in the next volume, yet I judge it very pertinent to the present
subject to anticipate that intention, so as to shew how far they might
advance toward that knowledge, by the dint of reason; to further the
works, wherein they have, in the largest characters that ever were
made, consign’d their notions of this sort, remaining to this day,
such as we have been describing; and which may induce us to have the
same sentiment concerning them as _Pere Marten_ in his _Religion des
Gaulois_, tho’ he knew nothing of our antiquities; but thus he writes,
“that the Druids worship’d the true God, and that their ideas of
religion were truly grand, sublime, magnificent.”
We may therefore very justly affirm of them, that in their serious
contemplations in this place, concerning the nature of the deity,
which, as _Cæsar_ tells us, was one part of their inquiries, they would
thus reason in their own minds.
A contemplative person, viewing and considering the world around him,
is ravish’d with the harmony and beauty, the fitnesses of things in it,
the uses and connexion of all its parts, and the infinite agreement
shining throughout the whole. He must belye all his senses to doubt,
that it was compos’d by a being of infinite power, wisdom and goodness,
which we call God. But among all the most glorious attributes of
divinity, goodness is preeminent. For this beautiful fabric of the
world displays thro’ every atom of it, such an amazing scene of
the goodness and beneficence of its author; that it appears to such
contemplative minds, that his infinite power and wisdom were but as the
two hands, employ’d by the _goodness_ of the sovereign architect.
Goodness was the beginning, the middle, the end of the creation. To
explain, to prove, or illustrate this topic, would be an affront to
the common understanding of mankind. The sum of what we can know of
him is, that he is good, essentially good. We are not more assured of
the existence of the first being, than that he is good, _the_ good,
goodness itself, in eminence. He is God, because he is good; which is
the meaning of the word in _english_, and in many other languages.
This, in God almighty, is the attribute of attributes, the perfection
of his all-perfect nature. He made and maintains those creatures which
he multiply’d to an infinite degree, the objects of his care and
beneficence; those great characters of supreme love, that render him
deservedly adorable.
All possible perfections, both moral and natural, must needs be
inherent in this first and supreme being, because from him alone they
can flow. This is in one comprehensive word, what we call good. But
good unexercis’d, unemploy’d, incommunicate, is no good, and implies
a contradiction, when affirmed of the all-good being. Therefore it
undeniably follows, there never was a time, never can be, when God was
useless, and did not communicate of his goodness.
But there was a time before creation, before this beautiful fabric of
the world was made, before even chaos itself, or the production of
the rude matter, of which the world was made. And this time must be
affirmed, not only as to material creation, but to that of angels and
spiritual beings. Reckon we never so many ages, or myriads of ages,
for the commencement of creation, yet it certainly began, and there
was a time before that beginning. For, by the definition, creation is
bringing that into being which was not before. There must have been a
time before it.
Here then occurs the difficulty, of filling up that infinite gap before
creation. Consider the supreme first being sitting in the center of
an universal solitude, environ’d with the abyss of infinite nothing,
a chasm of immense vacuity! what words can paint the greatness of the
solecism? what mind does not start at the horror of such an absurdity?
and especially supposing this state subsisted from infinite ages.
’Tis in vain to pretend, that a being of all perfections can be happy
in himself, in the consciousness of those perfections, whilst he
does no good to any thing; in the reflexive idea of his possessing
all excellency, whilst he exerts no tittle of any one. This is the
picture of a being quite dissonant to that of the All-good. And as
the Druids would, without difficulty, judge, that there must needs be
one, only, self-originated first being, the origin of all things: so
they would see the necessity of admitting one or more eternal beings,
or emanations from that first being, in a manner quite distinct from
creation.
That there ever was one eternal, self-existent, unoriginated being,
is the very first and most necessary truth, which the human mind
can possibly, by contemplation and ratiocination, obtain. Still by
considering the matter intimately, they would find it impossible to
conceive, that there should ever be a time, when there was but one
being in the universe, which we call the first and self-originated
being, possessing in himself all possible perfections, and remaining
for endless myriads of ages, torpid, unactive, solitary, useless.
This is a notion so abhorrent to reason, so contrary to the nature of
goodness, so absolutely absurd, that we may as well imagine this great
being altogether absent, and that there was no being at all.
