THE ARMY IN NORTH AFRICA--1867-96
Turn now from the southern portion of the Dark Continent to the
northern. The researches of recent explorers, such as Mr. Stanley and
others, had opened up the previously unknown interior to a much greater
extent than had been effected before their exertions.
Southern Africa, as far as its white immigrant population was
concerned, was extending its political limits northward. The Congo
Free State was attempting to bring European civilisation down towards
the equator. The ideas of “Hinterland,” a preposterous notion, had
been advanced. All nations were bent on pushing from the sea towards
the rediscovered Mountains of the Moon. All Europe was burning to
get authority over some portion of the African coast-line, and every
State, whether it had colonising power or not, burned to claim as much
ground behind the surf-clad beach as it could get. But before this
earth-hunger assumed the proportions it did, there had been trouble in
the north-eastern portion of Africa, though this case was rather one
of national honour and prestige than desire for the extension of our
“sphere of influence.”
A serious war-cloud had arisen in Abyssinia, the forerunner of the many
disturbances which by degrees have since led to the opening up of the
heart of Africa to commerce. Abyssinia had seemed a promising field
for our trade, and Consul Cameron was despatched there to represent
the British Government and protect as far as possible the missionaries
who followed and preceded him. But Theodoros, the Negus, or emperor,
was a man of violent passions, and both tyrannical and a drunkard. He
fancied himself insulted because the British Government took no notice
of a letter he had addressed to the Queen. He told Consul Cameron
that she “can give you orders to visit my enemies, but she cannot
return a civil answer to my letter to her.” So he quarrelled with his
visitors, and threw them into prison. To save their lives, if possible,
and avenge the insult to the nation through our representative, an
expedition was fitted out under the command of Sir Robert Napier. It
was about 10,000 strong, and well equipped. It was largely composed of
Indian troops, stiffened by the 3rd Dragoons, and the 4th, 26th, 33rd
and 45th Regiments of the line, with artillery and Engineers.
The general plan of the campaign was simple; it was to release the
prisoners, defeat the emperor if he would fight, and destroy his
capital of Magdala. The difficulties were regarded as mainly physical.
The country was “a broken Libyan highland. Abyssinia is what a vaster
Switzerland would be, if transported to the tropics, and if bordered by
blazing deserts on each flank of its cool rocky peaks.” The climate was
reported good, the people warlike; their weapons were firearms, with
shields and swords, or lances. They had no field artillery, but some
heavy guns were reported to be at Magdala. The landing was effected at
Zoola, where two companies of the 33rd were the first to get on shore,
and pushed on to garrison the first depôt or post at Senafé, on the
borders of the territory of King Kassa of Tigre, who readily agreed not
to oppose, but to some extent assist, the invading army.
Hard as the advanced party of Engineers and Pioneers worked at
improving the road, the advance was slow and laborious. “We have
scaled,” says Henty, “mountains and descended precipices; we have
traversed along the face of deep ravines, where a false step was death;
we are familiar with smooth, slippery rock and with loose boulders;
and after this expedition it can hardly be said that any country is
impracticable for a determined army to advance. I hear, however, that
between us and Magdala there are perpendicular precipices running like
walls for miles, places which could scarcely be scaled by experienced
cragsmen, much less by loaded mules.” When within twenty-five miles in
a direct line from Magdala, and when the place was clearly visible,
they had to make a detour of sixty miles to avoid these obstacles.
But the valley of the Bachelo was reached, and descending 3800 feet
on one side by a fair road, the stream was forded, and the ascent of
the opposite side of the enormous ravine was begun. On reaching the
first level, fire was opened from the hill fortress, and a serious
sortie was made by a large irregular mass of infantry and cavalry. The
army was almost taken at a disadvantage. The nature of the country had
tended to lengthen the column, and there were but few troops up to the
front; but the Naval Brigade rocket-battery came into action, with the
4th, some Engineers, two companies of the 10th Native Infantry and a
squadron of the 3rd Native Cavalry had to bear the first brunt of the
first battle. It was enough, however, and the fighting did not last
long under the breechloading fire of the 4th, the first time the Snider
had been used in actual war. This disposed of one of the two bodies
into which the enemy had been divided; the other made for the baggage
defended by some of the 4th and the Punjaubees, supported by the steel
mountain battery of Colonel Penn, known therefore as the “Steel Pens,”
and the Abyssinian rush was checked by shell fire at 300 yards, and
the deadly fire of the breechloading rifle. The enemy fell back badly
beaten, while our own loss was only 30 men wounded and none killed. Of
about 5000 men who had rushed boldly to the attack of the head of the
British column, the bulk were destroyed or dispersed, and the ground
was covered with dead and wounded. The expenditure of ammunition was
serious. In one hour nearly ninety rounds per man had been discharged.
