Being now the master of Bavaria, and rid of the presence of

Mack's army, the Emperor increased the pace of his advance, down

the right bank of the Danube towards Vienna. He captured Passau

and then Linz, where he learned that 50,000 Russians, commanded

by General Koutousoff, reinforced by 40,000 Austrians, whom

General Kienmayer had collected, had crossed the Danube at Vienna

and had taken up a position between M”lk and St. Poelten. He was

told at the same time that the Austrian army commanded by Prince

Charles had been defeated by Massena in the Venetian district and

was retreating via the Friuli in the direction of Vienna; and

lastly that the Archduke Jean was occupying the Tyrol with

several divisions. Those two princes were therefore threatening

the right of the French army, while it had the Russians in front

of it. To protect himself against a flank attack, the Emperor,

who already had Marshal Augereau's corps in the region of

Bregenz, sent Marshal Ney to attack Innsbruk and the Tyrol, and

moved Marmont's corps to Loeben, in order to block Prince

Charles' route from Italy. Having taken these wise precautions to

protect his right flank, Napoleon, before advancing to meet the

Russians, whose advance-guard had already clashed with ours at

Amstetten, near to Steyer, wished to protect his left flank from

any attack from those Austrians who had taken refuge in Bohemia,

under the command of Archduke Ferdinand. To effect this he gave

Marshal Mortier the infantry divisions of Generals Dupont and

Gazan, and ordered him to cross the Danube by the bridges at

Passau and Linz, and then proceed down the left bank of the

river, while the bulk of the army went down the right. However,

in order not to leave Marshal Mortier too isolated, Napoleon

conceived the idea of gathering together on the Danube a great

number of boats, which had been captured on the tributaries of

the river, and forming a flotilla which, manned by men from the

guard, could move down the river, keeping level with Mortier and

making a link between the troops on both banks.

You may think it a little presumptuous of me to criticise one of

the operations of a great captain, but I cannot refrain from

commenting that the sending of Mortier to the left bank was a

move which had not been sufficiently considered, and was an error

which could have had very serious consequences. The Danube,

Europe's largest river, is, after Passau, so wide in winter that

from one bank one cannot discern a man standing on the other; it

is also very deep and very fast-flowing, and it therefore

provided a guarantee of perfect safety for the left flank of the

French army as it marched down the right bank. Furthermore, any

attack could be made only by the Archduke Ferdinand, coming from

Bohemia; but he, very pleased to have escaped from the French

before Ulm, had only a few troops, and they were mostly cavalry.

Even if he had wished to do so, he had not the means to mount an

attack which involved crossing an obstacle such as the Danube,

into which he might be driven back. Whereas, by detaching two of

his divisions and allowing them to be isolated across this

immense river, Napoleon exposed them to the risk of being

captured or exterminated. A disaster which might have been

foreseen and which very nearly came about.

Field-marshal Koutousoff, had been awaiting the French with

confidence, in a strong position at St. Poelten, because he

believed that they were being pursued by the army of Mack; but

when he heard of the surrender of this army at Ulm, he no longer

felt himself strong enough to face Napoleon alone, and being

unwilling to risk his troops to save the city of Vienna, he

decided to put the barrier of the Danube between himself and the

victor, so he crossed the river by the bridge at Krems, which he

burned behind him.

He had scarcely arrived on the left bank with all his army, when

he ran into the scouts of the Gazan division, which was

proceeding from Dirnstein to Krems, with Marshal Mortier at its

head. Koutousoff, having discovered the presence of a French

corps isolated on the left bank, resolved to crush it, and to

achieve this aim he attacked it head to head on the narrow road

which ran along the river bank, while seizing control of the

escarpments which overlook the Danube. He sent light troops to

occupy Dirnstein to cut off the retreat of the Gazan division.

The position of the division was made even more critical by the

fact that the flotilla of boats had dropped back and there were

only two little boats available, which made it impossible to

bring reinforcements from the other bank.

Attacked in front and in the rear and on one of their flanks by

enemies six times their number; shut in between the rocky

escarpment occupied by the Russians and the depths of the Danube,

the French soldiers, crowded on the narrow roadway, did not

despair. The gallant Marshal Mortier set them an example, for,

when it was suggested that he should take one of the boats and go

over to the right bank, where he would be with the Grande Armee,

and avoid giving the Russians the glory of capturing a marshal,

he replied that he would die with his men, or escape over the

dead bodies of the Russians!

