POLAND AND BOHEMIA.
I. The Contrast—National Character of the Poles—Our Lady
of Csenstochova—Dancing Peasants—Galician Poles—Selfish
Policy—Austria a Slav State.
II. The Poles in Russia—Russia’s Repressive Measures—The
Slav Ideal—A Better Understanding—The Poles in
Prussia—The Iron Heel—Law of Expropriation.
III. Csech Characteristics—Professor Masaryk—Jan
Huss—Slav Puritans—The Hradćin—Modern Politics.
I.
Roughly speaking the Group of the Northern Slavs includes twenty
million Poles and eight million Csechs. Numerically, therefore, they
are the greatest of the unliberated Slav peoples. Bohemia and her
sister-country Moravia are under Austrian rule, while Poland has been
dismembered and partitioned between Russia, Germany and Austria. At one
time both countries were great and flourishing, and played a prominent
part in history. In 1526 the Csechs acknowledged the Hapsburgs as
their ruler,[6] and Bohemia’s political decay and gradual loss of
independence date both from this point. The first partition of Poland
in 1772 deprived the Republic of liberty. Her dismemberment was finally
completed and sealed by the third partition in 1795, and henceforth the
Poles were even deprived of the possibility of co-operating as a nation.
The Csechs and Poles have both passed through a national tragedy,
but of the two the Polish tragedy makes a stronger appeal to the
imagination, because of the contrast between their former greatness and
their present position, the high level of their culture, and the lofty
principles at stake in the Great Polish Revolution. The Poles fell
victims to the foreign yoke just as their civilization, their culture,
and their _esprit_ were on the fairway to rival the intellectual
splendours of France under Louis XIV. They were a brilliant
people—mentally and intellectually refined, but physically decadent,
and quite incapable of surviving their political freedom. They yielded
to listless sentimentality and bewailed their lost greatness instead
of fighting to retrieve it. You may love the Poles with your _heart_
but never with your reason! In this they are the very antithesis to the
Csechs whom you cannot love except with your reason. You may admire
them for the culture they have so laboriously won, but you cannot love
them for it.
To the German and Austrian the Csech presents a comic type. But no one
looks upon the Pole as comic; you hate him or you love him, but you
cannot ridicule him—there is something great and tragic about him. The
Russians who hate him for _political_ reasons are fired by religious
fanaticism. They hate the Jesuitical principles of the Pole. The
Germans hate the Polish want of management, and “Polnische Wirtschaft”
(“Polish management”) is a German idiom. But no one would insult Polish
idealism and the innate nobility of the Pole. He compares with the
Csech as Don Quixote with Sancho Panza. He is a dreamer and visionary
who prostrates himself before an invisible shrine and awaits the
miracle of salvation and liberation. This life of dreams has endowed
the modern Pole with hyper-sensitive nerves, dogmatic onesidedness,
and extreme passivity. Lost in the contemplation of their royal past,
the Polish people wait in breathless silence for the first bird-note to
herald the dawn of freedom that shall dispel the night of tribulation.
But, while the conscience of the nation languishes, crucified in the
bitter suffering of a Messianic ideal, the Masses—the common people—are
sane and sturdy; they live and multiply far removed from the griefs of
the Classes. Their hard life has made them dull and unfeeling; caught
in a world of factories, mines, and social democracy, they are only
interested in their own immediate concerns and personal pleasures.
Anything beyond that they expect from the mediation of “Bogarodjitza”
(Mother of God).
Wijspianski, a fine Polish dramatist, has strikingly sketched the
national character in one single scene in his play “Wesele” (The
Wedding). The people are dancing their Polonaise and Mazurka, with
gay cockades and ribands on their shoulders. The pretty bride leads
off with her herculean bridegroom. Suddenly Yasiek rushes in upon the
dancers and cries, “To arms! rise and rebel, for Poland!” But the
couples—as if bewitched—continue to dance the _national_ measure.