The next day came the “Easter Monday Review,” as the soldiers termed
it, and the storm of Theodore’s stronghold. Scaling ladders were
improvised from the bamboo dhooly-poles, and the handles of the
pioneers’ axes. But they were not needed. The guns and rockets opened
on the devoted fortress, and the storming column, formed of the
33rd, with Major Pritchard and the Engineers in front, the 45th in
support, and the remainder in reserve, pushed up the narrow path to
the entrance. Here, while efforts were made to break open the gate
(for the powder required for the purpose had been forgotten), some of
the 33rd managed to scramble up the side of the path, turned the flank
of the defenders of the barrier, and when a second gate at the top of
a steep flight of steps was destroyed, the place was taken. The loss
had been most slight, but the vengeance taken on a bloodthirsty tyrant
was complete. Theodore himself committed suicide, his fortress was
burned and destroyed, his queen died in our camp at Senafé, and Prince
Alamayu, his son, was taken to England. There he eventually became a
cadet at the Royal Military College, Sandhurst; and, dying of pneumonia
in 1880, was buried, by royal command, just outside the Royal Chapel of
St. George at Windsor.
With further researches and interest in Africa, and the greater
enterprise resulting from them, came the desire for more possessions
which would afford valuable outlets for our trade.
The finding of the sources of the Nile, the discovery of the Great
Lakes, the possibility of valuable gold-fields, the comparative
healthiness of the African uplands in the interior, all emphasised
again the future value of the great water way which drained those
inland seas, and terminated in the Egyptian Delta. It is to some
extent now, and might be one day fully made, the natural highway to
the heart of the Dark Continent. Directly or indirectly, politically
or instinctively, possibly both, the value of Egypt as the doorway
to Ethiopia became prominent. Probably no statesman really saw it at
first. But “there is a Providence that shapes our ends, rough hew them
how we will,” and the road to Central Africa from this side seems to be
only opened by the sword.
So dismissing the Eastern littoral and Zanzibar, where the question of
the penetration of the interior is far more a question of railways,
so as to get over the fever belt, than one of soldiers, the land of
Egypt became a serious factor in the awakening of Africa; as it was a
serious factor in Mediterranean politics when Pharaoh was king. But
the employment of the British army in Egypt in 1884 rose from what
most people would call a mere accident. It is possible that nothing is
seriously “accidental.” But while British interference in Egypt in the
first years of the century was due entirely to our war with France, our
present interference seems to have come from an instinctive feeling as
to the importance of securing, and teaching Egypt to improve, the one
natural highway to the uplands of the centre of Africa.
Theoretical as this may be, the practical fact of our second
interference in the land of Egypt, by landing there, arose from a very
simple cause. The Khedive of Egypt, Prince Tewfik, had made as his
Minister of War a turbulent and somewhat imperious soldier who aimed
certainly at a species of military dictatorship, if not at the supreme
power. Beloved by the Egyptian soldiery, and possessing some military
knowledge, he posed as a patriot, with the cry of “Egypt for the
Egyptians.” Between Mehemet Ali and Arabi there is but one difference.
The former succeeded, the latter failed. Nevertheless, such conduct,
with such a people, tended in the direction of anarchy. Anarchy might
at any time endanger the security of the Suez Canal, in which Great
Britain had an important pecuniary interest, and which was, moreover,
her shortest and best route to her Eastern possessions. Both France
and England claimed to have vital interests in the Nile Valley, and
at first there was an apparent accord between the two nations, to the
extent that a combined naval demonstration was made at Alexandria. In
this, however, the English ironclads very largely preponderated.
Riots and massacres on shore at once broke out. The native press was
bitterly hostile to England. Nor was it likely to be otherwise. No
self-respecting nation brooks foreign interference. Neither of the
Powers most interested would have admitted for a second of time such
interference at home; and Egypt being too weak to offer a formidable
resistance, only added bitterness to the native feeling of impotency.
Doubtless, only the most energetic sections of the people were
seriously in earnest. The vast mass of the people, the Fellahin, were
certainly more anxious about their daily bread than political freedom.
But so it is, and has been everywhere, in such popular revolts against
foreign domination. The heaven-born leaders lead, by their very force
of character; the mass follows. Whether such revolutions are for the
best, according to outside opinion, has nothing to do with the matter,
except only as regards the extent to which political revolt affects
foreign interests, which are mainly selfish.
All this the Egyptian leaders may have felt; and, admitting the
inherent corruption of all Eastern governments, and even the ambition
of those who seek to raise the storm, and not reap but guide the
whirlwind, there is nothing extraordinary in the effort made by those
who brought on the war against foreign interference to take the
government of their own country out of the hands of stranger powers.
Be all this as it may, it was decided by Europe, nominally, to coerce
the Egyptians; euphuistically, to help the Khedive against an armed and
threatening insurrection. The bombardment of Alexandria was decided on;
but the French warships steamed out to sea, and refused to co-operate.
The heavy fire of the ships soon silenced the shore batteries, and then
the seamen and marines were landed to save what was left of the town
from pillage. These were soon reinforced by battalions of infantry from
Malta.
