written subsequently to the dialogue _De Republica_; and it is evident,
from his letters to his brother Quintus, that the work _De Republica_ was
begun in 699, and finished in 700(396), so that the dialogue _De Legibus_
could not have been composed before that year. It is further clear, that
it was written after the year 701, since he obviously alludes in it to the
murder of Clodius,—boasting that his chief enemy was now not only deprived
of life, but wanted sepulture, and the accustomed funeral obsequies(397).
Now, it is well known that Clodius was slain in 701, and that his dead
body was dragged naked by a lawless mob into the Forum, where it was
consumed amid the conflagration raised in the Senate-house. It is equally
evident that the treatise _De Legibus_ was written before that _De
Finibus_, composed in 708, since, in the former work, the author alludes
to the questions which we find discussed in the latter, as controversies
which he is one day to take up(398). But it is demonstrable that the
dialogue _De Legibus_ was written even previous to the battle of
Pharsalia, which was fought in 705, since the author talks in it of Pompey
as of a person still alive, and in the plenitude of glory(399). Chapman,
in his dissertation _De Ætate Librorum de Legibus_, subjoined to
Tunstall’s Latin letter to Middleton, concerning the epistles to Brutus,
thinks that it was not written till the year 709. He is of opinion, that
what is said of Pompey, and the allusions to the murder of Clodius, as to
a recent event, were only intended to suit the time in which the dialogue
takes place: But then it so happens, that no historical period whatever is
assigned by the author of the dialogue, as the date of its actual
occurrence. Chapman also maintains, that this is the only mode of
accounting for the work _De Legibus_ not being mentioned in the treatise
_De Divinatione_, where Cicero’s other philosophical productions are
enumerated. The reason of this omission, however, might be, that the work
_De Legibus_ never was made public by the author; and, indeed, with
exception of the first book, the whole is but a sketch or outline of what
he intended to write, and is far from having received the polish and
perfection of those performances which he circulated himself.
The discussion _De Legibus_ is carried on, in the shape of dialogue, by
Cicero, his brother Quintus, and Atticus. Of these Cicero is the chief
interlocutor. The scene is laid amid the walks and pleasure-grounds of
Cicero’s villa of Arpinum, which lay about three miles from the town of
that name, and was situated in a mountainous but picturesque region of the
ancient territory of the Samnites, now forming part of the kingdom of
Naples. This house was the original seat of the family of Cicero, who was
born in it during the life of his grandfather, while it was yet small and
humble as the Sabine cottage of Curius or Cincinnatus; but his father had
gradually enlarged and embellished it, till it became a spacious and
elegant mansion, where, as his health was infirm, he passed the greater
part of his life in literary retirement(400). Cicero was thus equally
attracted to this villa by the many pleasing and tender recollections with
which it was associated, and by the amenity of the situation, which was
the most retired and delightful, even in that region of enchanting
landscape. It was closely surrounded by a grove, and stood not far from
the confluence of the Fibrenus with the Liris. The former stream, which
murmured over a rocky channel, was remarkable for its clearness, rapidity,
and coolness; and its sloping verdant banks were shaded with lofty
poplars(401). “Many streams,” says Mr. Kelsall, one of our latest Italian
tourists, “which are celebrated in story and song, disappoint the
traveller,—
‘Dumb are their fountains, and their channels dry,’—
but, in the course of long travels, I never met with so abundant and lucid
a current as the Fibrenus; the length of the stream considered, which does
not exceed four miles and a half. It flows with great rapidity, and is
about thirty or thirty-five feet in width near the Ciceronian isles. It is
generally fifteen and even twenty in depth; ‘largus et exundans,’ like the
genius of him who had so often trodden its banks. The water even in the
intensest heats, still retains its icy coldness; and, although the
thermometer was above 80° in the shade, the hand, plunged for a few
seconds into the Fibrenus, caused a complete numbness(402).” Near to the
house, the Fibrenus was divided into equal streams by a little island,
which was fringed with a few plane-trees, and on which stood a
portico(403), where Cicero often retired to read or meditate, and composed
some of his sublimest harangues. Just below this islet, each branch of the
stream rushed by a sort of cascade, into the cerulean Liris(404), on which
the Fibrenus bestowed additional freshness and coolness, and after this
union received the name of the more noble river(405). The epithet
_taciturnus_, applied to the Liris by Horace, and _quietus_, by Silius
Italicus, must be understood only of the lower windings of its course. No
river in Italy is so noisy as the Liris about Arpino and Cicero’s villa;
for the space of a mile and a half after receiving the Fibrenus, it formed
no less than six cascades, varying in height from three to twenty
feet(406). This spot, embellished with all the ornaments of hills and
valleys, and wood and water-falls, was one of Cicero’s most favourite
retreats. When Atticus first visited it, he was so charmed, that, instead
of wondering as before that it was such a favourite residence of his
friend, he expressed his surprise that he ever retired elsewhere(407);
declaring, at the same time, his contempt of the marble pavements, arched
ceilings, and artificial canals of magnificent villas, compared with the
tranquillity and natural beauties of Arpinum. Cicero, indeed, appears at
one time to have thought of the island, formed by the Fibrenus, as the
place most suitable for the monument which he intended to raise to his
beloved daughter Tullia(408).
