In the Punjab province, the extreme northwestern corner of India,

adjoining Afghanistan on the west and Cashmere on the east, where

the water supply comes from the melting snows of the Himalayas,

the government receives a net profit of 10.83 per cent, and the

value of the crop in the single year of 1902 was one and one-fourth

times the total amount invested in the works to date.

This does not include a vast undertaking known as the Chenab

Canal, which has recently been completed, and now supplies more

than 2,000,000 acres with water. Its possibilities include 5,527,000

acres. As a combination of business and benevolence and as an

exhibition of administrative energy and wisdom, it is remarkable,

and is of especial interest to the people of the United States

because the conditions are similar to those existing in our own

arid states and territories.

If you will take a map of India and run your eye up to the

northwestern corner you will see a large bald spot just south of

the frontier through which runs the river Chenab (or Chenaub)--the

name of the stream is spelt a dozen different ways, like every

other geographical name in India. This river, which is a roaring

torrent during the rainy season and as dry as a bone for six

months in the year, resembles several of out western rivers,

particularly the North Platte, and runs through an immense tract

of arid desert similar to those found in our mountain states.

This desert is known as the Rechna Doab, and until recently was

waste government land, a barren, lifeless tract upon which nothing

but snakes and lizards could exist, although the soil is heavily

charged with chemicals of the most nutritious character for plants,

and when watered yields enormous crops of wheat and other cereals.

Fifteen years ago it was absolutely uninhabited. To-day it is

the home of about 800,000 happy and prosperous people, working

more than 200,000 farms, in tracts of from five to fifty acres.

The average population of the territory disclosed at the census

of 1901 was 212 per square mile, and it is expected that the

extension of the water supply and natural development will largely

increase this average.

The colony has been in operation fat a little more than eleven

years. The colonists were drawn chiefly from the more densely

populated districts of the Punjab province, and were attracted

by a series of remarkable harvests, which were sold at exorbitant

prices during the famine years. The land was given away by the

government to actual settlers upon a plan similar to that of

our homestead act, the settlers being given a guarantee of a

certain amount of water per acre to a fixed price. The demand

caused by the popularity of the colony has already exhausted

the entire area watered by the canals, but an extension and

enlargement of the system will bring more land gradually under

cultivation, the estimates of the engineers contemplating an

addition of 2,000,000 acres within the next few years.

The value of the crop produced in 1902 upon 1,830,525 acres of

irrigated land in this colony was $16,845,000, irrigated by canals

that cost $8,628,380, and the government enjoyed a net profit of

14.01 per cent that year upon its benevolent enterprise. Aside

from the money value of the scheme, there is another very important

consideration. More than half of the canals and ditches were

constructed by "famine labor"--that is, by men and women (for

women do manual labor in india the same as men) who were unable

to obtain other employment and would have died of starvation

but for the intervention of the government. Instead of being

supplied with food at relief stations, these starving people

were shipped to the Rechan Doab besert and put to work at minimum

wages.

You will agree with me that the government has a right to feel

proud of its new colony, and its success has stimulated interest

in similar enterprises in other parts of the empire. It has not

only furnished employment to thousands of starving people, but

by bringing under cultivation a large tract of barren land with a

positive certainty of regular harvests it has practically insured

that section of the country against future famines.

The following figures will show the rapid development of the colony

from the first season of 1892-93 to the end of the season 1901,

which is the latest date for which statistics can be obtained:

