EVENTS IN THE EAST INDIES, 1778-1781.--SUFFREN SAILS FROM BREST,
1781.--HIS BRILLIANT NAVAL CAMPAIGN IN THE INDIAN SEAS, 1782,
1783.
The very interesting and instructive campaign of Suffren in the East
Indies, although in itself by far the most noteworthy and meritorious
naval performance of the war of 1778, failed, through no fault of his,
to affect the general issue. It was not till 1781 that the French
Court felt able to direct upon the East naval forces adequate to the
importance of the issue. Yet the conditions of the peninsula at that
time were such as to give an unusual opportunity for shaking the
English power. Hyder Ali, the most skilful and daring of all the
enemies against whom the English had yet fought in India, was then
ruling over the kingdom of Mysore, which, from its position in the
southern part of the peninsula, threatened both the Carnatic and the
Malabar coast. Hyder, ten years before, had maintained alone a most
successful war against the intruding foreigners, concluding with a
peace upon the terms of a mutual restoration of conquests; and he was
now angered by the capture of Mahé. On the other hand, a number of
warlike tribes, known by the name of the Mahrattas, of the same race
and loosely knit together in a kind of feudal system, had become
involved in war with the English. The territory occupied by these
tribes, whose chief capital was at Poonah, near Bombay, extended
northward from Mysore to the Ganges. With boundaries thus
conterminous, and placed centrally with reference to the three English
presidencies of Bombay, Calcutta, and Madras, Hyder and the Mahrattas
were in a position of advantage for mutual support and for offensive
operations against the common enemy. At the beginning of the war
between England and France, a French agent appeared at Poonah. It was
reported to Warren Hastings, the Governor-General, that the tribes had
agreed to terms and ceded to the French a seaport on the Malabar
coast. With his usual promptness, Hastings at once determined on war,
and sent a division of the Bengal army across the Jumna and into
Berar. Another body of four thousand English troops also marched from
Bombay; but being badly led, was surrounded and forced to surrender in
January, 1779. This unusual reverse quickened the hopes and increased
the strength of the enemies of the English; and although the material
injury was soon remedied by substantial successes under able leaders,
the loss of prestige remained. The anger of Hyder Ali, roused by the
capture of Mahé, was increased by imprudent thwarting on the part of
the governor of Madras. Seeing the English entangled with the
Mahrattas, and hearing that a French armament was expected on the
Coromandel coast, he quietly prepared for war. In the summer of 1780
swarms of his horsemen descended without warning from the hills, and
appeared near the gates of Madras. In September one body of English
troops, three thousand strong, was cut to pieces, and another of five
thousand was only saved by a rapid retreat upon Madras, losing its
artillery and trains. Unable to attack Madras, Hyder turned upon the
scattered posts separated from each other and the capital by the open
country, which was now wholly in his control.
Such was the state of affairs when, in January, 1781, a French
squadron of six ships-of-the-line and three frigates appeared on the
coast. The English fleet under Sir Edward Hughes had gone to Bombay.
To the French commodore, Count d'Orves, Hyder appealed for aid in an
attack upon Cuddalore. Deprived of support by sea, and surrounded by
the myriads of natives, the place must have fallen. D'Orves, however,
refused, and returned to the Isle of France. At the same time one of
the most skilful of the English Indian soldiers, Sir Eyre Coote, took
the field against Hyder. The latter at once raised the siege of the
beleaguered posts, and after a series of operations extending through
the spring months, was brought to battle on the 1st of July, 1781. His
total defeat restored to the English the open country, saved the
Carnatic, and put an end to the hopes of the partisans of the French
in their late possession of Pondicherry. A great opportunity had been
lost.
Meanwhile a French officer of very different temper from his
predecessors was on his way to the East Indies. It will be remembered
that when De Grasse sailed from Brest, March 22, 1781, for the West
Indies, there went with his fleet a division of five ships-of-the-line
under Suffren. The latter separated from the main body on the 29th of
the month, taking with him a few transports destined for the Cape of
Good Hope, then a Dutch colony. The French government had learned that
an expedition from England was destined to seize this important
halting-place on the road to India, and Suffren's first mission was to
secure it. In fact, the squadron under Commodore Johnstone[168] had
got away first, and had anchored at Porto Praya, in the Cape Verde
Islands, a Portuguese colony, on the 11th of April. It numbered two
ships-of-the-line, and three of fifty guns, with frigates and smaller
vessels, besides thirty-five transports, mostly armed. Without
apprehension of attack, not because he trusted to the neutrality of
the port but because he thought his destination secret, the English
commodore had not anchored with a view to battle.
It so happened that at the moment of sailing from Brest one of the
ships intended for the West Indies was transferred to Suffren's
squadron. She consequently had not water enough for the longer voyage,
and this with other reasons determined Suffren also to anchor at
Porto Praya. On the 16th of April, five days after Johnstone, he made
the island early in the morning and stood for the anchorage, sending a
coppered ship ahead to reconnoitre. Approaching from the eastward, the
land for some time hid the English squadron; but at quarter before
nine the advance ship, the "Artésien," signalled that enemy's ships
were anchored in the bay. The latter is open to the southward, and
extends from east to west about a mile and a half; the conditions are
such that ships usually lie in the northeast part, near the shore
(Plate XIII).[169] The English were there, stretching irregularly in a
west-northwest line. Both Suffren and Johnstone were surprised, but
the latter more so; and the initiative remained with the French
officer. Few men were fitter, by natural temper and the teaching of
experience, for the prompt decision required. Of ardent disposition
and inborn military genius, Suffren had learned, in the conduct of
Boscawen toward the squadron of De la Clue,[170] in which he had
served, not to lay weight upon the power of Portugal to enforce
respect for her neutrality. He knew that this must be the squadron
meant for the Cape of Good Hope. The only question for him was whether
to press on to the Cape with the chance of getting there first, or to
attack the English at their anchors, in the hope of so crippling them
as to prevent their further progress. He decided for the latter; and
although the ships of his squadron, not sailing equally well, were
scattered, he also determined to stand in at once, rather than lose
the advantage of a surprise. Making signal to prepare for action at
anchor, he took the lead in his flag-ship, the "Héros," of
seventy-four guns, hauled close round the southeast point of the bay,
and stood for the English flag-ship (f). He was closely followed by
the "Hannibal," seventy-four (line a b); the advance ship "Artésien"
(c), a sixty-four, also stood on with him; but the two rear ships were
still far astern.
[Illustration: Pl. XIII. PORTO PRAYA. APRIL 16, 1781.]
The English commodore got ready for battle as soon as he made out the
enemy, but had no time to rectify his order. Suffren anchored five
hundred feet from the flag-ship's starboard beam (by a singular
coincidence the English flag-ship was also called "Hero"), thus having
enemy's ships on both sides, and opened fire. The "Hannibal" anchored
ahead of her commodore (b), and so close that the latter had to veer
cable and drop astern (a); but her captain, ignorant of Suffren's
intention to disregard the neutrality of the port, had not obeyed the
order to clear for action, and was wholly unprepared,--his decks
lumbered with water-casks which had been got up to expedite watering,
and the guns not cast loose. He did not add to this fault by any
hesitation, but followed the flag-ship boldly, receiving passively the
fire, to which for a time he was unable to reply. Luffing to the wind,
he passed to windward of his chief, chose his position with skill, and
atoned by his death for his first fault. These two ships were so
placed as to use both broadsides. The "Artésien," in the smoke,
mistook an East India ship for a man-of-war. Running alongside (c'),
her captain was struck dead at the moment he was about to anchor, and
the critical moment being lost by the absence of a head, the ship
drifted out of close action, carrying the East-Indiaman along with her
(c''). The remaining two vessels, coming up late, failed to keep close
enough to the wind, and they too were thrown out of action (d, e).
Then Suffren, finding himself with only two ships to bear the brunt of
the fight, cut his cable and made sail. The "Hannibal" followed his
movement; but so much injured was she that her fore and main masts
went over the side,--fortunately not till she was pointed out from the
bay, which she left shorn to a hulk.
Putting entirely aside questions of international law, the wisdom and
conduct of Suffren's attack, from the military point of view, invite
attention. To judge them properly, we must consider what was the
object of the mission with which he was charged, and what were the
chief factors in thwarting or forwarding it. His first object was to
protect the Cape of Good Hope against an English expedition; the
chief reliance for effecting his purpose was to get there first; the
obstacle to his success was the English fleet. To anticipate the
arrival of the latter, two courses were open to him,--to run for it in
the hope of winning the race, or to beat the enemy and so put him out
of the running altogether. So long as his whereabouts was unknown, a
search, unless with very probable information, would be a waste of
time; but when fortune had thrown his enemy across his path, the
genius of Suffren at once jumped to the conclusion that the control of
the sea in southern waters would determine the question, and should be
settled at once. To use his own strong expression, "The destruction of
the English squadron would _cut off the root_ of all the plans and
projects of that expedition, gain us for a long time the superiority
in India, a superiority whence might result a glorious peace, and
hinder the English from reaching the Cape before me,--an object which
has been fulfilled and was the principal aim of my mission." He was
ill-informed as to the English force, believing it greater than it
was; but he had it at disadvantage and surprised. The prompt decision
to fight, therefore, was right, and it is the most pronounced merit of
Suffren in this affair, that he postponed for the moment--dismissed,
so to speak, from his mind--the ulterior projects of the cruise; but
in so doing he departed from the traditions of the French navy and the
usual policy of his government. It cannot be imputed to him as a fault
that he did not receive from his captains the support he was fairly
entitled to expect. The accidents and negligence which led to their
failure have been mentioned; but having his three best ships in hand,
there can be little doubt he was right in profiting by the surprise,
and trusting that the two in reserve would come up in time.
The position taken by his own ship and by the "Hannibal," enabling
them to use both broadsides,--in other words, to develop their utmost
force,--was excellently judged. He thus availed himself to the full of
the advantage given by the surprise and by the lack of order in the
enemy's squadron. This lack of order, according to English accounts,
threw out of action two of their fifty-gun ships,--a circumstance
which, while discreditable to Johnstone, confirmed Suffren's judgment
in precipitating his attack. Had he received the aid upon which, after
all deductions, he was justified in counting, he would have destroyed
the English squadron; as it was, he saved the Cape Colony at Porto
Praya. It is not surprising, therefore, that the French Court,
notwithstanding its traditional sea policy and the diplomatic
embarrassment caused by the violation of Portuguese neutrality, should
have heartily and generously acknowledged a vigor of action to which
it was unused in its admirals.
