EVENTS IN THE WEST INDIES AFTER THE SURRENDER OF
YORKTOWN--ENCOUNTERS OF DE GRASSE WITH HOOD.--THE SEA BATTLE OF
THE SAINTS.--1781, 1782.
The surrender of Cornwallis marked the end of the active war upon the
American continent. The issue of the struggle was indeed assured upon
the day when France devoted her sea power to the support of the
colonists; but, as not uncommonly happens, the determining
characteristics of a period were summed up in one striking event. From
the beginning, the military question, owing to the physical
characteristics of the country, a long seaboard with estuaries
penetrating deep into the interior, and the consequent greater ease of
movement by water than by land, had hinged upon the control of the sea
and the use made of that control. Its misdirection by Sir William Howe
in 1777, when he moved his army to the Chesapeake instead of
supporting Burgoyne's advance, opened the way to the startling success
at Saratoga, when amazed Europe saw six thousand regular troops
surrendering to a body of provincials. During the four years that
followed, until the surrender of Yorktown, the scales rose and fell
according as the one navy or the other appeared on the scene, or as
English commanders kept touch with the sea or pushed their operations
far from its support. Finally, at the great crisis, all is found
depending upon the question whether the French or the English fleet
should first appear, and upon their relative force.
The maritime struggle was at once transferred to the West Indies. The
events which followed there were antecedent in time both to Suffren's
battles and to the final relief of Gibraltar; but they stand so much
by themselves as to call for separate treatment, and have such close
relation to the conclusion of the war and the conditions of peace, as
to form the dramatic finale of the one and the stepping-stone of
transition to the other. It is fitting indeed that a brilliant though
indecisive naval victory should close the story of an essentially
naval war.
The capitulation of Yorktown was completed on the 19th of October,
1781, and on the 5th of November, De Grasse, resisting the suggestions
of Lafayette and Washington that the fleet should aid in carrying the
war farther south, sailed from the Chesapeake. He reached Martinique
on the 26th, the day after the Marquis de Bouillé, commanding the
French troops in the West Indies, had regained by a bold surprise the
Dutch island of St. Eustatius. The two commanders now concerted a
joint expedition against Barbadoes, which was frustrated by the
violence of the trade winds.
Foiled here, the French proceeded against the island of St.
Christopher, or St. Kitt's (Plate XVIII.). On the 11th of January,
1782, the fleet, carrying six thousand troops, anchored on the west
coast off Basse Terre, the chief town. No opposition was met, the
small garrison of six hundred men retiring to a fortified post ten
miles to the northwest, on Brimstone Hill, a solitary precipitous
height overlooking the lee shore of the island. The French troops
landed and pursued, but the position being found too strong for
assault, siege operations were begun.
The French fleet remained at anchor in Basse Terre road. Meanwhile,
news of the attack was carried to Sir Samuel Hood, who had followed De
Grasse from the continent, and, in the continued absence of Rodney,
was naval commander-in-chief on the station. He sailed from Barbadoes
on the 14th, anchored at Antigua on the 21st, and there embarked all
the troops that could be spared,--about seven hundred men. On the
afternoon of the 23d the fleet started for St. Kitt's, carrying such
sail as would bring it within striking distance of the enemy at
daylight next morning.
The English having but twenty-two ships to the French twenty-nine,
and the latter being generally superior in force, class for class, it
is necessary to mark closely the lay of the land in order to
understand Hood's original plans and their subsequent modifications;
for, resultless as his attempt proved, his conduct during the next
three weeks forms the most brilliant military effort of the whole
war. The islands of St. Kitt's and Nevis (Plates XVIII. and XIX.)
being separated only by a narrow channel, impracticable for
ships-of-the-line, are in effect one, and their common axis lying
northwest and southeast, it is necessary for sailing-ships, with the
trade wind, to round the southern extremity of Nevis, from which
position the wind is fair to reach all anchorages on the lee side of
the islands. Basse Terre is about twelve miles distant from the
western point of Nevis (Fort Charles), and its roadstead lies east
and west. The French fleet were anchored there in disorder (Plate
XVIII., A), three or four deep, not expecting attack, and the ships
at the west end of the road could not reach those at the east without
beating to windward,--a tedious, and under fire a perilous process. A
further most important point to note is that all the eastern ships
were so placed that vessels approaching from the southward could
reach them with the usual wind.
Hood, therefore, we are told, intended to appear at early daylight, in
order of and ready for battle, and fall upon the eastern ships, filing
by them with his whole fleet (a, a'), thus concentrating the fire of
all upon a few of the enemy; then turning away, so as to escape the
guns of the others, he proposed, first wearing and then tacking, to
keep his fleet circling in long procession (a', a'') past that part of
the enemy's ships chosen for attack. The plan was audacious, but
undeniably sound in principle; some good could hardly fail to follow,
and unless De Grasse showed more readiness than he had hitherto done,
even decisive results might be hoped for.[194]
[Illustration: Pl. XVIII. HOOD & DE GRASSE. JAN. 25 & 26, 1782.]
The best-laid plans, however, may fail, and Hood's was balked by the
awkwardness of a lieutenant of the watch, who hove-to (stopped) a
frigate at night ahead of the fleet, and was consequently run down by
a ship-of-the-line. The latter also received such injury as delayed
the movement, several hours being lost in repairing damages. The
French were thus warned of the enemy's approach, and although not
suspecting his intention to attack, De Grasse feared that Hood would
pass down to leeward of him and disturb the siege of Brimstone
Hill,--an undertaking so rash for an inferior force that it is as
difficult to conceive how he could have supposed it, as to account for
his overlooking the weakness of his own position at anchor.
At one P.M. of the 24th the English fleet was seen rounding the south
end of Nevis; at three De Grasse got under way and stood to the
southward. Toward sundown Hood also went about and stood south, as
though retreating; but he was well to windward of his opponent, and
maintained this advantage through the night. At daybreak both fleets
were to leeward of Nevis,--the English near the island, the French
about nine miles distant (Plate XIX.). Some time was spent in
manoeuvring, with the object on Hood's part of getting the French
admiral yet more to leeward; for, having failed in his first attempt,
he had formed the yet bolder intention of seizing the anchorage his
unskilful opponent had left, and establishing himself there in an
impregnable manner. In this he succeeded, as will be shown; but to
understand the justification for a movement confessedly hazardous, it
must be pointed out that he thus would place himself between the
besiegers of Brimstone Hill and their fleet; or if the latter anchored
near the hill, the English fleet would be between it and its base in
Martinique, ready to intercept supplies or detachments approaching
from the southward. In short, the position in which Hood hoped to
establish himself was on the flank of the enemy's communications, a
position the more advantageous because the island alone could not long
support the large body of troops so suddenly thrown upon it.
Moreover, both fleets were expecting reinforcements; Rodney was on his
way and might arrive first, which he did, and in time to save St.
Kitt's, which he did not. It was also but four months since Yorktown;
the affairs of England were going badly; something must be done,
something left to chance, and Hood knew himself and his officers. It
may be added that he knew his opponent.
At noon, when the hillsides of Nevis were covered with expectant and
interested sightseers, the English fleet rapidly formed its line on
the starboard tack and headed north for Basse Terre (Plate XIX., A,
A'). The French, at the moment, were in column steering south, but
went about at once and stood for the enemy in a bow-and-quarter
line[195] (A, A). At two the British had got far enough for Hood to
make signal to anchor. At twenty minutes past two the van of the
French came within gunshot of the English centre (B, B, B), and
shortly afterward the firing began, the assailants very properly
directing their main effort upon the English rear ships, which, as
happens with most long columns, had opened out, a tendency increased
in this case by the slowness of the fourth ship from the rear, the
"Prudent." The French flag-ship, "Ville de Paris," of one hundred and
twenty guns, bearing De Grasse's flag, pushed for the gap thus made,
but was foiled by the "Canada," seventy-four, whose captain,
Cornwallis, the brother of Lord Cornwallis, threw all his sails aback,
and dropped down in front of the huge enemy to the support of the
rear,--an example nobly followed by the "Resolution" and the "Bedford"
immediately ahead of him (a). The scene was now varied and animated in
the extreme. The English van, which had escaped attack, was rapidly
anchoring (b) in its appointed position. The commander-in-chief in the
centre, proudly reliant upon the skill and conduct of his captains,
made signal for the ships ahead to carry a press of sail, and gain
their positions regardless of the danger to the threatened rear. The
latter, closely pressed and outnumbered, stood on unswervingly,
shortened sail, and came to anchor, one by one, in a line ahead (B,
B'), under the roar of the guns of their baffled enemies. The latter
filed by, delivered their fire, and bore off again to the southward,
leaving their former berths to their weaker but clever antagonists.
