musketry were shaking the confidence of the enemy, now broken and turned
on their left by the French. The Light Division was obliged to
relinquish its hold of the work it had taken; but the Guards were
advancing to their support--the Highlanders were moving up on the
left--and the fortune of the day was every moment inclining to the
allies. The French had sent to Lord Raglan for assistance, some say
twice--certainly once, before we advanced. Our attack was not to begin
till they had turned the left, and it is likely that M. St. Arnaud
arranged to send information of that fact to Lord Raglan. But our
Commander-in-chief did not receive any such intelligence. He was
annoyed, uneasy, and disappointed at the delay which occurred on his
right. He sent Colonel Vico to ascertain the state of affairs, to
communicate, if possible, with the French Generals. Meantime, the French
Generals were, if we credit authorities, annoyed, uneasy, and
disappointed by the slowness of the English. Prince Napoleon sent to
Lord Raglan, French staff-officers came with the piteous
appeal--_Milord, je vous prie! pour l'amour de Dieu! Venez aux Français!
Nous sommes massacrés!_ At last Lord Raglan gave orders to advance,
although he had not heard of the success of the French attack on which
the advance was to depend. When the 1st and 3rd Divisions had deployed,
and were moving towards the Alma, Lord Raglan, and his staff advanced,
and skirting the village of Bourliouk to the right, passed down a narrow
lane which led to the ford, by which part of Adams's Brigade had crossed
to the other side. They proceeded round the right of Adams's Brigade,
immediately between the French and Evans's extreme right, and _en
route_, his lordship observed Turner's battery, and passed close to the
41st and 49th on the other side of the river, for whose disposition he
gave orders to Brigadier Adams. In crossing the ford the staff were
exposed to fire from the Russian guns on the high grounds opposite
Bourliouk, and the infantry in support. Two of the staff-officers were
hit--Lieutenant Leslie, Royal Horse Guards, who was acting as orderly
officer to the Commander-in-chief, and Captain Weare, Deputy-Assistant
Adjutant-General. Lord Raglan gave orders for Turner's battery to come
up to enfilade the enemy's guns. The lane, which formed at the other
side of the ford the continuation of that road by which the
Commander-in-chief had passed round Bourliouk to the river, ran at the
bottom of a sheltered ravine, which almost divided the Russian position,
and formed a boundary between the English and the French attacks. The
enemy had been driven out of this ravine by the French, and the lane was
unoccupied, but here and there in its windings it was swept by guns. The
ravine, as it ascended, opened out, and became shallower, and on the
right it wound below a small table-land, or rather a flattened knoll, of
which there were several at the edge of the general level of the
plateau. On ascending this knoll, Lord Raglan saw, as he anticipated,
that the Russian guns commanding the ford were on his left, in such a
position that they could be enfiladed, and indeed, taken in reverse. He
despatched repeated orders to Turner; but owing to the steepness of the
lane, and to the loss of a gun horse in the river, there was difficulty
and delay in getting the guns up, and when they did arrive the Guards
and Highlanders were already advancing up the hill, and closing on the
Russian columns. The guns[14] which came up were, I believe, a
24-pounder howitzer, and a 9-pounder, and as the tumbril attached to the
former had not arrived, it was served with 9-pounder ammunition and
round shot. The artillery officers and General Strangways dismounted and
worked the guns, as the men had not yet come up; Lieutenant Walsham
arrived with the rest of the battery, and the six guns opened--on what?
One officer says, on the "artillery" of the Russians--that two shots
forced a whole line of Russian guns to retire, and that the Russian
General, "seeing he was taken in flank," limbered up. But surely he
could have turned round some of his numerous guns, and could have fought
Turner's two with heavier metal. In fact, it was something else besides
this fire of two shots (one of which hit a tumbril) which determined the
retreat of the Russian artillery. It was the advance of the First and
Second Divisions. The Guards were half-way up the hill when these two
guns opened, and the Russians limbered up when they saw they were turned
on their left, and threatened on their right. The Russian artillery
officer, after he retired, directed his guns against Turner's battery,
and some riflemen were sent to cripple it, one of whom shot Lieutenant
Walsham as he was in the act of loading. Lord Raglan saw the day was won
by the Light Division, the Second Division, the Guards, and Highlanders;
for, seeing the advance of the latter, he exclaimed, "Let us join the
Guards!" and rode into the ravine to his left in their direction.
But the enemy had not yet abandoned their position. A division of
infantry in columns came from the rear of the hill, and marched straight
upon the Brigade of Guards. The Guards dressed up, and advanced to meet
them. Some shot struck the rear of the Russian columns, they began to
melt away, and wavered; still they came on slowly, and began
file-firing. One column moved towards the left flank of the Guards,
facing round as if to meet the Highlanders, who were moving with
rapidity up from the hollow in which they had been sheltered from the
enemy's fire. The two other columns faced the Guards. The distance
between them was rapidly diminishing, when suddenly the Brigade poured
in a fire so destructive that it annihilated their front ranks, and left
a ridge of killed and wounded men on the ground. The Highlanders almost
at the same moment delivered a volley, sharp, deadly, and decisive.
Pennefather's Brigade, on the right of the Guards, supported by Adams,
appeared on the side of the slope. The enemy, after a vain attempt to
shake off the panic occasioned by that rain of death, renewed their fire
very feebly, and then, without waiting, turned as our men advanced with
bayonets at the charge, over the brow of the hill to join the mass of
the Russian army, who, divided into two bodies, were retreating with all
possible speed. Our cavalry rode up to the crest of the hill, and looked
after the enemy. They took a few prisoners, but they were ordered to let
them go again. Lord Raglan expressed his intention of keeping his
cavalry "in a bandbox," and was apprehensive of getting into serious
difficulty with the enemy. The Battle of the Alma was won. The men
halted on the battle-field, and as the Commander-in-chief, the Duke of
Cambridge, Sir De Lacy Evans, and the other popular generals rode in
front of the line, the soldiers shouted, and when Lord Raglan was in
front of the Guards, the whole army burst into a tremendous cheer, which
made one's heart leap--the effect of that cheer can never be forgotten
by those who heard it. It was near five o'clock; the men had been eleven
hours under arms, and had fought a battle, and the enemy were to
be--"let alone." The Russians fired one gun as they retreated, and made
some show of covering their rear with their cavalry.
[Sidenote: TACTICS OF THE BATTLE OF THE ALMA.]
Upon the conduct of the Battle of the Alma there has been much foreign
criticism, and the results and deductions have been unfavourable to the
Russian General, who permitted his left to be turned without any serious
resistance, although he ought to have calculated on the effect of the
operations by sea on that flank. In apparent opposition to this judgment
there has been at the same time great praise awarded to the French for
the gallantry with which they attacked that portion of the position.
They deserve every laudation for the extraordinary activity, rapidity,
and bravery with which they established themselves on the centre and
left-centre, but on the extreme left they had no hard fighting. The
English seem to have been awarded the meed of solidity and unshaken
courage, but at the same time hints are thrown out that they did not
move quite quickly enough, that therefore their losses were great, and
their work after all not so hazardous and difficult as that of the
French, inasmuch as the English attack took place only when the Russian
left was turned. In effect, however, the right of the enemy presented
less physical difficulties to the establishment of a hostile force on
the flank, and it was there that the greatest number of artificial
obstacles in the shape of guns, cavalry, and men, was accumulated. But
was the plan of battle good? In the first place, we attacked the enemy
in the position of his own selection, without the least attempt to
manoeuvre or to turn him. It might have been difficult, situated as we
were, without cavalry, and with masses of baggage, to have attempted any
complex manoeuvres; but it has been asserted that by a flank march we
could, by a temporary abandonment of our seaboard, have placed the enemy
between two fires, and have destroyed his army in case of defeat. It has
been suggested that early on the morning of the 20th the Allies should
have moved obliquely from the bivouac on the Bouljanak, and, crossing
the Alma to the east of the enemy's position, have obliged his left to
make a harassing march, to get up and occupy new ground in a fresh
alignement, have deprived him of his advantages, and have endangered his
retreat to Bakshi Serai or Simpheropol, if he refused battle, and that
in event of his defeat, which would have been pretty certain,
considering how much weaker his new line would have been, he would have
been driven towards the shore, exposed to the fire of our ships, so that
his force would have been obliged to lay down their arms. Menschikoff's
army utterly ruined, Sebastopol would have at once surrendered, disposed
as it was to have done so with very little compression. Criticism is
easy after the circumstances or conduct of which you judge have had
their effect; but to this it may be remarked that criticism cannot, by
its very nature, be prospective. Even civilians are as good judges as
military men of the grand operations of war, although they may be
ignorant of details, and of the modes by which those operations have
been effected. Alexander, Cæsar, Pompey, Hannibal, may have had many
club colonels in their day, who thought they made "fatal moves;" we know
that in our own time there were many military men who "had no great
opinion" of either General Wellesley or General Bonaparte; but the
results carry with them the weight of an irreversible verdict, which is
accepted by posterity long after the cliques and jealousies and
animosities of the hour have passed away for ever. Now, without being a
member of a clique, having no possible jealousies, and being free from
the smallest animosities, I may inquire was there any generalship shown
by any of the allied generals at the Alma? We have Lord Raglan, as
brave, as calm, as noble, as any gentleman who ever owned England as his
mother-land--trotting in front of his army, amid a shower of balls,
"just as if he were riding down Rotten Row," with a kind nod for every
one, leaving his generals and men to fight it out as best they could,
riding across the stream through the French riflemen, not knowing where
he was going to, or where the enemy were, till fate led him to a little
knoll, from which he saw some of the Russian guns on his flank,
whereupon he sent an order for guns, seemed surprised that they could
not be dragged across a stream, and up a hill which presented
difficulties to an unencumbered horseman--then, cantering over to join
the Guards ere they made their charge, and finding it over while he was
in a hollow of the ground. As to the mode in which the attack was
carried on by us, there was immense gallantry, devotion, and courage,
and, according to military men present, no small amount of disorder. The
Light Division was strangely handled. Sir George Brown, whose sight was
so indifferent that he had to get one of his officers to lead his horse
across the river, seemed not to know where his division was, and
permitted Brigadier Buller to march off with two regiments of his
brigade, leaving the third to join Codrington's Brigade. The men got
huddled together on the other side of the river under the ridge, and lay
there seven or eight instead of two deep, so that when they rose and
delivered fire, their front was small, and the effect diminished. Then
they were led straight up at the guns in a confused mass; when they had
got into the battery they were left without supports, so that the enemy
forced them to relinquish their hold, and were enabled to recover the
work. The Light Division had, it is true, drawn the teeth of the
battery, but still the enemy were able to fire over the heads of the
columns from the hill above. However, the Alma was won. Menschikoff was
in retreat, and the world was all before us on the evening of the 20th
of September. Whether our generals had any foresight of what that world
was to be--what were to be the fruits of victory, or the chances of
disaster--let the history of the war on some future day communicate to
the world.
The Russians were very much dissatisfied with the result of this battle.
They put forth the rawness of the troops, their inferiority in numbers,
and many other matters; they criticised severely the conduct of their
generals during the action, and the disposition of the troops on the
ground; but, after all, their position ought to have been impregnable,
if defended by determined infantry.
The force under the orders of Prince Menschikoff was composed as
follows:--
[Sidenote: THE RUSSIAN FORCES.]
Battalions. Guns.
The 1st Brigade of the 14th Division of the 5th Army Corps, }
consisting of regiment No. 27 Volhynia, and regiment No. } 8 16
28 Minsk, with No. 3 battery of position, and No. 3 light }
battery }
The 16th Division 6th Army Corps, consisting of the regiments }
31st Vladimir, 32nd Sudalski, 31st (Light) Uglilski, 32nd } 16 36
(Light) Kazan, with the 16th Brigade of Artillery, No. 1 and}
No. 2 light batteries, and No. 2 battery of position }
The 2nd Brigade of the 17th Division, with the regiment of }
Moscow, the 17th Brigade of Artillery, No. 4 and No. 5 } 12 24
light batteries, and No. 3 battery of position }
4 Reserve battalions of the 13th 4 0
The rifle and sapper battalions of the 6th Corps 2 0
2 battalions of sailors, with 4 guns 2 4
------------
44 80
CAVALRY.
Squadrons. Guns.
2nd Brigade of 6th Cavalry Division, 2 regiments, each of 8 }
squadrons } 16 0
16 sotnias of Cossacks, or regiment of 4 squadrons 8 0
No. 12 light battery of horse artillery 0 8
No. 4 Cossack battery 0 8
------------
Total--Infantry, between 33,000 and 34,000 24 16
Cavalry, about 3,500.
The Russians have given the following account of their own position and
of some incidents of the action:--
The centre of their position lay on the high slopes of the left bank of
the river, opposite the village of Bourliouk; the left on the still
higher and less accessible hills, with perpendicularly scarped sides,
which rise from the river near the sea; the right wing on the gentle
ascents into which this rising ground subsides about half a mile
eastward of the village.
The reserves, which were posted behind the centre, consisted of the
regiments of Volhynia, Minsk, and Moscow, the two former of which
subsequently took an active part in the siege, and were the principal
workmen and combatants in constructing and occupying the famous "white
works" on the right of our position before Sebastopol. On their right
flank were two regiments of hussars and two field batteries; in the rear
of the right wing was stationed a regiment of Riflemen. Oddly enough,
the Russian General sent off a battalion of the Moscow regiment to
occupy the village of Ulukul Akles, several miles in the rear of his
left wing, as if to prevent a descent behind him from the sea.