The situation of this villa was close to the spot where now stands the
city of Sora(409). “The Liris,” says Eustace, “still bears its ancient
name till it passes Sora, when it is called the Garigliano. The Fibrenus,
still so called, falls into it a little below Sora, and continues to
encircle the island in which Cicero lays the scene of the dialogue _De
Legibus_. Arpinum, also, still retains its name(410).” Modern travellers
bear ample testimony to the scenery round Sora being such as fully
justifies the fond partiality of Cicero, and the admiration of Atticus.
“Nothing,” says Mr Kelsall, “can be imagined finer than the surrounding
landscape. The deep azure of the sky, unvaried by a single cloud—Sora on a
rock at the foot of the precipitous Apennines—both banks of the Garigliano
covered with vineyards—the _fragor aquarum_, alluded to by Atticus in the
work _De Legibus_—the coolness, rapidity, and ultramarine hue of the
Fibrenus,—the noise of its cataracts—the rich turquoise colour of the
Liris—the minor Apennines round Arpino, crowned with umbrageous oaks to
their very summits, present scenery hardly elsewhere to be equalled,
certainly not to be surpassed, even in Italy(411).” The spot where
Cicero’s villa stood, was, in the time of Middleton, possessed by a
convent of monks, and was called the villa of St Dominic. It was built in
the year 1030, from the fragments of the Arpine villa!
“Art, Glory, Freedom, fail—but Nature still is fair.”
The first conference, _De Legibus_, is held in a walk on the banks of the
Fibrenus; the other two in the island which it formed, and which Cicero
called Amalthea, from a villa belonging to Atticus in Epirus. These three
books are all that are now extant. It appears, however, that, at the
commencement of the fifth dialogue, the sun having then passed the
meridian, and its beams striking in such a direction that the speakers
were no longer sheltered from its rays by the young plane-trees, which had
been recently planted, they left the island, and descending to the banks
of the Liris, finished their discourse under the shade of the alder-trees,
which stretched their branches over its margin(412).
An ancient oak, which stood in Cicero’s pleasure-grounds, led Atticus to
inquire concerning the augury which had been presented to Marius, a native
of Arpinum, from that very oak, and which Cicero had celebrated in a poem
devoted to the exploits of his ferocious countryman, Cicero hints, that
the portent was all a fiction; which leads to a discussion on the
difference between poetry and history, and the poverty of Rome in the
latter department. As Cicero, owing to the multiplicity of affairs, had
not then leisure to supply this deficiency, he is requested by his guests,
to give them, in the meanwhile, a dissertation on Laws—a subject with
which he was so conversant, that he could require no previous preparation.
It is agreed, that he should not treat of particular or arbitrary laws,—as
those concerning _Stillicide_, and the forms of judicial procedure—but
should trace the philosophic principles of jurisprudence to their remotest
sources. From this recondite investigation he excludes the Epicureans, who
decline all care of the republic, and bids them retire to their gardens.
He entreats that the new Academy should be silent, since her bold
objections would soon destroy the fair and well-ordered structure of his
lofty system. Zeno, Aristotle, and the immediate followers of Plato, he
represents as the teachers who best prepare a citizen for performing the
duties of social life. Them he professes chiefly to follow; and, in
conformity with their system, he announces in the first book, which treats
of laws in general, that man being linked to a supreme God by reason and
virtue, and the whole species being associated by a communion of feelings
and interests, laws are alike founded on divine authority and natural
benevolence.
According to this sublime hypothesis, the whole universe forms one immense
commonwealth of gods and men, who participate of the same essence, and are
members of the same community. Reason prescribes the law of nature and
nations; and all positive institutions, however modified by accident or
custom, are drawn from the rule of right which the Deity has inscribed on
every virtuous mind. Some actions, therefore, are just in their own
nature, and ought to be performed, not because we live in a society where
positive laws punish those who pay no regard to them, but for the sake of
that equity which accompanies them, independently of human ordinances.
These principles may be applicable to laws in a certain sense; but, in
fact, it is rather moral right and justice than laws that the author
discusses—for bad or pernicious laws he does not admit to be laws at all.