Preparations were at once made for the despatch of considerable
reinforcements from home, and an Indian contingent, among which were
the Seaforth Highlanders and the 1st Manchester Regiment, was prepared
for despatch from India to the seat of war. Arabi made no effort to
oppose the military occupation of Alexandria, but contented himself
with strongly fortifying the position at Kafr ed Dowr, the neck of land
between Lakes Mareotis and Aboukir Bay. Some desultory skirmishes then
took place on the neutral ground between the city and the enemy’s lines.
The main expedition, under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir Garnet
Wolseley, embarked in August 1884 for the front. It consisted of the
First Division under General Willis, composed of the 2nd Battalion
Grenadier, the 2nd Coldstream, and the 1st Scots Guards, and the (18th)
2nd Royal Irish, the (84th) York and Lancaster, and (87th) Royal Irish
Fusilier Regiments, and the (50th) 1st West Kent, with two squadrons
of the 19th Hussars, the (46th) Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry,
and two batteries of artillery, with details. The Second Division,
commanded by Sir Edward Hamley, was formed of the 42nd, 75th, 79th, and
74th (or the Royal, Gordon, and Cameron Highlanders, with the Highland
Light Infantry), and the (35th) Sussex, (88th) Stafford, (49th)
Berkshire, and (53rd) Shropshire Light Infantry, with two squadrons of
the 10th Hussars, the 3-60th, and two batteries of artillery, etc.,
as divisional troops. The Cavalry Brigade contained three squadrons
of the Household Cavalry, and the 4th and 7th Dragoon Guards, with
Horse Artillery, etc., under Sir Drury Lowe. The Corps-Artillery
under General Goodenough had one battery of horse and three of field
artillery. Engineers and train were added in requisite proportion. An
ironclad train was also used during the operations outside Alexandria.
It was soon evident, however, that the frontal attack on the
enemy’s fortified position would be costly and, even if successful,
ineffective, as driving the Egyptian army back on the capital, which
it was necessary to seize. It was therefore decided to effect a change
of base; and, while deceiving the enemy by openly proclaiming that the
army was to be transferred to Aboukir Bay, to tranship the bulk of the
force to Ismailia, and move thence across the desert by the Sweet-water
Canal on Cairo. The several points on the Suez Canal were therefore
suddenly and rapidly seized by the fleet; the Seaforth Highlanders,
from India, advancing from Suez, seized Chalouffe, on the fresh water
Canal; and the bulk of the troops sailed for Ismailia. In so doing,
Sir Garnet, with a caution that in the conduct of so delicate an
operation was entirely justifiable, left Sir Edward Hamley, who took
command of Alexandria, in ignorance of what his real plan was, until
after the fleet had sailed. The controversy as to whether this was
right or not has, however, been warm and embittered.
The landing was rapidly accomplished, and after a brief delay the
mounted troops, with the York and Lancaster Regiment and the Royal
Marine Light Infantry, were pushed forward to Magfar and Tel el
Maskhuta, where a sharp skirmish took place with a force of all arms
about 7000 strong, and two batteries. Another took place the next day
near Mahsameh, and Tel el Maskhuta was occupied, with an advanced post
at Kassassin lock; behind these the army strung out along the line of
the Sweet-water Canal, as a forward movement in force was not possible
until sufficient stores had been collected in depôts well ahead, and
this, under the conditions of the ground, was necessarily a slow
operation.
While in this position the first “affair” of Kassassin was fought, in
which were engaged the Royal Marine Artillery, the Duke of Cornwall’s
Light Infantry, and the York and Lancaster Regiment, with a few cavalry
and artillery; and one peculiarity was a Krupp gun taken from the canal
and mounted on a truck, and worked by a detachment of Royal Marine
Artillery under Captain Tucker. The Royal Marine Light Infantry arrived
during the fight, and late in the evening the Household Cavalry and 7th
Dragoon Guards came up from Mahsameh and charged the Egyptian left.
As stores were pushed to the front, so the First Division became
concentrated between Maskhuta and Kassassin; and on the 29th August,
the Highland Brigade, under Alison, was, with Sir Edward Hamley,
ordered to Ismailia, leaving Sir Evelyn Wood with his brigade at
Alexandria, to watch the Kafr ed Dowr lines until the conclusion of
hostilities.
Early in September reinforcements were despatched to strengthen
Alexandria and protect the direct line of communications from Ismailia.
Here matters were still at a standstill, owing to the unavoidable
difficulties of transport; and frequent reconnaissances, involving
an occasional skirmish, were made towards Tel el Kebir, where the
enemy were now known to be in strength and heavily entrenched. That
this point was that in which a decisive battle for the possession of
the Delta might have to be fought, had been recognised before the
expedition left England. On the 9th, Arabi made his last offensive
effort on both sides of the canal, bringing on the second battle of
Kassassin; and on this occasion the troops he brought from Tel el
Kebir were reinforced by a force of five battalions from Salahieh to
the north; but the fighting was not severe and the loss on both sides
insignificant, while in retiring, the Egyptians abandoned three guns,
two of which were taken by the Royal Marine Light Infantry.
