spreading so rapidly that, until outside help came, it seemed
impossible to prevent her being completely gutted. Only great exertions
saved her and the incident showed that our strict guard against fire had
been no idle precaution.
CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO
THE MINE SWEEPERS
With the removal of the mines in peace, the sweepers came into
prominence, which gives occasion to mention an inconspicuous part of
the Mine Force work, too easily overlooked. There were four large
seagoing tugs in the mine squadron, _Patuxent_, Lieutenant J. B. Hupp;
_Patapsco_, Lieutenant W. E. Benson; _Sonoma_, Lieutenant J. S. Thayer;
and _Ontario_, Lieutenant E. J. Delavy. These, as fleet tenders had
towed targets, carried passengers, mail, stores, and the like. All this
continued after they were assigned to the original Mine Force, yet,
by a more systematic apportionment of their former duties, time was
gained for training in mining and sweeping, enough to arouse a keen
interest and foster the Mine Force spirit. In the fleet’s tactical and
strategical exercises the tugs took part, and upon our entering the war,
the anti-submarine net tasks and the experimenting that were assigned to
the Mine Force were possible of accomplishment only by the use of these
tugs, together with our mine carrier vessel, the _Lebanon_, Lieutenant
H. N. Huxford. In seaworthiness, power, and equipment, these vessels had
what was needed, but their chief value lay in the resourcefulness and
energy of their personnel. Lieutenant E. S. R. Brandt, U.S.N., was their
division leader, commanding the _Sonoma_, during their first 18 months in
the Mine Force.
Night and day, they were always ready, and it seemed as if their power
and seaworthiness would take them anywhere. Well equipped for salvaging,
they played an important part in saving the U.S.S. _Olympia_ and
afterwards the _Texas_, when they grounded, in 1917. Often they had long
hours of hard duty, but could always be counted on. Service in them gave
excellent experience for both officers and men, and many were the capable
petty officers turned out. The question “Can you do it?” was never asked,
nor “Are you ready?” It was necessary only to say go and do, and whether
foggy or clear, the tug that was sent would nose her way through somehow.
These tugs were not properly equipped for mine sweeping, lacking the
special type of winch needed for that purpose, but their 18 months’
experience with improvised arrangements yielded information of great
value for the new design of a combined seagoing tug and mine-sweeper
type, of the _Bird_ Class, contracted for during the summer of 1917.
By the original plan for the Northern Mine Barrage, the first 12 to
be completed of these new sweeping vessels were assigned to the mine
squadron, and continued efforts were made to expedite their completion,
but without success so far as concerned their joining the mine squadron.
Meantime, in the experiments and tests of the mine, in training the new
personnel, and in every kind of transportation and other assistance to
the new minelayers during the month preparatory to sailing, the four
original tugs were invaluable. The new sweepers not being ready, the
original four were fitted out to take part in the work abroad. When the
mine squadron left Hampton Roads late in April, 1918, the _Patuxent_ and
_Patapsco_ were temporarily detached, to proceed by way of Bermuda, the
Azores, and Brest, escorting a convoy of submarine chasers across. Rear
Admiral Wilson, U.S.N., commended them for being the first to deliver
such a convoy intact. They finally arrived at Inverness 24 June, 1918,
where they were used to inspect and observe minefields, to communicate
between the detachments of minelayers at the two bases, and to train men.
The larger pair, _Sonoma_ and _Ontario_, were retained with the
minelayers until their final sailing for abroad. The _Sonoma_, Lieutenant
J. S. Trayer, accompanied the squadron on its trip across, making a
notable passage for a vessel of her size. Always ready for any duty, up
to station, and able to steam at maximum speed at the end of a 3000-mile
run, she earned commendation for her captain and her engineer officer,
Lieutenant L. W. Knight, U.S.N.
With the _Ontario_, which accompanied a convoy of submarine chasers
across, the _Sonoma_, after a brief stay in Scotland, went to Queenstown,
where the need for that type was greater than with the Mine Force. In
this assignment their rescue of submarine victims was a continuation
in greater degree of similar pre-war assistance, in home and Cuban
ports, off Hatteras and Cape Maysi, rendered to vessels in distress from
collision, breakdown, and fire at sea.
CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE
THE MINE FORCE, OLD AND NEW
Details of preparation have been only briefly touched upon in the
preceding chapters, though actually their influence on the success of
the operation deserves more prominence. It will not be supposed that the
new squadron just grew, or that in the active operations everything just
broke fair. On the contrary, success was earned by logical, consistent
preparation, extending back over years and by sound organization and
execution when the plan was launched. Hard work, development of doctrine,
and prospective study, between 1914 and 1917, bore fruit, and, for the
navy’s credit, the foresight which produced it deserves record along with
the achievement itself.
While suitable and adequate material would ever be the first essential
in such an operation, the all-important question lay in the personnel
afloat. The excellent qualities of the new mine would be of no avail
without proper laying of the barrage. Fortunately we already had a
minelaying force, small but capable, so that we did not look abroad for
instruction.
Prior to 1914, minelaying from a ship underway had received little
attention in our navy, but when some early events of the great European
war showed what a part mines were likely to play in the future, mining
affairs were made the principal duty of Captain G. R. Marvell in the
Navy Department, the conversion of two more minelayers was pushed to
completion, and mine training was taken up in earnest in the fleet.
The hitherto solitary mine ship _San Francisco_ was taken out of the
heterogeneous group known as the Auxiliary Division of our fleet, to
become the flagship of a separate organization for mining and mine
sweeping, which was established on July 10, 1915, while Admiral F. F.
Fletcher had the Atlantic fleet.
In the development of this new branch, which was under my command
until September, 1917, one truth came out forcibly, that the sustained
attention requisite throughout mining operations could only be insured
by keeping everything up in man-of-war style. Laying and recovering
mines was messy work, and in a ship of a type long obsolete, classed as
auxiliary, and using a weapon of stealth barely tolerated, to maintain
such a standard was not easy. As Sir Eric Geddes, First Lord of the
British Admiralty, said in a speech in New York, “Before the war,
minelaying was considered unpleasant work for a naval man, an occupation
like that of rat-catching, and not attractive.”
Whatever aversion may have been felt quickly vanished in the growing
interest that had been aroused. Besides its own specialty, the new
branch joined the fleet’s tactical, gunnery, and strategic exercises,
these last leading to new activities and to study of the possibilities
of mines and of the logical functions of the Mine Force. Both Admiral
Fletcher and his successor, Admiral H. T. Mayo, did all in their power to
establish the new element firmly as a regular part of the mobile fleet.
Their interest and encouragement had immediate effect in confirming the
personnel’s sense of value, which had been engendered by the variety of
their employment, the stimulating results of their efforts, and belief in
the power of their weapon.
Experimenting with submarine nets was also taken up, and in our first
six months of war, the Mine Force was employed chiefly in planting three
nets in Chesapeake Bay, and one each in Long Island Sound and at Newport
entrance. Success with the Long Island net, over five miles long, was
only achieved after a hard struggle with a five-knot current, which time
after time swept the net away or, crushing its buoys, pulled it under and
entwined it with tons of kelp.
Such in outline was the scope of Mine Force activities during the 28
months prior to preparing for the North Sea expedition. We had not
yet laid any minefields during the war, but as if in practice for the
very operation to come, the Force, early in December, 1916, had laid
a minefield off the Jersey Coast, below Sandy Hook—200 loaded mines,
in three parallel lines laid simultaneously, and all taken up by next
day—the press not notified. Various arrangements in connection with
the handling and transportation of mines had been planned and actually
practiced. For result—when the Northern Barrage project came under
consideration, the question of practicability of the operation could be
answered yes with confidence, and the subsequent working out of mining
installations, organization, and training was guided by reliable data—all
from our own experience.
Many-sided experience had produced a well-knit organization of units that
were resourceful, self-reliant, and mutually helpful, well trained on
sound lines in minelaying, singly and together. Long hours and work in
all weathers were a matter of course. Quiet self-confidence was the mark
of the Force spirit. And thus, although the original Mine Force was much
too small for the great task ahead, its value as a nucleus and leaven
for the greatly enlarged mine squadron to be formed could hardly be
overstated.
Since the autumn of 1916, the principal Mine Force officers had been
myself, as Force Commander, Commander H. V. Butler, commanding the
flagship _San Francisco_ and senior aid, Commander A. W. Marshall, U.S.S.
