To return to the surrender of Faenza on April 26, 1501, we see Cesare
on the morrow of that event, striking camp with such amazing suddenness
that he does not even pause to provide for the government of the
conquered tyranny, but appoints a vicar four days later to attend to it.
He makes his abrupt departure from Faenza, and is off like a whirlwind
to sweep unexpectedly into the Bolognese territory, and, by striking
swiftly, to terrify Bentivogli into submission in the matter of Castel
Bolognese.
This fortress, standing in the duke’s dominions, on the road between
Faenza and Imola, must be a menace to him whilst in the hands of a power
that might become actively hostile.
Ahead of him Cesare sent an envoy to Bentivogli, to demand its
surrender.
The alarmed Lord of Bologna, having convened his Council (the
Reggimento), replied that they must deliberate in the matter; and two
days later they dispatched their ambassador to lay before Cesare the
fruits of these deliberations. They were to seek the duke at Imola; but
they got no farther than Castel S. Pietro, which to their dismay they
found already in the hands of Vitellozzo Vitelli’s men-atarms. For,
what time Bentivogli had been deliberating, Cesare Borgia had
been acting with that promptness which was one of his most salient
characteristics, and, in addition to Castel S. Pietro he had already
captured Casalfiuminense, Castel Guelfo, and Medecina, which were now
invested by his troops.
When the alarming news of this swift action reached Bologna it caused
Bentivogli to bethink him at last of Louis XII’s advice, that he should
come to terms with Cesare Borgia, and he realized that the time to do
so could no longer be put off. He made haste, therefore, to agree to the
surrender of Castel Bolognese to the duke, to concede him stipend for
one hundred lances of three men each, and to enter into an undertaking
to lend him every assistance for one year against any power with which
he might be at war, the King of France excepted. In return, Cesare
was to relinquish the captured strongholds and undertake that the Pope
should confirm Bentivogli in his ancient privileges. On April 29 Paolo
Orsini went as Cesare’s plenipotentiary to Bologna to sign this treaty.
It was a crafty arrangement on Bentivogli’s part, for, over and above
the pacification of Cesare and the advantage of an alliance with him, he
gained as a result the alliance also of those famous condottieri Vitelli
and Orsini, both bitter enemies of Florence--the latter intent upon
the restoration of the Medici, the former impatient to avenge upon the
Signory the execution of his brother Paolo. As an instalment, on account
of that debt, Vitelli had already put to death Pietro da Marciano--the
brother of Count Rinuccio da Marciano--when this gentleman fell into his
hands at Medicina.
Two days before the treaty was signed, Bentivogli had seized four
members of the powerful House of Marescotti. This family was related to
the exiled Malvezzi, who were in arms with Cesare, and Bentivogli feared
that communications might be passing between the two to his undoing.
On that suspicion he kept them prisoners for the present, nor did be
release them when the treaty was signed, nor yet when, amid public
rejoicings expressing the relief of the Bolognese, it was published on
May 2.
Hermes Bentivogli--Giovanni’s youngest son--was on guard at the palace
with several other young Bolognese patricians, and he incited these to
go with him to make an end of the traitors who had sought to destroy the
peace by their alleged plottings with Bentivogli’s enemies in Cesare’s
camp. He led his companions to the chamber where the Marescotti were
confined, and there, more or less in cold blood, those four gentlemen
were murdered for no better reason--ostensibly--than because it was
suspected they had been in communication with their relatives in the
Duke of Valentinois’s army. That was the way of the Cinquecento, which
appears to have held few things of less account than human life.
In passing, it may be mentioned that Guicciardini, of course, does his
ludicrous best to make this murder appear--at least indirectly, since
directly it would be impossible--the work of Cesare Borgia.
As for Castel Bolognese itself, Cesare Borgia sent a thousand
demolishers in the following July to raze it to the ground. It is said
to have been the most beautiful castle in the Romagna; but Cesare had
other qualities than beauty to consider in the matter of a stronghold.
Its commanding position rendered it almost in the nature of a gateway
controlling, as we know, the road from Faenza to Imola, and its
occupation by the Bolognese or other enemies in time of disturbance
might be of serious consequence to Cesare. Therefore he ruthlessly
ordered Ramiro de Lorqua to set about its demolition.