It has been said that Suffren, who had watched the cautious movements
of D'Estaing in America, and had served in the Seven Years' War,
attributed in part the reverses suffered by the French at sea to the
introduction of Tactics, which he stigmatized as the veil of timidity;
but that the results of the fight at Porto Praya, necessarily engaged
without previous arrangement, convinced him that system and method had
their use.[171] Certainly his tactical combinations afterward were of
a high order, especially in his earlier actions in the East (for he
seems again to have abandoned them in the later fights under the
disappointment caused by his captains' disaffection or blundering).
But his great and transcendent merit lay in the clearness with which
he recognized in the English fleets, the exponent of the British sea
power, the proper enemy of the French fleet, to be attacked first and
always when with any show of equality. Far from blind to the
importance of those ulterior objects to which the action of the French
navy was so constantly subordinated, he yet saw plainly that the way
to assure those objects was not by economizing his own ships, but by
destroying those of the enemy. Attack, not defence, was the road to
sea power in his eyes; and sea power meant control of the issues upon
the land, at least in regions distant from Europe. This view out of
the English policy he had the courage to take, after forty years of
service in a navy sacrificed to the opposite system; but he brought to
its practical application a method not to be found in any English
admiral of the day, except perhaps Rodney, and a fire superior to the
latter. Yet the course thus followed was no mere inspiration of the
moment; it was the result of clear views previously held and
expressed. However informed by natural ardor, it had the tenacity of
an intellectual conviction. Thus he wrote to D'Estaing, after the
failure to destroy Barrington's squadron at Sta. Lucia, remonstrating
upon the half-manned condition of his own and other ships, from which
men had been landed to attack the English troops:--
"Notwithstanding the small results of the two cannonades of the
15th of December [directed against Barrington's squadron], and
the unhappy check our land forces have undergone, we may yet
hope for success. But the only means to have it is to attack
vigorously the squadron, which, with our superiority, cannot
resist, notwithstanding its land batteries, whose effects will
be neutralized if we run them aboard, or anchor upon their
buoys. If we delay, they may escape.... Besides, our fleet being
unmanned, it is in condition neither to sail nor to fight. What
would happen if Admiral Byron's fleet should arrive? What would
become of ships having neither crews nor admiral? Their defeat
would cause the loss of the army and the colony. Let us destroy
that squadron; their army, lacking everything and in a bad
country, would soon be obliged to surrender. Then let Byron
come, we shall be pleased to see him. I think it is not
necessary to point out that for this attack we need men and
plans well concerted with those who are to execute them."
Equally did he condemn the failure of D'Estaing to capture the four
crippled ships of Byron's squadron, after the action off Grenada.
Owing to a combination of misfortunes, the attack at Porto Praya had
not the decisive result it deserved. Commodore Johnstone got under way
and followed Suffren; but he thought his force was not adequate to
attack in face of the resolute bearing of the French, and feared the
loss of time consequent upon chasing to leeward of his port. He
succeeded, however, in retaking the East India ship which the
"Artésien" had carried out. Suffren continued his course and anchored
at the Cape, in Simon's Bay, on the 21st of June. Johnstone followed
him a fortnight later; but learning by an advance ship that the French
troops had been landed, he gave up the enterprise against the colony,
made a successful commerce-destroying attack upon five Dutch India
ships in Saldanha Bay, which poorly repaid the failure of the military
undertaking, and then went back himself to England, after sending the
ships-of-the-line on to join Sir Edward Hughes in the East Indies.
Having seen the Cape secured, Suffren sailed for the Isle of France,
arriving there on the 25th of October, 1781. Count d'Orves, being
senior, took command of the united squadron. The necessary repairs
were made, and the fleet sailed for India, December 17. On the 22d of
January, 1782, an English fifty-gun ship, the "Hannibal," was taken.
On the 9th of February Count d'Orves died, and Suffren became
commander-in-chief, with the rank of commodore. A few days later the
land was seen to the northward of Madras; but owing to head-winds the
city was not sighted until February 15. Nine large ships-of-war were
found anchored in order under the guns of the forts. They were the
fleet of Sir Edward Hughes, not in confusion like that of
Johnstone.[172]
Here, at the meeting point between these two redoubtable champions,
each curiously representative of the characteristics of his own
race,--the one of the stubborn tenacity and seamanship of the English,
the other of the ardor and tactical science of the French, too long
checked and betrayed by a false system,--is the place to give an
accurate statement of the material forces. The French fleet had three
seventy-fours, seven sixty-fours, and two fifty-gun ships, one of
which was the lately captured English "Hannibal." To these Sir Edward
Hughes opposed two seventy-fours, one seventy, one sixty-eight, four
sixty-fours, and one fifty-gun ship. The odds, therefore, twelve to
nine, were decidedly against the English; and it is likely that the
advantage in single-ship power, class for class, was also against
them.
It must be recalled that at the time of his arrival Suffren found no
friendly port or roadstead, no base of supplies or repair. The French
posts had all fallen by 1779; and his rapid movement, which saved the
Cape, did not bring him up in time to prevent the capture of the Dutch
Indian possessions. The invaluable harbor of Trincomalee, in Ceylon,
was taken just one month before Suffren saw the English fleet at
Madras. But if he thus had everything to gain, Hughes had as much to
lose. To Suffren, at the moment of first meeting, belonged superiority
of numbers and the power of taking the offensive, with all its
advantages in choice of initiative. Upon Hughes fell the anxiety of
the defensive, with inferior numbers, many assailable points, and
uncertainty as to the place where the blow would fall.
It was still true, though not so absolutely as thirty years before,
that control in India depended upon control of the sea. The passing
years had greatly strengthened the grip of England, and
proportionately loosened that of France. Relatively, therefore, the
need of Suffren to destroy his enemy was greater than that of his
predecessors, D'Aché and others; whereas Hughes could count upon a
greater strength in the English possessions, and so bore a somewhat
less responsibility than the admirals who went before him.
Nevertheless, the sea was still by far the most important factor in
the coming strife, and for its proper control it was necessary to
disable more or less completely the enemy's fleet, and to have some
reasonably secure base. For the latter purpose, Trincomalee, though
unhealthy, was by far the best harbor on the east coast; but it had
not been long enough in the hands of England to be well supplied.
Hughes, therefore, inevitably fell back on Madras for repairs after an
action, and was forced to leave Trincomalee to its own resources until
ready to take the sea again. Suffren, on the other hand, found all
ports alike destitute of naval supplies, while the natural advantages
of Trincomalee made its possession an evident object of importance to
him; and Hughes so understood it.
Independently, therefore, of the tradition of the English navy
impelling Hughes to attack, the influence of which appears plainly
between the lines of his letters, Suffren had, in moving toward
Trincomalee, a threat which was bound to draw his adversary out of his
port. Nor did Trincomalee stand alone; the existing war between Hyder
Ali and the English made it imperative for Suffren to seize a port
upon the mainland, at which to land the three thousand troops carried
by the squadron to co-operate on shore against the common enemy, and
from which supplies, at least of food, might be had. Everything,
therefore, concurred to draw Hughes out, and make him seek to cripple
or hinder the French fleet.
The method of his action would depend upon his own and his adversary's
skill, and upon the uncertain element of the weather. It was plainly
desirable for him not to be brought to battle except on his own terms;
in other words, without some advantage of situation to make up for his
weaker force. As a fleet upon the open sea cannot secure any
advantages of ground, the position favoring the weaker was that to
windward, giving choice of time and some choice as to method of
attack, the offensive position used defensively, with the intention to
make an offensive movement if circumstances warrant. The leeward
position left the weaker no choice but to run, or to accept action on
its adversary's terms.
Whatever may be thought of Hughes's skill, it must be conceded that
his task was difficult. Still, it can be clearly thought down to two
requisites. The first was to get in a blow at the French fleet, so as
to reduce the present inequality; the second, to keep Suffren from
getting Trincomalee, which depended wholly on the fleet.[173]
Suffren, on the other hand, if he could do Hughes, in an action, more
injury than he himself received, would be free to turn in any
direction he chose.
Suffren having sighted Hughes's fleet at Madras, February 15, anchored
his own four miles to the northward. Considering the enemy's line,
supported by the batteries, to be too strong for attack, he again got
under way at four P.M., and stood south. Hughes also weighed, standing
to the southward all that night under easy sail, and at daylight found
that the enemy's squadron had separated from the convoy, the ships of
war being about twelve miles east, while the transports were nine
miles southwest, from him (Plate XIV. A, A). This dispersal is said to
have been due to the carelessness of the French frigates, which did
not keep touch of the English. Hughes at once profited by it, chasing
the convoy (c), knowing that the line-of-battle ships must follow. His
copper-bottomed ships came up with and captured six of the enemy, five
of which were English prizes. The sixth carried three hundred troops
with military stores. Hughes had scored a point.
Suffren of course followed in a general chase, and by three P.M. four
of his best sailers were two or three miles from the sternmost English
ships. Hughes's ships were now much scattered, but not injudiciously
so, for they joined by signal at seven P.M. Both squadrons stood to
the southeast during the night, under easy sail.
At daylight of the 17th--the date of the first of four actions fought
between these two chiefs within seven months--the fleets were six or
eight miles apart, the French bearing north-northeast from the
English (B, B). The latter formed line-ahead on the port tack (a),
with difficulty, owing to the light winds and frequent calms. Admiral
Hughes explains that he hoped to weather the enemy by this course so
as to engage closely, counting probably on finding himself to windward
when the sea-breeze made. The wind continuing light, but with frequent
squalls, from north-northeast, the French, running before it, kept the
puffs longer and neared the English rapidly, Suffren's intention to
attack the rear being aided by Hughes's course. The latter finding his
rear straggling, bore up to line abreast (b), retreating to gain time
for the ships to close on the centre. These movements in line abreast
continued till twenty minutes before four P.M., when, finding he could
not escape attack on the enemy's terms, Hughes hauled his wind on the
port tack and awaited it (C). Whether by his own fault or not, he was
now in the worst possible position, waiting for an attack by a
superior force at its pleasure. The rear ship of his line, the
"Exeter," was not closed up; and there appears no reason why she
should not have been made the van, by forming on the starboard tack,
and thus bringing the other ships up to her.
[Illustration: Pl. XIV. SUFFREN & HUGHES. FEB. 17. 1782.]
The method of Suffren's attack (C) is differently stated by him and by
Hughes, but the difference is in detail only; the main facts are
certain. Hughes says the enemy "steered down on the rear of our line
in an irregular double line-abreast," in which formation they
continued till the moment of collision, when "three of the enemy's
ships in the first line bore right down upon the 'Exeter,' while four
more of their second line, headed by the 'Héros,' in which M. de
Suffren had his flag, hauled _along the outside of the first line_
toward our centre. At five minutes past four the enemy's three ships
began their fire upon the 'Exeter,' which was returned by her and her
second ahead; the action became general from our rear to our centre,
the commanding ship of the enemy, with three others of their second
line, leading down on our centre, yet never advancing farther than
opposite to the 'Superbe,' our centre ship, with little or no wind and
some heavy rain during the engagement. Under these circumstances, the
enemy brought eight of their best ships to the attack of five of ours,
as the van of our line, consisting of the 'Monmouth,' 'Eagle,'
'Burford,' and 'Worcester,' could not be brought into action without
tacking on the enemy," for which there was not enough wind.
