THE FIRST YEAR OF SOLDIERING AT TRICHINOPOLI AND ARCOT
The state of affairs in Trichinopoli was sufficient to cause
considerable alarm as to the result of the war. Chanda Sahib was
besieging that fortress with a very large native force, aided by 900
Frenchmen. His rival, Muhammad Ali, depended solely on the 600
English who were assisting him, for of his own troops there were but
5000, and of these 2000 were horsemen.
But that which most impressed Clive when he arrived there with
Captain Clarke early in August was the depression which filled the
minds of the native prince and the English soldiers. The treasury of
Muhammad Ali was exhausted, and he despaired of success. The English
soldiers had no confidence in their leaders, and, with a few
exceptions,[1] the leaders had no confidence in themselves. To rouse
leaders and men from their apathy Clive felt that something startling
must be attempted. Not indeed at Trichinopoli, for Captain Gingens,
who commanded there, though a brave man, was scarcely equal to taking
{52}a bold initiative in face of the preponderating troops of the
enemy. Alike at school, and in his researches in the Governor's
library at Madras, Clive had read of the achievements of great
commanders who, pressed hard by enemies at home, had changed the fate
of the campaign by carrying the war into the enemy's country. What an
opportunity for such a strategy where he was! To take Trichinopoli
Chanda Sahib had massed all, or nearly all, his available troops
before that place, leaving the capital of the Karnatik, Arcot,
absolutely denuded of trustworthy fighting men. The true method of
relieving the former place was to seize and hold the latter.
Impressed with this idea, Clive returned to Fort St. David and
communicated it to Mr. Saunders. This large-minded man embraced the
plan with fervour, and although at the two principal places held by
the English, Madras and Fort St. David, he had but 350 English
soldiers, he resolved to risk 200 of them on the expedition.[2] The
command of it he gave to Clive, but one month before a simple
civilian, and despatched him forthwith to Madras, to march thence
with his raw levies, most of them recently arrived from England.
[Footnote 1: One of these exceptions was Captain John Dalton, whose
journal, published in 1886 (Messrs. W. H. Allen & Co.), adds much to
our knowledge of the individuals engaged in the campaign.]
[Footnote 2: Forrest, page 10. The Board unanimously concurred with
Mr. Saunders.]
It was on the 26th of August, 1751, that Clive set forth from Madras
on the march which was to bring to him immortal fame, and to secure
for his countrymen the first footing on the ladder which was to
conduct them to empire. He had with him 200 English {53}soldiers, 300
sipahis, and three small field-pieces. Of his eight officers, four
were volunteers from the civil service who, with two of the others,
had never been under fire. On the 29th the little force reached
Kanchipuram, 42 miles from Madras and 27 from Arcot. There he learned
that that place was garrisoned by about 1200 native soldiers, that
the discipline was lax, and that a surprise was quite feasible; but
that the place itself was capable of a good defence. He did not wait
longer. Setting out in a terrible storm, he reached the vicinity of
Arcot on the 31st, surprised the fort, and compelled the town to
surrender, without losing a single man. Having taken measures to
store provisions, he marched on the 4th September to the mud fort of
Timeri, frightened the 600 native soldiers encamped there into
retreating, and returned. Two days later, having been informed that
the enemy had again gathered there to the number of 2000, he marched
again against them, attacked and completely defeated them. From want
of heavy guns he did not take the fort.
Relieved from the chances of immediate attack, Clive returned to
improve, as far as he could, the defences of the place he had
captured. One of his first acts had been to write to Madras for some
18-pounder guns. These were at once despatched. But the enemy, now
fully awake, attempted to intercept them at Kanchipuram. To save his
guns Clive marched thither with all his force except 80 men. He did
save the guns, but the enemy, profiting by his {54}absence, attacked
Arcot with all their available numbers. The garrison, however, small
as it was (30 Englishmen and 50 sipahis), had become imbued with
their leader's spirit. They repulsed the attack, Clive brought the
guns into the fort, and the enemy dispersed.
Meanwhile the news of the brilliant enterprise had spread far and
wide; had brought hope to the defenders of Trichinopoli, and alarm
and irritation to Chanda Sahib and his French allies. More even than
that. The important kingdom of Mysore, the ruler of which had been
long pressed by the rival combatants, declared now in favour of
Muhammad Ali, and sent an army under its Dalwai (Prime Minister) to
assist him. The native chiefs who ruled the territories which
connected the beleaguered town with the eastern coast followed the
example of Mysore;--an enormous gain, for it ensured the safety of
the English convoys from the coast. Greatly impressed with these
defections, Chanda Sahib at once despatched 3000 of his best troops
to join the forces which his son, Raja Sahib, was commanding in North
Arcot. There they would be joined by 150 Frenchmen. One of Clive's
objects had thus been already attained. The capture of Arcot had
enormously weakened the enemy's attack: had more than proportionately
increased the strength of the defence of Trichinopoli.
The eyes of India south of the great Vindhyan range were now turned
upon Arcot. Upon its successful or unsuccessful defence depended the
future in India of the two European nations which, though
{55}nominally at peace, were warring desperately against each other.
