FEDERAL SUPREMACY (1793-1801).
81. REFERENCES.
BIBLIOGRAPHIES.--W. E. Foster, _References to Presidential
Administrations_, 1-8; Justin Winsor, _Narrative and Critical History_,
VII. 294-314, 319, 320, 329-336, 454-456, 513-519; Channing and Hart,
_Guide_, §§ 162, 166.
HISTORICAL MAPS.--Nos. 1, 4, this volume (_Epoch Maps_, Nos. 7, 9);
MacCoun, _Historical Geography_; Scribner, _Statistical Atlas_, Plate 13;
J. Morse, _American Geography_.
GENERAL ACCOUNTS.--J. B McMaster, _United States_, II. 89-557; H. Von
Holst, _Constitutional History_, I. 112-167; J. Schouler, _United States_,
I. 221-501; R. Hildreth, _United States_, IV. 411-704; V. 25-418; T.
Pitkin, _United States_, II. 356-500 (to 1797); George Tucker, _United
States_, I. 504-628, II. 21-145; Bryant and Gay, _Popular History_, IV.
123-144; Bradford, _Constitutional History_, 125-201.
SPECIAL HISTORIES.--Standard lives of Washington, especially Sparks,
Marshall, and Irving; C. F. Adams, _Life of John Adams_; Henry Adams,
_Albert Gallatin_; H. C. Lodge, _Washington_, II. 129-269; J. T. Morse,
_Jefferson_, 146-208, and _John Adams_, 241-310; G. Pellew, _John Jay_,
262-339; S. H. Gay, _Madison_, 193-251; George Gibbs, _Administrations of
Washington and Adams_, I., II.; W. H. Trescott, _Diplomatic History_; T.
Lyman, _Diplomacy_; J. C. Hamilton, _Republic_, V., VI.
CONTEMPORARY ACCOUNTS.--Thomas Jefferson, _Anas_ (_Works_, IX. 185-203);
William Sullivan, _Familiar Letters on Public Characters_, 48-187 (written
in reply to Jefferson); Works of Washington, Jefferson, Fisher Ames, John
Jay, Rufus King, Arthur St. Clair, John Adams, Madison, and Gallatin;
Abigail Adams, _Letters_; W. Winterbotham, _Historical View_ (1795); T.
Cooper, _Some Information respecting America_ (1793, 1794); Rochefoucault-
Liancourt, _Voyage dans les États-Unis_ (1795-1797) (also in translation);
J. Weld, _Travels through the States_ (1795-1797); newspapers, especially
_General Advertiser_ and _Aurora, Boston Gazette_.--Reprints in Alexander
Johnston, _American Orations_, I.; _American History told by
Contemporaries_, III.
82. FORMATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES (1792-1794).
[Sidenote: Origin of parties.]
During the four uneventful years from 1789 to 1793 two political parties
had been slowly developed. Some writers have imagined that these two
parties were a survival of the Revolutionary Whigs and Tories; some have
traced them back to the debate on the assumption of State debts. John
Adams, years later, went to the heart of the matter when he said: "You say
our divisions began with Federalism and anti-Federalism. Alas! they began
with human nature." The foundation for the first two great national
parties was a difference of opinion as to the nature and proper functions
of the new government.
During the second Congress, from 1791 to 1793, arose an opposition to
Hamilton which gradually consolidated into a party. It came chiefly from
the Southern and Middle States, and represented districts in which there
was little capital or trade. Arrayed among his supporters were most of the
representatives from New England, and many from the Middle States and
South Carolina: they represented the commercial interests of the country;
they desired to see the debt funded and the State debts assumed; they
began to act together as another party.
[Sidenote: Hamilton and Jefferson.]
