representative recommended extensive mine barrages in the Mediterranean,
in locations where the depths of water were much greater than any yet
mined, involving winter operations for us. As a first step, Captain
Murfin was sent down to Bizerta, near Tunis, to establish a base there,
like his two in Scotland—though under much less favorable conditions.
Considerable experimenting at home was likewise involved, to develop a
suitable extra-deep mine and its moorings. Experienced personnel being
needed for this, orders came placing the _Baltimore_ at disposition of
our Naval Bureau of Ordnance for the purpose. Accordingly, on the tenth
excursion, 26 September, she parted company off Scapa Flow, sailing
thence two days later for home. In the nine other ships, 97 per cent
of the mine capacity remained, but as an experienced vessel of regular
man-of-war type, the _Baltimore’s_ value in the squadron had far exceeded
her proportionate capacity.
The minelaying squadrons were now doubling and trebling the barrage,
which had been carried clear across the North Sea on the eighth
excursion, 7 September. Hitherto we had been favored by good weather, but
the season of frequent storms was approaching and already the lengthening
hours of darkness made a considerable difference.
Our one loss of life at sea occurred just as the _Baltimore_ left us. The
_Saranac’s_ port paravane was running badly and, in clearing it, George
C. Anderson, chief boatswain’s mate, stepped out on the davit—a sudden
jerk! and he was gone. Although search was made, he was never seen again.
He had been an energetic yet safe leader, never allowing another man to
go overside without a bowline around him, but of himself had been less
careful.
An almost unbroken record of ten excursions carried through without
breakdown or delay made such a performance now seem a matter of course.
The artificer personnel of all ships made a fine showing in upkeep and
in steady steaming at sea, notwithstanding that overhaul time was very
limited. On returning to port, the squadron would prepare immediately
for another excursion and would then wait from day to day for the
escort, under notice too short for the extensive overhaul desirable.
As the operation progressed, making more wear and tear, the intervals
between excursions became shorter and bad weather frequently necessitated
keeping steam ready, in case the anchors dragged, as often they did, all
which reduced the repair time. Unfinished details of conversion, hard
usage in former hands, absence of spare feed pumps and similar secondary
dependencies, and a large amount of auxiliary machinery for the vessels’
size,—all these were work-making factors. Yet, except for wear, the
general condition of all machinery steadily improved.
A large amount of self-repair was done, the _Roanoke_ being almost wholly
self-sustaining, resorting very little even to our own repair ship
_Black Hawk_. The _San Francisco’s_ carpenter gang built an excellent
emergency cabin under the bridge in about 10 days. Then the _Shawmut_ and
_Aroostook_ by themselves increased their oil fuel capacity by 50 per
cent, which later enabled them to make the run homeward unassisted and
unescorted.
Procedure in conducting the squadron aimed at steadiness in steaming
and steering. No unnecessary chances were taken, but neither was the
treatment tender. The ships always worked near their speed limit, with
only the reserve needed for tactical reasons. Their good performance
was due to careful, intelligent foresight, and the rarity of even minor
disablements is proof of noteworthy ability and fidelity on the part of
the engine and fireroom personnel. No ship was ever late, no minelaying
operation ever interrupted, only one hot bearing occurred, only once did
a ship’s engine have to stop—for but a few minutes—in 8400 miles steaming.
As for steady station-keeping, some ships, notably _Canandaigua_, were
always there—hour after hour, night and day—and the others were seldom
out. Approaching and during the minelaying, they were very accurate.
As one visiting officer from the fleet said, “You’ve got it on the
battleships,” and it was officially reported by Admiral Mayo that
The minelayers, though of diverse types, maneuvered well
together and kept station very well indeed; they appeared to be
under excellent control, both individually and as units, at all
times. The laying operation which was witnessed was carried out
according to plan without hitch of any kind, thus indicating
the efficacy of the preparation, including planning, and the
thorough understanding of the work by all concerned.