Yasiek, bitterly disappointed, sees his hopes blighted and, choked
with despair, he sinks to the ground. But the couples go on dancing,
and he is _trampled to death_ by the feet of those whom he came to
lead to freedom. This scene epitomises the position of affairs in
modern Poland—the despair of the great lord with his pedigree, broad
acres, and capital, who has absolutely no hold over the plain people
because they have turned away from him. They have lost their rights,
their land and their traditions; the only link between the two is the
Catholic ideal, the ideal of _Polish_ Catholicism, which is hallowed in
the image of Our Lady of Csenstochova, whose brow is encircled with the
crown of the ancient Queens of Poland.
The younger generation in Poland has realized that this link between
the Classes and Masses must rest on a surer foundation.
Between the aristocracy and the masses has arisen the class of
the _educated poor_. These people are mainly of Russian descent,
but the sons of Polish Jews form an important proportion and have
acquired considerable influence, chiefly in the journalistic world.
This young Poland saw itself confronted by a great vanished Polish
age of romanticists and poets, with pronounced aristocratic and
Catholic sentiments. The whole intellectual struggle of the modern
democratic generation consists in an attempt to find contact with this
past. Science also is endeavouring to reconcile the spirit of the
present with the spirit of the past, and hopes to prepare the future
development of an individualistic Polish culture on this foundation.
The contrast between German and Polish culture is the contrast
between the culture of the masses and the culture of the individual.
The principal social feature in mediæval Germany was _feudalism_.
Germany was ruled by a number of feudal _princes_, Poland by a number
of aristocratic _families_. But this _régime_ proved disastrous to
Poland. A state where individuals rule by mutual consent is bound to
develop differently from one where families rule without any mutual
consent. In the expansive Western monarchies the power of the State
increased, while the aristocratic republic of Poland steadily declined.
The main reason for this difference probably lies in the geographical
position of Poland. It lay too far from the West—too far from Rome and
its culture.
* * * * *
The province of Galicia, which fell to Austria’s share by the partition
of Poland, undoubtedly fared better than the rest of the country. It
is inhabited by 4,252,483 Poles and 3,381,570 Ruthenes (including
Bukovina). As geographical and racial neighbours of the Csechs, who
were already displaying the greatest determination in their national
struggle, the great population bade fair to become a danger to Austrian
policy. Vienna was quick to realize this, and arranged her tactics
towards the Poles accordingly. As soon as the Russian and German Poles
began to be down-trodden, it was an easy matter to dispose of any
separatist tendency among the Austrian Poles by reminding them of the
position of their brothers. At home the Government began by fomenting
the national discord between the Poles and the Ruthenes. It neglected
the latter in favour of the Poles, and absolutely disregarded their
reasonable claims. The Poles were not only granted great national
and political concessions; they became the Slav favourite of the
Viennese ministry. Not only were they represented by their own
“_Landmannsminister_” (“the Secretary for Galicia,” so to say), but
one other important portfolio (usually that of Finance) was always
entrusted to a Pole.
The Poles were quite content with this position and supported Austrian
policy accordingly. As this policy is above all things anti-Slav, this
meant that the most chivalrous of all the Slav nations became a tool
in the hands of Slavdom’s chief oppressor. This was partly due to the
fact that this staunchly Catholic people is surrounded by non-Catholic
enemies—by Protestant Germans on the one hand and Orthodox Russians
on the other. Moreover, they look upon Catholicism as the one safe
harbor—hence their attachment to Roman Catholic Austria. Here also
lies the clue to Polish views, their sympathies and antipathies. But
there is no justification for this position. Catholicism is not a Slav
national religion, and can never become part of the soul of a Slav
people. Strictly speaking, it is responsible for the decline of part
of the Slav race. _All_ Catholic Slav countries up to date have been
in captivity, whereas _all_ such Slavs as have retained their national
orthodox religion are _free_. It is quite natural that the Poles should
cling to Catholicism as an acquired religion which appeals to them,
but they should not have used it as a national and traditional basis
for their attitude towards the rest of the Slavs. It is a mistake
which has done little good to their own national aspirations, and
incalculable harm to the Slav cause.