Here we will leave them, and give Suffren's account of how he took up
his position. In his report to the Minister of Marine he says:--
"I should have destroyed the English squadron, less by superior
numbers than by the advantageous disposition in which I attacked
it. I attacked the rear ship and stood along the English line as
far as the sixth. I thus made three of them useless, so that we
were twelve against six. I began the fight at half-past three in
the afternoon, taking the lead and making signal to form line as
best could be done; without that I would not have engaged. At
four I made signal to three ships to double on the enemy's rear,
and to the squadron to approach within pistol-shot. This signal,
though repeated, was not executed. I did not _myself_ give the
example, in order that I might hold in check the three van
ships, which by tacking would have doubled on me. However,
except the 'Brilliant,' which doubled on the rear, no ship was
as close as mine, nor received as many shots."
The principal point of difference in the two accounts is, that Suffren
asserts that his flag-ship passed along the whole English line, from
the rear to the sixth ship; while Hughes says the French divided into
two lines, which, upon coming near, steered, one on the rear, the
other on the centre, of his squadron. The latter would be the better
manoeuvre; for if the leading ship of the attack passed, as Suffren
asserts, along the enemy's line from the rear to the sixth, she should
receive in succession the first fire of six ships, which ought to
cripple her and confuse her line. Suffren also notes the intention to
double on the rear by placing three ships to leeward of it. Two of the
French did take this position. Suffren further gives his reason for
not closing with his own ship, which led; but as those which followed
him went no nearer, Hughes's attention was not drawn to his action.
The French commodore was seriously, and it would seem justly, angered
by the inaction of several of his captains. Of the second in command
he complained to the minister: "Being at the head, I could not well
see what was going on in the rear. I had directed M. de Tromelin to
make signals to ships which might be near him; he only repeated my own
without having them carried out." This complaint was wholly justified.
On the 6th of February, ten days before the fight, he had written to
his second as follows:--
"If we are so fortunate as to be to windward, as the English are
not more than eight, or at most nine, my intention is to double
on their rear. Supposing your division to be in the rear, you
will see by your position what number of ships will overlap the
enemy's line, and you will make signal to them to double[174]
[that is, to engage on the lee side].... In any case, I beg you
to order to your division the manoeuvres which you shall think
best fitted to assure the success of the action. The capture of
Trincomalee and that of Negapatam, and perhaps of all Ceylon,
should make us wish for a general action."
The last two sentences reveal Suffren's own appreciation of the
military situation in the Indian seas, which demanded, first, the
disabling of the hostile fleet, next, the capture of certain strategic
ports. That this diagnosis was correct is as certain as that it
reversed the common French maxims, which would have put the port first
and the fleet second as objectives. A general action was the first
desideratum of Suffren, and it is therefore safe to say that to avoid
such action should have been the first object of Hughes. The attempt
of the latter to gain the windward position was consequently correct;
and as in the month of February the sea-breeze at Madras sets in from
the eastward and southward about eleven A.M., he probably did well to
steer in that general direction, though the result disappointed him.
De Guichen in one of his engagements with Rodney shaped the course of
his fleet with reference to being to windward when the afternoon
breeze made, and was successful. What use Hughes would have made of
the advantage of the wind can only be inferred from his own
words,--that he sought it in order to engage more closely. There is
not in this the certain promise of any skilful use of a tactical
advantage.
Suffren also illustrates, in his words to Tromelin, his conception of
the duties of a second in command, which may fairly be paralleled with
that of Nelson in his celebrated order before Trafalgar. In this first
action he led the main attack himself, leaving the direction of what
may be called the reserve--at any rate, of the second half of the
assault--to his lieutenant, who, unluckily for him, was not a
Collingwood, and utterly failed to support him. It is probable that
Suffren's leading was due not to any particular theory, but to the
fact that his ship was the best sailer in the fleet, and that the
lateness of the hour and lightness of the wind made it necessary to
bring the enemy to action speedily. But here appears a fault on the
part of Suffren. Leading as he did involves, not necessarily but very
naturally, the idea of example; and holding his own ship outside of
close range, for excellent tactical reasons, led the captains in his
wake naturally, almost excusably, to keep at the same distance,
notwithstanding his signals. The conflict between orders and example,
which cropped out so singularly at Vicksburg in our civil war, causing
the misunderstanding and estrangement of two gallant officers, should
not be permitted to occur. It is the business of a chief to provide
against such misapprehensions by most careful previous explanation of
both the letter and spirit of his plans. Especially is this so at sea,
where smoke, slack wind, and intervening rigging make signals hard to
read, though they are almost the only means of communication. This was
Nelson's practice; nor was Suffren a stranger to the idea.
"Dispositions well concerted with those who are to carry them out are
needed," he wrote to D'Estaing, three years before. The excuse which
may be pleaded for those who followed him, and engaged, cannot avail
for the rear ships, and especially not for the second in command, who
knew Suffren's plans. He should have compelled the rear ships to take
position to leeward, leading himself, if necessary. There was wind
enough; for two captains actually engaged to leeward, one of them
without orders, acting, through the impulse of his own good will and
courage, on Nelson's saying, "No captain can do very wrong who places
his ship alongside that of an enemy." He received the special
commendation of Suffren, in itself an honor and a reward. Whether the
failure of so many of his fellows was due to inefficiency, or to a
spirit of faction and disloyalty, is unimportant to the general
military writer, however interesting to French officers jealous for
the honor of their service. Suffren's complaints, after several
disappointments, became vehement.
"My heart," wrote he, "is wrung by the most general defection. I
have just lost the opportunity of destroying the English
squadron.... All--yes, all--might have got near, since we were
to windward and ahead, and none did so. Several among them had
behaved bravely in other combats. I can only attribute this
horror to the wish to bring the cruise to an end, to ill-will,
and to ignorance; for I dare not suspect anything worse. The
result has been terrible. I must tell you, Monseigneur, that
officers who have been long at the Isle of France are neither
seamen nor military men. Not seamen, for they have not been at
sea; and the trading temper, independent and insubordinate, is
absolutely opposed to the military spirit."
This letter, written after his fourth battle with Hughes, must be
taken with allowance. Not only does it appear that Suffren himself,
hurried away on this last occasion by his eagerness, was partly
responsible for the disorder of his fleet, but there were other
circumstances, and above all the character of some of the officers
blamed, which made the charge of a general disaffection excessive. On
the other hand, it remains true that after four general actions, with
superior numbers on the part of the French, under a chief of the skill
and ardor of Suffren, the English squadron, to use his own plaintive
expression, "still existed;" not only so, but had not lost a single
ship. The only conclusion that can be drawn is that of a French naval
writer: "Quantity disappeared before quality."[175] It is immaterial
whether the defect was due to inefficiency or disaffection.
The inefficiency which showed itself on the field of battle
disappeared in the general conduct of the campaign where the qualities
of the chief alone told. The battle of February 17th ended with a
shift of wind to the southeast at six P.M., after two hours action.
The English were thus brought to windward, and their van ships enabled
to share in the fight. Night falling, Suffren, at half-past six,
hauled his squadron by the wind on the starboard tack, heading
northeast, while Hughes steered south under easy sail. It is said by
Captain Chevalier, of the French navy, that Suffren intended to renew
the fight next day. In that case he should have taken measures to keep
within reach. It was too plainly Hughes's policy not to fight without
some advantage,--to allow the supposition that with one ship, the
"Exeter," lost to him through the concentration of so many enemies
upon her, he would quietly await an attack. This is so plain as to
make it probable that Suffren saw sufficient reason, in the results to
his fleet and the misconduct of his officers, not to wish to renew
action at once. The next morning the two fleets were out of sight of
each other. The continuance of the north wind, and the crippled state
of two of his ships, forced Hughes to go to Trincomalee, where the
sheltered harbor allowed them to repair. Suffren, anxious about his
transports, went to Pondicherry, where he anchored in their company.
It was his wish then to proceed against Negapatam; but the commander
of the troops chose to act against Cuddalore. After negotiations and
arrangements with Hyder Ali the army landed south of Porto Novo, and
marched against Cuddalore, which surrendered on the 4th of April.
Meanwhile Suffren, anxious to act against his principal objective, had
sailed again on the 23d of March. It was his hope to cut off two
ships-of-the-line which were expected from England. For this he was
too late; the two seventy-fours joined the main body at Madras, March
30th. Hughes had refitted at Trincomalee in a fortnight, and reached
Madras again on the 12th of March. Soon after the reinforcement had
joined him, he sailed again for Trincomalee with troops and military
stores for the garrison. On the 8th of April Suffren's squadron was
seen to the northeast, also standing to the southward. Hughes kept on,
through that and the two following days, with light northerly winds.
On the 11th he made the coast of Ceylon, fifty miles north of
Trincomalee, and bore away for the port. On the morning of the 12th
the French squadron in the northeast was seen crowding sail in
pursuit. It was the day on which Rodney and De Grasse met in the West
Indies, but the parts were reversed; here the French, not the English,
sought action.
The speed of the ships in both squadrons was very unequal; each had
some coppered ships and some not coppered. Hughes found that his slow
sailers could not escape the fastest of his enemy,--a condition which
will always compel a retreating force to hazard an action, unless it
can resolve to give up the rear ships, and which makes it imperative
for the safety, as well as the efficiency, of a squadron that vessels
of the same class should all have a certain minimum speed. The same
cause--the danger of a separated ship--led the unwilling De Grasse,
the same day, in another scene, to a risky manoeuvre and a great
mishap. Hughes, with better reason, resolved to fight; and at nine
A.M. formed his line on the starboard tack, standing in-shore (Plate
XV., A), the squadron in good order, with intervals of two cables
between the ships.[176] His account, which again varies from that of
Suffren, giving a radically different idea of the tactics used by the
French commodore, and more to the credit of the latter's skill, will
first be followed. He says:--
"The enemy, bearing north by east, distant six miles, with wind
at north by east, continued manoeuvring their ships and
changing their positions in line, till fifteen minutes past
noon, when they bore away (a) to engage us, five sail of their
van stretching along (b) to engage the ships of our van, and the
other seven sail (b') steering directly on our three centre
ships, the 'Superbe,' the 'Monmouth,' her second ahead, and the
'Monarca,' her second astern. At half-past one the engagement
began in the van of both squadrons; three minutes after, I made
the signal for battle. The French admiral in the 'Héros' and his
second astern in 'L'Orient' (both seventy-fours) bore down on
the 'Superbe'[177] within pistol-shot. The 'Héros' continued in
her position, giving and receiving a severe fire for nine
minutes, and then stood on, greatly damaged, to attack the
'Monmouth,' at that time engaged with another of the enemy's
ships, making room for the ships in his rear to come up to the
attack of our centre, where the engagement was hottest. At three
the 'Monmouth' had her mizzen-mast shot away, and in a few
minutes her mainmast, and bore out of the line to leeward (C,
c); and at forty minutes past three the wind unexpectedly
continuing far northerly without any sea-breeze, and being
careful not to entangle our ships with the land, I made signal
to wear and haul by the wind in a line-of-battle on the larboard
tack, still engaging the enemy."