Much official interest was taken in our operation and brief visits to the
bases and the ships were made during the summer by Vice Admiral Sims,
Admiral Sir Rosslyn Wemyss, the British First Sea Lord, Vice Admiral
Ommaney of the Admiralty, Rear Admiral Clinton-Baker, R.N., the House
of Representatives’ Naval Committee, and Assistant Secretary Franklin
D. Roosevelt. Several of our naval officers went out on excursions, and
Lieut. Commander DeSalis, R.N., always a welcome, enthusiastic supporter,
went on several of them. They all admired the orderly, complete, and
ample arrangements of the mine assembling bases and were especially
complimentary about the new minelayers.
Officers and men felt intense pride in their ships, and spared no effort
to keep them in regular man-of-war condition. The ten made a handsome
squadron, and in capacity for carrying mines, in equipment for handling
and planting them continuously, and general arrangement and quality, the
new American minelayers were admittedly superior to any others.
Their capacity and performance was the subject of much favorable comment
and careful study by the British Admiralty. Besides large mine capacity,
their mine elevators were a striking feature. The very first thing
considered in the plans had been how to get the lower deck mines up to
the launching deck, so that a ship’s entire load might be planted in
one unbroken string. The Otis Elevator Company’s representatives had
been called in at the outset and, after several alternatives had been
examined, their standard platform type was decided upon, each elevator
lifting two mines every 20 seconds. Six elevators in the four largest
ships, four in two others, were in use 9 months in all kinds of weather
at sea. Only one of the 32 elevators ever failed, and that one just once!
The British minelayers had had trouble from the mine tracks opening and
closing with the working of the ship in a seaway. In ours, the tracks
were secured to steel crossties mounted on wooden bolsters, the strength
and stiffness of the tie, with the elasticity of the bolster, keeping
the rails true to gauge, notwithstanding they were lighter rails than
the British used. Special interest was taken also in the simple, light
switches used in our ships’ mine tracks. Some of the Admiralty officials
were hard to convince that these switches actually worked, even when
operated before their eyes.
While the ships were embarking mines and coaling for the twelfth
excursion, Admiral H. T. Mayo, Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic Fleet,
accompanied by Captain O. P. Jackson, his Chief of Staff, Rear Admiral
Strauss, and Captain N. C. Twining, Chief of Staff to Vice Admiral Sims,
made an informal ship inspection, after which Rear Admiral Strauss
published the following:
8 October, 1918.
Admiral Mayo, commander-in-chief, left the headquarters of the
mine force yesterday evening for the south.
He expressed himself as highly pleased with the zeal, loyal
coöperation and efficiency of the mine force both ashore and
afloat and congratulated us on the work we have accomplished.
The commander of the mine force is unable to give any data as
to the number of enemy submarines that have been destroyed as a
result of our efforts, but it is practically certain that the
toll is considerable.
The commander-in-chief emphasized the part that the mine force
is taking against the enemy as a distinct military offensive,
thoroughly known and appreciated at home.
Admiral Mayo found things in their normal condition, with no preparation
made for him, as some ships were coaling, others embarking mines. He was
evidently pleased with all that he saw, and he remarked how fortunate it
was that we had been training in that kind of work, in the old, small
mine force, for two years past.
Bad weather during some part of an excursion became now the rule. Coming
through a narrow passage in Westray Firth one morning, strong tide
against a strong wind made an ugly cross sea, knocking us down to eight
knots. One destroyer broached to, and for a few moments lay between our
columns, wallowing heavily, as if the next roll would surely take her
under.
Shortly afterwards, one arm of the _Quinnebaug’s_ rudder quadrant broke,
and the other arm bent almost to the point of fracture. Had it too gone,
she could not have escaped wreck on the rocky channel side. Fortunately
she was able to gain partial shelter; in two hours she made repairs and,
taking after the rest at top speed, she arrived at Invergordon only
45 minutes behind them. As a coastwise merchant liner, she was often
behind time, but in naval hands she developed speed to spare, frequently
maintaining on natural draft 10 per cent more than her former best speed
under forced draft.
Passing mines adrift was a frequent occurrence. Occasionally we would
have to turn out for them. If of the moored type originally, broken away
from their anchors, they should be safe when drifting. But of course
safety devices, like all others, not infrequently fail to function,
especially after immersion in sea water. We let the mines alone, but
occasionally an escort destroyer would fire a few rounds, to sink them.
