THE MARNE--GENERAL PLAN OF BATTLE FIELD
On September 4, 1914, the bugler of Destiny sounded the "Halt!" to the
retreat of the armies of the Allies from the Belgian frontier. The
marvelous fighting machine of the German armies, perhaps the most superb
organization of military potency that has been conceived by the mind of
man, seemed to reach its limit of range. Success had perched upon the
German eagles, and for two weeks there had been a steady succession of
victories. Nevertheless the British and French armies were not crushed.
They were overwhelmed, they were overpowered, and, under stern military
necessity, they were forced to fall back.
Day after day, under the swinging hammer-head blows of the German drive,
the flower of the forces of the Allies had been compelled to break. A
little less generalship on the part of the defenders, or a little more
recklessness behind that smashing offensive might have turned this
retirement into a rout. Even as it was, the official dispatches reveal
that, while occasional and local retirements had been considered, such a
sweeping retreat was far from contemplated by Generals Joffre and
French. German official dispatches bear testimony to the intrepid
character of the defenders sullenly falling back and contesting every
inch of the way, as much as they do to the daring and the vivid bravery
of the German attackers who hurled themselves steadily, day after day,
upon positions hastily taken up in the retreat where the retirement
could be partly repaid by the heaviest toll of death.
The great strategical plan of the Germans, which had displayed itself
throughout the entire operations on the western theatre of war from the
very first gun of the campaign, came to its apex on this September 3,
1914. If the allied armies could develop a strong enough defense to halt
the German offensive at this point, and especially if they could develop
a sufficiently powerful counteroffensive to strike doubt into the
confident expectations of the armies of the Central Powers, then the
strategical plan had reached a check, which might or might not be a
checkmate, as the fortunes of war might determine. If, on the other
hand, the stand made by the Allies at this point should prove
ineffective, and if the counteroffensive should reveal that the German
hosts had been able to establish impregnable defenses as they marched,
then the original strategic plan of the attackers must be considered as
intact and the peril of France would become greatly intensified.
It is idle, in a war of such astounding magnitude, to speak about any
one single incident as being a "decisive" one. Such a term can only
rightly be applied to conditions where the opposing powers each have but
one organized army in the field, and these armies meet in a pitched
battle. None the less, the several actions which are known as the
Battles of the Marne may be considered as decisive, to the extent that
they decided the limit of the German offensive at that point. The German
General Staff, taking the ordinary and obvious precautions in the case
of a possible repulse, chose and fortified in the German rear positions
to which its forces might fall back in the event of retreat. These
prepared positions had a secondary contingent value for the Germans in
view of the grave Russian menace that might call at any moment for a
transfer of German troops from the western to the eastern front.
The Battle of the Marne stopped the advance of the main German army on
that line, forcing it back.
[Illustration: Battle of the Marne--Beginning on September 5, 1914.]
The scene of the battle ground is one of the most famous in Europe, not
even the plains of Belgium possessing a richer historical significance
than that melancholy plain, the Champagne-Pouilleuse, upon whose
inhospitable flats rested for centuries the curse of a prophecy, that
there would the fate of France be decided, a prophecy of rare
connotation of accuracy, for it refrained from stating what that fate
should be. Yet the historic sense is amplified even more by remembrance
than by prophecy, for in the territory confronting that huge arc on
which 1,400,000 German and Austrian soldiers lay encamped, awaiting what
even the German generals declared to be "the great decision," there
lies, on the old Roman road running from Chalons a vast oval mound,
known to tradition as "the Camp of Attila." In that country, a Roman
general, Aetius, leading a host of soldiers of whom many were Gauls,
broke a vast flood wave of the Huns as those savage Mongol hordes hurled
themselves against Rome's westernmost possession. On that occasion,
however, the Visigoths, under their King Theodoric, fought side by side
with the Gauls. Then, the dwellers on the banks of the Rhine and on the
banks of the Seine were brothers in arms, now, that same countryside
shall see them locked in deadly conflict.
The morale of tradition is a curious thing, and often will nerve a sword
arm when the most impassioned utterance of a beloved leader may fail.
There were few among the soldiers of France who forgot that in the south
of this same plain of Champagne-Pouilleuse was the home of Joan of Arc,
the Maid of Orleans, patriot and saint, and more than one French soldier
prayed that the same voices which had whispered in the ear of the virgin
of Domremy should guide the generalissimo who was to lead the armies of
France upon the morrow. Here, tradition again found old alliances
severed and new ones formed, for the Maid of Orleans led the French
against the English, while in the serried ranks awaiting the awful test
of the shock of battle, English and French soldiers lived and slept as
brothers.