[Sidenote: A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION.]
The disposition of this force will be seen on reference to the plan
which accompanies the description of the battle of the Alma. The right
was commanded by Lieutenant-General Knetsinsky, of the 16th Division;
the centre by Prince Gortschakoff I.; the left by Lieutenant-General
Kiriakoff, Commander of the 17th Division; and Prince Menschikoff took
the control of the whole, being generally on the left of the centre,
near the telegraph station. When the Allies came in sight, the Rifle
battalion, about 650 strong, crossed to the right bank of the river, and
occupied the village of Bourliouk and the vineyards near it, and the
regiments in front advanced their skirmishers to the left bank, and
Menschikoff rode along the front from the right to the left of the line
to animate the men, most of whom had been present at a mass to the
Virgin early in the morning, when prayers were offered for her aid
against the enemy. Our advance seemed to the Russians rather slow; but
at last, at about 12.30, the Allies came within range, and a sharp
fusilade commenced between the skirmishers and riflemen. About 12.20 the
steamers outside began to fire on the Russian left, and forced the
regiments of Minsk and Moscow to retire with loss, and killed some
horses and men of the light battery stationed on their flank. Their
shells struck down four officers of Menschikoff's staff later in the
day, and did most effective service in shaking the confidence of the
enemy, and in searching out their battalions so as to prevent their
advance towards the seaboard. As the Allies advanced, the Cossacks,
according to orders, set fire to the haystacks in the Tartar village,
which soon caught, and poured out a mass of black smoke, mingled with
showers of sparks. The guns of the Allies, from the right of the
village, now began to play on the enemy, and caused so much loss in the
four reserve battalions under General Oslonovich, that they, being young
soldiers, began to retire of their own accord. At the same time the
French gained the heights, driving back and destroying the 2nd battalion
of the Moscow regiment, and holding their ground against the Minsk
regiment, the 1st, 3rd, and 4th battalions of the Moscow regiment, and a
numerous artillery, which arrived too late to wrest the heights from
their grasp till the demonstration in the centre rendered their position
certain and secure. General Kiriakoff, who commanded the left wing,
seems to have been utterly bewildered, and to have acted with great
imbecility, and want of decision and judgment. The Russians with whom I
have conversed have assured me that he gave no orders, left every
officer to do as he liked, and retired from the field, or at least
disappeared from their view, very early in the fight. As the reserve
battalions retired, the battalion of the Taioutine regiment, which was
placed in a ravine in front of the river, withdrew as soon as it got
under fire, and left a very important part of the position undefended.
The Kazan and Ouglitsky regiments, defending the epaulement in which the
guns were placed, suffered severely from the fire of the English
riflemen, and the two battalions of the Borodino regiment, which
advanced towards the river to fire on our men as they crossed the ford,
were driven back with great slaughter by the continuous flight of Minié
bullets. As Pennefather's brigade advanced, two battalions of the
Vladimir regiment, deploying into columns of battalions, charged them
with the bayonet, but were checked by our murderous fire, and only a few
men were killed and wounded in the encounter between the foremost ranks,
which were much broken and confused for a few moments. The advance of
the French obliquely from the right, and the success of the English on
the left, threatening to envelope the whole of the enemy, they began to
retreat in tolerable order; but the English and French guns soon began
to open a cross fire on them, and their march became less regular. A
Russian officer, who has written an account of the action, relates that
Prince Menschikoff, as he rode past his regiment, then marching off the
ground as fast as it could under our fire, said, "It's a disgrace for a
Russian soldier to retreat;" whereupon one of the officers exclaimed,
"If you had ordered us, we would have stood our ground." It would appear
that, on arriving at the heights of the Katcha, part of the Russian army
halted for a short time, and took up their position in order of battle,
in case the Allies followed. As to the propriety of such a movement on
our part by a portion of our army, under the circumstances, there may be
some difference of opinion. As to the pursuit of the enemy on the spot
by all the allied forces there can be no diversity of sentiment; but as
to the proposition which Lord Raglan's friends declare he made, to
continue the pursuit with our 1,100 cavalry, some artillery, and no
infantry, it seems scarcely possible that it was made in seriousness.
The enemy, defeated though they were, mustered nearly 30,000 men, of
whom 3,500 were cavalry, and they had with them 94 guns. In their rear
there was a most formidable position, protected by a river of greater
depth and with deeper banks than the Alma. It was getting dark--no one
knew the country--the troops were exhausted by a day's marching and
manoeuvring under a hot sun--and yet it is said that, under these
circumstances, Lord Raglan proposed a pursuit by the portion of the
French who had not been engaged, by the Turkish division, and by part of
our cavalry, and a hypothetical two or three batteries. Most military
men will, if that assertion be substantiated, probably think less of his
lordship's military capacity than ever they did before. The grounds on
which M. St. Arnaud is stated to have declined acceding to the wishes of
Lord Raglan are these--that he could send no infantry, and that his
artillery had exhausted their ammunition. Now, unquestionably St. Arnaud
was quite as anxious as any one could be to complete his victory, and
continue the pursuit of the enemy; and in his three despatches
respecting the battle he laments repeatedly his inability, from want of
cavalry, to turn the retreat of the Russians into a rout. It is also
true that the artillery of the French had exhausted their ammunition;
but let us calmly examine the means at the disposal of the two generals
to effect an operation of a most difficult and serious kind, which is
said to have been suggested by the one and rejected by the other. The
English army present at the Alma, in round numbers as stated in the
official returns, consisted of 27,000 men; the French, of 25,000; the
Turks, of 6,000 men. Of the English were engaged with such loss as would
incapacitate the regiments from action--the Guards, the 7th, 19th, 23rd,
30th, 33rd, 47th, 55th, 95th, one wing of 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade.
There remained in just as good order for marching as any of the French
regiments--1st Battalion of the Royals, 4th, 79th, 44th, 21st, 1st
Battalion Rifle Brigade, 50th, 49th, 77th, 88th, 20th, 28th, 38th,
42nd--14 Battalions--and the cavalry; and according to the French
accounts all their divisions were more or less engaged, with the
exception of part of Forey's. The Staff-officer admits we had 7,000 men
who had not taken a part in the action; but then he adds that these
7,000 men were "not in fact more than sufficient for the immediate
necessities of the camp." Now, as the French force was nearly equal to
ours, the necessities of their camp would be nearly equal to ours also.
He avers they had "12,000 men who had never been engaged." Be it so. But
deduct 7,000 men required for "the immediate necessities of the camp,"
and you will have a disposable force of 5,000 men, who, with a force of
Turks (supposed to have no camp at all, and therefore to have none of
the English or French necessities for eating or drinking or camping),
were, according to Lord Raglan's Staff-officer, to start off at four
o'clock on a September evening to chase an army of 30,000 cavalry and
infantry, and 94 guns! That is really the most preposterous attempt to
vindicate Lord Raglan's generalship that has ever been given to the
world. His lordship never says a word in his published despatches to
corroborate those confidential communications, and it is to be hoped
that they illustrate some of "the many opinions and motives ascribed to
Lord Raglan which the Field-Marshal never entertained," to which the
writer refers. Next day St. Arnaud wished to advance and follow the
enemy, but Lord Raglan would not listen to it, as he had 3,000 wounded
English and Russians to move. That is, if the 10,000 Turks and French,
and a few field batteries, had come up with and beaten the Russians,
Lord Raglan would have permitted them to pursue their career of victory
without support, and to do as they pleased; and if they were beaten and
allowed to fall back, he would leave their wounded in the hands of the
enemy, or spend still more time in burying them. But the worst of all is
that, after losing two days, the English wounded were nearly all on
board ship by the afternoon of the 21st--in spite of the Marshal's
protest we were obliged to leave upwards of 700 wounded Russians on the
ground, with one surgeon and one servant to wait upon them. The enemy
halted at the Katcha till after midnight, crossing it at Aranchi, and
fell back towards Sebastopol, on the north side of which a portion of
the troops arrived by 4 o'clock on the following afternoon. Their loss
was, as stated in the official accounts, 1,762 killed, 2,315 wounded,
405 contused. Two generals prisoners. Generals Kvitzinsky, Schelkanoff,
Goginoff, Kourtianoff, wounded.
Every one of the enemy had a loaf of black bread, and a linen roll
containing coarse broken biscuit or hard bread like oil cake. Though
some of the troops had been at the Alma for a couple of days, no bones
were found about the ground. The ground was in a most filthy state.
After battle came removal of wounded and the burial of the dead.
The Russian dead were all buried together in pits, and were carried down
to their graves as they lay. Our parties on the 21st and 22nd buried
1,200 men. The British soldiers were buried in pits. Their firelocks,
and the useful portions of their military equipment, were alone
preserved.
[Sidenote: HUMANE BARBARITY.]
The quantity of firelocks, great coats, bearskin caps, shakos, helmets
and flat forage caps, knapsacks (English and Russian), belts, bayonets,
cartouch-boxes, cartridges, swords, exceeded belief; and round shot,
fragments of shell smeared with blood and hair, grape and bullets, were
under the foot and eye at every step. Our men broke the enemies'
firelocks and rifles which lay on the ground. As many of them were
loaded, the concussion set them off, so that dropping shot never ceased
for about forty hours. The Russian musket was a good weapon to look at,
but rather a bad one to use. The barrel, which was longer than ours, and
was polished, was secured to the stock by brass straps, like the French.
The lock was, however, tolerably good. The stock was of the old narrow
Oriental pattern, and the wood of which it was made--white-grained and
something like sycamore, broke easily. From the form of the heel of the
stock, the "kick" of the musket must have been sharp with a good charge.
Many had been originally flint-locked, but were changed to detonators by
screwing in nipples and plugging up the touch-holes with steel screws.
The cartridges were beautifully made and finished, the balls being
strongly gummed in at the end, but the powder was coarse and unglazed,
and looked like millet-seed; it was, however, clean in the hand, and
burnt very smartly. The rifles were two-grooved, and projected a long
conical ball. The ball was flat at the base, and had neither hollow cup
nor pin; its weight must exceed that of our Minié ball. These rifles
were made by J. P. Malherbe, of Liège. The bayonets were soft and bent
easily. Some good swords belonging to officers were picked up, and
weapons, probably belonging to drummers or bandsmen, exactly like the
old Roman sword, very sharp and heavy. Some six or seven drums were left
behind, but nearly all of them were broken--several by the shot which
killed their owners. No ensign, eagle, standard, or colour of any kind
was displayed by the enemy or found on the field. Our regiments marched
with their colours, as a matter of course, and the enemy made the latter
a special mark for the rifles. Thus it was so many ensigns, lieutenants,
and sergeants fell.
The sad duty of burying the dead was completed on the 22nd. The wounded
were collected and sent on board ship in arabas and litters, and the
surgeons with humane barbarity were employed night and day in saving
life. In the Light Division there were nearly 1,000 cases for surgical
attendance and operations, at which Drs. Alexander and Tice were busily
employed. Dr. Gordon was active in the Second Division in the same work.
There was more than an acre of Russian wounded when they were brought
and disposed on the ground. Some of the prisoners told us they belonged
to the army of Moldavia, and had only arrived in the Crimea twelve or
fourteen days before the battle. If that were so, the expedition might
have achieved enormous results at little cost, had it arrived three
weeks earlier. All the Russian firelocks, knapsacks, bayonets,
cartridge-boxes, &c., were collected together, near Lord Raglan's tent,
and formed heaps about twenty yards long by ten yards broad. Our men
were sent to the sea, three miles distant, on jolting arabas or tedious
litters. The French had well-appointed covered hospital vans, to hold
ten or twelve men, drawn by mules, and their wounded were sent in much
greater comfort than our poor fellows. The beach was lined with boats
carrying off the wounded. Commander Powell, of the _Vesuvius_, as
beachmaster was indefatigable in his exertions. Some poor fellows died
on their way to the sea. Not only the wounded but the sick were sent on
board the fleet. As a sanatorium alone, the value of the floating
batteries of our friends the sailors was beyond all price. The Russian
officers who were wounded, and all prisoners of rank, were likewise sent
on board. We had 1,000 sick on board, in addition to our wounded. The
French return of 1,400 killed and wounded was understood to include
those who died of cholera during the passage from Varna and the march to
the Alma.
Had a couple of thousand seamen and marines been landed, they could have
done all that was required, have released us from two days' fearful
duty, enabled us to follow the footsteps of our flying enemy, and to
have completed his signal discomfiture, and have in all probability
contributed materially to the issue of the campaign. Admiral Dundas,
however, seemed to be in apprehension of the Russian fleet sallying out
to attack us.
Brigadier-General Tylden died in his tent early on the morning of the
23rd, of cholera. He was buried in the valley under the heights of Alma.
He was succeeded by Lieut.-Colonel Alexander, R.E., who was not,
however, promoted to the rank of Brigadier. Many men died of cholera in
the night. My sleep was disturbed by the groans of the dying, and on
getting up in the morning I found that the corpse of a Russian lay
outside the tent in which I had been permitted to rest. He was not there
when we retired to rest, so that the wretched creature, who had probably
been wandering about without food upon the hills ever since the battle,
must have crawled down towards our fires, and there expired. Late at
night on the 22nd orders were sent round the divisions to be prepared
for marching after daybreak. Early on the 23rd we left the blood-stained
heights of the Alma--a name that will be ever memorable in history. Soon
after dawn the French assembled drums and trumpets on the top of the
highest of the hills they carried, and a wild flourish and roll,
repeated again and again, and broken by peals of rejoicing from the
bugles of the infantry, celebrated their victory ere they departed in
search of the enemy. It was spirit-stirring and thrilling music, and its
effect, as it swelled through the early morning over the valley, can
never be forgotten.