To do justice, to love mercy, and to worship God with a pure heart, were,
doubtless, laws in his meaning, (that is, they were right,) previous to
their enactment, and no human enactment to the contrary could abrogate
them. His principles, however, apply to laws in this sense, and not to
arbitrary civil institutions.
Having, in the first discourse, laid open the origin of laws, and source
of obligations, he proceeds, in the remaining books, to set forth a body
of laws conformable to his own plan and ideas of a well-ordered
state;—announcing, in the first place, those which relate to religion and
the worship of the gods; secondly, such as prescribe the duties and powers
of magistrates. These laws are, for the most part, taken from the ancient
government and customs of Rome, with some little modification calculated
to obviate or heal the disorders to which the republic was liable, and to
give its constitution a stronger bias in favour of the aristocratic
faction. The species of instruction communicated in these two books, has
very little reference to the sublime and general principles with which the
author set out. Many of his laws are arbitrary municipal regulations. The
number of the magistrates, the period of the duration of their offices,
with the suffrages and elections in the Comitia, were certainly not
founded in the immutable laws of God or nature; and the discussion
concerning them has led to the belief, that the second and third books
merely comprehended a collection of facts, from which general principles
were to be subsequently deduced.
At the end of the third book it is mentioned, that the executive power of
the magistracy, and rights of the Roman citizens, still remain to be
discussed. In what number of books this plan was accomplished, is
uncertain. Macrobius, as we have seen, quotes the fifth book(413); and
Goerenz thinks it probable there were six,—the fourth being on the
executive power, the fifth on public, and the sixth on private rights.
What authors Cicero chiefly followed and imitated in his work _De
Legibus_, has been a celebrated controversy since the time of Turnebus. It
seems now to be pretty well settled, that, in substance and principles, he
followed the Stoics; but that he imitated Plato in the style and dress in
which he arrayed his sentiments and opinions. That philosopher, as is well
known, after writing on government in general, drew up a body of laws
adapted to that particular form of it which he had delineated. In like
manner, Cicero chose to deliver his sentiments, not by translating Plato,
but by imitating his manner in the explication of them, and adapting
everything to the constitution of his own country. The Stoic whom he
principally followed, was probably Chrysippus, who wrote a book Περι
Νομου(414), some passages of which are still extant, and exhibit the
outlines of the system adopted in the first book _De Legibus_. What of
general discussion appears in the third book is taken from Theophrastus,
Dio, and Panætius the Stoic.
_De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum_.—This work is a philosophical account of
the various opinions entertained by the Greeks concerning the Supreme Good
and Extreme Evil, and is by much the most subtle and difficult of the
philosophic writings of Cicero. It consists of five books, of that sort of
dialogue, in which, as in the treatise _De Oratore_, the discourse is not
dramatically represented, but historically related by the author. The
constant repetition of “said I,” and “says he,” is tiresome and clumsy,
and not nearly so agreeable as the dramatic form of dialogue, where the
names of the different speakers are alternately prefixed, as in a play.
The whole is addressed to Marcus Brutus in an Introduction, where the
author excuses his study of philosophy, which some persons had blamed as
unbecoming his character and dignity. The conference in the first two
books is supposed to be held at Cicero’s Cuman villa, which was situated
on the hills of old Cumæ, and commanded a prospect of the Campi Phlegræi,
the bay of Puteoli, with its islands, the Portus Misenus the harbour of
the Roman fleet, and Baiæ, the retreat of the most wealthy patricians.
Here Cicero received a visit from Lucius Torquatus, a confirmed Epicurean,
and from a young patrician, Caius Triarius, who is a mute in the ensuing
colloquy. Torquatus engages their host in philosophical discussion, by
requesting to know his objections to the Epicurean system. These Cicero
states generally; but Torquatus, in his answer, confines himself to the
question of the Supreme Good, which he placed in pleasure. This tenet he
supports on the principle, that, of all things, Virtue is the most
pleasurable; that we ought to follow its laws, in consequence of the
serenity and satisfaction arising from its practice; and that honourable
toil, or even pain, are not always to be avoided, as they often prove
necessary means towards obtaining the most exquisite gratifications.
Cicero, in his refutation, which is contained in the second book, gives
rather a different representation of the philosophy of Epicurus, from his
great poetic contemporary Lucretius. The term ἡδονη, (voluptas,) used by
Epicurus to express his Supreme Good, can only, as Cicero maintains, mean
sensual enjoyment, and can never be so interpreted as to denote
tranquillity of mind. But supposing virtue to be cultivated merely as
productive of pleasure, or as only valuable because agreeable—a cheat, who
had no remorse or conscience, might enjoy the _summum bonum_ in defrauding
a rightful owner of his property; and no act would thus be accounted
criminal, if it escaped the brand of public infamy. On the other hand, if
pain be accounted the Supreme Evil, how can any man enjoy felicity, when
this greatest of all misfortunes may at any moment seize him!