The topography of the region of the battle field is of more than common
interest, for modern tactics deal with vaster stretches of country than
would have been considered in any previous war. This is due, partly, to
the large armies handled, partly to the terrific range of modern
artillery, and also to what may be called the territorial perceptiveness
which aeronautical surveys make possible to a general of to-day. While
war has not changed, it is true that a commander of an army in modern
campaign is compelled to review and to take into account a far larger
group of factors. A modern general must be capable of grasping increased
complexities, and must possess a synthetic mind to be able to reduce all
these complicating factors into a single whole. The first factor of the
battles of the Marne was the topographical factor, the consideration of
the land over which the action was to take place.
Let the River Marne be used as a base from which this topography can be
determined. The Marne rises near Langres, which is the northwest angle
of that pentagon of fortresses (Belfort, Epinal, Langres, Dijon, and
Besancon), which incloses an almost impregnable recuperative ground for
exhausted armies. From Langres the Marne flows almost north by west for
about fifty miles through a hilly and wooded country, then, taking a
more westerly course, it flows for approximately seventy-five miles
almost northwest, across the Plain of Champagne, past Vitry-le-Francois
and Chalons, thence almost due westward through the Plateau of Sezanne,
by Epernay, Chateau Thierry, La Ferte-sous-Jouarre, and Meaux to join
the Seine just south of Paris. In the neighborhood of Meaux, three small
tributaries flow into the Marne--the Ourcq from the north, and the Grand
Morin and Petit Morin from the east. The Marshes of St. Gond, ten miles
long from east to west and a couple of miles across, lie toward the
eastern borders of the Plateau of Sezanne, and form the source of the
Petit Morin, which has been deepened in the reclamation of the marsh
country.
Once more considering the source of the Marne, near Langres, it will be
noted that the River Meuse rises near by, flowing north by east to Toul,
and then north-northwest past Verdun to Sedan, where it turns due north,
flowing through the Ardennes country to Namur, in Belgium. To the east
of the Meuse lies the difficult forest clad hill barrier, known as the
Hills of the Meuse; to the east extends (as far as Triaucourt) the
craggy and broken wooded country of the Argonne, a natural barrier which
stretches southward in a chain of lakes and forests.
West of this impassible country of the Meuse and the Argonne lies the
plain of Champagne-Pouilleuse, which is almost a steppe, bare and open,
only slightly undulating, overgrown with heath, and studded here and
there by small copses of planted firs, naught but a small portion of the
whole being under cultivation. Between the Forest of the Argonne and
this great plain, which is over a hundred miles long from north to south
and forty miles in width, lies a short stretch of miniature foothills,
with upland meadows here and there, but crossed in every direction by
small ravines filled with shrubs and low second-growth timber. Here lies
the source of the Aisne, a river destined to live in history; and on the
farther side begins the great plain.
On the west of the plain of Champagne rises, 300 feet, with a curious
clifflike suddenness, the Plateau of Sezanne. The effect is as though a
geological fault had driven the original plateau from north to south
throughout its entire length, and then as though there had been a
general subsidence of the plain, giving rise to the clifflike formations
known as Les Falaises de Champagne, at the foot of which runs the road
from La Fere-Champenoise to Rheims.
The disposition and arrangement of the German forces is next to be
considered. It can be assumed that their objective was Paris. It is also
worthy of remembrance that the German tactical method has always favored
the envelopment of the enemy's flanks rather than a frontal attack
aiming to pierce the enemy's center, which latter was a favorite method
of Napoleon I to reach decision.
The tactical method of envelopment demands great numerical superiority,
and on account of the extreme extension of front necessitated is apt to
become dangerous as perforce the center is left weak. Attempts to
envelop, with which the observer is confronted again and again when
considering the military movements of the Central Powers on the western
battle front, were revealed on the morning of September 3, 1914, in the
position occupied by the German forces, and, correspondingly, in the
arrangement of the allied armies.
