It really seemed as if the condottieri were determined to make their
score as heavy as possible. For even whilst Paolo Orsini had been on his
mission of peace to Cesare, and whilst they awaited his return, they had
continued in arms against the duke. The Vitelli had aided Guidobaldo
to reconquer his territory, and had killed, in the course of doing so,
Bartolomeo da Capranica, Cesare’s most valued captain and Vitelli’s
brotherin-arms of yesterday. The Baglioni were pressing Michele da
Corella in Pesaro, but to little purpose; whilst the butcher Oliverotto
da Fermo in Camerino--of which he had taken possession with Gianmaria
Varano--was slaughtering every Spaniard he could find.
On the other side, Corella in Pesaro hanged five men whom he caught
practising against the duke’s government, and, having taken young Pietro
Varano--who was on his way to join his brother in Camerino in view of
the revolt there--he had him strangled in the market-place. There is a
story that, with life not yet extinct, the poor youth was carried into
church by the pitiful crowd. But here a friar, discovering that he still
lived, called in the soldiers and bade them finish him. This friar,
going later through Cagli, was recognized, set upon by a mob, and torn
to pieces--in which, if the rest of the tale be true, he was richly
served.
Into the theatre of bloodshed came Paolo Orsini from his mission
to Valentinois, bringing with him the treaty for signature by the
condottieri. Accustomed as they were to playing fast and loose,
they opined that, so far as Urbino was concerned, enough changes of
government had they contrived there already. Vitelli pointed out the
unseemliness of once again deposing Guidobaldo, whom they had just
reseated upon his throne. Besides, he perceived in the treaty the end
of his hopes of a descent upon Florence, which was the cause of all his
labours. So he rejected it.
But Valentinois had already got the Orsini and Pandolfo Petrucci on
his side, and so the confederacy was divided. Another factor came to
befriend the duke. On November 2 he was visited by Antonio Galeazzo
Bentivogli, sent by his father Giovanni to propose a treaty with
him--this state of affairs having been brought about by the mediation of
Ercole d’Este. From the negotiations that followed it resulted that, on
the 13th, the Orsini had word from Cesare that he had entered into
an alliance with the Bentivogli--which definitely removed their main
objection to bearing arms with him.
It was resigning much on Cesare’s part, but the treaty, after all, was
only for two years, and might, of course, be broken before then, as they
understood these matters. This treaty was signed at the Vatican on the
23rd, between Borgia and Bentivogli, to guarantee the States of both.
The King of France, the Signory of Florence, and the Duke of Ferrara
guaranteed the alliance.
Inter alia, it was agreed between them that Bologna should supply Cesare
with 100 lances and 200 light horse for one or two enterprises within
the year, and that the condotta of 100 lances which Cesare held from
Bologna by the last treaty should be renewed. The terms of the treaty
were to be kept utterly secret for the next three months, so that
the affairs of Urbino and Camerino should not be prejudiced by their
publication.
The result was instantaneous. On November 27 Paolo Orsini was back at
Imola with the other treaty, which bore now the signatures of all the
confederates. Vitelli, finding himself isolated, had swallowed his
chagrin in the matter of Florence, and his scruples in the matter of
Urbino, abandoning the unfortunate Guidobaldo to his fate. This came
swiftly. From Imola, Paolo Orsini rode to Fano on the 29th, and ordered
his men to advance upon Urbino and seize the city in the Duke of
Valentinois’s name, proclaiming a pardon for all rebels who would be
submissive.
Guidobaldo and the ill-starred Lord of Faenza were the two exceptions in
Romagna--the only two who had known how to win the affections of their
subjects. For Guidobaldo there was nothing that the men of Urbino would
not have done. They rallied to him now, and the women of Valbone--like
the ladies of England to save Coeur-de-Lion--came with their jewels and
trinkets, offering them that he might have the means to levy troops and
resist. But this gentle, kindly Guidobaldo could not subject his country
to further ravages of war; and so he determined, in his subjects’
interests as much as in his own, to depart for the second time.
Early in December the Orsini troops are in his territory, and Paolo,
halting them a few miles out of Urbino, sends to beg Guidobaldo’s
attendance in his camp. Guidobaldo, crippled by gout and unable at the
time to walk a step, sends Paolo his excuses and begs that he will come
to Urbino, where he awaits him. There Guidobaldo makes formal surrender
to him, takes leave of his faithful friends, enjoins fidelity to
Valentinois and trust in God, and so on December 19 he departs into
exile, the one pathetic noble figure amid so many ignoble ones. Paolo,
taking possession of the duchy, assumes the title of governor.