[Illustration: Pl. XIX. HOOD & DE GRASSE. JAN. 25, 1782.]
The anchorage thus brilliantly taken by Hood was not exactly the same
as that held by De Grasse the day before; but as it covered and
controlled it, his claim that he took up the place the other had left
is substantially correct. The following night and morning were spent
in changing and strengthening the order, which was finally established
as follows (Plate XVIII., B, B'). The van ship was anchored about four
miles southeast from Basse Terre, so close to the shore that a ship
could not pass inside her, nor, with the prevailing wind, even reach
her, because of a point and shoal just outside, covering her position.
From this point the line extended in a west-northwest direction to the
twelfth or thirteenth ship (from a mile and a quarter to a mile and a
half), where it turned gradually but rapidly to north, the last six
ships being on a north and south line. Hood's flag-ship, the
"Barfleur," of ninety guns, was at the apex of the salient angle thus
formed.
It would not have been impossible for the French fleet to take the
anchorage they formerly held; but it and all others to leeward were
forbidden by the considerations already stated, so long as Hood
remained where he was. It became necessary therefore to dislodge him,
but this was rendered exceedingly difficult by the careful tactical
dispositions that have been described. His left flank was covered by
the shore. Any attempt to enfilade his front by passing along the
other flank was met by the broadsides of the six or eight ships drawn
up _en potence_ to the rear. The front commanded the approaches to
Basse Terre. To attack him in the rear, from the northwest, was
forbidden by the trade-wind. To these difficulties was to be added
that the attack must be made under sail against ships at anchor, to
whom loss of spars would be of no immediate concern; and which, having
springs[196] out, could train their broadsides over a large area with
great ease.
Nevertheless, both sound policy and mortification impelled De Grasse
to fight, which he did the next day, January 26. The method of attack,
in single column of twenty-nine ships against a line so carefully
arranged, was faulty in the extreme; but it may be doubted whether any
commander of that day would have broken through the traditional
fighting order.[197] Hood had intended the same, but he hoped a
surprise on an ill-ordered enemy, and at the original French anchorage
it was possible to reach their eastern ships, with but slight exposure
to concentrated fire. Not so now. The French formed to the southward
and steered for the eastern flank of Hood's line. As their van ship
drew up with the point already mentioned, the wind headed her, so that
she could only reach the third in the English order, the first four
ships of which, using their springs, concentrated their guns upon her.
This vessel was supposed by the English to be the "Pluton," and if so,
her captain was D'Albert de Rions, in Suffren's opinion the foremost
officer of the French navy. "The crash occasioned by their destructive
broadsides," wrote an English officer who was present, "was so
tremendous that whole pieces of plank were seen flying from her off
side ere she could escape the cool, concentrated fire of her
determined adversaries. As she proceeded along the British line, she
received the first fire of every ship in passing. She was indeed in
so shattered a state as to be compelled to bear away for St.
Eustatius." And so ship after ship passed by, running the length of
the line (Plate XVIII., B, B), distributing their successive fires in
gallant but dreary, ineffectual monotony over the whole extent. A
second time that day De Grasse attacked in the same order, but
neglecting the English van, directed his effort upon the rear and
centre. This was equally fruitless, and seems to have been done with
little spirit.
From that time until the 14th of February, Hood maintained his
position in sight of the French fleet, which remained cruising in the
offing and to the southward. On the 1st a despatch vessel arrived from
Kempenfeldt, informing him of the dispersal of the French
reinforcements for the West Indies, which must have renewed his hopes
that his bold attempt would be successful through Rodney's arrival. It
was not, however, to be so. Brimstone Hill surrendered on the 12th,
after a creditable defence. On the 13th De Grasse took his fleet, now
amounting to thirty-three ships-of-the-line, to Nevis, and anchored
there. On the night of the 14th Hood summoned all his captains on
board, had them set their watches by his, and at eleven P.M., one
after another, without noise or signal, cut their cables and made sail
to the northward, passing round that end of the island unnoticed, or
at least unmolested, by the French.
Both strategically and tactically Hood's conceptions and dispositions
were excellent, and their execution was most honorable to the skill
and steadiness of himself and his captains. Regarded as a single
military operation, this was brilliant throughout; but when considered
with reference to the general situation of England at the time, a much
higher estimate must be formed of the admiral's qualities.[198] St.
Kitt's in itself might not be worth a great risk; but it was of the
first importance that energy and audacity should be carried into the
conduct of England's naval war, that some great success should light
upon her flag. Material success was not obtained. The chances, though
fair enough, turned against Hood; but every man in that fleet must
have felt the glow of daring achievement, the assured confidence which
follows a great deed nobly done. Had this man been in chief command
when greater issues were at stake, had he been first instead of second
at the Chesapeake, Cornwallis might have been saved. The
operation--seizing an anchorage left by the enemy--would have been
nearly the same; and both situations may be instructively compared
with Suffren's relief of Cuddalore.
The action of De Grasse, also, should be considered not only with
reference to the particular occasion, but to the general condition of
the war as well, and when thus weighed, and further compared with
other very similar opportunities neglected by this general officer, a
fair estimate of his military capacity can be reached. This
comparison, however, is better deferred to the now not very distant
close of the campaign. The most useful comment to be made here is,
that his action in failing to crush Hood at his anchors, with a force
at least fifty per cent greater, was in strict accordance with the
general French principle of subordinating the action of the fleet to
so-called particular operations; for nothing is more instructive than
to note how an unsound principle results in disastrous action. Hood's
inferiority was such as to weaken, for offensive purposes, his
commanding position. So long as De Grasse kept to windward, he
maintained his communications with Martinique, and he was strong
enough, too, to force communication when necessary with the troops
before Brimstone Hill. It was probable, as the event showed, that the
particular operation, the reduction of St. Kitt's, would succeed
despite the presence of the English fleet; and "the French navy has
always preferred the glory of assuring a conquest to that, more
brilliant perhaps but less real, of taking a few ships."
So far De Grasse may be acquitted of any error beyond that of not
rising above the traditions of his service. Some days, however, before
the surrender of the island and the departure of the English fleet, he
was joined by two ships-of-the-line which brought him word of the
dispersal of the expected convoy and reinforcements from Europe.[199]
He then knew that he himself could not be strengthened before Rodney's
arrival, and that by that event the English would be superior to him.
He had actually thirty-three ships-of-the-line in hand, and a few
miles off lay twenty-two English in a position where he knew they
would await his attack; yet he let them escape. His own explanation
implies clearly that he had no intention of attacking them at
anchor:--
"The day after the capitulation of Brimstone Hill was the moment
to watch Hood closely, and to fight him _as soon as he got under
way_ from the conquered island. But our provisions were
exhausted; We had only enough for thirty-six hours. Some
supply-ships had arrived at Nevis, and you will admit one must
live before fighting. I went to Nevis, always to windward and in
sight of the enemy, a league and a half from him, in order to
take on board the necessary supplies as rapidly as possible.