In the third and fourth books, the scene of the dialogue is changed. In
order to inspect some books of Aristotelian philosophy, Cicero walks over
to the villa of young Lucullus, to whom he had been appointed guardian, by
the testament of his illustrious father. Here he finds Cato employed in
perusing certain works of Stoical authors; and a discussion arises on that
part of the Stoical system, relating to the Supreme Good, which Cato
placed in virtue alone. Cicero, in his answer to Cato, attempts to
reconcile this tenet with the doctrines of the Academic philosophy, which
he himself professed, by showing that the difference between them
consisted only in the import affixed to the term _good_—the Academic sect
assigning a pre-eminence to virtue, but admitting that external advantages
are good also in their decree. Now, the Stoics would not allow them to be
good, but merely valuable, eligible, or preferable; so that the sects
could be reconciled in sentiments, if the terms were a little changed. The
Academical system is fully developed in the fifth book, in a dialogue held
within the Academy; and, at the commencement, the associations which that
celebrated, though then solitary spot, was calculated to awaken are finely
described. “I see before me,” says Piso, “the perfect form of Plato, who
was wont to dispute in this very place: These gardens not only recall him
to my memory, but present his very person to my senses—I fancy to myself
that here stood Speusippus—there Xenocrates—and here, on this bench, sat
his disciple Polemo. To me, our ancient Senate-house seems peopled with
the like visionary forms; for often when I enter it, the shades of Scipio,
of Cato, and of Lælius, and, in particular, of my venerable grandfather,
rise up to my imagination.” Here Piso, who was a great Platonist, gives an
account, in the presence of Cicero and Cicero’s brother Quintus, of the
hypothesis of the old Academy concerning moral good, which was also that
adopted by the Peripatetics. According to this system, the _summum bonum_
consists in the highest improvement of all the mental and bodily
faculties. The perfection, in short, of everything consistent with nature,
enters into the composition of supreme felicity. Virtue, indeed, is the
highest of all things, but other advantages must also be valued according
to their worth. Even pleasures become ingredients of happiness, if they be
such as are included in the _prima naturæ_, or primary advantages of
nature. Cicero seems to approve this system, and objects only to one of
the positions of Piso, That a wise man must be always happy. Our author
thus contrasts with each other the different systems of Greek philosophy,
particularly the Epicurean with the Stoical tenets; and hence, besides,
refuting them in his own person, he makes the one baffle the other, till
he arrives at what is most probable, the utmost length to which the middle
or new Academy pretended to reach. The chief part of the work _De
Finibus_, is taken from the best writings of the different philosophers
whose doctrines he explains. The first book closely follows the tract of
Epicurus, Κυριων δοξων. Cicero’s second book, in which he refutes
Epicurism, is borrowed from the stoic Chrysippus, who wrote ten books Of
the beautiful, and of pleasure, (Περι τοῦ καλοῦ και της ἡδονης,) wherein
he canvassed the Epicurean tenets concerning the Supreme Good and Evil.
His third book is derived from a treatise of the same Chrysippus, entitled
Περι τελων(415). The fourth, where he refutes the Stoics, is from the
writings of Polemo, who, following the example of his master Xenocrates,
amended the Academic doctrines, and nearly accommodated them on this
subject of Good and Evil to the opinions of the ancient Peripatetics. Some
works of Antiochus of Ascalon, who, in the time of Cicero, was the head of
the old Academy, supplied the materials for the concluding dialogue.
The work _De Finibus_ was written in 708, and though begun subsequently to
the _Academica_, was finished before it. The period, however, of the three
different conferences of which it consists, is laid a considerable time
before the date of its publication. It is evident that the first dialogue
is supposed to be held in 703, since Torquatus, the principal speaker, who
perished in the civil war, is mentioned as _Prætor Designatus_, and this
prætorship he bore in the year 704. The following conference is placed
subsequently, at least, to the death of the great Lucullus, who died in
701. The last dialogue is carried more than thirty years back, being laid
in 674, when Cicero was in his twenty-seventh year, and was attending the
lessons of the Athenian philosophers. For this change, the reason seems to
have been, that as Piso was the fittest person whom the author could find
to support the doctrines of the old Academy, and as he had renounced his
friendship during the time of the disturbances occasioned by the Clodian
faction, it became necessary to place the conference at a period when they
were fellow-students at Athens. The critics have observed some
anachronisms in this last book, in making Piso refer to the other two
dialogues, of which he had no share, and could have had no knowledge, as
being held at a later period than that of the conference he attended.