A savage bayonet fight ensued: five thousand French were up

against thirty thousand Russians: night came to add to the

horrors of the combat: Gazan's division, massed in column,

managed to regain Dirnstein at a moment when Dupont's division,

which had remained behind opposite M”lk, alerted by the sound of

gunfire, was running to their aid. Eventually the battlefield

remained in French hands.

In this hand to hand fighting, where the bayonet was almost the

only weapon used, our men, more adroit and agile than the giant

Russians, had a great advantage; so the enemy losses amounted to

some four thousand five hundred men, while ours were three

thousand only. But had our divisions not been made up of

seasoned soldiers, Mortier's corps would probably have been

destroyed. The Emperor was well aware of this, and hastened to

recall it to the right bank. What seems to me to be proof that

he realised the mistake he had made in sending this corps across

the river, is the fact that, although he generously rewarded the

brave regiments which had fought at Dirnstein, the official

bulletins scarcely mention this sanguinary affair, and it is as

if one wished to conceal the results of this operation because

one could find no military justification for it.

What further confirms me in the opinion which I have taken the

liberty of expressing, is that in the campaign of 1809, the

Emperor, when he found himself in a similar situation, did not

send any troops across the river, but, keeping all his force

together, he went with it to Vienna.

But let us return to the mission with which Major Massy and I

were charged.

When we arrived in Vienna, Napoleon and the bulk of the army had

already left the city, which they had seized without a shot being

fired. The crossing of the Danube which it was necessary to

effect in order to pursue the Russians and the Austrians who were

retreating into Moravia, had not been disputed, thanks to a

perhaps culpable deception which was carried out by Marshals

Lannes and Murat. This incident, which had such a profound effect

on this well-known campaign, deserves recounting.

The city of Vienna is situated on the right bank of the Danube: a

small branch of that immense river passes through the city, but

the main stream is half a league away; there the Danube contains

a large number of islands which are connected by a long series of

wooden bridges, terminated by one which, spanning the main arm of

the river, reaches the left bank at a place named Spitz. The road

to Moravia runs along this series of bridges. When the Austrians

are opposing the crossing of a river, they have a very bad habit

of leaving the bridges intact up to the very last moment, to give

them a means of mounting a counter-attack against the enemy, who

almost always does not allow them time to do so and takes from

them the bridges which they have neglected to burn. This is what

the French did during the campaign in Italy in 1796 at the

memorable affairs of Lodi and Arcoli. But these examples had not

served to correct the Austrians, for on leaving Vienna, which is

not suited to defence, they retired to the other side of the

Danube without destroying a single one of the bridges spanning

this vast watercourse, and limited themselves to placing

inflammable material on the platform of the main bridge, in order

to set it alight when the French appeared. They had also

established on the left bank, at the end of the bridge at Spitz,

a powerful battery of artillery, as well as a division of six

thousand men under the command of Prince D'Auersperg, a brave but

not very intelligent officer. Now I must tell you that some days

before the entry of the French into Vienna, the Emperor had

received the Austrian general, Comte de Guilay, who came as an

envoy to make peace overtures, which came to nothing. But hardly

had the Emperor settled in the palace of Schoenbrunn, when

General Guilay again appeared and spent more than an hour

tˆte-a-tˆte with Napoleon. From this a rumour arose that an

armistice had been arranged, a rumour which spread amongst the

French regiments which were entering Vienna and the Austrians who

were leaving to cross the Danube.

Murat and Lannes, whom the Emperor had ordered to secure the

crossing of the Danube, placed Oudinot's Grenadiers behind a

bushy plantation and went forward, accompanied only by some

German-speaking officers. The enemy outposts withdrew, firing as

they went. The French officers called out that there was an

armistice, and continuing their progress, they crossed all the

small bridges, without being held up. When they arrived at the

main bridge, they renewed their assertion to the commander at

Spitz, who did not dare to fire on two marshals, almost alone,

who claimed that hostilities were suspended. However, before

allowing them to go any further, he wanted to go and ask General

Auersperg for orders, and while he did so, he left the post in

charge of a sergeant. Lannes and Murat persuaded the sergeant

that under the terms of the cease-fire, the bridge should be

handed over to them, and that he should go with his men to join

his officer on the left bank. The poor sergeant hesitated, he was

edged back gently while the conversation continued, and by a slow

but steady advance they reached, eventually, the end of the main

bridge.