This all the philosophers were sensible of, for good unexercis’d, that
always lay dormant, never was put into act, is no goodness; it may as
well be supposed absent, and even that there was no God. To imagine
that God could be asleep all this while, shocks the mind, therefore it
casts about, to remedy this great paradox.
Now it cannot be said of any part of creation, or of the whole, that
God always did good to any created being or beings; for these are not,
cannot be commensurate in time with his own being. Count backward never
so long for the beginning of things, still there was a time prior to
this beginning of things; for eternal creation is an equal absurdity
with an eternal absence of any being: where no part is necessary, to
affirm the whole is a necessarily and self-existing being, is a mere
portent of reason.
So we see, in every light, an absolute necessity of admitting a being
or beings coeval with the supreme and self-originated being, distinct
from any creation, and which must needs flow from the first being, the
cause of all existence. For two self-originated beings is as much an
absurdity as any of the preceding.
But, as ’tis impossible that the act of creation should be coeval with
the first being, what other act of goodness can be? For that being
which is essentially good, must ever have been actively and actually
so. To answer this great question, we must thus expostulate, as the
prophet _Isaiah_ does in the person of God, in his last chapter, when
summing up the business of his prophetical office: “Shall I bring to
the birth, and not beget, saith _Jehovah_: shall I cause to bring
forth, and be myself barren, saith thy God?” He is there speaking of
the birth of the son of God in human form; but we may apply it in a
more eminent degree, to the son of God in his divine nature; and as the
Druids may well be suppos’d to have done. The highest act of goodness
which is possible, even for the supreme being, is the production of his
like, the act of filiation, the begetting of his son, _Prov._ viii. 22.
“The LORD _begat_ me _from eternity_, before his works of old;” (so
it ought to be read) _ver._ 30. “then I was by him, as one _brought
up_ with him (_amoun_ in the original) and I was daily his delight,
rejoicing always before him.”
This is the internal divine fecundity of the fruitful cause of all
things. Creation is external fecundity. The Druids would naturally
apply the term generation, to this act of producing this person, or
divine emanation from the supreme, which we are oblig’d to admit
of: and to affirm him coeval with the supreme. The difficulty of
priority in time, between father and son, would easily be remov’d, by
considering the difference between divine and human generation, the
production of necessary and contingent beings.
If an artist produces an admirable and curious piece of mechanism, he
is said to make it; if he produces a person or being altogether like
himself, he is rightly said to generate that person; he begets a son,
’tis an act of filiation. So the like we must affirm of the supreme
being generating another being, with whom only he could communicate
of his goodness from all eternity, and without any beginning; or, in
scripture language, _in whom he always had complacency_. This is what
_Plato_ means, “by love being ancienter than all the gods; that the
kingdom of love is prior to the kingdom of necessity.” And this son
must be a self-existent, all-perfect being, equally as the father,
self-origination only excepted, which the necessary relation or
oeconomy between them forbids. If he is a son, he is like himself; if
he is like himself, he is God; if he is God, an eternity of existence
is one necessary part of his divine nature and perfection.
If the son be of the same substance and nature as the father, an
eternity of being is one part of his nature; therefore no time can be
assign’d for this divine geniture, and it must be what we call eternal.
Or perhaps we may express it as well by saying, it was before eternity;
or that he is coeval with the almighty father. In this same sense
_Proclus de patriarch._ uses the word προαιώνιος, _præeternus_. For
tho’ ’tis impossible that creation, whether of material or immaterial
beings, should be coeval with God; yet, if the son be of the same
nature with the father, which must be granted, then ’tis impossible to
be otherwise, than that the son of God should be coeval with the father.
If goodness be, as it were, the essence of God, then he can have no
happiness but in the exercise of that goodness. We must not say,
as many are apt to do, that he was always and infinitely happy, in
reflecting upon his own being and infinite perfections, in the idea of
himself. This is no exercise of goodness, unless we allow this idea
of himself which he produces, to be a being without him, or distinct
from himself; and that is granting what we contend for. A true and
exact idea of himself is the _logos_ of the ancients, the first-born
of the first cause. And this is the meaning of what the eastern and
all other philosophers assert, “that it was necessary for unity to
make an evolution of itself, and multiply; it was necessary for good
to communicate itself. There could be no time before then, for then he
would be an imperfect unity, and may as well be termed a cypher, which
of itself can never produce any thing.” Agreeable to this doctrine,
_Philo in_ II. _de monarchiis_, writes, “the _logos_ is the express
image of God, and by whom all the whole world was made.” It would be
senseless to think here, he meant only the wisdom of the supreme, the
reason, the cunning of God, a quality, not a personality.