[Sidenote: LEFT ALONE WITH THE WOUNDED.]
Our watch-fires were still burning languidly, as the sleepers roused
themselves, and prepared to leave the scene of their triumphs. The fogs
of the night crept slowly up the hill sides, and hung in uncertain folds
around their summits, revealing here and there the gathering columns of
our regiments in dark patches on the declivities, or showing the deep
black-looking squares of the French battalions, already in motion
towards the south. Dimly seen in the distance, the fleet was moving
along slowly by the line of the coast, the long lines of smoke trailing
back on their wake. But what was that grey mass on the plain, which
seemed settled down upon it almost without life or motion? Now and
then, indeed, an arm might be seen waved aloft, or a man raised himself
for a moment, looked around, and then fell down again. Alas! that plain
was covered with the wounded Russians. Nearly sixty long hours they
passed in agony upon the ground, and with but little hope of help or
succour more, we were compelled to leave them. Their wounds had been
bound and dressed.
Ere our troops marched, General Estcourt sent into the Tartar village up
the valley, into which the inhabitants were just returning, and having
procured the attendance of the head men, proceeded to explain that the
wounded Russians would be confided to their charge, and that they were
to feed and maintain them, and when they were well they were to be let
go their ways. An English surgeon was left behind with these 750
men--Dr. Thomson, of the 44th Regiment. He was told his mission would be
his protection in case the Cossacks came, and that he was to hoist a
flag of truce should the enemy appear in sight; and then, provided with
rum, biscuit, and salt meat, he was left with his charge, attended by a
single servant. One of the Russian officers addressed the wounded, and
explained the position in which they were placed; they promised to obey
Dr. Thomson's orders, to protect him as far as they could, and to
acquaint any Russian force which might arrive with the peculiar
circumstances under which he was among them.
It was nearly eight o'clock ere the tents of head-quarters were struck,
and the march began. We heard from the fleet that the enemy had not only
left the Katcha, but that they had even retired across the Belbek. Our
course was directed upon the former stream, almost in continuation of
our march of the 20th, before the battle. As we moved along, the
unfinished stone building, intended by the Russians for a telegraph
station, came into view. The French had cut upon the entablature the
simple inscription--_La Bataille d'Alma, 20 Septembre, 1854_. A similar
building was visible further on towards Sebastopol; on reaching the top
of one of the hills on our way, we could see the white lighthouse of
Chersonesus at the end of the promontory which juts out into the sea.
The country through which we marched was undulating and barren. Amidst
steep hillocks covered with thistles, and separated from each other at
times by small patches of steppe, or by more undulating and less
hillocky ground, wound the road to Sebastopol--a mere beaten track,
marked with cart-wheels, hoofs, and the nails of gun-carriage wheels. We
advanced uninterruptedly at an average rate of two and a quarter miles
an hour, halting occasionally to rest the troops, and allow the
baggage-wagons to come up.
At three o'clock the beautiful valley of the Katcha came in sight,
formed by a ridge of hills clad with verdure and with small forests of
shrubs, through which here and there shone the white walls of villas and
snug cottages. The country over which we marched slid down gradually to
the level of the river, whose course was marked all along the base of
the hills to the stream by lines of trees, and by the most luxurious
vegetation, forming a strong contrast to the barren and bleak-looking
tract on which our troops advanced. Lord Raglan and his staff rode on
considerably in advance of the troops, to the great astonishment and
indignation of a Prussian officer (Lieut. Wagman), who loudly declared
such conduct was quite opposed to the rules of war. Fluellen himself
could not have been more angry at such disregard of martial etiquette
than the gallant gentleman in question, and certainly we did show marked
contempt for the enemy, and the most superb disdain of his famed
Cossacks. Lord Raglan, his aides, his generals of artillery and
engineers and their staff, his quartermaster-general and his staff, his
adjutant-general and his staff, Sir John Burgoyne and his staff, and all
the staff-doctors, actually came within a few hundred yards of the
shrubberies and plantations at the river, a mile in advance of even the
cavalry, and were riding on towards it in the same _poco curante_
fashion, when Captain Chetwode and his troop of the 8th Hussars pushed
on in the front to reconnoitre.
The Katcha is a small and rapid rivulet, with banks like those of the
Alma; its course marked by neat white cottages, the most delicious
vineyards and gardens, but no inhabitants were visible. Wheeling over
the bridge, we turned eastward towards the little village of Eskel, on
the left bank. The first building on the road was the Imperial
Post-house, with its sign-post of the double-headed eagle, and an
illegible inscription. The usual wooden direction-post, with a black and
red riband painted round it diagonally on a white ground, informed us we
were on our way to Sebastopol, distant ten miles. The road now assumed
the character of an English by-way in Devonshire or Hampshire. Low walls
at either side were surmounted by fruit trees laden with apples, pears,
peaches and apricots, all ripe and fit for use, and at their foot
clustered grapes of the most delicate flavour. The first villa we came
to was the residence of a physician. It had been destroyed by the
Cossacks. A verandah, laden with clematis, roses, and honeysuckle in
front, was filled with broken music-stools, work-tables, and lounging
chairs. All the glasses of the windows were smashed. Everything around
betokened the hasty flight of the inmates. Two or three side-saddles
were lying on the grass outside the hall-door; a parasol lay near them,
close to a Tartar saddle and a huge whip. The wine casks were broken and
the contents spilt; the barley and corn of the granary were thrown about
all over the ground; broken china and glass of fine manufacture were
scattered over the pavement outside the kitchen;--and amid all the
desolation and ruin of the place, a cat sat blandly at the threshold,
winking her eyes in the sunshine at the new comers.
Mirrors in fragments were lying on the floor; beds ripped open, the
feathers littered the rooms a foot deep; chairs, sofas, fauteuils,
bedsteads, bookcases, picture-frames, images of saints, women's
needlework, chests of drawers, shoes, boots, books, bottles, physic
jars, smashed or torn in pieces, lay in heaps in every room. The walls
and doors were hacked with swords. The genius of destruction had been at
work, and had revelled in mischief. The physician's account-book lay
open on a broken table: he had been stopped in the very act of debiting
a dose to some neighbour, and his entry remained unfinished. Beside his
account-book lay a volume of "Madame de Sévigné's Letters" in French,
and a Pharmacopoeia in Russian. A little bottle of prussic acid lay so
invitingly near a box of bon-bons, that I knew it would be irresistible
to the first hungry private who had a taste for almonds, and I
accordingly poured out the contents to prevent the possible catastrophe.
Our men and horses were soon revelling in grapes and corn; and we pushed
on to Eskel, and established ourselves in a house which had belonged to
a Russian officer of rank.
[Sidenote: NEW QUARTERS.]
Every house and villa in the place was in a similar state. The better
the residence, the more complete the destruction. Grand pianos, and
handsome pieces of furniture, covered with silk and damasked velvet,
rent to pieces, were found in more than one house. One of the
instruments retained enough of its vital organs to breathe out "God save
the Queen" from its lacerated brass ribs, and it was made to do so
accordingly, under the very eye of a rigid portrait of his Imperial
Majesty the Czar, which hung on the wall above! These portraits of the
autocrat were not uncommon in the houses--nearly as common as pictures
of saints with gilt and silver glories around their heads. The houses,
large and small, consisted of one story only. Each house stood apart,
with a large patch of vineyard around it, and a garden of fruit trees,
and was fenced in from the road by a stone wall and a line of poplars or
elms. A porch covered with vines protected the entrance. The rooms were
clean and scrupulously whitewashed. Large outhouses, with wine-presses,
stables, &c., complete the farmer's establishment.
A deserter came in, and was taken before Lord Raglan. He was, however,
only a Tartar, but he gave such information respecting the feelings of
the inhabitants towards us, that steps were at once taken to inform
those who were hiding that if they returned to their homes, their lives
and property would be protected. Some hour or so after we had arrived at
Eskel, a number of bullet-headed personages, with sheepskin caps, and
loose long coats and trousers, made their appearance, stealthily
creeping into the houses, and eyeing the new occupants with shy
curiosity. From the people who thus returned we heard that the Russians
had arrived at the Katcha in dispirited condition the night of the
battle of the Alma, and had taken up their position in the villages and
in the neighbouring houses. At twelve o'clock the same night they
continued their march. A part of the army went towards Bakschiserai.
They were said to consist of about 20,000, and to be under the command
of Menschikoff in person. The rest proceeded direct to Sebastopol, and
entered the city in disorder. The evidences of their march were found
along the road, in cartridges, shakos, caps, and articles of worn-out
clothing. In the house which we occupied were abundant traces of the
recent visit of a military man of rank: books on strategy, in Russian,
lay on the floor, and a pair of handsome epaulets were found in the
passage.
Lord Raglan occupied a very pretty villa for the night, but most of the
furniture had been destroyed by the Cossacks. Orders were given to
prevent the soldiers destroying the vineyards or eating the fruit, but
of course it was quite impossible to guard so extensive and tempting a
region as the valley of the Katcha from thirsty and hungry men. There
our soldiers fared on the richest of grapes and the choicest pears and
apples; but they did not waste and spoil as the French did at Mamaschai,
lower down the river.
CHAPTER V.
Move from the Katcha--The Belbek--The Flank March--What might have
been done--A surprise--Skirmish with the
Russians--Plunder--Balaklava--Mr. Upton made
Prisoner--Sebastopol--Its Fortifications--Preparations for the
Siege--The Cherson Light-house--Death of Marshal St. Arnaud--French
and English Positions.
On the 23rd, it was discovered that the enemy had sunk a line of vessels
across the harbour in deep water, so as to form a submarine barrier
against us. The ships thus sunk were the _Tre Sviatitel (Three
Bishops)_, three-decker; _Sufail_, _Urail_, two-deckers; the frigates
_Varna_ and _Med_, and the old two-decker _Bachmont_. This resolute and
sagacious measure was advised by Korniloff, and adopted by Menschikoff.
The head-quarters did not move from the Katcha till nearly noon on the
24th. The day was very hot, and the troops, standing under arms, or
lying down under the sun while this long delay took place, were very
much dissatisfied. The French received between 7,000 and 8,000 men, who
landed on the night of the 23rd and the morning of the 24th, at the
mouth of the Katcha. The Scots Greys, landed from the _Himalaya_, and
the 57th Regiment, which had been all but disembarked at the mouth of
the Alma, came round to the Katcha and joined the army.
The country towards the Belbek is hilly and barren for a couple of miles
after leaving the Katcha river. Then it becomes somewhat fresher and
more level, and at length the river is approached by a gentle descent of
meadow and greensward from the hills. The distance between the Katcha
and the Belbek is about six miles. The valley of the Belbek is commanded
by high hills on the left bank, but instead of being bare, like the
summits of the hills over the Katcha and the Alma, they are covered with
trees and brushwood.
[Illustration PLAN OF THE FORTIFICATIONS OF SEBASTOPOL TO SEPT 1st
1854.]
[Sidenote: A DISORDERLY MARCH.]
As it had been ascertained by _reconnaissance_ that the enemy had
batteries along the north-west of the harbour of Sebastopol, in
conjunction with the Star Fort and Fort Constantine, which would cause
loss in an attempt to invest the town on that face, it occurred to Sir
John Burgoyne that a flank movement on Balaklava would turn and
neutralize the batteries, secure a new base of operations (of which, we
were in want, having abandoned that of the Katcha), and distract the
enemy, who would find the weakest part of Sebastopol exposed to the fire
of our batteries, and our attacks directed against a point where they
had least reason to expect it, and which they might have imagined free
from all assault. The whole army marched towards the south-east, on the
Black River, and as they were obliged to pass through a thickly-wooded
country, intersected by narrow lanes winding up and down the hills, the
troops were in some disorder, and had the enemy possessed the smallest
enterprise they might have inflicted severe loss and annoyance by a
spirited attack on our flank. This operation they at one time
contemplated, but they dreaded the result of a second defeat.
At times, from the top of the hills, the town, with its white houses
shining in the sun, could plainly be seen. All the afternoon the
steamers effected a diversion by shelling the Star Fort and Fort
Constantine, but at such a long range they could do but little
execution; however, the fire had the effect of engaging the attention of
the Russians. They did not make the smallest attempt to interrupt our
progress. In the course of our march the baggage was sent too far to the
left, and became involved in the line of the French and Turkish troops,
who were marching on our flanks. Lord Raglan and his staff rode on (as
was their wont) in advance, and reconnoitred Sebastopol. They were close
to the north-east fort; but no shot was fired at them, notwithstanding
that they were within range.
The works which commanded the mouth of the Belbek were inconsiderable,
and could easily have been silenced by the fleet. An eyewitness, who
served in the Russian army, states that all the troops, as they arrived
in at the south side on the 20th and 21st, crossed to the south-west,
except the Taioutine regiment. Such a movement would make it appear that
the Russians expected a descent upon the south side, or were prepared to
hold that side against the north, in case the Allies seized upon the
Sievernaya and the northern forts. The only preparation made for the
defence of the Sievernaya on the 22nd was as follows:--The Taioutine
regiment, four battalions; the four depôt battalions of the 13th
Division, and one battalion of sailors, in all about 6,000 men, were
placed to garrison the work, which was in a very bad state and badly
armed. They received orders to retire by a subterranean passage 4,000
feet long to the sea-side, in case the enemy should attack with vigour.