The army was now concentrated within striking distance of the first
objective, the defeat of the Egyptian army under Arabi. Repeated
reconnaissances had shown that in front of the village of Tel el
Kebir was a long line of entrenchments, the right resting on the
canal, the left, some four miles out _en l’air_ in the desert.
The desert, absolutely treeless, and without marked undulations,
afforded absolutely no cover, and to cross the fire-swept approach
against entrenched troops would have caused serious loss. Sir Garnet,
therefore, decided on making a night march to get within charging
distance, and thus inaugurated on a large scale the system of night
attacks, which, as a distinguished soldier long since remarked, will,
if properly prepared for and organised by a nation, cause it to win the
next great war.
The ground favoured the operation, but the distance was not
inconsiderable, and the danger of that unreasoning panic which
sometimes seizes the best troops was always present. At anyrate, any
manœuvring in the dark or the early dawn was out of the question. The
army must march in the order in which it was going to fight, and
therefore each battalion had one half in first and the other half in
second line, either marching in line formation or in line of companies
in column of fours at deploying interval, from which lines could
speedily and readily be formed. Extended order was not required for the
rush into the entrenchments which the general planned. It was not to be
a fire-action, but a shock-battle such as the Peninsula saw.
[Illustration: _Formation of the Line of Battle at Tel-el-Kebir,
13^{th} Sept^{r} 1882._]
Willis’s First Division was on the right, to it having been added
the battalion of Royal Marine Light Infantry, the Guards being in
second line, and the Cavalry and Horse Artillery on the right to sweep
round the enemy’s flank and threaten his retreat. In the centre was
Goodenough’s Artillery, acting both as a link to the two divisions,
and yet separating them. If panic in one wing did occur, this might
prevent its spreading to the other. On the left, the Highland Brigade
was in first line, and Sir Edward Hamley’s Division, the other brigade
of which was with Wood at Alexandria, was completed by a weak brigade
under Ashburnham, made of the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry and
the King’s Royal Rifles. In reserve were the Royal Marine Artillery
and 19th Hussars; with the reserve ammunition was one company of the
West Kent; on the railway, the armoured train with a 40-pounder worked
by bluejackets; the West Kent guarded the stores at Kassassin; and
along the line of communication to Ismailia were other troops. The
army started at 1.30 a.m. on the early morning of the 13th September;
the Indian Contingent, the Seaforths leading, moving off on the other
bank of the canal an hour later, so as not to alarm the inhabitants of
the small hamlet on that side, and so give Arabi earlier warning than
need be of the impending attack. The total strength was about 11,000
infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 60 guns. Halting for a few minutes at about
1000 yards from the enemy, the lines advanced, with the right, however,
rather thrown back, and then suddenly a storm of fire ran along the
long line of parapet, and when about 300 yards from it, with a wild
cheer, the Highland Brigade began the storm. There was much stubborn
fighting while it lasted, but in half an hour the enemy were beaten,
and flying in hot haste and great disorder towards Zagazig, pursued by
the cavalry and the Indian Brigade. The battle had cost 9 officers and
48 men killed, with 27 officers and 385 men wounded or missing.
Pushing on rapidly with the 4th Dragoon Guards and the Indian cavalry,
Sir Drury Lowe seized Cairo, and Arabi surrendered. This practically
ended the war, and on the very date fixed by Sir Garnet, before he left
England, for its probable conclusion.
The isolated garrisons at Tanta and elsewhere were disarmed, and
when on the 17th it was found that the works at Kafr ed Dowr were
deserted, they were occupied by the Berkshire and Shropshire Regiments
of Sir Evelyn Wood’s brigade, which had been further strengthened by
the Manchester and Derbyshire Regiments. So the army returned home,
leaving, besides artillery and the 7th Dragoon Guards and the 19th
Hussars, the (35th) Sussex, (38th) Stafford, (42nd) Black Watch, (49th)
Berkshire, (53rd) Shropshire, the 3rd King’s Royal Rifles, the (74th)
Highland Light Infantry, (75th) Gordons, and (79th) Camerons as a
garrison for Cairo, and the 2nd (18th) Royal Irish, the (46th) Duke of
Cornwall’s, and a wing of the (50th) West Kent, to hold Alexandria.
For the war a medal with clasp for Tel el Kebir was granted by the
British Government and a bronze star by the Khedive; while numerous
Turkish and Egyptian orders were distributed. Sir Garnet Wolseley was
made a peer, and the names, “Egypt, 1882-84,” and “Tel el Kebir” were
placed on the colours or appointments of the regiments which had served
in this campaign.