In many Slav circles there is a tendency to ascribe this attitude of
the Poles, not to their Messianic ideal, but to a purely individual
egotism. This view is at least partially true, were it only because
Polish politics are not the politics of the nation, but of the ruling
class. The Polish aristocracy, who were unable to forget their past
glories, saw in the feudal and aristocratic principles of the Austrian
Government a possibility of retaining their position in the Dual
Monarchy. They made full use of their opportunities even while (in
theory) they were careful to guard Polish national interests. This
aristocracy had no feeling for the common Slav cause, and whenever they
had a chance of authority (Goluchowski, Bilinski) they have proved
themselves a positive danger to the cause. That this aristocracy has
cast its spell over the greater part of the educated classes and
formed political parties as it chose is due to the inherent moral
dependence of the Pole upon his aristocracy;—snobbery is as much a
disease with him as Roman Catholicism. Not however among the common
people are they always the heedless dancers of Wijspianski’s drama.
They allow everything to pass _over_ them, and only trample upon that
which happens to lie beneath their feet. Moreover, their inmost soul
is rich in the true Slav qualities; but this wealth is hidden as in a
fast-locked casket, and there it will lie until the radiant smile of
the “Mother of God” of Csenstochova shall miraculously reveal it.
For a long time Polish politics have disturbed the Slav balance in the
Dual Monarchy. The Austro-Hungarian monarchy is properly a Slav State
in the fullest sense of the word. According to official statistics
22,821,864 out of 51,351,531 souls are Slavs. The ruling races, Germans
and Hungarians, number 21,259,644 between them, and the remainder are
accounted for by Roumanians, Italians and other nationalities. It must
be pointed out that Slavs living in Hungary (especially in Baczka and
in the Banat) are—much against their will—simply entered in the census
as Hungarians, and that in like manner hundreds of thousands of Slavs
in Bohemia, Carinthia, Styria and Carniola are put down as Germans.
Protests against these proceedings pass unheeded, and Slav National
Census Unions were formed to check the Governmental statistics;
according to these more than 50 per cent. of the entire population
are Slavs. This percentage is proportionately increased if we further
include the Slav emigrants in Australia and America. These number
about five million, and would doubtless return to their homes if more
tolerable conditions could be procured.
And yet this Monarchy aspires to be anything but a Slav State. German
and Magyar rule has sought to swamp the Slav element in every possible
way. Following Metternich’s principle “_divide et impera_” the Slavs
were divided into two “spheres.” The Northern Slavs were handed over to
Austrian autocracy, and the Southern Slavs to Magyar plutocracy. Thus
it came to pass that _9 million Germans_ rule _15 million Slavs_, and
10 million Magyars, Jews, or spurious Magyars rule 7-1/2 million Slavs.
Even if theoretically the balance of power seems more rational
in the Hungarian sphere, in the Austrian it is plainly absurdly
disproportionate. And here the Poles were the straw in the balance
which decided in favour of German hegemony. If the Poles had recognized
their duty to their own race the Slav question would long ago have
been on a better footing. A just understanding with the Ruthenes and
a joint national struggle with the Csechs would certainly have broken
German supremacy, or forced it to accord more tolerable conditions to
all the Slavs. But the Galician Poles have never done anything for the
Slav cause in the Monarchy, but rather sought to curry favour with the
Government in Vienna, and, by repudiating their kinship, to obtain
concessions for their own negative national ideals, and for their
intellectual and economic development. Austria had no objection to this
platonic nationalism so long as the Poles by their pro-German policy
supported her in oppressing the other Slavs.
The Csechs and Ruthenes have been specially handicapped in their
national struggle by the attitude of the Poles. And the result was an
implacable enmity between the Poles and the Ruthenes, which was, if
anything, encouraged by the Government. In this struggle the Ruthenes
undoubtedly fared the worse. They are in a national minority in
Galicia, and unmercifully oppressed by the Poles, who hate them all the
more for being the descendants of the hated Russians (Little Russians)
and because they refused to conceal their sympathy with Russia. The
Ruthenes fought hard for the right to speak their own tongue and have
their own school system. But the Poles were ruthlessly opposed to these
demands, which were in consequence also denied by the Government.