The final form taken by these two parties depended much upon the character
of their leaders. Hamilton, a man of great personal force and of strong
aristocratic feeling, represented the principle of authority, of
government framed and administered by a select few for the benefit of
their fellows. Jefferson, an advocate of popular government extended to a
point never before reached, declared that his party was made up of those
"who identified themselves with the people, have confidence in them,
cherish and consider them as the most honest and safe, although not the
most wise depositary of the public interest." Between two such men
controversies were certain to arise. In May, 1792, Jefferson wrote that
Hamilton had introduced speculation and a dangerous construction of the
constitution; and Hamilton wrote that Jefferson was at the head of a
hostile faction dangerous to the Union. Washington attempted to make
himself an arbiter of this quarrel, but was unable to reconcile the two
men. They both urged him to accept a second term for the presidency, and
he was again unanimously elected in 1792. The quarrel between the two
great chiefs had by this time got abroad. Hamilton was said to be a
monarchist. His administration of the Treasury was attacked, and an
investigation was held early in 1793; but no one was able to find any
irregularity.
[Sidenote: Party names.]
By this time the followers of Jefferson had begun to take upon themselves
the name of Republicans. They held that the government ought to raise and
spend as little money as possible; beyond that they rested upon the
principles first definitely stated in Jefferson's opinion on the bank (§
96) that Congress was confined in its powers to the letter of the
Constitution; and that the States were the depositary of most of the
powers of government. The other party took upon itself the name of
Federal, or Federalist, which had proved so valuable in the struggle over
the Constitution. Among its most eminent members were Hamilton, John Jay,
Vice-President John Adams, and President Washington.
[Sidenote: Newspaper organs.]
Both parties now began to set in motion new political machinery. The
"Gazette of the United States" became the recognized mouthpiece of the
Federalists, and the "National Gazette," edited by Philip Freneau,
translating clerk in Jefferson's department, began to attack Hamilton and
other leading Federalists, and even the President. At a cabinet meeting
Washington complained that "that rascal Freneau sent him three copies of
his paper every day, as though he thought he would become a distributer of
them. He could see in this nothing but an impudent design to insult him."
83. WAR BETWEEN FRANCE AND ENGLAND (1793).
[Sidenote: French Revolution.]
[Sidenote: War.]
So far the parties had been little more than personal followings; the
mighty movements in Europe were now to crystallize them. Early in 1789 a
revolution had come about in France; in 1791 a constitution was put in
force under which the king became a limited monarch; in 1792 war broke out
between France and a Prussian-Austrian alliance. Disasters on the frontier
were followed by the overthrow of the monarchy, and in January, 1793,
Louis the Sixteenth was executed. The anarchical movement, once begun,
hurried on until the government of France fell into the hands of men
controlled by the populace of Paris. On Feb. 3, 1793, the French Republic
declared war against England: the issue was instantly accepted. As the two
powers were unable conveniently to reach each other on land, great efforts
were made on both sides to fit out fleets. The colonies of each power were
exposed to attack, and colonial trade was in danger.
[Sidenote: Interest of America.]
From the first the sympathy of the United States had naturally been with
France. The republic seemed due to American example; Jefferson was our
minister at Paris in 1789, and saw his favorite principles of human
liberty extending to Europe. The excesses of the Revolution, however,
startled the Federalists, who saw in them a sufficient proof that
Jefferson's "people" could not be trusted. The war brought up the question
of the treaty of 1778 with France, by which the Americans bound themselves
to guarantee the colonial possessions of France in case of defensive war.
[Sidenote: Danger to America.]
For the United States to enter the war as ally of either side meant to
lose most of the advantages gained by the new Constitution: the Indians on
the frontier had opposed and defeated a large body of United States
troops; the revenue of the country derived from imports would cease as
soon as war was declared; American ships would be exposed to capture on
every sea. Trade with the West Indies, which proceeded irregularly and
illegally, was now likely to be broken up altogether. The question was no
longer one of international law, but of American politics: the Democrats
were inclined to aid France, by war or by indirect aid,--such as we had
received from France at the beginning of the Revolutionary War; the
Federalists leaned toward England, because they wished English trade, and
because they feared the spread of anarchical principles in America.
84. AMERICAN NEUTRALITY (1793).
[Sidenote: Neutrality proclamation.]