CAPITAL OUTLAY TO END OF YEAR

1892-93 £721,233 1897-98 £1,512,916

1893-94 878,034 1898-99 1,616,676

1894-95 995,932 1899-1900 1,677,982

1895-96 1,174,781 1900-01 1,725,676

1896-97 1,362,075

ACRES IRRIGATED DURING THE YEAR

1892-93 157,197 1897-98 810,000

1893-94 270,405 1898-99 957,705

1894-95 269,357 1899-1900 1,353,223

1895-96 369,935 1900-01 1,830,525

1896-97 520,279

NET REVENUE DURING THE YEAR

1892-93 £4,084 1897-98 £111,041

1893-94 3,552 1898-99 131,566

1894-95 9,511 1899-1900 155,302

1895-96 51,632 1900-01 421,812

1896-97 92,629

RETURN ON CAPITAL OUTLAY, PER CENT

1892-93 0.57 1897-98 7.34

1893-94 0.40 1898-99 8.14

1894-95 0.96 1899-1900 9.26

1895-96 4.40 1900-01 14.01

1896-97 6.75

The system of allotment of land may be interesting. As the area

under irrigation was entirely open and unoccupied, few difficulties

were met with, and the engineers were perfectly free in plotting

the land. The entire area was divided into squares of 1,000 feet

boundary on each side, and these squares were each divided into

twenty-five fields which measure about one acre and are the unit

of calculation in sales and in measuring water. Sixty squares,

or 1,500 fields, compose a village, and between the villages,

surrounding them on all four sides, are canals. Between the squares

are ditches, and between the fields are smaller ditches, so that the

water can be measured and the allowance made without difficulty.

The government sells no smaller piece than a field of twenty-five

acres, but purchasers can buy in partnership and afterwards subdivide

it.

Each village is under the charge of a superintendent, or resident

engineer, who is responsible to a superior engineer, who has

charge of a number of villages. Each field is numbered upon a

map, and a record is kept of the area cultivated, the character

of the crops sown, the dates or irrigation and the amount of water

allowed. Before harvest a new measurement is taken and a bill is

given to the cultivator showing the amount of his assessment,

which is collected when his crop is harvested. As there has never

been a crop failure, this is a simple process, and in addition

to the water rate a land tax of 42 cents an acre is collected

at the same time and paid into the treasury to the credit of

the revenue department, while the water rates are credited to

the canal department.

The chief engineer fixes the volume of water to be furnished to

each village and the period for which it is to remain flowing.

The local superintendent regulates the amount allowed each

cultivator, according to the crops he has planted. There are

six rates, regulated by the crops, for some need more water than

others, as follows:

Class. Crops. Rate per acre.

1--Sugarcane $2.50

2--Rice 2.10

3--Orchards, gardens, tobacco, indigo,

vegetables and melons 1.66

4--Cotton, oil seeds, Indian corn and all cold

weather crops, except grain and lentils 1.66

5--All crops other than specified above .83

6--Single water to plow, not followed by a crop .40

As I have shown you from the figures above, this enterprise has

proved highly profitable to the government, and its management

is entitled to the highest compliments.

The main canal was originally forty miles long, averaging 109

feet wide, with an average slope of one foot to the mile, and

capable of carrying seven feet four inches of water, or 10,000

cubic feet, per second. Twenty-eight miles have since been enlarged

to a width of 250 feet and the remaining twelve miles to a width

of 150 feet. The canal has been deepened to nine feet six inches,

and the intention is to deepen it one foot more. The banks of the

main canal are twenty-five feet wide at the top and are built

entirely of earth. A railway ninety-six miles long of three-foot

gauge has been constructed down the main canal, which is a great

convenience in shipping crops and pays a profit to the government.

It was constructed by the canal engineers while the ditch was

being dug. There are 390 miles of branch canals from thirty to

fifty feet wide and from six to eight feet deep, and 2,095 miles

of distributaries, or ditches running between villages and squares.

The banks of the branches and ditches are all wide enough for

highways, and thus enable the people to go from village to village

and get their crops to market. Several towns of considerable size

have already grown up; the largest, called Lyallpur, having about

10,000 inhabitants. It is the headquarters of the canal and also

of the civil authorities; and scattered through the irrigated

country are about 100 permanent houses used as residences and

offices by the superintendents and engineers.