The struggle finally degenerated into wholesale denunciations of the
Ruthenes by the Poles, who accused their enemies of high treason and
conspiracy with Russia.
It must, however, be admitted that even among the Poles there were many
who deeply deplored this fratricidal struggle, and did their utmost
to induce the Northern Slavs of the Monarchy to combine in the common
cause. Time and again the Csech patriots urged the desirability of a
union, and, as similar appeals came from other Slav countries also,
the realization of a true _Pan-Slav_ and _democratic_ ideal often
seemed imminent. The spectre of _Pan-Germanism_, waiting like some
ravenous monster to devour the Slav nations limb by limb, appeared even
to the Poles, but unscrupulous politicians, bureaucratic upstarts, and
slippery diplomats from Vienna conjured up the bogey of _Russification_
to alarm them, and all patriotic efforts were in vain.
Still it is psychologically interesting that a Slav race through fear
of Russification should have thrown itself into the arms of—Germanism.
* * * * *
II.
The favoured position of the Poles in Austria contrasts sharply with
that of their brothers in Russia and Germany. They were oppressed in
every way;—Russian _official_ policy towards the Poles bears all the
stamp of autocratic tyranny. Their political rights are restricted to
a minimum, and as regards civil rights they are nearly as badly off as
the Russian Jews. Still it is characteristic that the reason for this
oppression lay, not in the national, but in the religious element.
Roman Catholicism, which was an advantage to the Austrian, proved a
misfortune to the Russian Poles. For the Russian looks upon Catholicism
as the very antithesis to his conception of the Slav ideal. Pravo-Slav
Russia, with her ancient, wondrously pure Slavo-religious traditions,
and all the warmth of her faith, could not take kindly to the haughty,
frigidly cold Catholic Poles. The great political power of the Holy
Synod, the supreme (unfortunately too clerical) representative body
of this faith, exercised an influence adverse to the Polish people,
and the Russian Government, which only too often has been the mere
executive of the will of the Holy Synod, established an autocratic
_régime_ with far-reaching national and personal restrictions. The
first result of this policy was unmitigated hatred on the part of the
Poles, and a craving for vengeance and freedom. The Russian Poles
intrigued with their Austrian brothers, and envied them their favoured
position. But the only support the Austrian Poles vouchsafed their
brothers was that they applied the Russian methods of oppression to the
Ruthenes.
Whoever knows anything of Russia’s repressive measures, will realize
that the Poles were in a hard case. Owing to the passive character of
the Poles their struggles were never sufficiently organized to assume
the proportions of a well organized revolution. But oppression has
strengthened their national self-reliance, their ideals have burned
more brightly, and a longing for freedom has entirely dominated them.
Still, even now, they are far more inclined to wait for the miracle
than to bestir themselves on their own behalf; and if in recent years
their position has somewhat improved, it is not so much due to their
own efforts as to the wave of modern thought among the Russians
themselves.
The _Russian Governmental_ policy made no distinction between the Poles
and her Russian subjects who were thirsting for social regeneration.
So the Russians discovered for themselves that they had to seek the
friendship and collaboration of the Poles. The wide horizon of the
modern Russian movement will not permit the exclusion of a single
capable member of the Tsar’s great realm from the benefits of the
future. Not only the Russian people, but the whole of Russia had to be
won over to the cause of the great ideal. The regeneration of Russia
was to herald the regeneration of the whole of the Slav race, and the
Poles as Slavs had a right to help in this work. The Russians have
always said that they are very fond of the Poles, but that they are not
sufficiently _Slav_—they ought to be Slavicized. The Russian Government
sought to accomplish this by violence, whereas the _Russian people_,
represented by the Russian revolutionaries, chose the better path of
mutual understanding and respect. Of course, the official policy of
the Holy Synod is still in force, and although the constitutional
manifesto and the Duma have brought about certain changes, these are
at present quite unimportant. The Poles, however, are winning an
increasing number of friends and advocates among the Russians, who are
pleading for equal rights and a constitution for Poland. Moreover, the
times have changed, and when Russia was confronted by the present great
European crisis the Poles displayed a marvellous loyalty, which has,
perhaps, unintentionally brought them nearer the realization of their
dreams than they have ever been before. The Manifesto of the Grand Duke
Nikolai Nikolaievitch is the greatest event in Polish history since the
partition.