Hood decamped at night without signals, and the next morning I
found only the sick whom he left behind."[200]
In other words, Hood having held his ground with consummate audacity
and skill, when he had some chance of successful resistance, declined
to await his adversary's attack under conditions overwhelmingly
unfavorable. What shall be said of this talk about provisions? Did not
the Comte de Grasse know a month before how long, to a day, the
supplies on board would last? Did he not know, four days before Hood
sailed, that he had with him every ship he could probably count on for
the approaching campaign, while the English would surely be
reinforced? And if the English position was as strong as good
judgment, professional skill, and bold hearts could make it, had it
not weak points? Were not the lee ships to leeward? If they did
attempt to beat to windward, had he not ships to "contain" them? If
the van ship could not be reached, had he not force enough to double
and treble on the third and following ships, as far down the line as
he chose? A letter of Suffren's, referring to a similar condition of
things at Santa Lucia,[201] but written three years before these
events, seems almost a prophetic description of them:--
"Notwithstanding the slight results of the two cannonades of
December 15 [1778], we can yet expect success; but the only way
to attain it is to attack vigorously the squadron, which in
consequence of our superiority cannot hold out, despite their
land works, which will become of no effect _if we lay them on
board, or anchor upon their buoys_. If we delay, a thousand
circumstances may save them. _They may profit by the night to
depart._"
There can be no doubt that the English would have sold their defeat
dearly; but results in war must be paid for, and the best are in the
long run the cheapest. A tight grip of a few simple principles--that
the enemy's fleet was the controlling factor in the coming campaign,
that it was therefore his true objective, that one fraction of it must
be crushed without delay when caught thus separated--would have saved
De Grasse a great blunder; but it is only fair to note that it would
have made him an exception to the practice of the French navy.
The hour was now close at hand when the French admiral should feel,
even if he did not admit, the consequences of this mistake, by which he
had won a paltry island and lost an English fleet. Rodney had sailed
from Europe on the 15th of January, with twelve ships-of-the-line. On
the 19th of February he anchored at Barbadoes, and the same day Hood
reached Antigua from St. Kitt's. On the 25th the squadrons of Rodney
and Hood met to windward of Antigua, forming a united fleet of
thirty-four ships-of-the-line. The next day De Grasse anchored in Fort
Royal, thus escaping the pursuit which Rodney at once began. The
English admiral then returned to Sta. Lucia, where he was joined by
three more ships-of-the-line from England, raising his force to
thirty-seven. Knowing that a large convoy was expected from France,
before the arrival of which nothing could be attempted, Rodney sent a
part of his fleet to cruise to windward and as far north as Guadeloupe;
but the officer in charge of the French convoy, suspecting this action,
kept well north of that island, and reached Fort Royal, Martinique, on
the 20th of March. The ships-of-war with him raised De Grasse's fleet
to thirty-three effective sail-of-the-line and two fifty-gun ships.
The object of the united efforts of France and Spain this year was the
conquest of Jamaica. It was expected to unite at Cap Français (now Cap
Haïtien), in Hayti, fifty ships-of-the-line and twenty thousand
troops. Part of the latter were already at the rendezvous; and De
Grasse, appointed to command the combined fleets, was to collect in
Martinique all the available troops and supplies in the French
islands, and convoy them to the rendezvous. It was this junction that
Rodney was charged to prevent.
The region within which occurred the important operations of the next
few days covers a distance of one hundred and fifty miles, from south
to north, including the islands of Sta. Lucia, Martinique, Dominica,
and Guadeloupe, in the order named. (See Plate XI. p. 378.) At this
time the first was in English, the others in French, hands. The final,
and for the moment decisive, encounter took place between, and a
little to westward of, Dominica and Guadeloupe. These are
twenty-three miles apart; but the channel is narrowed to thirteen by
three islets called the Saints, lying ten miles south of Guadeloupe.
It is said to have been De Grasse's intention, instead of sailing
direct for Cap Français,[202] to take a circuitous course near the
islands, which, being friendly or neutral, would give refuge to the
convoy if pressed. The close pursuit of the English, who came up with
him off Dominica, led him to forsake this plan, sending the convoy
into Basse Terre at the south end of Guadeloupe, while with the fleet
he tried to beat through the channel and pass east of the island, thus
drawing the English away from the transports and ridding himself of
the tactical embarrassment due to the latter's presence. Accidents to
various ships thwarted this attempt, and brought about a battle
disastrous to him and fatal to the joint enterprise.
The anchorages of the two fleets, in Martinique and Sta. Lucia, were
thirty miles apart. The prevailing east wind is generally fair to pass
from one to the other; but a strong westerly current, and the
frequency of calms and light airs, tend to throw to leeward
sailing-ships leaving Sta. Lucia for the northern island. A chain of
frigates connected the English lookout ships off Martinique, by
signal, with Rodney's flag-ship in Gros Ilot Bay. Everything was astir
at the two stations, the French busy with the multitudinous
arrangements necessitated by a great military undertaking, the English
with less to do, yet maintaining themselves in a state of expectancy
and preparation for instant action, that entails constant alertness
and mental activity.
On the 5th of April Rodney was informed that the soldiers were being
embarked, and on the 8th, soon after daylight, the lookout frigates
were seen making signal that the enemy was leaving port. The English
fleet at once began to get under way, and by noon was clear of the
harbor to the number of thirty-six of the line. At half-past two P.M.
the advanced frigates were in sight of the French fleet, which was
seen from the mastheads of the main body just before sundown. The
English stood to the northward all night, and at daybreak of the 9th
were abreast Dominica, but for the most part becalmed. In-shore of
them, to the northward and eastward, were seen the French fleet and
convoy: the men-of-war numbering thirty-three of the line, besides
smaller vessels; the convoy a hundred and fifty sail, under special
charge of the two fifty-gun ships. The irregular and uncertain winds,
common to the night and early hours of the day near the land, had
scattered these unwieldy numbers. Fifteen sail-of-the-line were in the
channel between Dominica and the Saints, with a fresh trade-wind,
apparently beating to windward; the remainder of the ships-of-war and
most of the convoy were still becalmed close under Dominica (Plate
XX., Position I, b). Gradually, however, one by one, the French ships
were catching light airs off the land; and by favor of these, which
did not reach so far as the English in the offing, drew out from the
island and entered the more steady breeze of the channel, reinforcing
the group which was thus possessed of that prime element of naval
power, mobility. At the same time light airs from the southeast crept
out to the English van under Hood, fanning it gently north from the
main body of the fleet toward two isolated French ships (i), which,
having fallen to leeward during the night, had shared the calms that
left the English motionless, with their heads all round the compass.
They had come nearly within gunshot, when a light puff from the
northwest enabled the Frenchmen to draw away and approach their own
ships in the channel.
The farther the English van advanced, the fresher grew their wind,
until they fairly opened the channel of the Saints and felt the
trade-wind. De Grasse signalled to the convoy to put into Guadeloupe,
which order was so well carried out that they were all out of sight to
the northward by two in the afternoon, and will appear no more in the
sequel. The two French ships, already spoken of as fallen to leeward,
not being yet out of danger from the English van, which had now a
commanding breeze, and the latter being much separated from their rear
and centre, De Grasse ordered his van to bear down and engage. This
was obeyed by the ships signalled and by three others, in all by
fourteen or fifteen, the action beginning at half-past nine A.M., and
lasting with intermissions until quarter-past one P.M. Hood was soon
forced to heave-to, in order not to increase too much his separation
from the main fleet; the French kept under way, approaching from the
rear and passing in succession at half cannon-shot to windward (Plate
XX., Position I.). As each ship drew ahead of the English division,
she tacked, standing back to the southward until in position to resume
her place in the order of attack, thus describing a continuous
irregular curve of elliptical form, to windward of their opponents.
The brunt of the attack fell upon eight or nine of the English, this
number being successively increased as one ship after another, as the
baffling airs served, drew out from the calm space under Dominica; but
the French received similar accessions. While this engagement was
going on, part of the English centre, eight ships with Rodney's flag
among them (Position I., a), by carefully watching the puffs and
cat's-paws, had worked in with the land and caught the sea breeze,
which was felt there sooner than in the offing. As soon as they had
it, about eleven A.M., they stood to the north, being now on the
weather quarter[203] both of the English van and its assailants
(Position II., a). The latter, seeing this, tacked, and abandoning the
contest for the moment, steered south to join their centre, lest
Rodney's eight ships should get between them. At half-past eleven the
French again formed line on the starboard tack, most of their ships
being now clear of the land, while the English rear was still
becalmed. The greater numbers of the French enabled them to extend
from north to south along the length of the English line, whereas the
latter was still broken by a great gap between the van and centre
(Position II.). The attack upon Hood was therefore hotly renewed;
but the French centre and rear (b), having the wind, kept their
distance, and held Rodney's division at long range. At quarter-past
one the French, finding that the whole British line was coming up with
the wind, ceased firing, and at two Rodney hauled down the signal for
battle, the enemy having withdrawn.