At this point an Austrian officer endeavored to set light to the

incendiary material, but the torch was snatched from his hand,

and he was told that he would be in serious trouble if he did any

such thing. Next, the column of Oudinot's Grenadiers appeared and

began to cross the bridge.... The Austrian gunners prepared to

open fire, but the French marshals ran to the commander of the

artillery and assured him that an armistice was in force, then,

seating themselves on the guns, they requested the gunners to go

and inform General Auersperg of their presence. General Auersperg

eventually arrived and was about to order the gunners to open

fire, although by now they and the Austrian troops were

surrounded by the French Grenadiers, when the two marshals

managed to convince him that there was a cease-fire, a principal

condition of which was that the French should occupy the bridge.

The unhappy general, fearing to compromise himself by the useless

shedding of blood, lost his head to the point of leading away all

the troops which he had been given to defend the bridges.

Without this error on the part of General Auersperg, the passage

of the Danube could only have been carried out with great

difficulty, and might even have been impossible; in which case

Napoleon would have been unable to pursue the Russians and

Austrians into Moravia, and would have failed in his campaign.

That was the opinion at the time, and it was confirmed three

years later when, the Austrians having burned the bridges, to

secure a passage we were forced to fight the two battles of

Essling and Wagram, which cost us more than thirty thousand men,

whereas in 1805 Marshals Lannes and Murat took possession of the

bridges without there being a single man wounded.

Was the stratagem they employed admissible? I have my doubts. I

know that in war one eases one's conscience, and that any means

may be employed to ensure victory and reduce loss of life, but in

spite of these weighty considerations, I do not think that one

can approve of the method used to seize the bridge at Spitz, and

for my part I would not care to do the same in similar

circumstances.

To conclude this episode, the credulity of General Auersperg was

very severely punished. A court-martial condemned him to be

cashiered, dragged through the streets of Vienna on a hurdle and

finally put to death at the hands of the public executioner...! A

similar sentence was passed on Field-marshal Mack, to punish him

for his conduct at Ulm. But in both cases the death sentence was

commuted to life imprisonment. They served ten years and were

then released, but deprived of their position, expelled from the

ranks of the nobility and rejected by their families, they died,

both of them, shortly after they had been set at liberty.

The stratagem employed by Marshals Lannes and Murat having

secured the crossing of the Danube, the Emperor Napoleon directed

his army in pursuit of the Russians and the Austrians. Thus began

the second phase of the campaign.

Chap. 25.

The Russian marshal Koutousoff was heading via Hollabrunn for

Brno in Moravia, in order to join the second army which was led

by the Emperor Alexander in person; but on approaching

Hollabrunn, he was alarmed to discover that the troops of Lannes

and Murat were already occupying the town and cutting off his

means of retreat. To get out of this fix, the aged marshal,

making use, in his turn, of trickery, sent General Prince

Bagration as an envoy to Marshal Murat, whom he assured that an

aide-de-camp of the Emperor was on his way to Napoleon in order

to conclude an armistice, and that, without doubt, peace would

shortly follow.

Prince Bagration was a very amiable man, he knew exactly how to

flatter Murat, so that he in turn was deceived into accepting an

armistice, in spite of the observations of Lannes, who wished to

fight but had to obey Murat, who was his superior officer.

The truce lasted for thirty-six hours; and while Murat was

inhaling the incense which the crafty Russian lavished on him,

Koutousoff's army made a detour and concealing its movement

behind a screen of low hills, escaped from danger, and went on to

take up, beyond Hollabrunn, a strong position which opened the

road to Moravia and assured his retreat and his junction with the

second Russian army which was encamped between Znaim and Brno.

Napoleon was still in the palace of Schoenbrunn, and was

furiously angry when he heard that Murat had allowed himself to

be bamboozled by Prince Bagration, and had accepted an armistice

without his orders, and he commanded him to attack Koutousoff

immediately.

Now the situation of the Russians had changed greatly to their

advantage, so they repelled the French most vigorously. The town

of Hollabrunn, taken and re-taken several times, set on fire by

the mortars, filled with the dead and dying, remained finally in

French possession. The Russians retired in the direction of Brno;

our troops followed them and took possession of this town without

a fight, although it was fortified and dominated by the

well-known citadel of Spielberg.