The hardest lot of all has befallen those Poles who have been most
loyal to their race. I mean those who came under Prussian rule. For
whereas Polish Slavdom is tolerated in Austria, and actually encouraged
in Russia, in Prussia it is remorselessly ground down under the iron
heel of Germanism. Germanization is carried out by Prussian rule,
aggressively, in a strictly military sense. It is not a question of
political tactics—no opinion at home or abroad is considered; there
is nothing but frank coercion. Germany’s ambitions are only too well
known—they have been advertised loudly enough, and they have been
expounded again quite recently in General von Bernhardi’s notorious
book, “Germany and the Next War”—a book written with all the brusque
insolence of which only a German is capable. If Germany’s future
programme includes the Germanizing of the whole of Europe, it is surely
superfluous to relate in detail how she strove to Germanize a people
under her own rule—it is one of the blackest chapters in the histories
of oppression.
By the constitution of Germany the Prussian Poles cannot forfeit their
rights as citizens of the realm. This circumstance afforded them a
chance of laying their grievances before the legislative assemblies.
But in spite of their gallant courage, the struggle brought them no
particular advantage except the moral satisfaction of knowing that
their pleading could reach the ear of Europe. But whenever their voice
grew too loud, the mailed fist fell on their lips and struck them dumb.
When the German Reichstag passed the Polish Expropriation Law (1886)[7]
all Europe was scandalized; but from the point of view of Germanization
it was highly successful. Germany disregarded foreign opinion and the
law was put in force.
It is to be hoped that the conclusion of the present European war will
also put an end to the sufferings of these martyrs, and that the whole
Polish nation will be granted an opportunity of applying its many
admirable qualities for its own welfare and for the union of the Slav
race.
* * * * *
III.
The Csechs have always been a strong, tenacious, energetic people, and
no sooner did they begin to feel the iron fist of their oppressors
than they opened a determined campaign against them and pitted
their strength against their tyrants. They have won their present
civilization inch by inch from their oppressors.
The eminent Csech political economist, Professor Masaryk, admirably
forecasts the future of his people. He says—“The humanistic ideal,
the ideal of regeneration, bears a deep national and historical
significance for us Csechs. A full and sincere grasp of the human ideal
will bridge over the spiritual and ethical dreams of centuries, and
enable us to advance with the vanguard of human progress. The Csech
humanitarian ideal is no romantic fallacy. Without work and effort the
humanitarian ideal is but dead; it demands that we shall everywhere
and systematically oppose ourselves to all that is bad, to all social
_un_humanity—both at home and abroad—with all its clerical, political
and national organs. The humanitarian ideal is not sentimentality—it
means work, work, and yet again work!”
Now all this is by no means a characteristic of the Csech people, but
only a forecast of what they shall be. Political tactics must always
correspond to the principles of decency and humanity. Masaryk further
says—“Our fame, our wars, and our intervention in the past have borne
a religious, not a national stamp. Our _national_ ideal is of more
recent birth—it only belongs to the last, and more especially to the
present century. The history of Bohemia must not be judged from this
standpoint.”
Perhaps this programme will prove too historical and too unpractical
for the present day. The small commercial and industrial Csech nation
is too far removed from the age of Jan Huss, and the Csech reformation
has lost its significance for them. But deep down in the soul of
the Csech people there still dwells a spark of the Hussite spirit.
Of course, the battle-cry is nationalist, the phrasing that of the
twentieth century, but the underlying spirit differs in no way from the
righteous indignation of Huss, when he preached against high-handed
oppression and violence. The physical inferior is never anxious to
see his affairs settled by physical force. For this reason it is not
a matter of indifference to the Csechs, whether they fight for a
higher principle or merely for material advantage. At present they are
principally fighting for their language, for the right to speak their
own tongue—they are fighting against Germanization. Their strongest
weapon in this fight is their striving for economic prosperity—a
physical power through which they may hope to obtain a spiritual
victory.