Now here, practically, was concentration with a vengeance. In this,
the hardest fight between these two hard fighters, the English loss
was 137 killed and 430 wounded in eleven ships. Of this total, the two
centre ships, the flag-ship and her next ahead, lost 104 killed and
198 wounded,--fifty-three per cent of the entire loss of the squadron,
of which they formed eighteen per cent. The casualties were very much
heavier, in proportion to the size of the ships, than those of the
leaders of the two columns at Trafalgar.[178] The material injury to
hulls, spars, etc., was yet more serious. The English squadron, by
this concentration of the enemy upon a small fraction of it, was
entirely crippled. Inferior when the action began, its inferiority
was yet more decisive by the subtraction of two ships, and Suffren's
freedom to move was increased.
[Illustration: Pl. XV. SUFFREN & HUGHES. APRIL 12, 1782.]
But how far was this concentration intended by Suffren? For this we
must go to the pages of two French writers,[179] who base their
narratives upon his own despatches on record in the French Marine
Office. The practical advantage gained by the French must also be
tested by comparing the lists of casualties, and the injuries received
by their individual ships; for it is evident that if both the
squadrons received the same total amount of injury, but that with the
English it fell on two ships, so that they could not be ready for
action for a month or more, while with the French the damage was
divided among the twelve, allowing them to be ready again in a few
days, the victory tactically and strategically would rest with the
latter.[180]
As regards Suffren's purpose, there is nothing to indicate that he
meant to make such an attack as Hughes describes. Having twelve ships
to the English eleven, his intention seems to have been to pursue the
usual English practice,--form line parallel to the enemy, bear down
together, and engage ship to ship. To this he added one simple
combination; the twelfth French ship, being unprovided with an
opponent, was to engage the rear English ship on her lee side, placing
her thus between two fires. In truth, a concentration upon the van and
centre, such as Hughes describes, is tactically inferior to a like
effort upon the centre and rear of a column. This is true of steamers
even, which, though less liable to loss of motive power, must still
turn round to get from van to rear, losing many valuable seconds; but
it is specially true of sailing vessels, and above all in the light,
baffling airs which are apt to mark the change of monsoon at the
season when this fight was fought. Nelson emphasized his contempt of
the Russians of his day by saying he would not hesitate to attack
their van, counting upon throwing the whole line in confusion from
their want of seamanship; but though entertaining a not much better
opinion of the Spaniards, he threw the weight of attack on the rear of
the allied fleets at Trafalgar. In dealing with such seamen as the
captains of Hughes's fleet, it would have been an error to assail the
van instead of the rear. Only a dead calm could have kept the latter
out of action.
Suffren's attack is thus described by Captain Chevalier. After
mentioning Hughes's forming line on the starboard tack, he says:--
"This manoeuvre was imitated by the French, and the two
squadrons ran on parallel lines, heading about west-northwest
(A, A). At eleven, our line being well formed, Suffren made
signal to keep away to west-southwest, by a movement all
together. Our ships did not keep their bearing upon the
prescribed line, and the van, composed of the best sailers, came
first within range of the enemy.[181] At one, the leading ships
of the English fleet opened fire upon the 'Vengeur' and
'Artésien' [French van]. These two ships, having luffed[182] to
return the fire, were at once ordered to keep away again.
Suffren, who wished for a decisive action, kept his course,
receiving without reply the shots directed upon his ship by the
enemy. When at pistol-range of the 'Superbe,' he hauled to the
wind (B), and the signal to open fire appeared at his mainmast
head. Admiral Hughes having only eleven ships, the 'Bizarre,'
according to the dispositions taken by the commander-in-chief,
was to attack on the quarter the rear ship of the English fleet
and double on it to leeward. At the moment when the first
cannon-shots were heard, our worst sailers were not up with
their stations. Breathing the letter, and not the spirit, of the
commodore's orders, the captains of these ships luffed at the
same time as those which preceded them. Hence it resulted that
the French line formed a curve (B), whose extremities were
represented in the van by the 'Artésien' and 'Vengeur,' and in
the rear by the 'Bizarre,' 'Ajax,' and 'Sévère.' In consequence,
these ships were very far from those which corresponded to them
in the enemy's line."
It is evident from all this, written by a warm admirer of Suffren, who
has had full access to the official papers, that the French chief
intended an attack elementary in conception and difficult of
execution. To keep a fleet on a line of bearing, sailing free,
requires much drill, especially when the ships have different rates of
speed, as had Suffren's. The extreme injury suffered by the "Superbe"
and "Monmouth," undeniably due to a concentration, cannot be
attributed to Suffren's dispositions. "The injuries which the 'Héros'
received at the beginning of the action did not allow her to remain by
the 'Superbe.' Not being able to back her topsails in time, the braces
having been cut, she passed ahead, and was only stopped on the beam of
the 'Monmouth.'"[183] This accounts for the suffering of the latter
ship, already injured, and now contending with a much larger opponent.
The "Superbe" was freed from Suffren only to be engaged by the next
Frenchman, an equally heavy ship; and when the "Monmouth" drifted or
bore up, to leeward, the French flag-ship also drifted so that for a
few moments she fired her stern guns into the "Superbe's" bow (C, d).
The latter at the same time was engaged on the beam and quarter by two
French ships, who, either with or without signal, came up to shield
their commodore.
An examination of the list of casualties shows that the loss of the
French was much more distributed among their ships than was the case
with the English. No less than three of the latter escaped without a
man killed, while of the French only one. The kernel of the action
seems to have been in the somewhat fortuitous concentration of two
French seventy-fours and one sixty-four on an English seventy-four and
sixty-four. Assuming the ships to have been actually of the same force
as their rates, the French brought, counting broadside only, one
hundred and six guns against sixty-nine.
Some unfavorable criticism was excited by the management of Admiral
Hughes during the three days preceding the fight, because he refrained
from attacking the French, although they were for much of the time to
leeward with only one ship more than the English, and much separated
at that. It was thought that he had the opportunity of beating them in
detail.[184] The accounts accessible are too meagre to permit an
accurate judgment upon this opinion, which probably reflected the
mess-table and quarter-deck talk of the subordinate officers of the
fleet. Hughes's own report of the position of the two fleets is vague,
and in one important particular directly contradictory to the French.
If the alleged opportunity offered, the English admiral in declining
to use it adhered to the resolve, with which he sailed, neither to
seek nor shun the enemy, but to go directly to Trincomalee and land
the troops and supplies he had on board. In other words, he was
governed in his action by the French rather than the English naval
policy, of subordinating the attack of the enemy's fleet to the
particular mission in hand. If for this reason he did allow a
favorable chance of fighting to slip, he certainly had reason bitterly
to regret his neglect, in the results of the battle which followed;
but in the lack of precise information the most interesting point to
be noted is the impression made upon public and professional opinion,
indicating how strongly the English held that the attack of the
enemy's fleet was the first duty of an English admiral. It may also be
said that he could hardly have fared worse by attacking than he did by
allowing the enemy to become the assailant; and certainly not worse
than he would have fared had Suffren's captains been as good as his
own.
After the action, towards sunset, both squadrons anchored in fifteen
fathoms of water, irregular soundings, three of the French ships
taking the bottom on coral patches. Here they lay for a week two miles
apart, refitting. Hughes, from the ruined condition of the "Monmouth,"
expected an attack; but when Suffren had finished his repairs on the
19th, he got under way and remained outside for twenty-four hours,
inviting a battle which he would not begin. He realized the condition
of the enemy so keenly as to feel the necessity of justifying his
action to the Minister of Marine, which he did for eight reasons
unnecessary to particularize here. The last was the lack of efficiency
and hearty support on the part of his captains.
It is not likely that Suffren erred on the side of excessive caution.
On the contrary, his most marked defect as a commander-in-chief was an
ardor which, when in sight of the enemy, became impatience, and
carried him at times into action hastily and in disorder. But if, in
the details and execution of his battles, in his tactical
combinations, Suffren was at times foiled by his own impetuosity and
the short-comings of most of his captains, in the general conduct of
the campaign, in strategy, where the personal qualities of the
commander-in-chief mainly told, his superiority was manifest, and
achieved brilliant success. Then ardor showed itself in energy,
untiring and infectious. The eagerness of his hot Provençal blood
overrode difficulty, created resources out of destitution, and made
itself felt through every vessel under his orders. No military lesson
is more instructive nor of more enduring value than the rapidity and
ingenuity with which he, without a port or supplies, continually
refitted his fleet and took the field, while his slower enemy was
dawdling over his repairs.
The battle forced the English to remain inactive for six weeks, till
the "Monmouth" was repaired. Unfortunately, Suffren's situation did
not allow him to assume the offensive at once. He was short of men,
provisions, and especially of spare spars and rigging. In an official
letter after the action he wrote: "I have no spare stores to repair
rigging; the squadron lacks at least twelve spare topmasts." A convoy
of supply-ships was expected at Point de Galles, which, with the rest
of Ceylon, except Trincomalee, was still Dutch. He therefore anchored
at Batacalo, south of Trincomalee, a position in which he was between
Hughes and outward-bound English ships, and was favorably placed to
protect his own convoys, which joined him there. On the 3d of June he
sailed for Tranquebar, a Danish possession, where he remained two or
three weeks, harassing the English communications between Madras and
the fleet at Trincomalee. Leaving there, he sailed for Cuddalore, to
communicate with the commander of the land forces and Hyder Ali. The
latter was found to be much discontented with the scanty co-operation
of the French general. Suffren, however, had won his favor, and he
expressed a wish to see him on his return from the expedition then in
contemplation; for, true to his accurate instinct, the commodore was
bent upon again seeking out the English fleet, _after_ beating which
he intended to attack Negapatam. There was not in him any narrowness
of professional prejudice; he kept always in view the necessity, both
political and strategic, of nursing the alliance with the Sultan and
establishing control upon the seaboard and in the interior; but he
clearly recognized that the first step thereto was the control of the
sea, by disabling the English fleet. The tenacity and vigor with which
he followed this aim, amid great obstacles, joined to the
clear-sightedness with which he saw it, are the distinguishing merits
of Suffren amid the crowd of French fleet-commanders,--his equals in
courage, but trammelled by the bonds of a false tradition and the
perception of a false objective.