XXI

THE FRONTIER QUESTION

The most sensitive nerve in the British Empire terminates in

Afghanistan, and the ghost of the czar is always dancing about

the Khyber Pass, through which caravans laden with merchandise

find their way across the mountains between India and the countries

of Central Asia. Every time there is a stir in a clump of bushes,

every time a board creaks in the floor, every time a footstep is

heard under the window, the goose flesh rises on John Bull's back,

and he imagines that the Great White Bear is smelling around the

back door of his empire in India. Peshawur is the jumping-off place

of the Northwest, the limit of British authority, the terminus of

the railway system of India and the great gateway between that

empire and Central Asia, through which everything must pass.

It is to the interior of Asia what the Straits of Gibraltar are

to the Mediterranean Sea, and the Dardanelles to the Black and

Caspian seas. While there are 300 paths over the mountains in

other directions, and it might be possible to cross them with

an army, it has never been attempted and would involve dangers,

expense and delays which no nation would undertake. The Khyber

Pass has been the great and only route for ages whether for war or

commerce. The masters of Central Asia, whether Persians, Greeks,

Macedonians or Assyrians, have held it. Alexander the Great crossed

it with his army. Timour the Tartar, whom we know better as

Tamerlane, came through upon his all-conquering expedition when

he subdued India to found the Mogul Empire, and if the Russians

ever enter India by land they will come this way.

The pass is reached by crossing a stony plain ten miles from

Peshawur, and winds through gorges and crevices in the mountains

for thirty-three miles at an altitude averaging 7,000 feet above

the sea. At one point the mountains close in to about 500 feet

apart and the rocks rise in sheer precipices on either side; in

other places the gorge widens to a mile or more and will average

perhaps three-quarters of a mile the entire distance. It is a

remarkable gateway, a natural barrier between hereditary enemies

and easily defended from either side. Kabul, the capital of

Afghanistan, is 180 miles from the western entrance to the defile.

The British fortifications are at Jamrud, nine miles from Peshawur,

and the terminus of the railways, where a strong garrison is

always kept. The pass itself is controlled by a powerful

semi-independent native tribe called the Afridis, estimated at

20,000 strong, who receive subsidies from the British government

and from the Ameer of Afghanistan to keep them good-natured on

the pretext that they are to do police work and keep order in the

pass. It is blackmail and bribery, but accomplishes its purpose,

and the pass itself, with a strip of highlands and foothills

on the Afghanistan side, is thus occupied by a neutral party,

which prevents friction between the nations on either side of

the border. The Afridis are fearless fighters, half-civilized,

half-savage, and almost entirely supported by the subsidies they

receive. Nearly all of the able-bodied men are under arms. A

few, who are too old or too young to fight, remain at home and

look after the cattle and the scraggy gardens upon the gravelly

hillsides. The women are as hardy and as enduring as the men

and are taught to handle the rifle. The British authorities are

confident of the loyalty of the Afridis and believe that the

present arrangement would be absolutely safe in time of war as

it is in time of peace--that they would permit no armed body,

whether Russians or Afghans, to cross the pass without the consent

of both sides, as is provided by treaty stipulations.

The arrangement is as effective as it is novel and the Afridis

carry out every detail conscientiously. The pass is open only two

days in the week, on Tuesdays and Fridays. No one is permitted

to cross or even enter it from either side except on those days.

And even then travelers, tourists and others actuated by curiosity

are not allowed to go through without permits. The caravans going

both ways are required to camp under well-formed regulations

at either entrance until daylight of Tuesday or Friday, when

they are escorted through by armed bodies of Afridis horsemen.

There is not the slightest danger of any sort to anyone, but it

is just as well to go through the ceremony, for it keeps the

Afridis out of mischief and reminds them continually of their

great responsibilities. These caravans are interesting. They

are composed of long strings of loaded camels, ox-carts, mules

and donkeys, vehicles of all descriptions and thousands of people

traveling on foot, who come sometimes from as far west as the

Ural Mountains and the banks of the Volga River. They come from

Persia, from all parts of Siberia and from the semi-barbarous

tribes who inhabit that mysterious region in central Asia, known

as the "Roof of the World."

The camel drivers and the traders are fierce-looking men and

extremely dirty. They have traveled a long way and over roads

that are very dusty, and water is scarce the entire distance.