The Florentines had had their chance of an alliance with Cesare, and had
deliberately neglected it. Early in November they had received letters
from the King of France urging them to come to an accord with Cesare,
and they had made known to the duke that they desired to reoccupy Pisa
and to assure themselves of Vitelli; but, when he pressed that Florence
should give him a condotta, Macchiavelli--following his instructions
not to commit the Republic in any way--had answered “that his Excellency
must not be considered as other lords, but as a new potentate in Italy,
with whom it is more seemly to make an alliance or a friendship than to
grant him a condotta; and, as alliances are maintained by arms, and
that is the only power to compel their observance, the Signory could
not perceive what security they would have when three-quarters or
three-fifths of their arms would be in the duke’s hands.” Macchiavelli
added diplomatically that “he did not say this to impugn the duke’s
good faith, but to show him that princes should be circumspect and never
enter into anything that leaves a possibility of their being put at a
disadvantage.”(1)
1 See the twenty-first letter from Macchiavelli on this legation.
Cesare answered him calmly (“senza segno d’alterazione alcuna”) that
without a condotta, he didn’t know what to make of a private friendship
whose first principles were denied him. And there the matter hung,
for Macchiavelli’s legation had for only aim to ensure the immunity
of Tuscany and to safeguard Florentine interests without conceding any
advantages to Cesare--as the latter had perceived from the first.
On December 10 Cesare moved from Imola with his entire army, intent now
upon the conquest of Sinigaglia, which State Giuliano della Rovere had
been unable to save for his nephew, as king and Pope had alike turned
a deaf ear upon the excuses he had sought to make for the Prefetessa,
Giovanna da Montefeltre--the mother of the young prefect--who had aided
her brother Guidobaldo in the late war in Urbino.
On the morrow Valentinois arrived in Cesena and encamped his army there
for Christmas, as in the previous year. The country was beginning
to feel the effects of this prolonged vast military occupation, and
although the duke, with intent to relieve the people, had done all that
was possible to provision the troops, and had purchased from Venice
30,000 bushels of wheat for the purpose, yet all had been consumed. “The
very stones have been eaten,” says Macchiavelli.
To account for this state of things--and possibly for certain other
matters--Messer Ramiro de Lorqua, the Governor-General, was summoned
from Pesaro; whilst to avert the threatened famine Cesare ordered that
the cereals in the private granaries of Cesena should be sold at reduced
prices, and he further proceeded, at heavy expense, to procure grain
from without. Another, less far-seeing than Valentinois, might have
made capital out of Urbino’s late rebellion, and pillaged the country to
provide for pressing needs. But that would have been opposed to Cesare’s
policy, of fostering the goodwill of the people he subjected.
On December 20 three of the companies of French lances that had been
with Cesare took their leave of him and returned to Lombardy, so
that Cesare was left with only one company. There appears to be some
confusion as to the reasons for this, and it is stated by some
that those companies were recalled to Milan by the French governor.
Macchiavelli, ever inquisitive and inquiring, questioned one of the
French officers in the matter, to be told that the lances were returning
because the duke no longer needed them, the inference being that this
was in consequence of the return of the condottieri to their allegiance.
But the astute secretary did not at the time account this convincing,
arguing that the duke could not yet be said to be secure, nor could
he know for certain how far he might trust Vitelli and the Orsini.
Presumably, however, he afterwards obtained more certain information,
for he says later that Valentinois himself dismissed the French, and
that the dismissal was part of the stratagem he was preparing, and had
for object to reassure Vitelli and the other confederates, and to throw
them off their guard, by causing them to suppose him indifferently
supported.
But the departure of the French did not take place without much
discussion being provoked, and rumour making extremely busy, whilst
it was generally assumed that it would retard the Sinigaglia conquest.
Nevertheless, the duke calmly pursued his preparations, and proceeded
now to send forward his artillery. There was no real ground upon which
to assume that he would adopt any other course. Cesare was now in
considerable strength, apart from French lances, and even as these
left him he was joined by a thousand Swiss, and another six hundred
Romagnuoli from the Val di Lamone. Moreover, as far as the reduction of
Sinigaglia was concerned, no resistance was to be expected, for Cardinal
Giuliano della Rovere had written enjoining the people to surrender
peacefully to the duke.