On the 23rd, finding they were not pressed or pursued, the Russians
pushed twelve battalions, two field batteries, and a regiment of
cavalry, to the Belbek, and at one time seemed to have contemplated a
demonstration against our flank. This, however, they abandoned; and on
the 24th they turned their attention to the defence of the bridge across
the Tchernaya, at Inkerman, on which they brought to bear four field and
four siege guns, and the troops which had been on the Belbek, and the
16th Division, the cavalry part of the 14th Division, &c., moved across
the Tchernaya by the Traktir bridge, and ascended to Mackenzie's farm,
whence on the morning of the 25th they descended to Otoukoi, on the
Belbek, and marched to Bakschiserai to await the course of events,
being joined there by Prince Gortschakoff, with the rest of the Russian
army of the Alma. The troops left in Sebastopol, exclusive of the
equipages of the fleet, were four battalions of the reserve of the 13th
Division, which had suffered severely at the Alma, four depôt battalions
of the 13th Division, and third battalion of the Taioutine regiment, in
all nine weak battalions.
All the Russian officers with whom I have conversed--all the testimony I
have heard or read, coincide on these two points--first, that if on the
25th we had moved to Bakschiserai in pursuit of the Russians, we should
have found their army in a state of the most complete demoralisation,
and might have forced the great majority of them to surrender as
prisoners of war in a sort of _cul de sac_, from which but few could
have escaped. Secondly, that had we advanced directly against
Sebastopol, the town would have surrendered after some slight show of
resistance to save the honour of the officers. The deduction from these
propositions is that the flank march was the certain precursor of a long
siege, of bloody battles and great losses; was an evidence of
diffidence, and at the same time of boldness which, though favoured by
fortune in its execution, was scarcely justifiable in a military sense,
and was an abandonment of the original character of the expedition.
And here I may be permitted to remark, that the statement in the letters
(of a Staff-officer) "from Head-quarters," page 224, to the effect that
Lord Lyons could not have disapproved of the flank march because he was
not present when Sir John Burgoyne proposed it, and that his manner,
when he received Lord Raglan at Balaklava, "proved he highly admired"
that movement, is calculated to lead to very erroneous impressions in
the minds of those who attach any weight to the assertions of that
officer. Lord Lyons, when he heard of the flank march, expressed his
disapproval of it, and when he met Lord Raglan, he (as I heard from his
own lips) told his lordship that he conceived the flank march to be a
departure from the spirit in which the expedition was undertaken, and
said, "This is strategy, but we are in no condition for strategical
operation. We came here for a coup-de-main, but this is strategy!" The
effects of that march are now matters beyond argument, and we can only
weigh probable results against events--a very difficult equation.
Whatever may be the opinions of civilians or military men respecting the
flank march, it is certain that to Sir John Burgoyne belongs the credit
of originating the idea at the conference which took place between the
generals on the Belbek.
[Sidenote: A DANGEROUS EXAMPLE.]
On the day of our march from the Katcha I was struck down by fever, fell
from my pony into the stream where he was drinking, and was placed by
one of the staff surgeons in a jolting araba carrying a part of the
baggage of the Light Division, with poor Hughes of the 23rd Regiment,
one of the finest men in the British army, who died in the course of the
winter. The sun was exceedingly powerful, and when from the top of a
wooded hill we saw the delicious valley of the Belbek studded with
little snow-white cottages, with stately villas, with cosy snug-looking
hamlets buried in trees, and fringed with a continuous line of the most
gloriously green vineyards, and the noblest orchards of fruit-trees,
there was a murmur of delight throughout the army, the men,
precipitating themselves down the steep slopes of the hill-sides, soon
swarmed in every garden, and clustered in destructive swarms around
every bush. Their halt was, however, a short one.
The word was given to push over the stream, and its bright waters were
soon denied by the tramp of many feet. Just as the araba in which I lay
was passing by a beautiful little chateau, said to belong to a Russian
general, I saw a stream of soldiers issue from it, laden with
incongruous, but at the same time the richest, spoils; others were
engaged inside, breaking the glasses, throwing mirrors, pictures, and
furniture out of the open frames. I learned from an officer who was
standing by that the soldiers had not done the smallest mischief till
they saw a staff-officer take a bronze statuette out of the house and
ride away with it, whereupon the cry arose, "Let us plunder too if our
officer sets the example." I could not help thinking what would have
been the fate of that officer if he had served under our great Duke.
At the other side of the valley of the Belbek the hill-sides are
exceedingly steep, and were covered with dwarf wood and undergrowth of
bushes. It was with difficulty the waggons were urged up the rugged and
narrow paths. Lord Raglan occupied one of the plundered villas, near the
only bridge the Russians had left across the stream. There was very
great confusion in getting the men into their places on this wooded and
steep ridge of hills intersected with ravines, and it was long after
sunset ere the men finally settled down at their bivouac fires. They had
not eaten their scrambling and very heterogeneous suppers, and laid down
to rest more than a few hours, when (about 1.30 in the morning) the
report of a gun on the hills towards our right woke up the allied
armies. The bugles at once sounded, the men stood to their arms, but all
was silent. It appeared that the French vedettes saw some Cossacks in
their front, and fell back on a picket who were bivouacing by a large
fire, when the enemy opened upon them at a long range, either from some
of the earthworks of the north side or from field-pieces. The shot
whizzed high over head, and one of them passed over the English
head-quarters, but as the vedettes reported all quiet in front soon
afterwards, the troops piled arms and lay down to sleep again. Cholera
was much on the increase, and many fell sick or died during the night.
On Monday morning, the 25th, our troops were under arms at 5.30 A.M.; at
seven Lord Raglan, Sir John Burgoyne, and other staff officers proceeded
to the French head-quarters, to decide on the course to be pursued in
the forthcoming attack on Sebastopol. Marshal St. Arnaud was very
unwell, but if M. de Bazancourt is to be credited, he was able to write
very unjust entries in his journal, and to speak in a tone of
egotistical confidence which his situation rendered painful, and which
but for that would have been ridiculous. He says, under the head of the
25th, "The English ought to start first, and do not move till nine
o'clock." He must have known that till after nine o'clock it was not
decided what course the troops were to take. Again, he speaks of himself
as the sole leader, at a time when he had all but resigned the command.
"Je les battrai," &c., on the very day when he was obliged to be carried
from his tent in Prince Menschikoff's carriage. At the conferences, the
French proposed to force the Inkerman bridge across the Tchernaya, and
to make a push at the town. Sir John Burgoyne proposed that we should
cross the stream by the bridge, at a place called Traktir, or
"Restaurant," near Tchorguna, and by his representations carried the
majority of those present with him, as he adduced strong reasons for
seizing Balaklava, Kamiesch, and Kazatch, which were as much appreciated
by our allies as by the English. It was therefore decided that the
armies should continue their march on the ridge between the Belbek and
the Tchernaya.
Our march was by different routes, the artillery proceeding by a
difficult road, which allowed only one horseman to ride by the side of
each gun. The Duke of Cambridge's baggage was actually within gunshot of
Sebastopol for a quarter of an hour. As Lord Raglan was riding on in
front of his staff he found himself, on emerging from a wooded road on
the open space in front, in the immediate presence of a body of Russian
infantry, which turned out to be the baggage guard of a large detachment
of the Russian army marching from Sebastopol to Bakschiserai. They were
not more than a few hundred yards distant. Lord Raglan turned his horse,
and quietly cantered back to the rear of the first division of
Artillery. The cavalry, consisting of a portion of the 11th and 8th
Hussars, were quickly got in front--the guns were unlimbered and opened
on the retreating mass of Russians; the 2nd battalion of Rifles in
skirmishing order threw in a volley, the cavalry executed a charge, and
the Russians broke and fled, leaving behind them an enormous quantity of
baggage of every description. The enemy were pursued two or three miles
on the road to Bakschiserai, but they fled so precipitately the cavalry
could not come up with them.
The troops were halted and allowed to take what they liked. They broke
open the carts and tumbled out the contents on the road; but the pillage
was conducted with regularity, and the officers presided over it to see
that there was no squabbling, and that no man took more than his share.
Immense quantities of wearing apparel, of boots, shirts, coats, dressing
cases, valuable ornaments, and some jewellery were found in the baggage
carts, as well as a military chest containing some money (there are
people who say it held 3000_l._). A Russian artillery officer was found
in one of the carriages, in a very jovial mood. Plenty of champagne was
discovered among the baggage, and served to cheer the captors during
their cold bivouac that night. A number of handsome hussar jackets,
richly laced with silver, and made of fine light-blue cloth, which had
never been worn, were also taken, and sold by the soldiers for sums
varying from 20_s._ to 30_s._ a-piece. Fine large winter cloaks of
cloth, lined with rich furs, were found in abundance.
[Sidenote: A LAND-LOCKED BAY.]
This plunder put the soldiers in good humour, and they marched the
whole day, leaving Sebastopol on their right, till they arrived at the
little hamlet of Traktir, on the Tchernaya or Black River, just before
sunset, and halted for the night. As the baggage was separated from the
bulk of the army by the distance of some miles, Lord Raglan was fain to
put up in a miserable lodge for the night, while the bulk of his staff
slept on the ground in a ditch outside it. Not the smallest attempt was
made by the enemy to interrupt or annoy us during this very remarkable
march, which could at any time have been greatly harassed by the least
activity on the part of the Russians. Continuing our advance early next
morning, we crossed the Tchernaya, and proceeded across the plains to
Balaklava.
He was a bold mariner who first ventured in here, and keen-eyed too. I
never was more astonished in my life than when on the morning of
Tuesday, Sept. 26th, I halted on the top of one of the numerous hills of
which this portion of the Crimea is composed, and looking down saw under
my feet a little pond, closely compressed by the sides of high rocky
mountains; on it floated some six or seven English ships, for which exit
seemed quite hopeless. The bay is like a highland tarn, and it is long
ere the eye admits that it is some half mile in length from the sea, and
varies from 250 to 120 yards in breadth. The shores are so steep and
precipitous that they shut out the expanse of the harbour, and make it
appear much smaller than it really is. Towards the sea the cliffs close
up and completely overlap the narrow channel which leads to the haven,
so that it is quite invisible. On the south-east of the poor village,
which struggles for existence between the base of the rocky hills and
the margin of the sea, are the extensive ruins of a Genoese fort, built
some 200 feet above the level of the sea. It must have once been a large
and important position, and its curtains, bastions, towers, and walls,
all destroyed and crumbling in decay though they are, evince the spirit
and enterprise of the hardy seamen who penetrated these classic recesses
so long ago. There may be doubts whether the Genoese built it, but there
can be none that it is very old, and superior in workmanship to the
edifices of the Turks or Tartars.
The staff advanced first on the town, and were proceeding to enter it,
when, to their surprise, from the old forts above came four spirts of
smoke in rapid succession, and down came four shells into the ground
close to them; but by this time the _Agamemnon_, outside the rocks, was
heard. The Rifles and some of the Light Division opened fire, and the
fort hung out a flag of truce. The Commandant had only sixty men, and
they were all made prisoners. On being asked why he fired from a
position which he must have known to be untenable, he replied that he
did so in order that he might be summoned, and that he felt bound to
fire till required to surrender.
Lord Raglan entered about twelve o'clock in the day. As he approached
the inhabitants came out to meet him, bearing trays laden with fruit and
flowers. Some of them bore loaves of bread cut up in pieces, and placed
on dishes covered with salt, in token of goodwill and submission.
Towards evening, the Agamemnon glided in between the rocks in the narrow
harbour, and anchored opposite the house of the General, whom Sir E.
Lyons speedily visited. The fleet and army were thus once more united,
and Lord Raglan had secured his base of operations.
Our cavalry in the afternoon took Mr. Upton, son of the English engineer
who constructed so many useful works at Sebastopol. He was captured on
his farm, and was taken before Lord Raglan, but refused to give any
information respecting the Russians, as he said he could not reconcile
it to his notions of honour to injure a Government in whose military
service he had been.
All the hills around were barren rock; towards the land they became more
fertile, and for a mile towards Sebastopol and Simpheropol were studded
with pleasant-looking white villas and farmhouses, principally inhabited
by Russian officials from Sebastopol.
The lighthouse of Cape Cherson fell into our hands, and was lighted up
by English sailors. The Russians had left it in darkness, but a party of
blue-jackets dashed at it on the 26th of September, and compelled the
Russian lighthouse-keeper to illuminate it. Jack was in great delight at
this. The _Firebrand_ and _Sanspareil_ landed 1000 sailors from the
fleet on the 1st of October. They were placed under canvas at the head
of the Bay of Balaklava. One thousand marines garrisoned the heights
above the town, and the First Division, liberated by their presence,
moved on in advance, and supported the Fourth Division. The Turks
encamped at the rear and to the right of our Third Division.