The Russian armies and the remains of the Austrian troops were

united in Moravia; the Emperor Napoleon, in order to deliver the

final blow, arrived in Brno, the capital of the province.

My comrade Massy and I followed after him, but we moved slowly

and with much difficulty, firstly because the post-horses were on

their last legs, and then because of the great quantity of

troops, guns, ammunition wagons, baggage, etc. with which the

roads were obstructed. We were obliged to stop for twenty-four

hours at Hollabrunn, while we waited for a passage to be cleared

through the streets, destroyed by fire and littered with planks

and beams and the debris of furniture, still alight. This

unfortunate town had been so completely burned that we were

unable to find a single house to provide shelter!

During our enforced stay, we were confronted and distressed by

the most horrible and shocking spectacle. The wounded, mainly

Russians, had taken refuge during the fighting in the houses

which were soon set ablaze. All who could walk fled at the

approach of this new danger, but the crippled and gravely injured

were burned alive in the ruins! Many had attempted to escape the

fire by crawling along the ground, but the flames had followed

them into the streets,where one could see a multitude of these

wretched victims half consumed by fire, some of them still

breathing! The bodies of the men and horses killed in the battle

had also been roasted, so that for several leagues around the

town there was a sickening stench of burning flesh! ... There are

countrysides and towns which because of their situation are

destined to serve as battlefields, and Hollabrun is one of them,

because it offers an excellent military position; thus it was

that the damage done by the fire of 1805 had scarcely been

repaired, when I saw the place again, four years later, once more

on fire and littered with the half-roasted bodies of the dead and

dying; as you will see from my description of the campaign of

1809.

Major Massy and I left this pestilential spot as soon as we

could, and went on to Znaim, where, four years later I was to be

wounded; and at last we reached the Emperor at Brunn (Brno), on

November 22nd, ten days before the Battle of Austerlitz.

The day after our arrival, we completed our mission and handed

over the flags with the ceremony laid down by the Emperor for

solemn occasions of this kind; for he missed no opportunity of

displaying to the troops anything which could raise their morale

and enthusiasm.

The procedure was as follows:--Half an hour before the daily

parade,--which took place at eleven o'clock outside whatever

residence was serving as the Emperor's palace,--General Duroc,

the Grand Marshal, sent to our billet a company of Grenadiers of

the Guard, with bandsmen and drummers. The town of Brunn was full

of French troops, and the soldiers, as we passed, celebrated with

much cheering the victory of their comrades of 7th Corps. All the

guard-posts accorded us military honours, and on our entry to the

courtyard of the Emperor's quarters, the units formed up for the

parade beat a salute, presented arms, and cried repeatedly "Vive

L'Empereur!"

The aide-de-camp on duty came to receive us and to present us to

Napoleon, to whom we were introduced, accompanied always by the

N.C.O.s carrying the Austrian flags. The Emperor examined these

various trophies, and after dismissing the N.C.O.s. he questioned

us closely about the various actions which had been fought by

Marshal Augereau and on all we had seen or learned on our long

journey through a countryside which had been the theatre of war.

Then he told us to await his instructions, and to join the

imperial suite. The Grand Marshal Duroc took charge of the

flags, for which he gave us a receipt in the regular manner,

informed us that horses would be placed at our disposal and

invited us, for the duration of our stay, to the table over which

he presided.

The French army was now massed around and before Brunn. The

Russian advance-guard occupied Austerlitz, while the bulk of

their army was positioned round the town of Olmutz, where were

also the Emperor Alexander of Russia and the Emperor of Austria.

A battle seemed inevitable, but both sides being well aware that

the outcome would have an immense bearing on the destiny of

Europe, each hesitated to make a decisive move. Napoleon, usually

so swift to act, waited for eleven days at Brunn before launching

a major attack. It is, however, true that every day of waiting

increased his forces by the arrival of great numbers of soldiers

who had lagged behind because of illness or fatigue, and who

having now recovered, hastened to rejoin their units. I recall

that, in these circumstances, I told a white lie which could have

ruined my military career.