* * * * *
The reorganisation of the Egyptian army was now commenced by British
officers, and Sir Evelyn Wood was its first Sirdar; but this command
was kept distinct from that of the British troops in the two great
cities, which were under General Stevenson.
Meanwhile, trouble had long been brewing in the Sudan, which had been
originally conquered by Mehemet Ali. There were many insurrections
of more or less importance, and the people were ripe for still more
serious revolt. The advent of Mohammed Ahmed, the son of Abdullah the
carpenter and Amina his wife, whose name, therefore, agreed with those
of the parents of the Prophet, as the expected Mahdi, whose mission it
was to convert the whole world, gave the opportunity, and one in which
religious fanaticism was added to patriotism. There were many small
skirmishes, with varying success, at first; but still the movement
increased, and soon El Obeid was captured, Hicks Pasha, with about 7000
men, was totally defeated, and his army practically destroyed. Next
General Gordon was appointed Governor-General of the Sudan and took up
his residence at Khartum, and a further advance of the Mahdieh resulted
in the fall of Berber and the investment of the capital of the Sudan.
Then it was that serious preparation for its relief by a British army
was seriously undertaken. As far back as April 1884, Lord Wolseley had
considered that General Gordon could not hold out later than the 15th
November. The nature of the opposition to be expected had, however,
been already tested in the independent series of operations that long
took place around Suakin on the Red Sea littoral. Suakin was the port
to Berber, but between the two places was an almost waterless desert,
inhabited by hostile tribes of the greatest bravery.
The fighting there had commenced this way. A slave trader, Osman Digna
by name, had heard of the Mahdi’s success, and saw an opportunity of a
revolt of his own with the warlike sept of the Hadendowas. He invested
Sinkat, which fell, and its garrison was massacred. He threatened both
Tokar and Suakin, and when to relieve the former Baker Pasha marched
out from Trinkitat with nearly 4000 Egyptians, he was badly beaten,
for the troops showed no fight at all. This aroused the attention of
the home authorities. A British force was formed, under Sir G. Graham,
and moved from Trinkitat, defeating the Sheikhs at El Teb, taking six
guns and a Gatling, and killing 2100 men; but Tokar had already fallen.
The troops engaged were the 19th and 10th Hussars, the Black Watch,
Gordon Highlanders, the Royal Irish Fusiliers, the York and Lancaster
Regiments, the Royal Marine Light Infantry, with a Naval Brigade and
some Artillery. They advanced in a hollow square, the Gordons leading;
and, leaving detachments at Trinkitat and Fort Baker (at the end of the
causeway across the salt marsh that nearly surrounds the town), the
small army moved against the Arabs entrenched around the wells of El
Teb. The fighting was severe and desperate, but discipline and weapons
soon told. The enemy’s guns were abandoned, and one taken by the Royal
Marine Artillery was manned by the men under Captain Tucker and turned
on the enemy, who fled finally towards Tokar. The loss to the British
force had been 22 officers and 167 men killed and wounded.
After marching to Tokar, the force returned to Suakin, and as Osman
Digna had collected a large force some miles outside the town, it was
again decided to disperse them. Sir G. Graham formed the small army
in two squares: that on the left, which led, under General Davis, had
its front and flank faces formed by the Royal Highlanders and the York
and Lancaster Regiments, with the Royal Marines in the rear face, and
the Naval Brigade with Gatlings in the centre; on the right rear,
echeloned, was General Buller’s Brigade, having the Gordon Highlanders
and the Royal Irish Fusiliers in the front and flank faces, and the
King’s Royal Rifles in rear, inside being the 7-pounder guns. The
squares were about 1000 yards apart, and between them was a battery of
9-pounders, while the left flank was covered by the Hussars.
The enemy was met with in the deep ravine, or “Khor,” of Tamai, and
early opened a brisk fire. Replying with a needlessly hot fire, which
enveloped the troops in smoke, the square of General Davis made a rush
with the front face and breaking up its close formation, the Arabs
rushed into the gaps between the front and flank faces. For a time it
was a scene of wild confusion. The British, fighting steadily still,
with bullet and steel, fell back in some disorder, abandoning the guns,
but they soon rallied, and the advance of the other square enabled it
to re-form. The edge of the ravine was reached, and the leading square
crossed it, with a cheer, to occupy Osman Digna’s camp, and disperse
such of the enemy as were still there. Thirteen officers and 208 men
had been killed and wounded on the attacking side.
Little was done after this for a while. The force returned to Suakin,
and afterwards occupied and burned the village of Tamaneb with little
opposition. Then the bulk of the troops were withdrawn, leaving the 3rd
King’s Royal Rifles and a battalion of Royal Marines to garrison Suakin.
The Nile expedition for the relief of Gordon had now begun, and it
was still, for a while, designed to take Berber and advance thence
on Khartum. To communicate with the coast at Suakin from Berber was
evidently advisable, but the district was almost waterless, and a
railway was of primary importance. Furthermore, the destruction of
Osman Digna’s power there was essential to its construction, let alone
that to attack him would effect a useful diversion, and weaken the
Dervish strength which might otherwise collect in the Nile Valley.