[Illustration: Pl. XX. RODNEY & DE GRASSE. APRIL 9, 1782.]
This action of the 9th of April amounted actually to no more than an
artillery duel. One French ship, the "Caton," a sixty-four (d),
received injuries which sent her into Guadeloupe; two English were
disabled, but repaired their injuries without leaving the fleet. The
material advantage, therefore, lay with the latter. Opinions differ as
to the generalship of the Comte de Grasse on this day, but they divide
on the same basis of principle as to whether ulterior operations, or
the chances of beating the enemy's fleet, are to determine an
admiral's action. The facts of the case are these: Sixteen of the
English fleet, all the rear and four of the centre (Position II., c),
were not able at any time to fire a shot. Apparently every French
ship, first and last, might have been brought into action. At the
beginning, eight or nine English were opposed to fifteen French. At
the end there were twenty English to thirty-three French, and these
general proportions doubtless obtained throughout the four hours. De
Grasse therefore found himself in the presence of a fleet superior to
his own, in numbers at least, and by the favor of Providence that
fleet so divided that nearly half of it was powerless to act. He had
the wind, he had a fine body of captains; what was to prevent him from
attacking Hood's nine ships with fifteen, putting one on each side of
the six in the rear. Had those nine been thoroughly beaten, Rodney's
further movements must have been hopelessly crippled. The French lost
only five in their defeat three days later. The subsequent
court-martial, however, laid down the French doctrine thus: "The
decision to persist in engaging with only a part of our fleet may be
considered as an act of prudence on the part of the admiral, which
might be dictated by the ulterior projects of the campaign." On this a
French professional writer naturally remarks, that if an attack were
made at all, it would be more prudent to make it in force; less injury
would fall on individual ships, while in the end the whole fleet would
inevitably be drawn in to support any which, by losing spars, could
not return to windward.
Three times in one year had Fortune thrown before De Grasse the
opportunity of attacking English fleets with decisive odds on his
side.[204] Her favors were now exhausted. Three days more were to show
how decidedly the ulterior projects of a campaign may be affected by a
battle and the loss of a few ships. From the 9th to the morning of the
12th the French fleet continued beating to windward between Dominica
and the Saints, in no regular order. On the night of the 9th the
English hove-to to repair damages. The next day the chase to windward
was resumed, but the French gained very decidedly upon their pursuers.
On the night of the 10th two ships, the "Jason" and "Zélé," collided.
The "Zélé" was the bane of the French fleet during these days. She was
one of those that were nearly caught by the enemy on the 9th, and was
also the cause of the final disaster. The injuries to the "Jason"
forced her to put into Guadeloupe. On the 11th the main body was to
windward of the Saints, but the "Zélé" and another had fallen so far
to leeward that De Grasse bore down to cover them, thus losing much of
the ground gained. On the night following, the "Zélé" was again in
collision, this time with De Grasse's flag-ship; the latter lost some
sails, but the other, which had not the right of way and was wholly at
fault, carried away both foremast and bowsprit. The admiral sent word
to the frigate "Astrée" to take the "Zélé" in tow; and here flits
across the page of our story a celebrated and tragical figure, for the
captain of the "Astrée" was the ill-fated explorer Lapeyrouse, the
mystery of whose disappearance with two ships and their entire crews
remained so long unsolved. Two hours were consumed in getting the ship
under way in tow of the frigate,--not very smart work under the
conditions of weather and urgency; but by five A.M. the two were
standing away for Basse Terre, where the "Caton" and "Jason," as well
as the convoy, had already arrived. The French fleet had thus lost
three from its line-of-battle since leaving Martinique.
The disabled ship had not long been headed for Basse Terre, when the
faint streaks of dawn announced the approach of the 12th of April, a
day doubly celebrated in naval annals. The sun had not quite set upon
the exhausted squadrons of Suffren and Hughes, anchoring after their
fiercest battle off Ceylon, when his early rays shone upon the opening
strife between Rodney and De Grasse.[205] The latter was at the time
the greatest naval battle in its results that had been fought in a
century; its influence on the course of events was very great, though
far from as decisive as it might have been; it was attended with
circumstances of unusual though somewhat factitious brilliancy, and
particularly was marked by a manoeuvre that was then looked upon as
exceptionally daring and decisive,--"breaking the line." It must be
added that it has given rise to a storm of controversy; and the mass
of details, as given by witnesses who should be reliable, are so
confused and contradictory, owing mainly to the uncertainties of the
wind, that it is impossible now to do more than attempt to reconcile
them in a full account. Nevertheless, the leading features can be
presented with sufficient accuracy, and this will first be done
briefly and barely; the outline thus presented can afterward be
clothed with the details which give color, life, and interest to the
great scene.
At daylight[206] (about half-past five) the English fleet, which had
gone about at two A.M., was standing on the starboard tack, with the
wind at southeast,[207] an unusual amount of southing for that hour
(Plate XXI., A). It was then about fifteen miles from the Saints,
which bore north-northeast, and ten from the French fleet, which bore
northeast. The latter, owing to the events of the night, was greatly
scattered, as much as eight or ten miles separating the weather, or
easternmost, ships from the lee,[208] the flag-ship "Ville de Paris"
being among the latter. Anxiety for the "Zélé" kept the French
admiral, with the ships in his company, under short canvas, standing
to the southward on the port tack (A). The English on the starboard
tack, with the wind as they had it,[3] headed east-northeast, and
thus, as soon as there was light to see, found the French "broad on
the lee bow, and one of M. de Grasse's ships (the "Zélé") towed by a
frigate, square under our lee (a), with his bowsprit and foremast
prostrate across his forecastle."[209] To draw the French farther to
leeward, Rodney detached four ships (b) to chase the "Zélé." As soon
as De Grasse saw this he signalled his fleet to keep away (c), as
Rodney wished, and at the same time to form the line-of-battle, thus
calling down to him the ships to windward. The English line was also
formed rapidly, and the chasing ships recalled at seven A.M. De
Grasse, seeing that if he stood on he would lose the weather-gage
altogether, hauled up again on the port tack (c'); and the breeze
changing to east-southeast and east in his favor and knocking the
English off, the race of the two fleets on opposite tacks, for the
advantage of the wind, became nearly equal. The French, however, won,
thanks to a superiority in sailing which had enabled them to draw so
far to windward of the English on the previous days, and, but for the
awkwardness of the "Zélé," might have cleared them altogether (Plate
XXI., B). Their leading ships first reached and passed the point where
the rapidly converging tracks intersected, while the English leader,
the "Marlborough," struck the French line between the sixth and
tenth ships (variously stated). The battle, of course, had by this
time begun, the ninth ship in the French line, the "Brave," opening
fire at twenty minutes before eight A.M. upon the "Marlborough." As
there was no previous intention of breaking the line, the English
leader kept away, in obedience to a signal from Rodney, and ran close
along under the enemy's lee, followed in succession by all the ships
as they reached her wake. The battle thus assumed the common and
indecisive phase of two fleets passing on opposite tacks, the wind
very light, however, and so allowing a more heavy engagement than
common under these circumstances, the ships "sliding by" at the rate
of three to four knots. Since the hostile lines diverged again south
of their point of meeting, De Grasse made signal to keep away four
points to south-southwest, thus bringing his van (B, a) to action with
the English rear, and not permitting the latter to reach his rear
unscathed. There were, however, two dangers threatening the French if
they continued their course. Its direction, south or south-southwest,
carried them into the calms that hung round the north end of Dominica;
and the uncertainty of the wind made it possible that by its hauling
to the southward the enemy could pass through their line and gain the
wind, and with it the possibility of forcing the decisive battle which
the French policy had shunned; and this was in fact what happened. De
Grasse therefore made signal at half-past eight to wear _together_ and
take the same tack as the English. This, however, was impossible; the
two fleets were too close together to admit the evolution. He then
signalled to haul close to the wind and wear _in succession_, which
also failed to be done, and at five minutes past nine the dreaded
contingency arose; the wind hauled to the southward, knocking off all
the French ships that had not yet kept away; that is, all who had
English ships close under their lee (Plate XXI. C). Rodney, in the
"Formidable," was at this time just drawing up with the fourth ship
astern of De Grasse's flag. Luffing to the new wind, he passed through
the French line, followed by the five ships next astern of him (C,
a), while nearly at the same moment, and from the same causes, his
sixth astern (C, b) led through the interval abreast him, followed by
the whole English rear. The French line-of-battle was thus broken in
two places by columns of enemies' ships in such close order as to
force its vessels aside, even if the wind had not conspired to
embarrass their action. Every principle upon which a line-of-battle
was constituted, for mutual support and for the clear field of fire of
each ship, was thus overthrown for the French, and preserved for the
English divisions which filed through; and the French were forced off
to leeward by the interposition of the enemy's columns, besides being
broken up. Compelled thus to forsake the line upon which they had been
ranged, it was necessary to re-form upon another, and unite the three
groups into which they were divided,--a difficult piece of tactics
under any circumstances, but doubly so under the moral impression of
disaster, and in presence of a superior enemy, who, though himself
disordered, was in better shape, and already felt the glow of victory.