Napoleon usually treated his officers with kindness, but there

was one point on which he was perhaps too strict, for he held

colonels responsible for keeping their units up to full strength,

something it is very difficult to do during a campaign. It was in

this matter that the Emperor was most often deceived, for the

corps commanders were so afraid of displeasing him that they

risked being committed to facing an enemy force disproportionate

to their own numbers, rather than admit that sickness, fatigue

and the need to forage for food had caused many soldiers to drop

out. So Napoleon, in spite of his authority, never knew the exact

number of combatants available to him on the day of battle.

Now it so happened that the Emperor, in the course of one of the

endless trips he made to visit the various corps of the army, saw

the mounted Chasseurs of his guard, who were moving to a

different position. He was particularly fond of this regiment, of

which his "guides" from Italy and Egypt formed the nucleus. The

Emperor, whose experienced eye could estimate very exactly the

strength of a column, noticing that their numbers were much

reduced, took out of his pocket a little notebook, and, calling

for General Morland, the commander of the mounted Chasseurs, he

said to him in a stern voice, "Your regiment is down in my notes

as having 1200 men, and although you have not been in action, you

have no more than 800; what has happened to the others?" General

Morland was a fine, brave fighting soldier, but he did not have a

ready tongue, and being quite nonplussed, he said in his

Franco-Alsatian dialect that he was short of only a small number

of men. The Emperor maintained that he was about four hundred

short, and to get to the truth of the matter he wanted to have an

immediate count; but knowing that General Morland was very much

liked by the officers of the imperial staff, he feared a

cover-up, and thought he would be more likely to discover the

truth by choosing an officer who did not belong to his entourage

nor to the Chasseurs; so, seeing me, he ordered me to count the

Chasseurs and to deliver to him personally a record of their

numbers; having said which, he made off at the gallop. I began my

task, which was made more easy because the troopers were riding

past four abreast at walking pace.

Poor General Morland, who knew how close Napoleon's estimate was

to the reality, was in a state of great agitation, for he foresaw

that my report would call down on his head a severe reprimand. He

hardly knew me, and did not dare to suggest that I might

compromise myself to get him out of trouble. He was then sitting

silently on his horse beside me, when, fortunately for him, his

adjutant came to join him. This officer, named Fournier, had

started his military career as an assistant surgeon, then, having

become a surgeon-major, he felt that he had more of a vocation

for the sabre than for the lancet, and had asked for and obtained

permission to join the ranks of the combatant officers, and

Morland, with whom he had served previously, arranged for him to

join the Guard.

I had known Captain Fournier very well when he was still

surgeon-major, and I was very much obliged to him, for not only

had he dressed my father's wound when it was inflicted, but he

had gone, like him, to Genoa, where, as long as my father lived,

he had come several times a day to care for him: if the doctors

charged with the duty of fighting the typhus epidemic had been as

assiduous and zealous as Fournier, my father, perhaps, would not

have died. I had often thought this, so I gave the warmest of

welcomes to Fournier, whom I did not at first recognise in the

pelisse of a captain of Chasseurs.

General Morland, seeing the pleasure we had in meeting one

another, thought he might profit from our mutual friendship to

persuade me not to reveal to the Emperor by how many men he was

short. He took his adjutant aside and conferred with him for a

time; then Fournier came, and in the name of our former

friendship, he begged me to extricate General Morland from a most

unpleasant situation by concealing from the Emperor the extent to

which the regiment was under strength. I refused firmly and

continued to count. The Emperor's estimate was very close, for

there were only a few over eight hundred Chasseurs present, four

hundred were missing.

I was about to leave to make my report, when General Morland and

Captain Fournier renewed their pleas pointing out that the

greater part of the men who had dropped behind for various

reasons would rejoin them very shortly, and that it was not

likely that Napoleon would engage in battle before the arrival of

the divisions of Friant and Gudin, who were still at the gates of

Vienna, thirty-six leagues from us and would take several days to

reach us. In the interval more laggards would rejoin the unit.

They added that the Emperor would be too busy to check my report.

I could not pretend to myself that I was not being asked to

deceive the Emperor, which was very wrong, but I felt also that I

was under a great obligation to Captain Fournier for the truly

tender care he had given to my dying father, I allowed myself

therefore to be swayed and promised to conceal a large part of

the truth.

The Memoirs of General Baron de Marbot · 第 15 / 48 段