The Council of Castel Bolognese made great protest, and implored Ramiro
to stay his hand until they should have communicated with the duke
petitioning for the castle’s preservation; but Ramiro--a hard, stern
man, and Cesare’s most active officer in the Romagna--told them bluntly
that to petition the duke in such a matter would be no better than a
waste of time. He was no more than right; for Cesare, being resolved
upon the expediency of the castle’s destruction, would hardly be likely
to listen to sentimental reasonings for its preservation. Confident of
this, Ramiro without more ado set about the execution of the orders he
had received. He pulled down the walls and filled up the moat, until
nothing remained so much as to show the place where the fortress had
stood.
Another fortress which shared the fate of Castel Bolognese was the
Castle of Sant’ Arcangelo, and similarly would Cesare have disposed
of Solarolo, but that, being of lesser importance and the inhabitants
offering, in their petition for its preservation, to undertake,
themselves, the payment of the Castellan, he allowed it to remain.
Scarcely was the treaty with Bologna signed than Cesare received letters
from the Pope recalling him to Rome, and recommending that he should not
molest the Florentines in his passage--a recommendation which Alexander
deemed very necessary considering the disposition towards Florence
of Vitelli and Orsini. He foresaw that they would employ arguments to
induce Valentinois into an enterprise of which all the cost would be
his, and all the possible profit their own.
The duke would certainly have obeyed and avoided Tuscany, but
that--precisely as the shrewd Pope had feared--Vitelli and Orsini
implored him to march through Florentine territory. Vitelli, indeed,
flung himself on his knees before Cesare in the vehemence of his
supplications, urging that his only motive was to effect the deliverance
from his unjust imprisonment of Cerbone, who had been his executed
brother’s chancellor. Beyond that, he swore he would make no demands
upon Florence, that he would not attempt to mix himself in the affairs
of the Medici, and that he would do no violence to town or country.
Thus implored, Cesare gave way. Probably he remembered the very
circumstances under which Vitelli had joined his banner, and considered
that he could not now oppose a request backed by a promise of so much
moderation; so on May 7 he sent his envoys to the Signory to crave leave
of passage for his troops through Florentine territory.
Whilst still in the Bolognese he was sought out by Giuliano de’Medici,
who begged to be allowed to accompany him, a request which Cesare
instantly refused, as being contrary to that to which he had engaged
himself, and he caused Giuliano to fall behind at Lojano. Nor would he
so much as receive in audience Piero de’Medici, who likewise sought to
join him in Siennese territory, as soon as he perceived what was toward.
Yet, however much the duke protested that he had no intention to make
any change in the State of Florence, there were few who believed him.
Florence, weary and sorely reduced by the long struggle of the Pisan
war, was an easy prey. Conscious of this, great was her anxiety and
alarm at Cesare’s request for passage. The Signory replied granting him
the permission sought, but imposing the condition that he should keep to
the country, refraining from entering any town, nor bring with him into
Florentine territory Vitelli, Orsini, or any other enemy of the existing
government. It happened, however, that when the Florentine ambassador
reached him with this reply the duke was already over the frontier of
Tuscany with the excluded condottieri in his train.
It was incumbent upon him, as a consequence, to vindicate this
high-handed anticipation of the unqualified Florentine permission which
had not arrived. So he declared that he had been offended last year by
Florence in the matter of Forli, and again this year in the matter of
Faenza, both of which cities he charged the Signory with having assisted
to resist him, and he announced that, to justify his intentions so far
as Florence was concerned, he would explain himself at Barberino.
There, on May 12, he gave audience to the ambassador. He declared to him
that he desired a good understanding with Florence, and that she should
offer no hindrance to the conquest of Piombino, upon which he was now
bound; adding that since he placed no trust in the present government,
which already had broken faith with him, he would require some good
security for the treaty to be made. Of reinstating the Medici he said
nothing; but he demanded that some satisfaction be given Vitelli and
Orsini, and, to quicken Florence in coming to a decision, he pushed
forward with his army as far as Forno dei Campi--almost under her very
walls.
The Republic was thrown into consternation. Instantly she got together
what forces she disposed of, and proceeded to fling her artillery into
the Arno, to the end that she should be constrained neither to refuse it
to Cesare upon his demand, nor yet to deliver it.