They look as if they had never washed their faces or cut their

hair, and their shaggy, greasy, black locks hang down upon their

shoulders beneath enormous turbans. Each wears the costume of

his own country, but they are so ragged, grimy and filthy that

the romance of it is lost. The Afghans are in the majority. They

are stalwart, big-bearded men, with large features, long noses

and cunning eyes, and claim that their ancestors were one of the

lost tribes of Israel. Their traditions, customs, physiognomy and

dialects support this theory. Although they are Mohammedans, they

practice several ancient Jewish rites. The American missionaries

who have schools and churches among them are continually running

up against customs and traditions which remind them forcibly of

the Mosaic teachings. They have considerable literature, poetry,

history, biography, philosophy and ecclesiastical works, and some

of their priests have large libraries of native books, which, the

missionaries say, are full of suggestions of the Old Testament.

One of the most successful missionaries in that part of the world

was an apostate Polish Jew named Rev. Isidore Lowenthal, a remarkable

linguist and a man of profound learning. He translated the Bible

and several other religious books into Pashto, the language of

the Afghans, and was convinced that he shared with them the same

ancestry. A story that is invariably related to travelers up

in that country refers to his untimely taking off, for he was

accidentally shot by one of his household attendants, and his

epitaph, after giving the usual statistical information, reads:

He was shot accidentally by his chookidar.

Well done, thou good and faithful servant.

I am not ashamed of the gospel of Jesus Christ.

The Afghanistan question, is, so to speak, in statu quo. The

ameer is friendly to the British, but asserts his independence

with a great deal of firmness and vigor, and is an ever-present

source of anxiety. He receives a subsidy of $600,000 from the

British government, which is practically a bribe to induce him

not to make friends with Russia, and yet there are continual

reports concerning Russian intrigues in that direction. He declines

to receive an English envoy and will not permit any Englishmen

to reside at his court. The Indian government is represented

at Kabul by a highly educated and able native Indian, who is

called a diplomatic agent, and has diplomatic powers. He reports

to and receives instructions from Lord Curzon directly, and is

the only medium of communication between the ameer and the British

government. The present ameer has been on the throne only since

the death of his father, the ameer Abdur Rahman, in October,

1901, and for several months there was considerable anxiety as

to what policy the young man, Habi Bullah Khan, would adopt.

During the last three years of the old man's life he yielded

his power very largely to his son, and selected him twenty wives

from the twenty most influential families in the kingdom in order

to strengthen his throne. Although Habi Bullah is not so able or

determined as his father, he has held his position without an

insurrection or a protest, and is no longer in danger of being

overthrown by one of the bloody conspiracies which have interlarded

Afghanistan history for the last two centuries.

The British were fortunate in having a viceroy at that critical

period who was personally acquainted with the young ameer and a

friend of his father. When Lord Curzon was a correspondent of

the London Times, before he entered parliament, he visited Cabul

and formed pleasant relations with the late ameer, who speaks

of him in most complimentary terms in his recently published

memoirs. The old man happened to die during the darkest period of

the South African war, and Russia took occasion at that critical

moment to demand the right to enter into independent diplomatic

negotiations with Afghanistan for the survey of a railroad across

that country. Only a few years before, Great Britain fought a war

with Afghanistan and overthrew Shere Ali, the shah, because he

received a Russian ambassador on a similar errand, after having

refused to allow a British envoy to reside at his court or even

enter his country. And there is no telling what might have happened

had not Lord Curzon taken advantage of his personal relations and

former friendship. Russia selected a significant date to make

her demands. It was only a fortnight after the British repulse

at Spion Kop, and Ladysmith was in a hopeless state of siege.

Such situations have a powerful influence upon semi-civilized

soldiers, who are invariably inclined to be friendly to those

who are successful at arms. However, Lord Curzon had influence

enough to hold the ameer to the British side, and the latter

has ever since shown a friendly disposition to the British and

has given the Russians no public encouragement.