The _Australian_, _Sidney_, and _Gertrude_, with the heavy artillery and
siege train, came in on the 27th, and proceeded to disembark their heavy
guns at a pier which was repaired by the 3rd company of Sappers. The 4th
and 2nd Divisions were pushed on towards the south-west side of
Sebastopol, and encamped on ridges about two miles from the city,
separated from each other by a ravine, which commences near Balaklava
and runs nearly to the head of the creek of Sebastopol. The city was
quite visible below. Across the north of the harbour, near the most
easterly of the creeks, was placed a two-decker, painted so as to look
like a three-decker, with springs on her cable, and her broadside turned
towards our position. On the northern side a large circular work, with
three tiers of guns--Fort Constantine--was visible, and more inland
there was another large fortification, called the "Star Fort." On the
near side was a very large fortification, with curtains, running inland,
a semi-circular bastion, and some rudimentary earthworks--all outside
the town. Lord Raglan and staff rode out and made a reconnaissance. A
frigate, anchored inside the two-decker, near the end of the creek,
amused herself by firing round shot and shell, but did no damage. The
French landed their guns at Kamiesch and Khazatchel.
The cholera, which never left us, made many victims. Colonel Beckwith
(1st battalion Rifles), Captain Cox (Grenadier Guards), Colonel Hoey
(30th Regiment), Dr. Mackay, Lieutenant Grant (79th), the Rev. Mr.
Mockler, and others, were among the number.
[Sidenote: RAVAGES OF CHOLERA.]
On Friday, September 29, Marshal St. Arnaud, who had been obliged to
resign his command to General Canrobert on the march, was carried from
his quarters in Balaklava on board the _Berthollet_ in a dying state,
and expired at sea ere she reached the Bosphorus.
On the 30th, all our heavy guns were parked. On the 1st of October,
there was a general rest throughout the army. The enemy the whole of
that day amused themselves firing shot and shell over the heads of our
artillery, and General Cathcart was obliged to move his quarters, as the
Russians found out his range and made beautiful practice at them.
However, he left his flagstaff, which seemed of much attraction to them,
in the same place, and they continued to hammer away at it as usual. The
Second Division moved up on the left of our position on the 8th of
October, and the Light Division took ground on the extreme right.
Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson obtained the command of Captain Patton's
battery of artillery, vacated by the decease of the latter-named officer
by cholera.
During the first three weeks of our stay in the Crimea we lost as many
of cholera as perished on the Alma. We heard strange things from the
deserters who began to join us. They said that thirty Russian ladies
went out of Sebastopol to see the battle of the Alma, as though they
were going to a play or a picnic. They were quite assured of the success
of the Russian troops, and great was their alarm and dismay when they
found themselves obliged to leave the telegraph house on the hill, and
to fly for their lives in their carriages. There is no doubt but that
our enemies were perfectly confident of victory.
Forty pieces of heavy artillery were sent up on the 4th of October to
the park, and twelve tons of gunpowder were safely deposited in the mill
on the road towards Sebastopol. As the French had very little ground
left on which to operate on our left, the 2nd Division moved from its
position, crossed the ravine on its right, and took up ground near the
4th Division. The French immediately afterwards sent up a portion of
their troops to occupy the vacant ground.
Dr. Thomson, of the 44th, and Mr. Reade, Assistant-Surgeon Staff, died
of cholera on the 5th of October, in Balaklava. The town was in a
revolting state. Lord Raglan ordered it to be cleansed, but there was no
one to obey the order, and consequently no one attended to it.
BOOK III.
THE COMMENCEMENT OF THE SIEGE--THE FIRST BOMBARDMENT--ITS
FAILURE--THE BATTLE OF BALAKLAVA--CAVALRY CHARGE--THE BATTLE OF
INKERMAN--ITS CONSEQUENCES.
CHAPTER I.
English Head-Quarters--Investment of Sebastopol--Russian Batteries
open fire--The Greeks expelled from Balaklava--First Sortie--Plan
of the Works--The Turks--Review of the
Campaign--Impediments--"Right" and "Left" Attacks--Officers in
Command--Opening of the Siege--First Bombardment--Its Results--The
"Valley of Death"--Hard Pounding--Privations--Russian
Movements--Conflagrations--A Stratagem--Returns of Killed and
Wounded--Diminution of our Numbers--Russian Tactics.
Lord Raglan and Staff established head-quarters in a snug farmhouse,
surrounded by vineyards and extensive out-offices, about four and a half
miles from Balaklava, on the 5th of October. From the rising ground,
about a mile and a half distant from head-quarters, in front, the town
of Sebastopol was plainly visible. The Russians were occupied throwing
up works and fortifying the exposed portions of the town with the
greatest energy.
The investment of the place on the south side was, as far as possible,
during the night of the 7th, completed. Our lines were to be pushed on
the right and closed in towards the north, so as to prevent supplies or
reinforcements passing out or in on this side of the Black River. This
measure was absolutely necessary to enable our engineers to draw the
lines or measure the ground.
The Russians continued to work all the week at the White Fort, and cast
up strong earthworks in front of it, and also on the extreme left,
facing the French. They fired shell and shot, at intervals of ten
minutes, into the camps of the Second and Light Divisions. Sir George
Brown had to move his quarters more to the rear.
[Sidenote: EFFECTS OF MARTIAL MUSIC.]
The silence and gloom of our camp, as compared with the activity and
bustle of that of the French, were very striking. No drum, no
bugle-call, no music of any kind, was ever heard within our precincts,
while our neighbours close by kept up incessant rolls, fanfaronnades,
and flourishes, relieved every evening by the fine performances of their
military bands. The fact was, many of our instruments had been placed in
store, and the regimental bands were broken up and disorganized, the
men being devoted to the performance of the duties for which the
ambulance corps was formed. I think, judging from one's own feelings,
and from the expressions of those around, that the want of music in camp
was productive of graver consequences than appeared likely to occur at
first blush from such a cause. Every military man knows how regiments,
when fatigued on the march, cheer up at the strains of their band, and
dress up, keep step, and walk on with animation and vigour when it is
playing. At camp, I always observed with pleasure the attentive auditory
who gathered every evening at the first taps of the drum to listen to
the music. At Aladyn and Devno the men used to wander off to the lines
of the 77th, because it had the best band in the division; and when the
bands were silenced because of the prevalence of cholera, out of a
humane regard for the feelings of the sick, the soldiers were wont to
get up singing parties in their tents in lieu of their ordinary
entertainment. It seemed to be an error to deprive them of a cheering
and wholesome influence at the very time they needed it most. The
military band was not meant alone for the delectation of garrison towns,
or for the pleasure of the officers in quarters, and the men were fairly
entitled to its inspiration during the long and weary march in the
enemy's country, and in the monotony of a standing camp ere the
beginning of a siege.
Soon after daybreak on the morning of the 10th, the Russian batteries
opened a heavy fire on the right of our position, but the distance was
too great for accuracy. On the same day four battalions of French,
numbering 2400 men, broke ground at nine o'clock P.M., and before
daybreak they had finished a ditch, parapet, and banquette, 1200 metres
long, at a distance of 900 metres from the enemy's line; and so little
did the Russians suspect the operation, that they never fired a gun to
disturb them. Each man worked and kept guard at one of the covering
parties in turn till daybreak, and by that time each man had finished
his half metre of work, so that the 1,200 metres were completed. From
this position a considerable portion of the enemy's defences on their
right was quite under control, and the French could command the heaviest
fort on that side. From the top of the ditch seventy-six guns could be
counted in the embrasures of this work, which was called the Bastion du
Mât. The French had got forty-six guns ready to mount when the
embrasures should be made and faced with gabions and fascines, and the
platforms were ready. Their present line was from 200 to 300 yards
nearer to the enemy's lines than ours; but the superior weight of our
siege guns more than compensated for the difference of distance.
On the previous night the British, who had already thrown up some
detached batteries, broke ground before Sebastopol on the left. Soon
after dark, 800 men were marched out silently under the charge and
direction of Captain Chapman, R.E., who has the construction of the
works and engineering department of the left attack under his control.
About 1200 yards of trench were made, though the greatest difficulty was
experienced in working, owing to the rocky nature of the ground. The
cover was tolerably good. The Russians never ceased firing, but
attempted nothing more, and those who were hoping for a sortie were
disappointed. As an earthwork for a battery had been thrown up the
previous day, within fire of the enemy's guns, their attention was
particularly directed to our movements, and throughout the day they kept
up a tremendous fire on the high grounds in front of the Light and
Second Divisions. The Russians, who usually ceased firing at sunset,
were on the alert all night, and continued their fire against the whole
line of our approaches almost uninterruptedly. Every instant the
darkness was broken by a flash which had all the effect of summer
lightning--then came darkness again, and in a few seconds a fainter
flash denoted the bursting of a shell. The silence in the English Camp
afforded a strange contrast to the constant roar of the Russian
batteries, to the music and trumpet calls and lively noises of the
encampment of our allies. After nightfall the batteries on the Russian
centre opened so fiercely that it was expected they were covering a
sortie, and the camp was on the alert in consequence. Lord Raglan,
accompanied by Quartermaster-General Airey and several officers, started
at ten o'clock, and rode along the lines, minutely inspecting the state
and position of the regiments and works. They returned at half-past one
o'clock in the morning. The casualties on the night of the 10th were,
one man, 68th, died of wounds, legs taken off; one man, 57th, killed by
cannon-shot; another man, 57th, arm shot off; Lieutenant Rotherham,
20th, slightly wounded in the leg by a stone which had been "started" by
a cannon-shot.
Colonel Waddy, Captain Gray, and Lieutenant Mangles, 50th, were wounded
by a shell on the evening of the 11th. It was rumoured that the Russians
would attack Balaklava, while the Greeks were to aid them by setting
fire to the town. The information on this point was so positive, that
the authorities resorted to the extreme measure of ordering the Greeks,
men, women, and children, to leave the town, and the order was rigidly
carried into effect before evening. An exception was made in favour of
the Tartar families, who were all permitted to remain. The Greeks were
consoled in their flight by a good deal of plunder in the shape of
clothes which had been left with them to wash.
[Sidenote: THE TERRORS OF A RINGING CHEER.]
Capt. Gordon, R.E., commenced our right attack soon after dark. Four
hundred men were furnished from the Second and Light Divisions on the
works, and strong covering parties were sent out in front and in rear to
protect them. The working party was divided into four companies of 100
men each, and they worked on during the night with such good will, that
before morning No. 1 party had completed 160 yards; No. 2, 78 yards; No.
3, 95 yards; No. 4, 30 yards--in all 363 yards of trench ready for
conversion into batteries. These trenches were covered very perfectly.
It was intended that a party of similar strength should be employed on
the left and centre; but, owing to one of those accidents which
unavoidably occur in night work, the sappers and miners missed their
way, and got in advance towards the lines of the enemy. They were
perceived by an advanced post, which opened fire on them at short
distance, and, wonderful to relate, missed them all. The flashes,
however, showed our men that strong battalions of Russian infantry were
moving silently towards our works, and the alarm was given to the
division in the rear. At twenty-five minutes past one a furious
cannonade was opened by the enemy on our lines, as they had then
ascertained that we had discovered their approach. The Second and Light
Divisions turned out, and our field guns attached to them opened fire on
the enemy, who were advancing under the fire of their batteries. Owing
to some misunderstanding, the covering parties received orders to
retire, and fell back on their lines--all but one company of riflemen,
under the command of Lieutenant Godfrey, who maintained the ground with
tenacity, and fired into the columns of the enemy with effect. The
Russians pushed on field-pieces to support their assault. The batteries
behind them were livid with incessant flashes, and the roar of shot and
shell filled the air, mingled with the constant "ping-pinging" of rifle
and musket-balls. All the camps "roused out." The French on our left got
under arms, and the rattle of drums and the shrill blast of trumpets
were heard amid the roar of cannon and small arms. For nearly
half-an-hour this din lasted, till all of a sudden a ringing cheer was
audible on our right, rising through the turmoil. It was the cheer of
the 88th, as they were ordered to charge down the hill on their unseen
enemy. It had its effect, for the Russians, already pounded by our guns
and shaken by the fire of our infantry, as well as by the aspect of the
whole hill-side lined with our battalions, turned and fled under the
shelter of their guns. Their loss was not known; ours was very trifling.
The sortie was completely foiled, and not an inch of our lines was
injured, while the four-gun battery (the main object of their attack)
was never closely approached at all. The alarm over, every one returned
quietly to tent or bivouac. In order to understand this description of
the works, it will be necessary to refer to the plan which accompanies
this. It affords a good idea of the appearance presented by the lines
and works on the eve of the first bombardment.
At the distance of about 700 sagenes (a sagene is seven feet), from the
south extremity of the Careening Bay, was placed a round tower, around
which the Russians had thrown up extensive entrenchments, armed with
heavy guns. There was a standing camp of cavalry and infantry on a
rising ground, on the summit of which this tower was placed, and
probably 10,000 or 12,000 men were encamped there. This round tower was
provided with guns, which, equally with those in the earthworks below,
threw shot and shell right over our advanced posts and working parties,
and sometimes pitched them over the hills in our front into the camps
below. At the distance of 1200 yards from this round tower, in a
direction nearly due south-south-east, our first batteries were to be
formed, and the earthworks had been thrown up there, inclining with the
slope of the hill towards the end of the Dockyard Creek, from which they
were distant 930 yards. The guns of works were intended to command the
Dockyard Creek, the ships placed in it, and the part of the town and its
defences on the west and south of the creek.
Our left attack extended up towards the slope of the ravine which
divided the French from the British attacks, and which ran south-east
from the end of the Dockyard Creek up to our headquarters at Khutor.