Hughes meantime, having rigged jury-masts to the "Monmouth," had gone
to Trincomalee, where his squadron refitted and the sick were landed
for treatment; but it is evident, as has before been mentioned, that
the English had not held the port long enough to make an arsenal or
supply port, for he says, "I will be able to remast the 'Monmouth'
from the spare stores on board the several ships." His resources were
nevertheless superior to those of his adversary. During the time that
Suffren was at Tranquebar, worrying the English communications between
Madras and Trincomalee, Hughes still stayed quietly in the latter
port, sailing for Negapatam on the 23d of June, the day after Suffren
reached Cuddalore. The two squadrons had thus again approached each
other, and Suffren hastened his preparations for attack as soon as he
heard that his enemy was where he could get at him. Hughes awaited his
movement.
Before sailing, however, Suffren took occasion to say in writing home:
"Since my arrival in Ceylon, partly by the help of the Dutch, partly
through the prizes we have taken, the squadron has been equipped for
six months' service, and I have rations of wheat and rice assured for
more than a year." This achievement was indeed a just source of pride
and self-congratulation. Without a port, and destitute of resources,
the French commodore had lived off the enemy; the store ships and
commerce of the latter had supplied his wants. To his fertility of
resource and the activity of his cruisers, inspired by himself, this
result was due. Yet he had but two frigates, the class of vessel upon
which an admiral must mainly depend for this predatory warfare. On the
23d of March, both provisions and stores had been nearly exhausted.
Six thousand dollars in money, and the provisions in the convoy, were
then his sole resources. Since then he had fought a severe action,
most expensive in rigging and men, as well as in ammunition. After
that fight of April 12 he had left only powder and shot enough for one
other battle of equal severity. Three months later he was able to
report as above, that he could keep the sea on his station for six
months without further supplies. This result was due wholly to
himself,--to his self-reliance, and what may without exaggeration be
called his greatness of soul. It was not expected at Paris; on the
contrary, it was expected there that the squadron would return to the
Isle of France to refit. It was not thought possible that it could
remain on a hostile coast, so far from its nearest base, and be kept
in efficient condition. Suffren thought otherwise; he considered, with
true military insight and a proper sense of the value of his own
profession, that the success of the operations in India depended upon
the control of the sea, and therefore upon the uninterrupted presence
of his squadron. He did not shrink from attempting that which had
always been thought impossible. This firmness of spirit, bearing the
stamp of genius, must, to be justly appreciated, be considered with
reference to the circumstances of his own time, and of the preceding
generations in which he grew up.
Suffren was born July 17, 1729, and served during the wars of 1739 and
1756. He was first under fire at Matthews's action off Toulon,
February 22, 1744. He was the contemporary of D'Estaing, De Guichen,
and De Grasse, before the days of the French Revolution, when the
uprising of a people had taught men how often impossibilities are not
impossible; before Napoleon and Nelson had made a mock of the word.
His attitude and action had therefore at the time the additional merit
of originality, but his lofty temper was capable of yet higher proof.
Convinced of the necessity of keeping the squadron on its station, he
ventured to disregard not only the murmurs of his officers but the
express orders of the Court. When he reached Batacalo, he found
despatches directing him to return to the Isle of France. Instead of
taking them as a release from the great burden of responsibility, he
disobeyed, giving his reasons, and asserting that he on the spot could
judge better than a minister in Europe what the circumstances
demanded. Such a leader deserved better subordinates, and a better
colleague than he had in the commander of the forces on shore. Whether
or no the conditions of the general maritime struggle would have
permitted the overthrow of the English East Indian power may be
doubtful; but it is certain that among all the admirals of the three
nations there was none so fitted to accomplish that result as Suffren.
We shall find him enduring severer tests, and always equal to them.
In the afternoon of the 5th of July Suffren's squadron came in sight
of the English, anchored off Cuddalore. An hour later, a sudden squall
carried away the main and mizzen topmasts of one of the French ships.
Admiral Hughes got under way, and the two fleets manoeuvred during the
night. The following day the wind favored the English, and the
opponents found themselves in line of battle on the starboard tack,
heading south-southeast, with the wind at southwest. The disabled
French ship having by unpardonable inactivity failed to repair her
injuries, the numbers about to engage were equal,--eleven on each
side. At eleven A.M. the English bore down together and engaged ship
against ship; but as was usual under those conditions, the rear ships
did not come to as close action as those ahead of them (Plate XVI.,
Position I.). Captain Chevalier carefully points out that their
failure was a fair offset to the failure of the French rear on the
12th of April,[185] but fails to note in this connection that the
French van, both on that occasion and again on the 3d of September,
bungled as well as the rear. There can remain little doubt, in the
mind of the careful reader, that most of the French captains were
inferior, as seamen, to their opponents. During this part of the
engagement the fourth ship in the French order, the "Brilliant" (a),
lost her mainmast, bore up out of the line (a'), and dropped gradually
astern and to leeward (a'')
[Illustration: Pl. XVI. SUFFREN & HUGHES. JULY 6, 1782.]
At one P.M., when the action was hottest, the wind suddenly shifted to
south-southeast, taking the ships on the port bow (Position II.). Four
English ships, the "Burford," "Sultan" (s), "Worcester," and "Eagle,"
seeing the breeze coming, kept off to port, toward the French line;
the others were taken aback and paid off to starboard. The French
ships, on the other hand, with two exceptions, the "Brilliant" (a) and
"Sévère" (b), paid off from the English. The effect of the change of
wind was therefore to separate the main parts of the two squadrons,
but to bring together between the lines four English and two French
ships. Technical order was destroyed. The "Brilliant," having dropped
far astern of her position, came under the fire of two of the English
rear, the "Worcester" and the "Eagle," who had kept off in time and so
neared the French. Suffren in person came to her assistance (Position
III., a) and drove off the English, who were also threatened by the
approach of two other French ships that had worn to the westward in
obedience to signal. While this partial action was taking place, the
other endangered French ship, the "Sévère" (b), was engaged by the
English "Sultan" (s), and, if the French captain M. de Cillart can be
believed, by two other English ships. It is probable, from her place
in the line, that the "Burford" also assailed her. However this may
be, the "Sévère" hauled down her flag; but while the "Sultan" was
wearing away from her, she resumed her fire, raking the English ship.
The order to surrender, given by the French captain and carried into
execution by the formal well-established token of submission, was
disregarded by his subordinates, who fired upon their enemy while the
flag was down. In effect, the action of the French ship amounted to
using an infamous _ruse de guerre_; but it would be unjust to say that
this was intended. The positions of the different vessels were such
that the "Sultan" could not have secured her prize; other French ships
were approaching and must have retaken it. The indignation of the
French juniors at the weakness of their captain was therefore
justified; their refusal to be bound by it may be excused to men face
to face with an unexpected question of propriety, in the heat of
battle and under the sting of shame. Nevertheless, scrupulous good
faith would seem to demand that their deliverance should be awaited
from other hands, not bound by the action of their commander; or at
least that the forbearing assailant should not have suffered from
them. The captain, suspended and sent home by Suffren, and cashiered
by the king, utterly condemned himself by his attempted defence: "When
Captain de Cillart saw the French squadron drawing off,--for all the
ships except the 'Brilliant' had fallen off on the other tack,--he
thought it useless to prolong his defence, and had the flag hauled
down. _The ships engaged with him immediately ceased their fire_, and
the one on the starboard side moved away. At this moment the 'Sévère'
fell off to starboard and her sails filled; Captain de Cillart then
ordered the fire to be resumed by his lower-deck guns, the only ones
still manned, and he rejoined his squadron."[186]
This action was the only one of the five fought by Suffren on the
coast of India, in which the English admiral was the assailant. There
can be found in it no indication of military conceptions, of tactical
combinations; but on the other hand Hughes is continually showing the
aptitudes, habits of thought, and foresight of the skilful seaman, as
well as a courage beyond all proof. He was in truth an admirable
representative of the average English naval officer of the middle of
the eighteenth century; and while it is impossible not to condemn the
general ignorance of the most important part of the profession, it is
yet useful to remark how far thorough mastery of its other details,
and dogged determination not to yield, made up for so signal a defect.
As the Roman legions often redeemed the blunders of their generals, so
did English captains and seamen often save that which had been lost by
the errors of their admirals,--errors which neither captain nor seamen
recognized, nor would probably have admitted. Nowhere were these solid
qualities so clearly shown as in Suffren's battles, because nowhere
else were such demands made upon them. No more magnificent instances
of desperate yet useful resistance to overwhelming odds are to be
found in naval annals, than that of the "Monmouth" on April 12, and of
the "Exeter" on February 17. An incident told of the latter ship is
worth quoting. "At the heel of the action, when the 'Exeter' was
already in the state of a wreck, the master came to Commodore King to
ask him what he should do with the ship, as two of the enemy were
again bearing down upon her. He laconically answered, 'there is
nothing to be done but to fight her till she sinks.'"[187] She was
saved.
Suffren, on the contrary, was by this time incensed beyond endurance
by the misbehavior of his captains. Cillart was sent home; but besides
him two others, both of them men of influential connections, and one a
relative of Suffren himself, were dispossessed of their commands.
However necessary and proper this step, few but Suffren would have had
the resolution to take it; for, so far as he then knew, he was only a
captain in rank, and it was not permitted even to admirals to deal
thus with their juniors. "You may perhaps be angry, Monseigneur," he
wrote, "that I have not used rigor sooner; but I beg you to remember
that the regulations do not give this power even to a general officer,
which I am not."
It is immediately after the action of the 6th of July that Suffren's
superior energy and military capacity begin markedly to influence the
issue between himself and Hughes. The tussle had been severe; but
military qualities began to tell, as they surely must. The losses of
the two squadrons in men, in the last action, had been as one to three
in favor of the English; on the other hand, the latter had apparently
suffered more in sails and spars,--in motive power. Both fleets
anchored in the evening, the English off Negapatam, the French to
leeward, off Cuddalore. On the 18th of July Suffren was again ready for
sea; whereas on the same day Hughes had but just decided to go to
Madras to finish his repairs. Suffren was further delayed by the
political necessity of an official visit to Hyder Ali, after which he
sailed to Batacalo, arriving there on the 9th of August, to await
reinforcements and supplies from France. On the 21st, these joined him;
and two days later he sailed, now with fourteen ships-of-the-line, for
Trincomalee, anchoring off the town on the 25th. The following night
the troops were landed, batteries thrown up, and the attack pressed
with vigor. On the 30th and 31st the two forts which made the defensive
strength of the place surrendered, and this all-important port passed
into the hands of the French. Convinced that Hughes would soon appear,
Suffren granted readily all the honors of war demanded by the governor
of the place, contenting himself with the substantial gain. Two days
later, on the evening of September 2d, the English fleet was sighted by
the French lookout frigates.