The German right, on September 3, 1914, and September 4, 1914, at which
time it was nearest to its desired goal of Paris, held the banks of the
Marne from Epernay to the banks of the little tributary the Ourcq, which
runs into the Marne from the north. This extreme right comprised the
Second Corps and the Fourth Reserve Corps, encamped on the western bank
of the little stream the Ourcq; while the Fourth Corps was given the
honor of the tip of the right, being camped on the Marne at La
Ferte-sous-Jouarre, supported by the Third Corps, the Seventh Corps and
the Seventh Corps Reserve. The Ninth Cavalry Division occupied an
advanced position west of Crecy and the Second Cavalry Division occupied
an advanced position near the British army, north of Coulommiers. These
troops constituted the First German Army, under the command of General
von Kluck.
The Allies' left, confronting this position, held strong reserves, and
by the nature of the ground itself, was well placed to prevent any
enveloping movement, dear to the German school of military tactics. It
rested securely on the fortress of Paris, believed by its constructors
to be the most fully fortified city in the world, and should the German
right endeavor to encircle the left wing of the Allies, should it
develop a farther westerly movement, it would but come in contact with
the outer line of those defenses and thence be deflected in such an
enormous arc as to thin the line beyond the power of keeping it strong
enough to resist a piercing attack at all points. Clearly, then, as long
as the extreme left of the Allies remained in contact with the defenses
of Paris, an enveloping movement was not possible on the easterly flank.
Facing the German extreme right, was the Sixth French Army, one of the
great reserves of General Joffre, which had been steadily building up
since August 29, 1914, with its right on the Marne and its left at Betz,
in the Ourcq Valley, encamped on the western side of that stream, facing
the Second and Fourth Corps of the Germans. The strengthening of that
army from the forces at Paris was hourly, and while three or four days
before it had been felt that the Sixth French Army was too weak to be
placed in so vital a point--that it should have been supplemented with
the Ninth Army--the results justified the French generalissimo's plans
and more than justified his confidence in the British Army, or
Expeditionary Force, which faced the tip of the German right wing drive
and was encamped on a line from Villeneuve le Comte to Jouy le Chatel,
the center of the British army being at a point five miles southeast of
Coulommiers. This army was under the command of General Sir John French.
The right center of the German line was held by General von Buelow's
army, consisting of the Ninth Corps, the Tenth Corps, the Tenth Reserve
Corps, and the Guard Corps. This army also was encamped upon the Marne,
stretching from the eastern end of General Von Kluck's army as far as
Epernay. This army thus held the Forests of Vassy but was confronted by
the marshes of St. Gond.
Confronting this right center was, first of all, General Conneau's
Cavalry Corps, which was in touch with the right wing of the British
army under Sir John French. Then, holding the line from Esternay to
Courtacon lay the Fifth French Army under General d'Esperey. Full in
face of the strongest part of the German right center stood one of the
strongest of General Joffre's new reserves, the Ninth Army under General
Foch, with the marshes of St. Gond in front of him, and holding a
twenty-mile line from Esternay, past Sezanne to Camp de Mailly, a
remarkably well-equipped army, very eager for the fray.
The hastily replenished corps, largely of Saxons, which had been General
von Hausen's army, lay next to General von Buelow, a little north of
Vitry, and as it proved, a weak spot in the German line. The left center
of the attacking force was under the command of the Duke of Wuerttemberg
and extended across the whole southern end of the plain of Champagne to
the upper streams of the Aisne south of St. Menhould. The extreme left
of this advanced line was the army of the Imperial Crown Prince, holding
the old line on the Argonne to the south of Verdun. In close relation to
this advanced line, but not directly concerned with the battles of the
Marne, were the armies of the Bavarian Crown Prince, encamped in the
plateau of the Woevre, engaged largely in the task of holding open the
various lines of communication, while far to the south, in the vicinity
of the much battered little town of Mulhouse, lay the remains of the
decimated army of the Alsace campaigns under General von Heeringen.
Facing this left center came General Langle's Fourth French Army,
covering the southern side of the plain of Chalons, it lay south of
Vitry-le-Francois, and faced due north. On this army, it was expected,
the brunt of the drive would fall. At this point the French battle line
made a sharp angle, the Third French Army, commanded by General
Sarrail, occupying a base from Bar-le-Duc to Verdun. It thus faced
almost west, skirting the lower edge of the Forest of Argonne. At the
same time it was back to back with the Second French Army, which covered
the great barrier of forts from Verdun to Toul and Epinal, while the
First French Army held the line from Epinal to Belfort.