_Baltimore_, and Commander T. L. Johnson, U.S.S. _Dubuque_. All these
were to take part in the North Sea operation and were concerned in its
preparation—myself in charge, Butler training the new crews, Marshall
experimenting with the new mine, which Butler concluded, and Johnson
helping to select the new ships, then going abroad for information.
Their experience and their ships were invaluable both in preparation and
afterwards. On the principle that, let material be old or new, discipline
may be the best, the style of these seasoned men-of-war, aiming to match
the highest naval standard, was always a strong influence in the squadron.
In October, 1917, with the original order to go ahead, which was
accompanied by a word of strong approval, from the President down, the
development of plans and coordination of all preparations became my
principal duty in the Office of Naval Operations. Command of a minelayer
and two years at the head of mining affairs in the Atlantic fleet had
given me experience that was directly pertinent.
The intention being to lay the barrage as soon as possible, and counting
five days as the least time between minelaying operations—coaling,
embarking mines, out, laying, and back—the expected manufacturing output
of 1000 mines a day demanded a minelaying squadron with capacity of 5000
mines at one time. Towards this, our _San Francisco_ and _Baltimore_
carried together only 350 mines. The eight new vessels would add 5350,
thus providing a good margin, either for the loss of a ship or for
speeding up.
No time was to be lost. The demand for ships, shipyard work, and ship
equipment for other purposes was increasing every day. Within 10 days
the Eastern Steamship Corporation’s fast passenger liners _Massachusetts_
and _Bunker Hill_, running daily between New York and Boston, were
purchased outright, becoming the _Shawmut_ and _Aroostook_. Within a
month the Southern Pacific freight steamers _El Rio_, _El Dia_, _El
Cid_, and _El Siglo_ were taken over, becoming _Roanoke_, _Housatonic_,
_Canonicus_, and _Canandaigua_, respectively. Carrying 860 mines each
they soon became known as the Big Four. The Old Dominion steamers
_Hamilton_ and _Jefferson_, familiar to passengers between New York and
Norfolk, followed by December 6, 1917.
[Illustration: THE BOSTON-NEW YORK PASSENGER LINER “MASSACHUSETTS.”
Before conversion into a minelayer.]
The task of making four freight ships habitable for crews of 400 men, at
the same time carrying twice as many mines as any other vessel of their
size, is not done by a wave of the hand, and as for the four passenger
steamers taken, they were gutted like fish—saloons and cabins ripped
out—before their conversion could begin. Although plans had to be based
upon what could be done within a reasonable time, with material and labor
scarce, all features had to conform to the requirements of the mining
installations. These were almost entirely new on the scale contemplated,
either in our own or any other service. There was little data available
of similar installations, except some British mining memoranda and a
few belated blueprints. Lieutenant DeSalis, R.N., kindly placed his
experience at our disposal, which was a help, but attempts abroad had not
made a success of mine elevators—which would form a cardinal feature of
our installation—nor had others gone in for mine-carrying capacity to
the extent we contemplated—which was the maximum number consistent with
not squeezing the crew intolerably. Hence, little of their information
proved applicable to our case. Experience in our own minelayers, however,
_San Francisco_, _Baltimore_, and _Dubuque_, during the past three years,
enabled many details to be decided with a confidence that subsequent
results confirmed.
[Illustration: THE 20-KNOT MINELAYER “SHAWMUT.”
Formerly the coastwise passenger liner _Massachusetts_.]
That winter of 1917-18 will be long remembered! Material was scarce,
transportation congested, labor unsettled, fuel short, weather severe,
haste and high prices everywhere. Much delay came from lack of interest
among workmen. The campaign of addresses by good speakers explaining the
need for the ships and the men’s own interest in doing their best, did
not begin until sometime in February, and then only in a small way. There
was insufficient supervision, the contractors were converting vessels
to a type for which no model existed, and plans were not forthcoming
as fast as wanted, often not in the logical order. Besides delays and
losses of material in transportation, one trade in which labor was
shortest—shipfitter—was the one on whose work much of the other had to
wait.
By constant urging and anticipating probable delays, the work as a whole
was kept always progressing, even if at times slowly. The captains to
be, and their principal officers, came to the ships soon after their
taking over, and by January 25, 1918, two of the largest ships,
_Roanoke_ and _Housatonic_, were enough advanced to be commissioned.