What difficulty here is in the thing, arises merely from the weakness
of our conceptions, and in being conversant only with ordinary
generation. A son of ours is of the same nature as his father. His
father was begat in time, therefore the son the like. Not so in
divine generation. But as the father is from eternity, so is the son.
This only difference there is, or rather distinction; the father is
self-existent, and unoriginate; the son is of the father.
Further, we must remove, in this kind of reasoning, all the
imperfection of different sexes, as well as time, which is in human
generations; and all such gross ideas incompatible with the most pure
and perfect divine nature. The whole of this our reasoning further
confirms, that the son is necessarily existing. It was necessary for
God to be actively good always, and begetting his son was the greatest
act of divine goodness, and the first, necessarily. But the word
_first_ is absurd, betraying our own imperfection of speech and ideas,
when we treat of these matters; for there could be no _first_, where
no beginning. And the very names of father and son are but relative
and oeconomical; so far useful, that we may be able to entertain some
tolerable notion in these things, so far above our understanding.
But tho’ it be infinitely above our understanding, yet we reach
so far, as to see the necessity of it. And we can no otherwise
cure that immense _vacuum_, that greatest of all absurdities, the
indolence and uselesness of the supreme being, before creation. And
all this the Druids might, and I may venture to say, did arrive at,
by ratiocination. And we can have no difficulty of admitting it,
if we do but suppose, there were obscure notions of such being the
nature of the deity, handed down from the beginning of the world.
Whence in _Chronicon Alexandrinum_, _Malala_, and other authors,
we read, for instance, “in those times (the most early) among the
_Egyptians_ reigned, of the family of _Misraim_, _Sesosiris_, that
is, the branch or offspring of _Osiris_, a man highly venerable for
wisdom, who taught, there were three greatest energies or persons in
the deity, which were but one.” This man was _Lud_, or _Thoth_, son of
_Misraim_ or _Osiris_, and for this reason, when idolatry began, he
was consecrated by the name of _Hermes_, meaning one of those divine
energies, which we call the Holy Spirit.
This is a short and easy account of that knowledge which the ancients
had of the nature of the deity, deduc’d from reason in a contemplative
mind, and which certainly was known to all the world from the
beginning, and rightly call’d a mystery. For our reason is strong
enough to see the necessity of admitting this doctrine, but not to see
the manner. The _how_ of an eternal generation is only to be understood
by the deity itself.
The Druids would pursue this notion from like reasoning a little
further, in this manner. Tho’ from all that has been said, there is
a necessity of admitting an eternal generation, yet the person so
generated, all-perfect God, does not multiply the deity itself, tho’ he
is a person distinct from his father. For addition or subtraction is
argument of imperfection, a thing not to be affirmed of the nature of
the deity. They would therefore say, that tho’ these two, the father
and the son, are different divine personalities, yet they cannot be
called two Gods, or two godheads; for this would be discerping the
deity or godhead, which is equally absurd and wicked.
That mankind did formerly reason in this wise, is too notorious to
need my going about formally to prove it. ’Tis not to be controverted;
very many authors have done it substantially. And when there was
such a notion in the world, our Druids, who had the highest fame for
theological studies, would cultivate it in some such manner as I
have deliver’d, by the mere strength of natural reason. Whether they
would think in this manner _ex priori_, I cannot say; but that they
did so think, we can need no weightier an argument than the operose
work of _Abury_ before us; for nought else could induce men to make
such a stamp, such a picture of their own notion, as this stupendous
production of labour and art.