A German floating mine, upon one occasion, was sighted nearly ahead by
the _Quinnebaug_, at a moment when her port paravane, running foul,
had been hauled in, to clear it. Thrown overboard bodily, the paravane
fell on its back, and fortunately righting itself, came in contact with
the floating mine, which apparently had a mooring line attached to it,
and towed it along with the ship for probably 30 seconds—when the mine
detached itself and floated astern. While this was going on on deck, a
fire broke out below, in the midst of the mines on the stowage deck.
The ship’s cooks, who were in the galley at work, with the greatest
promptness seized hand fire extinguishers, climbed over between the mines
and extinguished the flames. The _Quinnebaug_ started planting within two
minutes after this danger was averted.
How such a fire would have spread in one of these ships, so full of
woodwork, was shown on board the sister ship, _Saranac_, after our
return, in January, 1919, at Hampton Roads. The very night after
discharging her mines a fire broke out, spreading with such rapidity that
the sleeping officers had to escape in their night clothes, losing all
their effects, and the men in the engine room were barely able to attend
the pumps without suffocation.
The longest single minefield on record was the twelfth, laid on 13
October,—first an 8½ mile stretch 5 lines wide, then 65 miles 3 lines
wide, 73½ miles in all. It was begun at 7.33 a.m. and finished at 2.52,
over 7 hours. In the latter part, we ran closer than usual to the
adjacent field, to keep inside the proclaimed barrage limits. That night,
steaming at easy speed so as not to make the entrance to Westray Firth
before daylight, radio orders were received from the Commander-in-Chief,
Grand Fleet, about 11 o’clock, to proceed with despatch into Westray
Firth. Other messages were intercepted, indicating that enemy vessels
were out, and as we passed Pentland Skerries next forenoon an unusually
large number of British destroyers and sweepers and an observation
balloon were searching that vicinity for mines and submarines. Quiet was
returning, after a night of greater activity than for a long time.
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
THE THIRTEENTH EXCURSION
The thirteenth minefield was to be partly in Area A, extending from its
southeast corner across Area C towards Udsire Island, ending at a point
three miles short of a minefield which the Norwegians had planted around
Udsire. All mines were of the upper level, and, as the depth varied from
70 to 150 fathoms, three kinds of anchors were used, which necessitated
special care as to the order in which mines were stowed in the ships.
The purpose of this field was to close the gap between the British and
American minefields in Area C, and the American minefields in Area A, and
also to increase the surface obstruction across Area C by two more lines
of upper level mines.
No duty could surpass this series of mining excursions for interest
sustained to the end. The few events and noteworthy features so far
mentioned may perhaps seem to conflict with this statement, but the
smoothness of operation constantly striven for tended to eliminate
interior incidents, and no mere description can ever impart an adequate
impression of our experiences. Keen anticipation, attention ever alert,
and a sense of adventure were fresh on each occasion. There was sameness
enough in the occupations while in port—coaling, cleaning, embarking
mines, and liberty in small towns, but life underway meant something
doing all the time which every one felt worth while. Until back at the
buoy again, inward bound, it was all activity, the hours often crowded,
the whole period sleepless for those in command, never dull for any one.
Only as the anchors went down and the tension relaxed could one realize
how fast we were living. To quote a _Saranac_ poet—
“They gave us a job we had to do,
A little bit risky—yes—that’s true;
A good deal like work, both night and day
But a darn good game for a man to play.”
From the earliest discussion of the Northern Barrage project, one of
its probable developments was, by general acceptance, to draw out the
German fleet, and that ever present possibility gave an added spice to
the work. Someone characterized our operations as “An important military
offensive with a front seat at the second battle of Jutland,” and at the
time of the thirteenth excursion it seemed as if the mine squadron might
indeed be the bait. Due to the prospect of the German fleet coming out,
the squadron was ready a full week before Admiral Beatty could spare a
destroyer escort for us.