On April 5, 1793, the news of the outbreak of war was received at
Philadelphia. Washington at once summoned his cabinet for the most
important discussion which it had yet held. Was the United States to
consider itself bound to enter the war and to defend the French West
Indies against Great Britain? Should the President declare that the United
States stood neutral in this contest? The question was new. For the first
time in history there was an independent American power,--a nation so far
removed by distance and by interest from European conflicts that it might
reasonably ask that it should not be drawn into the struggle. Hamilton was
inclined to hold the treaties abrogated by the change of government in
France; Jefferson insisted that they were binding; both agreed that the
President ought to issue a proclamation announcing that the United States
would take no part on either side. The neutrality proclamation, issued
April 22, was therefore an announcement to the world that the United
States stood outside the European system, and might continue friendly
relations with both belligerent powers.
[Sidenote: Genet's mission.]
This attitude was anything but what France had expected. On April 8 a
French minister, Genet, landed in Charleston, armed with a quantity of
blank commissions for privateers. He was a man twenty-eight years old,
whose diplomatic experience had culminated in the disruption of one of the
weaker neighbors of France. He had no doubt that the sympathy of the
American people was with his country. He proposed, therefore, to act as
though he stood upon his own soil: men were enlisted; privateers were
commissioned; prizes were taken in American waters and brought into
American ports for condemnation. Genet advanced northward in a kind of
triumphal procession. Throughout the South and West, Democratic clubs were
organized, modelled on the French Jacobin and other revolutionary clubs.
[Sidenote: Genet and Washington.]
He reached Philadelphia, to be confronted by the Neutrality Proclamation
and by the firmness of the President. His privateers were checked. He does
not appear to have demanded of the United States a fulfilment of the
treaty of 1778, but he did ask for advance payment of money due to France,
and for other favors. To his chagrin, Congress was not to meet until
December, and he insisted in vain that there should be an extra session.
In July Genet proceeded to fit out a captured British vessel, the "Little
Sarah," as a privateer; and, contrary to the remonstrances of the
government and his own implied promise, she was sent to sea. Encouraged by
this success, he determined to make a public appeal to the people to
override the President. His purpose was made known, and his career was at
an end. When the United States asked for his recall, it was cheerfully
accorded by the French government. In three months Genet had contrived to
offend the principal officers of government and to insult the nation. The
current of feeling was thus set toward England.
85. THE JAY TREATY (1794-1796).
[Sidenote: American grievances.]
[Sidenote: Neutral rights.]
Once more the English government neglected the favorable moment for
securing the friendship of the United States. The grievances so much
resented under the Confederation (§ 56) were continued: the Western posts
were still occupied by the British; American vessels still paid
unreasonable duties in British ports; the West India trade was still
withheld. The war at once led to new aggressions. France and England
throughout sought to limit American commerce by capturing vessels for
violations of four disputed principles of international law. The first was
that provisions are "contraband of war," and hence that American vessels
carrying breadstuffs, the principal export of the United States, were
engaged in an unlawful trade: the United States insisted that only
military stores were "contraband of war." The second limiting principle
was that, after notice of the blockade of a port, vessels bound to it
might be taken anywhere on the high seas: the United States held that the
notice had no validity unless there was an actual blockading force outside
the port. The third principle was the so-called "Rule of 1756," that where
a European country forbade trade with its colonies in time of peace it
should not open it to neutrals in time of war: the United States denied
the right of Great Britain to interfere in their trade with the French and
Spanish colonies. The fourth principle was that a ship might be captured
if it had upon it goods which were the property of an enemy. The United
States asserted that "Free ships make free goods," that a neutral vessel
was not subject to capture, no matter whose property she carried.
[Sidenote: Aggressions on the United States.]
[Sidenote: Impressment.]
[Sidenote: Danger of war.]
On May 9, 1793, the French ordered the capture of vessels loaded with
provisions, although expressly excepted by the treaty of 1778. On June 8
the British issued a similar order; and in November the rule of 1756 was
again put in force by the British government. Captures at once began by
both powers; but the British cruisers were more numerous, did more damage,
and thus inclined public sentiment in the United States against England.
The pacific Jefferson now came forward as the defender of American
interests: Sept. 16, 1793, he sent to Congress a report in which he set
forth the aggressions upon American commerce, and recommended a policy of
retaliation. Meantime a new grievance had arisen, which was destined to be
a cause of the War of 1812. In time of war the commanders of British naval
vessels were authorized to "impress" British seamen, even out of British
merchant vessels. The search of American merchantmen on the same errand at
once began, and was felt by the United States government to be humiliating
to the national dignity. The whole country was outraged by the frequent
seizure of native Americans, on the pretext that they were English born.