A second expedition was hence despatched to Suakin under Sir G. Graham.
It consisted of a Guards Brigade (3rd Grenadiers, 1st Coldstream, and
2nd Scots), and a second brigade of the 2nd East Surrey, 1st Shropshire
Light Infantry, 1st Berkshire, and Royal Marines, with two squadrons
5th Lancers, two of the 20th Hussars, some mounted infantry, Royal
Engineers, and three batteries of artillery. In addition, there was a
strong Indian Contingent and a volunteer force from New South Wales.
The enemy was known to be at Tamai, to the south-west, and at Hasheen
to the west of the town, and by the latter the railway, which was to
be made by English contractors, was to run. The first move, therefore,
was the defeat of the force at Hasheen, and for this purpose the whole
force, with the exception of the Shropshire Light Infantry, marched
and formed in one square, of which the front face was held by the
Marines and Berkshire Regiment (the Surrey was detached to cover a
working party on some hills to the right front), the left flank by the
Indian Brigade, and the right by the Guards. The rear was open, and the
artillery, and the camel transport occupied the centre. The operations
resulted in the temporary dispersion of the Hadendowas, with a loss on
our side of 9 officers and men killed and 39 wounded. Throughout the
enemy displayed the most reckless bravery, and an utter indifference to
death.
It was now necessary to attack Osman Digna’s main force at Tamai,
and for this purpose it was intended to establish an intermediate
post on the road to that place, as one had been made at Hasheen. The
force detailed to cover the work was under Sir J. M’Neill, and, made
up of the Indian Contingent, one squadron of the 5th Lancers, with
the Berkshire Regiment, the Royal Marines, etc., was formed into two
squares. On reaching the open space of Tofrik, a zareba was commenced,
the two angles of which were held by the Berkshires and Marines in
two squares, while the Indian Contingent formed a large rectangle in
between, covering the huge mass of camels and transport.
The mimosa bush was very dense, and little could be seen even by the
cavalry, who were pushed out _en vedette_ in front. While in some
confusion a sudden attack was made by the enemy. Crawling under the low
trees until within charging distance, they reached the squares in small
groups with their usual headlong gallantry. So fierce was the assault
that the 17th Native Infantry broke, and for a while, with stampeded
animals rushing to and fro, and with the Mahdieh cutting and stabbing
in all directions, matters looked grave. But determined courage and
discipline at length triumphed, and the enemy sullenly withdrew,
leaving behind him 1500 dead. The loss on our side was 150 officers,
men, and camp followers killed, 148 missing, and 174 wounded, in a
fight that lasted just twenty minutes.
The remaining operations around Suakin have little interest. Tamai was
reached, and found to be abandoned; and numerous petty skirmishes
occurred in protecting the construction of the railway, which was
getting near Handub. But with the eventual abandonment of the Nile
expedition that of Suakin followed. On the 17th May the troops
commenced to withdraw. They had had a severe time of it, with the
thermometer at 120° in the tents, and constant disturbances night after
night from the enemy. He was by no means to be despised. He combined
the courage of the fanatic who saw heaven in view if he fell in battle
with the infidel, with the most determined physical bravery. Few men
want more killing than those Arabs of the Sudan. No one has added them
up better than Rudyard Kipling when he says--
“’E rushes at the smokes when we let drive,
An’, before we know, ’e’s ’ackin’ at our ’ead;
’E’s all ’ot sand and ginger when alive,
An’ ’e’s generally shammin’ when ’e’s dead.
’E’s a daisy, ’e’s a ducky, ’e’s a lamb,
’E’s a injia-rubber idiot on the spree;
’E’s the on’y thing that doesn’t give a d--n
For a regiment o’ British Infantree!
So ’ere’s to you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, at your ’ome in the Soudan.
You’re a pore benighted ’eathen, but a fust-class fightin’ man;
An’ ’ere’s _to_ you, Fuzzy-Wuzzy, with your ’ayrick ’ead of ’air,
You big black boundin’ beggar--for you broke a British square!”
To commemorate the services of the army in this portion of the theatre
of war, clasps for Suakin 1885, El Teb, Tamai, and Tofrik, were given
with the ordinary Egyptian war medal.
* * * * *
But a more important series of operations had been taking place at the
same time as these troublesome affairs on the shores of the Red Sea.
The relief of Gordon had, after fatal delays and indecision on the
part of the Government, been, with apparent reluctance, decided on,
and in supreme command was placed Lord Wolseley. Notwithstanding that
many authorities advocated the Suakin-Berber line of approach, he,
throughout, had resolutely insisted that the Nile Valley was the only
practicable way of reaching the Sudan, because of the difficulties both
of roads and water supply.