[Illustration: Pl. XXI. RODNEY & DE GRASSE. APRIL 12, 1782.]
It does not appear that any substantial attempt to re-form was made by
the French. To reunite, yes; but only as a flying, disordered mass.
The various shifts of wind and movements of the divisions left their
fleet, at midday (Plate XXI. D), with the centre (c) two miles
northwest of and to leeward of the van (v), the rear (r) yet farther
from the centre and to leeward of it. Calms and short puffs of wind
prevailed now through both fleets. At half-past one P.M. a light
breeze from the east sprang up, and De Grasse made signal to form the
line again on the port tack; between three and four, not having
succeeded in this, he made signal to form on the starboard tack. The
two signals and the general tenor of the accounts show that at no time
were the French re-formed after their line was broken; and all the
manoeuvres tended toward, even if they did not necessitate, taking the
whole fleet as far down as the most leewardly of its parts (D). In
such a movement, it followed of course that the most crippled ships
were left behind, and these were picked up, one by one, by the
English, who pursued without any regular order, for which there was
no need, as mutual support was assured without it. Shortly after six
P.M. De Grasse's flag-ship, the "Ville de Paris," struck her colors to
the "Barfleur," carrying the flag of Sir Samuel Hood. The French
accounts state that nine of the enemy's ships then surrounded her, and
there is no doubt that she had been fought to the bitter end. Her
name, commemorating the great city whose gift she had been to the
king, her unusual size, and the fact that no French naval
commander-in-chief had before been taken prisoner in battle, conspired
to bestow a peculiar brilliancy upon Rodney's victory. Four other
ships-of-the-line were taken,[210] and, singularly enough, upon these
particular ships was found the whole train of artillery intended for
the reduction of Jamaica.
Such were the leading features of the Battle of the Saints, or, as it
is sometimes styled, of the 12th of April, known to the French as the
Battle of Dominica. Certain points which have so far been omitted for
the sake of clearness, but which affect the issue, must now be given.
When the day opened, the French fleet was greatly scattered and
without order.[211] De Grasse, under the influence of his fears for
the "Zélé," so precipitated his movements that his line was not
properly formed at the moment of engaging. The van ships had not yet
come into position (B, a), and the remainder were so far from having
reached their places that De Vaudreuil, commanding the rear division
and last engaged, states that the line was formed under the fire of
musketry. The English, on the contrary, were in good order, the only
change made being to shorten the interval between ships from two to
one cable's length (seven hundred feet). The celebrated stroke of
breaking through the French line was due, not to previous intention,
but to a shift of wind throwing their ships out of order and so
increasing the spaces between them; while the gap through which
Rodney's group penetrated was widened by the "Diadème" on its north
side being taken aback and paying round on the other tack (C, c.) Sir
Charles Douglas says the immediate effect, where the flag-ship broke
through, was "the bringing together, almost if not quite in contact
with each other, the four ships of the enemy which were nearest," on
the north, "to the point alluded to (c), and coming up in succession.
This unfortunate group, composing now only one large single object at
which to fire, was attacked by the "Duke," "Namur," and "Formidable"
(ninety-gun ships) all at once, receiving several broadsides from
each, not a single shot missing; and great must have been the
slaughter." The "Duke" (C, d), being next ahead of the flag-ship, had
followed her leader under the French lee; but as soon as her captain
saw that the "Formidable" had traversed the enemy's order, he did the
same, passing north of this confused group and so bringing it under a
fire from both sides. The log of the "Magnanime," one of the group,
mentions passing under the fire of two three-deckers, one on either
side.
As soon as the order was thus broken, Rodney hauled down the signal
for the line, keeping flying that for close action, and at the same
time ordered his van, which had now passed beyond and north of the
enemy's rear, to go about and rejoin the English centre. This was
greatly delayed through the injuries to spars and sails received in
passing under the enemy's fire. His own flag-ship and the ships with
her went about. The rear, under Hood, instead of keeping north again
to join the centre, stood to windward for a time, and were then
becalmed at a considerable distance from the rest of the fleet.
Much discussion took place at a later day as to the wisdom of Rodney's
action in breaking through his enemy's order, and to whom the credit,
if any, should be ascribed. The latter point is of little concern; but
it may be said that the son of Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's
chief-of-staff, brought forward an amount of positive evidence, the
only kind that could be accepted to diminish the credit of the person
wholly responsible for the results, which proves that the suggestion
came from Douglas, and Rodney's consent was with difficulty obtained.
The value of the manoeuvre itself is of more consequence than any
question of personal reputation. It has been argued by some that, so
far from being a meritorious act, it was unfortunate, and for Rodney's
credit should rather be attributed to the force of circumstances than
to choice. It had been better, these say, to have continued along
under the lee of the French rear, thus inflicting upon it the fire of
the whole English line, and that the latter should have tacked and
doubled on the French rear. This argument conveniently forgets that
tacking, or turning round in any way, after a brush of this kind, was
possible to only a part of the ships engaged; and that these would
have much difficulty in overtaking the enemies who had passed on,
unless the latter were very seriously crippled. Therefore this
suggested attack, the precise reproduction of the battle of Ushant,
really reduces itself to the fleets passing on opposite tacks, each
distributing its fire over the whole of the enemy's line without
attempting any concentration on a part of it. It may, and must, be
conceded at once, that Rodney's change of course permitted the eleven
rear ships of the French (D, r) to run off to leeward, having received
the fire of only part of their enemy, while the English van had
undergone that of nearly the whole French fleet. These ships, however,
were thus thrown entirely out of action for a measurable and important
time by being driven to leeward, and would have been still more out of
position to help any of their fleet, had not De Grasse himself been
sent to leeward by Hood's division cutting the line three ships ahead
of him. The thirteen leading French ships, obeying the last signal
they had seen, were hugging the wind; the group of six with De Grasse
(C, e) would have done the same had they not been headed off by Hood's
division. The result of Rodney's own action alone, therefore, would
have been to divide the French fleet into two parts, separated by a
space of six miles, and one of them hopelessly to leeward. The
English, having gained the wind, would have been in position easily to
"contain" the eleven lee ships, and to surround the nineteen weather
ones in overwhelming force. The actual condition, owing to the _two_
breaches in the line, was slightly different; the group of six with De
Grasse being placed between his weather and lee divisions, two miles
from the former, four from the latter (D). It seems scarcely necessary
to insist upon the tactical advantages of such a situation for the
English, even disregarding the moral effect of the confusion through
which the French had passed. In addition to this, a very striking
lesson is deducible from the immediate effects of the English guns in
passing through. Of the five ships taken, three were those under whose
sterns the English divisions pierced.[212] Instead of giving and
taking, as the parallel lines ran by, on equal terms, each ship having
the support of those ahead and astern, the French ships near which the
penetrating columns passed received each the successive fire of all
the enemy's division. Thus Hood's thirteen ships filed by the two rear
ones of the French van, the "César" and "Hector," fairly crushing them
under this concentration of fire; while in like manner, and with like
results, Rodney's six passed by the "Glorieux." This "concentration by
defiling" past the extremity of a column corresponds quite accurately
to the concentration upon the flank of a line, and has a special
interest, because if successfully carried out it would be as powerful
an attack now as it ever has been. If quick to seize their advantage,
the English might have fired upon the ships on both sides of the gaps
through which they passed, as the "Formidable" actually did; but they
were using the starboard broadsides, and many doubtless did not
realize their opportunity until too late. The natural results of
Rodney's act, therefore, were: (1) The gain of the wind, with the
power of offensive action; (2) Concentration of fire upon a part of
the enemy's order; and (3) The introduction into the latter of
confusion and division, which might, and did, become very great,
offering the opportunity of further tactical advantage. It is not a
valid reply to say that, had the French been more apt, they could have
united sooner. A manoeuvre that presents a good chance of advantage
does not lose its merit because it can be met by a prompt movement of
the enemy, any more than a particular lunge of the sword becomes
worthless because it has its appropriate parry. The chances were that
by heading off the rear ships, while the van stood on, the French
fleet would be badly divided; and the move was none the less sagacious
because the two fragments could have united sooner than they did, had
they been well handled. With the alternative action suggested, of
tacking after passing the enemy's rear, the pursuit became a stern
chase, in which both parties having been equally engaged would
presumably be equally crippled. Signals of disability, in fact, were
numerous in both fleets.