Public feeling rose until on March 26, 1794, a temporary embargo was laid,
forbidding vessels to depart from American ports. On April 17, a motion
was introduced to cut off commercial intercourse with Great Britain. On
April 19, therefore, the President appointed John Jay, Chief Justice of
the United States, as a special envoy to make a last effort to adjust
matters in England. Nevertheless, the non-inter course bill passed the
House, and was defeated only by Adams's casting vote in the Senate.
[Sidenote: Jay's Treaty.]
Fortunately it was a time when communication with Europe was slow. Not
until June did Jay reach England. A treaty was negotiated on November 19,
but was not received by Washington until after the adjournment of Congress
in March, 1795. The treaty had indeed removed some old grievances: the
posts were to be evacuated; commissions were to settle the northeast
boundary, and to adjust the claims for the British debts; but Jay got no
indemnity for the negroes carried away by the British in 1783. The
commercial clauses were far less favorable: the discriminating taxes
against American shipping were at last withdrawn; but Jay was unable to
secure any suitable guarantee for neutral trade, and could obtain no
promise to refrain from searching American merchantmen, or seizing
English-born sailors found thereon. Above all, the West India trade, which
the United States so much desired, was granted only with the proviso that
it should be carried on in vessels of less than seventy tons burden. In
return for these meagre concessions, granted only for twelve years, the
United States agreed not to export to any part of the world "molasses,
sugar, coffee, cocoa, or cotton."
[Sidenote: Excitement in the United States.]
A special session of the Senate was summoned in June, 1795. and with great
difficulty the necessary two-thirds majority was obtained. The twelfth
article, containing the West India and the export clauses, was
particularly objectionable, and the Senate struck it out. During the
remainder of the year there was the fiercest popular opposition; the
commercial and ship-building interest felt that it had been betrayed; Jay
was burned in effigy; Hamilton was stoned at a public meeting; State
legislatures declared the treaty unconstitutional. Washington was attacked
so fiercely that he said the language used "could scarcely be applied to a
Nero, to a notorious defaulter, or even to a common pickpocket." When
Congress met in 1795 an effort was made to prevent the necessary
appropriations for carrying out the treaty. It was only the great personal
popularity of Washington that saved the country from a repudiation of the
treaty and a war with England. Once in force, the treaty was found
moderately favorable. Our commerce increased, and captures were much
diminished.
86. THE WHISKEY REBELLION (1794).
[Sidenote: The excise unpopular.]
[Sidenote: Outbreak.]
During this year of excitement a serious outbreak had occurred in
Pennsylvania. Ever since the first Excise Act in 1791 (§ 76), there had
been determined opposition to the collection of the whiskey tax. The
people of southwestern Pennsylvania were three hundred miles from tide-
water; and whiskey was the only commodity of considerable value, in small
bulk, with which they could purchase goods. The tax, therefore, affected
the whole community. In 1792 the policy pursued at the beginning of the
Revolution was brought into action: mobs and public meetings began to
intimidate the tax-collectors. In 1794 the difficulties broke out afresh,
and on July 17 the house of Inspector-General Neville was attacked by a
band of armed men; one man was killed, and the house was burned. Great
popular mass meetings followed, and a few days later the United States
mail was robbed.
[Sidenote: Suppression.]
As this violence was directed against the revenue laws, Hamilton made it
his special task to suppress it. On September 25 the President called out
the militia from Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Maryland, and Virginia.
Hamilton himself accompanied the troops, fifteen thousand in number; they
marched over the mountains, and reached the disaffected country at the end
of October. The insurgents made no stand in the field, and the troops
returned, after making a few arrests.
The matter now went to the courts. Six persons were indicted for treason,
of whom two, Vigol and Mitchell, were convicted. They were rough and
ignorant men, who had been led into the outbreak without understanding
their own responsibility, and Washington pardoned them both. In July,
1795, a general amnesty was proclaimed.
[Sidenote: Effect.]