During the six weeks in which Suffren had been so actively and
profitably employed, the English admiral had remained quietly at
anchor, repairing and refitting. No precise information is available
for deciding how far this delay was unavoidable; but having in view
the well-known aptitude of English seamen of that age, it can scarcely
be doubted that, had Hughes possessed the untiring energy of his great
rival, he could have gained the few days which decided the fate of
Trincomalee, and fought a battle to save the place. In fact, this
conclusion is supported by his own reports, which state that on the
12th of August the ships were nearly fitted; and yet, though
apprehending an attack on Trincomalee, he did not sail until the 20th.
The loss of this harbor forced him to abandon the east coast, which
was made unsafe by the approach of the northeast monsoon, and
conferred an important strategic advantage upon Suffren, not to speak
of the political effect upon the native rulers in India.
To appreciate thoroughly this contrast between the two admirals, it is
necessary also to note how differently they were situated with regard
to material for repairs. After the action of the 6th, Hughes found at
Madras spars, cordage, stores, provisions, and material. Suffren at
Cuddalore found nothing. To put his squadron in good fighting
condition, nineteen new topmasts were needed, besides lower masts,
yards, rigging, sails, and so on. To take the sea at all, the masts
were removed from the frigates and smaller vessels, and given to the
ships-of-the-line while English prizes were stripped to equip the
frigates. Ships were sent off to the Straits of Malacca to procure
other spars and timber. Houses were torn down on shore to find lumber
for repairing the hulls. The difficulties were increased by the
character of the anchorage, an open roadstead with frequent heavy sea,
and by the near presence of the English fleet; but the work was driven
on under the eyes of the commander-in-chief, who, like Lord Howe at New
York, inspired the working parties by his constant appearance among
them. "Notwithstanding his prodigious obesity, Suffren displayed the
fiery ardor of youth; he was everywhere where work was going on. Under
his powerful impulse, the most difficult tasks were done with
incredible rapidity. Nevertheless, his officers represented to
him the bad state of the fleet, and the need of a port for the
ships-of-the-line. 'Until we have taken Trincomalee,' he replied, 'the
open roadsteads of the Coromandel coast will answer.'"[188] It was
indeed to this activity on the Coromandel coast that the success at
Trincomalee was due. The weapons with which Suffren fought are
obsolete; but the results wrought by his tenacity and fertility in
resources are among the undying lessons of history.
While the characters of the two chiefs were thus telling upon the
strife in India, other no less lasting lessons were being afforded by
the respective governments at home, who did much to restore the
balance between them. While the English ministry, after the news of
the battle of Porto Praya, fitted out in November, 1781, a large and
compact expedition, convoyed by a powerful squadron of six
ships-of-the-line, under the command of an active officer, to
reinforce Hughes, the French despatched comparatively scanty succors
in small detached bodies, relying apparently upon secrecy rather than
upon force to assure their safety. Thus Suffren, while struggling with
his innumerable embarrassments, had the mortification of learning that
now one and now another of the small detachments sent to his relief
were captured, or driven back to France, before they were clear of
European waters. There was in truth little safety for small divisions
north of the Straits of Gibraltar. Thus the advantages gained by his
activity were in the end sacrificed. Up to the fall of Trincomalee the
French were superior at sea; but in the six months which followed, the
balance turned the other way, by the arrival of the English
reinforcements under Sir Richard Bickerton.
With his usual promptness the French commodore had prepared for
further immediate action as soon as Trincomalee surrendered. The
cannon and men landed from the ships were at once re-embarked, and the
port secured by a garrison strong enough to relieve him of any
anxiety about holding it. This great seaman, who had done as much in
proportion to the means intrusted to him as any known to history, and
had so signally illustrated the sphere and influence of naval power,
had no intention of fettering the movements of his fleet, or risking
his important conquest, by needlessly taking upon the shoulders of the
ships the burden of defending a seaport. When Hughes appeared, it was
past the power of the English fleet by a single battle to reduce the
now properly garrisoned post. Doubtless a successful campaign, by
destroying or driving away the French sea power, would achieve this
result; but Suffren might well believe that, whatever mishaps might
arise on a single day, he could in the long run more than hold his own
with his opponent.
Seaports should defend themselves; the sphere of the fleet is on the
open sea, its object offence rather than defence, its objective the
enemy's shipping wherever it can be found. Suffren now saw again
before him the squadron on which depended the English control of the
sea; he knew that powerful reinforcements to it must arrive before the
next season, and he hastened to attack. Hughes, mortified by his
failure to arrive in time,--for a drawn battle beforehand would have
saved what a successful battle afterward could not regain,--was in no
humor to balk him. Still, with sound judgment, he retreated to the
southeast, flying in good order, to use Suffren's expression;
regulating speed by the slowest ships, and steering many different
courses, so that the chase which began at daybreak overtook the enemy
only at two in the afternoon. The object of the English was to draw
Suffren so far to leeward of the port that, if his ships were
disabled, he could not easily regain it.
The French numbered fourteen ships-of-the-line to twelve English. This
superiority, together with his sound appreciation of the military
situation in India, increased Suffren's natural eagerness for action;
but his ships sailed badly, and were poorly handled by indifferent and
dissatisfied men. These circumstances, during the long and vexatious
pursuit, chafed and fretted the hot temper of the commodore, which
still felt the spur of urgency that for two months had quickened the
operations of the squadron. Signal followed signal, manoeuvre
succeeded manoeuvre, to bring his disordered vessels into position.
"Sometimes they edged down, sometimes they brought to," says the
English admiral, who was carefully watching their approach, "in no
regular order, as if undetermined what to do." Still, Suffren
continued on, and at two P.M., having been carried twenty-five miles
away from his port, his line being then partly formed and within
striking distance of the enemy, the signal was made to come to the
wind to correct the order before finally bearing down. A number of
blunders in executing this made matters worse rather than better; and
the commodore, at last losing patience, made signal thirty minutes
later to attack (Plate XVII., A), following it with another for close
action at pistol range. This being slowly and clumsily obeyed, he
ordered a gun fired, as is customary at sea to emphasize a signal;
unluckily this was understood by his own crew to be the opening of the
action, and the flag-ship discharged all her battery. This example was
followed by the other ships, though yet at the distance of half
cannon-shot, which, under the gunnery conditions of that day, meant
indecisive action. Thus at the end and as the result of a mortifying
series of blunders and bad seamanship, the battle began greatly to the
disadvantage of the French, despite their superior numbers. The
English, who had been retreating under short and handy sail, were in
good order and quietly ready; whereas their enemies were in no order
(B). Seven ships had forereached in rounding to,[189] and now formed
an irregular group ahead of the English van, as well as far from it,
where they were of little service; while in the centre a second
confused group was formed, the ships overlapping and masking each
other's fire. Under the circumstances the entire brunt of the action
fell upon Suffren's flag-ship (a) and two others which supported him;
while at the extreme rear a small ship-of-the-line, backed by a large
frigate, alone engaged the English rear; but these, being wholly
overmatched, were soon forced to retire.
[Illustration: Pl. XVII. SUFFREN AND HUGHES SEPT. 3, 1782.]
A military operation could scarcely be worse carried out. The French
ships in the battle did not support each other; they were so grouped
as to hamper their own fire and needlessly increase the target offered
to the enemy; so far from concentrating their own effort, three ships
were left, almost unsupported, to a concentrated fire from the English
line.[190] "Time passed on, and our three ships [B, a], engaged on the
beam by the centre of the English fleet and raked [enfiladed] by van
and rear, suffered greatly. After two hours the 'Héros'' sails were in
rags, all her running rigging cut, and she could no longer steer. The
'Illustre' had lost her mizzen-mast and maintopmast." In this disorder
such gaps existed as to offer a great opportunity to a more active
opponent. "Had the enemy tacked now," wrote the chief-of-staff in his
journal, "we would have been cut off and probably destroyed." The
faults of an action in which every proper distribution was wanting are
summed up in the results. The French had fourteen ships engaged. They
lost eighty-two killed and two hundred and fifty-five wounded. Of this
total, sixty-four killed and one hundred and seventy-eight wounded, or
three fourths, fell to three ships. Two of these three lost their main
and mizzen masts and foretopmast; in other words, were helpless.
This was a repetition on a larger scale of the disaster to two of
Hughes's ships on the 12th of April; but on that day the English
admiral, being to leeward and in smaller force had to accept action on
the adversary's terms, while here the loss fell on the assailant, who,
to the advantage of the wind and choice of his mode of attack, added
superiority in numbers. Full credit must in this action be allowed to
Hughes, who, though lacking in enterprise and giving no token of
tactical skill or _coup d'oeil_, showed both judgment and good
management in the direction of his retreat and in keeping his ships so
well in hand. It is not easy to apportion the blame which rests upon
his enemies. Suffren laid it freely upon his captains.[191] It has
been rightly pointed out, however, that many of the officers thus
condemned in mass had conducted themselves well before, both under
Suffren and other admirals; that the order of pursuit was irregular,
and Suffren's signals followed each other with confusing rapidity; and
finally that chance, for which something must always be allowed, was
against the French, as was also the inexperience of several captains.
It is pretty certain that some of the mishap must be laid to the fiery
and inconsiderate haste of Suffren, who had the defects of his great
qualities, upon which his coy and wary antagonist unwittingly played.
It is noteworthy that no complaints of his captains are to be found in
Hughes's reports. Six fell in action, and of each he speaks in terms
of simple but evidently sincere appreciation, while on the survivors
he often bestows particular as well as general commendation. The
marked contrast between the two leaders, and between the individual
ship-commanders, on either side, makes this singularly instructive
among naval campaigns; and the ultimate lesson taught is in entire
accordance with the experience of all military history from the
beginning. Suffren had genius, energy, great tenacity, sound military
ideas, and was also an accomplished seaman. Hughes had apparently all
the technical acquirements of the latter profession, would probably
have commanded a ship equally well with any of his captains, but shows
no trace of the qualities needed by a general officer. On the other
hand, without insisting again upon the skill and fidelity of the
English subordinates, it is evident that, to whatever it be
attributed, the French single ships were as a rule incomparably
worse-handled than those of their opponents. Four times, Suffren
claims, certainly thrice, the English squadron was saved from
overwhelming disaster by the difference in quality of the under
officers. Good troops have often made amends for bad generalship; but
in the end the better leader will prevail. This was conspicuously the
case in the Indian seas in 1782 and 1783. War cut short the strife,
but not before the issue was clearly indicated.