The principal trait in the Csech character is _initiative_. The very
name points to this, for “Csech” is derived from the old-Slav word
“Chenti,” meaning “to will” or “to begin.”
History finds the Csechs in the vanguard of all the Slav tribes in
their wanderings westward. Their legendary leader was Csech, one of
three brothers, and his tribe penetrated the farthest. In the Middle
Ages the Csechs were the first to challenge the power of Rome, and to
this day they send numbers of enterprising emigrants to all parts of
the world. But the Csechs have one great fault—they are fickle. Their
enthusiasm flashes up quickly and then as quickly dies down. This is
the reason of the failure of the Hussite Reformation. The Germans
finished what the Csechs began—Luther was the successor of Huss and
completed his work.
The Csechs are not by nature a commercial and industrial people. Their
business capacity is born of necessity—it is a weapon, not a means
of gain. It is kept going by an unwearied agitation on the part of
the national leaders, and if the Csech national ideal should suffer
shipwreck, then Csech finance, ambition, and industry will likewise
perish.
Sundry Slavophil thinkers would exclude the Csechs from the group
of Slav peoples, just because of their initiative and business
capacity. The Russian ethnologist Danilevski calls the Csech people a
monstrosity, a German people with a Slav tongue. But these men have
overlooked the fact that the foundation of modern Csech prosperity
was laid by the religion of the Csech Brethren. During the Catholic
reaction the Csech Protestants were driven from their possessions
and treated as aliens in their own country. Being thus compelled to
evolve a new means of gaining a livelihood, they turned to industry.
Trade and the towns were closed to them, and the Csech Brethren had
to seek refuge in the Bohemian and Moravian hills, and the Orlic
mountains. They became weavers, wood-carvers and miners, and laid the
foundation of the great modern Bohemian textile, glass and earthenware
industries. Religious considerations and nothing else have made the
Csechs into a mercantile nation. England’s wealth also springs from a
religious movement—the rise of Puritanism. Thrift and industry led to
the accumulation of capital. Only a religious man understands work and
thrift, and he alone knows how to utilise capital as a moral lever.
For this reason it would be wrong to adopt the views of the Russian
ethnologist. The Csech people _as they are_ have a right to their
future and to freedom.
* * * * *
In the centre of Prague, on the summit of the Hradčin, stands the
old Csech Royal Castle, a splendid monument of past greatness. Proud
and lofty, visible from afar, it speaks to the Csech people of the
days when it sheltered—not the foreign invader, but flesh of their
flesh, Csech kings and princes of their own blood. And even as it
is a monument of the past, it is also a beacon for the present and
the future. When the setting sun sheds his crimson glory upon Castle
and Hradčin, it seems as though the very stones were aglow with the
reflection of all the Csech blood that has been shed in the defence
of right and liberty. But—the royal splendour vanishes with the sun,
and the shadow of night descends on Castle and height like a symbol
of the present age of gloom. Day by day, with burning eyes, the Csech
reads the wordless message. Yet he does not give way to dreams, or sink
into deep melancholy, nor does he wait for a miracle. He clenches his
fist and smiles the grim smile of the tireless warrior. His fickleness
at the time of the Reformation weighs like a sin on his conscience,
but its ideals have set their mark upon him and quickened the seed of
_political_ reformation in his soul. In this matter the Csechs take the
lead among all the Slavs in Austria-Hungary.
I have already mentioned that in certain Slav circles the Csechs are
looked upon as Germans with a Slav tongue. But, if their industrial and
mercantile prosperity and certain individual characteristics lend some
colour to this view, it is quite refuted by the Csech activity in the
Slav national and political cause. In their sturdy and _progressive_
struggle against Germanization the Csechs have set the other Austrian
Slavs a tactical and practical example as to how the struggle should be
fought—_tactically_ on constitutional lines, and, _practically_, with
indomitable courage and perseverance.