As our western philosophers made a huge picture of this their idea,
in a work of three miles’ extent, and, as it were, shaded by the
interposition of divers hills; so the more eastern sages who were
not so shy of writing, yet, chose to express it in many obscure and
enigmatic ways. _Pythagoras_, for instance, affirmed, the original of
all things was from unity and an infinite duality. _Plutarc. de plac.
philos._ _Plato_ makes three divine authors of all things, the first
or supreme he calls king, the good. Beside him, he names the cause,
descended from the former; and between them he names _dux_, the leader,
or at other times he calls him the _mind_. Just in the same manner, the
_Egyptians_ called them _father_, _mind_, _power_. Therefore _Plato_,
in his VIth epistle, writing to _Hermias_ and his friends, to enter
into a most solemn oath, directs it to be made before “God the leader
or prince of all things, both that are, and that shall be; and before
the Lord, the father of that leader or prince; and of the cause: all
whom, says he, we shall know manifestly, if we philosophize rightly,
as far as the powers of good men will carry us.” And in _Timæus_
he makes MIND to be the son of GOOD, and to be the more immediate
architect of the world. And in _Epinomis_ he writes, “the most divine
LOGOS or WORD made the world,” the like as _Philo_ wrote; which is
expressly a christian verity.
’Tis not to be wonder’d at, that the ancients wrap’d up this doctrine
in an abstruse and symbolic way of speaking, of writing, and in
hieroglyphic characters and works, as we have seen. It was communicated
to them in the same manner; they did not, could not comprehend it any
more than we, but they held it as a precious depositum of sacred wisdom.
We may therefore make this deduction from what has been said, that the
christian doctrine of distinct personalities in the deity, is so far
from being contrary to reason, as some would have it, or above human
reason as others, that ’tis evidently deducible therefrom, at least
highly agreeable thereto, when seriously propos’d to our reason. And
when most undoubtedly the ancients had such a notion, even from the
creation, those minds that were of a contemplative turn, would embrace
it and cultivate it, as being the most exalted knowledge we are capable
of. Of such a turn were our Druids, as all accounts agree.
CHAP. XVI.
_Of the third species of patriarchal temples, form’d in the
resemblance of a circle and wings. A description of one of this
sort on the banks of the_ Humber _in_ Lincolnshire. _A very
remarkable sort of barrows there, like to beds. This figure
of the alate circle, the_ Egyptians _call’d by the name of_
CNEPH; _authors mistake in telling us it was the name of God.
’Tis indeed the symbol of the third divine emanation from the
supreme, call’d the_ anima mundi. CNEPH _is an oriental word,
from_ canaph, _to_ fly, עוף. _The entire symbol, circle, snake
and wings, was call’d_ CNEPHPTHA. Ptha _more particularly meant
the serpent, or symbol of the second divine person. The supreme,
they held to be ineffable, as well as invisible, therefore
symboliz’d him by the circle. The Neptune of the_ Greeks _deriv’d
from_ CNEPH, דניא dunia, _a circle added to_ Cneph, _is_ circulus
alatus. _He was president of the waters, from_ Gen. i. 2. and
the divine spirit moved upon the face of the waters. _Hence
this temple set on the edge of the_ Humber. _Of the_ Egyptian
Canopus. _Another of these alate temples on_ Navestock-common
_in_ Essex. _The word_ ganaph _preserv’d in the name of the
town._ Knave, gnavus _and_ knap, _a teutonic word, all from the_
hebrew. _Mr._ Toland _mentions an alate temple of the Druids in
the_ hebrid _islands, but does not altogether understand it. Of_
Abaris _the hyperborean Druid, a friend of_ Pythagoras’_s. That
the directive virtue of the magnetic needle was known anciently.
The bed barrows on the_ Humber _banks explain’d. A metaphysical
disquisition concerning the Druids’ knowledge of a third
emanation or divine person, from the supreme; a truth agreeable
to reason. This was the_ Mercury _of the ancients, as well as_
Neptune. _The names which the Druids gave to the three divine
persons. Conclusion. They were in effect Christians._
When I wrote my _Itinerary_, I travelled a good deal of the
_Hermen-street_ road, and the _Foss_ road, having Mr. _Samuel Buck_ in
my company. At that time I engag’d him to take in hand the work, which
he has so laudably pursued, and sav’d the remembrance of innumerable
antiquities in our island, by that collection of elegant prints which
he has publish’d. When we were on the banks of the _Humber_, the name
of _Barrow_ invited my curiosity, and it was fully answer’d, by finding
that most noble antiquity there of the old Druids, upon the _marsh_,
call’d _Humbers castle_.