Living conditions were extremely rough amid the dirt and disorder, made
worse by the slush and mud in the unpaved shipyards; but the presence
of officers and men on board exerted constant forward pressure, while
they were becoming acquainted with their ships. In the conversion of
the _Shawmut_ and _Aroostook_ at Boston Navy Yard, the ships’ companies
worked in industrial gangs alongside the civilian employees, with such
actual accomplishment and setting such an example, as to advance the date
of completion materially. At the same time, their training progressed so
well that, on June 16, 1918, only one week after completion, they started
across.
Every 10 days or so during the five months shipyard work, I would go
from Washington for a conference with the captains and the navy yard
officers at New York and Boston, to keep in touch with the actual
progress and the matters that appeared to need special attention. These
conferences eliminated infinite writing and enabled closer touch to be
kept with all preparations, additional effort to be more appropriately
applied, than were possible by regular procedure alone, especially amid
the swollen volume of correspondence in general. They developed, too, a
good understanding among the officers, which made for future harmony and
gained time towards the squadron’s readiness.
Before the new ships were delivered, a special camp at Newport had been
provided for training their crews under Mine Force officers. The _San
Francisco_ and _Baltimore_ gave some practical instruction on board,
and the camp was supplemented elsewhere, so that few, if any, wholly
untrained men went to any ship. Three gun crews were trained in the
battleships for each minelayer, and the engineer personnel were kept
under training at Philadelphia until wanted. For the officers, similar
measures were taken to put them in touch with the methods and experience
of the Mine Force, as far as this could be done with ships most of the
time at shipyards, fitting out.
Unlike the old Mine Force, the new was to consist of organizations on
shore as well as afloat, and for this an officer of flag rank was wanted.
Rear Admiral Joseph Strauss, U.S.N., was selected as the new Commander of
the Mine Force.
Long identified with ordnance matters and of distinguished experience
at the Naval Ordnance Proving Ground and Smokeless Powder Factory,
he was Chief of the Bureau of Ordnance for some years before going to
command the U.S. Battleship _Nevada_, which he quitted to take command
of the mine operation. On February 15, 1918, he came to temporary duty
in the Office of Naval Operations, where he familiarized himself with
all information bearing on the operation and its preparation, and after
a tour of inspection to the ships and acquainting himself with the mine
situation, he sailed for England with his aid, Lieutenant Noel Davis.
U.S.N. On March 29, 1918, he assumed command of the Mine Force, with
headquarters at U.S. Naval Base 18, Inverness, Scotland. Thereupon the
original Mine Force, consisting only of ships, became Mine Squadron One,
and it became my part to complete its preparations in the United States
and command the active force afloat.
The new Mine Squadron One was organized on Wednesday, April 10, 1918, at
Hampton Roads, Virginia, on board the squadron flagship _San Francisco_.
I relieved Captain H. V. Butler, U.S.N., who had been in command of the
Mine Force in the interval. He remained as captain of the flagship and
was also my chief-of-staff—the same association that we had in the old
Mine Force. Commander Bruce L. Canaga, U.S.N., who had been my invaluable
assistant in Washington since the preparations began in November, came as
my senior aid.
To us who had struggled through the long winter’s difficulties, it
was a memorable event when the first new minelayer, the _Roanoke_,
Captain Stearns, joined the flag, on Friday, 12th April, 1918. She was
followed closely by the _Housatonic_, Commander Greenslade, and by
the _Canandaigua_, Commander Reynolds, next day. All was arranged for
their loading with mines, and they began at once. By a week later the
_Quinnebaug_, Commander Mannix, and _Canonicus_, Commander Johnson, had
joined, completing the number ready for service at that time.
Almost immediately the _Roanoke_ was sent across ahead of the others,
an inspection only 16 days after leaving the shipyard showing that her
excellent condition warranted it. She was to help the _Baltimore_,
already there, to finish laying the minefield in the North Irish Channel,
described in a previous chapter, but though she arrived in good season
and ready, through a change of plan the _Roanoke_ was not employed there,
proceeding instead to Invergordon.
[Illustration: ORGANIZATION OF THE MINE FORCE.
Transcriber’s Note: The below is a transcription of the text printed
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For best results, view the HTML version, which contains the chart as an
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