The _San Francisco_ and six other planters made this excursion, the
_Roanoke_ and _Canandaigua_ being omitted. They had been docking at
Newcastle-on-Tyne when the mine embarking was done, and although they
returned in time to have joined without altering the loading of the other
ships, other considerations, external to our Force, determined that they
should not go. With _Vampire_, Captain Godfrey, as escort leader for the
tenth time, departure was made from Cromarty buoy at 1.30 p.m., Thursday,
24 October. An earlier departure had been first ordered, but a message
from the Grand Fleet held us back a few hours.
A storm warning was out as we sailed, and that night the storm overtook
us, continuing with varying intensity all the next day and night. Friday
forenoon, H.M.S. _Primrose_ pointed out and verified Buoy No. 3, and a
lull in the storm gave hope that the mining might be carried out that
day; but the wind freshened again before the starting point was reached.
The ships rolled deeply with their heavy loads, from 27 to 32 degrees
each way, but suffered no damage, and the mine installations stood the
severe test very well. Through Friday night the squadron cruised back and
forth 15 miles either side of the buoy, as far as adjacent minefields
would permit. We could not afford to go far away from the buoy, as the
time within which we must complete the task was limited and was now
scant. After the first turn about, the destroyers disappeared in the
darkness, and it was a relief to feel that at least they were clear
of possible collision. We needed no screen in such weather and could
dispense with them for the night. In the morning they were back again,
the weather moderated, _Vampire_ pointed out the buoy, and we could
proceed.
Mining began at 1.27 p.m. and continued according to schedule until
two hours after sunset. The sea and swell had died out so quickly that
conditions were very good for mining. All went smoothly; 3760 mines were
planted, the last 37 miles being over water up to 150 fathoms deep. As
the first four vessels completed their strings, they were ordered to
cross ahead of the remaining planting vessels and take station on the
southern wing, off _San Francisco’s_ starboard quarter, where they would
be clear of the British minefield which lay just to the north of us.
Three destroyers with high-speed minesweeps out preceded the line of
planting vessels until an hour after dark, 5.30 p.m. They then joined
the other destroyers to starboard and southward of us. In darkness, and
in silence except for the mine detonations astern from time to time, the
_San Francisco_, _Canonicus_, and _Housatonic_, in line abreast, stood
on a half-hour longer, to the end of the mining track, with no vessels
to sweep or to screen ahead as we drew near the coast. The coastal
mountains of Norway and a searchlight playing on the clouds were sighted
at considerable distance, but not distinctly enough at any time to make
an identified bearing. Udsire Island was dimly sighted in the direction
expected, but it was too dark to obtain a definite fix, as its light was
not burning. On our left was a field of British mines, eight miles away
by the chart, but of uncertain distance in fact, since storms and the
coastal current might have moved some of the mines in the ten weeks since
they were planted, or broken some adrift. The ships kept on to within
three miles, by the chart, of the Norwegian minefield ahead—presumably
in place and the mines presumably safe if broken adrift. One lacks,
however, the same confidence in other people’s mines and minefields as in
one’s own, and more than the usual relief was felt when our schedule was
finished.
Then, promptly, all ships and destroyers turned right 90 degrees, again
turning right, five minutes later, 70 degrees more, to course W. by S.
The squadron then formed in two columns and, when seven miles clear of
the minefield, ran parallel to it on the reverse of the mining course,
for observation. A curious effect was experienced here, the first
occasion where we were heading generally toward a freshly laid field,
instead of directly away. The vessel’s movement through the water towards
the mines enhanced the sharpness of shock from the exploding defective
ones—to such an extent that both officers and men came on the bridge in
real concern, reporting that we must have struck something.
It was noteworthy during this thirteenth excursion that the management
of the ships, always good before, continued so, in spite of the heavy
weather. About 9.00 p.m. following a hard squall which came in the midst
of a turn, causing the ships to get considerably out of station, three
successive 90-degree turns were made and the squadron was then formed,
upon signal, in a new order, for more convenience during the rest of
the night. All was done in good time, yet without any vessels coming
uncomfortably near in the course of it. Next day, the last two hours of
mining were after sunset, but no lights were shown nor tactical signal
made. All maneuvers at the finish were made at prescribed clock times, in
obedience to signals sent before dark.