A rivulet rises near the town of _Barrow_, and when it falls off the
high ground, and enters on the level marshes on the _Humber_ shore, it
turns a mill. Just there, upon the edge of the marsh, upon a gentle
eminence, nearly overflow’d by high spring-tides, and between the salt
and fresh water, is the work we are to speak of, made of great banks
of earth thrown up, in an odd manner, which gives it the denomination
of castle. I observ’d all about it, and in the adjacent marshes, many
long _tumuli_ of different sizes, but all of a particular shape, such
as I had never seen elsewhere, being form’d like a bed. I immediately
set to work in digging into several of them, and we found burnt bones,
ashes, bits of urns, and such kind of matters, all extremely rotten
and decay’d; and the very same appearances as I had so often seen, in
digging the barrows about _Stonehenge_ and _Abury_.
This satisfied me that the work must belong to the most ancient
inhabitants of the island, notwithstanding its unusual form. And when
I attentively consider’d those banks, and made a plan of them, I was
very agreeably surpriz’d in discovering the purport and meaning, which
was to represent the _circulus alatus_ or winged circle, an ancient
hieroglyphic well known to those more particularly conversant with
_Egyptian_ monuments; and what they rightly call the symbol of the
_anima mundi_, or _spirit pervading the universe_; in truth, the divine
spirit.
I had no hesitation in adjudging this to be a temple of our Druids. All
reasons imaginable concurr’d. Tho’ instead of stones, they have made
this work with mounds of earth; I suppose for want of stones, lying on
the surface of the ground. It makes the third kind of the Druid temples
which I proposed to describe. The vertical line of it is north-east and
south-west, the upper part being directly north-east; and the barrows
generally conform to this line, being either upon it, or at right
angles with it; the head of the barrow sometimes one way, sometimes the
other.
The circle was 120 cubits in diameter. The wings 100 cubits broad, 150
long; but the eastern wing was more extended than the other. For the
design of it is somewhat in perspective, as ’tis sometimes seen on
_Egyptian_ antiquities.
This very extraordinary work, which I could not sufficiently admire,
has very often entertain’d my thoughts. We see an uniformity in
human nature throughout all ages. We build our churches, especially
cathedrals, in a cross, the symbol or cognizance of Christianity; the
first builders of churches did it in the symbol of the deity, which
was pictur’d out with great judgment, and that (most likely) from the
beginning of the world.
The circle and wings was the picture of the deity, which the old
_Egyptian_ hierophants call’d CNEPH. As there were three varieties in
this figure, so they had more names than one for it, I mean the whole
figure, the circle, serpent, and wings. And sometimes they used one
word, sometimes another, and sometimes conjoin’d them. _Eusebius_ in
_pr. ev._ III. 3. writes, “that the _Egyptians_ painted God, whom they
call’d _Kneph_, like a man in a blue garment, holding a circle and
serpent (not scepter, for no such figure ever appears) and on his
head, feathers or wings.” Now this very figure is seen on the portals
of the _Persian_ temple of _Chilminar_. Authors are not sufficiently
accurate in these matters, for want of a more perfect knowledge of
them. _Cneph_ is properly the alate circle; yet sometimes they call
the whole figure by that name. So a feather or two, or wings, are
often plac’d on the heads of the _Egyptian_ deities; but the picture
above-mention’d at _Chilminar_ has the wings, as more commonly, annexed
to the circle.
_Phtha_ was another name of one of these figures, which they sometimes
join’d to the preceding, and made the word _Cnephtha_. _Kircher_
erroneously calls it _Hemptha_; for before him _Iamblichus_ err’d in
calling _Cneph_, _Emeph_. _Strabo_ calls _Cneph_, _Cnuphis_, and says
his temple was at _Syene_, XVII. Undoubtedly a temple some way of this
form. _Athenagoras in Eroticis_ VI. calls him Κνεφαιος, _Cnepheus_; and
says, “he can’t be seen by our eyes, nor comprehended by our mind.”
_Hesychius_, and the etymologist _Suidas_, _voce_ κνεφυς, interpret the
word, _obscure_, _hidden_, _not to be seen or understood_. _Iamblichus_
and _Proclus_ the like, who make _Amûn_ and _Phtha_ the same, _Prov._
viii. 30. The truth is, the word _Cneph_ comes from the _hebrew_ ענף
_ganaph volare_, to _fly_, קנף a _wing_, _Psal._ xviii. 11. _He rode
upon the cherubim, and did fly._