The siege began on the 23rd of September. It was characterized by
extraordinary tenacity, great daring, infinite powers of resource, on
the part of Clive and the defenders. The sipahis vied with the
English alike in courage and in capacity to withstand fatigue,
hunger, and thirst. Their self-denial, displayed when they insisted
that the water which was brought to them under much difficulty should
be offered first to their European comrades, went the round of the
world. It gave evidence of the cordiality which was to exist for a
century, and to be renewed in 1861-2 under conditions more favourable
than ever. At length, after more than seven weeks of continuous
pounding, the breach became practicable. The rumour that the great
Maratha soldier, Morari Rao, was approaching the place to lend a hand
to Clive, determined Raja Sahib to utilize his advantage without
delay. On the 14th of November he sent every available man to the
breach. The garrison, enfeebled though they were by privations, few
in number from their losses, separated by the necessities of the
defence, met their assailants with a courage as stern, a resolution
as dogged, as that which, in difficult circumstances, English
soldiers have always displayed. After an hour's fierce fighting, in
which the French took no part, the besiegers fell back, beaten,
baffled, and humiliated. At two o'clock that afternoon they begged to
be allowed to bury their dead. At two o'clock the following morning
they disappeared in the direction of Vellore.
{56}Thus ended the siege of Arcot. It had lasted fifty days. The
manner in which it ended gave the English, and especially the English
leader, a prestige which had an enormous effect on the campaigns that
followed. What a great thing this much-abused 'prestige' is in India
was illustrated by the fact that the minds of the native princes and
peoples all over the southern part of the peninsula turned to Clive
as to a master whom they would follow to the death. He inverted the
positions of the two nations, confounded by his brilliant action the
schemes of Dupleix, and, very soon afterwards, was able to impose his
will, representing the will of the English nation, upon all the
native princes who ruled or reigned in the territories of Haidarabad
and the Karnatik.
For--another great feature in the character of this man--Clive never
left a work half-finished. The blow, he felt, was weak and paltry
unless it were driven home. So he felt, so he acted, on this
occasion. On the 19th he took Timeri, the fort which had before
baffled him. Joined then by Morari Rao with 1000 Maratha horsemen, he
marched on Arni, seventeen miles south of Arcot, to attack Raja
Sahib, who had taken post there with the army which had lately
besieged him, reinforced by French troops just arrived from
Pondicherry. The superiority in numbers of the force of Raja Sahib
was so great that, when he noted the approach of Clive, he turned to
meet him. Clive halted where he was. He had recognized that his
position was excellent for defence, covered in front {57}by
rice-fields impracticable for guns, on the right by a village, and on
the left by a grove of palm-trees. There he ranged his troops to meet
the threatened attack.
It came very quickly, for the space between the two forces was but
300 yards. The enemy had discovered a narrow causeway leading across
the marshy ground to the village on Clive's right. Heralding their
approach with an advance of cavalry, they directed a portion of their
horsemen to assail the village on the right; another portion to drive
Morari Rao from the grove; whilst the main body of the infantry
should cross the causeway. The last-named was a dangerous operation
in the face of a man like Clive, for whilst the narrowness of the
causeway rendered the advance slow, it gave time to Clive to
concentrate upon it the fire of his guns. And this he did. For a time
the French, who led the attack, marched boldly. At length they came
under the full fire of the guns. It was the story of the bridge of
Arcola, but there was no Bonaparte to lead them on. They hesitated,
halted, then fell back with precipitation; and, quitting the
causeway, formed on the rice-fields, almost touching the cavalry on
their left, who were fighting fiercely to gain an entrance into the
village. This was the supreme moment, and Clive's genius utilized it
to the utmost. Whilst the enemy were busily engaged on the right and
left, their centre still reeling under the losses sustained on the
causeway, he detached a body of English soldiers into the
{58}village, directing them to seize the head of the causeway, and,
traversing it rapidly with a portion of the sipahis, to dash on the
enemy's centre, and seize their guns. Well was he served. No sooner
did the enemy perceive the English on the causeway than a panic
struck their centre, and they hastened to fall back. The panic
communicated itself to the two wings, already severely handled; they
too let go their hold, and turned to follow their comrades. True to
the principle referred to in a preceding page, Clive pressed them
hardly, not staying pursuit until darkness rendered it fruitless. The
record of this, his first real battle, fought against more than
double his numbers, was a splendid one. Whilst his own losses were
but eight sipahis of his own force, and some fifty horsemen of his
Maratha allies, there were killed or wounded fifty Frenchmen and
about three times that number of the natives. Whilst the English had
fought mostly under cover, the enemy had had the disadvantage of
being exposed, especially on the causeway.
Fit sequel to the defence of Arcot was this fight at Arni. It
dispersed the army of Raja Sahib, caused many of his soldiers, always
in the East inclined to side with the strongest, to desert to the
victors; it induced the ruler of the fort of Arni to declare for
Muhammad Ali; and it deprived the enemy of their military chest. From
its field Clive marched rapidly on Kanchipuram, took possession,
after a short siege, of the strong pagoda which, meanwhile, had been
{59}seized by the enemy; then, having placed in Arcot a sufficient
garrison, returned to Madras, thence to Fort St. David, having
carried out to the letter the programme he had submitted at the
latter place to Governor Saunders.
Well had he done it. The army of Chanda Sahib, doubled up by the
terrible blow struck in the very centre of his possessions, still
indeed held the position before Trichinopoli, but, from an enemy
confident, boastful, certain of ultimate success, he had become an
enemy timid, irresolute, doubtful of the issue, shrinking from his
own shadow. The prestige gained by the young Englishman paralyzed his
vitality. It required apparently but one more blow to complete his
demoralization. The one condition of that blow was that it must be
struck quickly, suddenly, before the enemy should have time to
recover. Considerations such as these, we may be sure, formed the
staple of the conversations at Fort St. David between the young
captain and the Governor after the return of the former from Arcot.
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