The supporting force sighted us about 1.55 p.m. Friday, 12 miles off,
then stood to the westward. About 9.30 a.m. Saturday a light cruiser
of the support communicated and at 2.00 p.m. the whole support was
sighted again, to the southward, consisting of the second battle cruiser
squadron, the fifth battle squadron, and the seventh light cruiser
squadron. Vice Admiral Pakenham, in H.M.S. _Lion_, commanding the Battle
Cruiser Force, was in command of the whole. This excursion took our
squadron farther afield than it had been since June. After the third
excursion, all our planting had been done behind a barrier of our own
making or else close to British waters, but on this occasion we were on
the exposed side of the whole barrage.
Late Sunday night, 27 October, the squadron returned to port, and by
the following Wednesday, 30 October, all nine ships were again loaded,
and there they waited, for 12 days of vile weather, ready for another
excursion. The one planned would have completed the fourth system,
extending northeasterly from the end of the twelfth minefield. But no
more mining was necessary, and upon the signing of the armistice, the
mines on the launching decks were disembarked from the ships, to give
more space for the crews. Preparations were then taken up for returning
to the United States.
Of six months in European waters to the date of the armistice, on 33
days the squadron or some of its ships were underway, steaming in the
North Sea more than 8400 miles. So far as readiness of the squadron
was concerned, the excursions could have been made with greater
rapidity—never was an excursion delayed on account of a ship’s not being
prepared. During the five months of minelaying activity, the intervals
between excursions averaged 10 days. The time actually consumed in
embarking mines, coaling, and routine overhaul came to less than four
days, so that four excursions a month could have been made, but for the
delays incident to manufacture and to considerations external to our
Force.
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
RESULTS
Altogether there were 13 regular excursions and two special ones by the
American squadron, and 11 by the British squadron. In all, 70,117 mines
were planted, of which 56,571, or four-fifths, were American. In its
230 miles length, the barrage varied in width from 15 to 35 miles, so
that a submarine could not attempt a crossing without being in danger
for from one to three hours, or twice as long, if running submerged. The
obstruction extended to a depth of 240 feet, except over the eastern
section of 50 miles length, where the deepest mines were submerged 125
feet.
In small fields, of a few score or hundreds of mines, laid piecemeal by
fixed marks, the mines in adjacent lines are usually “staggered,” so as
to halve and block the opposite intervals, but in an open-sea minefield
of immense area, far beyond sight of any marks and laid at 12 knots speed
or faster, no such nicety is possible or necessary. The great Northern
Barrage opposed from 6 to 10 lines of mines to a submarine on the surface
and three to four lines more at whatever depth the submarine might
think he could safely pass. Absolute impassability never was attained
nor expected. At the thickest part a submarine had one chance in ten of
getting through. The explosion of defective mines had left some thin
spots—but who could tell where? Such a minefield is not so much like a
Chinese wall as it is like a stretch of rough, treacherous country, whose
crossing would always be a desperate venture.
Submarines are known to have crossed the barrier, but they all feared it,
and as early as 8 July, 1918, some experienced its deadly effect. From
the very circumstances of the barrier’s great extent and the absence of
observers, the full toll, in damage as well as destruction, may never
be known. The official statistics of lost German submarines, compiled
March 1, 1919, credit the Northern Barrage with the destruction of four
submarines certainly, two more probably, and possibly still two more.
An equal number were severely damaged, though not destroyed, and it is
considered probable by the British Admiralty that the loss of five other
submarines, the cause of which cannot be definitely proven, is accounted
for by the Northern Barrage. Thus by reliable records, the toll was
17. Indications during the sweeping up of the barrage tend to confirm
this. Besides these, to the squadron’s credit, should be added the two
submarines reported lost in the North Irish Channel, in the field which
consisted of British mines laid by our _Baltimore_.
The summary of Activities of U.S. Naval Forces in European Waters, issued
by Admiral Sims, says further:
There is no doubt that this barrage had a considerable moral
effect on the German naval crews, for it is known that several
submarines hesitated some time before crossing. Also, reports
from German sources are that the barrage caused no small amount
of panic in some of the submarine flotillas.
It is also probable that the barrage played a part in
preventing raids on Allied commerce by fast enemy cruisers.