Dominating both of these entrenchments, for most of their course, was a
heavy battery of eight Lancaster and ten-inch naval guns, placed at a
distance of 2500 yards from the enemy's lines. The extreme of the French
right was about two and a half miles from the extreme of the British
left attack. South of the Cemetery, and inclining up towards Quarantine
Bay and the fresh-water wells, were the French lines, which were
beautifully made and covered. The fire of the Russian batteries thrown
up from the circular position at the end of the western wall towards the
barracks, near the end of the Dockyard Harbour, was incessantly directed
on them, and shells sometimes burst in the lines; but as a general rule
they struck the hill in front, bounded over, and burst in the rear. Our
left attack crept round towards Inkerman, and commanded the place from
the influx of the Tchernaya into the head of the bay or harbour of
Sebastopol, to the hills near the round tower already threatened by our
right attack. The French commanded the place from the sea to the ravine
at the end of the Dockyard Harbour, and when their guns were mounted, it
was hoped that all the forts, intrenchments, buildings, earthworks,
barracks, batteries, and shipping would be destroyed.
The front of both armies united, and the line of offensive operations
covered by them, extended from the sea to the Tchernaya for seven and a
half or eight miles. From our extreme right front to Balaklava our lines
extended for about the same distance, and the position of the army had
been made so strong on the eastern, south-eastern, flank and rear, as to
set all the efforts of the Russians to drive us from it utterly at
defiance. In the first place, the road from Kadikoi to Kamara, and the
western passes of the mountains, had been scarped in three places so
effectually that it would have been difficult for infantry, and
therefore impossible for artillery, to get along it to attack us. A
heavy gun had, however, been placed in position on the heights to
command this road, and to sweep the three scarps effectually. On the
heights over the east side of Balaklava, were pitched the tents of about
1000 marines from the various ships of the fleet, and several 24 pound
and 32 pound howitzers had been dragged up into position on the same
elevation. At Kadikoi, towards the north-west, was situated a sailors'
camp of about 800 men, with heavy guns in support, and with a temporary
park for artillery and ship-guns below them. From Kadikoi towards
Traktir the ground was mountainous, or rather it was exceedingly hilly,
the heights having a tumular appearance, and the ridges being
intersected by wide valleys, through a series of which passed on one
side Prince Woronzoff's road, the road to Inkerman, and thence to
Sebastopol, by a long _détour_ over the Bakschiserai road, and that to
Traktir.
[Sidenote: SUSPICIONS OF PORK IN DISGUISE.]
On five of these tumular ridges overlooking the road to Balaklava, a
party of 2000 Turks were busily engaged casting up earthworks for
redoubts, under the direction of Captain Wagman, a Prussian engineer
officer, who was under the orders of Sir John Burgoyne. In each of these
forts were placed two heavy guns and 250 Turks. These poor fellows
worked most willingly and indefatigably, though they had been exposed to
the greatest privations. For some mysterious reason or other the Turkish
government sent instead of the veterans who fought under Omar Pasha, a
body of soldiers of only two years' service, the latest levies of the
Porte, many belonging to the non-belligerent class of barbers, tailors,
and small shopkeepers. Still they were patient, hardy, and strong--how
patient I am ashamed to say. I was told, on the best authority, that
these men were landed without the smallest care for their sustenance,
except that some Marseilles biscuits were sent on shore for their use.
These were soon exhausted--the men had nothing else. From the Alma up to
the 10th of October, the whole force had only two biscuits each! The
rest of their food they had to get by the roadside as best they might,
and in an inhospitable and desolated country they could not get their
only solace, tobacco; still they marched and worked day after day,
picking up their subsistence by the way as best they might, and these
proud Osmanli were actually seen walking about our camps, looking for
fragments of rejected biscuit. But their sorrows were turned to joy, for
the British people fed them, and such diet they never had before since
Mahomet enrolled his first army of the faithful. They delighted in their
coffee, sugar, rice, and biscuits, but many of the True Believers were
much perturbed in spirit by the aspect of our salt beef, which they
believed might be pork in disguise, and they subjected it to strange
tests ere it was incorporated with Ottoman flesh and blood.
Eighteen days had elapsed since our army, by a brilliant and daring
forced march on Balaklava, obtained its magnificent position on the
heights which envelope Sebastopol on the south side from the sea to the
Tchernaya; the delay was probably unavoidable. Any officer who has been
present at great operations of this nature will understand what it is
for an army to land in narrow and widely separated creeks all its
munitions of war--its shells, its cannon-shot, its heavy guns, mortars,
its powder, its gun-carriages, its platforms, its fascines, gabions,
sandbags, its trenching tools, and all the various _matériel_ requisite
for the siege of extensive and formidable lines of fortifications and
batteries. But few ships could come in at a time to Balaklava or
Kamiesch; in the former there was only one small ordnance wharf, and yet
it was there that every British cannon had to be landed. The nature of
our descent on the Crimea rendered it quite impossible for us to carry
our siege train along with us, as is the wont of armies invading a
neighbouring country only separated from their own by some imaginary
line. We had to send all our _matériel_ round by sea, and then land it
as best we could. But when once it was landed the difficulties of
getting it up to places where it was required seemed really to commence.
All these enormous masses of metal had to be dragged by men, aided by
such inadequate horse-power as was at our disposal, over a steep and
hilly country, on wretched broken roads, to a distance of eight miles,
and one must have witnessed the toil and labour of hauling up a
Lancaster or ten-inch gun under such circumstances to form a notion of
the length of time requisite to bring it to its station. It will,
however, serve to give some idea of the severity of this work to state
one fact--that on the 10th no less than thirty-three ammunition horses
were found dead, or in such a condition as to render it necessary to
kill them, after the duty of the day before. It follows from all these
considerations that a great siege operation cannot be commenced in a few
days when an army is compelled to bring up its guns.
Again, the nature of the ground around Sebastopol offered great
impediments to the performance of the necessary work of trenching,
throwing up parapets, and forming earthworks. The surface of the soil
was stony and hard, and after it had been removed the labourer came to
strata of rock and petrous masses of volcanic formation, which defied
the best tools to make any impression on them, and our tools were far
from being the best. The result was that the earth for gabions and for
sand-bags had to be carried from a distance in baskets, and in some
instances enough of it could not be scraped together for the most
trifling parapets. This impediment was experienced to a greater extent
by the British than by the French. The latter had better ground to work
upon, and they found fine beds of clay beneath the first coating of
stones and earth, which were of essential service to them in forming
their works.
The officers commanding the batteries on the right attack were
Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, Captain D'Aguilar, and Captain Strange. The
officers commanding the batteries of the left attack were Major Young,
Major Freese, and Major Irving. The whole of the siege-train was
commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Gambier.
Our left attack consisted of four batteries and 36 guns; our right
attack of 20 guns in battery. There were also two Lancaster batteries
and a four-gun battery of 68-pounders on our right. The French had 46
guns. In all 117 guns to 130 guns of the Russians. The night was one of
great anxiety, and early in the morning we all turned out to see the
firing. On 17th October the bombardment began. It commenced by signal at
6.30 A.M.; for thirty minutes previous the Russians fired furiously on
all the batteries. The cannonade on both sides was most violent for
nearly two hours.
At eight o'clock it was apparent that the French batteries in their
extreme right attack, overpowered by the fire and enfiladed by the guns
of the Russians, were very much weakened; their fire slackened minute
after minute.
At 8.30 the fire slackened on both sides for a few minutes; but
recommenced with immense energy, the whole town and the line of works
being enveloped in smoke.
[Sidenote: TERRIFIC CANNONADES.]
At 8.40 the French magazine in the extreme right battery of twelve guns
blew up with a tremendous explosion, killing and wounding 100 men. The
Russians cheered, fired with renewed vigour, and crushed the French fire
completely, so that they were not able to fire more than a gun at
intervals, and at ten o'clock they were nearly silenced on that side.
At 10.30 the fire slackened on both sides, but the Allies and Russians
re-opened vigorously at 10.45. Our practice was splendid, but our works
were cut up by the fire from the Redan and from the works round a
circular martello tower on our extreme right.
At 12.45 the French line-of-battle ships ran up in most magnificent
style and engaged the batteries on the sea side. The scene was
indescribable, the Russians replying vigorously to the attacks by sea
and land, though suffering greatly.
At 1.25 another magazine in the French batteries blew up. The cannonade
was tremendous. Our guns demolished the Round Tower but could not
silence the works around it.
At 1.40 a great explosion took place in the centre of Sebastopol amid
much cheering from our men, but the fire was not abated. The Lancaster
guns made bad practice, and one of them burst. At 2.55 a terrific
explosion of a powder magazine took place in the Russian Redan Fort. The
Russians, however, returned to their guns, and still fired from the
re-entering angle of their works. The cannonade was continuous from the
ships and from our batteries, but the smoke did not permit us to discern
whether the British fleet was engaged.
At 3.30 a loose powder store inside our naval battery was blown up by a
Russian shell, but did no damage. The enemy's earthworks were much
injured by our fire, the Redan nearly silenced, and the fire of the
Round Tower entrenchments diminished, though the inner works were still
vigorous.
At 3.35 the magazine inside the works of the Round Fort was blown up by
our shot.
At four the ships outside were ripping up the forts and stone-works and
town by tremendous broadsides. Only the French flag was visible, the
English fleet being on the opposite side of the harbour. Orders were
given to spare the town and buildings as much as possible.
From four to 5.30 the cannonade from our batteries was very warm, the
Russians replying, though our fire had evidently established its
superiority over theirs, the ships pouring in broadside after broadside
on Forts Nicholas and Constantine at close ranges. Towards dusk the fire
slackened greatly, and at night it ceased altogether, the Russians for
the first time being silent.
The French lost about 200 men, principally by the explosions; our loss
was very small--not exceeding 100 killed and wounded from the
commencement of the siege.
The fire was resumed on the morning of the 18th, soon after daybreak.
The French on that occasion were unable to support us, their batteries
being silenced.
During the night the Russians remounted their guns and brought up fresh
ones, and established a great superiority of fire and weight of metal.
On the 18th, early in the morning, a vedette was seen "circling left"
most energetically;--and here, in a parenthesis, I must explain that
when a vedette "circles left," the proceeding signifies that the enemy's
infantry are approaching, while to "circle right" is indicative of the
approach of cavalry. On this signal was immediately heard the roll-call
to "boot and saddle;" the Scots Greys and a troop of Horse Artillery
assembled with the remaining cavalry on the plain; the 93rd got under
arms, and the batteries on the heights were immediately manned. The
distant pickets were seen to advance, and a dragoon dashed over the
plain with the intelligence that the enemy was advancing quickly. Then
cavalry and infantry moved upon the plain, remaining in rear of the
eminences from which the movements of the vedettes had been observed.
This state of things continued for an hour, when, from the hills, about
3000 yards in front, the Turks opened fire from their advanced
entrenchments. The Moskows then halted in their onward course, and in
the evening lighted their watch-fires about 2000 yards in front of our
vedettes, the blaze showing bright and high in the darkness. Of course
we were on the alert all night, and before the day broke were
particularly attentive to our front. If the Russians had intended to
attack us at that time, they could not have had a more favourable
morning, a low dense white fog covering the whole of the plain. The sun
rose, and the mist disappeared, when it was found the Russians had
vanished also. The next day, the 19th, we naturally expected would be a
quiet one, and that we should not be annoyed by having to remain at our
arms for our final work. Not a bit of it; we had just laden ourselves
with haversacks to forage among the merchant shipping in the harbour,
when a vedette was seen to "circle right" most industriously. "Boot and
saddle" again resounded through the cavalry camps, and another day was
passed like its predecessor, the enemy finally once more retiring, this
time without advancing near enough for a shot from the Turks.
The enemy scarcely fired during the night of the 18th. Our batteries
were equally silent. The French on their side opened a few guns on their
right attack, at which they worked all night to get them into position;
but they did not succeed in firing many rounds before the great
preponderance of the enemy's metal made itself felt, and their works
were damaged seriously; in fact, their lines, though nearer to the
enemy's batteries than our own in some instances, were not sufficiently
close for the light brass guns with which they were armed.
[Sidenote: FEATS OF HEROISM.]
At daybreak on the 19th the firing continued as usual from both sides.
The Russians, having spent the night in repairing the batteries, were
nearly in the same position as ourselves, and, unaided or at least
unassisted to the full extent we had reason to expect by the French, we
were just able to hold our own during the day. Some smart affairs of
skirmishers and sharpshooters took place in front. Our riflemen annoyed
the Russian gunners greatly, and prevented the tirailleurs from showing
near our batteries. On one occasion the Russian riflemen and our own men
came close upon each other in a quarry before the town. Our men had
exhausted all their ammunition; but as soon as they saw the Russians,
they seized the blocks of stone which were lying about, and opened a
vigorous volley on the enemy. The latter either had empty pouches, or
were so much surprised that they forgot to load, for they resorted to
the same missiles. A short fight ensued, which ended in our favour, and
the Russians retreated, pelted vigorously as long as the men could
pursue them. The coolness of a young artillery officer, named Maxwell,
who took some ammunition to the batteries through a tremendous fire
along a road so exposed to the enemy's fire that it has been called "The
Valley of Death," was highly spoken of on all sides. The blue-jackets
were delighted with Captain Peel, who animated the men by the exhibition
of the best qualities of an officer, though his courage was sometimes
marked by an excess that bordered on rashness. When the Union Jack in
the sailors' battery was shot away, he seized the broken staff, and
leaping up on the earthworks, waved the old bit of bunting again and
again amid a storm of shot, which fortunately left him untouched.
Our ammunition began to run short, but supplies were expected every
moment. Either from a want of cartridges, or from the difficulty of
getting powder down to the works, our 12-gun battery was silent for some
time. _The_ Admiral (Sir E. Lyons), on his little grey pony, was to be
seen hovering about our lines indefatigably.