Macchiavelli censures the Signory’s conduct of this affair as impolitic.
He contends that the duke, being in great strength of arms, and Florence
not armed at all, and therefore in no case to hinder his passage, it
would have been wiser and the Signory would better have saved its face
and dignity, had it accorded Cesare the permission to pass which he
demanded, rather than have been subjected to behold him enforce that
passage by weight of arms. But all that now concerned the Florentines
was to be rid of an army whose presence in their territory was a
constant menace. And to gain that end they were ready to give any
undertakings, just as they were resolved to fulfil none.
Similarly, it chanced that Cesare was in no less a hurry to be gone; for
he had received another letter from the Pope commanding his withdrawal,
and in addition, he was being plagued by Vitelli and Orsini--grown
restive--with entreaties for permission to go into either Florence or
Pistoja, where they did not lack for friends. To resist them Cesare had
need of all the severity and resolution he could command; and he even
went so far as to back his refusal by a threat himself to take up arms
against them if they insisted.
On the 15th, at last, the treaty--which amounted to an offensive and
defensive alliance--was signed. By the terms of this, Florence undertook
to give Cesare a condotta of 300 lances for three years, to be used in
Florentine service, with a stipend of 36,000 ducats yearly. How much
this really meant the duke was to discover two days later, when he
sent to ask the Signory to lend him some cannon for the emprise against
Piombino, and to pay him the first instalment of one quarter of the
yearly stipend before he left Florentine territory. The Signory replied
that, by the terms of the agreement, there was no obligation for
the immediate payment of the instalment, whilst in the matter of the
artillery they put him off from day to day, until Cesare understood that
their only aim in signing the treaty had been the immediate one of being
rid of his army.
The risk Florence incurred in so playing fast-and-loose with such a
man, particularly in a moment of such utter unfitness to resist him, is,
notwithstanding the French protection enjoyed by the Signory, amazing
in its reckless audacity. It was fortunate for Florence that the Pope’s
orders tied the duke’s hands--and it may be that of this the Signory
had knowledge, and that it was upon such knowledge, in conjunction with
France’s protection, that it was presuming. Cesare took the matter in
the spirit of an excellent loser.
Not a hint of his chagrin and resentment did he betray; instead, he set
about furnishing his needs elsewhere, sending Vitelli to Pisa with a
request for artillery, a request to which Pisa very readily responded,
as much on Vitelli’s account as on the duke’s. As for Florence, if
Cesare Borgia could be terribly swift in punishing, he could also be
formidably slow. If he could strike upon the instant where the opening
for a blow appeared, he could also wait for months until the opening
should be found. He waited now.
It would be at about this time that young Loenardo da Vinci sought
employment in Cesare Borgia’s service. Leonardo had been in Milan until
the summer of 1500, when he repaired to Florence in quest of better
fortune; but, finding little or no work to engage him there, he took the
chance of the duke of Valentinois’s passage to offer his service to one
whose liberal patronage of the arts was become proverbial. Cesare
took him into his employ as engineer and architect, leaving him in the
Romagna for the present. Leonardo may have superintended the repairs of
the Castle of Forli, whilst he certainly built the canal from Cesena to
the Porto Cesenatico, before rejoining the duke in Rome.
On May 25 Cesare moved by the way of the valley of Cecina to try
conclusions with Giacomo d’Appiano, Tyrant of Piombino, who with some
Genoese and some Florentine aid, was disposed to offer resistance to the
duke. The first strategic movement in this affair must be the capture
of the Isle of Elba, whence aid might reach Piombino on its promontory
thrusting out into the sea. For this purpose the Pope sent from Civita
Vecchia six galleys, three brigantines, and two galleons under the
command of Lodovico Mosca, captain of the papal navy, whilst Cesare
was further reinforced by some vessels sent him from Pisa together with
eight pieces of cannon. With these he made an easy capture of Elba and
Pianosa. That done, he proceeded to lay siege to Piombino, which, after
making a gallant resistance enduring for two months, was finally pressed
to capitulate.
Long before that happened, however, Cesare had taken his departure.
Being awaited in Rome, he was unable to conduct the siege operations
in person. So he quitted Piombino in June to join the French under
d’Aubigny, bound at last upon the conquest of Naples, and claiming--as
their treaty with him provided--Cesare’s collaboration.