Independently of the tactical handling of the two fleets, there were
certain differences of equipment which conferred tactical advantage,
and are therefore worth noting. The French appear to have had finer
ships, and, class for class, heavier armaments. Sir Charles Douglas,
an eminent officer of active and ingenious turn of mind, who paid
particular attention to gunnery details, estimated that in weight of
battery the thirty-three French were superior to the thirty-six
English by the force of four 84-gun ships; and that after the loss of
the "Zélé," "Jason," and "Caton" there still remained an advantage
equal to two seventy-fours. The French admiral La Gravière admits the
generally heavier calibre of French cannon at this era. The better
construction of the French ships and their greater draught caused them
to sail and beat better, and accounts in part for the success of De
Grasse in gaining to windward; for in the afternoon of the 11th only
three or four of the body of his fleet were visible _from the
mast-head_ of the English flag-ship, which had been within gunshot of
them on the 9th. It was the awkwardness of the unlucky "Zélé" and of
the "Magnanime," which drew down De Grasse from his position of
vantage, and justified Rodney's perseverance in relying upon the
chapter of accidents to effect his purpose. The greater speed of the
French as a body is somewhat hard to account for, because, though
undoubtedly with far better lines, the practice of coppering the
bottom had not become so general in France as in England, and among
the French there were several uncoppered and worm-eaten ships.[213]
The better sailing of the French was, however, remarked by the English
officers, though the great gain mentioned must have been in part owing
to Rodney's lying-by, after the action of the 9th, to refit, due
probably to the greater injury received by the small body of his
vessels, which had been warmly engaged, with greatly superior numbers.
It was stated, in narrating that action, that the French kept at half
cannon-range; this was to neutralize a tactical advantage the English
had in the large number of carronades and other guns of light weight
but large calibre, which in close action told heavily, but were
useless at greater distances. The second in command, De Vaudreuil, to
whom was intrusted the conduct of that attack, expressly states that
if he had come within reach of the carronades his ships would have
been quickly unrigged. Whatever judgment is passed upon the military
policy of refusing to crush an enemy situated as the English division
was, there can be no question that, if the object was to prevent
pursuit, the tactics of De Vaudreuil on the 9th was in all respects
excellent. He inflicted the utmost injury with the least exposure of
his own force. On the 12th, De Grasse, by allowing himself to be lured
within reach of carronades, yielded this advantage, besides
sacrificing to an impulse his whole previous strategic policy. Rapidly
handled from their lightness, firing grape and shot of large
diameter, these guns were peculiarly harmful in close action and
useless at long range. In a later despatch De Vaudreuil says: "The
effect of these new arms is most deadly within musket range; it is
they which so badly crippled us on the 12th of April." There were
other gunnery innovations, in some at least of the English ships,
which by increasing the accuracy, the rapidity, and the field of fire,
greatly augmented the power of their batteries. These were the
introduction of locks, by which the man who aimed also fired; and the
fitting to the gun-carriages of breast-pieces and sweeps, so that the
guns could be pointed farther ahead or astern,--that is, over a larger
field than had been usual. In fights between single ships, not
controlled in their movements by their relations to a fleet, this
improvement would at times allow the possessor to take a position
whence he could train upon his enemy without the latter being able to
reply, and some striking instances of such tactical advantage are
given. In a fleet fight, such as is now being considered, the gain was
that the guns could be brought to bear farther forward, and could
follow the opponent longer as he passed astern, thus doubling, or
more, the number of shots he might receive, and lessening for him the
interval of immunity enjoyed between two successive antagonists.[214]
These matters of antiquated and now obsolete detail carry with them
lessons that are never obsolete; they differ in no respect from the
more modern experiences with the needle-gun and the torpedo.
And indeed this whole action of April 12, 1782, is fraught with sound
military teaching. Perseverance in pursuit, gaining advantage of
position, concentration of one's own effort, dispersal of the enemy's
force, the efficient tactical bearing of small but important
improvements in the material of war, have been dwelt on. To insist
further upon the necessity of not letting slip a chance to beat the
enemy in detail, would be thrown away on any one not already convinced
by the bearing of April 9 on April 12. The abandonment of the attack
upon Jamaica, after the defeat of the French fleet, shows
conclusively that the true way to secure ulterior objects is to defeat
the force which threatens them. There remains at least one criticism,
delicate in its character, but essential to draw out the full
teachings of these events; that is, upon the manner in which the
victory was followed up, and the consequent effects upon the war in
general.
The liability of sailing-ships to injury in spars and sails, in other
words, in that mobility which is the prime characteristic of naval
strength, makes it difficult to say, after a lapse of time, what might
or might not have been done. It is not only a question of actual
damage received, which log-books may record, but also of the means for
repair, the energy and aptitude of the officers and seamen, which
differ from ship to ship. As to the ability of the English fleet,
however, to follow up its advantages by a more vigorous pursuit on the
12th of April, we have the authority of two most distinguished
officers,--Sir Samuel Hood, the second in command, and Sir Charles
Douglas, the captain of the fleet, or chief-of-staff to the admiral.
The former expressed the opinion that twenty ships might have been
taken, and said so to Rodney the next day; while the chief-of-staff
was so much mortified by the failure, and by the manner in which the
admiral received his suggestions, as seriously to contemplate
resigning his position.[215]
Advice and criticism are easy, nor can the full weight of a
responsibility be felt, except by the man on whom it is laid; but
great results cannot often be reached in war without risk and effort.
The accuracy of the judgment of these two officers, however, is
confirmed by inference from the French reports. Rodney justifies his
failure to pursue by alleging the crippled condition of many ships,
and other matters incident to the conclusion of a hard-fought battle,
and then goes on to suggest what might have been done that night, had
he pursued, by the French fleet, which "went off in a body of
twenty-six ships-of-the-line."[216] These possibilities are rather
creditable to his imagination, considering what the French fleet had
done by day; but as regards the body of twenty-six[217] ships, De
Vaudreuil, who, after De Grasse's surrender, made the signal for the
ships to rally round his flag, found only ten with him next morning,
and was not joined by any more before the 14th. During the following
days five more joined him at intervals.[218] With these he went to the
rendezvous at Cap Français, where he found others, bringing the whole
number who repaired thither to twenty. The five remaining, of those
that had been in the action, fled to Curaçoa, six hundred miles
distant, and did not rejoin until May. The "body of twenty-six ships,"
therefore, had no existence in fact; on the contrary, the French fleet
was very badly broken up, and several of its ships isolated. As
regards the crippled condition, there seems no reason to think the
English had suffered more, but rather less, than their enemy; and a
curious statement, bearing upon this, appears in a letter from Sir
Gilbert Blane:--
"It was with difficulty we could make the French officers
believe that the returns of killed and wounded, made by our
ships to the admiral, were true; and one of them flatly
contradicted me, saying we always gave the world a false account
of our loss. I then walked with him over the decks of the
'Formidable,' and bid him remark what number of shot-holes there
were, and _also how little her rigging had suffered_, and asked
if that degree of damage was likely to be connected with the
loss of more than fourteen men, which was our number killed, and
_the greatest of any in the fleet_, except the 'Royal Oak' and
'Monarch.' He ... owned our fire must have been much better kept
up and directed than theirs."[219]
There can remain little doubt, therefore, that the advantage was not
followed up with all possible vigor. Not till five days after the
battle was Hood's division sent toward San Domingo, where they picked
up in the Mona Passage the "Jason" and the "Caton," which had
separated before the battle and were on their way to Cap Français.