The action of September 3, like that of July 6, was brought to a close
by a shift of wind to the southeast. When it came, the English line
wore, and formed again on the other tack. The French also wore; and
their van ships, being now to windward, stood down between their
crippled ships and the enemy's line (C). Toward sundown Hughes hauled
off to the northward, abandoning the hope of regaining Trincomalee,
but with the satisfaction of having inflicted this severe retaliation
upon his successful opponent.
That firmness of mind which was not the least of Suffren's qualities
was severely tried soon after the action off Trincomalee. In returning
to port, a seventy-four, the "Orient," was run ashore and lost by
mismanagement, the only consolation being that her spars were saved
for the two dismasted ships. Other crippled masts were replaced as
before by robbing the frigates, whose crews also were needed to
replace the losses in battle. Repairs were pushed on with the usual
energy, the defence of the port was fully provided for, and on the
30th of September the squadron sailed for the Coromandel coast, where
the state of French interests urgently called for it. Cuddalore was
reached in four days; and here another incapable officer wrecked the
"Bizarre," of sixty-four guns, in picking up his anchorage. In
consequence of the loss of these two ships, Suffren, when he next met
the enemy, could oppose only fifteen to eighteen ships-of-the-line; so
much do general results depend upon individual ability and care.
Hughes was at Madras, ninety miles north, whither he had gone at once
after the late action. He reports his ships badly damaged; but the
loss was so evenly distributed among them that it is difficult to
justify his failure to follow up the injuries done to the French.
At this season the monsoon wind, which has come for four or five
months from southwest, changes to northeast, blowing upon the east
coast of the peninsula, where are no good harbors. The consequent
swell made the shore often unapproachable, and so forbade support from
fleet to army. The change of the monsoon is also frequently marked by
violent hurricanes. The two commanders, therefore, had to quit a
region where their stay might be dangerous as well as useless. Had
Trincomalee not been lost, Hughes, in the condition of his squadron,
might have awaited there the reinforcements and supplies expected soon
from England; for although the port is not healthy, it is secure and
well situated. Bickerton had already reached Bombay, and was on his
way now to Madras with five ships-of-the-line. As things were, Hughes
thought necessary to go to Bombay for the season, sailing or rather
being driven to sea by a hurricane, on the 17th of October. Four days
later Bickerton reached Madras, not having fallen in with the admiral.
With an activity which characterized him he sailed at once, and was
again in Bombay on the 28th of November. Hughes's ships, scattered and
crippled by tempest, dropped in one by one, a few days later.
Suffren held Trincomalee, yet his decision was not easy. The port was
safe, he had not to fear an attack by the English fleet; and on the
other hand, besides being sickly during the approaching monsoon, it
was doubtful whether the provisions needed for the health of the crews
could be had there. In short, though of strategic value from its
strength and position, the port was deficient in resources. Opposed to
Trincomalee there was an alternative in Achem, a harbor on the other
side of the Bay of Bengal, at the west end of the island of Sumatra.
This was healthy, could supply provisions, and, from its position with
reference to the northeast monsoon, would permit ships to regain the
Coromandel coast sooner than those in Bombay, when the milder ending
of the season made landing more practicable.
These simple considerations were not, however, the only elements in
the really difficult problem before Suffren. The small results that
followed this campaign must not hide the fact that great issues were
possible, and that much might depend upon his decision. Owing to the
French policy of sending out reinforcements in several small bodies,
not only was there much loss, but great uncertainty prevailed among
the scattered commands as to conditions elsewhere. This uncertainty,
loss, and delay profoundly affected the political situation in India.
When Suffren first reached the coast, the English had on their hands
not only Hyder Ali, but the Mahrattas as well. Peace with the latter
was signed on the 17th of May, 1782; but, owing probably to an
opposition party among them, the ratifications were not exchanged
until December. Both there and in the court of Hyder Ali there was
division of interest; and representations were made from both to the
French, who, though suspicious, could obtain no certain information of
the treaty, that everything depended upon the relative military
strength of themselves and the English. The presence and the actions
of Suffren were all that France had to show,--the prestige of his
genius, the capture of Trincomalee, his success in battle. The French
army, cooped up in Cuddalore, was dependent upon the sultan for money,
for food, and for reinforcements; even the fleet called on him for
money, for masts, for ammunition, for grain. The English, on the other
hand, maintained their ground; though on the whole worsted, they lost
no ships; and Bickerton's powerful squadron was known to have reached
Bombay. Above all, while the French asked for money, the English
lavished it.
It was impossible for the French to make head against their enemy
without native allies; it was essential to keep Hyder from also making
peace. Here the inadequate support and faulty dispositions of the home
government made themselves felt. The command in India, both by land
and sea, was intrusted to General de Bussy, once the brilliant
fellow-worker with Dupleix, now a gouty invalid of sixty-four. With a
view to secrecy, Bussy sailed from Cadiz in November, 1781, with two
ships-of-the-line, for Teneriffe, where he was to be joined by a
convoy leaving Brest in December. This convoy was captured by the
English, only two of the vessels escaping to Bussy. The latter pursued
his journey, and learning at the Cape of Good Hope that Bickerton's
strong force was on the way, felt compelled to land there a great part
of his troops. He reached the Isle of France on the 31st of May. The
next convoy of eighteen transports, sailing in April for India, was
also intercepted. Two of the four ships-of-war were taken, as also ten
of the transports; the remainder returned to Brest. A third detachment
was more fortunate, reaching the Cape in May; but it was delayed there
two months by the wretched condition of the ships and crews. These
disappointments decided Bussy to remain at the Island until joined by
the expected ships from the Cape, and Suffren at this critical moment
did not know what the state of things there was. The general had only
written him that, as he could not reach the coast before the bad
season, he should rendezvous at Achem. These uncertainties made a
painful impression upon Hyder Ali, who had been led to expect Bussy in
September, and had instead received news of Bickerton's arrival and
the defection of his old allies, the Mahrattas. Suffren was forced to
pretend a confidence which he did not feel, but which, with the
influence of his own character and achievements, determined the sultan
to continue the war. This settled, the squadron sailed for Achem on
the 15th of October, anchoring there the 2d of November.
Three weeks afterward a vessel arrived from Bussy, with word that his
departure was indefinitely delayed by an epidemic raging among the
troops. Suffren therefore determined to hasten his own return to the
coast, and sailed on the 20th of December. January 8, 1783, he
anchored off Ganjam, five hundred miles northeast of Cuddalore, whence
he would have a fair wind to proceed when he wished. It was his
purpose to attack not only the coasting vessels but the English
factories on shore as well, the surf being now often moderate; but
learning on the 12th, from an English prize, the important and
discouraging news of Hyder Ali's death, he gave up all minor
operations, and sailed at once for Cuddalore, hoping to secure by his
presence the continuance of the alliance as well as the safety of the
garrison. He reached the place on the 6th of February.
During his four months absence the failure of Bussy to appear with his
troops, and the arrival of Bickerton, who had shown himself on both
coasts, had seriously injured the French cause. The treaty of peace
between the English and the Mahrattas had been ratified; and the
former, released from this war and reinforced, had attacked the sultan
on the west, or Malabar, coast. The effect of this diversion was of
course felt on the east coast, despite the efforts of the French to
keep the new sultan there. The sickness among the troops at the Isle
of France had, however, ceased early in November; and had Bussy then
started without delay, he and Suffren would now have met in the
Carnatic, with full command of the sea and large odds in their favor
ashore. Hughes did not arrive till two months later.
Being thus alone, Suffren, after communicating with Tippoo-Saib, the
new sultan of Mysore, went to Trincomalee; and there he was at last
joined, on the 10th of March, by Bussy, accompanied by three
ships-of-the-line and numerous transports. Eager to bring the troops
into the field, Suffren sailed on the 15th with his fastest ships, and
landed them the next day at Porto Novo. He returned to Trincomalee on
the 11th of April, and fell in with Hughes's fleet of seventeen
ships-of-the-line off the harbor's mouth. Having only part of his
force with him, no fight ensued, and the English went on to Madras.
The southwest monsoon was now blowing.
It is not necessary to follow the trivial operations of the next two
months. Tippoo being engaged on the other side of the peninsula and
Bussy displaying little vigor, while Hughes was in superior force off
the coast, the affairs of the French on shore went from bad to worse.
Suffren, having but fifteen ships to eighteen English, was unwilling
to go to leeward of Trincomalee, lest it should fall before he could
return to it. Under these conditions the English troops advanced from
Madras, passing near but around Cuddalore, and encamped to the
southward of it, by the sea. The supply-ships and light cruisers were
stationed off the shore near the army; while Admiral Hughes, with the
heavy ships, anchored some twenty miles south, where, being to
windward, he covered the others.
In order to assure to Suffren the full credit of his subsequent
course, it is necessary to emphasize the fact that Bussy, though
commander-in-chief both by land and sea, did not venture to order him
to leave Trincomalee and come to his support. Allowing him to feel the
extremity of the danger, he told him not to leave port unless he heard
that the army was shut up in Cuddalore, and blockaded by the English
squadron. This letter was received on the 10th of June. Suffren waited
for no more. The next day he sailed, and forty-eight hours later his
frigates saw the English fleet. The same day, the 13th, after a sharp
action, the French army was shut up in the town, behind very weak
walls. Everything now depended on the action of the fleets.
Upon Suffren's appearance, Hughes moved away and anchored four or five
miles from the town. Baffling winds prevailed for three days; but the
monsoon resuming on the 16th, Suffren approached. The English admiral
not liking to accept action at anchor, and to leeward, in which he was
right, got under way; but attaching more importance to the
weather-gage than to preventing a junction between the enemy's land
and sea forces, he stood out into the offing with a southerly, or
south-southeast wind, notwithstanding his superior numbers. Suffren
formed on the same tack, and some manoeuvring ensued during that
night and the next day. At eight P.M. of the 17th the French squadron,
which had refused to be drawn to sea, anchored off Cuddalore and
communicated with the commander-in-chief. Twelve hundred of the
garrison were hastily embarked to fill the numerous vacancies at the
guns of the fleet.
Until the 20th the wind, holding unexpectedly at west, denied Hughes
the advantage which he sought; and finally on that day he decided to
accept action and await the attack. It was made by Suffren with
fifteen ships to eighteen, the fire opening at quarter-past four P.M.
and lasting until half-past six. The loss on both sides was nearly
equal; but the English ships, abandoning both the field of battle and
their army, returned to Madras. Suffren anchored before Cuddalore.
The embarrassment of the British army was now very great. The
supply-ships on which it had depended fled before the action of the
20th, and the result of course made it impossible for them to return.