In spite of their long subjection to an absolute autocracy, the Csechs
developed into so strong a political factor, that even Vienna began
to fear the weight of their hand. They achieved this not only from a
sense of self-preservation or separatist selfishness like the Poles,
but the Slav ideal runs like a gold thread through all they have done;
it is their motto, task and goal. They were beset from three sides,
by the Austrian Germans in all their power, by Polish opposition, and
by Magyar agitations and hostile influences in Vienna. The Southern
Slav deputies in the Reichstag were their only helpers in the unequal
struggle. But they never relaxed their energy and they never yielded a
position they had won.
The national struggle in Bohemia took on its present form in the first
half of the nineteenth century, and it first centred round “cultural”
interests as in other Slav countries. The love of the people for their
own language had to be established and even rekindled to a pitch of
fiery enthusiasm, and national education had also to be fostered by the
foundation of Csech national schools. The State was by no means anxious
to enlighten the people, and the number of schools maintained in the
country was quite inadequate. The fiscal schools were all German and
served to spread the German propaganda. But the Csech educated classes
founded schools at their own expense, as well as the “Matica Školska”
(School Union), which undertook the organization of these schools.
This was an effective counter-stroke to Germanization as well as a
good foundation for further success. Palacky, Kollar and Havliček were
leaders of the National movement of the time.
Palacky was the source from whom the others drew their inspiration. He
was a great thinker, a brilliant author, and a cautious, liberal-minded
politician who may be considered the founder of modern Csech national
life. And through him radiated the light that pointed the way which
these people must take. Kollar, the poet and publicist, and Havliček,
as politician and political economist, shared the Csech leadership
with Palacky, and paved the way for a great national intellectual
movement which kept pace with the national political movement. They
founded a strong nationalist party in Bohemia (The Old Csechs) in
opposition to the Viennese Government. With their majority in the
Landtag, and their appearance in the Viennese Parliament, the Csech
people became a factor with whom the Government had to reckon for good
or for evil—a people who refused to be ousted. Bohemia, which official
Austria loves to consider a German country, had to be divided into
“spheres.” The State had to pay for the upkeep of Csech schools and the
administration became bi-lingual! Of course, in accordance with the
usual Government policy, many Csech localities were included in German
spheres and promptly became bones of contention. The “Matica Školska”
founded more schools in these spheres to prevent the Germanization
of Csech children, whilst the German schools pursued their system of
an unofficial propaganda with the tacit support of the Government.
This state of affairs led to constant disturbances, which frequently
degenerated into riot and bloodshed. With the rise of the “Young
Csechs” the struggle assumed a more drastic and determined character,
for this party aimed at nothing less than a purely Csech government
for Bohemia, and a proportionate share in the management of Imperial
affairs. They repeatedly succeeded in wrecking the Austrian Government,
and under Prince Hohenlohe they were so strongly represented in the
Cabinet that they succeeded in making their power felt. The “Young
Csechs” have greatly helped the national cause in Bohemia, and also
furthered the Slav cause by their enthusiastic championship of the
All-Slav Ideal.
One of their leaders, Dr. Kramarz, who was very friendly with Russia,
has been specially active in this cause. Though the “Young Csechs” are
still the leading party, recent years have seen the rise of parties
even more radical in their demands. The Social-Nationals and the Csech
Radicals desire to see Bohemia an absolutely autonomous State, whereas
the followers of Professor Masaryk aim at the regeneration of the Csech
race on a different basis (see opening of this article).
Events have moved rapidly in Bohemia since the last Balkan war, which
made a profound impression on all the Austrian Slavs. Owing to the
uncompromising attitude taken up by the various parties, the Government
dissolved the Bohemian Landtag, suspended the constitution and placed
the administration in the hands of a Commission appointed by the
Government and responsible to none. The Csechs retorted by a violent
obstruction in the Viennese Parliament and so paralyzed the House, that
it had to be prorogued indefinitely. The Csechs demanded the immediate
convocation of the Landtag. “No Landtag, no Austrian Parliament,” was
their watchword, and they stood firm. When the crisis with Serbia and
the outbreak of the war occurred, the Parliament was unable to adopt
any attitude towards these events, and the only _constitutional body_
in the Monarchy able to deal with them was the Hungarian Parliament.
_PART II._
YOUGOSLAVIA.
(THE SOUTHERN SLAVS.)