The effect of the whole movement was to make it evident throughout the
nation that the United States had at its disposal a military force
sufficient to put down any ordinary insurrection. In his message on the
subject on Nov. 19, 1794, Washington alluded to "combinations of men who
have disseminated suspicions, jealousies, and accusations of the whole
government." The Senate applied these words to "self-created societies."
The allusion was to the Democratic clubs, founded in 1793 when Genet came
to the country (§ 84), and still in existence. The effect of Washington's
criticism was to break down the societies and to check a movement which
looked toward resistance to all constituted government. The opposition
were compelled to take a less objectionable party name, and began to call
themselves Republicans.
87. ELECTION OF JOHN ADAMS (1796).
[Sidenote: Washington retires.]
[Sidenote: Nominations.]
On Sept. 17, 1796, Washington, in a public address, announced that he
should not accept a re-election. The presidency had been irksome to
Washington, and the personal attacks upon himself had grieved him; but he
retired with the admiration and respect of the whole country. The
selection of a successor at once became a party question. Jefferson, who
had resigned the office of Secretary of State at the end of 1793, was the
natural leader of the Republicans. John Adams, then Vice-President, had
the largest Federalist following; but Hamilton hoped, by an electoral
trick, to bring T. Pinckney, the candidate for Vice-President, in over his
head. Adams candidly expressed his opinion of this intrigue: "That must be
a sordid people indeed, a people destitute of a sense of honor, equity,
and character, that could submit to be governed and see hundreds of its
most meritorious public men governed by a Pinckney under an elective
government."
[Sidenote: Adams and Jefferson.]
The danger was not, however, from Pinckney, but from Jefferson. When the
votes were counted it was found that Adams had received the vote of the
Northern States, with Delaware and a part of Maryland; but that Jefferson
had received almost the whole vote of the South and of Pennsylvania. Adams
became President by a vote of seventy-one, and Jefferson Vice-President by
a vote of sixty-eight. The two men had been associated in early years, and
were not unfriendly to each other. There was even a hint that Jefferson
was to be taken into the cabinet. As soon as the administration began, all
confidence between them was at an end. The same set of elections decided
the membership of Congress to serve from 1797 to 1799; the Senate remained
decidedly Federalist; in the House the balance of power was held by a few
moderate Republicans.
[Sidenote: Adams's cabinet.]
Adams considered himself the successor to the policy of Washington, and
committed the serious mistake of taking over his predecessor's cabinet.
Hamilton retired in 1795; he had been replaced by his friend and admirer,
Oliver Wolcott; the Secretary of State was Timothy Pickering of
Pennsylvania: both these men looked upon Hamilton as their party chief.
The administration began, therefore, with divided counsels, and with
jealousy in the President's official household.
88. BREACH WITH FRANCE (1795-1798).
[Sidenote: Monroe's mission.]
While the war-cloud with England was gathering and disappearing, new
complications had arisen with France. The Jay treaty was received by that
power as an insult, partly because it was favorable to her rival, partly
because it removed the danger of war between England and the United
States. In 1795 the first period of the Revolution was over, and an
efficient government was constituted, with an executive directory of five.
James Monroe, appointed minister to France, had begun his mission in
September, 1794, just after the fall of Robespierre; he appeared in the
National Convention, and the president of that body adjured him to "let
this spectacle complete the annihilation of an impious coalition of
tyrants." During Jay's negotiations he continued to assure the French of
the friendship of America, although the Directory speedily declared that
Jay's treaty had released France from the treaty of 1778. As Monroe made
no effort to push the American claims for captured vessels, he was
recalled in disgrace in 1796, and C. C. Pinckney was appointed as his
successor.
[Sidenote: Pinckney rebuffed.]
Three weeks after his inauguration Adams received a despatch from Pinckney
announcing that he had been treated as a suspected foreigner, and that
official notice had been given that the Directory would not receive
another minister from the United States until the French grievances had
been redressed. A special session of Congress was at once summoned, and
the President declared that "the action of France ought to be repelled
with a decision which shall convince France and the world that we are not
a degraded people, humiliated under a colonial spirit of fear and sense of
inferiority." Headstrong behavior on the President's part would have
immediately brought on war; but he had already made up his mind to send a
special mission to France. In June, 1797, John Marshall and Elbridge
Gerry, a Republican, but a personal friend of the President, were sent out
to join Pinckney in a final representation.