The sultan's light cavalry harassed their communications by land. On
the 25th, the general commanding wrote that his "mind was on the rack
without a moment's rest since the departure of the fleet, considering
the character of M. de Suffren, and the infinite superiority on the
part of the French now that we are left to ourselves." From this
anxiety he was relieved by the news of the conclusion of peace, which
reached Cuddalore on the 29th by flag-of-truce from Madras.
If any doubt had remained as to the relative merits of the two
sea-commanders, the last few days of their campaign would have removed
them. Hughes alleges the number of his sick and shortness of water as
his reasons for abandoning the contest. Suffren's difficulties,
however, were as great as his own;[192] and if he had an advantage at
Trincomalee, that only shifts the dispute a step back, for he owed its
possession to superior generalship and activity. The simple facts that
with fifteen ships he forced eighteen to abandon a blockade, relieved
the invested army, strengthened his own crews, and fought a decisive
action, make an impression which does not need to be diminished in
the interests of truth.[193] It is probable that Hughes's
self-reliance had been badly shaken by his various meetings with
Suffren.
Although the tidings of peace sent by Hughes to Bussy rested only upon
unofficial letters, they were too positive to justify a continuance of
bloodshed. An arrangement was entered into by the authorities of the
two nations in India, and hostilities ceased on the 8th of July. Two
months later, at Pondicherry, the official despatches reached Suffren.
His own words upon them are worth quoting, for they show the
depressing convictions under which he had acted so noble a part: "God
be praised for the peace! for it was clear that in India, though we
had the means to impose the law, all would have been lost. I await
your orders with impatience, and heartily pray they may permit me to
leave. War alone can make bearable the weariness of certain things."
On the 6th of October, 1783, Suffren finally sailed from Trincomalee
for France, stopping at the Isle of France and the Cape of Good Hope.
The homeward voyage was a continued and spontaneous ovation. In each
port visited the most flattering attentions were paid by men of every
degree and of every nation. What especially gratified him was the
homage of the English captains. It might well be so; none had so
clearly established a right to his esteem as a warrior. On no occasion
when Hughes and Suffren met, save the last, did the English number
over twelve ships; but six English captains had laid down their lives,
obstinately opposing his efforts. While he was at the Cape, a division
of nine of Hughes's ships, returning from the war, anchored in the
harbor. Their captains called eagerly upon the admiral, the stout
Commodore King of the "Exeter" at their head. "The good Dutchmen have
received me as their savior," wrote Suffren; "but among the tributes
which have most flattered me, none has given me more pleasure than the
esteem and consideration testified by the English who are here." On
reaching home, rewards were heaped upon him. Having left France as a
captain, he came back a rear-admiral; and immediately after his return
the king created a fourth vice-admiralship, a special post to be
filled by Suffren, and to lapse at his death. These honors were won by
himself alone; they were the tribute paid to his unyielding energy and
genius, shown not only in actual fight but in the steadfastness which
held to his station through every discouragement, and rose equal to
every demand made by recurring want and misfortune.
Alike in the general conduct of his operations and on the battlefield
under the fire of the enemy, this lofty resolve was the distinguishing
merit of Suffren; and when there is coupled with it the clear and
absolute conviction which he held of the necessity to seek and crush
the enemy's fleet, we have probably the leading traits of his military
character. The latter was the light that led him, the former the
spirit that sustained him. As a tactician, in the sense of a driller
of ships, imparting to them uniformity of action and manoeuvring, he
seems to have been deficient, and would probably himself have
admitted, with some contempt, the justice of the criticism made upon
him in these respects. Whether or no he ever actually characterized
tactics--meaning thereby elementary or evolutionary tactics--as the
veil of timidity, there was that in his actions which makes the _mot_
probable. Such a contempt, however, is unsafe even in the case of
genius. The faculty of moving together with uniformity and precision
is too necessary to the development of the full power of a body of
ships to be lightly esteemed; it is essential to that concentration of
effort at which Suffren rightly aimed, but which he was not always
careful to secure by previous dispositions. Paradoxical though it
sounds, it is true that only fleets which are able to perform regular
movements can afford at times to cast them aside; only captains whom
the habit of the drill-ground has familiarized with the shifting
phases it presents, can be expected to seize readily the opportunities
for independent action presented by the field of battle. Howe and
Jervis must make ready the way for the successes of Nelson. Suffren
expected too much of his captains. He had the right to expect more
than he got, but not that ready perception of the situation and that
firmness of nerve which, except to a few favorites of Nature, are the
result only of practice and experience.
Still, he was a very great man. When every deduction has been made,
there must still remain his heroic constancy, his fearlessness of
responsibility as of danger, the rapidity of his action, and the
genius whose unerring intuition led him to break through the
traditions of his service and assert for the navy that principal part
which befits it, that offensive action which secures the control of
the sea by the destruction of the enemy's fleet. Had he met in his
lieutenants such ready instruments as Nelson found prepared for him,
there can be little doubt that Hughes's squadron would have been
destroyed while inferior to Suffren's, before reinforcements could
have arrived; and with the English fleet it could scarcely have failed
that the Coromandel coast also would have fallen. What effect this
would have had upon the fate of the peninsula, or upon the terms of
the peace, can only be surmised. His own hope was that, by acquiring
the superiority in India, a glorious peace might result.
No further opportunities of distinction in war were given to Suffren.
The remaining years of his life were spent in honored positions
ashore. In 1788, upon an appearance of trouble with England, he was
appointed to the command of a great fleet arming at Brest; but before
he could leave Paris he died suddenly on the 8th of December, in the
sixtieth year of his age. There seems to have been no suspicion at
the time of other than natural causes of death, he being exceedingly
stout and of apoplectic temperament; but many years after a story,
apparently well-founded, became current that he was killed in a duel
arising out of his official action in India. His old antagonist on the
battlefield, Sir Edward Hughes, died at a great age in 1794.
FOOTNOTES:
[168] This Commodore Johnstone, more commonly known as Governor
Johnstone, was one of the three commissioners sent by Lord North in
1778 to promote a reconciliation with America. Owing to certain
suspicious proceedings on his part, Congress declared it was
incompatible with their honor to hold any manner of correspondence or
intercourse with him. His title of Governor arose from his being at
one time governor of Pensacola. He had a most unenviable reputation in
the English navy. (See Charnock's Biog. Navalis.)
[169] This plate is taken almost wholly from Cunat's "Vie de Suffren."
[170] Page 299.
[171] La Serre: Essais Hist. et Critiques sur la Marine Française.
[172] The question of attacking the English squadron at its anchors
was debated in a council of war. Its opinion confirmed Suffren's
decision not to do so. In contrasting this with the failure of the
English to attack the French detachment in Newport (p. 394), it must
be borne in mind that in the latter case there was no means of forcing
the ships to leave their strong position; whereas by threatening
Trincomalee, or other less important points, Suffren could rely upon
drawing Hughes out. He was therefore right in not attacking, while the
English before Newport were probably wrong.
[173] The dependence of Trincomalee upon the English fleet in this
campaign affords an excellent illustration of the embarrassment and
false position in which a navy finds itself when the defence of its
seaports rests upon it. This bears upon a much debated point of the
present day, and is worthy the study of those who maintain, too
unqualifiedly, that the best coast defence is a navy. In one sense
this is doubtless true,--to attack the enemy abroad is the best of
defences; but in the narrow sense of the word "defence" it is not
true. Trincomalee unfortified was simply a centre round which Hughes
had to revolve like a tethered animal; and the same will always happen
under like conditions.
[174] Plate XIV., Fig. D, shows the order of battle Suffren intended
in this action. The five rear ships of the enemy would each have two
opponents close aboard. The leading French ship on the weather side
was to be kept farther off, so that while attacking the sixth
Englishman she could "contain" the van ships if they attempted to
reinforce the rear by tacking.
[175] Troude: Batailles Navales.
[176] Between four and five hundred yards.
[177] The English and French flag-ships are denoted in the plan by
their exceptional size.
[178] The "Victory," Nelson's ship at Trafalgar, a 100-gun ship, lost
57 killed and 102 wounded; Hughes's ship, a 74, lost 59 killed and 96
wounded. Collingwood's ship, the "Royal Sovereign," also of 100 guns,
lost 47 killed and 94 wounded; the "Monmouth," a 64, in Hughes's
action lost 45 killed and 102 wounded.
[179] Troude: Batailles Navales; Chevalier: Hist. de la Marine
Française.
[180] This remark seems too self-evident to need emphasis; yet it may
be questioned whether naval men generally carry it in their stock of
axioms.
[181] As always.
[182] That is turned their side to the enemy instead of approaching
him.
[183] Chevalier.
[184] Annual Register, 1782.
[185] The British account differs materially as to the cause of the
distance separating the two rears. "In this action it did not fall to
the 'Monmouth's' lot to sustain a very considerable share, the enemy's
rear being so far to leeward that the ships of the British rear could
not, even whilst the wind was favorable, close with them without
considerably breaking the order of their own line" (Memoir of Captain
Alms, Naval Chronicle, vol. ii). Such contradictions are common, and,
except for a particular purpose, need not to be reconciled. Alms seems
to have been not only a first-rate seaman, but an officer capable of
resolute and independent action; his account is probably correct.
[186] Troude: Batailles Navales. It was seen from Suffren's ship that
the "Sévère's" flag was down; but it was supposed that the ensign
halliards had been shot away. The next day Hughes sent the captain of
the "Sultan" to demand the delivery to him of the ship which had
struck. The demand, of course, could not be complied with. "The
'Sultan,'" Troude says, "which had hove-to to take possession of the
'Sévère,' was the victim of this action; she received during some
time, without replying, the whole fire of the French ship."
[187] Annual Register, 1782.
[188] Cunat: Vie de Suffren.
[189] The curves in (B) represent the movements of the ships _after_
the shift of wind, which practically ended the battle. The ships
themselves show the order in fighting.
[190] The enemy formed a semicircle around us and raked us ahead and
astern, as the ship came up and fell off, with the helm to
leeward.--_Journal de Bord du Bailli de Suffren._
[191] See page 435. He added: "It is frightful to have had four times
in our power to destroy the English squadron, and that it still
exists."
[192] There was not a single ship of Suffren's which had more than
three-fourths of her regular complement of men. It must be added that
soldiers and sepoys made up half of these reduced crews.--_Chevalier_,
p. 463.
[193] You will have learned my promotion to commodore and
rear-admiral. Now, I tell you in the sincerity of my heart and for
your own ear alone, that what I have done since then is worth
infinitely more than what I had done before. You know the capture and
battle of Trincomalee; but the end of the campaign, and that which
took place between the month of March and the end of June, is far
above anything that has been done in the navy since I entered it. The
result has been very advantageous to the State, for the squadron was
endangered and the army lost.--_Private Letter of Suffren, Sept. 13,
1783; quoted in the "Journal de Bord du Bailli de Suffren."_