What matters Cesare may have found in Cesena to justify the arrest of
his Governor-General we do not know to the full with absolute certainty.
On December 22 Ramiro de Lorqua, coming from Pesaro in response to his
master’s summons, was arrested on his arrival and flung into prison. His
examination was to follow.
Macchiavelli, reporting the arrest, says: “It is thought he [Cesare] may
sacrifice him to the people, who have a very great desire of it.”
Ramiro had made himself detested in Romagna by the ruthlessness of his
rule, and a ruthless servant reflects upon his master, a matter which
could nowise suit Borgia. To all who have read The Prince it will be
clear that upon that ground alone--of having brought Valentinois’s
justice into disrepute by the harshness which in Valentinois’s name he
practised--Macchiavelli would have approved the execution of Ramiro.
He would have accounted it perfectly justifiable that Ramiro should
be sacrificed to the people for no better reason than because he had
provoked their hatred, since this sacrifice made for the duke’s welfare.
He does, as a matter of fact, justify this execution, but upon much
fuller grounds than these. Still, had the reasons been no better than
are mentioned, he would still have justified it upon those. So much
is clear; and, when so much is clear, much more will be clear to you
touching this strange epoch.
There was, however, more than a matter of sacrificing the
Governor-General to the hatred of the people. There was, for one thing,
the matter of that wheat which had disappeared. Ramiro was charged with
having fraudulently sold it to his own dishonest profit, putting
the duke to the heavy expense of importing fresh supplies for the
nourishment of the people. The seriousness of the charge will be
appreciated when it is considered that, had a famine resulted from
this peculation, grave disorder might have ensued and perhaps even a
rebellion against a government which could provide no better.
The duke published the news of the governor’s arrest throughout Romagna.
He announced his displeasure and regret at the harshnesses and corrupt
practices of Ramiro de Lorqua, in spite of the most urgent admonishings
that he should refrain from all undue exactions and the threat of grave
punishment should he disobey. These frauds, corruption, extortion, and
rapine practised by the governor were so grave, continuous and general,
stated the duke in his manifesto, that “there is no city, country-side,
or castle, nor any place in all Romagna, nor officer or minister of
the duke’s, who does not know of these abuses; and, amongst others,
the famine of wheat occasioned by the traffic which he held against our
express prohibition, sending out such quantities as would abundantly
have sufficed for the people and the army.”
He concludes with assurances of his intention that, in the future, they
shall be ruled with justice and integrity, and he urges all who may
have charges to prefer against the said governor to bring them forward
immediately.
It was freely rumoured that the charges against Ramiro by no means ended
there, and in Bologna--and from Bologna the truth of such a matter might
well transpire, all things considered--it was openly said that Ramiro
had been in secret treaty with the Bentivogli, Orsini, and Vitelli,
against the Duke of Valentinois: “Aveva provixione da Messer Zoane
Bentivogli e da Orsini e Vitelozo contro el duca,” writes Fileno della
Tuate, who, it will be borne in mind, was no friend of the Borgia, and
would be at no pains to find justification for the duke’s deeds.
But of that secret treaty there was, for the moment, no official
mention. Later the rumour of it was to receive the fullest confirmation,
and, together with that, we shall give, in the next chapter, the duke’s
obvious reasons for having kept the matter secret at first. Matter
enough and to spare was there already upon which to dispose of Messer
Ramiro de Lorqua and disposed of he was, with the most summary justice.
On the morning of December 26 the first folk to be astir in Cesena
beheld, in the grey light of that wintry dawn, the body of Ramiro lying
headless in the square. It was richly dressed, with all his ornaments
upon it, a scarlet cloak about it, and the hands were gloved. On a
pike beside the body the black-bearded head was set up to view, and
so remained throughout that day, a terrible display of the swift and
pitiless justice of the duke.
Macchiavelli wrote: “The reason of his death is not properly known”
(“non si sa bene la cagione della sua morte”) “beyond the fact that such
was the pleasure of the prince, who shows us that he can make and unmake
men according to their deserts.”
The Cronica Civitas Faventiae, the Diariurn Caesenate, and the Cronache
Forlivese, all express the people’s extreme satisfaction at the deed,
and endorse the charges of brutality against the man which are contained
in Cesare’s letter.