[Sidenote: X. Y. Z. affair.]
It was nearly a year before news of the result was received. On April 2,
1798, the President communicated the despatches revealing the so-called
"X. Y. Z. affair." It appeared that the envoys on reaching Paris, in
October, 1797, had been denied an official interview, but that three
persons, whose names were clouded under the initials X. Y. Z., had
approached them with vague suggestions of loans and advances; these were
finally crystallized into a demand for fifty thousand pounds "for the
pockets of the Directory." The despatch described one conversation.
"'Gentlemen,' said X., 'you do not speak to the point. It is money. It is
expected that you will offer money.' We said that we had spoken to that
point very explicitly, that we had given an answer. 'No,' he replied, 'you
have not. What is your answer?' We replied, 'It is No, no, no; not a
sixpence.'" The President concluded with a ringing paragraph which summed
up the indignation of the American people at this insult. "I will never
send another minister to France without assurances that he will be
received, respected, and honored as the representative of a great, free,
powerful, and independent nation."
[Sidenote: Naval war with France.]
The Republican opposition in Congress was overwhelmed and almost silenced.
A succession of statutes in April, May, and June hurried on military and
naval preparations, and on July 7, 1798, American vessels of war were
authorized to attack French cruisers. On Feb. 9, 1799, the "Constellation"
took the French frigate "Insurgente," and American cruisers and privateers
had the satisfaction of retaliating for the numerous captures of American
vessels by preying on French commerce. Measures were taken to raise land
forces; but here again the rift in the Federal party appeared. Washington
was made titular commander-in-chief. It was expected that operations would
be directed by the second in command, and Hamilton's friends insisted that
he should receive that appointment. With great reluctance Adams granted
the commission, the result of which was the resignation of Knox, who had
been third on the list.
89. ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1798).
[Sidenote: Triumph of the Federalists.]
[Sidenote: Alien Act.]
For the first and last time in his administration John Adams found himself
popular. From all parts of the country addresses were sent to the
President approving his patriotic stand. The moderate Republicans in the
House were swept away by the current, and thus there was built up a
compact Federalist majority in both houses. It proceeded deliberately to
destroy its own party. The newspapers had now reached an extraordinary
degree of violence; attacks upon the Federalists, and particularly upon
Adams, were numerous, and keenly felt. Many of the journalists were
foreigners, Englishmen and Frenchmen. To the excited imagination of the
Federalists, these men seemed leagued with France in an attempt to destroy
the liberties of the country; to get rid of the most violent of these
writers, and at the same time to punish American-born editors who too
freely criticised the administration, seemed to them essential. This
purpose they proposed to carry out by a series of measures known as the
Alien and Sedition Acts. A naturalization law, requiring fourteen years
residence, was hurried through. On April 25 a Federalist introduced a
temporary Alien Act, for the removal of "such aliens born, not entitled by
the constitution and laws to the rights of citizenship, as may be
dangerous to its peace and safety." The opposition, headed by Albert
Gallatin, made a strong appeal against legislation so unnecessary,
sweeping, and severe. The Federalists replied in panic fear: "Without such
an act," said one member, "an army might be imported, and could be
excluded only after a trial." To the details of the bill there was even
greater objection. It conferred upon the President the power to order the
withdrawal of any alien; if he refused to go, he might be imprisoned at
the President's discretion, Nevertheless, the act, limited to two years,
was passed on June 25, 1798. Adams seems to have had little interest in
it, and never made use of the powers thus conferred.
[Sidenote: Sedition Act.]
[Sidenote: Sedition prosecutions.]