The French fire slackened very much towards one o'clock, the enemy
pitching shells right into their lines and enfilading part of their new
works. Hour after hour one continuous boom of cannon was alone audible,
and the smoke screened all else from view. At a quarter past three there
was an explosion of powder in the tower opposite to our right attack.
The Flagstaff Fort seemed much knocked about by the French. The Redan
and Round Tower earthworks fired nearly as well as ever. As it was very
desirable to destroy the ships anchored in the harbour below us, and to
fire the dockyard buildings, our rockets were brought into play, and,
though rather erratic in their flight, they did some mischief, but not
so much as was expected. Wherever they fell the people could be seen
flying up the streets when the smoke cleared. At three o'clock P.M. the
town was on fire; but after the smoke had excited our hopes for some
time, it thinned away and went out altogether. They kept smartly at work
from three guns in the Round Tower works, and from some four or five in
the Redan, on our batteries.
Two 68-pounders were mounted during the night of the 19th in our
batteries, and the firing, which nearly ceased after dark, was renewed
by daybreak. We were all getting tired of this continual
"pound-pounding," which made a great deal of noise, wasted much powder,
and did very little damage. Our amateurs were quite disappointed and
tired out. Rome was not built in a day, nor could Sebastopol be taken in
a week. In fact, we had run away with the notion that it was a kind of
pasteboard city, which would tumble down at the sound of our cannon as
the walls of Jericho fell at the blast of Joshua's trumpet. The news
that Sebastopol had fallen, which we received _viâ_ England, excited
indignation and astonishment. The army was enraged, as they felt the
verity, whenever it might be realized, must fall short of the effect of
that splendid figment. They thought that the laurels of the Alma would
be withered in the blaze of popular delight at the imaginary capture.
People at home must have known very little about us or our position. I
was amused at seeing in a journal a letter from an "Old Indian," on the
manufacture of campaign bread _more Indico_, in which he advised us to
use salt! milk! and butter! in the preparation of what must be most
delicious food. Salt was a luxury which was very rarely to be had,
except in conjunction with porky fibre; and as to milk and butter, the
very taste of them was forgotten. Lord Raglan was very glad to get a
little cold pig and ration rum and water the night before we entered
Balaklava. However, the hardest lot of all was reserved for our poor
horses. All hay rations for baggagers were rigidly refused; they only
received a few pounds of indifferent barley. There was not a blade of
grass to be had--the whole of these _plateaux_ and hills were covered
with thistles only, and where the other covering of the earth went I
know not. The hay ration for a charger was restricted to 6lb. daily.
Under these circumstances horseflesh was cheap, and friendly presents
were being continually offered by one man to another of "a deuced good
pony," which were seldom accepted.
The next day, the 20th, I had a foraging expedition, and returned with a
goose, butter, preserved milk, &c.--a very successful foray, and a full
havresack. We were just beginning our meal of commissariat beef and
pork, tempered with the contents of the aforesaid havresack, when away
went the vedette again, first circling right and then reversing as
suddenly to the left. Again sounded trumpet, bugle, and drum through the
plain, and masses again moved into position upon it. So we remained till
dark, a night attack on the Turkish position in our front being
anticipated, and so we again stood all ready for some hours, during
which the only amusement was in the hands of the Turks, who fired a
round or two; darkness found us similarly occupied.
At 2.50 P.M. a fire broke out behind the Redan. At 3.15 P.M. a fire of
less magnitude was visible to the left of the Redan, further in towards
the centre of the town.
Prince Edward of Saxe-Weimar was wounded in the trenches. His wound was,
however, not at all serious. Our loss was three killed and thirty-two or
thirty-three wounded.
On the 21st a battery was finished before Inkerman, and two 18-pounders
were mounted in it, in order to silence the heavy ship gun which annoyed
the Second Division.
The steamer _Vladimir_ came up to the head of the harbour and opened
fire on the right attack. She threw her shell with beautiful accuracy,
and killed two men and wounded twenty others before we could reply
effectually. A large traverse was erected to resist her fire, and she
hauled off. Twenty-two guns were placed in a condition to open in this
attack by the exertions of the men under Major Tylden, who directed it.
[Sidenote: RUSSIAN STRATAGEM.]
Lord Dunkellin, Captain Coldstream Guards, eldest son of the Marquis of
Clanricarde, was taken prisoner on the 22nd. He was out with a working
party of his regiment, which had got a little out of their way, when a
number of men were observed through the dawning light in front of them.
"There are the Russians," exclaimed one of the men. "Nonsense, they're
our fellows," said his lordship, and off he went towards them, asking in
a high tone as he got near, "Who is in command of this party?" His men
saw him no more, but he was afterwards exchanged for the Russian
Artillery officer captured at Mackenzie's farm.
The Russians opened a very heavy cannonade on us in the morning; they
always did so on Sundays. Divine Service was performed with a continued
bass of cannon rolling through the responses and liturgy. The Russians
made a stealthy sortie during the night, and advanced close to the
French pickets. When challenged, they replied, "Inglis, Inglis," which
passed muster with our allies as _bonâ fide_ English; and before they
knew where they were, the Russians had got into their batteries and
spiked five mortars. They were speedily repulsed; but this misadventure
mortified our brave allies exceedingly.
The return of killed and wounded for the 22nd, during the greater part
of which a heavy fire was directed upon our trenches, and battery
attacks right and left, showed the excellent cover of our works and
their great solidity. We only lost one man killed in the Light Division,
and two men in the Siege Train; of wounded we had one in the First
Division, two in the Second Division, two in the Third Division, six in
the Fourth Division, five in the Light Division, and ten in the Siege
Train. A request made to us by the French that we would direct our fire
on the Barrack Battery, which annoyed them excessively, was so well
attended to, that before evening we had knocked it to pieces and
silenced it. But sickness continued, and the diminution of our numbers
every day was enough to cause serious anxiety. Out of 35,600 men borne
on the strength of the army, there were not at this period more than
16,500 rank and file fit for service. In a fortnight upwards of 700 men
were sent as invalids to Balaklava. There was a steady drain of some
forty or fifty men a-day going out from us, which was not dried up by
the numbers of the returned invalids. Even the twenty or thirty a-day
wounded and disabled, when multiplied by the number of the days we had
been here, became a serious item in the aggregate. We were badly off for
spare gun carriages and wheels, for ammunition and forage. Whilst our
siege works were languishing and the hour of assault appeared more
distant, the enemy were concentrating on our flank and rear, and
preparing for a great attempt to raise the siege.
CHAPTER II.
Criticisms on the British Cavalry--The Light Cavalry--Rear of our
position--Endangered by the Russians--Redoubts defended by
Turks--93rd Highlanders--The position--Advance of the
Russians--Retreat of the Turks--Marshalling of the forces--The
Cossacks stopped by the Highlanders--Charge of the Heavy
Cavalry--Captain Nolan's Order--The Charge resolved upon--The
Advance--Splendid spectacle--Fearful struggle--Retreat of the
Russians--Our loss--Sortie on the 26th of October.
If the exhibition of the most brilliant valour, and of a daring which
would have reflected lustre on the best days of chivalry, could afford
full consolation for the affair of the 25th of October, we had no reason
to regret the loss we sustained.
In the following account I describe, to the best of my power, what
occurred under my own eyes, and I state the facts which I heard from men
whose veracity was unimpeachable. A certain feeling existed in some
quarters that our cavalry had not been properly handled since they
landed in the Crimea, and that they had lost golden opportunities from
the indecision and excessive caution of their leaders. It was said that
our cavalry ought to have been manoeuvred at Bouljanak in one way or
in another, according to the fancy of the critic. It was affirmed, too,
that the Light Cavalry were utterly useless in the performance of one of
their most important duties--the collection of supplies for the
army--that they were "above their business, and too fine gentlemen for
their work;" that our horse should have pushed the flying enemy after
the battle of the Alma; and, above all, that at Mackenzie's farm first,
and at the gorge near Kamara on the 7th October, they had been
improperly restrained from charging, and had failed in gaining great
successes, which would have entitled them to a full share of the laurels
of the campaign, owing solely to the timidity of the officer in command.
The existence of this feeling was known to many of our cavalry, and they
were indignant and exasperated that the faintest shade of suspicion
should rest upon any of their corps. With the justice of these
aspersions they had nothing to do, and perhaps the prominent thought in
their minds was that they would give such an example of courage to the
world, if the chance offered itself, as would shame their detractors for
ever.
[Sidenote: CHARACTER OF RUSSIAN LANDSCAPE.]
It has been already mentioned that several battalions of Russian
infantry crossed the Tchernaya, and threatened the rear of our position
and our communication with Balaklava. Their bands could be heard playing
at night by the travellers along the Balaklava road to the camp, but
they "showed" but little during the day, and kept among the gorges and
mountain passes through which the roads to Inkerman, Simpheropol, and
the south-east of the Crimea wind towards the interior. The position we
occupied was supposed by most people to be very strong. Our lines were
formed by natural mountain slopes in the rear, along which the French
had made entrenchments. Below these entrenchments, and very nearly in a
right line across the valley beneath, were four conical hillocks, one
rising above the other as they reached from our lines; the farthest,
which joined the chain of mountains opposite to our ridges being named
Canrobert's Hill, from the meeting there of that general with Lord
Raglan after the march to Balaklava. On the top of each of these hills
the Turks had thrown up redoubts, each defended by 250 men, and armed
with two or three heavy ship guns--lent by us to them, with one
artilleryman in each redoubt to look after them. These hills crossed the
valley of Balaklava at the distance of about two and a half miles from
the town. Supposing the spectator, then, to take his stand on one of the
heights forming the rear of our camp before Sebastopol, he would have
seen the town of Balaklava, with its scanty shipping, its narrow strip
of water, and its old forts, on his right hand; immediately below he
would have beheld the valley and plain of coarse meadow land, occupied
by our cavalry tents, and stretching from the base of the ridge on which
he stood to the foot of the formidable heights at the other side; he
would have seen the French trenches lined with Zouaves a few feet
beneath, and distant from him, on the slope of the hill; a Turkish
redoubt lower down, then another in the valley; then, in a line with it,
some angular earthworks; then, in succession, the other two redoubts up
to Canrobert's Hill.
At the distance of two or two and a half miles across the valley was an
abrupt rocky mountain range covered with scanty brushwood here and
there, or rising into barren pinnacles and _plateaux_ of rock. In
outline and appearance this portion of the landscape was wonderfully
like the Trosachs. A patch of blue sea was caught in between the
overhanging cliffs of Balaklava as they closed in the entrance to the
harbour on the right. The camp of the Marines, pitched on the hill sides
more than 1000 feet above the level of the sea, was opposite to the
spectator as his back was turned to Sebastopol and his right side
towards Balaklava. On the road leading up the valley, close to the
entrance of the town and beneath these hills, was the encampment of the
93rd Highlanders.
The cavalry lines were nearer to him below, and were some way in advance
of the Highlanders, but nearer to the town than the Turkish redoubts.
The valley was crossed here and there by small waves of land. On the
left the hills and rocky mountain ranges gradually closed in towards the
course of the Tchernaya, till, at three or four miles' distance from
Balaklava, the valley was swallowed up in a mountain gorge and deep
ravines, above which rose tier after tier of desolate whitish rock,
garnished now and then by bits of scanty herbage, and spreading away
towards the east and south, where they attained the Alpine dimensions of
the Tschatir Dagh. It was very easy for an enemy at the Belbek, or in
command of the road of Mackenzie's farm, Inkerman, Simpheropol, or
Bakschiserai, to debouch through these gorges at any time upon this
plain from the neck of the valley, or to march from Sebastopol by the
Tchernaya, and to advance along it towards Balaklava, till checked by
the Turkish redoubts on the southern side, or by the fire from the
French works on the northern--_i.e._, the side which, in relation to the
valley at Balaklava, formed the rear of our position. It was evident
enough that Menschikoff and Gortschakoff had been feeling their way
along this route for several days past, and very probably at night the
Cossacks had crept up close to our pickets, which were not always as
watchful as might be desired, and had observed the weakness of a
position far too extended for our army to defend, and occupied by their
despised enemy, the Turks.
At half-past seven o'clock on the eventful morning of the 25th, an
orderly came galloping in to the head-quarters camp from Sir Colin
Campbell with the news, that at dawn a strong corps of Russian horse,
supported by guns and battalions of infantry, had marched into the
valley, had nearly dispossessed the Turks of the redoubt No. 1 (that on
Canrobert's Hill, which was farthest from our lines), and they had
opened fire on the redoubts Nos. 2, 3, and 4. Lord Lucan, who was in one
of the redoubts when they were discovered, brought up his guns and some
of his heavy cavalry, but they were obliged to retire owing to the
superior weight of the enemy's metal.
Orders were despatched to Sir George Cathcart and the Duke of Cambridge,
to put the Fourth and the First in motion; and intelligence of the
advance of the Russians was furnished to General Canrobert. Immediately
the General commanded General Bosquet to get the Third Division under
arms, and sent artillery and 200 Chasseurs d'Afrique to assist us. Sir
Colin Campbell, who was in command of Balaklava, had drawn up the 93rd
Highlanders a little in front of the road to the town, at the first news
of the advance of the enemy. The Marines on the heights got under arms;
the seamen's batteries and Marines' batteries, on the heights close to
the town, were manned, and the French artillerymen and the Zouaves
prepared for action along their lines. Lord Lucan's men had not had time
to water their horses; they had not broken their fast from the evening
of the day before, and had barely saddled at the first blast of the
trumpet, when they were drawn up on the slope behind the redoubts in
front of their camp, to operate on the enemy's squadrons.