These, and two small vessels with them, were the sole after-fruits of
the victory. Under the conditions of England's war this cautious
failure is a serious blot on Rodney's military reputation, and goes
far to fix his place among successful admirals. He had saved Jamaica
for the time; but he had not, having the opportunity, crushed the
French fleet. He too, like De Grasse, had allowed the immediate
objective to blind him to the general military situation, and to the
factor which controlled it.
To appreciate the consequences of this neglect, and the real
indecisiveness of this celebrated battle, we must go forward a year
and listen to the debates in Parliament on the conditions of peace, in
February, 1783. The approval or censure of the terms negotiated by the
existing ministry involved the discussion of many considerations; but
the gist of the dispute was, whether the conditions were such as the
comparative financial and military situations of the belligerents
justified, or whether it would have been better for England to
continue the war rather than submit to the sacrifices she had made. As
regards the financial condition, despite the gloomy picture drawn by
the advocates of the peace, there was probably no more doubt then than
there is now about the comparative resources of the different
countries. The question of military strength was really that of naval
power. The ministry argued that the whole British force hardly
numbered one hundred sail-of-the-line, while the navies of France and
Spain amounted to one hundred and forty, not to speak of that of
Holland.
"With so glaring an inferiority, what hopes of success could we
derive, either from the experience of the last campaign, or from
any new distribution of our force in that which would have
followed? In the West Indies we could not have had more than
forty-six sail to oppose to forty, which on the day that peace
was signed lay in Cadiz Bay, with sixteen thousand troops on
board, ready to sail for that quarter of the world, where they
would have been joined by twelve of the line from Havana and
ten from San Domingo.... Might we not too reasonably apprehend
that the campaign in the West Indies would have closed with the
loss of Jamaica itself, the avowed object of this immense
armament?"[220]
These are certainly the reasonings of an avowed partisan, for which
large allowances must be made. The accuracy of the statement of
comparative numbers was denied by Lord Keppel, a member of the same
party, and but lately at the head of the admiralty, a post which he
had resigned because he disapproved the treaty.[221] English
statesmen, too, as well as English seamen, must by this time have
learned to discount largely the apparent, when estimating the real,
power of the other navies. Nevertheless, how different would have been
the appreciation of the situation, both moral and material, had Rodney
reaped the full fruits of the victory which he owed rather to chance
than to his own merit, great as that undeniably was.
A letter published in 1809, anonymous, but bearing strong internal
evidence of being written by Sir Gilbert Blane, the physician of the
fleet and long on intimate terms with Rodney, who was a constant
sufferer during his last cruise, states that the admiral "thought
little of his victory on the 12th of April, 1782." He would have
preferred to rest his reputation upon his combinations against De
Guichen, April 17, 1780, and "looked upon that opportunity of beating,
with an inferior fleet, such an officer, whom he considered the best
in the French service, as one by which, but for the disobedience of
his captains, he might have gained immortal renown."[222] Few students
will be inclined to question this estimate of Rodney's merit on the
two occasions. Fortune, however, decreed that his glory should depend
upon a battle, brilliant in itself, to which his own qualities least
contributed, and denied him success when he most deserved it. The
chief action of his life in which merit and success met, the
destruction of Langara's fleet off Cape St. Vincent, has almost
passed into oblivion; yet it called for the highest qualities of a
seaman, and is not unworthy of comparison with Hawke's pursuit of
Conflans.[223]
Within the two years and a half which had elapsed since Rodney was
appointed to his command he had gained several important successes,
and, as was remarked, had taken a French, a Spanish, and a Dutch
admiral. "In that time he had added twelve line-of-battle ships, all
taken from the enemy, to the British navy, and destroyed five more;
and to render the whole still more singularly remarkable, the 'Ville
de Paris' was said to be the only first-rate man-of-war that ever was
taken and carried into port by any commander of any nation."
Notwithstanding his services, the party spirit that was then so strong
in England, penetrating even the army and navy, obtained his
recall[224] upon the fall of Lord North's ministry, and his successor,
a man unknown to fame, had already sailed when news arrived of the
victory. In the fallen and discouraging state of English affairs at
the time, it excited the utmost exultation, and silenced the
strictures which certain parts of the admiral's previous conduct had
drawn forth. The people were not in a humor to be critical, and amid
the exaggerated notions that prevailed of the results achieved, no one
thought of the failure to obtain greater. This impression long
prevailed. As late as 1830, when Rodney's Life was first published, it
was asserted "that the French navy had been so effectually crippled
and reduced by the decisive victory of the 12th of April, as to be no
longer in a condition to contest with Great Britain the empire of the
seas." This is nonsense, excusable in 1782, but not to the calm
thought of after days. The favorable terms obtained were due to the
financial embarrassment of France, not to her naval humiliation; and
if there was exaggeration in the contention of the advocates of peace
that England could not save Jamaica, it is probable that she could not
have recovered by arms the other islands restored to her by the
treaty.
The memory of De Grasse will always be associated with great services
done to America. His name, rather than that of Rochambeau, represents
the material succor which France gave to the struggling life of the
young Republic, as Lafayette's recalls the moral sympathy so
opportunely extended. The incidents of his life, subsequent to the
great disaster which closed his active career, cannot be without
interest to American readers.
After the surrender of the "Ville de Paris," De Grasse accompanied the
English fleet and its prizes to Jamaica, whither Rodney repaired to
refit his ships, thus appearing as a captive upon the scene of his
intended conquest. On the 19th of May he left the island, still a
prisoner, for England. Both by naval officers and by the English
people he was treated with that flattering and benevolent attention
which comes easily from the victor to the vanquished, and of which his
personal valor at least was not unworthy. It is said that he did not
refuse to show himself on several occasions upon the balcony of his
rooms in London, to the populace shouting for the valiant Frenchman.
This undignified failure to appreciate his true position naturally
excited the indignation of his countrymen; the more so as he had been
unsparing and excessive in denouncing the conduct of his subordinates
on the unlucky 12th of April.
"He bears his misfortune," wrote Sir Gilbert Blane, "with
equanimity; conscious, as he says, that he has done his duty....