The Sedition Act was resisted with even greater stubbornness. It proposed
to punish persons who should conspire to oppose measures of the
government, or to intimidate any office-holder. The publishing of libels
upon the government, or either house, or the President, was likewise made
a crime. Against this proposition there were abundant arguments, on
grounds both of constitutionality and expediency. It introduced the new
principle of law that the United States should undertake the regulation of
the press, which up to this time had been left solely to the States. That
its main purpose was to silence the Republican journalists is plain from
the argument of a leading Federalist: the "Aurora," a Republican organ,
had said that "there is more safety and liberty to be found in
Constantinople than in Philadelphia;" and the "Timepiece" had said of
Adams that "to tears and execrations he added derision and contempt." It
is impossible to agree with the member who quoted these extracts that
"they are indeed terrible. They are calculated to freeze the blood in the
veins." The Sedition Act was to expire in 1801. It was quickly put into
operation, and one of the prosecutions was against Callender, known to be
a friend of Jefferson; he was indicted and convicted for asserting among
other things that "Mr. Adams has only completed the scene of ignominy
which Mr. Washington began." So far from silencing the ribald journalists,
the Act and its execution simply drew down worse criticism. On the other
hand, the Federalist press, which had been hardly inferior in violence,
was permitted to thunder unchecked. The Alien and Sedition Acts were party
measures, passed for party purposes; they did not accomplish the purposes
intended, and they did the party irreparable harm.
90. VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS (1798-1800).
[Sidenote: Danger of disunion.]
[Sidenote: Madison's and Jefferson's resolutions.]
The elections of 1798 in the excited state of public feeling assured a
Federalist majority in the Congress to sit from 1799 to 1801. The
Republicans felt that their adversaries were using the power of the
federal government to destroy the rights of the people. June 1, 1798,
Jefferson wrote to a friend who thought that the time was come to withdraw
from the Union; "If on the temporary superiority of one party the other is
to resort to a scission of the Union, no federal government can exist."
The remedy which lay in his mind was an appeal to the people through the
State legislatures. In November and December, 1798, two series of
resolutions were introduced,--one in the Virginia legislature, the other
in the Kentucky legislature; the first drawn by Madison, and the second by
Jefferson's own hand. They set forth that the Constitution was a compact
to which the States were parties, and that "each party has an equal right
to judge for itself as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of
redress." The Alien and Sedition Acts and some other statutes were
declared by Kentucky "not law ... void and of no effect;" and the other
States were called upon to unite in so declaring them void, and in
protesting to Congress. For the first time since the Constitution had been
formed, a clear statement of the "compact" theory of government was now
put forth. It was a reasonable implication from these resolutions that if
the Federalist majority continued to override the Constitution, the States
must take more decisive action; but the only distinct suggestion of an
attack on the Union is found in a second series of Kentucky resolutions,
passed in 1799, in which it is declared that "nullification ... of all
unauthorized acts ... is the rightful remedy."
[Sidenote: Purpose of the resolutions.]
The constitutional doctrine in these resolutions was secondary. The real
purpose was to arouse the public to the dangerous character of the
Federalist legislation. Madison, many years afterward, explained that he
meant only an appeal to the other States to unite in deprecation of the
measures. The immediate effect was to set up a sort of political platform,
about which the opponents of the Federalists might rally, and by the
presentation of a definite issue to keep up the Republican organization
against the electoral year 1800.
91. ELECTION OF 1800-1801.
[Sidenote: Peace with France.]
[Sidenote: Breach in the party.]
The Alien and Sedition Acts had quickly destroyed all Adams's popularity
in the Republican party; his later action deprived him of the united
support of the Federalists. War with France was pleasing to them as an
assertion of national dignity, as a protest against the growth of
dangerous democracy in France, and as a step toward friendship or eventual
alliance with England. Early in 1799 Talleyrand intimated that a minister
would now be received from the American government. Without consulting his
cabinet, with whom Adams was not on good terms, the President appointed an
embassy to France. Early in 1800 they made a favorable treaty with France:
better guarantees were secured for American neutral trade; the old
treaties of 1778 were practically set aside; and the claims of American
merchants for captures since 1793 were abandoned, This last action gave
rise to the French Spoliation Claims, which remained unsettled for nearly
a century thereafter, Adams's determination to make peace was
statesmanlike and patriotic, but it gave bitter offence to the warlike
Federalists. In May, 1800, Adams found his cabinet so out of sympathy that
he removed Pickering, Secretary of State, and appointed John Marshall.
This meant a formal breach between the Adams and the Hamilton wings of the
party.
[Sidenote: Republicans successful.]