The official report of the viceroy to the secretary of state for

India in London, covering the ten years ending Dec. 31, 1902,

contains the following interesting paragraph concerning the greatest

source of anxiety:

"Relations with Afghanistan have been peaceful throughout the

decade. Although there is reason to believe that Afghan influence

among the turbulent tribes on the northwestern frontier was at

times the cause of restlessness and disorder, the Durand agreement

of 1893, followed by the demarcation of the southern and nearly

all the eastern Afghan boundary, set a definite limit to the

legitimate interference of Afghanistan with the tribes included

in the British sphere of influence. Under that agreement the annual

subsidy paid by the British government to the ameer was increased

from £80,000 to £120,000. A further demarcation, which affected

alike Afghanistan and the British sphere, was that which resulted

from the Pamir agreement concluded with Russia in 1895. Russia

agreed to accept the River Oxus as her southern boundary as far

east as the Victoria Lake. Thence to the Chinese frontier a line

was fixed by a demarcation commission. This arrangement involved

an interchange of territories lying on the north and south bank

of the Oxus respectively between Afghanistan and Bokhara, which

was carried out in 1896. The Ameer of Afghanistan also undertook

to conduct the administration of Wakkhan, lying between the new

boundary and the Hindu Kush, in return for an increase of his

subsidy.

"Under the strong rule of the late ameer the country for the

most part enjoyed internal peace, but this was broken by the

revolt of the Hazaras in 1892, which was severely suppressed.

In 1895-96 Kafiristan, a region which the delimitation included

in the Afghan sphere of influence, was subjugated. Political

relations of the government of India with the late and with the

present ameer have been friendly, and were undisturbed by the

murder of the British agent at Kabul by one of his servants in

1895, an incident which had no political significance. In the

year 1894-95 His Highness sent his second son, Shahzada Nasrulla

Khan, to visit England as the guest of Her Majesty's government.

The Ameer Abdur Rahman, G. C. B., died in October, 1901, and

was peacefully succeeded by his eldest son, Habi Bullah Khan,

G. C. M.G."

There is no doubt as to what Lord Curzon knows and believes

concerning the aggressive policy of Russia in Asia, because,

shortly before he was appointed viceroy of India, he wrote an

article on that subject for a London magazine, which is still

what editors call "live matter."

"The supreme interest," he said, "ties in the physical fact that

it (the northwestern frontier) is the only side upon which India

has been or ever can be invaded by land, and in the political

fact that it confronts a series of territories inhabited by wild

and turbulent, by independent or semi-independent tribes, behind

whom looms the grim figure of Russia, daily advancing into clearer

outline from the opposite or northwest quarter. It is to protect the

Indian Empire, its peoples, its trades, its laboriously established

government and its accumulated wealth from the insecurity and

possible danger arising from a further Russian advance across the

intervening space that the frontier which I am about to describe

has been traced and fortified. Politicians of all parties have

agreed that, while the territorial aggrandizement of Russia is

permissible over regions where she replaces barbarism even by

a crude civilization, there can be no excuse for allowing her

to take up a position in territories acknowledging our sway,

where she can directly menace British interests in India, or

indirectly impose an excessive strain upon the resources and the

armed strength of our eastern dominions. The guardianship of the

frontier is, therefore, an act of defense, not of defiance, and is

an elementary and essential obligation of imperial statesmanship.

"Originally it was supposed that there were but three or four

passes or cracks by which this mountain barrier was perforated,

and that if British soldiers only stood sentinel at their exits

an invader would have no other alternative but to come down and

be annihilated. Modern surveys, however, have shown that the

number of available passes is nearer 300 than three, a discovery

which has suggested the policy of establishing friendly relations

with the tribes who hold them, and thus acquiring an indirect

control over their western mouths. For just as the main physical

feature of the frontier is this mountain wall, with its narrow

lateral slits, so the main political feature is the existence

in the tracts of country thus characterized of a succession of

wild and warlike tribes, owing allegiance to no foreign potentate,

but cherishing an immemorial love for freedom and their native

hills."

Modern India · 第 22 / 34 段