Lord Wolseley arrived in Cairo on the 9th September, and proceeded to
organise the concentration of a sufficiently powerful force about Korti
and Ambigol (south of Dongola), whence one, “the river” column, could
be despatched to seize Berber, assisted to some extent by the force
operating at Suakin against Osman Digna, and the other, the “desert”
column, could make its way across the Bayuda Desert, by a known track
way indifferently furnished with water, to Metemmeh on the Nile
opposite Shendy, and about midway between Berber and Khartum.
A camel force had also been formed, and was divided into four parts,
the Heavy Camel Regiment (from the Household and seven other cavalry
regiments), the Light (made up of detachments of light cavalry men),
the Guards (from the brigade, and to which the Royal Marines were
attached), and the Mounted Infantry Camel Regiment (men selected from
different line regiments).
The general plan of the desert march was to form posts at the wells of
Howeryat, Jakdul, and Abu Klea, and seize Metemmeh, forming at the same
time a strong depôt at Jakdul. The first move was made at 3 a.m. on
the 30th December, and Jakdul was occupied, garrisoned, and the camels
returned for stores, etc., but it was the 8th January before the force
definitely started on its mission. It was composed of a Naval Brigade
under Lord Charles Beresford, one squadron 19th Hussars, the Guards,
Heavy and Mounted Infantry Camel Regiments (the Light was employed
chiefly in guarding convoys), half battery Royal Artillery, Royal
Engineers, 400 men of the Royal Sussex Regiment (of whom 150 were to
be left at Jakdul), one company of the Essex Regiment for the Howeryat
post, with “details”; in all about 120 officers and 1900 men, exclusive
of natives, camel-drivers, etc. The whole was under the command of Sir
Herbert Stewart. The force left Jakdul at 2 p.m. on the 14th January,
and on the 16th got touch of the enemy near Abu Klea wells, but too
late for fighting that day. At 9 a.m. the following day, square was
formed with camels in the centre, the front angles being formed by
the Mounted Infantry, the Guards Camel Regiment, with the Artillery
between, and the rear angles by the Heavy Camel Regiment and the Royal
Sussex Regiment, with the Naval Brigade in the middle of the rear face.
The cavalry were left free to act outside; the sick and baggage were
left in a zareba guarded by some of the Royal Sussex; and the square,
covered by skirmishers, then advanced against the enemy’s line, which
was some half mile long, and marked by flags. Though the skirmishers
helped to check the enemy’s fire, which had already caused casualties,
they were in the way of the defensive power when the Arab rush was
made. It was executed with “lightning rapidity, and into gaps formed
by the lagging back of the camels the Arab spearmen poured. The fight
was sharp and desperate.” Within the square the din of battle was such
that no words of command could be heard, and each man was obliged to
act on the impulse of the moment. The enemy’s “formation was curious,
a sort of variety of the old phalanx. It was as if there were portions
of three phalanxes, with rows of men behind. At the head of each rode
an Emir or Sheikh with a banner, accompanied by personal attendants,
and then came the fighting men. They advanced at a quick, even pace,
as if on parade.” And this before the breechloading fire! The “fine
old Sheikh on horseback,” who planted his banner in the middle of the
broken square, had advanced “with his banner in one hand and his book
of prayers in the other.” He “never swerved to the right or left, and
never ceased chanting his prayers until he had planted his banner in
our square.” Such bravery is worthy of all admiration, and well may
Sir Charles Wilson say, “If any man deserved a place in the Moslem
paradise, he did.” It was sheer hard hand-to-hand work for a brief
space, and then the square re-formed, with its late antagonists falling
suddenly back, leaving only their dead. Short as the affair was, 9
officers and 65 men were killed, and 9 officers and 85 men wounded;
a serious loss. On the other hand, 1100 Arab dead were counted near
the square, and their loss in wounded too was severe. Before moving
on, a small fort was built here to contain the wounded, guarded by
100 men of the Royal Sussex, and when this was completed, Sir Herbert
marched at 4 p.m. on the 18th for Abu Kru. The guide was one Ali Loda,
a local freebooter. But night marches, however advisable under such
conditions as Tel el Kebir, are bad with wearied men. The soldiers in
this case were exhausted, and did not get within measurable distance
of the river, so that between them and water lay the Arab host. Laager
was then formed to protect the transport; and was garrisoned by some
of the Heavies, the 19th Hussars, the Artillery and Naval Brigade.
Then the square moved toward the enemy, not without skirmishes, and
while halting for breakfast the enemy’s fire increased, and Sir Herbert
received the wound which afterwards proved fatal. At 3 p.m. the advance
was resumed, and the Arabs charged as before. But the men were cooler
than in the previous action, and none of the enemy got within 100 yards
of the square, and in five minutes the Arabs broke and fled. Thereupon
the wearied British reached the wished-for stream and bivouacked. The
loss had been 1 officer and 22 men killed, and 8 officers and 90 men
wounded.