The campaign of 1800 thus began with the Federalists divided, and the
Republicans hopeful. Hamilton was determined to force Adams from the
headship, and prepared a pamphlet, for which materials were furnished by
Oliver Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury. Aaron Burr, a wily Republican
leader, managed to get a copy, published it, and spread it broadcast.
Adams was re-nominated by a caucus of Federalist members, and C. C.
Pinckney was put on the ticket with him. Jefferson was, as in 1796, the
candidate of his party for President. For Vice-President there was
associated with him Burr, who was able to control the important vote of
the State of New York. The result of this coalition was seen in May, 1800,
when a New York legislature was elected with a Republican majority; and
that legislature would, in the autumn, cast the vote of the State. The
Federalists persevered, but South Carolina deserted them, so that both
Jefferson and Burr received seventy-three votes, and Adams had only sixty-
five. The Federalist supremacy was broken.
[Sidenote: Election by the House.]
Now arose an unexpected complication. There being a tie between Jefferson
and Burr, the House of Representatives was called upon to decide between
them, its vote being cast by States. Had the majority of the House been
Republican, Jefferson would, of course, have received their votes; it was,
however, Federalist, and the Federalists thought themselves entitled to
choose that one of their enemies who was least likely to do them harm.
Obscure intrigues were entered upon both with Jefferson and Burr. Neither
would make definite promises, although Burr held out hopes of alliance
with the Federalists. Hamilton now came forward with a letter in which he
declared that of the two men Jefferson was less dangerous. "To my mind,"
said he, "a true estimate of Mr. Jefferson's character warrants the
expectation of a temporizing rather than of a violent system." After a
long struggle the deadlock was broken; Jefferson was chosen President of
the United States, and Burr Vice-President.
92. CAUSES OF THE FALL OF THE FEDERALISTS.
[Sidenote: Unpopularity of the Federalists.]
[Sidenote: Judiciary Act.]
The electoral majority was small; the Federalists preserved their
organization, and had the prestige of twelve years of administration; it
was impossible to realize that there never again would be a Federalist
president. In the election of 1804, however, they received but fourteen
electoral votes altogether (§ 100). The reasons for this downfall are
many, However popular the French war had been, the taxes made necessary by
it had provoked great dissatisfaction; and in 1799 a little insurrection,
the so-called Fries Rebellion, had broken out in Pennsylvania. The
Sedition prosecutions were exceedingly unpopular, The last acts of the
party left a violent resentment. In 1801, after it was known that there
would be a Republican President with a large majority in both houses of
Congress, the Federalists resolved to bolster up their power in the third
department of government. A Judiciary Act was therefore passed, creating
new courts, new judges, and new salaried officials. All the resulting
appointments were made by Adams, and duly confirmed by the Senate, thus
anticipating by many years any real needs of the country. A vacancy
occurring in the chief-justiceship, Adams appointed John Marshall, one of
the few Virginia Federalists; he had made his reputation as a politician
and statesman: even Adams himself scarcely foresaw that he was to be the
greatest of American jurists.
[Sidenote: Internal dissensions.]
Still more fatal were the internal dissensions in the party. In 1799
Washington died, and no man in the country possessed his moderating
influence, The cabinet, by adhering to Hamilton and corresponding with him
upon important public matters, had weakened the dignity of the President
and of the party. In the election of 1800 Hamilton, besides his open
attack on Adams, had again tried to reduce his vote sufficiently to bring
Pinckney in over his head. Adams himself, although a man of strong
national spirit, was in some respects too moderate for his party. Yet his
own vanity and vehemence made him unfit to be a party leader.
[Sidenote: Republican theories.]
While these reasons may account for the defeat of the Federalists, they do
not explain their failure to rise again. They had governed well: they had
built up the credit of the country; they had taken a dignified and
effective stand against the aggressions both of England and of France. Yet
their theory was of a government by leaders. Jefferson, on the other hand,
represented the rising spirit of democracy. It was not his protest against
the over-government of the Federalists that made him popular, it was his
assertion that the people at large were the best depositaries of power.
Jefferson had taken hold of the "great wheel going uphill." He had behind
him the mighty force of the popular will.