He attributes his misfortune, not to the inferiority of his
force, but to the base desertion of his officers in the other
ships, to whom he made the signal to rally, and even hailed them
to abide by him, but was abandoned."[225]
This was the key-note to all his utterances. Writing from the English
flag-ship, the day after the battle, he "threw upon the greater part
of his captains the misfortunes of the day. Some had disobeyed his
signals; others, and notably the captains of the 'Languedoc' and
'Couronne,' that is to say his next ahead and astern, had abandoned
him."[226] He did not, however, confine himself to official reports,
but while a prisoner in London published several pamphlets to the same
effect, which he sent broadcast over Europe. The government, naturally
thinking that an officer could not thus sully the honor of his corps
without good reason, resolved to search out and relentlessly punish
all the guilty. The captains of the "Languedoc" and "Couronne" were
imprisoned as soon as they reached France, and all papers, logs, etc.,
bearing upon the case were gathered together. Under all the
circumstances it is not to be wondered at that on his return to
France, De Grasse, to use his own words, "found no one to hold out a
hand to him."[227] It was not till the beginning of 1784 that all the
accused and witnesses were ready to appear before the court-martial;
but the result of the trial was to clear entirely and in the most
ample manner almost every one whom he had attacked, while the faults
found were considered of a character entitled to indulgence, and were
awarded but slight punishment. "Nevertheless," cautiously observes a
French writer, "one cannot but say, with the Court, that the capture
of an admiral commanding thirty ships-of-the-line is an historical
incident which causes the regret of the whole nation."[228] As to the
conduct of the battle by the admiral, the Court found that the danger
of the "Zélé" on the morning of the 12th was not such as to justify
bearing down for so long a time as was done; that the crippled ship
had a breeze which was not then shared by the English, five miles away
to the southward, and which carried her into Basse Terre at ten A.M.;
that the engagement should not have been begun before all the ships
had come into line; and finally, that the fleet should have been
formed on the same tack as the English, because, by continuing to
stand south, it entered the zone of calms and light airs at the north
end of Dominica.[229]
De Grasse was much dissatisfied with the finding of the Court, and was
indiscreet enough to write to the minister of marine, protesting
against it and demanding a new trial. The minister, acknowledging his
protest, replied in the name of the king. After commenting upon the
pamphlets that had been so widely issued, and the entire contradiction
of their statements by the testimony before the Court, he concluded
with these weighty words:--
"The loss of the battle cannot be attributed to the fault of
private officers.[230] It results, from the findings, that you
have allowed yourself to injure, by ill-founded accusations, the
reputation of several officers, in order to clear yourself in
public opinion of an unhappy result, the excuse for which you
might perhaps have found in the inferiority of your force, in
the uncertain fortune of war, and in circumstances over which
you had no control. His Majesty is willing to believe that you
did what you could to prevent the misfortunes of the day; but he
cannot be equally indulgent to your unjust imputations upon
those officers of his navy who have been cleared of the charges
against them. His Majesty, dissatisfied with your conduct in
this respect, forbids you to present yourself before him. I
transmit his orders with regret, and add my own advice to
retire, under the circumstances, to your province."
De Grasse died in January, 1788. His fortunate opponent, rewarded with
peerage and pension, lived until 1792. Hood was also created a peer,
and commanded with distinction in the early part of the wars of the
French Revolution, winning the enthusiastic admiration of Nelson, who
served under him; but a sharp difference with the admiralty caused him
to be retired before achieving any brilliant addition to his
reputation. He died in 1816, at the great age of ninety-two.
FOOTNOTES:
[194] The curve, a, a', a'', represents the line which Hood proposed
to follow with his fleet, the wind being supposed east-southeast. The
positions B, B, B, refer to the proceedings of a subsequent day and
have nothing to do with the diagram at A.
[195] When a fleet is in line ahead, close to the wind, on one tack,
and the ships go about together, they will, on the other tack, be on
the same line, but not one ahead of the other. This formation was
called bow-and-quarter line.
[196] A spring is a rope taken from the stern or quarter of a ship at
anchor, to an anchor properly placed, by which means the ship can be
turned in a desired direction.
[197] In the council of war of the allied fleets on the expediency of
attacking the English squadron anchored at Torbay (p. 408) an opponent
of the measure urged "that the whole of the combined fleets could not
bear down upon the English in a line-of-battle abreast, that of course
they must form the line-of-battle ahead, and go down upon the enemy
singly, by which they would run the greatest risk of being shattered
and torn to pieces," etc. (Beatson, vol. v. p. 396).
[198] In war, as in cards, the state of the score must at times
dictate the play; and the chief who never takes into consideration the
effect which his particular action will have on the general result,
nor what is demanded of him by the condition of things elsewhere, both
political and military, lacks an essential quality of a great general.
"The audacious manner in which Wellington stormed the redoubt of
Francisco [at Ciudad Rodrigo], and broke ground on the first night of
the investment, the more audacious manner in which he assaulted the
place before the fire of the defence had in any way lessened, and
before the counterscarp had been blown in, were the true causes of the
sudden fall of the place. _Both the military and political state of
affairs warranted this neglect of rules._ When the general terminated
his order for the assault with this sentence, 'Ciudad Rodrigo _must_
be stormed this evening,' he knew well that it would be nobly
understood" (Napier's Peninsular War). "Judging that the honour of his
Majesty's arms, _and the circumstances of the war in these seas_,
required a considerable degree of enterprise, I felt myself justified
in departing from the regular system" (Sir John Jervis's Report of the
Battle of Cape St. Vincent).
[199] By Kempenfeldt's attack upon De Guichen's convoy, and the
following gale in December, 1781. See p. 408.
[200] Kerguelen: Guerre Maritime de 1778. Letter of De Grasse to
Kerguelen, dated Paris. January 8, 1783. p. 263.
[201] See pp. 366, 426.
[202] See Map IV. of the Atlantic Ocean, p. 532.
[203] Weather quarter is behind, but on the windward side.
[204] April 29, 1781, off Martinique, twenty-four ships to eighteen;
January, 1782, thirty to twenty-two; April 9, 1782, thirty to twenty.
[205] The difference of time from Trincomalee to the Saints is nine
hours and a half.
[206] The account of the transactions from April 9 to April 12 is
based mainly upon the contemporary plates and descriptions of
Lieutenant Matthews, R.N., and the much later "Naval Researches" of
Capt. Thomas White, also of the British Navy, who were eye-witnesses,
both being checked by French and other English narratives. Matthews
and White are at variance with Rodney's official report as to the tack
on which the English were at daybreak; but the latter is explicitly
confirmed by private letters of Sir Charles Douglas, sent immediately
after the battle to prominent persons, and is followed in the text.
[207] Letter of Sir Charles Douglas, Rodney's chief-of-staff: "United
Service Journal," 1833, Part I. p. 515.
[208] De Grasse calls this distance three leagues, while some of his
captains estimated it to be as great as five.
[209] The French, in mid-channel, had the wind more to the eastward.
[210] The positions of the French ships captured are shown by a cross
in each of the three successive stages of the battle, B, C, D.
[211] The distance of the weathermost French ships from the "Ville de
Paris," when the signal to form line-of-battle was made, is variously
stated at from six to nine miles.
[212] The other two French ships taken were the "Ville de Paris,"
which, in her isolated condition, and bearing the flag of the
commander-in-chief, became the quarry around which the enemy's ships
naturally gathered, and the "Ardent," of sixty-four guns, which
appears to have been intercepted in a gallant attempt to pass from the
van to the side of her admiral in his extremity. The latter was the
solitary prize taken by the allied Great Armada in the English
Channel, in 1779.
[213] Official letter of the Marquis de Vaudreuil. Guérin: Histoire de
la Marine Française, vol. v. p. 513.
[214] See United Service Journal, 1834, Part II. pp. 109 and
following.
[215] See letter of Sir Howard Douglas in United Service Journal,
1834, Part II. p. 97; also "Naval Evolutions," by same author. The
letters of Sir Samuel Hood have not come under the author's eye.
[216] Rodney's Life, vol. ii. p. 248.
[217] There were only twenty-five in all.
[218] Guérin, vol. v. p. 511.
[219] Rodney's Life, vol. ii. p. 246.
[220] Annual Register, 1783, p. 151.
[221] Annual Register, 1783, p. 157; Life of Admiral Keppel, vol. ii.
p. 403.
[222] Naval Chronicle, vol. xxv. p. 404.
[223] Page 404. Yet here also the gossip of the day, as reflected in
the Naval Atalantis, imputed the chief credit to Young, the captain of
the flag-ship. Sir Gilbert Blane stated, many years later, "When it
was close upon sunset, it became a question whether the chase should
be continued. After some discussion between the admiral and captain,
at which I was present, the admiral being confined with the gout, it
was decided to persist in the same course with the signal to engage to
leeward." (United Service Journal, 1830, Part II. p. 479.)
[224] Rodney was a strong Tory. Almost all the other distinguished
admirals of the day, notably Keppel, Howe, and Barrington, were
Whigs,--a fact unfortunate for the naval power of England.
[225] Rodney's Life, vol. ii. p. 242.
[226] Chevalier, p. 311.
[227] Kerguelen: Guerre Maritime de 1778. Letter of De Grasse to
Kerguelen, p. 263.
[228] Troude: Batailles Navales. It is interesting to note in this
connection that one of the ships near the French admiral, when he
surrendered, was the "Pluton," which, though the extreme rear ship,
had nevertheless thus reached a position worthy of the high reputation
of her captain, D'Albert de Rions.
[229] Troude, vol. ii. p. 147
[230] That is, commanders of single ships.