Sir C. Wilson was now in chief command, and made a reconnaissance in
force of Metemmeh; but he judged that to storm it would be both costly
and inadvisable, and therefore returned to the zareba at Gubat, to meet
the Egyptian Government steamers from Khartum. Then ensued a brief
delay, necessary to make arrangements for the security of the camp,
and also because of the general exhaustion of the men. Sir Charles,
therefore, first proceeded down stream beyond Metemmeh, to ensure
that there was no force advancing from the north in addition to what
might be reasonably expected to arrive from the south, and then turned
back, halting for a while at Gubat, and finally reached the immediate
neighbourhood of Khartum, to find that all was over. It had fallen,
and Gordon had been killed; so, running the gauntlet of guns and
rifles, the small flotilla returned to Gubat, but both steamers were
sunk and a fresh one had to be sent up. The story of this adventure
well merited the telegram received by Sir Charles at Korti from the
Secretary of State for War: “Express warm recognition of Government of
brilliant services of Sir Charles Wilson and satisfaction at gallant
rescue of his party.”[70]
On his return from Khartum, he started for Korti, and on his report,
Sir R. Buller was despatched to take command of the desert column,
which was to be reinforced by the Royal Irish and West Kent Regiments;
but it was soon afterwards decided to abandon the effort to crush the
power of the Mahdi, and the small army withdrew by degrees to Korti,
with but little molestation on the way. During the march, however, Sir
Herbert Stewart succumbed to his wound, and was buried near Jakdul.
Like his namesake, who had been with Gordon and was murdered when going
down the river at Hebbeh, his loss to the army was serious. “What an
ill-fated expedition this has been!” writes Sir C. Wilson. “The whole
Sudan is not worth the lives of men like Gordon and the two Stewarts.”
In the meantime, the river column had been pushing on, and had its tale
to tell. Under the command of General Earle, it was made up of one
squadron 19th Hussars, the South Staffordshire Regiment, the Duke of
Cornwall’s Light Infantry, the Black Watch, and the Gordon Highlanders,
with some Egyptian artillery and Camel Corps, etc. The Essex Regiment
was, at first, to hold the line of communication of this force between
Merowi and Abu Hamed, but the idea had to be abandoned.
The force marched on the 24th, the mounted troops by land, the
remainder in the boats, and there was a small skirmish at Berti; but on
the news of the fall of Khartum, the force halted for further orders
near Dulka Island; and while there, news was received that the enemy,
some 1500 strong, had advanced out of the Shukuk Pass and taken up a
position at Kirbekan.
As it was still determined to seize Berber, in which operation it was
proposed, if possible, to employ the remains of the desert column,
General Earle was directed to push on again; and, finding the enemy
still blocking the road to Abu Hamed, whence there is a track across
the desert to Korosko, he turned the enemy’s left flank and attacked
him in flank and rear. The battle was mainly a fire-action, there being
only one partial charge of the Arab spearmen; and with the charge of
the Highlanders, pipes playing, the enemy were turned out of the rocky
hill land on which they were posted, and at the very end of the fight,
General Earle was killed, with 2 other officers and 7 men, while 4
officers and 43 men were wounded. The troops engaged had been the
Staffordshire Regiment, Black Watch, Egyptian Camel Corps, and the
Artillery. On the 20th February, however, the column, now commanded by
General H. Brackenbury, was recalled, in accordance with the decision
to attempt no further operations until after the hot season. But even
this plan was given up by orders from home; and on the 11th May, Lord
Wolseley was ordered to withdraw the troops from the Sudan. This was
successfully effected, but, as might be expected, the Arab leaders
pushed on. Kassala was occupied by Osman Digna from Suakin, and
Dongola by the Mahdieh from Khartum. Near this, the town of Kosheh was
invested, and the small action of Ginnis was fought in December 1885,
the last skirmish of the first Sudan War. Throughout, the enormous
physical and administrative difficulties had been successfully met; the
conduct of the men, both in battle and on the march, left nothing to be
desired. That Lord Wolseley and the expedition failed in their primary
object of relieving Khartum and saving Gordon’s life was no fault of
theirs. They did all that men could, and the blame rests only on the
head of a weak Government, that could not make up its mind until it
was too late. Yet “the siege of Khartum lasted for three hundred and
seventeen days--only nine less than the great siege of Sebastopol,
in which General Gordon first saw active service. For more than ten
months the wild tribes of the Sudan were kept in check by the genius,
the indomitable resolution, and fertile resources of one man; and, long
after the controversies of the present day have been forgotten, the
defence of Khartum by General Gordon will be looked on as one of the
most memorable military achievements of modern times.”[71]
A medal was given for the campaign, with clasps for Kirbekan, Abu
Klea, and Abu Kru; and the rank of viscount was bestowed on the
Commander-in-Chief of the two expeditions, those of the Nile and
Suakin. Never was honour more justly bestowed.