When the Russians advanced, the Turks fired a few rounds, got frightened
at the advance of their supports, "bolted," and fled with an agility
quite at variance with common-place notions of Oriental deportment on
the battle-field.
[Sidenote: PICTURESQUE SITUATIONS OF THE ARMIES.]
Soon after eight o'clock, Lord Raglan and his staff turned out and
cantered towards the rear of our position. The booming of artillery, the
spattering roll of musketry, were heard rising from the valley, drowning
the roar of the siege guns before Sebastopol. As I rode in the direction
of the firing, over the undulating plain that stretches away towards
Balaklava, on a level with the summit of the ridges above it, I observed
a French light infantry regiment (the 27th, I think) advancing from our
right towards the ridge near the telegraph-house, which was already
lined by companies of French infantry. Mounted officers scampered along
its broken outline in every direction.
General Bosquet followed with his staff and a small escort of Hussars at
a gallop. Never did the painter's eye rest on a more beautiful scene
than I beheld from the ridge. The fleecy vapours still hung around the
mountain tops, and mingled with the ascending volumes of smoke; the
patch of sea sparkled freshly in the rays of the morning sun, but its
light was eclipsed by the flashes which gleamed from the masses of armed
men.
Looking to the left towards the gorge, we beheld six masses of Russian
infantry, which had just debouched from the mountain passes near the
Tchernaya, and were advancing with solemn stateliness up the valley.
Immediately in their front was a line of artillery. Two batteries of
light guns were already a mile in advance of them, and were playing with
energy on the redoubts, from which feeble puffs of smoke came at long
intervals. Behind these guns, in front of the infantry, were bodies of
cavalry. They were three on each flank, moving down _en échelon_ towards
us, and the valley was lit up with the blaze of their sabres, and lance
points, and gay accoutrements. In their front, and extending along the
intervals between each battery of guns, were clouds of mounted
skirmishers, wheeling and whirling in the front of their march like
autumn leaves tossed by the wind. The Zouaves close to us were lying
like tigers at the spring, with ready rifles in hand, hidden chin deep
by the earthworks which ran along the line of these ridges on our rear;
but the quick-eyed Russians were manoeuvring on the other side of the
valley, and did not expose their columns to attack. Below the Zouaves we
could see the Turkish gunners in the redoubts, all in confusion as the
shells burst over them. Just as I came up, the Russians had carried No.
1 redoubt, the farthest and most elevated of all, and their horsemen
were chasing the Turks across the interval which lay between it and
redoubt No. 2.
At that moment the cavalry, under Lord Lucan, were formed--the Light
Brigade, under Lord Cardigan, in advance; the Heavy Brigade, under
Brigadier-General Scarlett, in reserve, drawn up in front of their
encampment, and were concealed from the view of the enemy by a slight
"wave" in the plain. Considerably to the rear of their right, the 93rd
Highlanders were in front of the approach to Balaklava. Above and behind
them, on the heights, the Marines were visible through the glass, drawn
up under arms, and the gunners could be seen ready in the earthworks, in
which were placed the ships' heavy guns. The 93rd had originally been
advanced somewhat more into the plain, but the instant the Russians got
possession of the first redoubt they opened fire on them from our own
guns, which inflicted some injury, and Sir Colin Campbell "retired" his
men to a better position. Meantime the enemy advanced his cavalry
rapidly. The Turks in redoubt No. 2 fled in scattered groups towards
redoubt No. 3, and Balaklava; but the horse-hoof of the Cossack was too
quick for them, and sword and lance were busily plied among the
retreating herd. The yells of the pursuers and pursued were plainly
audible. As the Lancers and Light Cavalry of the Russians advanced they
gathered up their skirmishers. The shifting trails of men, which played
all over the valley like moonlight on the water, contracted, gathered
up, and the little _peloton_ in a few moments became a solid column. Up
came their guns, in rushed their gunners to the abandoned redoubt, and
the guns of No. 2 soon played upon the dispirited defenders of No. 3
redoubt. Two or three shots in return and all was silent. The Turks
swarmed over the earthworks, and ran in confusion towards the town,
firing at the enemy as they ran. Again the solid column of cavalry
opened like a fan, and resolved itself into a "long spray" of
skirmishers. It lapped the flying Turks, steel flashed in the air, and
down went the Moslem on the plain. In vain the naval guns on the heights
fired on the Russian cavalry; the distance was too great. In vain the
Turkish gunners in the batteries along the French entrenchments
endeavoured to protect their flying countrymen; their shot flew wide and
short of the swarming masses.
The Turks betook themselves towards the Highlanders, where they checked
their flight and formed on the flanks. As the Russian cavalry on the
left of their line crowned the hill across the valley, they perceived
the Highlanders drawn up at the distance of some half a mile. They
halted, and squadron after squadron came up from the rear. The Russians
drew breath for a moment, and then in one grand line charged towards
Balaklava. The ground flew beneath their horses' feet; gathering speed
at every stride, they dashed on towards that _thin red line tipped with
steel_. The Turks fired a volley at eight hundred yards and ran. As the
Russians came within six hundred yards, down went that line of steel in
front, and out rang a rolling volley of Minié musketry. The distance was
too great; the Russians were not checked, but swept onwards, here and
there knocked over by the shot of our batteries; but ere they came
within two hundred and fifty yards, another volley flashed from the
rifles. The Russians wheeled about, and fled faster than they came.
"Bravo, Highlanders! well done!" shouted the excited spectators. But
events thickened; the Highlanders and their splendid front were soon
forgotten--men scarcely had a moment to think of this fact, that the
93rd never altered their formation to receive that tide of horsemen.
"No," said Sir Colin Campbell, "I did not think it worth while to form
them even four deep!" Then they moved _en échelon_, in two bodies, with
another in reserve. The cavalry who had been pursuing the Turks on the
right were coming up to the ridge beneath us, which concealed our
cavalry from view. The Heavy Brigade in advance was drawn up in two
lines. The first line consisted of the Scots Greys, and of their old
companions in glory, the Enniskillens; the second, of the 4th Royal
Irish, of the 5th Dragoon Guards, and of the 1st Royal Dragoons. The
Light Cavalry Brigade was on their left, in two lines also.
[Sidenote: A GALLANT CHARGE.]
Lord Raglan sent orders to Lord Lucan to cover the approaches, and his
heavy horse were just moving from their position near the vineyard and
orchard, when he saw a body of the enemy's cavalry coming after him
over the ridge. Lord Lucan rode after his cavalry, wheeled them round,
and ordered them to advance against the enemy. The Russians--evidently
_corps d'élite_--their light blue jackets embroidered with silver lace,
were advancing at an easy gallop towards the brow of the hill. A forest
of lances glistened in their rear, and several squadrons of grey-coated
dragoons moved up quickly to support them as they reached the summit.
The instant they came in sight, the trumpets of our cavalry gave out the
warning blast which told us all that in another moment we should see the
shock of battle beneath our very eyes. Lord Raglan, all his staff and
escort, and groups of officers, the Zouaves, French generals and
officers, and bodies of French infantry on the height, were spectators
of the scene as though they were looking on the stage from the boxes of
a theatre. Every one dismounted, and not a word was said. The Russians
advanced down the hill at a slow canter, which they changed to a trot,
and at last nearly halted.
The trumpets rang out again through the valley, and the Greys and
Enniskilleners went right at the centre of the Russian cavalry. The
space between them was only a few hundred yards; it was scarce enough to
let the horses "gather way," nor had the men quite space sufficient for
the full play of their sword arms. The Russian line brought forward each
wing as our cavalry advanced, and threatened to annihilate them as they
passed on. Turning a little to the left, so as to meet the Russian
right, the Greys rushed on with a cheer that thrilled to every
heart--the wild shout of the Enniskilleners rose through the air at the
same instant. As lightning flashes through a cloud, the Greys and
Enniskilleners pierced through the dark masses of Russians. The shock
was but for a moment. There was a clash of steel and a light play of
sword-blades in the air, and then the Greys and the redcoats disappeared
in the midst of the shaken and quivering column. The first line of
Russians, which had been smashed by and had fled off at one flank and
towards the centre, were coming back to swallow up our handful of men.
By sheer steel and sheer courage Enniskillener and Scot were winning
their way right through the enemy's squadrons, and already grey horses
and red coats appeared at the rear mass, when the 4th Dragoon Guards,
riding at the right flank of the Russians, and the 5th Dragoon Guards,
following close after the Enniskilleners, rushed at the enemy and put
them to utter rout.
A cheer burst from every lip--in the enthusiasm, officers and men took
off their caps and shouted with delight; and thus keeping up the scenic
character of their position, they clapped their hands again and again.
Lord Raglan at once despatched Lieutenant Curzon, aide-de-camp, to
convey his congratulations to Brigadier-General Scarlett, and to say
"Well done!" The Russian cavalry, followed by our shot, retired in
confusion, leaving the ground, covered with horses and men.
At ten o'clock the Guards and Highlanders of the First Division were
seen moving towards the plains from their camp. The Duke of Cambridge
came up to Lord Raglan for orders, and his lordship, ready to give the
honour of the day to Sir Colin Campbell, who commanded at Balaklava,
told his Royal Highness to place himself under the direction of the
Brigadier. At forty minutes after ten, the Fourth Division also took up
their position in advance of Balaklava. The cavalry were then on the
left front of our position, facing the enemy; the Light Cavalry Brigade
_en échelon_ in reserve, with guns, on the right; the 4th Royal Irish,
the 5th Dragoon Guards, and Greys on the left of the brigade, the
Enniskillens and 1st Royals on the right. The Fourth Division took up
ground in the centre; the Guards and Highlanders filed off towards the
extreme right, and faced the redoubts, from which the Russians opened on
them with artillery, which was silenced by the rifle skirmishers under
Lieutenant Godfrey.
At fifty minutes after ten, General Canrobert, attended by his staff,
and Brigadier-General Rose, rode up to Lord Raglan, and the staffs of
the two Generals and their escorts mingled in praise of the magnificent
charge of our cavalry, while the chiefs apart conversed over the
operations of the day, which promised to be one of battle. At fifty-five
minutes after ten, a body of cavalry, the Chasseurs d'Afrique, passed
down to the plain, and were loudly cheered by our men. They took up
ground in advance of the ridges on our left.
Soon after occurred the glorious catastrophe. The Quartermaster-General,
Brigadier Airey, thinking that the Light Cavalry had not gone far enough
in front, gave an order in writing to Captain Nolan, 15th Hussars, to
take to Lord Lucan. A braver soldier than Captain Nolan the army did not
possess. He was known for his entire devotion to his profession, and for
his excellent work on our drill and system of remount and breaking
horses. He entertained the most exalted opinions respecting the
capabilities of the English horse soldier. The British Hussar and
Dragoon could break square, take batteries, ride over columns, and
pierce any other cavalry, as if they were made of straw. He thought they
had missed even such chances as had been offered to them--that in fact,
they were in some measure disgraced. A matchless horseman and a
first-rate swordsman he held in contempt, I am afraid even grape and
canister. He rode off with his orders to Lord Lucan.
When Lord Lucan received the order from Captain Nolan, and had read it,
he asked, we are told, "Where are we to advance to?" Captain Nolan
pointed with his finger in the direction of the Russians, and according
to the statements made after his death, said "There are the enemy, and
there are the guns," or words to that effect.
[Sidenote: THE CHARGE OF BALAKLAVA.]
Lord Raglan had only in the morning ordered Lord Lucan to move from the
position he had taken near the centre redoubt to "the left of the second
line of redoubts occupied by the Turks." Seeing that the 93rd and
invalids were cut off from the cavalry, Lord Raglan sent another order
to Lord Lucan to send his heavy horse towards Balaklava, and that
officer was executing it just as the Russian horse came over the ridge.
The Heavy Cavalry charge then took place, and afterwards the men
dismounted on the scene. After an interval of half an hour, Lord Raglan
again sent an order to Lord Lucan--"Cavalry to advance and take
advantage of any opportunity to recover the heights. They will be
supported by infantry, which has been ordered to advance upon two
fronts." Lord Raglan's reading of this order was, that the infantry had
been ordered to advance on two fronts. It does not appear that the
infantry had received orders to advance; the Duke of Cambridge and Sir
G. Cathcart stated they were not in receipt of such instruction. Lord
Lucan advanced his cavalry to the ridge, close to No. 5 redoubt, and
while there received from Captain Nolan an order which as
follows:--"Lord Raglan wishes the cavalry to advance rapidly to the
front, follow the enemy, and try to prevent the enemy carrying away the
guns; troops of Horse Artillery may accompany. French cavalry is on your
left. Immediate."
Lord Lucan gave the order to Lord Cardigan to advance upon the guns,
conceiving that his orders compelled him to do so. The noble Earl saw
the fearful odds against him. It is a maxim of war, that "cavalry never
act without a support." "Infantry should be close at hand when cavalry
carry guns, as the effect is only instantaneous," and should always be
placed on the flank of a line of cavalry. The only support our light
cavalry had was the heavy cavalry at a great distance behind them, the
infantry and guns being far in the rear. There were no squadrons in
column. There was a plain to charge over, before the enemy's guns could
be reached, of a mile and a half in length.